Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 233, 235 & 239---Separate charges for distinct offences---Joint trial---Same transaction---General rule and exceptions---Held, that S.233, Cr.P.C. embodies the general rule that every distinct offence shall carry a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately---Such rule is, however, subject to the exceptions contained in Ss.234, 235, 236 and 239, Cr.P.C.---Section 235 permits one accused to be charged and tried in one trial for multiple offences where the offences arise from one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction---Section 239(d), Cr.P.C. extends the principle to joint trial of several accused for different offences committed in the course of the same transaction---Provisions of Ss.235 and 239 are enabling and discretionary, not mandatory, because the legislature used the expression “may”---Mere legal possibility of joinder does not create a legal duty to consolidate trials. Cited Cases: • MD. Mosaddar Hoque and another v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131 • Shahadat Khan and another v. Home Secretary PLD 1969 SC 158 • Nadir Shah v. The State 1980 SCMR 402 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 235 & 239---Expression “same transaction”---Tests for determination---Continuity of action---Community of purpose or design---Causal connection---Held, that the expression “transaction” is not defined in the Code and it is for the Court to determine whether a given set of facts constitutes the “same transaction”---Tests include proximity of time and place, community of purpose or design, continuity of action and causal connection---Proximity of time and place alone is insufficient; the essential elements are community of purpose or design and continuity of action---Where offences are separable in nature, purpose and motive, they cannot automatically be treated as forming the same transaction---In the present matter, allegations relating to physical occurrence and allegations relating to later dissemination of the event were separable; former could relate to sexual gratification while the latter could relate to humiliation, degradation or blackmail---Same transaction was therefore not established. Cited Cases: • MD. Mosaddar Hoque and another v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131 • Emperor v. Datto Hanmant Shahapurkar ILR 30 Bom 49 • Babulal Chaukhani v. King Emperor 65 IA 158 • Emperor v. Sejmal Poonamchand ILR 51 Bom 310 • Ata Muhammad Khan Alvi v. Crown PLD 1950 Lahore 288 (c) Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act (XXXI of 2021)---- ----Ss. 9 & 16(4)---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss.29 & 30---Special statutes---Separate investigative and trial mechanisms---Joint trial of scheduled and non-scheduled offences---Scope of S.16(4) of Anti-Rape Act---Held, that the Anti-Rape Act and PECA are special statutes with distinct investigative and procedural regimes---Scheduled sexual offences under the Anti-Rape Act are to be investigated by Special Sexual Offences Investigation Units, whereas offences under PECA are investigated by the notified cybercrime investigation agency---Section 16(4) of the Anti-Rape Act, 2021, which provides that the Special Court “may also try” connected non-scheduled offences, is an enabling provision and must be read narrowly so as not to displace the forum and procedure contemplated by PECA---Consolidation across separate statutory regimes may raise issues of jurisdictional enlargement not expressly conferred by law. (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.175(2)---Jurisdiction of courts---Special courts---Joint trial across statutory regimes---Held, that in view of Art.175(2) of the Constitution, Courts must avoid any impression of enlarging jurisdiction beyond what is expressly conferred by law---Where legislature has created separate court structures for distinct categories of offences, consolidation of proceedings across different regimes is not to be ordered mechanically---Court must exercise caution before requiring a trial court to assume jurisdiction not clearly conferred by the relevant statute. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 173, 233, 235 & 239---Separate FIRs under different statutory regimes---Separate investigations and challans---Charges framed and evidence partly recorded---Consolidation after commencement of trial---Held, that where separate FIRs were registered under two different statutory regimes, separate investigations were undertaken by distinct agencies, separate reports under S.173, Cr.P.C. were submitted, separate charges had been framed and prosecution evidence had partly been recorded, formal consolidation at such advanced stage would require alteration of charges and restructuring of proceedings---Consolidation after commencement of evidence is an exception rather than the norm---Discretion under Ss.235 and 239, Cr.P.C. is to be exercised judiciously and not mechanically. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 235 & 239---Joint trial---Apprehension of conflicting judgments---Same Court conducting both trials---Held, that apprehension of conflicting judgments did not arise in the peculiar facts where both matters stood entrusted to the same Court---Possibility of inconsistency is substantially minimized when the same judicial forum evaluates the evidence---Simultaneous continuation of separate trials before the same Court sufficiently safeguards coherence in proceedings without disturbing the procedural structure already in place. (g) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.10-A & 14---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984), Arts.131 & 143 to 148---Cross-examination---Right of accused---Protection of witness dignity---Role of trial Judge---Held, that the right of an accused to cross-examine a complainant or witness exists, but it is neither unlimited nor unbridled---Trial Judge must balance the right of cross-examination with the right of fair trial and human dignity guaranteed under Arts.10-A and 14 of the Constitution---Questions which are irrelevant, indecent, without reasonable grounds, or intended to insult or annoy the witness must not be permitted---Prolonged cross-examination designed to exhaust the witness or manipulate error amounts to misuse of such right---Presiding Judge must not remain a silent spectator and should intervene where cross-examination is abused. (h) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.9, 10-A & 14---Witness protection and dignity---Witness box---No requirement that witness must remain standing---Provision of seating arrangements---Held, that there is no legal requirement under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 that a witness must remain standing while giving evidence---Compelling a witness, particularly in sexual offence cases, to remain standing for prolonged periods during testimony imposes unnecessary physical and psychological burden and may impair clarity and composure of evidence---Allowing a witness to remain seated does not diminish the sanctity of oath or dignity of judicial proceedings; rather, it promotes fairness, composure and orderly administration of justice---Witnesses assist the administration of justice and must be treated with dignity, security and respect. (i) Witness protection statutes---- ----Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, 2017---Sindh Witness Protection Act, 2013---Balochistan Witness Protection Act, 2016---Punjab Witness Protection Act, 2018---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Witness Protection Act, 2021---Protection of witnesses and complainants---Constitutional duty of State---Held, that protection of witnesses and complainants is grounded in Arts.9, 10-A and 14 of the Constitution and reinforced by federal and provincial witness protection laws---State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that witnesses and victims are protected from intimidation, coercion, humiliation and undue hardship so that testimony may be rendered freely and judicial proceedings may proceed in accordance with law. (j) Administration of justice---- ----Witness seating arrangements---Directions to subordinate courts, Special Courts and Tribunals---Held, that all District and Sessions Judges, courts subordinate to them, Administrative Judges of Special Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan were directed to ensure that appropriate seating arrangements are mandatorily provided to persons in the witness box, whether by chair, seat or bench---Registrar of Supreme Court was directed to circulate the judgment to the Chief Justices of all High Courts for implementation and compliance in all courts where evidence is recorded, including civil courts, criminal courts, special courts and tribunals. (k) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.185(3)---Leave to appeal---Consolidation of trials---Discretion exercised by Courts below---Interference by Supreme Court---Held, that the impugned order did not suffer from any jurisdictional defect, illegality or perversity warranting interference under Art.185(3) of the Constitution---Question raised related essentially to exercise of judicial discretion by Courts below and did not call for intervention in absence of injustice. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and Criminal Petition No.1160 of 2025 was dismissed; directions were issued for mandatory seating arrangements for witnesses in courts and for circulation of the judgment to all High Courts for implementation.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199----Dowry and bridal gifts---Recovery of alternate value of dowry articles---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner/wife challenged concurrent family court judgments whereby trial court had granted 30% alternate value of dowry articles but appellate court had set aside even that relief---Held, dowry articles and personal belongings of a wife remain her exclusive property and, where not returned in specie, she may claim their alternate value, subject to proof of existence, entrustment and retention---Appellate Court failed to appreciate material admissions and surrounding circumstances, including respondent/husband’s own stance that household articles were available in the house and his admission that no traditional dowry was given at the time of marriage, coupled with his assertion that he purchased various household luxuries during matrimony---Where original financial details were withheld by husband and wife’s bank record showed regular withdrawal of her salary for household consumption, presumption operated in favour of wife’s contribution---Appellate Court had, therefore, misdirected itself in discarding claim in toto merely on ground that wife had not produced her parents or further documentary proof. (b) Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act (LXXVIII of 1976)----Ss. 2 & 5---Dowry---Meaning and legal status---Property given to bride before or after marriage by her parents in connection with marriage constitutes dowry, excluding inherited property---Wife has absolute right in her dowry and bridal gifts---Any property rights available to a woman cannot be restricted, controlled or limited, and every gift becomes her exclusive property---There is no legal bar to a wife purchasing household articles herself after marriage and claiming them as dowry articles within the meaning of law, if such articles were acquired in connection with marriage and matrimonial home. Reliance placed on Ghulam Rasool v. Family Court 1991 CLC 1696 and Syeda Mehwish v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West) 2018 CLC 1337. (c) Family proceedings---Proof of dowry articles---Nature of evidence required---Strict rules of evidence---Held, wife’s solitary statement may be sufficient to prove existence of dowry items in a recovery suit, and oral testimony can substantiate a dowry claim because Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not apply in its strict sense to family proceedings---There is no rigid formula requiring receipts, shopkeepers’ details or production of parents in every case---Determination depends upon facts of each case and overall probabilities emerging from evidence. Reliance placed on Aziz-Ur-Rehman v. Mst. Bibi Jameela 2020 CLC 380 and Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous 2017 SCMR 393. (d) Dowry articles---Valuation of used household goods---Principles---Held, valuation of dowry articles is to be made case to case with reference to nature, quality, user period and prevailing market conditions---Judge, Family Court cannot adopt a bare rule of thumb without objective criteria---For assessing alternate value of used household articles, relevant factors include: present and past market value; years of use; average life of article; sentimental value attached to item; need to account for replacement at current price where article remains with husband; online market sources and auction platforms for valuation; reasonable depreciation; inflation and consumer price data; and average market prices supplied by parties---Used item may generally be considered at half price, but not below that level, unless marital breakdown occurred within first one or two years, in which case value may be considered around 80% in view of inflation and taxation---Family Court may use modern scientific tools, data, websites and market applications without requiring expert evidence in every case. Reliance placed on Mst. Ayesha Shaheen v. Khalid Mehmood 2013 SCMR 1049; Muhammad Zahid v. Mst. Ghazala Mazhar 2014 CLC 895; Mst. Samreen Bibi v. Judge Family Court PLD 2015 Lahore 504; and Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal 2017 SCMR 321. (e) Matrimonial property---Assets acquired during subsistence of marriage---Vehicle purchased in husband’s name---Claim of wife on basis of contribution---Islamic jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence and equitable principles---Petitioner/wife claimed that vehicle bearing Registration No. AAK-478, Suzuki Cultus, though standing in husband’s name, was acquired with her financial contribution including initial seed money---Held, such asset required consideration not merely as dowry but as matrimonial property---Though under existing Pakistani law a wife does not automatically acquire ownership in husband’s assets merely by marriage, proprietary interest may still be established through proof of contribution, partnership, trust, gift or joint acquisition---Non-financial contributions such as homemaking, childcare and domestic management possess economic significance and can justify recognition of beneficial interest in assets accumulated during marriage---Marriage operates as a cooperative partnership and there should be no bias in favour of sole titled money-earner against homemaker or child-carer. (f) Islamic law---Marriage and property rights---Separate ownership of spouses---Legislative competence to protect women’s matrimonial rights---Held, under classical Islamic jurisprudence husband and wife remain distinct legal persons with separate property rights; wife retains control over her own property and does not, by marriage alone, become owner of husband’s property, nor does husband acquire wife’s property automatically---However, Islamic law does not prohibit legislation for protection of women in respect of matrimonial property where justice and prevention of hardship so require---Concepts of mut‘at al-talaq, maslahah, ijtihad and compensation for women’s contribution provide room for development of protective legal norms---Silence of classical law on community or matrimonial property does not bar modern legislation safeguarding women from post-divorce destitution and exploitation. (g) Comparative jurisprudence---Recognition of marital partnership and non-financial contribution---Held, in a number of jurisdictions including Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Brunei, United Kingdom, United States and Canada, courts and legislation recognize direct and indirect contributions of spouses in distribution of matrimonial assets---Homemaking and childcare are treated as contributions of equal worth to financial input in appropriate cases---Principles of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, equitable distribution and community property regimes demonstrate a broader modern trend that marriage is an economic partnership and domestic contribution materially aids acquisition and preservation of wealth---Such comparative experience may legitimately guide development of family law principles in Pakistan. (h) Women’s rights---Constitutional protection---International obligations---CEDAW---Held, Pakistan, having ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is under an obligation to reconsider its legal framework so as to eliminate discrimination against women in matters concerning ownership, acquisition, management and disposition of property, including consequences of dissolution of marriage---Equal protection of women, particularly homemakers and working wives, requires meaningful legal and policy safeguards in respect of assets acquired during marriage. (i) Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Writ jurisdiction---Limits on enhancement of relief---Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily reappraise evidence to enhance relief granted by trial court---Although appellate court had erred in law and fact by denying wife’s rights altogether, High Court could not itself enhance trial court’s award from 30% to a higher quantified share on writ side---Proper course was to set aside both judgments and remand matter to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties and applying correct legal principles. (j) Recommendations/observations---Legislative reform---Nikahnama---Protection of wife’s property rights---High Court observed that every wife who cohabits with husband during subsistence of marriage should be deemed to have contributed, through domestic labour, childcare and household management, to establishment and maintenance of matrimonial home and family welfare---Recommended that Government initiate comprehensive legislation for equitable distribution of assets acquired during marriage, with enhanced protection for working wives and recognition of homemaker’s contribution---Further observed that Nikahnama may be amended, or appropriate condition inserted in existing form, to record agreement regarding equal division of property acquired after marriage, so as to better protect matrimonial property rights of women. Petition was allowed, judgments and decrees of Family Court and Appellate Court were set aside, and matter was remanded to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties, to be decided within two months.

