Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit---Withdrawal with permission to file fresh suit---Effect on earlier judgment and decree---Plaintiff’s right to abandon suit---Court’s discretion to grant permission for fresh suit---Held, that under O.XXIII, R.1, CPC, a plaintiff may withdraw his suit or abandon part of his claim, but if such withdrawal is without permission under sub-rule (2), he is precluded from instituting a fresh suit on the same subject-matter---Where permission is granted under sub-rule (2), the withdrawal protects the plaintiff from the restrictive consequences of O.II, R.2 and S.11, CPC---Grant of such permission is not a matter of right but a judicial discretion to be exercised only where the suit must fail by reason of a formal defect or where other sufficient grounds exist for allowing a fresh suit---When a suit is withdrawn with permission to institute a fresh suit, parties are placed in the same legal position as if the original suit had never been filed. Cited Cases: • Balida Kamayya and others v. Paragada Papayya and another AIR 1918 Mad. 1287 • Behari Lal Pal v. Srimati Baran Mai Dasi 1894 ILR 17 All 53 • Becharam Chowdhuri and others v. Purna Chandra Chatterji and others AIR 1925 Cal. 845 • Baisnab Das Mohanta v. Nani Gopal Das and others PLD 1963 Dacca 504 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit at appellate stage---Permission to file fresh suit---Effect on decrees already passed---Judicial caution---Held, that an application under O.XXIII, R.1(2), CPC, especially when made at appellate or second appellate stage, requires strict judicial scrutiny---If permission is granted at such stage, it may enable an unsuccessful plaintiff to avoid adverse decrees already rendered against him and may deprive the contesting defendant of rights accrued through adjudication by courts below---Court must consider all relevant factors, including the effect of allowing a party to re-agitate the same dispute and the wastage of public judicial time---Backlog of cases and delay in disposal of litigation further require appellate courts to exercise such discretion with care and restraint. Cited Case: • Mrs. Afroz Shah and others v. Sabir Qureshi and others PLD 2010 SC 913 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal order with permission to file fresh suit---Finality of unchallenged order---Collateral attack---Subsequent proceedings---Held, that once a competent Court grants permission to withdraw a civil suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit, such order remains binding unless set aside in appeal, revision or other lawful direct proceedings---Court seized of a subsequent suit cannot examine whether the earlier permission was rightly or wrongly granted---Such order cannot be challenged collaterally in proceedings not intended to reverse, modify or annul it---Where the appellants did not challenge the withdrawal order through proper procedure, they could not later question its validity in subsequent proceedings. Cited Cases: • Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. 2004 1 SCR 629 • Raj Kumar Mahto v. Ram Khelawan Singh AIR 1922 Pat. 44 • Haridey Nath Roy v. Ramchandra AIR 1921 Cal. 34 • R v. Wilson 1983 2 SCR 594 • Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. 2001 2 SCR 460 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Declaratory suit based on earlier decree---Earlier suit withdrawn with permission to file fresh suit---Effect of withdrawal on earlier decree---Held, that where the first suit had been withdrawn with permission to institute a fresh suit, the judgment and decree previously passed in that first suit ceased to have operative legal value for founding a subsequent claim---Such judgment and decree became ineffective and could not be used as the basis for declaration of title---Appellants’ claim in the second suit was based solely on the earlier judgment and decree dated 26.02.1998, but after withdrawal of the first suit, that decree no longer furnished any foundation for claiming ownership---Courts below were justified in dismissing the declaratory suit. (e) Precedent---- ----Leave-refusing order---Applicability of precedent---Decision to be read in context of its own facts---Held, that every judicial opinion must be understood in relation to the facts established or assumed in that case---Broad observations in a judgment are not to be treated as complete expositions of law divorced from their context---A case is authority only for what it actually decides---Precedent of Haji Muhammad Boota was distinguishable because in that case the Supreme Court had itself permitted withdrawal and later revisited the withdrawal order due to indications of misrepresentation and possible fraudulent acquisition of escheated land---In the present case, withdrawal was allowed by the First Appellate Court and the appellants never challenged such order before any forum at the proper time---Reliance on Haji Muhammad Boota was therefore misplaced. Cited Cases: • Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 • Quinn v. Leathern 1901 AC 495 • Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 • Muhammad Shakeel and others v. Additional District Judge and others PLD 2025 SC 572 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VI, R.17---Amendment of plaint---Declaratory suit---Change in character of claim---Request for remand to amend plaint and prove independent title---Held, that although the proposed amended suit would still remain one for declaration, the character of the appellants’ claim would materially change because the original plaint was founded solely on the earlier judgment and decree---Amendment which changes the character of the original claim is not permissible under O.VI, R.17, CPC---Appellants had not produced any foundational material or supplementary documents showing that they could establish title independently of the earlier decree---Remanding the matter merely on counsel’s assertion would serve no practical purpose and would create unnecessary litigation. Cited Cases: • Alokeshi Banik v. Aftabuddin PLD 1963 Dacca 87 • Syed Muhammad Ali and others v. Syed Dabir Ali and others 2016 SCMR 2164 (g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Declaratory suit---Declaration of title---Burden to establish independent legal foundation---Earlier ineffective decree relied upon as sole basis of title---Held, that a plaintiff seeking declaration of ownership must establish a valid legal foundation for such title---Where the only foundation pleaded was an earlier judgment and decree which had become ineffective due to withdrawal of the suit with permission to file fresh proceedings, no declaration of title could be granted---In absence of any other evidence or documentation proving ownership of the disputed land, appellants were rightly non-suited. Disposition: Appeal was dismissed with costs throughout; judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, maintaining dismissal of appellants’ declaratory suit, was upheld.