Summary: (a) West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962----S.2-A---Muslim inheritance---Rights of female heirs---Custom or tribal practice excluding women from inheritance---Validity---Property of deceased Muslim was required to devolve strictly in accordance with injunctions of Islam and applicable Hanafi law---Any custom purporting to suppress, defeat or exclude inheritance rights of women was directly opposed to Islamic Sharia and could not be recognized by law---Petitioners failed to prove existence of alleged customary law under which male members could exclusively retain property to exclusion of female heirs---Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, invalidated customary action or tribal mechanism inconsistent with Islamic injunctions---Female heirs could not be deprived of their Quranic shares through custom, family arrangement, tribal practice or any other device. (b) Jirga---Decision affecting inheritance rights---Legal effect---A Jirga had no lawful authority to divest a legal heir of inheritance rights conferred by Holy Quran and Sunnah---Any Jirga proceeding or decision made in derogation of Islamic law of inheritance was patently illegal and void ab initio---Purported arrangement allegedly made on oath upon Holy Quran could not defeat lawful inheritance rights, particularly where such arrangement had not been proved through cogent evidence. (c) Fraud---Fraudulent mutation of inherited property---Effect upon subsequent devolution---Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh were not legal heirs of deceased Mitha Khan but had fraudulently represented themselves as such and procured mutation of his land in their names---Fraud vitiated even the most solemn proceedings---Where foundational transfer was tainted by fraud, subsequent devolution of property upon legal heirs of persons responsible for fraud was also illegal and unsustainable---When foundation of title was unlawful, entire superstructure erected upon it was bound to fall. Cited Cases: • Fazal Ellahi (deceased) through his legal heirs v. Mst. Zainab Bi 2019 SCMR 1930 • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Fraudulent mutation---Limitation---Knowledge of fraud---Fraudulent mutation had not been within knowledge of Mst. Ayesha Bibi---Respondents approached Court for cancellation after mutation came to their knowledge---Objection regarding limitation was misplaced where right to sue arose upon discovery of fraudulent entries and no knowledge of fraud at an earlier stage was established. (e) Mutation---Revenue entries---Evidentiary value---Mutation entries were maintained for fiscal and revenue purposes and did not constitute documents of title---Mere existence of mutations in names of Abdul Razzaq Khan, Wahid Bakhsh or their successors could not confer ownership upon them or exclude legally entitled heirs---Revenue entries founded upon fraud carried no legal sanctity and were liable to cancellation. Cited Case: • Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani and 10 others 1992 SCMR 1832 (f) Evidence---Claim of ownership through Court decision or private agreement---Proof---Petitioners asserted that property had been transferred to Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh through a Court decision, but no such order was produced---They also relied upon an alleged agreement dated 31.10.1968 but failed to establish it through cogent material---Neither alleged judicial transfer nor purported family arrangement could be acted upon in absence of legal proof---Petitioners also failed to establish any blood relationship between Abdul Razzaq Khan or Wahid Bakhsh and deceased Mitha Khan---Lengthy cross-examination of plaintiffs’ witnesses did not discredit their testimony regarding lawful line of succession. (g) Islamic law of inheritance---Hanafi law---Sole surviving daughter---Quranic share and residuary estate---Mitha Khan died leaving only his daughter, Mst. Lal Khatoon---Under Surah An-Nisa, verse 11, and settled Hanafi law, a sole surviving daughter inherited one-half of her deceased father’s estate as her Quranic share---Remaining residue devolved upon residuaries and would return to Quranic heir through doctrine of Radd only where no residuary existed---Upon death of Mst. Lal Khatoon, her sole daughter, Mst. Ayesha Bibi, similarly inherited one-half of property held by her mother, resulting in her entitlement to one-fourth of estate originally owned by Mitha Khan---Upon death of Mst. Ayesha Bibi, one-half of her property devolved upon her son, Bostan Khan, while remaining one-half devolved equally upon her two daughters---Respondent daughters were not direct legal heirs of Mitha Khan but derived entitlement through their mother, Mst. Ayesha Bibi---Their entitlement was confined to their respective shares in one-fourth interest lawfully held by their mother and did not extend to entire estate originally owned by Mitha Khan. (h) Civil decree---Declaration of exclusive ownership and distribution according to inheritance shares---Harmonious construction---Trial Court had declared Mst. Ayesha Bibi to be exclusive owner of properties described in plaint but had simultaneously directed Tehsildar to enter names of respondents and deliver possession according to their respective shares under Hanafi law---Both parts of decree were required to be read harmoniously---Expression “exclusive owner” could not enlarge inheritance beyond shares permitted by Sharia---Revenue entries and possession were to be effected strictly according to actual Islamic shares determined by Court---Trial Court was directed to reframe decree sheet accordingly. (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference by Supreme Court---Concurrent findings recorded by Trial Court and High Court were not to be disturbed unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, arbitrariness or jurisdictional defect---Record established that findings regarding fraudulent mutations, absence of relationship with deceased and lawful succession of female heirs were based upon evidence and did not suffer from any such defect---No ground existed for interference under Art.185(3), except correction of actual quantum of inheritance shares. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 • Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1454 • Faqir Syed Anwar ud Din deceased through LRs v. Syed Raza Haider and others PLD 2025 SC 31 Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal dismissed and leave refused---Concurrent judgments and decrees maintained subject to modification regarding actual inheritance shares---Respondents held entitled only to their respective shares in one-fourth interest inherited by their mother, Mst. Ayesha Bibi, and not to entirety of estate originally owned by Mitha Khan---Trial Court directed to reframe decree sheet and ensure revenue entries and delivery of possession strictly in accordance with Islamic law of inheritance---No order as to costs. Mst. Ameer Begum and others v. Rahima Khatoon and others, Civil Petition No.97-Q of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 13.05.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----S.74---Performance guarantee---Forfeiture upon breach---Reasonable compensation---Scope---Performance guarantee was a contractual mechanism intended to secure due and satisfactory performance of obligations and could be conditional or unconditional, collateral to parent contract or incorporated within contractual framework---Where guarantee stipulated a financial consequence upon breach or non-performance, its invocation attracted S.74 of Contract Act, 1872---Section 74 did not prohibit stipulation of a fixed sum payable upon breach nor make proof of actual loss a condition precedent to enforcement---Party complaining of breach could recover reasonable compensation not exceeding stipulated amount even where actual loss was not proved---Court nevertheless retained supervisory jurisdiction to determine whether retention of stipulated amount represented reasonable compensation or operated as an unconscionable or disproportionate penalty---Existence of forfeiture clause did not entitle beneficiary to retain stipulated amount irrespective of surrounding circumstances, but judicial power under S.74 was not to be exercised routinely by substituting Court’s view for commercial allocation of risk agreed by parties---Reduction or refund was warranted only where forfeiture was excessive, harsh or unconscionable in context of nature of contract, conduct of parties and circumstances of breach. Cited Cases: • Province of West Pakistan v. Messrs Mistri Patel & Co. PLD 1969 SC 80 • Abdul Haq Khan Khattak v. WAPDA 1991 SCMR 436 (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----S.74---Commercial contract---Performance guarantee equal to three percent of