Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 141, 142(a), 142(c), 143, 175F(3), 185(3)—Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010—Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025—Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967—S. 3—Balochistan Finance Act, 2020—S. 7—Legislative competence—Provincial autonomy—Labour welfare—Excise duty on minerals—Doctrine of pith and substance—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Cooperative federalism—The Federal Constitutional Court considered whether the amendment made through S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 to S. 3 of the Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967, enhancing the rate of duty on minerals, was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan on the ground that duties of excise fall within the exclusive federal domain under Entry 44 of the Federal Legislative List. The Court held that, after the Eighteenth Amendment, legislative power is distributed such that the Federation legislates only on subjects enumerated in the Federal Legislative List, while residual subjects vest exclusively in the Provinces; labour welfare, not being part of the Federal Legislative List, is therefore a provincial subject. The Court further held that the 1967 Act, when read as a whole and especially in light of its preamble, was enacted not merely to impose a fiscal levy, but to finance measures for promoting the welfare of labour employed in the mining industry. Accordingly, although the statutory mechanism employed was the levy and collection of excise duty, the dominant constitutional purpose and essential character of the legislation lay in labour welfare, which squarely fell within provincial competence. The amendment made by the Province was, therefore, not unconstitutional merely because it touched upon a fiscal instrument also known to federal legislative entries. Constitutional law—Doctrine of pith and substance—Incidental encroachment—Validity of legislation—The Court reaffirmed that where legislative spheres appear to overlap, the true nature and character of the impugned law must be determined through the doctrine of pith and substance. A law does not become invalid merely because it incidentally trenches upon a field otherwise assigned to another legislature; only a substantial encroachment disturbing the constitutional distribution of powers may render it ultra vires. Applying that doctrine, the Court held that the impugned provincial amendment did not amount to an impermissible invasion of federal legislative authority, because its real object was to support labour welfare in the mining industry and the enhancement of the levy was only a means adopted to advance that constitutionally legitimate provincial purpose. Constitutional law—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Same subject viewed from different constitutional aspects—The Court also invoked the doctrine of double aspect legislation and explained that a single subject may, in one aspect and for one purpose, fall within federal competence, and in another aspect and for another purpose, fall within provincial competence. Thus, while the levy of excise duty as a fiscal subject may ordinarily fall within the federal domain, the same measure, when examined from the standpoint of labour welfare and public interest in relation to mine workers, may validly operate within the provincial sphere. In such circumstances, both legislative aspects may co-exist in constitutional harmony, and the Court should prefer an interpretation that sustains rather than destroys legislation enacted by democratically elected bodies. Federalism—Post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional structure—Cooperative federalism—The Court emphasized that the post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional arrangement broadens provincial autonomy and reflects a commitment to participatory and cooperative federalism. The Federation and Provinces are not to be viewed as functioning in isolated compartments; rather, constitutional interpretation should favour harmonious operation of their respective powers. A rigid or formalistic reading that disregards the practical interaction of fiscal measures and welfare objectives would be inconsistent with the constitutional design. The impugned amendment, therefore, was held to represent a lawful and harmonious exercise of legislative power in furtherance of a legitimate provincial objective. Case references—Prafulla v. Bank of Commerce (AIR 1947 PC 28); Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (1982 CanLII 55 (SCC)); Sui Northern Gas Pipelines v. S.K. Pvt Limited (2025 SCMR 570); DG Khan Cement v. The Province of Punjab (2014 PTD 478); Pakistan College of Law v. University of the Punjab (W.P. No. 45178 of 2017, Lahore High Court). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the amendment introduced by S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 did not fall outside the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan. The petition was accordingly dismissed, leave was refused, and no order as to costs was made.