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance of agreement to sell---Discretionary and equitable relief---Continuous readiness and willingness---Petitions arose out of three interconnected civil proceedings concerning same immovable property and two competing agreements to sell dated 16.04.2014 and 03.06.2016---Supreme Court held that relief of specific performance, though statutorily recognized, was not granted as a matter of right but rested in equity and judicial discretion---Person seeking such relief was required to plead and prove that he had been continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract---Readiness and willingness was not a mere formal requirement but foundational to equitable relief, as the Court could not compel performance of reciprocal obligations unless satisfied that the claimant himself had adhered to the discipline of the contract---Held, plaintiff seeking specific performance must establish continuous readiness and willingness through pleadings, conduct and reliable evidence, failing which the foundation for equitable relief becomes unsustainable. Cited Cases: • Messrs DW Pakistan (Private) Limited, Lahore v. Begum Anisa Fazl-I-Mahmood and others 2023 SCMR 555 • Ijaz Ul Haq v. Mrs. Maroof Begum Ahmed and others PLD 2023 SC 653 • Muhammad Yaqub v. Muhammad Nasrullah Khan and others PLD 1986 SC 497 • Narinjan v. Muhammad Yunus AIR 1932 Lah 265 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----First Sched., Appendix “A”, Form 47---Suit for specific performance---Pleading readiness and willingness---Requirement not an empty technicality---Supreme Court held that plaint in a suit for specific performance must conform to Form 47 of Appendix “A” to the First Schedule of C.P.C. and must contain a clear assertion that plaintiff “has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement” on his part---Plaintiff must plead readiness and willingness in clear and specific terms and then prove the same by convincing evidence---Readiness must relate to contract as actually executed, including timelines and conditions, and must continue from inception of obligation until institution of suit---In the present case, plaint did not contain the categorical averment mandated by Form 47 and absence of clear continuous assertion weakened the very foundation of the claim for specific performance. Cited Cases: • Messrs DW Pakistan (Private) Limited, Lahore v. Begum Anisa Fazl-I-Mahmood and others 2023 SCMR 555 • Ijaz Ul Haq v. Mrs. Maroof Begum Ahmed and others PLD 2023 SC 653 • Muhammad Yaqub v. Muhammad Nasrullah Khan and others PLD 1986 SC 497 (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance of agreement to sell---Balance sale consideration---Tender, deposit or proof of financial capacity---Buyer’s primary obligation---Supreme Court held that in a contract for sale of immovable property the vendee’s core reciprocal obligation is payment of balance sale consideration---Readiness and willingness cannot be established in abstraction or by mere assertion; it must be reflected through objective acts showing financial capacity and preparedness to perform---Preparation of pay order, cashier cheque, segregation of funds, bank guarantee, bank statement, or prompt deposit in Court are evidentiary indicators of bona fide readiness---Though deposit of sale consideration at the time of filing suit is not an inflexible statutory precondition, failure to tender or otherwise demonstrate availability of funds materially affects the plaintiff’s claim---Where no credible material shows that buyer secured or tendered consideration in terms of agreement, Court may draw adverse inference regarding bona fides. Cited Cases: • Nazar Hussain and another v. Syed Iqbal Ahmad Qadri 2022 SCMR 1216 • Inayatullah Khan and others v. Shabir Ahmad Khan 2021 SCMR 686 • Muhammad Yousaf v. Allah Ditta and others 2021 SCMR 1241 • Mst. Noor Jehan and another v. Saleem Shahadat 2022 SCMR 918 • Muhammad Jamil and others v. Muhammad Arif 2021 SCMR 1108 • Hamood Mehmood v. Mst. Shabana Ishaque and others 2017 SCMR 2022 • Muhammad Shafiq Ullah and others v. Allah Bakhsh through LRs 2021 SCMR 763 (d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---- ----S. 51---Reciprocal promises---Agreement to sell immovable property---Vendor’s obligation to execute sale deed dependent upon vendee’s readiness to pay balance sale consideration---Supreme Court held that obligations of vendor and vendee in sale of immovable property are ordinarily reciprocal and interdependent---Vendor cannot be compelled to execute and register sale deed unless vendee first establishes through pleadings and proof that he was ready and willing to perform his corresponding obligation to pay balance sale consideration---Court while exercising jurisdiction in suit for specific performance must examine mutuality of obligations and determine whether claimant has satisfied pre-requisite of demonstrating his own readiness to perform. Cited Case: • Mst. Samina Riffat and others v. Rohail Asghar and others 2021 SCMR 7 (e) Contract Act (IX of 1872) / Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Time as essence of contract---Sale of immovable property---Express contractual stipulation---Effect---Although time is not ordinarily treated as essence in transactions of immovable property, parties are competent to expressly stipulate otherwise---Where agreement prescribes definite time for payment and provides consequence for default, Court must give effect to contractual terms settled between parties---Equitable jurisdiction of Court does not extend to rewriting bargain or diluting express stipulations relating to timelines and forfeiture---In present case, agreement dated 03.06.2016 specifically required balance sale consideration to be paid on or before 15.01.2017; obligation was neither contingent nor deferred but formed core reciprocal promise of vendees---No tender of balance amount was made within stipulated time, no pay order, bank guarantee, bank statement or segregated funds were shown, and no immediate deposit was made in Court upon institution of suit---Deposit made only after Court direction and substantially beyond contractual deadline could not retrospectively cure absence of readiness and willingness at material time. Cited Cases: • Fazal Ur Rehman v. Ahmed Saeed Mughal and others 2004 SCMR 436 • Muhammad Jamil v. Muhammad Arif 2021 SCMR 1108 (f) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance---Belated deposit of balance consideration---Effect---Courts below treated subsequent deposit of balance sale consideration, made pursuant to Court direction after expiry of stipulated period, as sufficient to cure earlier default---Supreme Court held that such approach was contrary to settled principles---Jurisprudence did not equate belated compliance with continuous readiness and willingness---Court was required to examine whether plaintiff had secured, tendered or demonstrated availability of consideration on the due date fixed by contract and whether such readiness continued thereafter without interruption---Failure to conduct such inquiry amounted to overlooking a material legal requirement governing grant of specific performance---Record did not satisfactorily establish that respondents fulfilled essential precondition of continuous readiness and willingness; therefore decree for specific performance could not be sustained. (g) Administration of justice---- ----Concurrent findings of fact---Interference by Supreme Court---Misreading/non-reading of evidence and violation of settled principles---Although concurrent findings are not ordinarily disturbed, interference is warranted where findings result from misreading or