contractual value---Time expressly made essence of contract---Failure to supply goods within extended period---Forfeiture---Reasonableness---Contract required seller to furnish performance guarantee for due and satisfactory performance and empowered buyer to forfeit same upon failure to supply goods within specified period or upon breach of any contractual condition---Form of performance bond expressly provided that buyer would be sole judge of performance and that any grant of time or indulgence would not absolve liability under guarantee---Extensions granted by buyer therefore did not amount to waiver or extinguishment of right to invoke guarantee upon continued non-performance---Seller failed to make any shipment even within extended deadlines and attributed failure to increase in international prices and shortage of supply rather than any actionable default of buyer---Performance guarantee securing only three percent of value of a high-value, time-sensitive public procurement contract for an essential commodity was neither excessive nor unconscionable---Forfeiture of entire guarantee constituted reasonable compensation under S.74 and was legally justified. (c) Contract---Extension of time---Revised contractual framework---Default---Earlier impediments---Legal effect---Once parties by mutual conduct extended timelines for performance, antecedent delays and difficulties stood absorbed into revised contractual schedule---Legally controlling question thereafter was whether seller performed within subsisting extended period and whether any legally cognisable justification existed when performance ultimately became due---Default under performance guarantee regime was triggered by non-performance within operative contractual framework and was not dependent upon abstract attribution of blame for earlier events---Arbitrator erred by treating prior delay in operationalisation of letter of credit as determinative and by failing to consider that no supply was made despite subsequent extensions---Finding conflated fault attribution with contractual default and substituted a non-contractual standard for agreed triggering condition of forfeiture. (d) Contract---Principle that no person may take advantage of his own wrong---Application---Principle could not operate as substitute for express contractual framework governing performance---It became relevant only where wrongful conduct of one party was shown to be legally operative cause of non-performance within subsisting contractual obligations---Where timelines had been revised by mutual conduct, relevant enquiry was legal causation at date performance fell due and not historical attribution of earlier difficulties---Seller’s eventual failure resulted from adverse market conditions and inability to procure goods rather than conduct of buyer---Principle against taking advantage of one’s own wrong was therefore inapplicable. (e) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----Arbitral award---Judicial interference---Misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Patent error of law---Court did not sit in appeal over arbitral award and could not reappraise evidence merely because another view was possible---Findings of arbitrator were ordinarily final where they represented a possible and legally tenable view---Court could not conduct roving enquiry to discover errors and interference was confined to infirmity apparent on face of award or material expressly relied upon therein---However, where finding rested upon misreading or non-reading of material evidence or an incorrect factual premise that directly vitiated application of law, error ceased to be mere factual appreciation and assumed character of patent error of law---Arbitrator ignored revised contractual timeline, extensions expressly granted without waiver, seller’s own stated reasons for non-performance and contractual conditions triggering forfeiture---Such omissions led to legally erroneous application of S.74 of Contract Act and justified judicial interference. Cited Case: • Pakistan Railways v. CCRC Ziyang Co. Limited PLD 2025 SC 706 (f) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----Arbitral award---Miscarriage of justice---Erroneous direction for refund of performance guarantee---Single Judge found serious errors in arbitral reasoning but declined interference on ground that refund would not cause substantial miscarriage of justice because buyer’s counterclaim for damages had failed---Once contractual breach and reasonableness of forfeiture were correctly appreciated, allowing refund would relieve defaulting seller of expressly agreed consequence of non-performance despite repeated indulgence and would distort contractual bargain---Such result itself amounted to miscarriage of justice and could not be sustained merely because separate counterclaim for damages had been rejected. (g) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----Damages---Independent upstream supply arrangement---Commercial risk---Causation and privity---Seller entered into contract with supplier before conclusion of principal contract with buyer and paid advance of US$3,465,000 under independent back-to-back arrangement---Buyer was neither party nor privy to such arrangement and had given no undertaking to indemnify seller against supplier default, market fluctuation or other upstream commercial exposure---Structuring of procurement chain and alignment of upstream obligations with principal contract were matters of seller’s own commercial judgment and risk allocation---Seller failed to open required letter of credit in favour of supplier, resulting in termination and forfeiture of advance---Consequences of independent supply arrangement could not be shifted to buyer in absence of express contractual assumption of liability or indemnity. (h) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----Damages---Legal causation---Intervening commercial event---Seller’s supplier forfeited advance before expiry of revised timelines under principal contract---Buyer continued to act within extended contractual framework while seller’s supply chain had already failed---Termination by supplier and forfeiture of advance constituted intervening commercial event breaking chain of legal causation between conduct of buyer and claimed loss---Claim for US$3,465,000 lacked legally cognisable nexus with any breach by buyer and award of damages would impermissibly convert performance guarantee under sale contract into warranty against seller’s upstream commercial risks---Seller was not entitled to recover said amount or any other damages from buyer. Disposition---Civil Appeal No.140-K of 2016 filed by Trading Corporation of Pakistan allowed---Judgments of learned Single Judge and Division Bench of Sindh High Court, to extent directing refund of performance guarantee, set aside---Forfeiture of entire performance guarantee held justified and reasonable---Decision setting aside award of US$3,465,000 as damages maintained---Civil Appeal No.141-K of 2016 filed by Company dismissed in entirety. Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. M/s Abdulla Mezroei Metal Trading Company and another; and M/s Abdulla Mezroei Metal Trading Company and another v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Civil Appeals Nos.140-K and 141-K of 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 05.05.2026 and announced on 03.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Muhammadan Law----Hiba---Oral gift---Essential ingredients---Burden of proof---Exclusion of female heirs from inheritance---Where beneficiaries relied upon an alleged oral gift to exclude widow and daughters of deceased from inherited property, burden rested squarely upon beneficiaries to prove transaction through cogent and reliable evidence---Valid gift required proof of declaration by donor, acceptance by donee and delivery of possession---Beneficiary was required to prove gift itself and not merely mutation recording it---Courts were bound to scrutinize alleged gift with particular care where its effect was to bypass or artificially block inheritance rights of female heirs. Cited Cases: • Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85 • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 • Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276 (b) Muhammadan Law----Hiba by female heirs of inherited property---Knowledge and voluntary relinquishment---Proof---Inheritance rights of widow and daughters had already vested by operation of law upon death of predecessor---Beneficiaries of alleged gift were required to prove not only declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession but also that female heirs fully understood nature, extent and consequences of transaction and consciously and voluntarily elected to abandon their vested proprietary rights---No evidence established that female heirs had been apprised that alleged gift would permanently divest them of inherited estate---Transaction was in favour of male heirs who directly benefited from exclusion of women and therefore demanded closest judicial scrutiny---Mere mutation entry or long possession could not substitute proof of knowing and voluntary relinquishment. (c) Revenue record----Mutation---Evidentiary value---Oral gift---Mutation was maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and neither created nor extinguished title---Where ownership was claimed through oral gift, title flowed from gift itself and not from revenue entry recording it---Mutation could at most corroborate a transaction independently proved but could not establish declaration, acceptance or delivery of possession---Courts below committed error of law by treating Gift Mutation No.75 as substantive proof of title. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Sarwar deceased through LRs and others v. Ghulam Sakina 2019 SCMR 567 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim deceased through LRs and others 2025 SCMR 955 • Noor Ud Din deceased through LRs v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others 2023 SCMR 1928 • Mst. Barikhna and others v. Faiz Ullah Khan and others 2020 SCMR 1618 • Zohra Bibi and another v. Haji Sultan Mahmood and others 2018 SCMR 762 • Khan Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others 2017 SCMR 1476 • Muhammad Munir v. Muhammad Saleem and others 2004 SCMR 1530 • Muhammad Younus Khan and 12 others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Forest and Agriculture, Peshawar and others 1993 SCMR 618 • Noor Ahmad and 20 others v. Mst. Zeba and 12 others 1991 SCMR 1990 (d) Muhammadan Law----Oral gift---Subsequent consolidation proceedings, private partition and later revenue transactions---Evidentiary effect---Real controversy was whether valid oral gift had taken place in year 1955---Consolidation proceedings of 1968, preparation of Wanda Jaat, private arrangements amongst alleged donees and subsequent dealings could not relieve beneficiaries of burden to prove original transaction---Events occurring years later were incapable of retrospectively proving declaration, acceptance or delivery of possession at time of alleged gift. (e) Evidence---Oral gift---Witness not present at mutation proceedings---Hearsay testimony---Witness relied upon by beneficiaries was neither present before Revenue Officer at attestation of gift mutation nor participant in proceedings and could not identify persons who appeared or circumstances in which mutation was sanctioned---His testimony represented only what he subsequently learnt and was not evidence of transaction itself---Such testimony could not establish essential ingredients of valid gift. (f) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Knowledge of mutation---Proof of underlying transaction---Distinct questions---Knowledge of revenue mutation might be relevant to limitation but did not prove transaction entered therein---Even if female heirs knew of mutation years earlier, such knowledge did not dispense with beneficiaries’ obligation to independently prove valid gift---Courts below erred by conflating knowledge of mutation with proof of oral gift. (g) Muhammadan Law----Oral gift---Continued payment of share in produce to female heirs---Effect---Evidence indicated that female heirs continued to receive hissa batai from land after alleged gift---Such conduct cast doubt upon claim that they had completely and irrevocably divested themselves of all proprietary rights---Continued recognition of their entitlement in produce was inconsistent with assertion of absolute gift in favour of male heirs and was material evidence ignored by Courts below. (h) Muhammadan Law----Hiba---Delivery of possession---Co-heir already in possession---Proof---Delivery of possession was indispensable ingredient of valid gift---No witness identified act, date or manner by which donors allegedly relinquished dominion and delivered possession to donees---Male heirs were already cultivating property as co-heirs and their continued possession was not necessarily referable to alleged gift---Possession already held in capacity of heir could not, without independent evidence, establish delivery of possession pursuant to gift. (i) Muslim inheritance----Co-heirs---Possession of one heir---Constructive possession of all heirs---Possession of one co-heir was ordinarily deemed possession on behalf of all heirs unless rights of others were clearly and unequivocally repudiated---Exclusive physical possession by brothers did not by itself extinguish inheritance rights of sisters---Doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment and adverse possession generally did not operate amongst co-heirs in absence of express repudiation brought to their knowledge. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 • Abrar Hussain v. Mst. Bibi Shahida and others PLD 2026 SC 42 (j) Muslim inheritance----Female heirs---Protection of vested inheritance rights---Public policy---Inheritance rights vested immediately upon death of predecessor and were neither bounty of male relatives nor concession dependent upon family custom, convenience or goodwill---Purported relinquishment by women required extreme caution because female heirs were frequently deprived through fabricated gifts, manipulated revenue entries, coercive arrangements and fraudulent documentation---Courts were duty-bound to protect inheritance rights of women and prevent procedural technicalities from perpetuating deprivation. Cited Cases: • Mirza Abid Baig v. Zahid Sabir deceased through legal representatives and others 2020 SCMR 601 • Mst. Aksar Jan and others v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2025 SCMR 88 • Tanvir Sarfraz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCMR 98 • Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 (k) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Inheritance rights---Old mutation---Subsequent exchange and gift transactions---Fresh assertions of exclusive title---Limitation could not be examined in isolation from nature of right and validity of transaction forming foundation of title---Before relying upon delay, Court was required first to determine whether alleged gift had been proved---Subsequent exchange and gift transactions founded upon disputed mutation constituted independent assertions of exclusive ownership and furnished fresh causes for judicial scrutiny---Claim could not be dismissed merely by counting years from original mutation while ignoring failure to establish foundational gift. Cited Case: • Haji Muhammad Yunis deceased through legal heirs v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others 2022 SCMR 1282 (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.2-A, 23, 24, 25, 35 & 227---Inheritance rights of women---Equality, property and Islamic injunctions---Constitution did not permit deprivation of women from lawful inheritance---Equality before law and protection of property would become illusory if rights vested through succession could be defeated by coercion, fraud, social pressure, manipulated revenue entries or dubious family arrangements---State, Courts and revenue authorities bore positive obligation to ensure that female heirs obtained, retained and enjoyed inheritance in practical and effective manner---Any custom, practice, arrangement or device excluding female heir from lawful share offended injunctions of Islam and constitutional commitments to equality, dignity, social justice and property rights. (m) Courts and revenue authorities---Inheritance disputes involving women---Duty of heightened scrutiny---Law leaned in favour of protecting rather than defeating inheritance rights of women and vulnerable members of society---Every transaction having effect of excluding female heir from succession was required to be examined with utmost care, caution and judicial scrutiny---Courts could not permit artificial devices, dubious gifts, manipulated entries or prolonged litigation to defeat Divine and statutory scheme of inheritance. (n) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---Interference by Supreme Court---Concurrent findings ordinarily commanded respect but lost sanctity where founded upon misconception of law, misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Courts below failed to require proof of gift independent of mutation, ignored legal character of possession amongst co-heirs, overlooked continued payment of produce to female heirs and treated delay and revenue entries as substitutes for proof---Such findings were infected by misapplication of settled legal principles and warranted interference. Cited Cases: • Habib Ur Rehman and others v. Abdul Karim deceased through L.Rs. and others 