Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199----Dowry and bridal gifts---Recovery of alternate value of dowry articles---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner/wife challenged concurrent family court judgments whereby trial court had granted 30% alternate value of dowry articles but appellate court had set aside even that relief---Held, dowry articles and personal belongings of a wife remain her exclusive property and, where not returned in specie, she may claim their alternate value, subject to proof of existence, entrustment and retention---Appellate Court failed to appreciate material admissions and surrounding circumstances, including respondent/husband’s own stance that household articles were available in the house and his admission that no traditional dowry was given at the time of marriage, coupled with his assertion that he purchased various household luxuries during matrimony---Where original financial details were withheld by husband and wife’s bank record showed regular withdrawal of her salary for household consumption, presumption operated in favour of wife’s contribution---Appellate Court had, therefore, misdirected itself in discarding claim in toto merely on ground that wife had not produced her parents or further documentary proof. (b) Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act (LXXVIII of 1976)----Ss. 2 & 5---Dowry---Meaning and legal status---Property given to bride before or after marriage by her parents in connection with marriage constitutes dowry, excluding inherited property---Wife has absolute right in her dowry and bridal gifts---Any property rights available to a woman cannot be restricted, controlled or limited, and every gift becomes her exclusive property---There is no legal bar to a wife purchasing household articles herself after marriage and claiming them as dowry articles within the meaning of law, if such articles were acquired in connection with marriage and matrimonial home. Reliance placed on Ghulam Rasool v. Family Court 1991 CLC 1696 and Syeda Mehwish v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West) 2018 CLC 1337. (c) Family proceedings---Proof of dowry articles---Nature of evidence required---Strict rules of evidence---Held, wife’s solitary statement may be sufficient to prove existence of dowry items in a recovery suit, and oral testimony can substantiate a dowry claim because Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not apply in its strict sense to family proceedings---There is no rigid formula requiring receipts, shopkeepers’ details or production of parents in every case---Determination depends upon facts of each case and overall probabilities emerging from evidence. Reliance placed on Aziz-Ur-Rehman v. Mst. Bibi Jameela 2020 CLC 380 and Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous 2017 SCMR 393. (d) Dowry articles---Valuation of used household goods---Principles---Held, valuation of dowry articles is to be made case to case with reference to nature, quality, user period and prevailing market conditions---Judge, Family Court cannot adopt a bare rule of thumb without objective criteria---For assessing alternate value of used household articles, relevant factors include: present and past market value; years of use; average life of article; sentimental value attached to item; need to account for replacement at current price where article remains with husband; online market sources and auction platforms for valuation; reasonable depreciation; inflation and consumer price data; and average market prices supplied by parties---Used item may generally be considered at half price, but not below that level, unless marital breakdown occurred within first one or two years, in which case value may be considered around 80% in view of inflation and taxation---Family Court may use modern scientific tools, data, websites and market applications without requiring expert evidence in every case. Reliance placed on Mst. Ayesha Shaheen v. Khalid Mehmood 2013 SCMR 1049; Muhammad Zahid v. Mst. Ghazala Mazhar 2014 CLC 895; Mst. Samreen Bibi v. Judge Family Court PLD 2015 Lahore 504; and Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal 2017 SCMR 321. (e) Matrimonial property---Assets acquired during subsistence of marriage---Vehicle purchased in husband’s name---Claim of wife on basis of contribution---Islamic jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence and equitable principles---Petitioner/wife claimed that vehicle bearing Registration No. AAK-478, Suzuki Cultus, though standing in husband’s name, was acquired with her financial contribution including initial seed money---Held, such asset required consideration not merely as dowry but as matrimonial property---Though under existing Pakistani law a wife does not automatically acquire ownership in husband’s assets merely by marriage, proprietary interest may still be established through proof of contribution, partnership, trust, gift or joint acquisition---Non-financial contributions such as homemaking, childcare and domestic management possess economic significance and can justify recognition of beneficial interest in assets accumulated during marriage---Marriage operates as a cooperative partnership and there should be no bias in favour of sole titled money-earner against homemaker or child-carer. (f) Islamic law---Marriage and property rights---Separate ownership of spouses---Legislative competence to protect women’s matrimonial rights---Held, under classical Islamic jurisprudence husband and wife remain distinct legal persons with separate property rights; wife retains control over her own property and does not, by marriage alone, become owner of husband’s property, nor does husband acquire wife’s property automatically---However, Islamic law does not prohibit legislation for protection of women in respect of matrimonial property where justice and prevention of hardship so require---Concepts of mut‘at al-talaq, maslahah, ijtihad and compensation for women’s contribution provide room for development