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) — Ss. 25A, 25D — Determination and revision of customs value — Interpretation of “any person” — Scope of revisional power of Director General (Customs Valuation). Held, the phrase “any person” in s. 25A(1) is of widest amplitude and includes local manufacturers of goods identical or similar to imported goods under valuation. Such manufacturers are not strangers to the process and may provide relevant material to assist in fair determination of customs value; exclusion of local manufacturers from that expression is unwarranted. The subsequent insertion of the words “a local manufacturer” in s. 2(pa) by the Finance Act 2018 merely clarified existing law and overcame the restrictive interpretation adopted by the High Court. (b) — Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015, distinction from customs valuation — Remedies compared. Anti-dumping investigations under the 2015 Act address injury caused by goods exported at “dumped” prices below their normal value in the exporting country, whereas customs valuation under ss. 25–25D seeks to ascertain the true transaction value for duty assessment and to prevent under-invoicing. These are parallel but distinct regimes; resort to the National Tariff Commission is no substitute for participation in proceedings under s. 25A. (c) — Local manufacturers — Standing. A local manufacturer affected by under-invoiced imports may validly make a reference to the Director of Customs Valuation under s. 25A and furnish evidence such as price lists, catalogues, comparative market data, or production-cost information to aid determination. Their role is facilitative and does not convert the valuation process into protectionism. (d) — Revision under s. 25D — Extent of power. Revisional jurisdiction of the Director General (Customs Valuation) under s. 25D is broader than that under s. 115 C.P.C.; it is not confined to mere remand. The DG-CV may, on revision, revise or rescind the determination made under s. 25A, and may substitute, modify, increase or decrease the assessed customs value on the basis of material available, provided he acts within law. The High Court erred in holding that the DG-CV could only set aside and remand. (e) Statutory interpretation — Word “any” — Scope. The expression “any person” ordinarily denotes universality and is to be construed broadly unless the context compels restriction; inclusion of local manufacturers is therefore consistent with the object of s. 25A to ensure accurate and transparent valuation. ------ Disposition — Appeals allowed; impugned judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 19-03-2018 set aside to the extent inconsistent herewith. Civil Miscellaneous Applications for impleadment and stay dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) ----S. 179(3) & proviso; S. 2(s)—Limitation for passing order-in-original—Extension of time—Collector’s jurisdiction—Scope. Show cause notice was issued on 27-04-2020 alleging smuggling under S. 2(s) of the Act; order-in-original was passed on 10-08-2020. Tribunal (Referee Member concurring with Member Judicial) and High Court found the order time-barred. Supreme Court held that under the proviso to S. 179(3), where proceedings invoke S. 2(s), the order-in-original must be passed within 30 days of the show-cause notice and no extension is permissible. Collector’s self-granted extension without recorded reasons had no legal effect. Both Collector (Adjudication) and Tribunal wrongly presumed a 90-day period applicable to S. 2(s) matters. The 30-day limitation is absolute, leaving no discretion for extension. (b) Statutory construction—Mandatory time-limits in fiscal statutes. Court reiterated that limitation provisions in taxing laws are mandatory; administrative convenience cannot justify deviation. Once the statutory period lapses, adjudication stands void ab initio. The Collector’s purported extension was ultra vires, and the order-in-original passed beyond limitation was invalid. (c) Jurisdiction—Failure to act within prescribed time. Passing an order beyond the statutory time limit deprives the adjudicating authority of jurisdiction; the defect goes to the root and cannot be cured by consent or subsequent validation. Disposition: Petition dismissed—Leave to appeal refused—Judgment of Islamabad High Court upholding Tribunal’s view maintained.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969) ----S. 169(5)—Claim to sale proceeds of confiscated goods—Prerequisites—Held, entitlement to sale proceeds of seized goods arises only after adjudication or appellate declaration that the goods were not liable to confiscation—Petitioner, without obtaining such declaration, directly claimed the proceeds of confiscated “black tea” under S.169(5)—Such claim was premature and not maintainable—To invoke S.169(5), the claimant must first establish ownership and wrongful confiscation through proper adjudication or court proceedings; absent such finding, no right to proceeds accrues. (b) Customs law—Confiscation and sale proceeds ----S. 168, S. 169(5), Ss. 156(1)(8)(89), 201—Once goods are lawfully confiscated under adjudication (Order-in-Original No.123/2011, dated 19.08.2011), the sale proceeds remain property of the State unless later adjudged otherwise—Findings in Custom Reference No. 27-P of 2018 and dismissal of subsequent Civil Appeal No.176 of 2020 upheld the confiscation; thus, petitioner’s ownership claim stood negated. Held: Petitioner failed to obtain requisite declaration that the goods were not liable to confiscation; claim for sale proceeds under S.169(5) was misconceived and premature. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused—Petition dismissed. Statutes and Provisions Cited: • Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969), Ss. 2(s), 16, 156(1)(8)(89), 157, 168, 169(5), 201. • Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950, Ss. 3(1) & 3(3). Result: Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) ----S. 36(1), (2) & (3)–––Time limitation for passing order after issuance of show cause notice–––Scope and effect–––Mandatory nature of prescribed period–––Where statute provides that order-in-original shall be made within 120 days of issuance of show cause notice, extendable only by 60 days for recorded reasons, any order made thereafter would be time-barred–––No extension beyond 180 days permissible under law–––In present case, show cause notices were issued on 30.06.2000 and 12.12.2001, whereas orders-in-original were passed on 02.02.2001 and 20.04.2002 respectively–––Both orders made beyond statutory period–––Held, orders-in-original were barred by limitation and had no legal effect–––Provisions of S.36(3) being mandatory, non-compliance rendered proceedings void ab initio–––Larger Bench judgment in Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore (2025 SCMR 1280) applied. (b) Central Excises Act, 1944 ----S. 33(3)–––Adjudication proceedings–––Time limit of 45 days for deciding matter after issuance of show cause notice–––Order passed beyond prescribed period–––Validity–––Held, order-in-original passed after expiry of statutory period was time-barred and without jurisdiction–––Observance of limitation is mandatory to ensure certainty and fairness in fiscal adjudication. (c) Fiscal statutes–––Mandatory nature of limitation provisions ----Interpretation–––Timeframes in taxing statutes must be strictly construed–––Non-compliance with statutory timelines deprives the authority of jurisdiction to act–––Corrigenda issued after expiry of limitation could not revive jurisdiction or cure the lapse–––Held, consequence of failure to pass order within prescribed period is nullity of entire proceedings–––Subsequent proceedings and demands, being consequential, also stood annulled. Cited Case: • Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore (2025 SCMR 1280). Disposition: Appeals allowed–––Impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court set aside–––Orders-in-original declared time-barred and without lawful authority.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969— —Ss. 32, 80, 81 & 179—Jurisdiction—Recovery of short-levied taxes—Scope— Customs authorities retain jurisdiction, within five-year limitation, to recover sales tax and advance income tax at the import stage, even where discovered after clearance of goods due to wrongly granted exemption. Insertion of “taxes” in S.32 by Finance Act, 2014 and “including recovery” in S.6(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by Finance Act, 2015, coupled with omission of S.11 Sales Tax Act by Finance Act, 2024, show legislative intent to vest post-clearance recovery jurisdiction in Customs. Sections 80 and 81 envisage assessment not concluded at clearance stage; S.179 provides adjudicatory machinery. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990— —S. 6(1)—Collection and recovery at import stage—Extent— Import-stage sales tax is charged, paid, enforced and recovered in the same manner and time as customs duty. With omission of general recovery jurisdiction of Inland Revenue (earlier S.11), S.6(1) now stands as sole operative provision, incorporating Customs Act machinery for collection and recovery of sales tax at import. (c) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001— —S. 148(5) & (6)—Advance income tax at import stage— Sub-sections (5) and (6) synchronize collection of advance income tax with customs duty, borrowing Customs Act provisions “so far as they relate to collection”. Scheme envisages that Customs may recover unpaid advance tax discovered through post-clearance audit. (d) Fiscal statutes—Amendments—Retrospective application— Amendments by Finance Acts 2012, 2014 and 2015 to Customs Act and Sales Tax Act are procedural; they regulate forum and machinery for collection but do not create new liabilities. Being procedural, they apply retrospectively unless expressly excluded. (e) Constitutional law— —Art. 199—High Court jurisdiction— Sindh High Court erred in holding Customs lacked jurisdiction to recover import-stage sales tax and income tax post clearance; impugned judgments set aside. Dissent (Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J.) (f) Customs Act, 1969—Sales Tax Act, 1990—Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Jurisdiction— Held, Customs’ jurisdiction limited to import stage only. Post-clearance recovery of sales tax or income tax lies exclusively with Inland Revenue authorities under respective statutes. Amendments inserting “taxes” (Customs Act) or “including recovery” (Sales Tax Act) do not confer adjudicatory powers to Customs absent express conferment. Import-stage jurisdiction ends once goods are cleared under S.80 of Customs Act; subsequent proceedings must be by Inland Revenue. Civil Petitions dismissed. Cited Cases Gulistan Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 393 (Lahore High Court) (distinguished) Banwari Lal v. Mahesh AIR 1918 PC 188 Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan PLD 1984 SC 289 Other jurisprudence on court-fees and jurisdiction referred for analogy. ----Disposition: By majority (Afridi, C.J. and Shakeel Ahmad, J.)—Petitions converted into appeals—Allowed—Sindh High Court judgments/orders set aside—Customs authorities declared competent to recover short-levied sales tax and advance income tax post-clearance. Dissent (Siddiqui, J.)—Leave refused—Customs jurisdiction confined to import stage; post-clearance recovery lies with Inland Revenue.

