Summary: (a) Service law (ZTBL employees) ----ADBP (Re-organization and Conversion) Ordinance, 2002, S. 6; Banks (Nationalization) Act, 1974, S. 13; ZTBL Staff Regulations, 2005 (SR-2005); ZTBL (Staff) Service Regulations, 1961 (SSR-1961) Employee who voluntarily opted into SR-2005, received 100% commutation and other benefits, and reaffirmed that option through a written undertaking, cannot subsequently seek reversion to SSR-1961—Once benefits under SR-2005 were availed, reversion was barred; plea of discrimination or equitable re-opening of option was unavailable. Reliance placed on Muhammad Rafiullah v. ZTBL (2018 SCMR 598) (distinguishing employees who did not opt), and on classifications upheld in National Bank of Pakistan v. Nasim Arif Abbasi (2011 SCMR 446), State Bank of Pakistan v. Taraqiati Ali Khan (2012 SCMR 280) and I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041). (b) Service law—Options/undertakings—Irrevocability ----Circular No. HRD/45/2014 dated 11-12-2014; Undertaking dated 26-12-2014 ZTBL circular allowed transferred employees to make a final, conscious choice to remain under either SR-2005 or SSR-1961; undertakings submitted by 26-12-2014 were final—Petitioner’s undertaking to remain under SR-2005 and acknowledgment of full and final settlement (including 100% commutation) estopped him from resiling; option, once exercised and acted upon, is irrevocable. Followed Ghulam Nazik v. ZTBL (2017 PLC (C.S.) Note 89). (c) Constitutional jurisdiction—Relief against refusal to reconvert service regime ----Art. 199 of the Constitution Office Memorandum dated 28-09-2022 declining reconversion from SR-2005 to SSR-1961 did not warrant interference under Art. 199 where the record showed (i) voluntary exercise of SR-2005 option in 2008, (ii) receipt of commutation/benefits, and (iii) a subsequent, express 2014 undertaking to continue under SR-2005—Prior 10-04-2018 letter indicating conversion was lawfully held in abeyance during pending litigation and, after final adjudication, could not override petitioner’s binding undertakings and availed benefits—No enforceable right to reconversion was made out. (d) Retirement/LPR—No revival of pre-option rights ----Employees’ Leave Policy (LPR); SR-2005 Relief could not be founded on superannuation/LPR or humanitarian considerations; retirement did not revive pensionary rights under SSR-1961 once commutation under SR-2005 had been taken and final undertakings executed—Equities could not defeat binding regulatory choices and the settled Supreme Court law. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Rafiullah and others v. ZTBL (2018 SCMR 598) • National Bank of Pakistan v. Nasim Arif Abbasi (2011 SCMR 446) • State Bank of Pakistan v. Taraqiati Ali Khan (2012 SCMR 280) • I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041) • Ghulam Nazik and others v. ZTBL (2017 PLC (C.S.) Note 89) (g) Disposition — Writ petition dismissed; Impugned Office Memorandum dated 28-09-2022 upheld; no entitlement to reconversion from SR-2005 to SSR-1961.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199 Maintainability of writ petition against interlocutory orders—Scope—Both writ petitions filed by husband and wife assailing and seeking enhancement of interim maintenance allowance were held not maintainable under Art. 199 of the Constitution—Interim orders passed by Family Court are revisable only upon final adjudication—Such interlocutory orders are not amenable to constitutional jurisdiction unless shown to be without jurisdiction, perverse, or patently illegal—Neither side could point out any jurisdictional defect or illegality in the impugned order—Held, petitions were misconceived and not maintainable under Art. 199 of the Constitution. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964) ----Ss. 14(3) & 17-A---Interim maintenance---Failure to comply---Striking off defence---Family Court’s powers and consequences of non-payment---Father/petitioner failed to comply with order of interim maintenance for minor for several months despite notice by Family Court---Family Court competent under S.17-A to strike off defence and proceed ex parte---Reliance placed on Shahzad Amir Farid v. Mst. Sobia Amir Farid (2024 SCMR 1292) where Supreme Court upheld striking off of defence and imposition of costs for deliberate default in payment of interim maintenance—High Court observed that similar contumacious conduct by petitioner justified Family Court’s warning and directions. (c) Family law ----Interim maintenance---Nature and scope---Quantum---Interim maintenance allowance is provisional and subject to revision on conclusion of trial—Adequacy or otherwise of amount requires factual inquiry into financial means of parties which cannot be undertaken in writ jurisdiction---Family Court, having fixed interim maintenance on available material, committed no illegality warranting interference—Determination neither arbitrary nor