of protective legal norms---Silence of classical law on community or matrimonial property does not bar modern legislation safeguarding women from post-divorce destitution and exploitation. (g) Comparative jurisprudence---Recognition of marital partnership and non-financial contribution---Held, in a number of jurisdictions including Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Brunei, United Kingdom, United States and Canada, courts and legislation recognize direct and indirect contributions of spouses in distribution of matrimonial assets---Homemaking and childcare are treated as contributions of equal worth to financial input in appropriate cases---Principles of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, equitable distribution and community property regimes demonstrate a broader modern trend that marriage is an economic partnership and domestic contribution materially aids acquisition and preservation of wealth---Such comparative experience may legitimately guide development of family law principles in Pakistan. (h) Women’s rights---Constitutional protection---International obligations---CEDAW---Held, Pakistan, having ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is under an obligation to reconsider its legal framework so as to eliminate discrimination against women in matters concerning ownership, acquisition, management and disposition of property, including consequences of dissolution of marriage---Equal protection of women, particularly homemakers and working wives, requires meaningful legal and policy safeguards in respect of assets acquired during marriage. (i) Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Writ jurisdiction---Limits on enhancement of relief---Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily reappraise evidence to enhance relief granted by trial court---Although appellate court had erred in law and fact by denying wife’s rights altogether, High Court could not itself enhance trial court’s award from 30% to a higher quantified share on writ side---Proper course was to set aside both judgments and remand matter to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties and applying correct legal principles. (j) Recommendations/observations---Legislative reform---Nikahnama---Protection of wife’s property rights---High Court observed that every wife who cohabits with husband during subsistence of marriage should be deemed to have contributed, through domestic labour, childcare and household management, to establishment and maintenance of matrimonial home and family welfare---Recommended that Government initiate comprehensive legislation for equitable distribution of assets acquired during marriage, with enhanced protection for working wives and recognition of homemaker’s contribution---Further observed that Nikahnama may be amended, or appropriate condition inserted in existing form, to record agreement regarding equal division of property acquired after marriage, so as to better protect matrimonial property rights of women. Petition was allowed, judgments and decrees of Family Court and Appellate Court were set aside, and matter was remanded to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties, to be decided within two months.

Summary: (a) Divorce Act (IV of 1869) - The Queen v. Leresche and another 1891 QB 2418; Azhar Abbas Haideri v. Government of the Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 278 and PLD 2026 SC 53 ref. (b) Administration of justice- -The expectation that the judiciary must act to eliminate any form of injustice serves as a cornerstone of trust in the legal system-It is this ability to priorities substantial justice over mere technical compliance that fortifies the integrity and efficacy of our legal processes. Province of Punjab through the District Collector, Bhakkar v. Muhammad Chiragh and others PLD 2026 SC 53 rel. (c) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)- -Ss.10 & 22-Dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses-Scope-The bond of Christian marriage is treated as a solemn and enduring civil status, and its dissolution is not to be granted lightly-There exists no concept analogous to dissolution at will; relief is conditioned upon strict proof of statutory grounds. Mst. Parveen Amanual v. ADJI and 2 others PLD 2009 Lah. 213 ref. (d) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)- -S.10-Dissolution of marriage-Statutory grounds-Proof-Requirement-Unless and until anyone of the grounds is not proved, marriage cannot be dissolved, meaning thereby, to get the dissolution of marriage, the party is required to allege and prove the allegation of adultery. Saima v. Additional District Judge PLD 2022 Lahore 214 and Mushtaq v. Mst. Fareeda 1979 CLC 457 ref. (e) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)- -Ss.10 & 22-Dissolution of Christian marriage-Desertion-Concept and essential ingredients-Desertion is not a mere physical separation, it consists of certain essential constituent elements, namely: i. the factum desired: the fact of separation; ii. the animus deserendi: the intention to permanently abandon the matrimonial union; iii. absence of consent of the other spouse; iv. absence of reasonable cause for such withdrawal; and v. the completion of the statutory period of desertion as required under the law-The concept may manifest either as actual desertion or constructive desertion, depending upon whether the abandonment arises from physical departure or from conduct rendering cohabitation impossible. (f) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-In exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, High Court can review the judgments to ensure that the lower courts acted in accordance with law and properly considered the evidence before them-However, High Court cannot assume the functions of a civil court to re-examine evidence or to pass a decree in favor of either party-The primary responsibility for determining the facts and granting relief rests with the Civil Court, which is empowered to adjudicate disputes