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited through its President and others v. Jamil Ahmed and others 2024 SCMR 164 • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed and others v. Khalid and others 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed---Judgments and decrees of Trial Court, Appellate Court and High Court set aside---Gift Mutation No.75 dated 17.04.1955 and all subsequent transactions founded thereon declared illegal, void and ineffective against inheritance rights of petitioners---Petitioners declared entitled to their respective shares in estate of Roshan son of Bora according to applicable law of inheritance---Revenue authorities directed to make consequential corrections and determine and separate shares in accordance with law---No order as to costs. Noor Muhammad and others v. Ghulam Haider and others, C.P.L.A. No.1103-L of 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 04.06.2026 and announced on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (1) Distinction between “supersession” and “deferment” (2) Rule 13-A of 1975 Rules for determination of inter-se seniority (3) Principle “Birds of a feather flock together” explained. --- (a) Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973----Ss.8 & 9---Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, Rr.9, 10, 11 & 13-A---Seniority of Mukhtiarkars (BPS-16)---Promotees, deferred promotees and direct recruits---Seniority was to be determined according to mode and date of regular appointment and relevant statutory rules---Civil servant possessed no vested right to a particular position in seniority list, but appointing authority was required to prepare and revise seniority according to law---Seniority on promotion ordinarily took effect from date of regular appointment, subject to protection of inter-se seniority of persons belonging to same promotion batch---Direct recruits were to reckon seniority from date of their regular appointment and according to merit assigned by selection authority. (b) Service law---Promotion---“Supersession” and “deferment”---Distinction---Supersession involved conscious assessment by competent selection forum that civil servant was not fit or suitable for promotion on a particular occasion, resulting in promotion of junior and ordinarily affecting inter-se seniority---Deferment was temporary postponement of consideration due to incomplete service record, missing training, pending disciplinary or criminal proceedings or other administrative impediment and did not amount to adverse determination on fitness or merit---Supersession and deferment carried distinct legal consequences and could not be used interchangeably---Deferred civil servant, upon subsequent promotion after removal of impediment, could retain seniority with original batch in accordance with governing rules. (c) Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975----R.13-A---Deferred civil servant---Subsequent promotion---Inter-se seniority with juniors---Civil servant not promoted on his turn because seniority was disputed, he was on deputation, training or leave, disciplinary proceedings were pending, or for a reason other than unfitness for promotion, was, upon subsequent promotion and subject to competent authority’s order, deemed for purposes of inter-se seniority in higher post to have been promoted in same batch as his juniors---Fifty-four Assistant Mukhtiarkars had not been meaningfully considered and superseded on merit but were deferred because departmental, criminal or anti-corruption proceedings were pending---Upon subsequent promotion, their inter-se seniority with batchmates promoted on 03.01.2011 was protected under R.13-A. (d) Service law---Deferment from promotion---Non-reservation of vacancies---Effect upon seniority---Argument that deferred candidates could not claim seniority with original batch because no posts had been reserved for them was not sustainable---Deferred candidates were temporarily kept out of consideration and available candidates could lawfully be promoted against existing posts without suspending entire promotion process---Requirement to reserve posts for every deferred candidate would create administrative stalemate and frustrate Departmental Promotion Committee proceedings---Mere exhaustion or non-availability of promotion quota at time of subsequent promotion did not by itself deprive deferred civil servants of inter-se seniority protected by R.13-A after removal of impediment and regular promotion. (e) Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973----S.8---Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975, Rr.10 & 11---Initial appointees and promotees---Determination of inter-se seniority---Seniority of civil servant was ordinarily reckoned from date of regular appointment and ad hoc appointment could not be retrospectively regularized---Among direct recruits, earlier selection ranked senior to later selection and merit assigned by selection authority governed inter-se position---Among promotees, seniority in lower post governed their inter-se ranking---Rule 11 further required determination of relative seniority of promotees and direct recruits according to prescribed statutory criterion---Department was bound to reconcile seniority positions strictly under applicable rules. (f) Service law---Promotion quota---Earlier remand directions of Supreme Court---Compliance---Earlier judgment dated 19.01.2021 required department to follow fifty percent quota each for direct recruits and promotees, ensure promotion only against available post in relevant quota, prohibit cross-quota promotion, treat persons promoted without available posts as ad hoc promotees until regular appointment and determine seniority from date of regular appointment under relevant rules---Grant of inter-se seniority to genuinely deferred promotees under R.13-A did not, by itself, violate said directions---Deferred candidates had not been promoted cross-quota merely by being placed with their original batch for inter-se seniority. Previous Proceedings: • Civil Appeals Nos.489 to 491 of 2017 and connected petitions, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 19.01.2021 (g) Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975----Rr.10 & 11---Promoted Mukhtiarkars vis-à-vis directly recruited Mukhtiarkars---Final seniority list dated 08.06.2021---Promotees, including deferred promotees accorded batch seniority, claimed promotion date of 03.01.2011, whereas direct recruits were regularly appointed on 31.10.2011---Service Tribunal correctly held that direct recruits’ seniority commenced from date of regular appointment, but did not clearly determine whether their placement above promotees regularly promoted from an earlier date was consistent with governing rules---Matter required limited administrative reconciliation and re-examination rather than wholesale disturbance of seniority already determined regarding deferred promotees. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.212(3)---Service Tribunal judgment---Seniority dispute---Scope of interference---Tribunal’s conclusion applying R.13-A to protect inter-se seniority of deferred promotees with their original batch was maintained---Interference was required only to extent that relative ranking between regularly promoted Mukhtiarkars and directly recruited Mukhtiarkars had not been examined with clarity under Rr.10 and 11 of the 1975 Rules. Disposition---Civil petitions converted into appeals and partly allowed---Finding protecting inter-se seniority of deferred Mukhtiarkars with their original batch maintained---Matter remanded to Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Sindh, for limited re-examination of seniority ranking of promoted Mukhtiarkars from dates of promotion vis-à-vis directly recruited Mukhtiarkars from dates of appointment---Competent authority directed to hear stakeholders and, if any lapse, apparent error or violation of 1975 Rules was found, make necessary correction in Final Seniority List dated 08.06.2021 within two months. Faheemuddin Memon and others v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others, C.P.L.A. Nos.914-K to 919-K of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 25.03.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: The ultimate purpose of procedural law is to give voice to human suffering, not to silence it. Principally, the procedural framework under the Cr.P.C. facilitates the observance of due process and the right to a fair trial, thereby securing the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution. Section 360(2) of the Cr.P.C. provides the procedure when a witness challenges the written record of his statement, mandating the Judge to append a “memorandum” of the objection, setting out Judge’s own remarks regarding the objection, and recording the correct version of the statement of the witness. --- (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Condonation of delay---Criminal petition for leave to appeal---Grounds stated in application were found plausible---Delay in filing petition was condoned. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360(1)---Recording of evidence of witness---Reading over and correction of statement---Trial Court was required, upon completion of testimony, to read over statement to witness in presence of accused or his counsel and correct any mistake, where necessary, before obtaining signature of witness---Object of provision was to ensure that testimony was reduced into writing accurately and substantially word for word---Recording of evidence through video link did not dilute statutory obligation to ensure correctness of written statement. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360(2)---Witness disputing correctness of recorded statement---Memorandum of objection---Where witness asserted that exact narrative had not been correctly reduced into writing, Magistrate or Sessions Judge was required, after hearing parties, to make memorandum of objection, append appropriate remarks and record correct version of testimony---Provision vested Trial Court with jurisdiction to rectify discrepancies, omissions and inaccuracies in written statement and cross-examination---Such jurisdiction was required to be exercised whenever accuracy of judicial record was legitimately questioned. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.10-A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.360---Fair trial and due process---Accurate recording of testimony---Procedural framework governing recording and correction of evidence served vital purpose of ensuring fairness and transparency in criminal trial---Procedure was an instrument for advancement of justice and could not be applied through purely technical approach so as to frustrate ends of justice---Failure to correct material inaccuracies in statement of witness could seriously impair evidentiary value of testimony and prejudice merits of criminal case---Ultimate purpose of procedural law was to give voice to human suffering rather than silence it. (e) Criminal trial---Evidence recorded through video link---Written statement inconsistent with video recording---Rectification---Witness stated in video recording that incident occurred on 31.05.2018, whereas Trial Court inadvertently recorded date as 30.05.2018---Supreme Court examined video recording and written statement and found material discrepancies and inaccuracies---Respondent also conceded mistakes and raised no objection to correction---Video recording constituted reliable contemporaneous source for comparison and rectification of written judicial record. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss.360(2) & 435---Trial Court and Revisional Court---Failure to exercise jurisdiction---Witness specifically sought comparison of written statement with available video recording, but Trial Court declined application and High Court maintained such order---Both fora were required to exercise jurisdiction conferred by Ss.360(2) and 435, Cr.P.C. to examine and rectify irregularity in proceedings---Non-exercise of such jurisdiction, despite admitted non-verbatim recording of testimony, amounted to illegality. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360(2)---Correction of testimony---Presence of parties---Procedure after remand---Trial Court was required to re-examine video recording and compare it with written examination-in-chief and cross-examination in presence of accused, counsel for parties and Prosecutor---Where discrepancy, omission or inaccuracy was found, Trial Court was to incorporate correct version of witness’s statement through memorandum containing its remarks and make same part of judicial record---Correction exercise was to preserve transparency and protect rights of all parties rather than permit unilateral alteration of evidence. Disposition---Criminal miscellaneous application allowed and delay in Criminal Petition No.1033 of 2024 condoned---Criminal petitions disposed of---Orders of Trial Court and High Court set aside---Trial Court directed to compare video recording with written statement, prepare memorandum under S.360(2), Cr.P.C. containing correct version and complete exercise within fifteen working days from receipt of certified copy of order---Thereafter parties to be afforded opportunity of re-arguments and criminal case to be decided within thirty working days strictly in accordance with law and on merits. Mst. Nayab v. The State through Prosecutor General, Sindh and others, Criminal Petitions Nos.1033 and 1036 of 2024 along with Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.1207 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 23.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.212(3)---Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973---Departmental proceedings---Scope of interference by Federal Service Tribunal---Where inquiry had been conducted in accordance with law, adequate opportunity of defence had been afforded and findings were supported by material available on record, Tribunal could not arbitrarily interfere with penalty or substitute its own conclusions merely because another view of evidence was possible---Departmental proceedings were distinct from criminal proceedings and Tribunal was not to act as an appellate forum for fresh reassessment of evidence after requirements of due process had been satisfied. Cited Cases: • Director General, Directorate General of Training and Research (Inland Revenue), Lahore v. Ijaz Younas 2021 SCMR 710 • Saboor Khan v. Chairman WAPDA 2021 SCMR 667 (b) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973---Departmental inquiry---Due process---Respondent was served with charge-sheet and statement of allegations, submitted written reply, participated throughout inquiry, was informed of rights available under Rules, was afforded opportunity to cross-examine departmental witnesses, received show-cause notice and was granted personal hearing before competent authority---No violation of any mandatory legal provision or denial of reasonable opportunity of defence was established---Inquiry proceedings were conducted in accordance with law. (c) Evidence---Cross-examination---Departmental witnesses not challenged---Evidentiary effect---Where witness was not cross-examined on material portion of testimony, such statement ordinarily deserved acceptance as true unless displaced by reliable contrary evidence---Respondent was expressly afforded opportunity to cross-examine all departmental witnesses but consciously declined to avail it---Testimony concerning harassment, blackmail, indecent photographs, objectionable associations and immoral conduct therefore remained unrebutted and could legitimately be relied upon by Inquiry Committee. Cited Cases: • Mst. Nur Jehan Begum through Legal Representatives v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi 1991 SCMR 2300 • Sheraz Tufail v. The State 2007 SCMR 518 • Ishfaq Ahmed v. Mushtaq Ahmed and others PLD 2025 SC 582 (d) Departmental proceedings---Voluntary confession by delinquent employee---Evidentiary value---Respondent made detailed signed statement before Inquiry Committee after being informed of his rights, expressly declaring that it was made willingly and without pressure or duress---He admitted involvement in immoral and illicit activities and furnished particulars thereof---Confession was never retracted during inquiry nor was coercion, threat, inducement or mala fide alleged before competent authority---Respondent subsequently admitted misconduct during personal hearing and sought pardon---Such admissions constituted substantive evidence and independently supported conclusion that respondent had rendered himself unsuitable for retention in service. (e) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973---Departmental misconduct---Standard of proof---“Some evidence” rule---Findings of Inquiry Committee were supported by oral testimony of several witnesses, voluntary confession of respondent and subsequent admissions before competent authority---Such material satisfied requirement of “some evidence” necessary to sustain departmental findings---Findings could not be characterized as arbitrary, capricious, perverse or based on no evidence. (f) Departmental inquiry---Misconduct of immoral nature---Absence of documentary evidence---Effect---Tribunal erred in treating want of documentary evidence as fatal---Misconduct involving personal conduct, objectionable associations, harassment and immoral activities could be proved through oral testimony, admissions, surrounding circumstances and conduct of delinquent employee---Law did not require documentary proof of every allegation in disciplinary proceedings. (g) Civil service---Conduct before regularization and during service---Relevance---Tribunal attached undue significance to fact that some incidents related to period before respondent’s regular appointment---Inquiry record also contained material showing continuation of objectionable conduct during service---Earlier incidents, when forming part of continuing pattern of misconduct extending into service, could not be discarded merely because some conduct preceded regularization. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.212(3)---Federal Service Tribunal---Reappraisal of departmental evidence---Jurisdictional limits---Tribunal failed to appreciate unrebutted witness testimony, voluntary confession and subsequent admissions and substituted its own assessment for conclusions of disciplinary authority---Such reassessment exceeded lawful limits of Tribunal’s jurisdiction where inquiry was fair and findings were supported by ample material. Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed---Judgment dated 22.10.2024 passed by Federal Service Tribunal set aside---Order dated 30.08.2021 imposing major penalty of dismissal from service, as maintained in departmental appeal on 14.10.2021, restored. Additional Director Civilian Personnel, Air Headquarters, Peshawar and others v. Muzafar Masih, Civil Petition No.5857 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 21.05.2026 and announced on 19.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 211 & 215---Attorney and principal---Fiduciary obligation---Transfer of principal’s property by attorney in favour of his own sons---Validity---Attorney, acting under registered general power of attorney, transferred principal’s inherited property in favour of his own sons through registered sale deed and mutation---Principal subsequently revoked power of attorney and sought cancellation of sale deed and mutation on ground of misuse of authority, fraud and absence of consent---Held, that attorney stands in fiduciary relationship with principal and cannot validly transfer principal’s property in favour of himself or his close relatives without prior permission, approval and consent of principal after full disclosure of material circumstances---Transfer in favour of sons of attorney, without proof of express consent of principal, was legally unsustainable. Cited Cases: • Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan PLD 1985 SC 341 • Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Jamil Akhtar v. Las Baba PLD 2003 SC 494 • Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Malik PLD 2008 SC 389 • Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Riaz PLD 2025 SC 63 (b) Power of attorney--- ----General power of attorney---Authority to alienate immovable property---Scope---General power of attorney does not, merely by reason of being described as “general”, automatically include authority to sell or alienate property of principal---Such authority must be contained in a clear and specific clause, and even then Court must examine whether principal’s knowledge, intention and consent are clearly established---Held, that implied authority to alienate property is not readily deducible from vague or general words, particularly where principal alleges fraud or misrepresentation. Cited Case: • Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan PLD 1985 SC 341 (c) Power of attorney--- ----Attorney purchasing or transferring property for his own benefit or for benefit of close relatives---Special permission of principal---Requirement---Attorney transferred suit property in favour of his own sons---Held, that where attorney intends to deal with principal’s property for his own benefit or in favour of close fiduciary relations, he must obtain special permission/prior approval of principal---Failure to obtain such consent entitles principal to repudiate transaction---Burden lies heavily upon attorney and beneficiaries to establish valid consent and lawful authority. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Jamil Akhtar v. Las Baba PLD 2003 SC 494 • Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Malik PLD 2008 SC 389 • Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Riaz PLD 2025 SC 63 (d) Sale by attorney--- ----Transfer in favour of attorney’s sons---Absence of express written consent---Effect---No cogent or reliable evidence was produced to prove that principal had granted express consent or prior approval for transfer of suit property in favour of attorney’s sons---Held, that in absence of such consent, transaction was hit by settled principles governing fiduciary obligations of attorney and could not be sustained. (e) Sale transaction--- ----Payment through cheque---Proof of sale consideration---Evidentiary value---Attorney/brother relied upon alleged cheque payment in favour of principal/sister to support sale transaction---Held, that payment through cheque, by itself, was not conclusive proof of valid sale transaction, particularly where no agreement to sell or independent corroborative evidence existed to show lawful bargain---Mere production of payment, without proof of underlying transaction and principal’s informed consent, did not satisfy legal standard required to validate alienation of immovable property. (f) Fraud and misuse of authority--- ----Power of attorney executed due to close familial relationship---Subsequent sale in favour of attorney’s sons---Material alteration in written statement regarding consideration---Effect---Principal had executed power of attorney in favour of appellant due to close familial relations for management of suit property---Attorney later transferred property in favour of his sons---Appellants initially pleaded purchase for valuable consideration, but later materially altered alleged sale consideration in amended written statement without explanation---Held, that surrounding circumstances, fiduciary relationship, absence of proven consent and inconsistency regarding consideration supported conclusion that authority had been misused and transaction was not legally sustainable. (g) Civil suit--- ----Cancellation of sale deed and mutation---Attorney’s unauthorized transfer---Trial Court decree restored by High Court---Supreme Court refusal to interfere---Trial Court decreed suit for cancellation; appellate Court reversed; High Court restored Trial Court decree---Supreme Court held that core question was whether attorney could validly transfer principal’s property to his own sons without express written consent and whether such consent had been proved---No reliable evidence of prior approval or express consent having been produced, High Court rightly restored decree of Trial Court---Appeal was dismissed. Disposition: Appeal was dismissed. Supreme Court upheld High Court judgment dated 06.10.2025 whereby decree of Trial Court cancelling the impugned sale deed and mutation was restored. No order as to costs.

Summary: Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908)--- ----S. 36---Execution of orders---Compromise order---Undertaking given before Court---Enforceability---Scope--- Respondents had instituted suit for declaration against inheritance mutation, while during pendency of suit petitioners sought appointment of receiver for collection of their share of produce from disputed land---Matter was settled before High Court on undertaking that if respondents failed in suit, they would compensate petitioners according to their share recorded in mutation---Suit was ultimately dismissed up to High Court and execution proceedings were initiated by petitioners for recovery of amount representing their share of produce---Meanwhile, subsequent proceedings before Supreme Court also ended in compromise, whereby mutation was to stand modified to extent of share of predecessor of petitioners and such arrangement was agreed to be final settlement regarding disputed mutation---Executing Court repeatedly held execution petition maintainable and dismissed objections, but High Court in revision set aside orders of Executing Court and dismissed execution petition---Validity---Supreme Court held that order passed on basis of compromise, even where no formal decree was drawn, remained binding upon parties and was fully enforceable---By virtue of S. 36, C.P.C., provisions relating to execution of decrees apply equally, so far as may be, to execution of orders---Undertaking recorded by Court carries sanctity and enforceability, and party giving such undertaking cannot subsequently resile from it---Order disposing of proceedings in terms of compromise was not mere private arrangement but judicial order possessing full legal force---Executing Court was competent to enforce obligations arising out of undertaking and compromise and respondents could not, through objections, reopen matters that had already attained finality or flowed directly from compromise---High Court had erred in revisional jurisdiction in interfering with well-reasoned orders of Executing Court and in rendering undertaking and compromise ineffective---Petitions were converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment of High Court was set aside; Executing Court was directed to proceed with execution petition and conclude proceedings expeditiously in accordance with law. Mehar Zulfiqar Ali Babu and others v. Government of Punjab (1997 SCMR 117); Ranjit Singh Hazari v. Juman Meah (PLD 1961 Dacca 842); Kilachand Devchand & Co. v. Ajodhuaprasad Sukhamnand (AIR 1934 Bombay 452); Hassan Masud Malik v. Dr. Muhammad Iqbal (1995 SCMR 766); Bakhtawar v. Amin (1980 SCMR 89) rel. (a) Compromise recorded by Court---Binding effect--- An order passed on the basis of compromise between parties does not lose its binding force merely because no formal decree has been drawn up---Once proceedings are disposed of in terms of compromise, the order remains operative and binding inter se the parties and cannot be permitted to be defeated on technical grounds. (b) Section 36, C.P.C.