Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199----Dowry and bridal gifts---Recovery of alternate value of dowry articles---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner/wife challenged concurrent family court judgments whereby trial court had granted 30% alternate value of dowry articles but appellate court had set aside even that relief---Held, dowry articles and personal belongings of a wife remain her exclusive property and, where not returned in specie, she may claim their alternate value, subject to proof of existence, entrustment and retention---Appellate Court failed to appreciate material admissions and surrounding circumstances, including respondent/husband’s own stance that household articles were available in the house and his admission that no traditional dowry was given at the time of marriage, coupled with his assertion that he purchased various household luxuries during matrimony---Where original financial details were withheld by husband and wife’s bank record showed regular withdrawal of her salary for household consumption, presumption operated in favour of wife’s contribution---Appellate Court had, therefore, misdirected itself in discarding claim in toto merely on ground that wife had not produced her parents or further documentary proof. (b) Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act (LXXVIII of 1976)----Ss. 2 & 5---Dowry---Meaning and legal status---Property given to bride before or after marriage by her parents in connection with marriage constitutes dowry, excluding inherited property---Wife has absolute right in her dowry and bridal gifts---Any property rights available to a woman cannot be restricted, controlled or limited, and every gift becomes her exclusive property---There is no legal bar to a wife purchasing household articles herself after marriage and claiming them as dowry articles within the meaning of law, if such articles were acquired in connection with marriage and matrimonial home. Reliance placed on Ghulam Rasool v. Family Court 1991 CLC 1696 and Syeda Mehwish v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West) 2018 CLC 1337. (c) Family proceedings---Proof of dowry articles---Nature of evidence required---Strict rules of evidence---Held, wife’s solitary statement may be sufficient to prove existence of dowry items in a recovery suit, and oral testimony can substantiate a dowry claim because Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not apply in its strict sense to family proceedings---There is no rigid formula requiring receipts, shopkeepers’ details or production of parents in every case---Determination depends upon facts of each case and overall probabilities emerging from evidence. Reliance placed on Aziz-Ur-Rehman v. Mst. Bibi Jameela 2020 CLC 380 and Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous 2017 SCMR 393. (d) Dowry articles---Valuation of used household goods---Principles---Held, valuation of dowry articles is to be made case to case with reference to nature, quality, user period and prevailing market conditions---Judge, Family Court cannot adopt a bare rule of thumb without objective criteria---For assessing alternate value of used household articles, relevant factors include: present and past market value; years of use; average life of article; sentimental value attached to item; need to account for replacement at current price where article remains with husband; online market sources and auction platforms for valuation; reasonable depreciation; inflation and consumer price data; and average market prices supplied by parties---Used item may generally be considered at half price, but not below that level, unless marital breakdown occurred within first one or two years, in which case value may be considered around 80% in view of inflation and taxation---Family Court may use modern scientific tools, data, websites and market applications without requiring expert evidence in every case. Reliance placed on Mst. Ayesha Shaheen v. Khalid Mehmood 2013 SCMR 1049; Muhammad Zahid v. Mst. Ghazala Mazhar 2014 CLC 895; Mst. Samreen Bibi v. Judge Family Court PLD 2015 Lahore 504; and Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal 2017 SCMR 321. (e) Matrimonial property---Assets acquired during subsistence of marriage---Vehicle purchased in husband’s name---Claim of wife on basis of contribution---Islamic jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence and equitable principles---Petitioner/wife claimed that vehicle bearing Registration No. AAK-478, Suzuki Cultus, though standing in husband’s name, was acquired with her financial contribution including initial seed money---Held, such asset required consideration not merely as dowry but as matrimonial property---Though under existing Pakistani law a wife does not automatically acquire ownership in husband’s assets merely by marriage, proprietary interest may still be established through proof of contribution, partnership, trust, gift or joint acquisition---Non-financial contributions such as homemaking, childcare and domestic management possess economic significance and can justify recognition of beneficial interest in assets accumulated during marriage---Marriage operates as a cooperative partnership and there should be no bias in favour of sole titled money-earner against homemaker or child-carer. (f) Islamic law---Marriage and property rights---Separate ownership of spouses---Legislative competence to