Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss. 119, 122, 126 & 127---Central Depositories Act (XIX of 1997), Ss. 3, 5 & 11---Rectification of register of members---Central Depository System---Distinction between company’s register of members and central depository register---Scope of statutory bar under S.11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997---Held, that the register of members maintained by a company under S.119 of the Companies Act, 2017 and the central depository register maintained by the Central Depository Company were distinct statutory records serving different legal functions---Section 11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997 barred the Court from ordering rectification of the central depository register but did not prohibit rectification of the company’s own register of members---Overriding effect under S.3 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997 did not impliedly repeal or override the remedy under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017, as both statutes could harmoniously coexist within their respective fields---Right to seek rectification of the company’s register under S.126 remained intact---Petition under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017 was therefore maintainable notwithstanding the bar contained in S.11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997. Cited Cases: • Packages Limited through its General Manager and others v. Muhammad Maqbool and others PLD 1991 SC 258 • Muhammad Mohsin Ghuman and others v. Government of Punjab through Home Secretary, Lahore and others 2013 SCMR 85 • Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investigation Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218 (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 2(10), 3 & Art.120---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Rectification of register of members---Whether proceedings under S.126 constituted a “suit”---Article 120 of Limitation Act, 1908---Applicability---Held, that proceedings under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017 were initiated by application/petition and not by plaint---Although such proceedings involved determination of civil rights and were before the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction, neither the Companies Act, 2017 nor the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997 treated them as a suit---Expression “suit” under the Limitation Act, 1908 had a specific and limited meaning and was expressly distinguishable from an appeal and an application---Proceedings under S.126 could not be treated as a suit merely because they concerned property or civil rights---Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was therefore not applicable. Cited Cases: • Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1 • Kishan Chand & Co. v. Nur Muhammad PLD 1949 Lahore 30 (c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Rectification of register of members---Application for rectification---Residuary limitation---Applicability of Art.181---Held, that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply to petitions/applications under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017---Preamble of the Limitation Act, 1908 referred to suits and appeals generally but only to “certain applications”, showing that the Act did not prescribe limitation for every conceivable application before Courts---Article 181 was historically confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and, by extension in limited contexts, to arbitration proceedings owing to the special provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940---Proceedings for rectification of register under S.126 were not applications putting into motion the machinery of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the sense contemplated by Article 181---High Court’s reliance on Article 181 for dismissing petitions under S.126 as time-barred was not justified. Cited Cases: • Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. AIR 1933 PC 63 • Baimanekbai v. Manekji Kavasji 1880 ILR 7 Bom 213 • Naeem Finance Ltd. and another v. Bashir Ahmad Rafiqui, Administrator, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. and another PLD 1971 SC 8 • M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through the Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad PLD 1972 SC 123 • Brother Steel Mills Ltd. and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and 14 others PLD 1996 SC 543 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Art.181---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss.37 & 41---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.126---Applicability of residuary Article 181 beyond Code of Civil Procedure---Distinction between