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---- ----S. 5---Proof of Nikah---Registration of marriage---Nikahnama not proved through reliable evidence---Suit for jactitation of marriage was filed by respondent No.1, while petitioner filed connected suit for restitution of conjugal rights on the plea that a Sharia Nikah had been solemnized between parties on 03.04.2020---Family Court decreed suit for jactitation and dismissed suit for restitution; Appellate Court and High Court maintained concurrent findings---Supreme Court held that alleged Nikah was not established through reliable or legally admissible evidence---No credible explanation was offered as to why alleged Nikah was never registered despite legal requirement under S.5 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Registered Nikahnama is a public record and carries probative value in Court---Failure to register alleged Nikah and failure to prove Nikahnama in accordance with law weakened legal basis of petitioner’s claim. (b) Family law---- ----Jactitation of marriage---False and persistent claim of marriage---Object and scope---Suit for jactitation of marriage is a civil remedy available where a person persistently and falsely asserts existence of marriage---Object of such suit is to obtain declaration that no valid marriage exists and to secure decree of perpetual silence against wrongful assertion---Supreme Court held that petitioner’s conduct reflected an attempt to fabricate an impression of legality to his inhumane acts; therefore Courts below rightly decreed suit for jactitation of marriage and dismissed petitioner’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights. (c) Muslim personal law---- ----Alleged Sharia Nikah---Prohibited degree during subsistence of earlier marriage---Petitioner was already married and his lawful wife was paternal aunt/phupho of respondent No.1---Supreme Court observed that even on petitioner’s own showing, alleged marriage with respondent would attract doctrine of prohibited degree and would not be permissible during subsistence of earlier marriage---To overcome such legal impediment, petitioner set up wholly unsubstantiated plea of divorce against his lawful wife---Such plea, instead of strengthening petitioner’s case, reflected an attempt to tailor facts and manufacture a narrative to lend colour of legality to an otherwise unlawful and coercive relationship. (d) Criminal proceedings---- ----Allegations of sexual assault---Observations in family/civil proceedings---No prejudice to criminal trial---Respondent alleged that petitioner, being her paternal uncle/phupha and taking advantage of relationship of trust, proximity and dominance, subjected her to sexual assault---Supreme Court clarified that any criminal liability arising from such allegations would be adjudicated by competent criminal Court strictly in accordance with law, and observations made in present proceedings would not prejudice such criminal proceedings. (e) Family law---- ----Minor child---Maintenance---Biological father---Distinction between legitimate child and biological child---Petitioner was declared biological father of minor child born to respondent---Supreme Court held that even where petitioner’s version of marriage was discarded, he could not evade consequences of his own conduct---Minor child is an innocent life and cannot be left unprotected---Law does not permit deprivation of sustenance, dignity and lawful support merely because relationship between parents is disputed, unlawful or subject matter of criminal proceedings---Right of maintenance is vested in child and is founded upon welfare, justice and equity---Once biological paternity is established, corresponding obligation of maintenance follows as necessary legal consequence---Biological father cannot deny responsibility or seek refuge behind technical pleas of legitimacy. Cited Cases: • Qudrat Ullah v. Additional District Judge, Renala Khurd District Okara and others PLD 2024 SC 581 • Muhammad Afzal v. Judge Family Court, etc. 2025 LHC 495 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 9, 14, 25 & 35---Welfare of child---Child born outside wedlock---No deprivation of maintenance and protection---Supreme Court emphasized that welfare and rights of minor child cannot be made hostage to unlawful conduct, disputes or defences of adults---Even where child is alleged to have been born outside wedlock, law does not permit such child to be treated as a person without entitlement---Right to maintenance and protection vests in child---Stigma of illegitimacy cannot become shield for biological father to evade responsibility, nor justify deprivation of innocent child---Approach is consistent with constitutional obligations under Arts. 9, 14, 25 and 35 of Constitution and Pakistan’s international commitments under Convention on the Rights of the Child, requiring protection of children without discrimination. (g) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185(3)---Concurrent findings of Family Court, Appellate Court and High Court---No reappraisal of evidence by Supreme Court---Supreme Court held that while exercising jurisdiction under Art.185(3), it does not sit as a Court of further appeal to reappraise evidence or substitute its own conclusions for concurrent findings recorded by Courts below---Interference is warranted only where findings are perverse, arbitrary, based on misreading or non-reading of material evidence, suffer from jurisdictional defect, or result in manifest miscarriage of justice---Petitioner failed to establish lawful basis for relief and sought reassessment of evidence, which was impermissible. Cited Cases: • Saleh Muhammad and another v. Mst. Mehnaz Begum and others PLD 2025 SC 1039 • Allah Bakhsh deceased through LRs and others v. Muhammad Riaz and other PLD 2025 SC 63 • Muhammad Ain-Ul-Haq v. Abdul Ali and another 2024 SCMR 1767 (h) Civil litigation---- ----Frivolous and vexatious litigation---Use of judicial process as coercion and harassment---Exemplary costs---Supreme Court observed that petitioner, despite failing to establish alleged Nikah before three forums, persisted in invoking legal process to pressurize and morally intimidate respondent---Respondent, a young woman, was compelled to undergo repeated, invasive and demeaning scrutiny through a defence concurrently found unsubstantiated---Use of judicial proceedings as instrument of coercion and harassment is impermissible---To mark strong disapproval, compensate respondent for needless hardship, and deter frivolous/vexatious litigation, exemplary costs of Rs.1,000,000 were imposed, payable to respondent No.1 within thirty days, failing which recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Cited Case: • Zakir Mehmood v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence (D.P), Pakistan Secretariat, Rawalpindi and others 2023 SCMR 960 (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 14---Dignity of person---Secondary victimization of women through court process---Supreme Court held that dignity of person is inviolable and constitutionally protected---Courts cannot remain passive venues for perpetuation of social prejudice, nor permit their process to become means of inflicting secondary victimization upon women who approach Courts for vindication of lawful rights---Frivolous allegations and contrived pleas aimed at undermining identity, character and dignity of a woman cannot be countenanced in any civilized system of justice. Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused; concurrent judgments and decrees of Family Court, Appellate Court and Lahore High Court were maintained; suit for jactitation of marriage filed by respondent No.1 remained decreed and petitioner’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights remained dismissed; petitioner was burdened with exemplary costs of Rs.1,000,000 payable to respondent No.1 within thirty days, failing which recoverable as arrears of land revenue; observations regarding criminal liability were held not to prejudice any competent criminal proceedings.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.184(3), 175E(3) & 188---Original constitutional jurisdiction---Final judgment of Supreme Court---Attempt to reopen concluded litigation---Maintainability---Held, that original constitutional jurisdiction under Art.184(3), and after constitutional reconfiguration Art.175E(3), is not an appellate, revisional, supervisory or collateral review jurisdiction over final judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in appeal and affirmed in review---Such jurisdiction remains conditioned upon a question of public importance with reference to enforcement of fundamental rights and cannot be invoked to create a horizontal appeal against concluded Supreme Court adjudication. Cited Cases: • Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 416 • Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 997 • District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 401 (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.184(3)---Public importance and enforcement of fundamental rights---Individual grievance---Land acquisition compensation dispute---Held, that public importance and enforcement of fundamental rights are jurisdictional preconditions for invoking original constitutional jurisdiction---A private dispute concerning compensation arising out of land acquisition proceedings, already adjudicated through the judicial hierarchy, does not become a matter of public importance merely because a party seeks to reopen concluded litigation. (c) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.188---Review jurisdiction---Finality of judgments---Scope---Held, that Art.188 provides the constitutionally recognized corrective mechanism after final adjudication by the Supreme Court, subject to law and rules---Once appellate remedy and review have been exhausted, a party cannot indirectly reopen the same controversy through a fresh constitutional petition under Art.184(3) or Art.175E(3)---Finality of judgments is indispensable to administration of justice and institutional certainty. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473 • Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582 (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.175E(3)---Federal Constitutional Court---Effect of constitutional amendment---No appellate supervision over concluded Supreme Court judgments---Held, that even after incorporation of Art.175E(3), constitutional provisions of similar nature must be construed harmoniously within the structural framework of the Constitution---Nothing in Art.175E(3) vests the Federal Constitutional Court with supervisory, appellate or review jurisdiction over final judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in appeal and affirmed in review---The provision cannot be converted into a collateral appellate mechanism. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.184(3)---Original jurisdiction---Not a substitute for appeal or review---Held, that Art.184(3) is extraordinary in nature and designed for cases involving systemic or structural violations of fundamental rights requiring immediate constitutional scrutiny---It is not meant for re-agitating matters already determined through regular judicial hierarchy, nor for redress of individual grievances arising out of concluded litigation. (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.188 read with Order XXVI of Supreme Court Rules, 1980---Review petition against order dismissing C.M. Appeal and sustaining office objection---Maintainability---Held, that where the office had objected to the maintainability of a constitutional petition under Art.184(3), and the C.M. Appeal against such objection had been dismissed on the ground that the petition did not involve public importance or enforcement of fundamental rights, a further review petition seeking to reopen the concluded controversy was not maintainable. (g) Constitutional Law---- ----Doctrine of finality---Perpetual litigation disfavoured---Held, that the Constitution does not envisage perpetual litigation; judicial discipline requires a terminus to adjudication---Permitting concluded Supreme Court judgments to be reopened through Art.184(3) or Art.175E(3) after dismissal of review would render Art.188 redundant and destabilize the doctrine of finality. (h) Constitutional Law---- ----Curative review---Exceptional jurisdiction---No general right to reopen concluded judgments---Held, that reliance upon the concept of curative review could not assist the petitioner where no general curative jurisdiction exists to permit reopening of concluded judgments as a matter of course---Exceptional constitutional proceedings in distinct circumstances do not create a routine collateral remedy against final adjudication. Disposition: Review petition was dismissed as not maintainable; order dismissing C.M. Appeal and sustaining office objection to the constitutional petition under Art.184(3) was maintained.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---- ----Ss. 24, 27 & 28---Pre-emption suit---Deposit of one-third sale consideration---Actual sale consideration disputed---Plaint rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. for alleged non-compliance with statutory deposit requirement---Supreme Court held that pre-emption law is anchored to the sale transaction itself and not to an independent or automatic assessment of market value---Pre-emptor ordinarily steps into shoes of vendee and must purchase property at same consideration where price is found genuine and fixed in good faith---Market value is not the default rule; it becomes relevant only where declared consideration is proved fictitious, inflated or mala fide. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---- ----S. 27---Determination of price payable by pre-emptor---Genuine sale price versus market value---Two-stage mechanism---Supreme Court held that where sale consideration is found to be genuine and fixed in good faith, Court shall fix such price to be paid by pre-emptor---Pre-emptor cannot claim property merely on perceived “realistic” or market value---Only where Court concludes that stated price was not fixed in good faith, for example where it was inflated or fictitious to defeat pre-emption, Court may determine market value as price payable by pre-emptor. Cited Cases: • Zilla Muhammad v. Qamar Ali Khan 2016 SCMR 184 • Allah Bakhsh v. Umar 1991 SCMR 1692 (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---- ----S. 24---Deposit in pre-emption suit---“Sale consideration” not “pre-emption money”---Supreme Court reiterated that statutory deposit under S.24 is one-third of sale consideration---Courts should avoid loose expression “pre-emption money” and instead use correct statutory terminology, namely “sale consideration”---Lower Courts must calculate and specify precise amount required for deposit within reasonable time. Cited Case: • Wasal Khan v. Niaz Ali Khan 2016 SCMR 40 (d) Pre-emption---- ----Inflated or exaggerated sale consideration---Burden of proof---Market value lower than transaction price---Effect---Appellant/pre-emptor contended that value shown in sale transaction was exorbitantly higher than market value---Supreme Court held that such plea is insignificant unless it is shown that inflated value was purposely stated to defeat right of pre-emption---A very heavy burden rests on pre-emptor seeking to enforce pre-emption on such plea---Seller is not deprived merely because property fetched price higher than prevailing market value; what matters is whether declared price was actually paid and represented bona fide transactional value. (e) Pre-emption---- ----Bona fide transactional value---Court’s duty---Supreme Court held that Trial Court must determine whether sale consideration disclosed in transaction was exaggerated and not actually paid to vendor, or whether it was true transactional value actually paid, irrespective of market value---The Court must first examine bona fides of sale price before resorting to valuation based on comparable sales or surrounding circumstances. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Pre-emption suit---Dispute regarding correct sale consideration and statutory deposit---Trial Court rejected plaint on ground that plaintiff had not deposited actual one-third sale consideration and bank guarantee for remaining two-thirds---Appellate Court restored suit because substantial evidence had already been recorded and dispute regarding actual transactional value required determination---Supreme Court upheld restoration approach, observing that where sale consideration itself is disputed and evidence exists, matter should proceed for determination in accordance with Ss.24, 27 and 28 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Limits---Appellate Court’s lawful exercise of jurisdiction---High Court in revision set aside Appellate Court’s judgment and restored Trial Court’s rejection of plaint---Supreme Court held that once Appellate Court had lawfully exercised jurisdiction by remanding/restoring suit for proper determination, revisional Court had no room to substitute another view in absence of jurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularity---No ground was available for High Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction under S.115, C.P.C. (h) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185(2)(d)---Appeal as of right---Pre-emption matter---Appellant filed direct appeal before Supreme Court against High Court judgment allowing revision and restoring rejection of plaint---Supreme Court entertained appeal as of right and corrected High Court’s interference with Appellate Court’s lawful order. Disposition: Appeal was allowed; judgment of Peshawar High Court dated 23.02.2022 was set aside; matter was remanded to Trial Court to proceed with pre-emption suit in light of Supreme Court’s observations regarding genuine sale consideration, market value as exceptional mechanism, and statutory deposit; Trial Court was permitted to frame issue if deemed necessary and allow additional evidence, if any; trial was directed not to take more than three months.

Summary: Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983--- ----Arts. 9(2), 29 & 32---Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199---Service matter---Pensionary benefits---Jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib---Bar regarding personal grievance of public servant---Effect of undertaking given before Ombudsman---Representations before President---Maintainability of constitutional petition--- Petitioner, retired employee of Telephone Industries of Pakistan, sought redress before Wafaqi Mohtasib regarding non-settlement of pensionary benefits, including cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted pension and annual increases---Chief Financial Officer of employer gave written undertaking before Mohtasib that pension issues would be resolved within 30 to 45 days, whereupon complaint was disposed of with direction for compliance---On review, Mohtasib further directed employer to place matter before Board of Directors and determine date of payment---Representation before President was dismissed on limitation, but High Court in constitutional jurisdiction set aside orders of Mohtasib and President on ground of want of jurisdiction---Federal Constitutional Court held that grievance raised by petitioner was plainly a personal service grievance relating to his employment in agency where he had served, and thus fell squarely within bar contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983---Wafaqi Mohtasib had no lawful authority to entertain such complaint or pass directions thereon, and orders passed by him were coram non judice and void ab initio---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts under Art. 29 of the Order of 1983 did not preclude interference by High Court where order of Ombudsman suffered from want or excess of jurisdiction---Dismissal of representation before President on ground of limitation did not validate inherently void order, nor did exhaustion of alternate remedy bar constitutional jurisdiction in such case---Undertaking or participation by employer before Ombudsman could not confer jurisdiction on forum expressly barred by statute, nor could doctrine of estoppel operate against law---High Court had rightly set aside impugned orders---Leave was refused and petition dismissed. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Karachi v. Wafaqi Mohtasib and others (1998 SCMR 841); Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), Islamabad and others (PLD 2016 SC 940); Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another (PLD 1967 SC 314); Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.