Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss. 119, 122, 126 & 127---Central Depositories Act (XIX of 1997), Ss. 3, 5 & 11---Rectification of register of members---Central Depository System---Distinction between company’s register of members and central depository register---Scope of statutory bar under S.11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997---Held, that the register of members maintained by a company under S.119 of the Companies Act, 2017 and the central depository register maintained by the Central Depository Company were distinct statutory records serving different legal functions---Section 11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997 barred the Court from ordering rectification of the central depository register but did not prohibit rectification of the company’s own register of members---Overriding effect under S.3 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997 did not impliedly repeal or override the remedy under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017, as both statutes could harmoniously coexist within their respective fields---Right to seek rectification of the company’s register under S.126 remained intact---Petition under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017 was therefore maintainable notwithstanding the bar contained in S.11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997. Cited Cases: • Packages Limited through its General Manager and others v. Muhammad Maqbool and others PLD 1991 SC 258 • Muhammad Mohsin Ghuman and others v. Government of Punjab through Home Secretary, Lahore and others 2013 SCMR 85 • Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investigation Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218 (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 2(10), 3 & Art.120---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Rectification of register of members---Whether proceedings under S.126 constituted a “suit”---Article 120 of Limitation Act, 1908---Applicability---Held, that proceedings under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017 were initiated by application/petition and not by plaint---Although such proceedings involved determination of civil rights and were before the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction, neither the Companies Act, 2017 nor the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997 treated them as a suit---Expression “suit” under the Limitation Act, 1908 had a specific and limited meaning and was expressly distinguishable from an appeal and an application---Proceedings under S.126 could not be treated as a suit merely because they concerned property or civil rights---Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was therefore not applicable. Cited Cases: • Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1 • Kishan Chand & Co. v. Nur Muhammad PLD 1949 Lahore 30 (c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Rectification of register of members---Application for rectification---Residuary limitation---Applicability of Art.181---Held, that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply to petitions/applications under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017---Preamble of the Limitation Act, 1908 referred to suits and appeals generally but only to “certain applications”, showing that the Act did not prescribe limitation for every conceivable application before Courts---Article 181 was historically confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and, by extension in limited contexts, to arbitration proceedings owing to the special provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940---Proceedings for rectification of register under S.126 were not applications putting into motion the machinery of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the sense contemplated by Article 181---High Court’s reliance on Article 181 for dismissing petitions under S.126 as time-barred was not justified. Cited Cases: • Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. AIR 1933 PC 63 • Baimanekbai v. Manekji Kavasji 1880 ILR 7 Bom 213 • Naeem Finance Ltd. and another v. Bashir Ahmad Rafiqui, Administrator, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. and another PLD 1971 SC 8 • M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through the Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad PLD 1972 SC 123 • Brother Steel Mills Ltd. and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and 14 others PLD 1996 SC 543 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Art.181---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss.37 & 41---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.126---Applicability of residuary Article 181 beyond Code of Civil Procedure---Distinction between arbitration proceedings and company rectification proceedings---Held, that the applicability of Article 181 to applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940 rested upon the special statutory scheme of Ss.37 and 41 of the Arbitration Act, which applied the Limitation Act and the Code of Civil Procedure to arbitration proceedings before Court---Such reasoning could not automatically be extended to proceedings under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017---No inconsistency existed between Naeem Finance and Imam-ud-Din Janjua, as both operated in different statutory contexts---Article 181 was not to be applied to company register rectification proceedings merely because it had been applied to certain arbitration applications. Cited Cases: • Naeem Finance Ltd. and another v. Bashir Ahmad Rafiqui, Administrator, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. and another PLD 1971 SC 8 • M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through the Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad PLD 1972 SC 123 • Mrs. Naila Naeem Younus and others v. Messrs Indus Services Limited through Chief Executive and others 2022 SCMR 1171 (e) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.29(2)---Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, Rr.5 & 7---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.6---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.509(4)---Proceedings under Companies Act---Petition and application---Special law---Whether Limitation Act applicable through S.29(2)---Held, that the Companies Act, 2017 was a special law and was self-contained in respect of limitation for several company proceedings, prescribing timelines in some provisions and omitting them in others---Under R.5 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, all