arbitration proceedings and company rectification proceedings---Held, that the applicability of Article 181 to applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940 rested upon the special statutory scheme of Ss.37 and 41 of the Arbitration Act, which applied the Limitation Act and the Code of Civil Procedure to arbitration proceedings before Court---Such reasoning could not automatically be extended to proceedings under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017---No inconsistency existed between Naeem Finance and Imam-ud-Din Janjua, as both operated in different statutory contexts---Article 181 was not to be applied to company register rectification proceedings merely because it had been applied to certain arbitration applications. Cited Cases: • Naeem Finance Ltd. and another v. Bashir Ahmad Rafiqui, Administrator, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. and another PLD 1971 SC 8 • M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through the Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad PLD 1972 SC 123 • Mrs. Naila Naeem Younus and others v. Messrs Indus Services Limited through Chief Executive and others 2022 SCMR 1171 (e) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.29(2)---Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, Rr.5 & 7---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.6---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.509(4)---Proceedings under Companies Act---Petition and application---Special law---Whether Limitation Act applicable through S.29(2)---Held, that the Companies Act, 2017 was a special law and was self-contained in respect of limitation for several company proceedings, prescribing timelines in some provisions and omitting them in others---Under R.5 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, all applications except interlocutory applications were to be made by petition---A petition under S.126 for rectification of register was therefore not an “application” within the meaning of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908---Since proceedings under S.126 were neither suit, appeal nor application within the meaning of S.29(2), the Limitation Act, 1908 could not be invoked to prescribe a limitation period where the Companies Act, 2017 itself had not done so. Cited Cases: • Government of Canada v. Aronson 1989 2 All ER 1025 • A v. B (Investigatory Powers Tribunal: Jurisdiction) 2009 UKSC 12 • Dr. Muhammad Amin v. President Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited 2010 SCMR 1458 (f) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss.126 & 127---Rectification of register---Fraudulent entries or omissions---No prescribed limitation period---Reason for legislative omission---Equitable and public-law character of register rectification---Held, that absence of a statutory limitation period for proceedings under S.126 was consistent with the equitable nature of the Court’s jurisdiction in register rectification matters---Section 126 was designed not merely to resolve private disputes but to preserve the accuracy and integrity of the company register, which determined legal ownership, governance rights and corporate control---Where fraudulent or unjustified entries were alleged, imposing a limitation period at the threshold could reward concealment and obstruct the Court’s power under S.126(4) to refer matters for adjudication of offences under S.127---Fraud may remain concealed for years and the wrongdoer could not be permitted to take advantage of such concealment---Rectification jurisdiction protected proprietary rights in shares and membership interests, and an inaccurate register could not be allowed to persist merely because an ordinary civil limitation period was invoked. Cited Case: • In Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd. 2008 EWHC 2810 (g) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Rectification of register---Delay---Doctrine of laches---Equitable discretion of Court---No fixed limitation period---Effect of stale claims---Held, that although no statutory limitation period applied to proceedings under S.126, the Court was still bound to examine delay, neglect and stale claims through the equitable doctrine of laches---Court could consider the length of delay, reasons for delay, late discovery of facts, ongoing investigations, complexity of corporate transactions, regulatory hurdles, prejudice to opposite parties and conduct of the parties---Where respondent’s fraud, concealment, misrepresentation or obstruction prevented timely proceedings, the respondent could be estopped from relying upon delay---However, party seeking rectification had to approach the Court before rights of innocent third parties accrued, and must provide a satisfactory and credible explanation for any apparent delay---No fixed upper or lower time limit could be judicially created, as that would amount to legislation---Each case had to be assessed on its own facts, and in appropriate cases avoidable delay could disentitle a party from equitable relief. Cited Cases: • Archbold v. Scully 1861 9 HL 360 • THG Plc v. Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd. 2026 UKSC 6 • Shoreham Hills, LLC v. Sagaponack Dream House LLC 2020 NY Slip Op 50326 • Poiss v. Lambert Health Authority 1978 2 All ER 125 • Verrall v. Great Yarmouth Borough Council 1981 QB 202 • Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd LR 5 PC 239 (h) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Rectification of register---Allegations of fraud---Summary dismissal on limitation---Remand---Held, that petitions under S.126 involving allegations of fraud raised complex and delicate questions of law and fact and ought not to have been dismissed summarily on the basis of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908---In one matter, although the High Court had also examined merits, such findings were considerably influenced by its opinion on limitation and were recorded without affording parties full opportunity to present their best case---Matters required fresh adjudication after hearing all parties and permitting them to present their complete case. Disposition: Leave petitions, i.e. CPLA No.559 of 2025 and CPLA No.2624 of 2025, were converted into appeals and allowed along with Civil Appeal No.125 of 2025; impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court were set aside; matters were remitted to the High Court for fresh decision after affording each party fair opportunity of hearing; no order as to costs.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: 177ITR (Income Tax Reference) 41034/17 COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE Vs MS. M. FAISAL LAHORE Mr. Justice Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom 24- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 6475

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10-A (fair trial & due process)---Quasi-judicial proceedings before statutory tribunals---Impartiality and appearance of fairness---Held, Art. 10-A guarantees not only actual fairness but the appearance of fairness; adjudication must be free from bias and from any structural imbalance that disadvantages a party---Where a statutory chairperson who has already voted in the cause is further empowered to break a tie by a “second” or casting vote, the arrangement undermines impartiality and public confidence and offends Art. 10-A. (b) Competition Act, 2010 ----S. 24(5)---Casting vote of Chairperson---Scope---Reading down---Commission’s dual roles distinguished (administrative vs adjudicatory)---Held, S. 24(5) confers a casting vote to resolve equality of votes; however, to preserve Art. 10-A fairness in adjudicatory/quasi-judicial proceedings, the provision is read down to apply only to the Commission’s administrative or internal matters---In adjudication determining civil rights/obligations (e.g., post-show-cause proceedings under S. 30), each member’s vote must carry equal weight; no member may exercise a “double vote.” (c) Administrative law / Natural justice ----Bias—Structure of decision-making bodies—Equal weight of members’ votes---In adjudicatory forums, a chairperson’s casting vote after already expressing an opinion creates an appearance of bias and violates the equal-weight principle inherent in fair trial guarantees---Tribunal correctly set aside the Chairperson’s casting-vote decision rendered to resolve a deadlock in a four-member bench. (d) Comparative jurisprudence (persuasive only) ----Competition law—Casting vote in adjudication—Reference to Indian law---Delhi High Court declared unconstitutional the provision granting a casting vote to the chairperson in quasi-judicial decisions under S. 22(3) of the Indian Competition Act, 2002; the Indian legislature later omitted the casting-vote words (Act 9 of 2023). This comparative reasoning reinforces limiting such powers to non-adjudicatory matters. (e) Appellate review—Remand directions ----Tribunal’s approach examined---While upholding the setting aside of the Chairperson’s casting-vote decision in adjudication, the Supreme Court modified the consequential directions: instead of remitting to the Commission for rehearing by the Chairperson/another non-signatory member, the matter is remanded to the Tribunal to decide afresh after full hearing, within ninety days, uninfluenced by prior opinions. Held: (i) The Chairperson of the Competition Commission has no authority to exercise a casting vote in quasi-judicial/adjudicatory proceedings; S. 24(5) of the Competition Act, 2010 is read down to administrative/internal matters to conform with Art. 10-A. (ii) The Tribunal rightly set aside the Chairperson’s casting-vote decision; however, its direction remitting the matters to the Commission is modified—cases are remanded to the Tribunal to decide afresh within ninety days after hearing all parties. No order as to costs. Cited Cases: • Suo Motu Case No. 4 of 2010, PLD 2012 SC 553 • Mahindra Electric Mobility Ltd. & others v. CCI & others, 2019 DHC 2043-DB (Delhi High Court) Disposition: Appeals partly allowed—Chairperson’s casting-vote in adjudication held impermissible; Tribunal’s annulment of casting-vote decision upheld; remand modified—matters sent to the Tribunal for fresh decision within ninety days; no costs.