-W.F.P. (PLD 1995 SC 66); Maulvi Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Ahmad Khan and others (2004 SCMR 1622); Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Ashiq and others (PLD 2006 SC 328); Syed Muhammad Hussain Shah v. Abdul Qayyum and others (2011 SCMR 743) rel. (a) Wafaqi Mohtasib---Jurisdiction---Service matters of employees of agency---Bar contained in Art. 9(2), Order of 1983--- Article 9(2) of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 expressly prohibits Wafaqi Mohtasib from accepting for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of a public servant or functionary concerning any matter relating to agency in which he is or has been working, where grievance pertains to his personal service affairs---Such matters are to be agitated before competent fora constituted for service disputes, and not before Ombudsman. (b) Pensionary claim of retired employee---Nature of dispute--- Claim regarding recalculation of pension, inclusion of cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted portion of pension and grant of annual increases is a personal grievance arising out of service and retirement benefits---Such dispute falls within exclusionary clause of Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (c) Order passed without jurisdiction---Effect--- Any order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib in a matter expressly excluded by Art. 9(2) is without lawful authority, coram non judice and void ab initio---Such order cannot be sustained irrespective of merits of underlying claim. (d) Article 29, Order of 1983---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts---Scope--- Statutory bar against challenge to action or order of Wafaqi Mohtasib does not oust constitutional jurisdiction of High Court where impugned order suffers from want or excess of jurisdiction, is coram non judice, or has been passed in violation of law---In such cases, judicial review under Art. 199 of the Constitution remains available. (e) Representation before President under Art. 32, Order of 1983---Dismissal on limitation---Effect--- Dismissal of representation on technical ground of limitation does not amount to affirmation of impugned order on merits, nor does it cure inherent jurisdictional defect in original proceedings---Even a decision on merits cannot validate an order that is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. (f) Alternate remedy---Exhaustion of statutory recourse---Whether bars writ jurisdiction--- Availability or even exhaustion of alternate statutory remedy does not operate as absolute bar to constitutional jurisdiction where impugned order is ex facie contrary to statute or passed without jurisdiction---High Court remains competent to correct such illegality. (g) Undertaking before Ombudsman---Consent, waiver or acquiescence---Effect on jurisdiction--- Jurisdiction is creature of statute and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, acquiescence, silence, participation or undertaking of parties---An employer’s written undertaking before Ombudsman to resolve employee’s grievance cannot validate proceedings before a forum expressly barred by law from entertaining such matter. (h) Estoppel against statute---Non-application of doctrine--- Doctrine of estoppel does not operate against statute---No concession or conduct of parties can override express prohibition contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (i) Undertaking given before incompetent forum---Remedy--- Although undertaking given before Wafaqi Mohtasib cannot cure lack of jurisdiction, aggrieved person may, if so advised, agitate effect of such undertaking before a competent forum in accordance with law. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 175F(1)(c)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 491---Leave to appeal against dismissal of habeas corpus petition for recovery of alleged detenue/daughter---Scope---Petitioner/father sought recovery of his daughter on the plea that she was a Christian minor and had been taken into unlawful custody by respondent, who claimed to be her husband---Courts below dismissed the petition on the basis of the girl’s voluntary statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and her assertion that she had contracted marriage of her free will---Federal Constitutional Court held that where the alleged detenue had repeatedly appeared before competent fora and unequivocally stated that no abduction had taken place and that she had married voluntarily, her custody with the person claiming to be her husband could not, in summary proceedings under S.491, Cr.P.C., be termed illegal or unlawful---Question whether Nikahnama was forged, or whether investigation required transfer, pertained to criminal process and could not by itself justify habeas corpus relief---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed. (b) Muslim Personal Law---Marriage between Muslim male and Christian female---Validity---Petitioner contended that his Christian daughter could not lawfully marry a Muslim male---Held, contention was misconceived and contrary to settled principles of Islamic law---A Muslim male may validly contract marriage with a Christian woman, being from Ahl al-Kitab---Such principle stood recognized in earlier Supreme Court authorities and classical juristic exposition---Court held that objection to marriage merely on the basis of difference of religion was without substance. Cited Cases: Mrs. Marina Jatoi v. Nuruddin K. Jatoi and others PLD 1967 SC 580. Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Mst. Bilqis Bibi and others PLD 1981 SC 56. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 189---Federal Constitutional Court---Precedential value of judgments of Supreme Court of Pakistan after establishment of Federal Constitutional Court---Held, judgments of the former Supreme Court of Pakistan do not bind the Federal Constitutional Court as a matter of absolute precedent under the restructured constitutional hierarchy, but continue to carry great persuasive value where they are based on sound reasoning, are consistent with constitutional text and structure, and do not offend fundamental rights or evolved constitutional values---Doctrine of stare decisis was not abrogated but recalibrated in light of constitutional supremacy---Departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent must be express, reasoned and principled, and may be justified where such precedent is manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution, undermines fundamental rights, reflects judicial overreach, becomes incompatible with evolved constitutional values and democratic norms, or where any other compelling reason advances the cause of justice. (d) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)----S.1(2)---Marriage---Conversion to Islam---Effect---Though marriage of a Muslim male with a Christian female is permissible in principle, solemnization and registration under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is confined to Muslim citizens---Respondent’s stance was that the girl had embraced Islam before marriage---Affidavit appended with Nikahnama and subsequent certificate issued by a religious institution were produced to show conversion---Held, faith is a personal matter; once a person openly professes adherence to Islam, ordinarily no roving inquiry into the sincerity or motive of conversion is warranted in such proceedings---No specific ritual is indispensable beyond declaration and profession of belief---Where girl herself acknowledged correctness of Nikahnama and declared conversion, Court would not undertake deeper inquiry into genuineness of conversion in summary jurisdiction---Marriage was, prima facie, validly solemnized under the Ordinance. Cited Cases: Mst. Zarina and another v. The State PLD 1988 FSC 105. Tariq Masih v. The State 2004 PCr.LJ 622. (e) Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929---Child marriage---Effect on validity of marriage---Petitioner asserted that alleged detenue was about twelve years of age and, therefore, incapable of contracting valid marriage---Held, the Act of 1929 restrains and criminalizes solemnization of child marriage, but does not expressly render such marriage void or voidable---In absence of explicit statutory language invalidating the marriage, its legal status remains unaffected---Where legislature intends to override settled personal law, it must do so in clear and unequivocal terms; such intention cannot be inferred from silence---Therefore, even assuming minority, marriage would not automatically become void merely because it was contracted in contravention of the Act of 1929. Cited Cases: Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mirza Muhammad Amin and another PLD 1962 W.P. Karachi 442. Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad and another PLD 1970 SC 323. Mauj Ali v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah and another 1970 SCMR 437. Nasreen Bibi v. Station House Officer and others 2024 PCr.LJ 2058. Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate 1st Class and others PLD 2021 Lahore 21. Muhammad Azam v. The State and another 2018 PCr.LJ Note 175. Muhammad Safeer v. Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad PLD 2018 Islamabad 385. Allah Nawaz v. Station House Officer PLD 2013 Lahore 243. Allah Bakhsh v. Safdar and others 2006 YLR 2936. Ghulam Qadir v. The Judge Family Court, Murree 1988 CLC 113. Ghulam Hussain v. Nawaz Ali and another 1975 PCr.LJ 1049. (f) Evidence---Age of alleged detenue---Delayed birth documents---Probative value---Petitioner relied on birth certificate and child registration certificate to show that his daughter was born on 07.10.2012---Held, both documents had been procured many years after the alleged date of birth and no satisfactory explanation for such inordinate delay was furnished---Delayed registration of birth, unless supported by independent and reliable material, is susceptible to manipulation and its evidentiary value is diminished---Further, inconsistency in petitioner’s own stance regarding age in the F.I.R., close birth dates shown for the alleged detenue and her next sibling, entry of a different date of birth in the Nikahnama, and the girl’s own denial of minority materially weakened petitioner’s case---In such circumstances, delayed documents could not be treated as sole basis for holding that the girl was minor, particularly when she appeared physically before the Court and seemed to be of more advanced age. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.164---Statement of alleged detenue---Evidentiary significance in habeas corpus proceedings---Girl had recorded statement before Magistrate that nobody abducted her, no zina was committed, and that she had married respondent of her own free will; she had also made a similar statement in proceedings under Ss.22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.---Held, such consistent voluntary statements before judicial fora carried significant value in determining whether custody was illegal---Where marriage was acknowledged and free will asserted, summary court was justified in declining to infer unlawful detention. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.491---Summary nature of proceedings---Limitations---Question whether Nikahnama was forged or unregistered, and whether offences were made out in investigation, could not properly be adjudicated in proceedings of interim and summary nature under S.491, Cr.P.C.---Such issues were to be pursued before competent criminal court or through appropriate investigative remedies---Habeas corpus jurisdiction is not designed to conclusively determine complex factual controversies touching upon validity of marriage documents. (i) Res judicata---Constitutional petition for recovery of daughter---Earlier writ petition on same cause having attained finality---Effect---Petitioner had earlier filed writ petition for recovery of same daughter from same alleged custody on same foundational ground, which was dismissed by High Court after considering her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and holding that her custody with husband was not illegal or unlawful---Said finding was not challenged before higher forum and, therefore, attained finality---Held, subsequent proceedings on same issue were barred by principle of res judicata, and petitioner could not re-agitate the same question through another round of litigation. Cited Case: Pir Bakhsh v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145. (j) Constitutional law---Fundamental rights---Reliance on High Court judgment concerning discriminatory definition of “child”---Relevance---Petitioner relied upon PLD 2025 Lah. 1---Held, said judgment had no application to the controversy in hand, as that case concerned challenge to discriminatory definition of “child” prescribing different minimum ages for males and females with reference to provincial legislation, whereas present case concerned legality of custody and alleged invalidity of marriage in the factual setting of Punjab law. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed; however, observations made in the judgment were not to prejudice or impede criminal proceedings, if any, before the competent criminal court in accordance with law. ------ "The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 merely criminalizes the solemnization of a child marriage but does not expressly declare such a marriage to be void or voidable. The binding force of judicial precedent is not derived from institutional seniority but from the constitutional hierarchy itself. Since, the supremacy of constitutional adjudication now vests in this Court, therefore, all courts, including the Supreme Court of Pakistan, are bound by its pronouncements. However, this Court would ordinarily respect and follow the earlier constitutional jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, unless it is established that the same is manifestly erroneous, inconsistent with the constitutional text or scheme, or incompatible with fundamental rights and contemporary constitutional values. "

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art. 175E(5) & Federal Legislative List, Entry 49---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022, Sch. 2, Serial No. 14---Provincial sales tax on services---Construction services---Challenge to vires---Tax on services vis-à-vis tax on goods---Scope of provincial taxing power after Eighteenth Amendment--- Petitioners challenged vires of Serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022 on ground that levy described as tax on “Construction Services” in substance included goods component of construction contracts, which, according to petitioners, could only be taxed by Federation under Entry 49 of Federal Legislative List---Federal Constitutional Court held that impugned provision, when read harmoniously with Entry 49, imposed tax only on services and not on goods---After Eighteenth Amendment, power to levy tax on services vested exclusively in Provinces, while Federation retained competence over taxes on sales and purchases of goods except sales tax on services---Impugned entry was confined to construction and allied services and was not inconsistent with Constitution---Even learned counsel for petitioners conceded that Serial No. 14 was confined to services and did not extend to goods---Accordingly, no ground was made out to strike down impugned law as ultra vires. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022--- ----Levy on entire contractual consideration---Inclusion of goods component---Double taxation concern---Adjustment mechanism---Need for bifurcation--- Court, however, observed that grievance of petitioners substantially related not to vires of law but to manner of its implementation, as show-cause notices had demanded tax on entire contractual consideration for period from July 2021 to April 2022, including value of goods utilized in performance of contracts---Court noted that statute itself allowed claim of adjustments, including refunds, regarding tax paid under other laws on goods or taxable services used in provision of taxable services, and Memorandum of Understanding between FBR and KPRA also envisaged cross-adjustment to avoid double taxation---Matter was thus governed by existing law and administrative arrangement and did not warrant constitutional invalidation of impugned provision---Court nevertheless emphasized that KPRA should devise clearer mechanism, rules or Standard Operating Procedures requiring bifurcation of contractual consideration into service component and goods component so that only service portion is subjected to provincial sales tax and unnecessary hardship to taxpayers is avoided. Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art. 175E(5)---Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction---Tax reference involving vires of law--- Though tax references were not expressly enumerated within ordinary appellate jurisdiction of Federal Constitutional Court, challenge in present case involved substantial question of constitutional interpretation, namely vires of provincial law---Court held that Art. 175E(5) empowered it, on its own motion or otherwise, to call for record of “any case” from “any court” where substantial question of law as to interpretation of Constitution arose---Such power was unqualified and wide enough to include tax references and other proceedings even where express jurisdiction might not otherwise be specifically mentioned---Since vires of legislation inherently raised substantial constitutional question, Federal Constitutional Court was competent to adjudicate matter and, under present constitutional scheme, is sole apex forum for determining vires of legislation. (a) Provincial sales tax on services---Construction services---Constitutional validity--- After the Eighteenth Amendment, Provinces possess exclusive competence to levy tax on services, while Federation retains competence to tax goods under Entry 49 of Federal Legislative List, except sales tax on services---Serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022, being confined to “Construction Services” and allied services, was intra vires the Constitution. (b) Vires challenge---Harmonious construction of constitutional and statutory provisions--- Where constitutional entry and impugned statutory provision can be read harmoniously without contradiction, constitutional invalidation is not warranted---Impugned law did not trench upon federal taxing domain over goods merely because construction contracts may involve use of goods in course of service delivery. (c) Levy on whole contract amount---Goods and services mixed in construction contracts---Effect--- If tax is demanded on entire contractual consideration, inclusive of both service charges and cost of goods utilized in execution of contract, such grievance pertains to application and assessment mechanism rather than constitutional validity of charging provision itself---Province may tax service component only and not goods component. (d) Double taxation concern---Statutory adjustment and refund mechanism--- Where statute provides for adjustment or refund of tax paid under other laws on goods or taxable services used in provision of taxable service, and there exists inter-agency arrangement for cross-adjustment, apprehended double taxation is addressable within framework of law and does not by itself render charging provision unconstitutional. (e) Revenue administration---Need for bifurcation of contractual consideration--- Revenue authority should streamline process by first requiring taxpayer to identify and segregate portion of contractual consideration attributable to services and portion attributable to goods, so that provincial sales tax is levied strictly on services while goods component remains governed by federal sales tax regime---Formulation of rules or Standard Operating Procedures to this effect was recommended. (f) Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction over tax reference involving vires of law--- Even though tax references are not expressly listed in ordinary heads of jurisdiction, Art. 175E(5) authorizes Federal Constitutional Court to call for and adjudicate “any case” from “any court” if it involves substantial question of law as to interpretation of Constitution---Challenge to vires of legislation inherently raises such question and therefore falls within jurisdiction of said Court. (g) Present constitutional scheme---Forum for striking down legislation--- Under present constitutional arrangement, authority to adjudicate upon vires of legislation and to strike down laws on constitutional grounds vests in Federal Constitutional Court, and not in Supreme Court, wherever substantial question of constitutional interpretation is involved. Leave refused; petitions dismissed; impugned judgment affirmed.