applications except interlocutory applications were to be made by petition---A petition under S.126 for rectification of register was therefore not an “application” within the meaning of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908---Since proceedings under S.126 were neither suit, appeal nor application within the meaning of S.29(2), the Limitation Act, 1908 could not be invoked to prescribe a limitation period where the Companies Act, 2017 itself had not done so. Cited Cases: • Government of Canada v. Aronson 1989 2 All ER 1025 • A v. B (Investigatory Powers Tribunal: Jurisdiction) 2009 UKSC 12 • Dr. Muhammad Amin v. President Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited 2010 SCMR 1458 (f) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss.126 & 127---Rectification of register---Fraudulent entries or omissions---No prescribed limitation period---Reason for legislative omission---Equitable and public-law character of register rectification---Held, that absence of a statutory limitation period for proceedings under S.126 was consistent with the equitable nature of the Court’s jurisdiction in register rectification matters---Section 126 was designed not merely to resolve private disputes but to preserve the accuracy and integrity of the company register, which determined legal ownership, governance rights and corporate control---Where fraudulent or unjustified entries were alleged, imposing a limitation period at the threshold could reward concealment and obstruct the Court’s power under S.126(4) to refer matters for adjudication of offences under S.127---Fraud may remain concealed for years and the wrongdoer could not be permitted to take advantage of such concealment---Rectification jurisdiction protected proprietary rights in shares and membership interests, and an inaccurate register could not be allowed to persist merely because an ordinary civil limitation period was invoked. Cited Case: • In Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd. 2008 EWHC 2810 (g) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Rectification of register---Delay---Doctrine of laches---Equitable discretion of Court---No fixed limitation period---Effect of stale claims---Held, that although no statutory limitation period applied to proceedings under S.126, the Court was still bound to examine delay, neglect and stale claims through the equitable doctrine of laches---Court could consider the length of delay, reasons for delay, late discovery of facts, ongoing investigations, complexity of corporate transactions, regulatory hurdles, prejudice to opposite parties and conduct of the parties---Where respondent’s fraud, concealment, misrepresentation or obstruction prevented timely proceedings, the respondent could be estopped from relying upon delay---However, party seeking rectification had to approach the Court before rights of innocent third parties accrued, and must provide a satisfactory and credible explanation for any apparent delay---No fixed upper or lower time limit could be judicially created, as that would amount to legislation---Each case had to be assessed on its own facts, and in appropriate cases avoidable delay could disentitle a party from equitable relief. Cited Cases: • Archbold v. Scully 1861 9 HL 360 • THG Plc v. Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd. 2026 UKSC 6 • Shoreham Hills, LLC v. Sagaponack Dream House LLC 2020 NY Slip Op 50326 • Poiss v. Lambert Health Authority 1978 2 All ER 125 • Verrall v. Great Yarmouth Borough Council 1981 QB 202 • Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd LR 5 PC 239 (h) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Rectification of register---Allegations of fraud---Summary dismissal on limitation---Remand---Held, that petitions under S.126 involving allegations of fraud raised complex and delicate questions of law and fact and ought not to have been dismissed summarily on the basis of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908---In one matter, although the High Court had also examined merits, such findings were considerably influenced by its opinion on limitation and were recorded without affording parties full opportunity to present their best case---Matters required fresh adjudication after hearing all parties and permitting them to present their complete case. Disposition: Leave petitions, i.e. CPLA No.559 of 2025 and CPLA No.2624 of 2025, were converted into appeals and allowed along with Civil Appeal No.125 of 2025; impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court were set aside; matters were remitted to the High Court for fresh decision after affording each party fair opportunity of hearing; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas respondent No.1 instituted suit on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years alleging fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Supreme Court held that unexplained delay in challenging a mutation renders the claim legally untenable---Respondent remained completely silent for more than two decades and took no step to question validity of mutation or underlying sale transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---A person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Law of limitation is designed to bring certainty and finality to legal relations and prevent reopening of stale claims---Suit was clearly and hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and 10 others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and 4 others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraud alleged in respect of mutation/sale transaction---Fraud vitiates all solemn acts, but must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved---Supreme Court reiterated that fraud vitiates solemn acts and any instrument, deed, judgment or decree obtained through fraud is a nullity, but allegation of fraud cannot be accepted on mere assertion---Fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Question of fraud involves finding of fact regarding conduct of party concerned---Even where fraud is alleged in relation to an instrument or transaction, party challenging such instrument is required to seek cancellation within prescribed limitation period---Where document is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act and suit seeking declaration/cancellation must be filed within three years under Art.91 of Limitation Act from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Respondent failed to produce convincing evidence of fraud and remained silent for more than two decades; plea of fraud could not be used