Summary: Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 179(3), second proviso & 179(4)---Show Cause Notice, issuance of---Collector, Collectorate of Customs (Adjudication) adjudicate a matter---Limitation---Time-bound proceeding, non-observance of---Effect---In the present case, admittedly, the Show Cause Notice was issued in 2014 (i.e. prior to amendment of Finance Act 2019); proceedings commenced on the basis of the Show Cause Notice before the Collector, Collectorate of Customs (Adjudication), who was under an obligation to decide the case within 120 days (as the law then was)---Such period was subsequently reduced to 90 days via Finance Act 2019---Show Cause Notice was issued on 05.12.2014 leaving the officer to decide the case within a period of 120 days in addition to adjournment sought in terms of 2nd proviso to section 179(3)---As per record (first/title page) the order-in-original was shown to have been passed as on 19th of May 2015, whereas at the end of the said order-in-original it was shown to have been signed on 4th of June, 2015---In counting the prescribed period in terms of section 179(3) (as it then was) a period of 120 days and another period of 30 days of adjournment i.e. 150 days were available to decide the case within the frame of section 179(3)---The order ought to have been passed on or before 4th of May of 2015---However, such order was shown to have been passed either on 4th June, 2015 or on 19th of May, 2015---Surprisingly, record (a letter) showed to have extended a request for extension of time in terms of section 179(4) of the Customs Act, 1969, however, alleged extension was dated 20th of May 2015---The alleged extension was shown to have been passed much after the limit prescribed in terms of section 179(3), i.e. 150 days---Then (if this was done on 20th of May 2015), how an order could have been passed on 19th of May 2015 as disclosed on the title page of the customs order-in- original---Said time-bound proceeding in terms of sections 179(3) and 179(4) was mandatory---Since, in terms of the calculation/computation, the order-in-original was passed much beyond the time limits and even the alleged extension was much beyond the limit prescribed, (as it ought to have been extended, if at all, within the time frame), it left the decision i.e. order-in-original as time barred and consequently the proceedings under the aforesaid show cause notice could not continue any more---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order of the High Court---Petition was converted into appeal and was allowed accordingly. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427; Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax 2018 SCMR 1474 and Messers Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore and others v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore and others 2025 SCMR 1280 ref. Sh. Zafar ul Islam, Advocate Supreme Court along with Tanveer Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Izhar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Ali Hassan Raza, D.C. Customs for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 ---- Ss. 179(3) & 179(4)---- Adjudication proceedings—Limitation for passing order-in-original—Mandatory nature of time frame—Effect of delay—Show cause notice issued on 05.12.2014 under S. 179(3), Customs Act, 1969—Adjudicating officer was legally bound to pass the order-in-original within 120 days, with a maximum 30-day extension under second proviso to S. 179(3), making 150 days in total—Order-in-original dated either 19.05.2015 (title page) or 04.06.2015 (signature page), both falling outside the prescribed time frame—Extension under S. 179(4) allegedly granted on 20.05.2015, was also beyond limitation—Held, entire adjudication proceedings rendered time-barred—Provisions of S. 179(3) and 179(4) are mandatory and non-compliance vitiates proceedings. (b) Limitation—Mandatory statutory timelines—Interpretation by Supreme Court ---- Time-bound adjudication under fiscal statutes—Non-compliance results in nullity—Supreme Court reaffirmed that adjudication timelines under Customs Act, 1969 are mandatory—Cited and affirmed larger bench ruling in Messrs Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax (2025 SCMR 1280), which upheld earlier precedent in Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Mohammad Din (2017 SCMR 1427)—Provisions mandating time-limited adjudication must be strictly followed—Late extensions or post-facto regularizations cannot cure jurisdictional defect. (c) Fiscal Law—Adjudication under show cause notices—Invalidity due to lapse of limitation --- Adjudication orders passed beyond statutory time—Invalidity and consequences—Where adjudicating officer fails to conclude proceedings within prescribed time under S. 179(3) Customs Act, and extension (if any) is granted after expiry, the resulting adjudication order is without lawful authority—Proceedings under show cause notice abate—Held, order-in-original passed beyond limitation period was unlawful and proceedings void. (d) Disposition Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Impugned order of Lahore High Court set aside—Order-in-original held to be time-barred and proceedings under show cause notice declared invalid—Stay application (CMA No. 5968/2025) disposed of accordingly. Cited Cases: Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Super Asia Mohammad Din, 2017 SCMR 1427 Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, 2018 SCMR 1474 Messrs Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, 2025 SCMR 1280