protect women’s matrimonial rights---Held, under classical Islamic jurisprudence husband and wife remain distinct legal persons with separate property rights; wife retains control over her own property and does not, by marriage alone, become owner of husband’s property, nor does husband acquire wife’s property automatically---However, Islamic law does not prohibit legislation for protection of women in respect of matrimonial property where justice and prevention of hardship so require---Concepts of mut‘at al-talaq, maslahah, ijtihad and compensation for women’s contribution provide room for development of protective legal norms---Silence of classical law on community or matrimonial property does not bar modern legislation safeguarding women from post-divorce destitution and exploitation. (g) Comparative jurisprudence---Recognition of marital partnership and non-financial contribution---Held, in a number of jurisdictions including Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Brunei, United Kingdom, United States and Canada, courts and legislation recognize direct and indirect contributions of spouses in distribution of matrimonial assets---Homemaking and childcare are treated as contributions of equal worth to financial input in appropriate cases---Principles of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, equitable distribution and community property regimes demonstrate a broader modern trend that marriage is an economic partnership and domestic contribution materially aids acquisition and preservation of wealth---Such comparative experience may legitimately guide development of family law principles in Pakistan. (h) Women’s rights---Constitutional protection---International obligations---CEDAW---Held, Pakistan, having ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is under an obligation to reconsider its legal framework so as to eliminate discrimination against women in matters concerning ownership, acquisition, management and disposition of property, including consequences of dissolution of marriage---Equal protection of women, particularly homemakers and working wives, requires meaningful legal and policy safeguards in respect of assets acquired during marriage. (i) Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Writ jurisdiction---Limits on enhancement of relief---Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily reappraise evidence to enhance relief granted by trial court---Although appellate court had erred in law and fact by denying wife’s rights altogether, High Court could not itself enhance trial court’s award from 30% to a higher quantified share on writ side---Proper course was to set aside both judgments and remand matter to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties and applying correct legal principles. (j) Recommendations/observations---Legislative reform---Nikahnama---Protection of wife’s property rights---High Court observed that every wife who cohabits with husband during subsistence of marriage should be deemed to have contributed, through domestic labour, childcare and household management, to establishment and maintenance of matrimonial home and family welfare---Recommended that Government initiate comprehensive legislation for equitable distribution of assets acquired during marriage, with enhanced protection for working wives and recognition of homemaker’s contribution---Further observed that Nikahnama may be amended, or appropriate condition inserted in existing form, to record agreement regarding equal division of property acquired after marriage, so as to better protect matrimonial property rights of women. Petition was allowed, judgments and decrees of Family Court and Appellate Court were set aside, and matter was remanded to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties, to be decided within two months.

Summary: Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983--- ----Arts. 9(2), 29 & 32---Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199---Service matter---Pensionary benefits---Jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib---Bar regarding personal grievance of public servant---Effect of undertaking given before Ombudsman---Representations before President---Maintainability of constitutional petition--- Petitioner, retired employee of Telephone Industries of Pakistan, sought redress before Wafaqi Mohtasib regarding non-settlement of pensionary benefits, including cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted pension and annual increases---Chief Financial Officer of employer gave written undertaking before Mohtasib that pension issues would be resolved within 30 to 45 days, whereupon complaint was disposed of with direction for compliance---On review, Mohtasib further directed employer to place matter before Board of Directors and determine date of payment---Representation before President was dismissed on limitation, but High Court in constitutional jurisdiction set aside orders of Mohtasib and President on ground of want of jurisdiction---Federal Constitutional Court held that grievance raised by petitioner was plainly a personal service grievance relating to his employment in agency where he had served, and thus fell squarely within bar contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983---Wafaqi Mohtasib had no lawful authority to entertain such complaint or pass directions thereon, and orders passed by him were coram non judice and void ab initio---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts under Art. 29 of the Order of 1983 did not preclude interference by High Court where order of Ombudsman suffered from want or excess of jurisdiction---Dismissal of representation before President on ground of limitation did not validate inherently void order, nor did exhaustion of alternate remedy bar constitutional jurisdiction in such case---Undertaking or participation by employer before Ombudsman could not confer jurisdiction on forum expressly barred by statute, nor could doctrine of estoppel operate against law---High Court had rightly set aside impugned orders---Leave was refused and petition dismissed. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Karachi v. Wafaqi Mohtasib and others (1998 SCMR 841); Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), Islamabad and others (PLD 2016 SC 940); Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another (PLD 1967 SC 314); Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.-W.F.P. (PLD 1995 SC 66); Maulvi Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Ahmad Khan and others (2004 SCMR 1622); Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Ashiq and others (PLD 2006 SC 328); Syed Muhammad Hussain Shah v. Abdul Qayyum and others (2011 SCMR 743) rel. (a) Wafaqi Mohtasib---Jurisdiction---Service matters of employees of agency---Bar contained in Art. 9(2), Order of 1983--- Article 9(2) of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 expressly prohibits Wafaqi Mohtasib from accepting for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of a public servant or functionary concerning any matter relating to agency in which he is or has been working, where grievance pertains to his personal service affairs---Such matters are to be agitated before competent fora constituted for service disputes, and not before Ombudsman. (b) Pensionary claim of retired employee---Nature of dispute--- Claim regarding recalculation of pension, inclusion of cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted portion of pension and grant of annual increases is a personal grievance arising out of service and retirement benefits---Such dispute falls within exclusionary clause of Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (c) Order passed without jurisdiction---Effect--- Any order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib in a matter expressly excluded by Art. 9(2) is without lawful authority, coram non judice and void ab initio---Such order cannot be sustained irrespective of merits of underlying claim. (d) Article 29, Order of 1983---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts---Scope--- Statutory bar against challenge to action or order of Wafaqi Mohtasib does not oust constitutional jurisdiction of High Court where impugned order suffers from want or excess of jurisdiction, is coram non judice, or has been passed in violation of law---In such cases, judicial review under Art. 199 of the Constitution remains available. (e) Representation before President under Art. 32, Order of 1983---Dismissal on limitation---Effect--- Dismissal of representation on technical ground of limitation does not amount to affirmation of impugned order on merits, nor does it cure inherent jurisdictional defect in original proceedings---Even a decision on merits cannot validate an order that is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. (f) Alternate remedy---Exhaustion of statutory recourse---Whether bars writ jurisdiction--- Availability or even exhaustion of alternate statutory remedy does not operate as absolute bar to constitutional jurisdiction where impugned order is ex facie contrary to statute or passed without jurisdiction---High Court remains competent to correct such illegality. (g) Undertaking before Ombudsman---Consent, waiver or acquiescence---Effect on jurisdiction--- Jurisdiction is creature of statute and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, acquiescence, silence, participation or undertaking of parties---An employer’s written undertaking before Ombudsman to resolve employee’s grievance cannot validate proceedings before a forum expressly barred by law from entertaining such matter. (h) Estoppel against statute---Non-application of doctrine--- Doctrine of estoppel does not operate against statute---No concession or conduct of parties can override express prohibition contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (i) Undertaking given before incompetent forum---Remedy--- Although undertaking given before Wafaqi Mohtasib cannot cure lack of jurisdiction, aggrieved person may, if so advised, agitate effect of such undertaking before a competent forum in accordance with law. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 199, 201, 175F(1)(c) & 25A—Judicial review—Constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts—Equitable relief—Compassion and conscience of Judge—Courts as courts of law and not of personal sentiment—The Federal Constitutional Court held that High Courts, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199, are strictly bound to decide cases in accordance with law and cannot grant relief on the basis of compassion, hardship, equity, or personal notions of justice where no legal right or statutory basis exists. The Court emphasized that Pakistan’s constitutional order is founded on rule of law and constitutionalism, under which judges are required to interpret and apply the law rather than substitute it with individual morality or subjective conscience. It was held that the Constitution does not confer upon High Courts any general authority to do “complete justice” or to fill perceived gaps in law through equitable intervention, and that every case must be adjudicated within constitutional and statutory limits. Constitutional jurisdiction—Mandamus—Requirement of pre-existing legal duty and enforceable legal right—No writ can issue in absence of law—The Court held that a writ of mandamus under Art. 199(1)(a)(i) can only issue where the law imposes a duty upon a person or authority and a corresponding legal right exists in favour of the petitioner. In the present case, there was admittedly no law, rule, or regulation permitting a “special/super supplementary examination” for the respondent MBBS student. Therefore, the Sindh High Court acted without lawful authority in directing the University to conduct such examination and in effectively creating, through judicial order, a power and duty not recognized by law. The impugned direction was thus held to be beyond the permissible scope of mandamus and an instance of judicial overreach. Educational institutions—Autonomy in academic matters—Judicial restraint—Special/super supplementary examination—The Federal Constitutional Court reiterated that courts must sparingly interfere in the internal governance, academic structure, and disciplinary affairs of educational institutions, which possess specialized expertise and are entitled to regulate their own examinations and policies in accordance with law. Since the statutes and academic framework governing the medical university did not contemplate or permit a “special/super supplementary examination,” the Sindh High Court could not, under the guise of equitable relief or enforcement of rights, compel the University to hold an examination unknown to law. Judicial intervention in educational matters was held permissible only where the governing rules or policies offend natural justice or transgress statutory or constitutional limits, which was not the case here. Fundamental rights—Art. 25A—Right to education—Limits of enforcement jurisdiction—The Court observed that although Art. 25A recognizes the right to education, the enforcement of a fundamental right under Art. 199(1)(c) does not authorize a High Court to grant disproportionate or legally unsanctioned relief. Even in matters touching upon fundamental rights, the High Court remains confined by law and cannot invent remedies contrary to the statutory framework. The Court further found that the respondent’s plea that the relevant examination schedule was not uploaded on the website lacked substance, particularly when he admittedly appeared in the other supplementary examinations and the record showed that all other students were aware of the timetable. Precedent—Arts. 189 & 201—Binding effect of superior court judgments—Court cannot confine precedential value of its own decision—The Federal Constitutional Court held that once a court delivers a judgment deciding a question of law or laying down a principle of law, such judgment enters the stream of precedent and cannot be insulated by the court itself through a direction that it shall not serve as precedent. Such a course was held to undermine legal certainty, invite arbitrariness, and weaken judicial accountability. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of stare decisis is embedded in the constitutional structure, and that judges remain bound by the principles they pronounce as well as by the precedents of superior courts operating within the relevant constitutional hierarchy. It was further observed that the practice of granting relief in an individual case while disclaiming precedential effect would permit unchecked discretion and destabilize the rule of law. Constitutional structure—Federal Constitutional Court and Supreme Court jurisprudence—Partial disagreement with earlier precedent—The Court observed that while prior jurisprudence of the Supreme Court remains valid unless overruled, the Federal Constitutional Court, within its own constitutional domain, is competent to interpret the law independently. In that context, the Court partially disagreed with the proposition in Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174) to the extent it suggested that equity may step in where law has no answer to provide justice, holding instead that even in cases of perceived silence in law, courts must seek answers consistent with constitutional order, legal principle, and precedent rather than resort to free-standing compassion. Case references—The Court referred to and discussed the following authorities: Muhammad Umar Wahid v. University of Health Sciences, Lahore (PLD 2006 SC 300); Dossani Travels Pvt. v. Messers Travels Shop (PLD 2014 SC 1); Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174); Riaz Hussain through Legal Representatives v. Chairman Federal Land Commissioner (CPLA Nos. 962, 963 and 964 of 2023); DeShaney v. Winnebago County (489 U.S. 189, 1989); Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (597 U.S. 215); Khalid Mehmood v. Pakistan, through Ministry of Finance (2025); Muhammad Azam Khan Swati v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2023 Islamabad 184); Prof. Dr. Sheikh Israr Ahmed v. Government of Punjab (2025 PLC (C.S.) 182); Muhammad Azam Khan v. Government of N.W.F.P through Chief Secretary NWFP (1998 SCMR 204); and Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan (PLD 2022 SC 92). The Court also cited A.K. Brohi’s Fundamental Law of Pakistan and an academic article by Susan A. Bandes on compassion and rule of law. Appeal accepted—Impugned order set aside—Writ petition dismissed—The petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed. The impugned order of the Sindh High Court directing the holding of a “special/super supplementary examination” was set aside, and the respondent’s constitutional petition stood dismissed.