based on the evidence and material placed before it-High Court under its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, is neither an appellate forum nor a vehicle for re-appraisal of evidence meticulously recorded by the forums below-The Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is not designed to undertake a roving exercise of re-evaluating factual findings or to substitute its own opinion for that of the Family Court and the Appellate Authority, who are the primary fact-finding tribunals entrusted with the appreciation of evidence-While the High Court retains the power to interfere where orders are suffering from jurisdictional defects, patent illegality, non-consideration of material evidence, or where the forums below have acted in violation of the law declared by the superior courts, it cannot embark upon a de-novo assessment of the evidence as if sitting in regular appeal-However, where the impugned judgment demonstrably overlooks crucial admissions and fails to apply settled legal principles, the appropriate remedy is not for the High Court to re-adjudicate the factual matrix itself, but to remand the matter for fresh determination in accordance with law. Shahbaz v. Fakhira Bibi 2021 MLD 1506; Tariq Javed v. Mst. Tahira Bibi and 2 others 2006 MLD 1956 and Tahir Umar v. Messrs Bata Shoe (Pakistan) Limited through Managing Director and 3 others 1991 MLD 1236 ref. (g) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.20-Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions-Constitutional guarantee-Scope-Article 20 of the Constitution has been interpreted as a broad guarantee of equal religious freedom for all citizens; Muslims and non-Muslims alike-Article 20 ensures both individual and collective rights of conscience, protecting citizens not only from interference by other religious groups but also from coercion within their own faith communities. PLD 2014 Supreme Court 699 rel. (h) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts.4 & 10-A-Fair trial and due process, right of-Procedural compliance-Constitutional obligation of the Courts-Scope-After insertion of Art.10-A of the Constitution in the list of fundamental rights, it has become obligatory upon the Court to adhere to the procedural steps and to avoid from doing anything which caused prejudice to the rights of the parties-Article 10-A of the Constitution provides right of fair trial and due process for determination of rights and obligations-It is also pertinent to mention here that Art.4 of the Constitution clearly states that it is inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and no action detrimental to the reputation, life, and liberty shall be taken except as per law. Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 and Syed Tahir Hussain Mehmoodi and others v. Agha Syed Liaqat Ali and others 2014 SCMR 637 rel. Dates of hearing: 9th and 23rd February of 2026.

Summary: ----Ss.3(9), 10, 11 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.10-A, 14, 20 & 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XX, Rr.1 & 6---Constitutional petition---Judicial separation/dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses---Scope and evidentiary discipline---Petitioner contracted Christian marriage and sought dissolution---Concurrent judgments dismissing petitioner’s petition for failing to prove allegation of adultery, challenge to---Legality---Courts below failing to evaluate other statutory grounds such as cruelty and desertion---Effect---Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioner/husband and respondent No.3/wife, both Christians by faith, contracted marriage; the petitioner initially filed a petition for dissolution/judicial separation under the (Christian) Divorce Act, 1869 before the Civil Court, which was dismissed and the appeal thereagainst was later withdrawn with permission to file afresh; he subsequently instituted a fresh petition under Ss. 7 & 10 of the Act, 1869 which was dismissed and the dismissal was maintained by the District Court; aggrieved, the petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below---Pivotal questions for determination were as to “whether the allegations of adultery and cruelty had been adjudicated after strict compliance with the evidentiary discipline required under the C.P.C. read with Ss. 10 & 12 of the Act, 1869?”; and “whether the plea of desertion was legally available on the facts and properly examined by the Courts below?”---Held: Impugned judgments were passed without fully considering the evidence, which amounted to non-compliance of the requirements of O.XX, Rr. 1 & 6 of the C.P.C.---To discuss or elaborate reliance upon an allegation of adultery in the absence of cogent and legally admissible evidence was not only contrary to the procedural mandate of the C.P.C. and the statutory safeguards of the Act, 1869 but also implicated the constitutional guarantee of dignity under Art.14 of the Constitution---Since it was admitted that the parties had been living apart, it became apparent that the constituent elements of desertion were not examined by the Courts below while framing issues---The matter therefore had to be remanded for proper framing of issues---The right of Christian citizens to seek dissolution or judicial separation through Civil Courts was a manifestation of their freedom to profess, practice and manage matters arising out of their religious law---In the present case, the courts below failed to examine the petitioner’s claim in the light of this constitutional mandate, as neither the ground of cruelty nor the admitted state of separation was analyzed within the statutory framework of Ss. 10 & 22 of the Act, 1869---Such omission constituted non-compliance of the procedural discipline of law and also infringed the petitioner’s right to fair trial and due process secured under Art.10-A, read with Art.4 of the Constitution---Concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below were set aside---Matter was remanded to Trail Court for fresh