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 86(2) & 286---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 23---Affairs of company---Subsidiary company holding shares in its holding company---Petition before Court---Limitation---Continuing wrong, doctrine of---Applicability---Petitioner invoked jurisdiction of Court alleging that subsidiary company was holding shares in its holding company---Plea raised by respondents was that the petition was barred by limitation---Validity---Remedy in S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017 is based on doctrine of continuing wrong which is also embodied in S. 23 of Limitation Act, 1908---Arrangement arrived between respondent companies in December 2021 amounted to financial assistance by subsidiary company to purchase its own shares in violation of S. 86(2) of the Companies Act, 2017---Each time in year 2022 to year 2024 respondent company with majority shares used financial assistance to purchase shares of holding company and then in year 2025 had made public offer---Affairs of subsidiary company were conducted unlawfully falling within the time-line envisaged in S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017---There was also no question of latches in such circumstances. B and T Ag v. Ministry of Defence 2023 SCC OnLine SC 657; Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investments (Pvt.) Ltd. (AIR ONLINE 2021 SC 179; Ramashankar Prosad v. Sindri Iron Foundry (P.) Ltd. AIR 1966 Cal 512; Surinder Singh Bindra v. Hindustan Fasteners Ltd. AIR 1990 Delhi 32; Bentonite Pakistan Ltd. v. Bankers Equity Ltd. 2023 SCMR 1353; Naila Naeem Younus v. Indus Services Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1171; Naeem Finance Ltd. v. Bashir Ahmed Rafiqui PLD 1971 SC 8; M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. Thal Development Authority PLD 1972 SC 123; Muhammad Tariq Badar v. National Bank of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 314; A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar 2025 INSC 274 and Hassan v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793 rel. (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 86(4) & 286---'Court' and 'Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan'---Jurisdiction---Imposing of penalties---Power of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan under S. 86(4) of Companies Act, 2017 to penalize a company has no bearing on the power of Court under S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017. (c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----S. 286 ---Complaint of oppression and mismanagement---Scope---Complaint of oppression is usually where petitioner is directly affected and complaint of mismanagement and prejudice to public interest is where petitioner is indirectly affected---Petitioner is permitted by S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017 to bring what would otherwise be a derivative action on behalf of company for correcting affairs of the company---Complaint under S. 286 of Companies Act, 2017 may be against mismanagement only; against oppression only; against both; against prejudice to public interest only; against the latter coupled with mismanagement or/and oppression---While acts underlying oppression and mismanagement may be overlapping, it is important to distinguish between the two. (d) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)--- ----Ss. 2 (7)(d), 86 (2), 88, 158 (2), 286 & 301---Listed Companies (Buy-Back of Shares) Regulations, 2019, Regln. 