---Execution of orders as distinguished from decrees--- Section 36, C.P.C. expressly provides that provisions relating to execution of decrees shall, so far as may be applicable, apply equally to execution of orders---Thus, judicial orders, including compromise orders, are capable of enforcement through execution proceedings. (c) Undertaking given before Court---Sanctity and enforceability--- A party who voluntarily gives undertaking before Court to perform a particular obligation is bound by the same and cannot later wriggle out of it---Such undertaking, once recorded by Court, acquires sanctity and is enforceable through judicial process. (d) Executing Court---Jurisdiction and limitation--- Where obligations arise directly from compromise and undertaking recorded by superior Courts, Executing Court is competent to enforce the same---Objections seeking to reopen issues already settled or having attained finality are legally impermissible, for Executing Court cannot go behind the order sought to be executed. (e) Revisional jurisdiction of High Court---Interference with execution orders---Propriety--- High Court fell into error in upsetting orders of Executing Court and appellate court which had correctly held execution petition maintainable---Such interference had effect of rendering judicial undertaking and compromise insignificant, contrary to settled principles governing enforceability of orders of Court. Petitions converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment set aside; Executing Court directed to proceed with execution petition expeditiously.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit---Withdrawal with permission to file fresh suit---Effect on earlier judgment and decree---Plaintiff’s right to abandon suit---Court’s discretion to grant permission for fresh suit---Held, that under O.XXIII, R.1, CPC, a plaintiff may withdraw his suit or abandon part of his claim, but if such withdrawal is without permission under sub-rule (2), he is precluded from instituting a fresh suit on the same subject-matter---Where permission is granted under sub-rule (2), the withdrawal protects the plaintiff from the restrictive consequences of O.II, R.2 and S.11, CPC---Grant of such permission is not a matter of right but a judicial discretion to be exercised only where the suit must fail by reason of a formal defect or where other sufficient grounds exist for allowing a fresh suit---When a suit is withdrawn with permission to institute a fresh suit, parties are placed in the same legal position as if the original suit had never been filed. Cited Cases: • Balida Kamayya and others v. Paragada Papayya and another AIR 1918 Mad. 1287 • Behari Lal Pal v. Srimati Baran Mai Dasi 1894 ILR 17 All 53 • Becharam Chowdhuri and others v. Purna Chandra Chatterji and others AIR 1925 Cal. 845 • Baisnab Das Mohanta v. Nani Gopal Das and others PLD 1963 Dacca 504 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit at appellate stage---Permission to file fresh suit---Effect on decrees already passed---Judicial caution---Held, that an application under O.XXIII, R.1(2), CPC, especially when made at appellate or second appellate stage, requires strict judicial scrutiny---If permission is granted at such stage, it may enable an unsuccessful plaintiff to avoid adverse decrees already rendered against him and may deprive the contesting defendant of rights accrued through adjudication by courts below---Court must consider all relevant factors, including the effect of allowing a party to re-agitate the same dispute and the wastage of public judicial time---Backlog of cases and delay in disposal of litigation further require appellate courts to exercise such discretion with care and restraint. Cited Case: • Mrs. Afroz Shah and others v. Sabir Qureshi and others PLD 2010 SC 913 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal order with permission to file fresh suit---Finality of unchallenged order---Collateral attack---Subsequent proceedings---Held, that once a competent Court grants permission to withdraw a civil suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit, such order remains binding unless set aside in appeal, revision or other lawful direct proceedings---Court seized of a subsequent suit cannot examine whether the earlier permission was rightly or wrongly granted---Such order cannot be challenged collaterally in proceedings not intended to reverse, modify or annul it---Where the appellants did not challenge the withdrawal order through proper procedure, they could not later question its validity in subsequent proceedings. Cited Cases: • Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. 2004 1 SCR 629 • Raj Kumar Mahto v. Ram Khelawan Singh AIR 1922 Pat. 44 • Haridey Nath Roy v. Ramchandra AIR 1921 Cal. 34 • R v. Wilson 1983 2 SCR 594 • Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. 2001 2 SCR 460 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Declaratory suit based on earlier decree---Earlier suit withdrawn with permission to file fresh suit---Effect of withdrawal on earlier decree---Held, that where the first suit had been withdrawn with permission to institute a fresh suit, the judgment and decree previously passed in that first suit ceased to have operative legal value for founding a subsequent claim---Such judgment and decree became ineffective and could not be used as the basis for declaration of title---Appellants’ claim in the second suit was based solely on the earlier judgment and decree dated 26.02.1998, but after withdrawal of the first suit, that decree no longer furnished any foundation for claiming ownership---Courts below were justified in dismissing the declaratory suit. (e) Precedent---- ----Leave-refusing order---Applicability of precedent---Decision to be read in context of its own facts---Held, that every judicial opinion must be understood in relation to the facts established or assumed in that case---Broad observations in a judgment are not to be treated as complete expositions of law divorced from their context---A case is authority only for what it actually decides---Precedent of Haji Muhammad Boota was distinguishable because in that case the Supreme Court had itself permitted withdrawal and later revisited the withdrawal order due to indications of misrepresentation and possible fraudulent acquisition of escheated land---In the present case, withdrawal was allowed by the First Appellate Court and the appellants never challenged such order before any forum at the proper time---Reliance on Haji Muhammad Boota was therefore misplaced. Cited Cases: • Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 • Quinn v. Leathern 1901 AC 495 • Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 • Muhammad Shakeel and others v. Additional District Judge and others PLD 2025 SC 572 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VI, R.17---Amendment of plaint---Declaratory suit---Change in character of claim---Request for remand to amend plaint and prove independent title---Held, that although the proposed amended suit would still remain one for declaration, the character of the appellants’ claim would materially change because the original plaint was founded solely on the earlier judgment and decree---Amendment which changes the character of the original claim is not permissible under O.VI, R.17, CPC---Appellants had not produced any foundational material or supplementary documents showing that they could establish title independently of the earlier decree---Remanding the matter merely on counsel’s assertion would serve no practical purpose and would create unnecessary litigation. Cited Cases: • Alokeshi Banik v. Aftabuddin PLD 1963 Dacca 87 • Syed Muhammad Ali and others v. Syed Dabir Ali and others 2016 SCMR 2164 (g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Declaratory suit---Declaration of title---Burden to establish independent legal foundation---Earlier ineffective decree relied upon as sole basis of title---Held, that a plaintiff seeking declaration of ownership must establish a valid legal foundation for such title---Where the only foundation pleaded was an earlier judgment and decree which had become ineffective due to withdrawal of the suit with permission to file fresh proceedings, no declaration of title could be granted---In absence of any other evidence or documentation proving ownership of the disputed land, appellants were rightly non-suited. Disposition: Appeal was dismissed with costs throughout; judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, maintaining dismissal of appellants’ declaratory suit, was upheld.