adjudication---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. The Queen v. Leresche and another 1891 QB 2418; Azhar Abbas Haideri v. Government of the Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 278 and PLD 2026 SC 53 ref. (b) Administration of justice--- ----The expectation that the judiciary must act to eliminate any form of injustice serves as a cornerstone of trust in the legal system---It is this ability to priorities substantial justice over mere technical compliance that fortifies the integrity and efficacy of our legal processes. Province of Punjab through the District Collector, Bhakkar v. Muhammad Chiragh and others PLD 2026 SC 53 rel. (c) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----Ss.10 & 22---Dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses---Scope---The bond of Christian marriage is treated as a solemn and enduring civil status, and its dissolution is not to be granted lightly---There exists no concept analogous to dissolution at will; relief is conditioned upon strict proof of statutory grounds. Mst. Parveen Amanual v. ADJ I and 2 others PLD 2009 Lah. 213 ref. (d) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----S.10---Dissolution of marriage---Statutory grounds---Proof---Requirement---Unless and until anyone of the grounds is not proved, marriage cannot be dissolved, meaning thereby, to get the dissolution of marriage, the party is required to allege and prove the allegation of adultery. Saima v. Additional District Judge PLD 2022 Lahore 214 and Mushtaq v. Mst. Fareeda 1979 CLC 457 ref. (e) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----Ss.10 & 22---Dissolution of Christian marriage---Desertion---Concept and essential ingredients---Desertion is not a mere physical separation, it consists of certain essential constituent elements, namely: i. the factum desired: the fact of separation; ii. the animus deserendi: the intention to permanently abandon the matrimonial union; iii. absence of consent of the other spouse; iv. absence of reasonable cause for such withdrawal; and v. the completion of the statutory period of desertion as required under the law---The concept may manifest either as actual desertion or constructive desertion, depending upon whether the abandonment arises from physical departure or from conduct rendering cohabitation impossible. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---In exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, High Court can review the judgments to ensure that the lower courts acted in accordance with law and properly considered the evidence before them---However, High Court cannot assume the functions of a civil court to re-examine evidence or to pass a decree in favor of either party---The primary responsibility for determining the facts and granting relief rests with the Civil Court, which is empowered to adjudicate disputes based on the evidence and material placed before it---High Court under its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, is neither an appellate forum nor a vehicle for re-appraisal of evidence meticulously recorded by the forums below---The Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is not designed to undertake a roving exercise of re-evaluating factual findings or to substitute its own opinion for that of the Family Court and the Appellate Authority, who are the primary fact-finding tribunals entrusted with the appreciation of evidence---While the High Court retains the power to interfere where orders are suffering from jurisdictional defects, patent illegality, non-consideration of material evidence, or where the forums below have acted in violation of the law declared by the superior courts, it cannot embark upon a de-novo assessment of the evidence as if sitting in regular appeal---However, where the impugned judgment demonstrably overlooks crucial admissions and fails to apply settled legal principles, the appropriate remedy is not for the High Court to re-adjudicate the factual matrix itself, but to remand the matter for fresh determination in accordance with law. Shahbaz v. Fakhira Bibi 2021 MLD 1506; Tariq Javed v. Mst. Tahira Bibi and 2 others 2006 MLD 1956 and Tahir Umar v. Messrs Bata Shoe (Pakistan) Limited through Managing Director and 3 others 1991 MLD 1236 ref. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.20---Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions---Constitutional guarantee---Scope---Article 20 of the Constitution has been interpreted as a broad guarantee of equal religious freedom for all citizens; Muslims and non-Muslims alike---Article 20 ensures both individual and collective rights of conscience, protecting citizens not only from interference by other religious groups but also from coercion within their own faith communities. PLD 2014 Supreme Court 699 rel. (h) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4 & 10-A---Fair trial and due process, right of---Procedural compliance---Constitutional obligation of the Courts---Scope---After insertion of Art.10-A of the Constitution in the list of fundamental rights, it has become obligatory upon the Court to adhere to the procedural steps and to avoid from doing anything which caused prejudice to the rights of the parties---Article 10-A of the Constitution provides right of fair trial and due process for determination of rights and obligations---It is also pertinent to mention here that Art.4 of the Constitution clearly states that it is inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and no action detrimental to the reputation, life, and liberty shall be taken except as per law. Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 and Syed Tahir Hussain Mehmoodi and others v. Agha Syed Liaqat Ali and others 2014 SCMR 637 rel. Muhammad Ahsan Khan and Mudassar Hassan for Petitioner. Muhammad Musarrat Nawaz Khan and Syed Haider Ali Shah for Respondents. Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General, assisted by: Ms. Areej Omar Ramay for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 9th and 23rd February of 2026.