capricious—Reliance placed on Minhaj Saqib v. Najam-us-Saqib (2018 CLC 506 Islamabad). (d) Family law ----Visitation rights---Conveyance allowance for visitation---Family Court’s fixation of Rs.5,000/- per visit as conveyance allowance held not arbitrary—Such allowance lies within Family Court’s discretion to facilitate minor’s meetings with non-custodial parent—No illegality found warranting interference. Cited Cases: • Shahzad Amir Farid v. Mst. Sobia Amir Farid and others, 2024 SCMR 1292 • Minhaj Saqib and others v. Najam-us-Saqib and others, 2018 CLC 506 (Islamabad) (g) Disposition— Both writ petitions dismissed as being devoid of merit and not maintainable; interim maintenance order of Family Court upheld; connected civil miscellaneous application dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9, 14, 15 & 199 Fundamental rights—Right to dignity, reputation, and freedom of movement—Post-acquittal continuation of name in police records—Scope of relief—Petitioner, acquitted under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. from FIR No. 40/2022, sought deletion of his name from all police databases and issuance of a clear Police Character Certificate (PCC)—Held, once an acquittal attains finality, no stigma or adverse inference can lawfully persist against the acquitted person—However, police may retain internal historical records of FIRs for administrative, operational, or inter-agency purposes so long as such records are not misused—Constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 cannot be invoked merely to interfere with internal record-keeping unless misuse or targeted discrimination is shown—Relief for expunction of entire record declined. (b) Police administration—Character certificate—Post-acquittal status ----Issuance of Police Character Certificate (PCC)—Obligation of police authorities—After acquittal based on complainant’s own clarification exonerating the accused, the police must issue a PCC omitting reference to the concerned FIR—Continued mention of an obsolete and unchallenged FIR in the PCC would unjustly stigmatize an exonerated citizen and offend the dignity guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution—Direction issued to authorities to issue PCC within fifteen (15) days without reference to the FIR. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 249-A—Acquittal—Finality—Once an accused is acquitted under S. 249-A Cr.P.C., and the prosecution does not challenge the decision, the acquittal attains finality and fully exonerates the accused from criminal liability—No adverse record or inference can subsist thereafter. (g) Disposition — Petition partly allowed—Request for complete expunction of FIR from police database declined—Respondents directed to issue Police Character Certificate to the Petitioner omitting reference to FIR No. 40/2022 within fifteen days.

Summary: (a) Specific performance—proof of agreement ----Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 79 Party seeking specific performance must prove a valid, duly executed agreement—Plaintiff failed to produce a formally executed agreement to sell bearing signatures of parties and attestation of marginal witnesses; receipts relied upon lacked signatures/independent attestation and were not proved in accordance with law—Claim for specific performance rightly declined. (b) Registered instruments—presumption and cancellation ----Registration Act, 1908; Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 Registered sale deeds (Nos. 1836 dated 11-07-1998 and 506 dated 31-01-2004) carry a presumption of correctness and cannot be set aside on unsubstantiated oral assertions—No cogent documentary proof of fraud/forgery/misrepresentation produced—Presumption unrebutted; cancellation refused. (c) Bona fide purchasers—protection ----Property law—general principles Subsequent purchasers shown to be purchasers for value without notice; in absence of admissible evidence establishing mala fides or notice, their titles remain protected—Mere assertions of prior payment/understanding insufficient to defeat registered title, particularly when no lis or restraining order existed at the relevant time. (d) Power of attorney—revocation—necessary party—agency coupled with interest ----Contract Act, 1872, S. 202 General power of attorney in favour of Mst. Noor Jahan was later cancelled through a registered deed; attorney was neither impleaded nor did she independently challenge revocation—No relief could be granted in her absence; further, without a duly executed sale agreement conferring an interest, the agency was not one “coupled with interest” so revocation was not barred. (e) Consequential reliefs—injunctions and money claim ----Civil procedure—consequences of failure of main relief With primary reliefs of specific performance/cancellation failing, consequential claims for permanent/mandatory injunctions and recovery of Rs. 2,362,000/- do not survive