13---Affairs of company---Complaint---Winding-up of company---Grounds---Opression of minority shares---Substantial shareholder---Subsidiary company holding shares in its holding company---Delay in election of directors---Petitioner was holding 16 % shares of company under winding-up, which was a public listed company---Petitioner alleged that shares of company under winding-up were put to public offer which had earlier been purchased by respondent company with majority shares---Validity---Grounds for winding-up a company are set-out in S.301 of Companies Act, 2017---Company may be wound up by the Court under S.301 (g)(iii) of Companies Act, 2017 if the company is - conducting its business in a manner oppressive to the minority members or persons concerned with the formation or promotion of the company---Oppression of minority members by the companyis a recognized ground for winding-up of that company---Where oppression of minority is established under S.286 of Companies Act, 2017, it is implicit that there should be cause to wind-up the company---Once threshold of oppression is crossed, the threshold of winding-up is automatically crossed---Where it is established under S.286 of Companies Act, 2017 that affairs of the company are being conducted, or are likely to be conducted, in an unlawful or fraudulent manner, or in a manner not provided for in its memorandum, a case for winding-up can be triggered under S.301 (g)(i), (ii), (iv) & (v) of Companies Act, 2017---Such acts committed by the Board of company under winding-up in collusion with respondent company with majority shares, oppressed minority shareholders such as the petitioner who were in the category of 'substantial shareholder' as defined in S.2(7)(d) of Companies Act, 2017 i.e. holding an interest of 10% or more in the company---Once oppression of minority shareholders was established, a case for winding-up was made out in view of S.301 (g)(iii) of Companies Act, 2017 and Court could then consider corrective orders under S.286 (2) of Companies Act, 2017---Violation of S.86(2) of Companies Act, 2017 to divert funds/assets of the company for no apparent gain to the company and deliberate violation 158(2) of Companies Act, 2017 to delay election of directors at the behest of the largest shareholder was also mismanagement by the Board of company under winding-up, conducting the affairs in unlawful and fraudulent manner within the meaning of S.286 of Companies Act, 2017---High Court in exercise of powers under Ss. 286 & 287 of Companies Act, 2017 declared that shares held by respondent company with majority shares were to be the property of company under winding-up as the same were deemed to have been purchased by the company from its shareholders under S.88 of Companies Act, 2017 as treasury shares subject to the conditions set-out in S.88 (3) of Companies Act, 2017---High Court directed Central Depository Company to amend central depository register accordingly---High Court directed the company to amend register of its members accordingly and make other consequential alterations to its record---High Court declared that public offer made by respondent company with majority shares stood abated as it was to acquire controlling shares of the company---High Court directed the Manger to the Offer to return the shares tendered by shareholders of the company to the respective shareholders---High Court directed Board of directors of the company to forthwith issue notice for calling an extra-ordinary general meeting of the company for electing directors---High Court further directed that Board of Directors of the company, constituted after election would then decide whether to retain treasury shares, to cancel them or to sell them as per Regln. 13 of Listed Companies (Buy-Back of Shares) Regulations, 2019 provided that, where the treasury shares would exceed the limit fixed by Regln. 9 of Listed Companies (Buy-Back of Shares) Regulations, 2019, the shares exceeding such limit were to be cancelled or sold---Petition was allowed accordingly. PLD 1988 Lah. 1; 2021 CLD 578; 2015 CLC 877; 2021 CLD 7; 1987 CLC 1408; 2007 CLD 1210; Matloob Ellahi Paracha v. Raja Arshad Mahmood PLD 2024 SC 663; Ghulam Nabi v. Muhammad Yaqub PLD 1983 SC 344; Khursheed Ismail v. Unichem Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. 1996 CLC 1863; Associate Biscuits International Ltd. v. English Biscuits Manufacturers (Pvt.) Ltd. 2003 CLD 815; Pakistan WAPDA v. Kot Addu Power Co. Ltd. PLD 2000 Lah. 461; Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) 12 AC 409; Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta AIR 2006 SC 3672; Belmont Finance Corporation v. Williams Furniture Ltd. and others (No.2) - [1980] 1 All ER 393; Charterhouse Investment Trust Ltd. v. Tempest Diesel Ltd. (1986) BCLC 1 (Ch D); Elder v. Elder and Whatson Ltd. (1952) SC 49; Scottish Cooperative Whole Sale Society Ltd. v. Meyer (1958) 3 All ER 66; Inam Ullah Khan v. AKSA Solutions Development Services (Pvt.) Ltd. 2019 CLD 355; Needle Industries (India) Ltd. v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 333; Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investments (Pvt.) Ltd., (AIR ONLINE 2021 SC 179) Loch v. John Blackwood; Neelofar Shah v. Ofspace (Pvt.) Ltd. 2013 CLD 114 and Shahamatullah Qureshi v. Hi-tech Construction Pvt. Ltd. 2004 CLD 640 ref. Barrister Sarfaraz Ali Metlo, Barrister Fayaz Ali Metlo, Athar Hussain along with