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---- ----S. 5---Proof of Nikah---Registration of marriage---Nikahnama not proved through reliable evidence---Suit for jactitation of marriage was filed by respondent No.1, while petitioner filed connected suit for restitution of conjugal rights on the plea that a Sharia Nikah had been solemnized between parties on 03.04.2020---Family Court decreed suit for jactitation and dismissed suit for restitution; Appellate Court and High Court maintained concurrent findings---Supreme Court held that alleged Nikah was not established through reliable or legally admissible evidence---No credible explanation was offered as to why alleged Nikah was never registered despite legal requirement under S.5 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Registered Nikahnama is a public record and carries probative value in Court---Failure to register alleged Nikah and failure to prove Nikahnama in accordance with law weakened legal basis of petitioner’s claim. (b) Family law---- ----Jactitation of marriage---False and persistent claim of marriage---Object and scope---Suit for jactitation of marriage is a civil remedy available where a person persistently and falsely asserts existence of marriage---Object of such suit is to obtain declaration that no valid marriage exists and to secure decree of perpetual silence against wrongful assertion---Supreme Court held that petitioner’s conduct reflected an attempt to fabricate an impression of legality to his inhumane acts; therefore Courts below rightly decreed suit for jactitation of marriage and dismissed petitioner’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights. (c) Muslim personal law---- ----Alleged Sharia Nikah---Prohibited degree during subsistence of earlier marriage---Petitioner was already married and his lawful wife was paternal aunt/phupho of respondent No.1---Supreme Court observed that even on petitioner’s own showing, alleged marriage with respondent would attract doctrine of prohibited degree and would not be permissible during subsistence of earlier marriage---To overcome such legal impediment, petitioner set up wholly unsubstantiated plea of divorce against his lawful wife---Such plea, instead of strengthening petitioner’s case, reflected an attempt to tailor facts and manufacture a narrative to lend colour of legality to an otherwise unlawful and coercive relationship. (d) Criminal proceedings---- ----Allegations of sexual assault---Observations in family/civil proceedings---No prejudice to criminal trial---Respondent alleged that petitioner, being her paternal uncle/phupha and taking advantage of relationship of trust, proximity and dominance, subjected her to sexual assault---Supreme Court clarified that any criminal liability arising from such allegations would be adjudicated by competent criminal Court strictly in accordance with law, and observations made in present proceedings would not prejudice such criminal proceedings. (e) Family law---- ----Minor child---Maintenance---Biological father---Distinction between legitimate child and biological child---Petitioner was declared biological father of minor child born to respondent---Supreme Court held that even where petitioner’s version of marriage was discarded, he could not evade consequences of his own conduct---Minor child is an innocent life and cannot be left unprotected---Law does not permit deprivation of sustenance, dignity and lawful support merely because relationship between parents is disputed, unlawful or subject matter of criminal proceedings---Right of maintenance is vested in child and is founded upon welfare, justice and equity---Once biological paternity is established, corresponding obligation of maintenance follows as necessary legal consequence---Biological father cannot deny responsibility or seek refuge behind technical pleas of legitimacy. Cited Cases: • Qudrat Ullah v. Additional District Judge, Renala Khurd District Okara and others PLD 2024 SC 581 • Muhammad Afzal v. Judge Family Court, etc. 2025 LHC 495 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 9, 14, 25 & 35---Welfare of child---Child born outside wedlock---No deprivation of maintenance and protection---Supreme Court emphasized that welfare and rights of minor child cannot be made hostage to unlawful conduct, disputes or defences of adults---Even where child is alleged to have been born outside wedlock, law does not permit such child to be treated as a person without entitlement---Right to maintenance and protection vests in child---Stigma of illegitimacy cannot become shield for biological father to evade responsibility, nor justify deprivation of innocent child---Approach is consistent with constitutional obligations under Arts. 9, 14, 25 and 35 of Constitution and Pakistan’s international commitments under Convention on the Rights of the Child, requiring protection of children without discrimination. (g) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185(3)---Concurrent findings of Family Court, Appellate Court and High Court---No reappraisal of evidence by Supreme Court---Supreme Court held that while exercising jurisdiction under Art.185(3), it does not sit as a Court of further appeal to reappraise evidence or substitute its own conclusions for concurrent findings recorded by Courts below---Interference is warranted only where findings are perverse, arbitrary, based