Summary: Opinion of Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar --- (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 186---Advisory jurisdiction of Supreme Court---Scope, nature and effect---President of Pakistan may seek opinion of Supreme Court on any question of law which he considers of public importance---Advisory jurisdiction, though not deciding a lis between parties in the ordinary sense, is a solemn constitutional jurisdiction requiring due deliberation, evaluation of arguments and formulation of opinion by the Court---Opinion rendered in Presidential Reference is not strictly binding like an inter-partes judgment, but carries significant credence, persuasive value and moral authority, and ought to be respected by constitutional organs---Questions referred to Supreme Court should not be ambiguous, indeterminate or incapable of formulation of opinion---Supreme Court is empowered to consider whether reference raises a constitutional question of public importance and to answer it accordingly. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 186---Presidential Reference concerning trial of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto---Fair trial and due process---Larger Bench had opined that proceedings of trial by Lahore High Court and appeal before Supreme Court did not meet requirements of fundamental right to fair trial and due process enshrined in Arts. 4 and 9 of the Constitution and later expressly guaranteed under Art.10-A---Although conviction had attained finality after dismissal of review petition, advisory jurisdiction was invoked to examine grave blemishes and glitches in the murder trial which had damaged public confidence in fairness of proceedings---Reference was maintainable to the extent of constitutional questions relating to fair trial, due process and administration of justice. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 156, 160, 169, 170 & 173---Investigation and reinvestigation---Closed case---Effect---Police are required to conduct investigation impartially and collect evidence from all possible angles, including material favourable to accused---If evidence is insufficient, Investigating Officer may release accused under S.169, Cr.P.C.; if sufficient evidence exists, report is to be submitted under S.173, Cr.P.C.---After first investigation in murder case had been closed and cancellation report submitted before Magistrate, matter was resurrected years later without complaint by legal heirs or any aggrieved person and without lawful justification---No independent reasoning or cogent justification was available for reinvestigation---Reinvestigation must not be routinely ordered to favour influential persons or punish non-influential persons; if used improperly, it becomes a dangerous tool undermining integrity of criminal justice system and poses serious threat to administration of justice. Cited Cases: • Noor Mohd Holt Ltd. v. Department of Trade and others 1978 3 All ER 280 • Wiseman v. Borneman 1971 AC 297 (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 28, 190 & 526---Transfer of murder trial from Court of Sessions to High Court---Jurisdiction and procedure---Offence under S.302, PPC is ordinarily triable by Court of Sessions, while High Court may try such case only when lawfully transferred or otherwise within jurisdiction---Transfer of case from Sessions Court to Lahore High Court was allowed in slipshod manner on very next day after Sessions Judge framed charge, without notice to accused, without considering statutory parameters and without judicially examining whether transfer was necessary for ends of justice---Transfer was not sought for convenience or safety but had effect of depriving accused of ordinary forum and ordinary first appellate scrutiny---Such hurried transfer raised serious concerns regarding fairness and due process. (e) Administration of justice---- ----Bias---Judicial impartiality---Fair trial---Test for bias---Justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done---A Judge must decide cases according to law and conscience without fear, favour, affection, pressure, annoyance or external influence---Where circumstances create a reasonable apprehension in mind of prudent person that Judge may not act with complete impartiality, the proceedings are tainted---Bias may be personal, pecuniary, official, political, or arise from conduct showing prejudice, hostility, pressure or predisposition---In the murder trial under consideration, allegations of bias, pressure, annoyance with counsel and unusual haste created circumstances affecting appearance and substance of fair trial. Cited Cases: • Ms. Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 1405 • R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy 1924 1 KB 256 • Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors 1852 3 HLC 759 • Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon 1969 1 QB 577 • R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte No.2 1999 1 WLR 876 • Porter v. Magill 2002 2 AC 357 • Ali Asad Zaidi v. The State PLD 2001 SC 663 • State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar AIR 2013 SC 364 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A---Doctrine of natural justice and due process---Criminal trial---Presumption of innocence---Accused as favourite child of law---In every criminal trial, burden lies on prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; accused is not to be treated as an unfavourable child of law but remains entitled to all safeguards of fair trial---Scrutiny of prosecution evidence must be independent, impartial and free from bias or prejudice---Personal bias, preconceived mind or jaundiced eye of Judge tarnishes fairness of trial and undermines equal protection of law---No person can be condemned without fair opportunity to explain, contest and defend---Fair trial and due process are sacred obligations for every Court and tribunal. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shahzad 2024 SCMR 51 • Junaid Wazir v. Superintendent of Police 2024 SCMR 181 • Federation of Pakistan v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 • Umar Khan v. Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745 • Capital Development Authority v. Sabir Hussain 2023 SCMR 627 • Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135 • Government of Balochistan v. Ghulam Rasool 2024 SCMR 1185 • Inspector General of Police, Quetta v. Zia Muhammad 2023 SCMR 1583 (g) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Approver/accomplice evidence---Evidentiary value---Corroboration---Evidence of an approver is an acid test for Court; Court must examine whether such testimony is trustworthy and supported by independent reliable corroboration---An accomplice is generally unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars---Approver may be competent witness, but rule of prudence demands great care and caution before relying upon such testimony, particularly in capital cases---Corroboration must not be merely formal but must connect accused with commission of offence through independent and reliable evidence. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 374 & 376---Confirmation of death sentence---Trial by High Court in original criminal jurisdiction---Where death sentence is awarded by Court of Sessions, proceedings are submitted to High Court for confirmation under S.374, Cr.P.C., and sentence cannot be executed unless confirmed---However, where High Court itself conducts murder trial and convicts accused under original jurisdiction, no further confirmation by a larger bench of High Court is required; rather remedy lies by appeal before Supreme Court under Art.185 of the Constitution---In such situation, constitutional and appellate scrutiny by Supreme Court assumes heightened importance. (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185---Right of appeal---Murder trial conducted by High Court---Denial of ordinary appellate forum---Where murder trial is conducted by Court of Sessions, convict ordinarily has appeal before High Court and further remedy before Supreme Court---But where High Court withdraws case and tries it itself, accused is deprived of ordinary first appellate forum and can approach Supreme Court directly---Supreme Court, in such cases, should ordinarily be inclined to grant leave and examine case carefully to ensure safe administration of criminal justice, especially where death sentence is involved---In the case of Mr. Bhutto, direct appeal before Supreme Court after trial by High Court left no ordinary appellate reappraisal by High Court. (j) Media interviews and post-retirement disclosures---- ----Judicial conduct---Bias and public confidence---Subsequent interviews of former Judge suggesting pressure, annoyance with defence counsel, and external atmosphere surrounding proceedings could not by themselves unsettle a final judicial decision, but they were relevant in understanding cumulative circumstances showing fair trial concerns---Such disclosures, read with record of proceedings, corroborated apprehension that trial and appeal were not conducted in atmosphere required by constitutional guarantees of due process and impartial justice. (k) Sentence---- ----Death penalty---Mitigating circumstances---Role of Judge---Judge must not be influenced by appeasement, flattery, malice, annoyance with counsel, or emotional pressure while deciding punishment---Criminal Court retains power to consider mitigating circumstances and impose lesser sentence where justice so demands---In murder cases before Supreme Court, Court may confirm death sentence, alter it to life imprisonment, or grant acquittal depending on record---In Bhutto review proceedings, submission seeking commutation rather than acquittal was recorded, but Court still had power to consider whether punishment could be altered---On independent appraisal of record and peculiar circumstances, death sentence was not safe to maintain; life imprisonment would have met ends of justice. Cited Case: • Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto v. The State PLD 1979 SC 741 (l) Administration of justice---- ----Delay in answering Presidential Reference---Effect---Reference was answered after nearly thirteen years---Delay in adjudication undermines confidence in justice system, as justice delayed is justice denied---Courts must decide matters within reasonable time because prolonged pendency can prejudice rights of parties and create possibility of injustice---Proper balance in Court docket is necessary so that powerful or constitutionally significant matters do not unjustly eclipse other important matters, yet matters raising fundamental fairness concerns are not left unanswered. (m) Islamic jurisprudence---- ----Doctrine of repentance---Question framed in Presidential Reference---No opinion by larger Bench---One question in Reference sought opinion regarding doctrine of repentance under Islamic jurisprudence, but no opinion was rendered by Supreme Court on that question---Where trial itself was found to have been unfair and proceedings below were tainted by denial of fair trial and due process, unresolved question of repentance remained unanswered and did not alter conclusion regarding constitutional infirmities in trial process. (n) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 186---Reporting of opinion to President---After recording opinion on questions arising from Reference, office was directed to report opinion through proper channel to worthy President of Pakistan in terms of Art.186 of the Constitution. Disposition: Opinion was rendered in Reference No.01/2011 under Art.186 of the Constitution; Supreme Court, through the larger Bench, had already opined that the trial of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and appellate proceedings did not meet requirements of fair trial and due process under Arts.4 and 9 of the Constitution and later Art.10-A; Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, in his separate opinion, further examined advisory jurisdiction, reinvestigation, transfer of trial to High Court, bias, natural justice, approver evidence, confirmation of death sentence, right of appeal, media interviews, mitigating circumstances and doctrine of repentance; office was directed to report the opinion to the President of Pakistan through proper channel.