Ms. Adeela Ansari and Atiya Manzoor for Petitioner. Abid S. Zuberi, Ayan Mustafa Memon, Muhammad Nawaz Khan, Saif Sohail and M. Arif Ansari for Respondent No.1. Arshad M. Tayebaly, Sameer Tayebaly and Aitzaz Manzoor Memon for Respondent No.2. Ali Almani, Furqan Mushtaq and Sami-ur-Rehman for Respondent No.3. Muzaffar Mirza, Imran Ahmed Shamsi, Syed Ebad-ur-Rehman along with Sabeel Shah, Deputy Director (Listed Companies), SECP for Respondent No.4. Nemo for Respondents Nos.5-8. Mayhar Kazi, Ahmed Imran Dewan and Sheheryar Malik for Respondent No.9. Syed Ghulam Shabbir Shah, Irtafa-ur-Rehman, Mukesh Kumar Talreja, Agha Shahzaib and Anas Habib Magoon for Applicants / Interveners. Dates of hearing: 7th, 10th, 15th, 17th, 23rd, 24th, 28th April, 5th, 6th and 8th May, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011—S. 6 & Schedule—New York Convention, 1958—Enforcement of foreign arbitral award—Interim relief—Scope and object—Interference by Division Bench at interlocutory stage—Pro-enforcement mandate—Validity—Petitioners sought enforcement of partial and costs award rendered under ICC arbitration seated in London—Single Judge of High Court granted interim injunction restraining respondent from transferring or encumbering working interest in Badin Fields—Division Bench, in intra-court appeal (ICA), suspended said interim relief—Held, foreign arbitral awards are not to be treated as ordinary civil decrees; they are binding under international law and the Convention—Interim measures passed in aid of enforcement are within court’s jurisdiction and necessary to protect efficacy of the enforcement process—Interference by appellate court at interim stage, without considering grounds of refusal under Article V of the Convention, is premature and contrary to settled jurisprudence—Supreme Court suspended impugned ICA order and reinstated interim relief. The Court reaffirmed the principle that courts must maintain a pro-enforcement bias in matters concerning foreign arbitral awards—Such awards enjoy presumptive validity and should be enforced unless one of the narrow grounds in Article V of the Convention is clearly established—Suspension of interim protection at an early stage without evaluating those grounds undermines Pakistan’s international obligations and discourages foreign investment. Cited Cases: Taisei Corporation v. A.M. Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2024 SCMR 640) Orient Power Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. SNGPL (2021 SCMR 1728) Government of India v. Vedanta Ltd. (AIR 2020 SC 4550) Zeiler v. Deitsch (500 F.3d 157 (2007)) (b) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972—S. 3(2)—Maintainability of intra-court appeal (ICA)—Order passed in enforcement proceedings under special law—Scope—Held, enforcement petition under 2011 Act is a special law proceeding with a self-contained appellate mechanism—Order of Single Judge not amenable to ICA under S.3(2) of Ordinance, 1972—Division Bench’s jurisdiction was barred. The Supreme Court reiterated that ICAs are not maintainable from orders passed under special statutes that provide no express appeal provision—Enforcement of foreign awards under the 2011 Act falls within such category—Reference made to precedents holding that Law Reforms Ordinance does not apply where special legislation governs appellate procedure. Cited Cases: Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh (PLD 1984 SC 344) Muhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1985 SC 107) International Islamic University v. Syed Naveed Altaf (2024 SCMR 472) (c) Supreme Court Rules, 1980—Orders XI, XX & XXXIII—Leave to appeal—Power to suspend High Court orders—Scope—Held, Supreme Court is competent to grant interim relief and suspend impugned orders of High Court Division Bench while granting leave—Suspension of ICA order and continuation of Single Judge’s interim relief were within judicial discretion—Pro-enforcement orientation and settled case law supported such intervention. Cited Cases: Sheri-CBE v. LDA (2006 SCMR 1202) Municipal Committee v. Province of Punjab (2001 SCMR 745) ICI Pakistan Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2007 PTD 2306) (d) Practice and Procedure—Appearance by Advocate not enrolled with Supreme Court—Permission—Learned counsel who had represented petitioners before High Court sought special permission to argue urgent matter—Held, limited permission granted for current stage; petitioners directed to engage Advocate of Supreme Court for further proceedings—Pending applications disposed of accordingly. Disposition: Leave to appeal granted—Impugned order of Division Bench dated 19.05.2025 suspended—Interim injunction passed by Single Judge restored and shall remain operative—Petitions to be listed before three-member bench after a fortnight.