on misreading or non-reading of material evidence, suffer from jurisdictional defect, or result in manifest miscarriage of justice---Petitioner failed to establish lawful basis for relief and sought reassessment of evidence, which was impermissible. Cited Cases: • Saleh Muhammad and another v. Mst. Mehnaz Begum and others PLD 2025 SC 1039 • Allah Bakhsh deceased through LRs and others v. Muhammad Riaz and other PLD 2025 SC 63 • Muhammad Ain-Ul-Haq v. Abdul Ali and another 2024 SCMR 1767 (h) Civil litigation---- ----Frivolous and vexatious litigation---Use of judicial process as coercion and harassment---Exemplary costs---Supreme Court observed that petitioner, despite failing to establish alleged Nikah before three forums, persisted in invoking legal process to pressurize and morally intimidate respondent---Respondent, a young woman, was compelled to undergo repeated, invasive and demeaning scrutiny through a defence concurrently found unsubstantiated---Use of judicial proceedings as instrument of coercion and harassment is impermissible---To mark strong disapproval, compensate respondent for needless hardship, and deter frivolous/vexatious litigation, exemplary costs of Rs.1,000,000 were imposed, payable to respondent No.1 within thirty days, failing which recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Cited Case: • Zakir Mehmood v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence (D.P), Pakistan Secretariat, Rawalpindi and others 2023 SCMR 960 (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 14---Dignity of person---Secondary victimization of women through court process---Supreme Court held that dignity of person is inviolable and constitutionally protected---Courts cannot remain passive venues for perpetuation of social prejudice, nor permit their process to become means of inflicting secondary victimization upon women who approach Courts for vindication of lawful rights---Frivolous allegations and contrived pleas aimed at undermining identity, character and dignity of a woman cannot be countenanced in any civilized system of justice. Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused; concurrent judgments and decrees of Family Court, Appellate Court and Lahore High Court were maintained; suit for jactitation of marriage filed by respondent No.1 remained decreed and petitioner’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights remained dismissed; petitioner was burdened with exemplary costs of Rs.1,000,000 payable to respondent No.1 within thirty days, failing which recoverable as arrears of land revenue; observations regarding criminal liability were held not to prejudice any competent criminal proceedings.

Summary: Deferred dower becomes payable in the wake of proved polygamy under Section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. 11Murder Reference 23-23 The State . Vs Usman . Mr. Justice Farooq Haider 09-02- 2026 2026 LHC 1118

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)- -Ss.1(2) & 12-Child Marriage Restraint Act (XIX of 1929), Preamble-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.175F(1)(c), 189 [as amended by the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act (XXXII of 2025)] & 268-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.11-Interfaith marriage between Muslim male and Christian female-Permissibility-Female claiming conversion to Islam-Essentials and proof-Petitioner sought recovery of his daughter alleging that her marriage with respondent No.6 was void because she was a minor Christian girl and was being kept in illegal custody-The courts below dismissed the matter on the basis of her own statements that she had married of her free will-Issue requiring determination in the present matter was-whether such custody could be treated as illegal despite dispute about age and validity of marriage?-Held: The Christian girl made a formal declaration of embracing Islam-Undoubtedly, the certificate was issued by the authority two days after the solemnization of her marriage, however, it sufficiently verified and confirmed her earlier declaration made at the time of her marriage with respondent No. 6-The aforesaid declarations were adequate to conclude that the Christian girl had fulfilled all the prerequisites for embracing Islam-Any further probe into the matter, or an attempt to ascertain the true nature of her prior disbelief would have amounted to unwarranted intermeddling, unjustifiable on any ground-She was no longer a Christian by faith and, as such, her marriage was validly solemnized under the Ordinance, 1961-Documents advanced by the petitioner could not be relied upon as the sole basis for concluding that her daughter was born on 07.10.2012, particularly when she was physically present in the court and appeared to be of a more advanced age-High Court was fully justified in holding that her custody with her husband could not be termed illegal or unlawful, particularly in the absence of any declaration of invalidity by a competent court of law-Leave was refused and petitions were dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Islamic law- -Marriage-Interfaith marriage-A Muslim male may validly contract marriage with a Christian woman (being from the Ahl al-Kitab). Mrs. Marina Jatoi v. Nuruddin K Jatoi and others PLD 1967 SC 580 and Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Mst. Bilqis Bibi and others PLD 1981 SC 56 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.189 [as amended by the Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act (XXXII of 2025)-Judgments of the Supreme Court-Whether binding upon Federal Constitutional Court?