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Arts. 8, 10A, 175F, 199, 202A & Third Schedule---Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 109-A---Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2024---Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025---Challenge to vires of statutory provision---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench vis-à-vis Regular Bench under erstwhile Art. 202A---Dominant object theory---Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Maintainability of challenge thereto---Petitioner, after availing 2018 Amnesty Scheme and declaring ownership of foreign company, was issued notice under S.109-A, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---He challenged both vires of said provision and the notice issued thereunder before Sindh High Court, which initially granted ad-interim restraint against passing of any final adverse order---Later, Constitutional Bench of High Court recalled said interim order on ground that courts ought not suspend operation of law, particularly in revenue matters---Before Federal Constitutional Court, principal question was whether Constitutional Bench, under erstwhile Art. 202A, possessed jurisdiction to entertain matter whose dominant relief was declaration that impugned law was ultra vires---Held, challenge to vires of statute, in substance, sought relief under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely declaration that law was “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”, and not merely a direction under Art.199(1)(a)(i) or enforcement of fundamental rights simpliciter---Under pre-27th Amendment regime, such matter did not fall within exclusive jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench---Only forum competent to grant final relief could competently grant interim relief; therefore, Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction from the outset and its order recalling the earlier ad-interim order was without jurisdiction---Court further held that ad-interim order which had effect of suspending operation of law could validly be brought in challenge before this Court, as until law is finally declared ultra vires it must ordinarily continue to operate---However, in view of subsequent constitutional amendment, exclusive writ jurisdiction now vests in Constitutional Benches and similar matters would henceforth lie before such Benches---Matter was remanded to Sindh High Court for fresh decision by competent Bench in accordance with law. Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (deceased) through legal heirs (2024 SCMR 1059); Attock Cement case (2024 SHC 1302); Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416); Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 24); Federation of Pakistan v. Aitzaz Ahsan (PLD 1989 SC 61); Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137 (1803)) rel. (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---Art. 202A (as it stood before Twenty-Seventh Amendment)---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Benches of High Courts---Scope--- Under erstwhile Art.202A, Constitutional Benches were not vested with entire writ jurisdiction under Art.199 but only with limited classes of matters specified therein---Therefore, question whether matter was to be heard by Constitutional Bench or Regular Bench had to be determined by reference to true nature of relief claimed. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction---Dominant object theory---Application--- For determining proper forum under former Art.202A, Court must examine pleadings, prayer clause and ultimate effect of relief sought so as to ascertain dominant or substantive relief, while treating merely consequential relief as ancillary---Such exercise is judicial in nature and not dependent upon drafting alone. (c) Challenge to vires of statute---Nature of relief--- Where petitioner assails validity of statutory provision and seeks declaration that same is contrary to Constitution, dominant relief is one under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely that impugned law is “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”---Such relief is, in substance, in nature of certiorari / declaratory judicial review, even if consequential directions are also sought. (d) High Courts---Power of judicial review---Inherent constitutional authority--- Power of High Court to strike down law ultra vires Constitution is inherent in constitutional scheme and flows from its role as guardian of Constitution, read with judicial oath and constitutional supremacy---Such authority is not negated merely because relief of declaration is not textually set out in identical terms in every clause of Art.199. (e) Interim relief---Competence of forum--- Interim relief may only be granted by forum competent to render final decision on