to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Proof of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Independent and reliable evidence required---Respondent alleged that Mutation No.684 dated 15.03.1980 was procured through fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, held that respondent failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation through independent evidence---Supreme Court held that such allegations remained unsubstantiated and were rightly disbelieved by subordinate Courts---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day and identifying witnesses were the same, which negatived respondent’s stance that he had not visited office of Patwari on relevant date---Respondent remained confined to his solitary statement and did not produce independent witnesses sufficient to dislodge documentary proof brought on record. (d) Revenue record---- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Presumption of correctness---Jamabandi---Revenue entries remaining unquestioned for decades---Supreme Court held that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they have remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights have subsequently accrued on their basis---Once mutation is duly sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it forms part of regular revenue record and carries statutory presumption of truth unless rebutted by strong and cogent evidence---Mutation in question remained part of revenue record for more than two decades without challenge---Respondent produced no convincing evidence to rebut presumption attached to revenue entries---Courts below were justified in giving due weight to revenue record and holding that respondent failed to discharge heavy burden required to displace statutory presumption. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (e) Mutation---- ----Procedural irregularity in attestation---Effect on proved sale transaction---Mutation entries do not themselves create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, technical defects in mutation proceedings cannot invalidate transaction---Supreme Court held that even if certain procedural irregularities in attestation of mutation were assumed, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and respondent had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently dismissed suit after proper appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, holding that sale transaction was genuine, fraud was not proved and suit was barred by limitation---Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits---Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into third court of fact---High Court reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, material illegality or perversity in findings of subordinate Courts---Such approach was inconsistent with settled limits of revisional jurisdiction and amounted to impermissible interference with concurrent findings of fact. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim, etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Difference between misreading/non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---High Court’s limits in revision---Supreme Court reiterated that scope of appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be confused---Revisional Court cannot upset finding of fact merely because another view appears more plausible---Interference is permissible only where finding is result of misreading, non-reading, perverse or absurd appraisal of material evidence, jurisdictional error, illegality or serious miscarriage of justice---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and same conclusion has been reached concurrently, revisiting evidence in second appeal or revision to draw another conclusion would offend doctrine of finality---High Court cannot independently reassess evidence to supplant its own conclusion unless findings below are legally flawed. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (h) Revenue record / Limitation---- ----Third-party rights and finality of long-standing entries---Mutation remaining incorporated for decades---Effect---Supreme Court held that where revenue entries have remained unchallenged for prolonged period and third-party rights have intervened, challenges to such entries must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained---In present case, during long interregnum of over twenty-two years, third-party rights had come into existence, further strengthening need to uphold sanctity and finality of long-standing revenue entries---Belated suit challenging mutation could not be permitted to unsettle settled rights. Disposition: Appeals were allowed; judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court in Civil Revision No.410 of 2017 was set aside; concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored; civil suit filed by respondent No.1 was dismissed; no order as to costs; connected CMAs No.12138 and 12580 of 2019 and CMA No.2581 of 2022 were disposed of as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.184(3), 175E(3) & 188---Original constitutional jurisdiction---Final judgment of Supreme Court---Attempt to reopen concluded litigation---Maintainability---Held, that original constitutional jurisdiction under Art.184(3), and after constitutional reconfiguration Art.175E(3), is not an appellate, revisional, supervisory or collateral review jurisdiction over final judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in appeal and affirmed in review---Such jurisdiction remains conditioned upon a question of public importance with reference to enforcement of fundamental rights and cannot be invoked to create a horizontal appeal against concluded Supreme Court adjudication. Cited Cases: • Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416 • Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 997 • District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 401 (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.184(3)---Public importance and enforcement of fundamental rights---Individual grievance---Land acquisition compensation dispute---Held, that public importance and enforcement of fundamental rights are jurisdictional preconditions for invoking original constitutional jurisdiction---A private dispute concerning compensation arising out of land acquisition proceedings, already adjudicated through the judicial hierarchy, does not become a matter of public importance merely because a party seeks to reopen concluded litigation. (c) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.188---Review jurisdiction---Finality of judgments---Scope---Held, that Art.188 provides the constitutionally recognized corrective mechanism after final adjudication by the Supreme Court, subject to law and rules---Once appellate remedy and review have been exhausted, a party cannot indirectly reopen the same controversy through a fresh constitutional petition under Art.184(3) or Art.175E(3)---Finality of judgments is indispensable to administration of justice and institutional certainty. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473 • Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582 (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.175E(3)---Federal Constitutional Court---Effect of constitutional amendment---No appellate supervision over concluded Supreme Court judgments---Held, that even after incorporation of Art.175E(3), constitutional provisions of similar nature must be construed harmoniously within the structural framework of the Constitution---Nothing in Art.175E(3) vests the Federal Constitutional Court with supervisory, appellate or review jurisdiction over final judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in appeal and affirmed in review---The provision cannot be converted into a collateral appellate mechanism. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.184(3)---Original jurisdiction---Not a substitute for appeal or review---Held, that Art.184(3) is extraordinary in nature and designed for cases involving systemic or structural violations of fundamental rights requiring immediate constitutional scrutiny---It is not meant for re-agitating matters already determined through regular judicial hierarchy, nor for redress of individual grievances arising out of concluded litigation. (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.188 read with Order XXVI of Supreme Court Rules, 1980---Review petition against order dismissing C.M. Appeal and sustaining office objection---Maintainability---Held, that where the office had objected to the maintainability of a constitutional petition under Art.184(3), and the C.M. Appeal against such objection had been dismissed on the ground that the petition did not involve public importance or enforcement of fundamental rights, a further review petition seeking to reopen the concluded controversy was not maintainable. (g) Constitutional Law---- ----Doctrine of finality---Perpetual litigation disfavoured---Held, that the Constitution does not envisage perpetual litigation; judicial discipline requires a terminus to adjudication---Permitting concluded Supreme Court judgments to be reopened through Art.184(3) or Art.175E(3) after dismissal of review would render Art.188 redundant and destabilize the doctrine of finality. (h) Constitutional Law---- ----Curative review---Exceptional jurisdiction---No general right to reopen concluded judgments---Held, that reliance upon the concept of curative review could not assist the petitioner where no general curative jurisdiction exists to permit reopening of concluded judgments as a matter of course---Exceptional constitutional proceedings in distinct circumstances do not create a routine collateral remedy against final adjudication. Disposition: Review petition was dismissed as not maintainable; order dismissing C.M. Appeal and sustaining office objection to the constitutional petition under Art.184(3) was maintained.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 115---Estoppel of tenant---Tenant denying title of landlord---Scope---Respondents instituted suit for recovery of produce and ejectment against petitioners, which was decreed by Trial Court and such decree was maintained by appellate, revisional and constitutional forums---Supreme Court held that where a person enters into possession as tenant, he is estopped from disputing title of landlord so long as he continues to retain possession under tenancy---Doctrine embodied in Art.115 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is founded on public policy and prevents tenant from approbating and reprobating simultaneously---Tenant who subsequently asserts ownership rights cannot retain possession as tenant and, at same time, deny landlord’s title. Cited Case: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 (b) Landlord and tenant---- ----Tenant asserting ownership/proprietary rights---Duty to first surrender possession---Tenant disputing proprietary title of landlord must first vacate and surrender possession and thereafter may contest his alleged title before competent forum---Law does not permit tenant to continue possession under tenancy while simultaneously setting up hostile title against landlord---If tenant ultimately succeeds in establishing his proprietary rights, he may enforce decree according to law with all its consequences. Cited Case: • Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad deceased through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068 (c) Landlord and tenant---- ----Agreement to sell or alleged purchase by tenant---Effect on tenancy---Mere assertion of ownership on basis of agreement to sell or alleged acquisition of proprietary rights does not defeat maintainability of ejectment proceedings---Until tenant establishes his claim before competent Court, landlord continues to enjoy status of owner/landlord and relationship between parties remains regulated by tenancy---Tenant cannot legitimately resist ejectment proceedings merely on ground of alleged sale agreement or ownership claim. Cited Cases: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 • Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 (d) Ejectment proceedings---- ----Maintainability---Tenant claiming purchase of share/co-ownership---Effect---Ejectment proceedings remain maintainable even where tenant asserts that he has acquired ownership rights by purchase of a share in the property---Such assertion does not automatically terminate tenancy nor oust jurisdiction of forum deciding ejectment---Tenant’s plea of ownership cannot be made basis to resist ejectment where his possession qua demised premises remains that of tenant. Cited Cases: • Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913 • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 (e) Rent Controller / ejectment forum---- ----Limited jurisdiction---Complicated question of title---Proper remedy---Forum exercising limited jurisdiction in ejectment proceedings cannot adjudicate upon complicated questions of ownership title between parties---Where tenant claims to have purchased a share or acquired co-ownership, proper remedy is to seek partition through competent civil forum and not to resist ejectment proceedings by raising disputed