non-reading of material evidence or are contrary to settled principles governing equitable relief---Courts below failed to properly examine absence of timely tender, absence of financial proof, absence of immediate deposit in Court, defective pleadings under Form 47 C.P.C., and contractual stipulation making time material for payment---Concurrent judgments therefore could not be maintained. Cited Cases: • Habib Ur Rehman and others v. Abdul Karim through LRs 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited through its President and others v. Jamil Ahmed and others 2024 SCMR 164 / 2024 PLC 50 SC • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed and others v. Khalid and others 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 (h) Specific performance---- ----Earlier agreement dated 16.04.2014---Agreement already cancelled by competent Court---Finality of judgment---No decree for specific performance sustainable---Petitioner Muhammad Imran sought possession through specific performance of agreement dated 16.04.2014---Courts below dismissed his suit, appeal and Regular Second Appeal---Supreme Court held that agreement sought to be specifically performed had already been cancelled by Court of competent jurisdiction due to non-payment of balance sale consideration within stipulated time, in terms of contractual conditions---Such determination was not assailed further and had attained finality---No decree for specific performance could legally be sustained on basis of such cancelled agreement---Petition was devoid of merit and leave was refused. Disposition: Petitions for leave to appeal in C.P.L.A. Nos. 3649 and 3650 of 2025 were converted into appeals and allowed; impugned judgments of courts below were set aside; suit for specific performance filed by respondents No.3 and 4 on basis of agreement dated 03.06.2016 was dismissed; suit for cancellation of agreement filed by petitioners/respondents was decreed; suit instituted by Muhammad Imran in C.P.L.A. No.3639 of 2025 for specific performance on basis of agreement dated 16.04.2014 was dismissed and leave refused; earnest money paid under agreements dated 16.04.2014 and 03.06.2016 was ordered to be returned by respective recipients to concerned payers within thirty days from date of judgment.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas respondent No.1 instituted suit on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years alleging fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Supreme Court held that unexplained delay in challenging a mutation renders the claim legally untenable---Respondent remained completely silent for more than two decades and took no step to question validity of mutation or underlying sale transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---A person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Law of limitation is designed to bring certainty and finality to legal relations and prevent reopening of stale claims---Suit was clearly and hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and 10 others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and 4 others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraud alleged in respect of mutation/sale transaction---Fraud vitiates all solemn acts, but must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved---Supreme Court reiterated that fraud vitiates solemn acts and any instrument, deed, judgment or decree obtained through fraud is a nullity, but allegation of fraud cannot be accepted on mere assertion---Fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Question of fraud involves finding of fact regarding conduct of party concerned---Even where fraud is alleged in relation to an instrument or transaction, party challenging such instrument is required to seek cancellation within prescribed limitation period---Where document is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act and suit seeking declaration/cancellation must be filed within three years under Art.91 of Limitation Act from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Respondent failed to produce convincing evidence of fraud and remained silent for more than two decades; plea of fraud could not be used to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Proof of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Independent and reliable evidence required---Respondent alleged that Mutation No.684 dated 15.03.1980 was procured through fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, held that respondent failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation through independent evidence---Supreme Court held that such allegations remained unsubstantiated and were rightly disbelieved by subordinate Courts---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day and identifying witnesses were the same, which negatived respondent’s stance that he had not visited office of Patwari on relevant date---Respondent remained confined to his solitary statement and did not produce independent witnesses sufficient to dislodge documentary proof brought on record. (d) Revenue record---- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Presumption of correctness---Jamabandi---Revenue entries remaining unquestioned for decades---Supreme Court held that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they have remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights have subsequently accrued on their basis---Once mutation is duly sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it forms part of regular revenue record and carries statutory presumption of truth unless rebutted by strong and cogent evidence---Mutation in question remained part of revenue record for more than two decades without challenge---Respondent produced no convincing evidence to rebut presumption attached to revenue entries---Courts below were justified in giving due weight to revenue record and holding that respondent failed to discharge heavy burden required to displace statutory presumption. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (e) Mutation---- ----Procedural irregularity in attestation---Effect on proved sale transaction---Mutation entries do not themselves create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, technical defects in mutation proceedings cannot invalidate transaction---Supreme Court held that even if certain procedural irregularities in attestation of mutation were assumed, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and respondent had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently dismissed suit after proper appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, holding that sale transaction was genuine, fraud was not proved and suit was barred by limitation---Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits---Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into third court of fact---High Court reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, material illegality or perversity in findings of subordinate Courts---Such approach was inconsistent with settled limits of revisional jurisdiction and amounted to impermissible interference with concurrent findings of fact. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim, etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Difference between misreading/non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---High Court’s limits in revision---Supreme Court reiterated that scope of appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be confused---Revisional Court cannot upset finding of fact merely because another view appears more plausible---Interference is permissible only where finding is result of misreading, non-reading, perverse or absurd appraisal of material evidence, jurisdictional error, illegality or serious miscarriage of justice---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and same conclusion has been reached concurrently, revisiting evidence in second appeal or revision to draw another conclusion would offend doctrine of finality---High Court cannot independently reassess evidence to supplant its own conclusion unless findings below are legally flawed. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (h) Revenue record / Limitation---- ----Third-party rights and finality of long-standing entries---Mutation remaining incorporated for decades---Effect---Supreme Court held that where revenue entries have remained unchallenged for prolonged period and third-party rights have intervened, challenges to such entries must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained---In present case, during long interregnum of over twenty-two years, third-party rights had come into existence, further strengthening need to uphold sanctity and finality of long-standing revenue entries---Belated suit challenging mutation could not be permitted to unsettle settled rights. Disposition: Appeals were allowed; judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court in Civil Revision No.410 of 2017 was set aside; concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored; civil suit filed by respondent No.1 was dismissed; no order as to costs; connected CMAs No.12138 and 12580 of 2019 and CMA No.2581 of 2022 were disposed of as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance---Oral agreement to sell immovable property---Strict proof required---Respondents/plaintiffs sought specific performance on basis of alleged oral agreement dated 28.05.1992, allegedly arising out of reconciliation after acquittal in a murder case, whereby petitioner/defendant was said to have agreed to transfer 32 kanals of land to them---Supreme Court held that an oral agreement intended to bind parties may be valid and enforceable, but it must be proved through clearest and most satisfactory evidence---Basic ingredients of valid contract, including offer, acceptance, lawful consideration, mutuality of obligation, competency of parties and consensus ad idem, must be established through unimpeachable evidence. Cited Cases: • Hafiz Qari Abdul Fateh through LRs v. Ms. Urooj Fatima and others 2024 SCMR 1709 • Maqbool Ahmad v. Suleman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---- ----S. 2(h)---Agreement---Oral agreement for sale of immovable property---Onus of proof---Supreme Court held that person seeking decree of specific performance on basis of oral agreement must prove that mutual agreement and consensus existed between parties regarding terms of contract---Oral agreement must satisfy legal requirements of an enforceable agreement under Contract Act, 1872---Respondents failed to prove essential elements of alleged bargain with requisite clarity and certainty. (c) Specific performance---- ----Oral agreement to sell---Pleadings---Date, time, place, witnesses, consideration and terms---Sine qua non---Supreme Court held that party claiming existence of oral agreement must clearly specify date, time, place and names of witnesses in pleadings, along with exact terms and conditions, consideration, subject matter and detail of striking of bargain---Such requirements are sine qua non for proving oral agreement to sell---Suits based on oral sale agreements are more susceptible to dishonest improvements in evidence and pleadings; therefore Courts must strictly insist upon foundational details at earliest stage. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz and others v. Mst. Badshah Begum and others 2021 SCMR 605 • Moiz Abbas v. Mrs. Latifa and others 2019 SCMR 74 • Saddaruddin through LRs v. Sultan Khan through LRs and others 2021 SCMR 642 • Sheikh Akhtar Aziz v. Mst. Shabnam Begum and others 2019 SCMR 524 • Muhammad Nawaz through LRs v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through LRs 2013 SCMR 1300 (d) Pleadings and evidence---- ----Evidence beyond pleadings---Impermissible improvement---Oral agreement and alleged reconciliation committee/Jirga---Respondents’ plaint did not disclose with precision date, time and place of alleged oral agreement, exact terms and conditions, settled consideration, or names of witnesses before whom bargain was struck---Plea of reconciliation committee/Jirga was also not supported by necessary particulars in pleadings---Supreme Court held that attempt to supplement foundational deficiencies through oral testimony amounted to impermissible improvement beyond pleadings and could not be looked into---Parties must lead evidence in consonance with pleadings, and no evidence can be considered in support of a plea not properly taken. Cited Cases: • Saddaruddin through LRs v. Sultan Khan through LRs and others 2021 SCMR 642 • Sardar Muhammad Naseem Khan v. Returning Officer, PP-12 and others 2015 SCMR 1698 • Binyameen and others v. Chaudhry Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336 (e) Specific performance---- ----Sale of immovable property---Requirements for enforcement---Transaction with title holder, offer, acceptance, competency, consideration and delivery of possession---Supreme Court reiterated that to enforce sale of immovable property, vendee must establish that transaction was made with title holder, offer was made and accepted, parties were competent, consensus ad idem existed, valid consideration was settled, and transaction was accompanied by delivery of possession---Respondents failed to satisfy such strict standard of proof in respect of alleged oral agreement. Cited Case: • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 (f) Specific performance---- ----Alleged possession and subsequent ownership mutation---Effect---Respondents alleged that possession had been delivered and petitioner became bound to transfer property after securing ownership rights through Mutation No.1314 dated 14.10.2016---Supreme Court held that mere assertions regarding possession or subsequent title could not substitute proof of valid oral agreement---Mere prolonged possession, even coupled with title documents, does not establish ownership or enforceable sale unless underlying sale agreement is legally proved. (g) Concurrent findings---- ----Specific performance decreed by Trial Court, maintained by Appellate Court and High Court---Concurrent findings contrary to settled law---Interference by Supreme Court---Trial Court, after remand, decreed suit for specific performance; Appellate Court dismissed petitioner’s appeal and High Court dismissed revision---Supreme Court held that Courts below failed to apply strict standard of proof mandated for oral agreements to sell immovable property---Findings suffered from misapplication of settled law and non-reading of material deficiencies in pleadings and proof---Concurrent findings cannot be allowed to stand where demonstrably contrary to principles repeatedly