Summary: Short order ---- Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Ss. 4B & 4C—First Schedule, Part I, Division IIA & Division IIB—Fifth Schedule, Rules 4, 4AA & 4AB—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 25, 73(2)(a), 175F, 185(3)—Fourth Schedule, Federal Legislative List, Part I, Entry 47—Super tax—Constitutional validity—Nature of levy—Tax on income—The Federal Constitutional Court considered the vires of super tax imposed under S. 4B, introduced through the Finance Act, 2015 for raising revenue for internally displaced persons, and under S. 4C, introduced through the Finance Act, 2022 on high-earning persons. The Court held that both S. 4B and S. 4C were validly enacted taxes on income falling squarely within Entry 47 of Part I of the Federal Legislative List, and that Parliament was fully competent to impose, alter, regulate, or abolish such taxes through a Finance Act as part of a Money Bill under Art. 73(2)(a) of the Constitution. It was further held that super tax under S. 4B was a “tax” and not a “fee”, and that neither S. 4B nor S. 4C suffered from any inherent lack of legislative competence or facial constitutional infirmity warranting invalidation. Constitutional law—Fiscal legislation—Article 25—Classification—Income-based and sector-based distinctions—The Court held that the classification created under S. 4B was income-based, founded on intelligible differentia, and bore a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved; therefore, it was neither discriminatory nor productive of unreasonable or hostile discrimination among persons similarly situated. Likewise, the classification of fifteen sectors in the First Proviso to Division IIB, Part I, First Schedule, subjected to a higher rate of super tax under S. 4C for tax year 2022, was held to be reasonable and constitutionally permissible under Art. 25 of the Constitution. Consequently, the judgments of the Sindh, Lahore and Islamabad High Courts, insofar as they had declared the said proviso discriminatory, were set aside. Taxation—Retrospective operation of fiscal statutes—Tax year 2022 and onwards—Past and closed transactions—The Court held that the legislature possesses plenary power to enact laws with retrospective as well as prospective effect, subject to the limitation that such laws must not operate upon past and closed transactions. Applying that principle, it was held that S. 4C validly applied to tax year 2022 and onwards, and that the closing of accounts for a tax year did not, in the scheme of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, constitute such an event as would preclude imposition of a fresh charge, particularly when returns for tax year 2022 were yet to be filed. On the same reasoning, the rates in Division IIB amended through the Finance Act, 2023 were held applicable to tax year 2023. Accordingly, the contrary findings of the Sindh, Lahore and Islamabad High Courts, which had held S. 4C inapplicable to tax year 2022, and the amended rates inapplicable to tax year 2023, were set aside. Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—S. 4C(2)—Meaning of “income”—All sources of income—Capital gains on securities—The Court held that the statutory definition of “income” for purposes of S. 4C, insofar as it embraced income from all sources, was validly enacted. The judgments of the Islamabad High Court which had read down S. 4C were, to that extent, set aside. It was further held that super tax under S. 4C is a self-contained and standalone tax on income independent of the levy under S. 4 of the Ordinance, and, therefore, applies to capital gains falling under S. 37A and the Eighth Schedule, being within the ambit of S. 4C(2)(i) and (iv). Practice and procedure—Maintainability of appeals—Locus standi of CIR/FBR—Transposition of parties—The taxpayers raised a preliminary objection that appeals in the S. 4C matters were not maintainable because they had not been instituted by the Federation of Pakistan. The Court rejected the objection and held that it possessed inherent power to transpose a party where necessary for just and proper adjudication, and since the Federation was already before the Court as respondent, it could be transposed as appellant, which was accordingly done. The Court further noted that several connected matters had, in any event, been filed by the Federation itself in addition to the Commissioner Inland Revenue and Federal Board of Revenue; hence, the appeals were maintainable on that count as well. Exploration and petroleum companies—Fifth Schedule—Petroleum Concession Agreements—Aggregate tax ceiling—Super tax liability—The Court held that Ss. 4B and 4C, by virtue of Rules 4AA and 4AB of the Fifth Schedule, would apply to income arising to oil exploration and petroleum companies only to the extent that such application did not result in exceeding the aggregate rate of taxes provided in the Fifth Schedule and in their respective Petroleum Concession Agreements. In relation to S. 4C, the Court modified the Islamabad High Court judgment to the extent that the departmental determination of each Petroleum Concession Agreement was to be undertaken by juxtaposing its terms and conditions with the Regulation of Mines & Minerals (Government Control) Act, 1948 and the applicable tax law, whether the Income Tax Act, 1922, the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, or the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Court further held that S. 4C would continue to apply to other income of such companies from all other sources falling under S. 4C(2)(i), (ii) and (iii), but the concerned Commissioner Inland Revenue must first determine liability afresh and afford an opportunity of hearing before taking recovery measures. Special statutory regimes—Sector-specific protection—No implied override—The Court held that S. 4C could not be construed to operate in a manner inconsistent with Rule 4 of the Fifth Schedule, because that rule embodied a sector-specific framework recognizing the unique nature, risks and investment requirements of the petroleum and exploration industry. Imposition of super tax beyond the prescribed threshold would override that legislative safeguard, impose an excessive and disproportionate burden, and frustrate the very purpose for which the special provisions had been enacted. In the absence of a clear and express legislative intention to abrogate or modify those sectoral thresholds, S. 4C could not be interpreted so as to produce that result. Banking companies—Super tax—Tax year 2023 onwards—The Court held that S. 4C, as enacted through the Finance Act, 2022, applied to banking companies for tax year 2023 and onwards, and at the rates made applicable to tax year 2023 by the Finance Act, 2023. Exempt entities—Provident and benevolent funds—Statutory exemption—Super tax not chargeable—The Court held that, without prejudice to the foregoing declaration upholding S. 4C, the said provision would not apply to income, particularly of benevolent funds, enjoying exemption from tax under S. 53 read with the relevant provisions of the Second Schedule to the Ordinance. Such funds constituted a distinct class expressly exempted by the Legislature in furtherance of recognized charitable and welfare objectives, and subjecting them to super tax would defeat the statutory exemption and be inconsistent with the legislative scheme. In the case of provident and benevolent funds before the Court, it was held that those holding valid exemption certificates under the Ninth Schedule read with the relevant entries in the Second Schedule were not liable to pay super tax under S. 4C. The Court directed such funds to furnish their exemption certificates for the relevant tax years to the concerned Commissioners Inland Revenue within fifteen days, whereupon written orders absolving them of liability were to be passed within seven days. Constitutional transition—Transfer of pending matters—The Court noted that, owing to the complexity of the issues and the large number of pending cases concerning Ss. 4B and 4C for multiple tax years, the Supreme Court had, by order dated 12.03.2025 under the erstwhile Art. 186A of the Constitution, directed that all such cases pending in various High Courts and the Supreme Court be transferred and clubbed for final adjudication. Upon the coming into force of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, all such cases stood transferred to the Federal Constitutional Court by virtue of Art. 175F of the Constitution. Appeals, petitions and transfer cases disposed of—The Federal Constitutional Court upheld S. 4B as intra vires and applicable for tax year 2015 and onwards; upheld S. 4C as intra vires and applicable for tax year 2022 and onwards; upheld the amended rates for tax year 2023; sustained the statutory definition of income and the sectoral classification under the First Proviso; declared S. 4C applicable to capital gains on securities and to banking companies for tax year 2023 onwards; limited the application of Ss. 4B and 4C to exploration and petroleum companies in accordance with the Fifth Schedule and their Petroleum Concession Agreements; protected exempt provident and benevolent funds from liability under S. 4C; set aside the contrary findings of the High Courts to the extent indicated; and disposed of all appeals, petitions and transfer cases accordingly.