title questions before ejectment forum. (f) Landlord and tenant---- ----Tenant claiming co-ownership by purchase of share---Proper recourse---Tenant claiming co-ownership cannot use such plea as shield against ejectment while retaining possession under tenancy---His remedy is to file suit for partition or appropriate proceedings before competent civil forum---Ejectment cannot be refused merely because tenant claims purchase of a share, where his position in respect of disputed premises remains that of tenant. Cited Case: • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 (g) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Concurrent findings---Interference by Supreme Court---Suit for recovery of produce and ejectment was decreed by Trial Court; appeal, revision, second revision and constitutional petition were dismissed---High Court correctly construed law relating to estoppel of tenant, surrender of possession, maintainability of ejectment proceedings and remedy of partition---No illegality or jurisdictional defect warranting interference by Supreme Court was shown---Petition was devoid of merit. Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.806-P of 2018 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; Supreme Court held that tenant asserting ownership/co-ownership must first surrender possession before contesting title, ejectment proceedings remain maintainable, and remedy for alleged co-ownership lies through partition before competent civil forum. CMA No.1877-P of 2018 became infructuous and was disposed of accordingly.

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Ss. 42, 44, 52, 53, 166 & 172(2)(vi)—Specific Relief Act, 1877—S. 42—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 175F(1)(c) & 199—Revenue record—Old sanctioned mutations—Non-implementation for over a century—Correction of entries—Clerical or arithmetical mistake—Contentious dispute—Jurisdiction of revenue authorities—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the alleged non-implementation of Mutation No. 117 dated 29.12.1907 and Mutations Nos. 401 and 402 dated 30.01.1913 could not be treated as a mere clerical or arithmetical mistake capable of correction by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967. The Court observed that where implementation of century-old mutations would potentially disturb long-standing revenue entries, affect possible intervening alienations, and prejudice third parties not before the forum, the matter plainly assumes a contentious character. In such circumstances, the limited power of correction available to revenue authorities cannot be invoked for deciding substantive controversies affecting proprietary rights. The Court further held that the discretion under S. 166 is not unbridled and is confined to cases free from factual controversy and incapable of adversely affecting vested rights without proper adjudication. Revenue law—Record-of-rights—Presumption of correctness—Remedy against adverse entry—The Court held that Ss. 42, 44, and 52 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 collectively regulate the preparation, evidentiary value, and correction of the record-of-rights, and once entries are incorporated therein, a presumption of truth attaches to them until the contrary is proved or lawful substitution is made. To dislodge such presumption, the law itself provides a remedy through S. 53 of the Act, enabling an aggrieved person to institute a suit for declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, where he is prejudiced by an entry in the record-of-rights or periodical record relating to a right of which he is in possession. The Court reaffirmed that the statute does envisage an appropriate remedy even where summary correction before revenue authorities is unavailable. In this regard, reliance was placed on Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334). Jurisdiction—Civil court and revenue authorities—Section 172(2)(vi), Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Bar of jurisdiction not absolute in contentious matters—The Federal Constitutional Court examined the petitioners’ contention that, because S. 172(2)(vi) bars civil court jurisdiction regarding correction of entries in the record-of-rights, periodical record, or register of mutations, only revenue authorities could grant relief. Rejecting the broad proposition, the Court held that the exclusion recognized in S. 172(2)(vi) operates in matters of correction that are not controversial in nature. Where, however, the dispute involves contentious questions, competing rights, and possible effect on absent parties, the matter cannot be summarily resolved by revenue authorities. The Court relied upon Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906), wherein the Supreme Court clarified that only non-controversial corrections in revenue record fall within the exclusive domain of revenue authorities to the exclusion of civil courts. Delay and equity—Laches and acquiescence—Unexplained silence for more than a century—The Court held that the petitioners’ claim was hopelessly belated, having been raised for the first time in the year 2020 in relation to mutations sanctioned in 1907 and 1913. It was observed that the petitioners had failed to produce any material explaining why their predecessors-in-interest did not seek implementation during their lifetime, or why the petitioners themselves remained silent for decades. Such inordinate and unexplained delay attracted the principles of laches and acquiescence with full force. The mere existence of old sanctioned but unimplemented mutations did not automatically entitle the petitioners to their implementation after a lapse of over one hundred years, particularly in the face of possible competing claims and long-standing contrary entries in the revenue record. Constitutional jurisdiction—Article 199—Disputed questions of fact and title—Scope of writ jurisdiction—The Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 is meant to provide prompt relief where illegality or impropriety is apparent on the face of the record and can be determined without elaborate inquiry or recording of evidence. Where, however, the controversy involves disputed or intricate questions of fact, title, or enforceability of old mutations, requiring proper evidence and adjudication, the High Court cannot assume the role of a fact-finding forum. Such matters fall within the domain of courts of plenary jurisdiction. In support of this proposition, the Court referred to Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61), Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990), and Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). The