lis---Consequently, where Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction to decide vires challenge under former Art.202A, it also lacked competence to pass or recall interim orders in relation thereto. (f) Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Propriety and challenge thereto--- As a general constitutional principle, until a law is finally declared ultra vires, it should ordinarily continue to operate in normal course---An interim order having effect of suspending operation of law, especially in revenue matters, is therefore open to challenge before this Court and cannot be shielded merely because it is ad-interim in form. (g) Twenty-Seventh Constitutional Amendment---Effect--- After enactment of Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, exclusive writ jurisdiction under Art.199 now lies with Constitutional Benches of High Courts, and Regular Benches no longer possess such jurisdiction---Accordingly, a case of like nature would now fall to be heard by Constitutional Bench. (h) Remand---When warranted--- Where impugned order has been passed by a Bench lacking jurisdiction, proper course is to set aside such order and remit matter for fresh adjudication by competent Bench in accordance with law. Petition allowed; impugned order set aside; matter remanded for decision by competent Bench of Sindh High Court in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 ----S. 18 & S. 47; MoI Notification dated 19-04-2017 (blocked-CNIC SOPs)—Cancellation/impounding power—“Reason to believe”—Scope---CNIC previously issued to petitioner No.1 and MNICs/CNICs issued to her husband and father-in-law established a continuous chain of identity; passport also issued on the basis of CNIC—In absence of any allegation or proof under S. 18(2)(a)–(d) (ineligibility, multiple cards on same eligibility, obliteration/tampering, or forgery), NADRA could not refuse issuance of corrected CNIC or renewal—Pre-1978 documentary requirements in MoI SOPs (land record, domicile, pedigree, employment certificate, educational certificates, passport, arms/driving licence, MNIC etc.) may apply to blocked-CNIC cases, but were inapplicable where CNICs had already been lawfully issued and no S. 18 basis was invoked or established—“Reason to believe” must rest on tangible evidence; mere insistence on SOP formalities cannot defeat extant statutory protections. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Constitutional petition—Mandamus—Where Zonal Board recommended and respondent No.3 approved correction of date of birth, NADRA’s subsequent delay/refusal to issue corrected CNIC and to renew petitioner No.2’s CNIC was unjustified—Writ jurisdiction competently invoked to enforce performance of a legal duty arising under the Ordinance, 2000 and the approval already granted. (c) Administrative law—Presumption of regularity; burden on authority ----Prior issuance of CNICs/MNIC and passport carries presumption that statutory requirements were observed; unless rebutted through the S. 18 process (notice and proof within clauses (a)–(d)), NADRA must honour existing entitlements and approvals—No adverse presumption lies against the citizen where the department’s own records support identity and eligibility. Disposition --- Petition allowed. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 directed to issue corrected CNIC to petitioner No.1 (as already approved) and to renew petitioner No.2’s CNIC without delay. Copy to DG NADRA, Balochistan, for compliance.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 199, 212(2) & 13---Writ jurisdiction despite Art. 212(2) bar---Order directing de-novo inquiry not a “final order” relating to terms and conditions; High Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 199 not ousted---Initiating a second/de-novo inquiry on identical charges after a lawful exoneration violates Art. 13 (double jeopardy) and the rule that no one be vexed twice for the same cause. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Tariq Saeed v. Government of the Punjab, 2022 LHC (relied upon for maintainability where only an inquiry is ordered) • Sayyed Saeed Hussain Shah v. Province of Punjab 1981 PLC 297 • Muhammad Yar Buttar v. Board of Governors, OPF 1999 SCMR 819 (b) Balochistan Employees’ Efficiency and Discipline Act, 2011 ----Ss. 13(6) & 17(7)---Scope of de-novo inquiry and revisional powers---Where, pursuant to Supreme Court’s directions, a regular inquiry has been conducted, recommendations accepted by the competent authority, and the civil servant reinstated, a subsequent statement of allegations on the same charges under S. 13(6) is void ab initio; departmental reliance on S. 17(7) cannot override finality of prior exoneration. (c) Fundamental Rules ----FR-54 (Section-I, Chapter-VIII), cl. (a)---Back benefits on reinstatement---Entitlement to arrears, seniority, and related service benefits must be examined under FR-54 by the competent authority/committee; inquiry limited to quantum and conditions of back benefits (including mitigation for outside earnings), not to re-opening concluded misconduct charges. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Bashir v. Government of Punjab 1994 SCMR 1801 (guidelines for FR-54 determination and committee process) (d) Service law—effect of earlier Supreme Court order and departmental exoneration ----De-novo inquiry after exoneration---Pursuant to Supreme Court’s order dated 12-02-2018 in CP No. 169-Q/2012, a regular inquiry was held and the petitioner was exonerated; recommendations accepted and petitioner reinstated vide notifications dated 17-07-2019 and 01-08-2019---Issuance of fresh statement of allegations on identical facts is unlawful and contrary to final departmental adjudication. Cited Cases: • Director-General (Field), Agriculture Dept., Lahore v. Haji Abdul Rehman, PLD/SC (principle against being vexed twice affirmed) Disposition --- Constitution petition partly allowed. Statement of allegations/de-novo inquiry dated 31-08-2022 under S. 13(6) of BEEDA, 2011 set aside. Competent authority directed to process petitioner’s claim for back benefits strictly under FR-54 and in light of Muhammad Bashir (1994 SCMR 1801). Order accordingly.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 199---Writ of certiorari---Scope and limitations---High Court’s power of judicial review---The High Court, while exercising judicial review under Art. 199, must not substitute its own findings for those of the lower courts or tribunals but may intervene where there is a jurisdictional error, non-consideration of material evidence, or an error of law on the face of the record---In the present case, the High Court modified the appellate court’s decision by awarding enhanced maintenance and granting recovery of gold ornaments without remanding the matter for reconsideration---Held, that while the High Court had the authority to issue a writ of certiorari where the lower court’s findings were flawed, it should have remanded the case for fresh adjudication instead of substituting its own findings.Cited Cases:Nawaza v. Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 391Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141(b) Family Law---Maintenance and Dowry Articles----Recovery of maintenance---Quantum---Scope---In family disputes, courts must determine maintenance based on credible evidence regarding financial circumstances and necessity---In the present case, High Court enhanced the maintenance allowance to Rs. 10,000 per month but did not remand the matter for further factual determination---Held, that while the enhancement of maintenance was justified based on evidence, the matter should have been remanded to the appellate court for a thorough re-evaluation.(c) Family Law---Recovery of Gold Ornaments----Evidentiary burden on spouse claiming recovery of dowry articles and gold ornaments---Scope---Where a spouse claims entitlement to gold ornaments, the burden is on them to establish ownership and wrongful retention by the other party---High Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and granted recovery of 04 tolas of gold without directing further inquiry into the matter---Held, that the issue required factual determination, and the High Court should have remanded the case for proper adjudication instead of making a direct substitution of findings.(d) Civil Procedure---Appellate Jurisdiction----Scope of appellate court’s review in family matters---High Court’s interference with appellate court’s findings---Where an appellate court has made a determination based on available evidence, the High Court should not interfere unless there is a clear case of misreading or non-consideration of material evidence---Held, that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting its own findings without remanding the matter for reconsideration.Cited Case:Nawaza v. Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 391----- Disposition: Petition converted into an appeal and allowed. The matter remanded to the appellate court to decide the issue of maintenance and recovery of gold ornaments afresh, in light of the High Court’s observations, within three months.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 22-A & 22-B—Application for direction to register FIR—Scope and discretion of Justice of Peace Applicant sought registration of FIR under Ss. 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C., alleging theft of dowry articles by his brother and nephews—Learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace dismissed the application, holding the dispute to be civil in nature arising out of inheritance—High Court upheld the finding, observing that the Justice of Peace correctly exercised discretion in declining to issue direction for registration of FIR where the underlying dispute was patently civil and the police had already declined to record the applicant’s version. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 22-A & 22-B—Alternate remedy—Filing of direct complaint When the police refuse to register FIR and the version of the complainant is not accepted, the appropriate course is to file a direct complaint before the competent court, enabling the complainant to lead his own evidence—Justice of Peace not bound to direct registration of FIR in such circumstances—Adequate remedy through private complaint considered sufficient. Habibullah v. Political Assistant, Dera Ghazi Khan (2005 SCMR 951) relied upon. (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Judicial restraint High Court observed that even under Art.199, issuance of writ for registration of FIR is not obligatory in every case—Court may exercise judicial restraint where adequate alternative remedies exist and the matter is essentially civil in character. (d) Criminal jurisprudence—Civil disputes given criminal colour—Principle Courts must guard against conversion of family or property disputes into criminal proceedings—Where facts disclose civil liability or inheritance contest rather than a cognizable offence, criminal process should not be invoked to settle private grievances. Cited case: • Habibullah v. Political Assistant, Dera Ghazi Khan 2005 SCMR 951 (g) Disposition — Application dismissed—Applicant advised to avail remedy of direct complaint before competent court—Observations made not to prejudice any future proceedings.