independently. (f) Appellate review—no perversity or legal infirmity ----Civil procedure—first appeal Trial Court correctly appreciated evidence and applied settled principles—Findings disclose no perversity or legal error warranting interference—Decree of dismissal upheld. (g) Disposition — Appeal dismissed; Judgment and Decree dated 27-04-2025 of the Trial Court upheld; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Maintainability—Scope of judicial review—Policy matters—Allocation of Hajj quota—Petitioner sought revision of marks awarded under the “Criteria of Evaluation” framed by Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) and allocation of Hajj quota on the basis of past experience—Contention raised that evaluation was arbitrary, discriminatory and contrary to Supreme Court directives in PLD 2014 SC 1—Held, Courts ordinarily refrain from interfering in matters falling within the executive domain, particularly where the process involves policy formulation, technical assessments, or allocation of limited national resources—Evaluation criteria had been framed by Hajj Policy Formulation Committee pursuant to directions of Supreme Court in Dossani Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2014 SC 1) and applied uniformly by MORA—No jurisdictional or procedural irregularity established—Judicial interference under Art.199 not warranted. (b) Administrative law ----Discretion of executive authority—Uniform application of policy—Validity—Petitioner failed to produce proof of company’s experience of organizing Hajj or Umrah after introduction of private Hajj scheme in 2005—Individual experience of Petitioner as Group Leader or Hajj Trainer could not substitute corporate experience mandated by policy—Grievance Committee provided personal hearing and rightly found Petitioner non-qualified under approved criteria—Record disclosed consistent and uniform application of evaluation policy—No evidence of mala fide, discrimination, or manipulation of marks—Action of Ministry held lawful. (c) Administrative law ----Infructuous petition—Time-bound policy—Hajj Policy 2020 having ceased to remain operative, petition became infructuous—Court declined to issue directions concerning allocation of future quotas on basis of expired policy. (g) Disposition— Writ petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9, 25, 35 & 199 --- Fundamental rights—Right to equality and family life—Issuance of Pakistan Origin Card (POC)—Scope—Petitioner, a Pakistani national, sought direction for issuance of POC to her foreign husband (Swiss citizen of Afghan origin)—Held, issuance of POC is not an absolute right but a conditional privilege subject to prescribed eligibility and security clearance—Where competent security agency declines clearance, NADRA has no authority to override such assessment—Court cannot interfere in executive decision based on national security considerations absent mala fides or lack of jurisdiction—No violation of fundamental rights established. (b) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000) ----Ss. 10 & 11—Issuance of Pakistan Origin Card—Conditions—Section 11 authorizes NADRA to issue POCs to prescribed classes of foreigners subject to fulfillment of criteria, terms, and security clearance—Authority lawfully refused POC when clearance was denied by security agency—NADRA acted within jurisdiction. (c) Pakistan Origin Card Rules, 2002 ----R. 13—Refusal of registration—Scope—Authority may refuse registration or issuance of POC if, in its opinion, such issuance is prejudicial to the sovereignty, integrity, security, or defense of Pakistan, or against public interest—Rule 13 validly invoked where security agency withheld clearance of applicant—Refusal neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (d) Case law distinguished ----Regional Manager NADRA Hayatabad Peshawar v. Mst. Hajira (2024 SCMR 197) and Mst. Amina v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2024 Peshawar 87) Cited precedents inapplicable since those matters involved no adverse security clearance—Current refusal based solely on non-clearance by competent authority under Rule 13. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction—Judicial restraint ----Art. 199 --- Courts cannot substitute executive discretion or reappraise security assessments made by specialized agencies unless shown to be mala fide or ultra vires—No material on record proving such infirmities—Constitutional petition not maintainable. (g) Disposition — Petition dismissed; NADRA’s refusal to issue POC to petitioner’s husband upheld; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Judicial review—Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS)—Interference in findings of specialized forum—Scope—Petitioner challenged order of Full Bench, NIRC, which had set aside Single Member’s order granting pensionary benefits—Held, High Court does not substitute its view for that of competent fora absent jurisdictional or procedural infirmity, perversity, or misreading/non-reading of evidence—Impugned Order found consistent with law and record—No ground for interference under Art. 199. (b) Contract Act, 1872 ----Ss. 2(h), 10 & 11—VSS—Contractual nature—Binding effect—Employee, after due notice and understanding of terms, voluntarily opted for VSS and received severance pay, separation bonus, medical payouts, leave encashment and housing allowance—Held, VSS is a binding contract; having accepted benefits, employee is estopped from resiling or claiming additional statutory/pensionary entitlements—Sajjad Rabbani v. PTCL (2023 PLC (C.S.) 953); State Bank of Pakistan v. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2012 SCMR 280); Muhammad Rafiullah v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Ltd. (2018 SCMR 598) relied upon—Supreme Court orders in Civil Petitions No. 68-K, 116-K to 130-K, 149-K to 153-K, 157-K to 184-K and 1101 to 1110 of 2020; and Civil Appeals Nos. 2506 to 2551 of 2016 applied. (c) Service matters ----Pension—Qualifying service—Effect of opting VSS—Where VSS terms required a minimum of 20 qualifying years for pension and employee’s credited service was 17 years as acknowledged at the time of opting VSS, subsequent plea to count additional tenure/training period or to treat six months as a full year held afterthought and contrary to accepted terms—Employee, having knowingly accepted computation in VSS, cannot later claim pension on a different footing. (d) Industrial Relations Act, 2012 ----S. 33—Redress of individual grievances—Limitation—Worker must serve written grievance within 90 days of accrual; upon employer’s inaction/decision, petition before Commission within 60 days—Employee accepted VSS in March 2008 but first approached forum in 2010 without showing any grievance notice—Held, proceedings hopelessly barred by limitation—PTCL v. Muhammad Dilpazeer Abbasi (2016 PLC 367) followed—Plea that pension is a recurring cause rejected in context of VSS-based claims. (e) Estoppel / administrative law ----Estoppel by conduct—Employees who sever service through VSS and receive negotiated consideration cannot claim later benefits extended to serving employees or revised scales/pension—Litigation must attain finality—Wali-ur-Rehman v. State Life Insurance Corporation (2006 SCMR 1079) applied. (g) Disposition— Writ petition dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Specific relief ----Specific performance—Discretion—Readiness and willingness—Subject‐matter ceased to exist—Plaintiff’s suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 06.10.2011 was dismissed by Trial Court; no appeal thereagainst—Held, dismissal attained finality—Plot already stood cancelled from Defendant’s name; no decree for performance could be passed against a non-existent subject-matter—Alleged subsequent agreement dated 05.09.2013 was denied; Plaintiff failed to prove its execution—Specific performance being discretionary, cannot be granted where Plaintiff did not establish readiness/willingness or a subsisting enforceable contract. (b) Evidence law ----Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 17 & 79—Burden and mode of proof—Admission and contradictions—Receipt of Rs.1,500,000 as earnest money under agreement dated 06.10.2011 was admitted in pleadings; Plaintiff not required to re-prove admitted facts—Defendant’s attempt in examination-in-chief to reduce admitted amount (claiming part paid to dealers) was contrary to pleadings and disregarded—Affidavit Ex.P-5 (to show further Rs.700,000) was not proved by marginal witnesses/scribe; Defendant alleged signatures obtained on blank papers under coercion—Failure to prove Ex.P-5 rendered claim to additional payment unsubstantiated. (c) Contract and restitution ----Contract Act, 1872, Ss. 73 & 74—Earnest money—Restitution—Unjust enrichment—Time value of money—Despite failure of specific performance, Plaintiff entitled to refund of admitted earnest money with appropriate enhancement as compensation/restoration—Defendant retained Rs.1,500,000 since October 2011, concealed subsequent allotment, and disposed property—Trial Court rightly quantified enhanced refund at Rs.15,000,000 to reflect depreciation/time value, consequential loss, and to prevent unjust enrichment—Principle that courts may mould relief to do complete justice in lieu of specific performance applied—PLD 2009 SC 879; PLD 2010 Karachi 68; 2017 SCMR 902; 2018 CLC 648; 2010 SCMR 1507 relied upon. (d) Appellate practice ----Finality—Scope of appeal—Plaintiff did not challenge refusal of specific performance; that part of decree attained finality—In Defendant’s appeal against enhanced refund, appellate interference unwarranted where Trial Court’s findings are reasoned, evidence-based, and consonant with equity/restitution—No perversity or illegality shown. Cited cases: • Messrs Ghulam Haider & Sons v. Abdul Wahid PLD 2009 SC 879 • Mrs. Humaira