Court accordingly held that the Lahore High Court rightly declined to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction. Natural justice—Affected third parties—No adverse order behind the back of interested persons—The Court observed that during the extraordinarily long interregnum between the sanction of the mutations and the filing of the petitioners’ application, it was highly probable that various transactions, alienations, or changes in possession had taken place, and that third parties may have acquired rights on the basis of the existing revenue entries. Any order directing implementation of the old mutations without impleading such persons or affording them opportunity of hearing would violate the principles of natural justice and risk grave miscarriage of justice. This consideration further demonstrated that the matter was not one of a simple ministerial correction but of substantive adjudication. Case references—Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334); Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906); Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61); Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990); Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the controversy regarding implementation of century-old mutations was contentious in nature, could not be resolved by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, and was not amenable to determination in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution. Finding no legal infirmity in the orders of the Member Board of Revenue, the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), and the Lahore High Court, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Arts. 8, 10A, 175F, 199, 202A & Third Schedule---Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 109-A---Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2024---Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025---Challenge to vires of statutory provision---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench vis-à-vis Regular Bench under erstwhile Art. 202A---Dominant object theory---Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Maintainability of challenge thereto---Petitioner, after availing 2018 Amnesty Scheme and declaring ownership of foreign company, was issued notice under S.109-A, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---He challenged both vires of said provision and the notice issued thereunder before Sindh High Court, which initially granted ad-interim restraint against passing of any final adverse order---Later, Constitutional Bench of High Court recalled said interim order on ground that courts ought not suspend operation of law, particularly in revenue matters---Before Federal Constitutional Court, principal question was whether Constitutional Bench, under erstwhile Art. 202A, possessed jurisdiction to entertain matter whose dominant relief was declaration that impugned law was ultra vires---Held, challenge to vires of statute, in substance, sought relief under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely declaration that law was “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”, and not merely a direction under Art.199(1)(a)(i) or enforcement of fundamental rights simpliciter---Under pre-27th Amendment regime, such matter did not fall within exclusive jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench---Only forum competent to grant final relief could competently grant interim relief; therefore, Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction from the outset and its order recalling the earlier ad-interim order was without jurisdiction---Court further held that ad-interim order which had effect of suspending operation of law could validly be brought in challenge before this Court, as until law is finally declared ultra vires it must ordinarily continue to operate---However, in view of subsequent constitutional amendment, exclusive writ jurisdiction now vests in Constitutional Benches and similar matters would henceforth lie before such Benches---Matter was remanded to Sindh High Court for fresh decision by competent Bench in accordance with law. Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (deceased) through legal heirs (2024 SCMR 1059); Attock Cement case (2024 SHC 1302); Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416); Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 24); Federation of Pakistan v. Aitzaz Ahsan (PLD 1989 SC 61); Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137 (1803)) rel. (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---Art. 202A (as it stood before Twenty-Seventh Amendment)---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Benches of High Courts---Scope--- Under erstwhile Art.202A, Constitutional Benches were not vested with entire writ jurisdiction under Art.199 but only with limited classes of matters specified therein---Therefore, question whether matter was to be heard by Constitutional Bench or Regular Bench had to be determined by reference to true nature of relief claimed. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction---Dominant object theory---Application--- For determining proper forum under former Art.202A, Court must examine pleadings, prayer clause and ultimate effect of relief sought so as to ascertain dominant or substantive relief, while treating merely consequential relief as ancillary---Such exercise is judicial in nature and not dependent upon drafting alone. (c) Challenge to vires of statute---Nature of relief--- Where petitioner assails validity of statutory provision and seeks declaration that same is contrary to Constitution, dominant relief is one under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely that impugned law is “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”---Such relief is, in substance, in nature of certiorari / declaratory judicial review, even if consequential directions are also sought. (d) High Courts---Power of judicial review---Inherent constitutional authority--- Power of High Court to strike down law ultra vires Constitution is inherent in constitutional scheme and flows from its role as guardian of Constitution, read with judicial oath and constitutional supremacy---Such authority is not negated merely because relief of declaration is not textually set out in identical terms in every clause of Art.199. (e) Interim relief---Competence of forum--- Interim relief may only be granted by forum competent to render final decision on lis---Consequently, where Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction to decide vires challenge under former Art.202A, it also lacked competence to pass or recall interim orders in relation thereto. (f) Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Propriety and challenge thereto--- As a general constitutional principle, until a law is finally declared ultra vires, it should ordinarily continue to operate in normal course---An interim order having effect of suspending operation of law, especially in revenue matters, is therefore open to challenge before this Court and cannot be shielded merely because it is ad-interim in form. (g) Twenty-Seventh Constitutional Amendment---Effect--- After enactment of Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, exclusive writ jurisdiction under Art.199 now lies with Constitutional Benches of High Courts, and Regular Benches no longer possess such jurisdiction---Accordingly, a case of like nature would now fall to be heard by Constitutional Bench. (h) Remand---When warranted--- Where impugned order has been passed by a Bench lacking jurisdiction, proper course is to set aside such order and remit matter for fresh adjudication by competent Bench in accordance with law. Petition allowed; impugned order set aside; matter remanded for decision by competent Bench of Sindh High Court in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 21---Territorial jurisdiction---Objection as to place of suing---Stage for raising objection---Objection to territorial jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity before or at settlement of issues and specifically pleaded---Where no such objection raised before Trial Court, no issue framed and trial concluded on merits, objection cannot be entertained for first time at appellate stage unless consequent failure of justice shown---Defect in territorial jurisdiction treated as technical irregularity after full trial---Appellate Court erred in reversing decree on ground of territorial jurisdiction which was neither pleaded nor raised in memo of appeal nor resulted in any failure of justice. (b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 & Family Courts Rules, 1965 ----R. 6---Territorial jurisdiction---Suit for maintenance, dowry articles and gold ornaments---Such claims not falling within proviso relating to dissolution of marriage or dower---Even if question of territorial jurisdiction arguable, same stood waived by failure of respondent to raise objection at trial stage---Proceedings allowed to conclude without demur---Non-suiting wife after full trial held unjustified. (c) Civil procedure ----Framing of issues---Jurisdictional objection---Effect of non-framing---Where jurisdictional objection not raised and no issue framed, parties lead evidence and court decides matter on merits---Jurisdictional plea deemed waived---Such plea cannot subsequently be resurrected at appellate stage. (d) Appellate jurisdiction ----Scope---Appellate Court confined to grounds raised---Appellate Court cannot suo motu introduce and decide a new point of territorial jurisdiction not pleaded, not raised in grounds of appeal and not resulting in failure of justice---Such exercise held legally unsustainable. (e) Administration of justice ----Fair trial---Non-suiting after full trial---Plaint filed, written statement submitted, issues framed, evidence recorded and judgment passed on merits---Setting aside decree on purely technical ground at appellate stage held contrary to settled principles of justice. Cited cases: • Khan Muhammad Tareen v. Nasir and Brother Coal Company 2018 SCMR 2121 • Faqir Muhammad v. Pakistan 2000 SCMR 1312 • Chief Engineer, Hydel (North) and Project Director, WAPDA v. Zafarullah Shah 2003 SCMR 686 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal; appeal allowed; judgment of Islamabad High Court set aside; matter remanded to Appellate Court for decision afresh on merits on the basis of evidence already recorded before the Trial Court.

Summary: (a) Civil Servants Acts, 1973-74 — Federal & Provincial Service Tribunals Acts ----Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 212; Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 3, 5 & 29(2); Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977; Punjab Civil Services Rules (Vol-I), r. 14.21; Sindh Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1980; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986; Balochistan Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 2013— Service appeal—Departmental appeal barred by limitation—Whether appeal before Service Tribunal competent—Held: Yes. The Service Tribunal is the first independent judicial forum and is statutorily empowered to examine questions of limitation as well as merits. Departmental delay cannot extinguish a civil servant’s statutory right of appeal; the tribunal must itself determine whether “sufficient” or “reasonable” cause existed for delay, review the department’s exercise (or failure) of discretion to condone it, and proceed accordingly. Outright dismissal merely because the departmental appeal was time-barred amounts to abdication of jurisdiction and violates Art. 212(1)-(2). (b) Civil Servants Acts, 1973-74 — Departmental appeals — Power to condone delay — Limitation Act, 1908, S. 5 — Applicability—Held: Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not automatically attracted to departmental proceedings, as S. 29(2)(b) excludes its application unless expressly incorporated; nevertheless, the relevant Rules themselves confer discretion on departmental authorities either to withhold or condone appeals filed out of time on showing of “reasonable cause”. Thus, even under the “withholding” framework (Federal, Punjab) or “condonation” framework (Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan), the department must apply its mind and record reasons before rejecting an appeal as time-barred. (c) Service Tribunals Acts, 1973-74 — Appellate jurisdiction — Scope and duty— Tribunals, as constitutional creatures under Art. 212, exercise appellate and fact-finding powers akin to civil courts; they are obliged to examine legality, factual foundation, and procedural fairness of departmental decisions, including limitation issues. Failure to consider condonation applications or to address limitation constitutes non-exercise of jurisdiction. (d) Case law — Chairman, P.I.A.C. v. Nasim Malik, PLD 1990 SC 951 — per incuriam— Held: The rule derived from PIAC case and followed in later decisions (e.g. Abdul Wahid, 1998 SCMR 882; Anwar Ali Sahto, PLD 2002 SC 101; Razi Uddin, 2004 PLC (CS) 468; Muhammad Aslam, 2007 SCMR 513; Raja Khan, 2011 SCMR 676; Ghulam Shabbir, 2013 