laid down by Supreme Court. Cited Cases: • Habib Ur Rehman and others v. Abdul Karim through LRs and others 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited through its President and others v. Jamil Ahmed and others 2024 SCMR 164 / 2024 PLC 50 SC • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed and others v. Khalid and others 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 Disposition: Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decrees passed by Trial Court, Appellate Court and Lahore High Court were set aside; suit filed by respondents for specific performance of alleged oral agreement stood dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Declaratory suit---Recruitment process---Candidate failing minimum eligibility threshold---No vested right---Respondents were excluded from merit lists for recruitment to posts of Primary School Teachers after failing to obtain minimum 40% marks in NTS test prescribed by recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017---Supreme Court held that declaratory decree can only be granted where plaintiff establishes an existing legal character or vested legal right which has been denied or threatened---S.42 does not permit adjudication of abstract questions or creation of rights where none exist---A candidate in competitive recruitment process has only right to fair, equal and non-discriminatory consideration, but no vested right to appointment or inclusion in merit list unless eligibility criteria are fulfilled---Failure to meet prescribed minimum marks extinguished even limited expectancy of consideration. (b) Recruitment policy---- ----Minimum qualifying marks in NTS test---Condition precedent for eligibility---Recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017 expressly provided that obtaining minimum 40% marks in NTS test was mandatory, otherwise candidate would not be eligible for post---Supreme Court held that requirement was unambiguous and left no room for departure---Courts below erred in disregarding express mandate of 2017 policy and relying upon earlier policy dated 30.04.2014, which had removed previous 50% marks requirement---Governing policy at relevant time was 2017 policy, and candidates who failed to secure 40% marks were ineligible for inclusion in merit list. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Suit based on mere expectation---Not maintainable---Respondents’ claim was founded upon anticipation of inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet prescribed threshold---Supreme Court held that declaratory suit cannot be based on mere expectation or disagreement with policy; it must involve infringement of a subsisting right---Claim for inclusion despite non-fulfilment of criteria was, in substance, challenge to recruitment policy itself---Unless such policy was shown to be ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, or violative of constitutional guarantees, no enforceable legal right arose in favour of respondents. (d) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985---- ----R. 5(1)---Departmental policy---Competence of Minister---Recruitment standards---High Court had observed that directions issued by Provincial Minister regarding 40% marks requirement had no legal effect---Supreme Court held that under R.5(1) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985, framing of departmental policy falls within competence of Minister---Recruitment criteria emanated from policy framed by competent authority---In absence of finding that policy was ultra vires, beyond authority, or unconstitutional, prescription of minimum qualifying marks fell within domain of executive policy. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction / judicial review---- ----Recruitment policy---Executive domain---Limited scope of Court interference---Supreme Court held that where competent authority is empowered to frame policy relating to recruitment standards, such policy carries executive authority---Courts ordinarily refrain from interfering with such policy unless it is shown to be unconstitutional, ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, mala fide, or violative of constitutional guarantees---Courts below erred in substituting their view for express eligibility criterion prescribed by competent authority. (f) Estoppel---- ----Recruitment process---Candidate participating without protest---Challenge after failure---Respondents participated in recruitment process with full knowledge of prescribed 40% NTS qualifying threshold and raised challenge only after failing to secure required marks---Supreme Court held that candidate who voluntarily enters selection process under known terms cannot, after being unsuccessful, challenge criteria---Such conduct attracts doctrines of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence---Respondents were estopped from disputing eligibility requirements after participation without protest. (g) Civil litigation---- ----Declaratory suit versus constitutional challenge---Recruitment policy---Proper remedy---Supreme Court held that in absence of pre-existing legal right, declaratory suit under S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 was not maintainable---Mere dissatisfaction with recruitment policy did not confer enforceable civil claim---Proper remedy, if any, was to challenge vires of policy through appropriate constitutional proceedings, not to seek declaration for inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet eligibility condition. Disposition: Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; consolidated judgment of Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench dated 23.09.2024, along with concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court and Appellate Court, were set aside; respondents’ suits seeking inclusion in PST merit lists despite failure to secure minimum 40% NTS marks stood dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Ss. 42, 44, 52, 53, 166 & 172(2)(vi)—Specific Relief Act, 1877—S. 42—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 175F(1)(c) & 199—Revenue record—Old sanctioned mutations—Non-implementation for over a century—Correction of entries—Clerical or arithmetical mistake—Contentious dispute—Jurisdiction of revenue authorities—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the alleged non-implementation of Mutation No. 117 dated 29.12.1907 and Mutations Nos. 401 and 402 dated 30.01.1913 could not be treated as a mere clerical or arithmetical mistake capable of correction by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967. The Court observed that where implementation of century-old mutations would potentially disturb long-standing revenue entries, affect possible intervening alienations, and prejudice third parties not before the forum, the matter plainly assumes a contentious character. In such circumstances, the limited power of correction available to revenue authorities cannot be invoked for deciding substantive controversies affecting proprietary rights. The Court further held that the discretion under S. 166 is not unbridled and is confined to cases free from factual controversy and incapable of adversely affecting vested rights without proper adjudication. Revenue law—Record-of-rights—Presumption of correctness—Remedy against adverse entry—The Court held that Ss. 42, 44, and 