Begum v. Abdul Hameed PLD 2010 Karachi 68 • 2017 SCMR 902; 2018 CLC 648; 2010 SCMR 1507 (g) Disposition— Appeal dismissed; money decree for Rs.15,000,000 (enhanced refund of earnest money) maintained; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Exercise of constitutional jurisdiction—Cancellation of vehicle registration—Jurisdictional competence—Scope of interference—Excise and Taxation Officer (ETO), Islamabad, cancelled transfer of a Hino Truck originally registered with Motor Registering Authority (MRA), Peshawar—Held, ETO Islamabad lacked territorial jurisdiction to cancel a registration pertaining to a vehicle registered in another province—Orders passed without lawful authority were void ab initio—Exercise of such power amounted to jurisdictional excess and infringement of proprietary rights—High Court, in constitutional jurisdiction, may set aside administrative orders passed in patent lack of jurisdiction. (b) Contract Act, 1872 ----Ss. 10 & 73—Loan agreement—Default and security—Enforcement of contractual right—Respondent obtained loan of Rs.1,500,000/- and pledged vehicle documents as security under agreement dated 15.05.2009—On default, lender transferred ownership of vehicle pursuant to clause authorizing sale and possession—Held, transfer justified in terms of contract—Subsequent complaint and cancellation proceedings could not extinguish contractual rights lawfully exercised before any contrary adjudication. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 249-A & 417—Acquittal and abatement—Legal effect—Borrower’s criminal complaint against lender under Ss. 420, 468 & 471 PPC culminated in acquittal under S.249-A Cr.P.C.; subsequent appeal abated due to lender’s death—Acquittal having attained finality, no adverse inference could be drawn against lender’s ownership claim—Administrative authorities bound to respect outcome of judicial proceedings. (d) Administrative law ----Fraud—Application under S.12(2), C.P.C.—Maintainability—Petitioner’s claim that cancellation order was obtained through misrepresentation—Authorities failed to examine material record or apply judicial mind—Findings based on conjecture—Orders dated 04.08.2010, 13.09.2017, and 17.01.2018 set aside for being arbitrary and passed without lawful authority. (g) Disposition— Writ petition accepted; orders dated 04.08.2010, 13.09.2017, and 17.01.2018 declared void; Motor Registering Authority, Peshawar directed to restore ownership of vehicle in the names of legal heirs of deceased lender.

Summary: (a) Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001 ----Ss. 17(2)(ii)(b), 17(8), 21 & 24—Expiry of lease—Summary eviction—Scope of appellate review—Eviction petitions were allowed summarily by Rent Controller under s. 17(8) on ground that leases dated 07.06.2021 had expired on 15.10.2022—Held, upon expiry of tenancy, the tenant’s right stands determined and he is liable to eviction under s. 17(2)(ii)(b); summary procedure was competently invoked—Appellate Court, seized only of appeals against the eviction Order and Decree dated 01.06.2024, was required to decide the merits of ejectment on the expiry ground and could not non-suit the landlord on a fresh technical objection. PLD 2018 SC 81 applied. (b) Appellate practice ----Finality of unchallenged orders—Confines of appeal—Preliminary order dated 20.02.2024 holding the eviction petitions competently instituted was never appealed and thus attained finality—Appellate Court committed material irregularity by revisiting the settled issue of authorization while setting aside the eviction decrees. (c) Corporate authority / locus standi ----Winding-up of corporation—Vesting of assets in Government—Sufficiency of authorization—AJK Cabinet decision (21.03.2018) to wind up AKLASC and AJK Act V of 2021 repealing the 1968 Ordinance resulted in assets and liabilities vesting in AJK Government—Administrator appointed vide Notification dated 02.03.2021 expressly authorized (letter dated 21.06.2023) institution and prosecution of ejectment proceedings and nominated an authorized officer—Held, such express authorization was valid; no board resolution was required after winding-up—Appellate Court’s contrary view misconceived. (d) Procedural law ----Curable technicalities—Courts to prefer decisions on merits—Questions of authorization, where raised, are curable and should not defeat substantive rights, particularly when an express mandate exists on record—Dismissing eviction petitions on a technical ground, despite subsisting findings and documentary authorization, was unlawful. (e) Landlord & tenant ----Hold-over—Effect—After expiration of tenancy, continued possession without landlord’s consent infringes tenancy conditions and attracts eviction under s. 17(2)(ii)(b) of IRRO, 2001. PLD 2018 SC 81 reaffirmed. (g) Disposition— Writ petitions allowed; Impugned Judgment dated 07.12.2024 set aside; eviction decrees of 01.06.2024 restored/executable.