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 199—Scope of constitutional jurisdiction—High Court’s revisional powers limited to correcting jurisdictional or procedural irregularities—High Court cannot act as a second appellate forum or reappraise factual findings of lower courts—*M. Hammad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari* (2023 SCMR 1434) followed—Once appeal decided on facts, High Court should refrain from substituting its findings to preserve finality and prevent multiplicity of litigation. (b) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 ----S. 5 & Schedule—Jurisdiction—Matters of dower and dowry articles fall within exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts—Jurisdiction determined by *subject matter*, not by person entitled to sue—Right to sue survives upon death of spouse; legal heirs may pursue claim—*Khan Assadullah Khan v. Sheikh Islam-ud-Din* (PLD 1978 Lah. 711) and *Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal* (PLD 1984 SC 95) referred. (c) Family Law—Right to sue after death of spouse ----Where wife dies during pendency of suit for recovery of dower and dowry articles, her legal heirs (e.g., mother) may continue proceedings as plaintiffs in representative capacity—Family Court rightly proceeded to adjudicate and decree matter—Claim survives as part of deceased’s estate. (d) Dower and dowry articles—Evaluation of evidence ----Trial Court decreed both dower (Rs.10,000) and dowry items (including 87.2 gms gold); Appellate Court, upon reappraisal, set aside decree only to extent of gold ornaments—No illegality or perversity found—Appellate findings upheld as based on proper appraisal. (e) Constitutional petition—Maintainability ----Where both trial and appellate courts have concurrently adjudicated on facts, invoking constitutional jurisdiction amounts to misuse of Art.199—Petition dismissed as devoid of merit and barred by settled judicial principle of finality of findings. (f) Disposition --- Petition dismissed. Findings of Appellate Court dated 24-08-2022 upheld; no interference warranted. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Maintainability---Alternative remedy---Petitions under Art. 199 for quashment of FIRs and orders under S. 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Scope---Where statutory remedy of revision existed and no constitutional right was infringed, extraordinary jurisdiction could not be invoked merely to circumvent the regular criminal process—However, Court examined legality as petitions were consolidated and involved identical legal questions. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 403—Quashment of FIRs—Double jeopardy—Dishonoured cheques issued on different dates---Distinct transactions---Held, each dishonour arising from separate cheque constitutes a separate cause of action and distinct offence; multiple FIRs, each based on an independently dishonoured cheque, do not attract the bar of S. 403, Cr.P.C. or Art. 13 of the Constitution---Petitioner’s plea that subsequent FIRs were hit by double jeopardy was misconceived—No illegality in dismissal of S. 249-A applications by trial and revisional courts. Cited Cases: • *Saira Fatima v. The State* (2024 P Cr.LJ 1289) • *State v. Saeed Khan* (2021 P Cr.LJ 608) (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 234—Joinder of charges—Dishonour of cheques within twelve months—Discretion of trial court---Where several offences of the same kind are alleged within one year, trial court may, on request, join them in a single trial to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 503 & 539-B—Recording of complainant’s statement through local commission---Legality---Where complainant’s physical appearance before court was impracticable due to health or security concerns, trial court may appoint an advocate-commissioner to record evidence at residence—No prejudice caused to accused if attendance is already dispensed with—Order modifying mode of recording evidence held lawful and within discretion of trial court. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 489-F—Dishonoured cheque—Successive prosecutions---Separate FIRs for distinct cheques dishonoured on different dates do not offend double jeopardy principles; each dishonour gives rise to a fresh and independent offence. (f) Criminal Justice—Quashment proceedings ----Jurisdiction under S. 561-A Cr.P.C.—Parameters—Only exercisable where continuation of proceedings is manifestly illegal, oppressive, or amounts to abuse of process—Mere existence of multiple FIRs for separate transactions or pendency of trial does not justify quashment. Disposition --- All petitions dismissed. Orders dated 20-07-2022 (refusing acquittal under S. 249-A), 15-10-2022 (revisional order), 10-06-2023 (appointment of local commission), and 26-08-2023 (revisional confirmation) upheld. Trial court directed to ensure police security during recording of complainant’s statement at his residence. No order as to costs.