-Upon the establishment of the Federal Constitutional Court and the conferment upon it of final and binding authority in all matters, particularly constitutional matters, the precedential hierarchy stands constitutionally restructured-Accordingly, the binding force contemplated under Article 189 must be understood as operating subject to the overriding authority of the Federal Constitutional Court-The supremacy of constitutional adjudication now vests in the Federal Constitutional Court, and all courts, including the Supreme Court of Pakistan, are bound by its pronouncements-However, the judicial discipline demands that precedent be reconsidered, not ignored and disregarded in silence, and that continuity be preserved except where departure becomes a constitutional necessity-Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court would ordinarily respect and follow the earlier constitutional jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, unless it is established that the same is manifestly erroneous, inconsistent with the constitutional text or scheme, or incompatible with fundamental rights and contemporary constitutional values-Any departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent would be reasoned, express, and principled. (d) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)- -S.1(2)-Marriage between a Muslim male and Christian female-Registration of such under Muslim law-Impermissibility-Such marriage cannot be solemnized and registered under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, as the Ordinance, 1961 only applies to Muslim citizens of Pakistan. (e) Islamic jurisprudence- -Religion-Conversion-Inquiry-Proof and sufficiency-Embracing Islam-Essentials-Proof-If a person openly professes belief in or adherence to a particular faith, no further inquiry or evidence is ordinarily required to verify its genuineness-In Islam, no specific rituals are required to be performed by a non-Muslim before he or she is regarded as having renounced a previous faith and embraced Islam-What is required is a declaration to that effect and the recitation of the Kalma, along with belief in the Oneness of Allah, the Finality of the Prophethood of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), and the Holy Qur’an. Mst. Zarina and another v. The State PLD 1988 FSC 105 and Tariq Masih v. The State 2004 PCr.LJ 622 ref. (f) Child Marriage Restraint Act (XIX of 1929)- -Preamble-Constitution of Pakistan, Art.268-Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.12-Child marriages-Restriction-Statutory framework-The Act of 1929 is considered to be the first enactment on the subject, in the sub-continent, to restrain the solemnization of child marriages-The Act of 1929 is one of the few laws on the statute books that were introduced by the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, while he was a member of the British India Legislative Assembly-It was enacted on 01.10.1929, to restrain the solemnization of child marriages and applied to the whole of India, with effect from 01.04.1930-The Act of 1929 remains in force in Pakistan, being protected under Article 224 of the Constitution of 1956, Article 225 of the Constitution of 1962, and Article 268 of the Constitution of 1973-It applies to both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan-The term ‘Child’ was originally defined in the Act of 1929 to mean a ‘person who, if a male, is under 18 years of age, and if a female, is under 14 years of age’-Subsequently, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 (VIII of 1961), S. 12 raised the age of a girl child in the Act from 14 to 16 years to the extent of Muslim citizens. Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mirza Muhammad Amin and another PLD 1962 (W.P.) Kar. 442; Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad and another PLD 1970 SC 323; Mauj Ali v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah and another 1970 SCMR 437; Nasreen Bibi v. Station House Officer and others 2024 PCr.LJ 2058; Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate 1st Class and others PLD 2021 Lah. 21; Muhammad Azam v. the State and another 2018 PCr.LJ Note 175; Muhammad Safeer v. Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad PLD 2018 Isl. 385; Allah Nawaz v. Station House Officer PLD 2013 Lah. 243; Allah Bakhsh v. Safdar and others 2006 YLR 2936; Ghulam Qadir v. The Judge Family Court, Murree 1988 CLC 113 and Ghulam Hussain v. Nawaz Ali and another 1975 PCr.LJ 1049 ref. (g) Interpretation of statutes- -Where the legislature intends to alter or abrogate a settled personal law, it must do so in clear and unequivocal terms-In absence of any explicit statutory provision invalidating the marriage itself, the legal status of such a marriage remains unaffected. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)- -S.11-Res judicata-Finality of judgments-Principle-A judgment not challenged before a higher forum would attain finality and as such the determination made would operate as final between the parties on the well-known principle of res judicata. Pir Bakhsh v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145 ref.