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)---- ----S.15---Ejectment petition---Commercial premises---Unregistered lease deed for thirty-three years---Long-term tenancy---Effect---Held, that an unregistered lease deed purporting to create rights in immovable property for a term exceeding one year could not be relied upon for establishing a long-term tenancy---Where the alleged lease deed was unregistered, the tenancy was rightly treated as month-to-month tenancy under the law---Upon valid termination of such tenancy, ejectment petitions were maintainable and could lawfully be accepted. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.185(3)---Leave to appeal---New factual plea before Supreme Court---Alleged partition of property and identity of landlord---Held, that a party cannot be permitted to raise, for the first time at the stage of leave to appeal, a factual controversy requiring determination through evidence---Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art.185(3) is not intended to reopen factual disputes which were neither pleaded nor adjudicated upon by the courts below---Where no foundational plea challenging the locus standi of the ejectment petitioner on the basis of alleged partition or different landlord was raised before the Rent Controller, no issue was framed and no evidence was led, such plea could not be entertained for the first time before the Supreme Court. Cited Cases: • Pirzada Noor-Ul-Basar v. Mst. Pakistan Bibi and others 2023 SCMR 1072 • WAPDA through Chairman and others v. Alam Sher and others 2023 SCMR 981 • Najaf Iqbal v. Shahzad Rafique 2020 SCMR 1621 • Muhammad Rashid Bhatti v. Director General FIA Headquarters, Islamabad and others 2018 SCMR 1995 • Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Azan and another 2011 SCMR 474 • Rauf Ahmad v. Mst. Walayat Begum PLD 1995 SC 639 (c) Civil Procedure---- ----Remand---Scope and object---Not to be ordered routinely---Held, that remand is a corrective jurisdiction to be exercised carefully where a material issue has remained undecided or where a party has been denied fair opportunity to present its case---Remand cannot be used as a device to prolong litigation or to provide a litigant a second opportunity to fill lacunae in his case---Where Rent Controller framed relevant issues, recorded oral and documentary evidence and returned findings after appraisal of record, and Appellate Court and High Court also examined the matter, remand was not warranted in absence of jurisdictional defect, misreading or non-reading of material evidence. Cited Cases: • Rozi Khan and others v. Nasir and others 1997 SCMR 1849 • Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore and another v. Gulbat Khan 1996 SCMR 230 (d) Civil Procedure---- ----Pleadings---Parties bound by pleadings---Evidence beyond pleadings---Held, that parties are bound by their pleadings and no amount of evidence can be looked into in support of a plea not specifically raised---A litigant cannot improve or reconstruct his case at a later stage by introducing facts that were neither pleaded, nor made subject of issue, nor tested through evidence before the competent forum---Pleas regarding acquisition of ownership through sale deeds during pendency of proceedings and extension of demised premises through adjoining portions could not be entertained where such pleas were not part of the original defence before the Rent Controller. Cited Cases: • Hafiz Qari Fateh through L.Rs. v. Ms. Urooj Fatima and others 2024 SCMR 1709 • Muhammad Ghaffar through LRs and others v. Arif Muhammad 2023 SCMR 344 • Zulfiqar and others v. Shahdat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582 • Government of West Pakistan through Collector, Bahawalpur v. Hail Muhammad PLD 1976 SC 469 • Messrs Choudhary Brothers Ltd., Sialkot v. The Jaranwala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Jaranwala 1968 SCMR 804 • Binyameen and others v. Chaudhry Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336 • Major (Retd.) Barkat Ali and others v. Qaim Din and others 2006 SCMR 562 (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Art.115---Estoppel of tenant---Tenant disputing landlord’s title---Subsequent claim of ownership---Held, that a tenant who entered into possession under a tenancy cannot, during subsistence of tenancy, dispute the landlord’s title as it existed at the inception of tenancy---Doctrine of estoppel under Art.115 bars such denial---If, after expiry of tenancy, tenant sets up an independent title in himself, lawful course is to vacate the premises and pursue appropriate remedies before a competent civil forum---Rent proceedings cannot be converted into proceedings for adjudication of complex title disputes. Cited Cases: • Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913 • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 • Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068 • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 • Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 (f) Transfer of Property / Rent Law---- ----Doctrine of pendente lite---Sale deeds executed during pendency of ejectment proceedings---Effect on rent proceedings---Held, that reliance upon sale deeds executed in 2022 and 2023 could not be used to resist ejectment proceedings instituted in 2018---Rights, if any, acquired pendente lite cannot be employed as a ploy to defeat proceedings lawfully initiated years earlier, particularly where such rights were neither pleaded at inception nor integrated into the original defence before the Rent Controller. (g) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)---- ----S.15---Rent Controller---Jurisdiction---Title dispute---Summary nature of rent proceedings---Held, that rent jurisdiction under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 is summary and specialized in character and is confined to determining the landlord-tenant relationship and statutory grounds of ejectment---Rent Controller cannot adjudicate complex questions of proprietary title---Questions of ownership fall within the exclusive domain of the civil court---Where tenants had already disputed respondents’ title through separate civil proceedings pending before a competent civil court, remand to the Rent Controller for inquiry into title would be misconceived and would merely delay finality of rent proceedings. (h) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)---- ----S.15---Co-ownership dispute---Change in ownership of demised premises---Distinguishable precedents---Held, that precedents relating to change in ownership of the very demised premises through alienation by co-owners were distinguishable where no such alteration in ownership of the demised premises had been established---Alleged purchases relied upon by tenants related to adjoining portions and were never made part of the original defence before the Rent Controller---Precedents apply only where factual foundation is analogous; where facts materially differ, reliance upon such authorities is of no assistance. Cited Cases: • Mst. Sanobar Sultan and others v. Obaidullah Khan and others PLD 2009 SC 71 • Abdul Zahir v. Jaffar Khan 2010 SCMR 189 (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings of Rent Controller, Appellate Court and High Court---Interference by Supreme Court---Held, that concurrent findings that tenancy stood established, unregistered lease deed could not create long-term tenancy, plea of extended ownership/acquisition of title was neither pleaded nor proved, and ejectment petitions were maintainable, were based on proper appreciation of record and settled principles of law---No perversity, misreading, non-reading of material evidence or jurisdictional defect was shown---Supreme Court refused interference. Disposition: All connected C.P.L.As. Nos.209, 210, 211, 212, 324 and 325 of 2026 were dismissed; leave to appeal was refused; no order as to costs.