PLC (CS) 1087; Muhammad Asif Chatha, 2015 SCMR 165) that an appeal before the Service Tribunal becomes incompetent when the departmental appeal was time-barred, is declared incorrect in law and per incuriam. The PIAC Regulations themselves envisaged condonation (withholding) of delayed appeals; the omission to appreciate this and the relevant statutory framework vitiated that precedent. (e) Sufficient/Reasonable cause — Concept and application— Both expressions are interchangeable; cause must be bona fide, beyond the applicant’s control, and shown with diligence. Mistaken legal advice or negligence ordinarily not enough unless founded on genuine ambiguity. Public authorities must apply limitation rules equitably, treating them as instruments of fairness rather than exclusion. (f) Practice and procedure — Prospective and consequential directions— All pending appeals where dismissal rested solely on departmental limitation to be re-listed and decided on merits after examining sufficiency of cause; past and closed transactions (including disposed review petitions) remain unaffected. PIAC line of cases overruled to this extent. Cited Cases: • Chairman, P.I.A.C. v. Nasim Malik, PLD 1990 SC 951 ( per incuriam ) • Abdul Wahid v. Chairman, C.B.R., 1998 SCMR 882 • Anwar Ali Sahto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2002 SC 101 • Muhammad Aslam v. WAPDA, 2007 SCMR 513 • Raja Khan v. Manager (Operation) FESCO, 2011 SCMR 676 • Muhammad Asif Chatha v. Chief Secretary Punjab, 2015 SCMR 165 • Khushi Muhammad v. Fazal Bibi, PLD 2016 SC 872 (5-M bench) • Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah, 2001 SCMR 286 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani, 2002 SCMR 1540 • Secretary to Govt. Punjab (Law & Parliamentary Affairs) v. Ali Ahmad Khan, 2025 SCMR 489 • Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Amin, 2025 SCMR 646 Disposition: Legal question answered in negative—Appeal before Service Tribunal not rendered incompetent merely because departmental appeal was time-barred—Earlier contrary view in PIAC and following cases overruled—All connected matters to proceed individually on merits before competent benches—Past and closed transactions unaffected—Approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure — Non-party appeals; leave to appeal — Test —Constitutional/Procedural practice; CPC, S.115; Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S.52 (lis pendens); Limitation Act, 1908, Art.113— A non-party may appeal with leave if they could properly have been a party to the proceedings and are affected by the impugned order. Applied: leave refused where applicants purchased subject property pendente lite, concealed the transaction, and could not show why they failed to seek impleadment at trial. Precedents reaffirmed: H.M. Saya, Sahib Dad, Munir Ahmed, Kanwar Arif Ali Khan. (b) Transfers pendente lite — Impleadment of transferee — Scope & discretion —TPA, S.52— Ordinarily, a transferee pendente lite may be joined to protect its interest; however, joinder is discretionary, and can be declined when the transfer appears not bona fide, is designed to frustrate proceedings, or where parties withheld disclosure from the court. Followed: Sajjad Hussain v. State; Fazal Karim v. Muhammad Afzal. (c) Bona fides & concealment — Effect Applicants were tenants who entered an agreement to purchase the disputed house during the suit without leave of court and kept it secret until after dismissal at trial. A contract clause envisaging loss of title and refund revealed awareness of the litigation risk; applicants therefore not bona fide purchasers and squarely hit by lis pendens. (d) Limitation for specific performance — Starting point & consequence —Limitation Act, 1908, Art.113— Agreement dated 22-01-2010 required balance payment by 22-07-2010; suit for specific performance filed 14-07-2016 was time-barred. A time-barred independent claim confers no enforceable interest warranting impleadment or leave to appeal. (e) Appellate/revisional posture — No right to protract litigation Applicants’ sequence—filing SP suit, then impleadment in appeal after a compromise between original parties—was viewed as a calculated attempt to prolong litigation; absent any valid reason for not joining at trial, they cannot intrude at the revisional stage. (f) Disposition: CMA No. 9923 of 2024 dismissed (leave to appeal refused); CMA No. 9924 of 2024 dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Service Law ----Adverse remarks—Promotion—Supersession—Effect of expunged adverse remarks on subsequent DPC decisions—Held: Once adverse remarks recorded in the respondent’s Annual Confidential Report were judicially set aside by the Federal Service Tribunal and the judgment attained finality up to the Supreme Court, such remarks stood obliterated from the service record ab initio. Any supersession based solely on those remarks automatically lost legal effect. Administrative orders resting on a foundation that has ceased to exist cannot survive. Non-challenge to individual DPC supersession orders, being derivative in nature, is of no consequence; law does not require a futile challenge to orders whose substratum has already been judicially extinguished. (b) Service Law ----Limitation—Condonation of delay—Tribunal’s discretion—Departmental representation filed after limitation period—Held: The Federal Service Tribunal recorded sufficient cause and exercised discretion judiciously in condoning the delay considering factual circumstances including security and access constraints of the respondent’s posting—No jurisdictional or legal error shown; interference by the Supreme Court unwarranted. (c) Promotion—Ante-dated or pro-forma promotion—Entitlement—Where adverse remarks forming the sole basis of supersession are subsequently expunged, the officer’s right to promotion relates back to the date he first became eligible—The respondent, having been wrongly superseded on a ground later declared void, was rightly granted promotion from 2015, when his entitlement first matured. (d) Case Distinction— Abdul Ghani Chaudhry v. Secretary Establishment (1998 SCMR 2544) distinguished; that case did not involve the setting aside of adverse remarks forming the foundation of supersession, hence its ratio inapplicable to the present facts. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ghani Chaudhry v. Secretary Establishment, Islamabad & others, 1998 SCMR 2544 (distinguished) Disposition: Leave to appeal declined—Petition dismissed—Federal Service Tribunal judgment dated 02.11.2022 upheld; respondent entitled to promotion retrospectively from 27.07.2015.