Summary: In a suit for dissolution of marriage, the court is required to make proper efforts to reconcile the matter in terms Section 10(3) of the Family Court Act, 1964 and on failure of reconciliation proceedings is empowered to pass a decree for dissolution of marriage but said Section does not provide that in every case, where reconciliation proceedings are declared as not successful, the decree for dissolution of marriage on basis of Khula is definitely to be passed, rather the Court has to assess whether wife through her voluntary decision really requires marriage to be dissolved or not. 24First Appeal Against Order(F.A.O.) 68910/22 Oil Marketing Association of Pakistan Vs Oil Companies Advisory Council etc Mr. Justice Raheel Kamran 29- 01- 2026 2025 LHC 8281

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched. & S.10(5)-Suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula-High Court directing return of entire prompt dower, challenge to-Marriage remaining unconsummated-Effect-Wife’s liability confined to surrender up to 25% of admitted prompt dower-Statutory limit in Punjab-Scope-Briefly, after the parties’ nikah was solemnized, prompt dower was admitted as 15 tolas of gold; however, rukhsati did not take place and marriage remained unconsummated; wife filed a suit for dissolution through khula; she did not plead that the admitted prompt dower was unpaid; Family Court decreed khula subject to surrender of 25% of the admitted prompt dower; Appellate Court upheld that decree, whereas, High Court set aside the concurrent judgments and directed return of the entire prompt dower of 15 tolas on the ground of non-consummation-Question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to-whether, in a khula case in Punjab governed by Section 10(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, the wife could be directed to return the entire prompt dower due to non-consummation, or her liability was statutorily limited to surrender up to 25% of the admitted prompt dower?-Held: Section 10(5) of the Act, 1964 (specifically in the province of Punjab) empowered the Family Court, in cases of khula, to direct the wife to surrender up to twenty five percent of her admitted prompt dower to the husband and it did not make any distinction between consummated and unconsummated marriages-In the present case the admitted prompt dower being 15 tolas of gold, the maximum liability of the petitioner under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1964 could not exceed twenty-five percent i.e. 3.75 tolas of gold - Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside-Present petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)- -S.5, Sched.& 10(5)-Husband claiming recovery of various items given to wife relating to wedding functions-Permissibility-Law draws a clear distinction between dower, dowry, bridal gifts and presents-Items given by a husband or his family in connection with marriage fall within the category of bridal gifts or presents and, as such, vest absolutely in the bride-Such items cannot be reclaimed by the husband, as they do not constitute dower nor are they recoverable as personal property of the husband.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 18.03.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in W.P. No. 1954 of 2019). (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched. & S.10(5)---Suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---High Court directing return of entire prompt dower, challenge to---Marriage remaining unconsummated---Effect---Wife’s liability confined to surrender up to 25% of admitted prompt dower---Statutory limit in Punjab---Scope---Briefly, after the parties’ nikah was solemnized, prompt dower was admitted as 15 tolas of gold; however, rukhsati did not take place and marriage remained unconsummated; wife filed a suit for dissolution through khula; she did not plead that the admitted prompt dower was unpaid; Family Court decreed khula subject to surrender of 25% of the admitted prompt dower; Appellate Court upheld that decree, whereas, High Court set aside the concurrent judgments and directed return of the entire prompt dower of 15 tolas on the ground of non-consummation---Question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to “whether, in a khula case in Punjab governed by Section 10(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, the wife could be directed to return the entire prompt dower due to non-consummation, or her liability was statutorily limited to surrender up to 25% of the admitted prompt dower?”---Held: Section 10(5) of the Act, 1964 (specifically in the province of Punjab) empowered the Family Court, in cases of khula, to direct the wife to surrender up to twenty five percent of her admitted prompt dower to the husband and it did not make any distinction between consummated and unconsummated marriages---In the present case the admitted prompt dower being 15 tolas of gold, the maximum liability of the petitioner under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1964 could not exceed twenty-five percent i.e. 3.75 tolas of gold --- Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside---Present petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.& 10(5)---Husband claiming recovery of various items given to wife relating to wedding functions---Permissibility---Law draws a clear distinction between dower, dowry, bridal gifts and presents---Items given by a husband or his family in connection with marriage fall within the category of bridal gifts or presents and, as such, vest absolutely in the bride---Such items cannot be reclaimed by the husband, as they do not constitute dower nor are they recoverable as personal property of the husband. Amicus Curiae: Barrister Umar Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms. Maliha Zia, Advocate. Iftikhar Ahmed Awan, Advocate Supreme Court along with the Petitioner in person. Atif Nisar Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2025.