52 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 collectively regulate the preparation, evidentiary value, and correction of the record-of-rights, and once entries are incorporated therein, a presumption of truth attaches to them until the contrary is proved or lawful substitution is made. To dislodge such presumption, the law itself provides a remedy through S. 53 of the Act, enabling an aggrieved person to institute a suit for declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, where he is prejudiced by an entry in the record-of-rights or periodical record relating to a right of which he is in possession. The Court reaffirmed that the statute does envisage an appropriate remedy even where summary correction before revenue authorities is unavailable. In this regard, reliance was placed on Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334). Jurisdiction—Civil court and revenue authorities—Section 172(2)(vi), Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Bar of jurisdiction not absolute in contentious matters—The Federal Constitutional Court examined the petitioners’ contention that, because S. 172(2)(vi) bars civil court jurisdiction regarding correction of entries in the record-of-rights, periodical record, or register of mutations, only revenue authorities could grant relief. Rejecting the broad proposition, the Court held that the exclusion recognized in S. 172(2)(vi) operates in matters of correction that are not controversial in nature. Where, however, the dispute involves contentious questions, competing rights, and possible effect on absent parties, the matter cannot be summarily resolved by revenue authorities. The Court relied upon Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906), wherein the Supreme Court clarified that only non-controversial corrections in revenue record fall within the exclusive domain of revenue authorities to the exclusion of civil courts. Delay and equity—Laches and acquiescence—Unexplained silence for more than a century—The Court held that the petitioners’ claim was hopelessly belated, having been raised for the first time in the year 2020 in relation to mutations sanctioned in 1907 and 1913. It was observed that the petitioners had failed to produce any material explaining why their predecessors-in-interest did not seek implementation during their lifetime, or why the petitioners themselves remained silent for decades. Such inordinate and unexplained delay attracted the principles of laches and acquiescence with full force. The mere existence of old sanctioned but unimplemented mutations did not automatically entitle the petitioners to their implementation after a lapse of over one hundred years, particularly in the face of possible competing claims and long-standing contrary entries in the revenue record. Constitutional jurisdiction—Article 199—Disputed questions of fact and title—Scope of writ jurisdiction—The Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 is meant to provide prompt relief where illegality or impropriety is apparent on the face of the record and can be determined without elaborate inquiry or recording of evidence. Where, however, the controversy involves disputed or intricate questions of fact, title, or enforceability of old mutations, requiring proper evidence and adjudication, the High Court cannot assume the role of a fact-finding forum. Such matters fall within the domain of courts of plenary jurisdiction. In support of this proposition, the Court referred to Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61), Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990), and Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). The Court accordingly held that the Lahore High Court rightly declined to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction. Natural justice—Affected third parties—No adverse order behind the back of interested persons—The Court observed that during the extraordinarily long interregnum between the sanction of the mutations and the filing of the petitioners’ application, it was highly probable that various transactions, alienations, or changes in possession had taken place, and that third parties may have acquired rights on the basis of the existing revenue entries. Any order directing implementation of the old mutations without impleading such persons or affording them opportunity of hearing would violate the principles of natural justice and risk grave miscarriage of justice. This consideration further demonstrated that the matter was not one of a simple ministerial correction but of substantive adjudication. Case references—Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334); Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906); Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61); Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990); Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the controversy regarding implementation of century-old mutations was contentious in nature, could not be resolved by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, and was not amenable to determination in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution. Finding no legal infirmity in the orders of the Member Board of Revenue, the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), and the Lahore High Court, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12—Specific performance—Essential prerequisites—Clean hands doctrine—Misstatement in pleadings—Equitable relief rightly denied- Vendee filed suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 17.02.2009. He claimed to have paid Rs. 200,000 as part payment; however, no mention of earnest money was made in the agreement to sell. Moreover, during testimony, the vendee contradicted his own pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the vendee had misstated material facts and approached the court without clean hands. Relief of specific performance being discretionary in nature could not be granted in such circumstances. Held: Party seeking equity must come with clean hands; false pleadings disentitle relief. Cited Case: Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 55—Specific performance—Time as essence of contract—Express stipulation—Failure to perform within agreed time fatal to relief sought Agreement to sell fixed 31.10.2010 as deadline for payment and execution. The vendee failed to pay full consideration within stipulated period despite having over 20 months. The Supreme Court emphasized that the express terms of the agreement, including forfeiture clause and deadline, showed that time was the essence of the contract. Delay rendered vendee disentitled to relief. Held: Where time is expressly stipulated as essence and performance not rendered within such time, suit for specific performance must fail. Cited Cases: • Fazal-ur-Rehman v. Ahmed Saeed Mughal (2004 SCMR 436) • Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Sofia Khatoon (1994 SCMR 2189) (c) Equity—Contract for sale of immovable property—Commercial character—Escalating property values—Equitable jurisdiction to be exercised cautiously Court noted that the suit property was commercial in nature and real estate prices were constantly escalating. In such cases, courts should exercise equitable jurisdiction for specific performance with caution, particularly where delay in performance would unjustly enrich one party. Held: Equity does not aid a party whose default, delay or misrepresentation would lead to injustice. (d) Civil Procedure—Appellate and revisional jurisdiction—High Court’s interference—Concurrent findings reversed—Proper consideration of law and fact The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit in favour of the vendee. However, the Supreme Court held that both courts below failed to appreciate legal and factual issues regarding misrepresentation and time-bound performance. The High Court correctly reversed the concurrent findings and dismissed the suit. Held: Revisional jurisdiction rightly exercised where lower courts misconstrued law and overlooked material facts. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgments and decrees of trial and appellate courts set aside by High Court were upheld. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 12---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115(1), 'second proviso'---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Conditional decree---Order for depositing remaining sale consideration failing which suit would stand dismissed---Dispute regarding remaining sale consideration---Belated filing of application for rectification of remaining sale consideration amount---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court---Limitation---Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioner (vendee) filed a suit for specific performance which was decreed conditionally, directing the petitioner to deposit the remaining sale consideration, failing which the suit would stand dismissed---The petitioner, instead of depositing the specified amount, filed an application disputing the determined amount by the trial court, which application was dismissed---A revision petition filed against that dismissal was dismissed as time-barred---The petitioner challenged the dismissal through a Constitutional petition, arguing that no specific limitation period existed under S. 115 C.P.C. for filing revision---Pivotal questions for determination before the High Court were; (i) "whether the petitioner's failure to deposit the remaining sale consideration within the stipulated timeframe rendered the decree ineffective, and whether the trial court had any jurisdiction to entertain his subsequent application for rectification of amount after the lapse of time"; & (ii)"whether the revision petition filed after more than one year was maintainable despite the statutory bar under the second proviso to S. 115(1) C.P.C."---Held: Had there been any dispute with regard to the remaining sale consideration, the petitioner must have been vigilant enough to move for the rectification of the judgment swiftly but he remained waiting till the time to deposit expired---When a decree is conditional and it stipulated the condition as well as the consequence of non-fulfillment of such condition the court would become functus officio on the target date---As regards the contention of the petitioner that his application was well within time, if its limitation was computed from the date decree was drawn, bare perusal of the judgment made it clear that the time for deposit of remaining sale consideration started from the date of passing of the decree and not from the date when the decree sheet was drawn, even otherwise if date of preparation of the decree was considered and the if the application of the petitioner would be treated as well within time, he was then obliged to deposit at least the amount which he allegedly specified, being the remaining consideration as per his estimation to show his bona fide but it was not done either before the trial court or the revisional court---Moreover, it was made obligatory that a revision application shall be made within ninety days of the decision of the subordinate court---Revision was filed after passing of about more than a year, which was adjudged as barred by time and rightly so---Even otherwise the petitioner had remained indolent in prosecuting his cause right from the passing of the decree---The petitioner was thus precluded to ask the court to come to his rescue on the principles of equity---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Wahid and another v. Nasrullah and another 2016 SCMR 179 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss. 115(1) 'second proviso' & 115(2)---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, invoking of---Limitation---As regards the proposition that revision application even though filed after the period of ninety days can be entertained, if the court is satisfied that sufficient reason has been assigned for the delay and it can condone the same, to this effect the revisional powers were conferred upon the High Court for the first time by virtue of S. 35 of the Act No. XXIII of 1861 and through the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972---Section 115, C.P.C. as it then was, has been re- numbered as subsection (1), and subsections (2), (3) & (4) were added---Second proviso to subsection (1) was added through the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1992 where-under it was made obligatory that a revision application shall be made within ninety days of the decision of the subordinate court which shall provide a copy of such decision within three days thereof and the High Court shall dispose of such application within six months---Mere limitation would not come in the way of revisional court to exercise its jurisdiction where it appears from the record that the proceedings brought before it are tainted with such patent illegalities or material irregularities defeating the ends of justice but at the same time limitation cannot be considered merely a formality---The prime object of law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent---A court cannot come to the rescue of a litigant who has gone into deep slumber and becomes forgetful of his right. Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss. 115(1),'second proviso' & 115(2)---Revisional powers of the District Court---Revision application, limitation of---As regards the question that no limitation is provided in S. 115 of the C.P.C. for a revision application before the District Court, the addition of subsection (2) through the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and the Civil Laws (Reforms) Act, 1994) along with the High Court amendments, the District Court was also vested with the revisional powers as is conferred upon the High Court by virtue of subsection (1) of S. 115, C.P.C. in respect of any case decided by a court subordinate to such District Court in which no appeal lies and the amount or value of the subject matter whereof does not exceed the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court---For the purpose of limitation, second proviso to subsection (1) of S. 115 of the C.P.C., would undoubtedly come into play. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Concurrent findings by the courts below---Limited scope of interference in judgments/orders passed under revisional jurisdiction by the court below---When a question of fact or even of law is decided by the courts of competent jurisdiction concurrently it should not to be interfered with in extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court unless some patent illegality is floating on the surface of record---High Court, while invoking its Constitutional jurisdiction always exercises restraint in interfering with the judgment or order passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction unless some perversity or patent illegality is floating on the surface of record---The Constitutional jurisdiction can only be exercised in such an eventuality if the impugned order or judgment suffers with certain legal infirmities or patent illegalities, resulting into failure of justice. Chief Executive MEPCO and others v. Muhammad Fazil and others 2019 SCMR 919 and Muhammad Husain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others PLD 1974 SC 139 rel. Ajam Naz Malik for Petitioner. Abdul Rauf Qureshi and Usama Bin Salam for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 4 to 8. Date of hearing: 16th April, 2021.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 115—Revisional jurisdiction—Scope—Concurrent findings of fact—Registered sale deed—Improper reversal by High Court—Non-speaking order—EffectAppellants filed suit for possession and mesne profits on the strength of a registered sale deed dated 05.03.1989. Trial Court decreed the suit, holding appellants as owners and respondent in illegal possession. First Appellate Court affirmed findings. However, Revisional Court, while exercising jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC, reversed concurrent findings without providing cogent reasons or identifying jurisdictional errors. Supreme Court held that Revisional Courts cannot act as another appellate forum and must refrain from reassessing evidence unless findings are perverse or contrary to law. Reversal without reasoning, and without addressing binding nature of registered deed or prior litigation, amounted to a serious legal error. Impugned judgment of High Court set aside—Findings of Trial and Appellate Courts restored.Cited Cases:• District Council Sialkot v. Nazir Ahmed Khan 2001 SCMR 1641• Lahore Development Authority v. Sharifan Bibi 2010 SCMR 742(b) Evidence Act (I of 1872)----S. 91 & S. 92—Registered sale deed—Presumption of validity—Challenge to title—Burden of proof—Failure to prove consideration—EffectRespondent alleged he had paid consideration to the father of appellants, claiming joint ownership of suit property. Supreme Court held that once a registered sale deed stands in favour of appellants, presumption of ownership arises, and burden lies on the challenger to rebut it through cogent evidence. Respondent failed to produce any proof of alleged payments or joint ownership and did not seek specific performance or refund. Courts below rightly disregarded vague oral assertions. Revisional Court's failure to address these evidentiary gaps rendered its interference unwarranted and contrary to settled law.(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)—S. 42—Declaratory relief—Challenge to registered instrument—Delay and failure to obtain relief—ConsequencesRespondent challenged appellants' title in a separate suit for cancellation of registered deed, which was dismissed by Trial Court and upheld by Appellate Court. Supreme Court noted that belated claims seeking cancellation without concurrent pursuit of specific relief or refund have no legal sanctity. Failure to challenge ownership through appropriate legal remedies bars collateral assertions in defence. Courts must give due weight to registered title documents when unassailed or unsuccessfully challenged—Revisional Court erred in undermining conclusive effect of prior judgments.(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 9—Jurisdiction of civil court—Possession suit—Nature and maintainability—Mischaracterization by High Court—EffectAppellants' suit was for possession and mesne profits, duly based on title acquired through registered sale deed. Supreme Court disapproved High Court's characterization of such suit as one for “administration,” noting it had no basis in pleadings or relief sought. Misreading of record by Revisional Court led to misapplication of law and unwarranted interference with valid decrees. Such jurisdictional error warranted correction under constitutional appellate jurisdiction.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss. 100 & 101—Second Appeal—Scope and jurisdiction—Concurrent findings—Substitution of equitable discretion by High Court—ImpermissibilitySecond Appeal under Section 100 CPC lies only on limited grounds, including decision contrary to law or containing substantial procedural defects affecting the merits of the case. The Supreme Court reiterated that High Court, in exercise of Second Appellate jurisdiction, cannot substitute its own view merely on equitable considerations, particularly when the First Appellate Court had reversed the Trial Court's decree by applying discretion judiciously and in accordance with law. In the instant case, the High Court interfered with the First Appellate Court's findings without establishing any substantial question of law, thereby exceeding the permissible scope under Sections 100 and 101 CPC. Supreme Court held that such interference amounted to sitting as a Court of First Appeal—Impugned order of High Court set aside—Judgment of First Appellate Court restored.Cited Cases:• District Council Sialkot v. Nazir Ahmed Khan 2001 SCMR 1641• Mir Abdullah v. Muhammad Ali 1977 SCMR 280(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)—S. 12—Specific performance of contract—Discretionary relief—Readiness and willingness—Delay in deposit of consideration—Effect—Doctrine of equityRelief of specific performance is discretionary and dependent upon consistent readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform contractual obligations. In the present case, the plaintiff/respondent failed to deposit balance consideration during prolonged litigation spanning seven years, and only upon the trial court's directive was such payment ordered. Supreme Court held that failure to deposit consideration during pendency showed lack of bona fides and disentitled the respondent from equitable relief. Additionally, the Court noted that market value of plots had appreciated considerably during the intervening years, which, coupled with retention of unpaid amount by plaintiff, militated against the grant of specific performance. Trial Court’s adjustment of consideration for three out of four plots, excluding one deceased defendant, was deemed speculative and unsupported by record—First Appellate Court rightly exercised discretion in refusing specific performance.(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 96—First Appeal—Findings on facts—Sanctity and weight—When immune from interferenceFindings of fact by the First Appellate Court, when based on proper appraisal of evidence and supported by record, are not liable to be disturbed in Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC. Supreme Court observed that while the High Court may disagree with the findings, it cannot replace its own view unless the findings are perverse, contrary to law, or cause miscarriage of justice. In the absence of such circumstances, appellate findings must prevail even if divergent from those of the trial Court. High Court’s action of substituting its view amounted to reappreciation of facts, beyond the lawful scope of Section 100 CPC—Principle of finality in litigation reaffirmed.