Summary: (Against order dated 15.10.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in Customs Reference No. 1 of 2015). (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 74, 179 & 224---Extension of time limit---Board of Revenue---Jurisdiction---Authorities were aggrieved of order passed by Customs Appellate Tribunal in favour of respondent / importer that time limits imposed by section 179(3) of Customs Act, 1969, were breached and extension in time granted by Federal Board of Revenue under section 179(4) of Customs Act, 1969---Validity---There is difference between a power of extension to allow doing of requisite act or thing within an "appropriate" time period on the one hand, and a power to extend a time-limit in "exceptional circumstances" on the other---Latter expression is more restricted than the former term---Power of the Board to grant an extension under section 179(4) of Customs Act, 1969, is much narrower and more circumscribed---Provision of section 74 of Customs Act, 1969, is a general provision, applying to "any" act or thing required to be done within a specified timeframe, whereas section 179(4) of Customs Act, 1969, moves within a much more circumscribed locus, relatable only to matters of adjudication within the four corners of the section itself---Power to extend a time-limit under section 179(4) of Customs Act, 1969, must be understood and applied while keeping in mind that timelines set out in section 179(3) of Customs Act, 1969, are mandatory and not directory---There was nothing on record that could indicate that there was a proper (or, indeed, any) consideration of the factors involved---Extension granted by the Board was an unlawful exercise of power conferred---Supreme Court was not persuaded from involving of large amount of taxes and duties, as if such a large amount was at stake it behooved the Collector to act speedily and had made his order in a timely manner, if that did not happen, then it was for the State to bear the burden and consequences of such tardiness---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427; 2017 PTD 1756; Wak Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue C.A. 634 of 2018 and Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal 2019 SCMR 1735 ref. (b) Public functionaries--- ----Statutory powers, exercise of---Principle---Statutory power can only be exercised in terms as granted and for the purposes granted---Terms of grant may include conditions and limitations which have to be complied with and applied as required even if grant is ostensibly in open and untrammelled form. Sultan Mahmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video-link, Lahore). Rizwan Basharat, Collector (Faisalabad) for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 26th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 –– S. 179(3) & (4) –– Time limits for adjudication –– Mandatory nature –– Extension of time only in “exceptional circumstances” –– Extension granted without proper justification –– Order-in-original held void –– The adjudicating authority passed the order-in-original beyond the mandatory 120-day period prescribed under S. 179(3), Customs Act, 1969. Although an extension was sought under S. 179(4), the Board granted it without recording any "exceptional circumstances" as required by law. The Supreme Court held that such power to extend adjudication deadlines is narrow and conditional upon exceptional circumstances. Mere reference to the revenue involved or internal delays does not suffice. The Collector's failure to act in a timely manner could not be cured retroactively by an unlawful extension. Consequently, the order-in-original was invalid and rightly set aside by the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. Cited cases: Collector of Sales Tax v. Super Asia 2017 SCMR 1427; Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal 2019 SCMR 1735; Wak Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Larger Bench judgment dated 14.05.2025). (b) Administrative Law –– Exercise of statutory discretion –– Power must be exercised strictly within legal bounds –– Board’s extension order invalid due to lack of application of mind –– Subjective satisfaction not sufficient –– The Court reiterated that statutory powers must be exercised within the express limits of the statute. The Board's extension under S. 179(4) was not preceded by any objective inquiry or justification regarding “exceptional circumstances.” Reliance on subjective satisfaction or vague justifications such as revenue stakes renders the act ultra vires. No material was placed on record to establish that the Board applied its mind to the requirement of "exceptional circumstances." Cited cases: Super Asia 2017 SCMR 1427 (reaffirmed in Larger Bench ruling of 14.05.2025); Wak Ltd. (CA 634/2018). (c) Customs Act, 1969 –– S. 224 –– Extension of time limits by “aggrieved party” –– Inapplicable to Collector –– Limited applicability of condonation provision –– S. 224 of the Customs Act permits condonation of delay by the Board, but only upon application by an “aggrieved party.” The Court clarified that the Collector, acting as the adjudicating authority, could not claim to be an aggrieved party under this provision. Therefore, S. 224 was not applicable, and the Collector’s reliance on the concept of condonation was misplaced. (d) Interpretation of tax statutes –– Harmonious reading with Sales Tax and Excise laws –– Time bars interpreted strictly –– Adjudication orders passed after lapse of limitation are without legal effect –– The Court applied the principles laid down in indirect tax jurisprudence, including the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and Federal Excise Act, 2005, to the Customs Act. The time limits in S. 179(3) were interpreted as mandatory, consistent with interpretations under S. 74 of the Sales Tax Act. Late adjudication, even if technically extended, must satisfy statutory thresholds and cannot be justified post facto without proper legal basis. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused. Petition dismissed. The order-in-original under Section 179, Customs Act, 1969, was held unlawful and void due to lack of lawful extension. High Court judgment upholding Appellate Tribunal’s decision affirmed.