Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Declaratory suit---Recruitment process---Candidate failing minimum eligibility threshold---No vested right---Respondents were excluded from merit lists for recruitment to posts of Primary School Teachers after failing to obtain minimum 40% marks in NTS test prescribed by recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017---Supreme Court held that declaratory decree can only be granted where plaintiff establishes an existing legal character or vested legal right which has been denied or threatened---S.42 does not permit adjudication of abstract questions or creation of rights where none exist---A candidate in competitive recruitment process has only right to fair, equal and non-discriminatory consideration, but no vested right to appointment or inclusion in merit list unless eligibility criteria are fulfilled---Failure to meet prescribed minimum marks extinguished even limited expectancy of consideration. (b) Recruitment policy---- ----Minimum qualifying marks in NTS test---Condition precedent for eligibility---Recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017 expressly provided that obtaining minimum 40% marks in NTS test was mandatory, otherwise candidate would not be eligible for post---Supreme Court held that requirement was unambiguous and left no room for departure---Courts below erred in disregarding express mandate of 2017 policy and relying upon earlier policy dated 30.04.2014, which had removed previous 50% marks requirement---Governing policy at relevant time was 2017 policy, and candidates who failed to secure 40% marks were ineligible for inclusion in merit list. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Suit based on mere expectation---Not maintainable---Respondents’ claim was founded upon anticipation of inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet prescribed threshold---Supreme Court held that declaratory suit cannot be based on mere expectation or disagreement with policy; it must involve infringement of a subsisting right---Claim for inclusion despite non-fulfilment of criteria was, in substance, challenge to recruitment policy itself---Unless such policy was shown to be ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, or violative of constitutional guarantees, no enforceable legal right arose in favour of respondents. (d) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985---- ----R. 5(1)---Departmental policy---Competence of Minister---Recruitment standards---High Court had observed that directions issued by Provincial Minister regarding 40% marks requirement had no legal effect---Supreme Court held that under R.5(1) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985, framing of departmental policy falls within competence of Minister---Recruitment criteria emanated from policy framed by competent authority---In absence of finding that policy was ultra vires, beyond authority, or unconstitutional, prescription of minimum qualifying marks fell within domain of executive policy. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction / judicial review---- ----Recruitment policy---Executive domain---Limited scope of Court interference---Supreme Court held that where competent authority is empowered to frame policy relating to recruitment standards, such policy carries executive authority---Courts ordinarily refrain from interfering with such policy unless it is shown to be unconstitutional, ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, mala fide, or violative of constitutional guarantees---Courts below erred in substituting their view for express eligibility criterion prescribed by competent authority. (f) Estoppel---- ----Recruitment process---Candidate participating without protest---Challenge after failure---Respondents participated in recruitment process with full knowledge of prescribed 40% NTS qualifying threshold and raised challenge only after failing to secure required marks---Supreme Court held that candidate who voluntarily enters selection process under known terms cannot, after being unsuccessful, challenge criteria---Such conduct attracts doctrines of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence---Respondents were estopped from disputing eligibility requirements after participation without protest. (g) Civil litigation---- ----Declaratory suit versus constitutional challenge---Recruitment policy---Proper remedy---Supreme Court held that in absence of pre-existing legal right, declaratory suit under S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 was not maintainable---Mere dissatisfaction with recruitment policy did not confer enforceable civil claim---Proper remedy, if any, was to challenge vires of policy through appropriate constitutional proceedings, not to seek declaration for inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet eligibility condition. Disposition: Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; consolidated judgment of Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench dated 23.09.2024, along with concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court and Appellate Court, were set aside; respondents’ suits seeking inclusion in PST merit lists despite failure to secure minimum 40% NTS marks stood dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, Rr. 1 & 3—Withdrawal of suit—Effect—Bar to fresh proceedings—Compromise not recorded— Petitioners’ predecessor earlier instituted suit challenging registered lease deed concerning disputed shop, which suit was dismissed as withdrawn (simpliciter) without seeking permission to file a fresh suit on same cause of action—Subsequently, petitioners’ predecessor instituted another suit seeking declaration, injunction and alternate possession on same subject-matter and challenging same lease deed—Trial Court decreed suit and Appellate Court maintained decree; High Court in revision set aside concurrent judgments and dismissed suit—Validity— Supreme Court held that where earlier suit is withdrawn unconditionally without liberty under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC, a subsequent suit on the same subject-matter/cause of action is barred—Plea that earlier withdrawal was based on private compromise was rejected as no compromise/terms were ever placed on judicial record, nor disclosed in withdrawal application, nor recorded by Court—Court can only record compromise on material formally presented—Unchallenged withdrawal order attained finality; petitioners, having acquiesced, could not later re-characterize unconditional withdrawal as conditional—Bar under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC squarely applied. Cited Cases: Ghulam Abbas v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs (2016 SCMR 1403) Azhar Hayat v. Karachi Port Trust (2016 SCMR 1916) Muhammad Yar (Deceased) through LRs v. Muhammad Amin (Deceased) through LRs (2013 SCMR 464) Malik Shahid Mehmood v. Malik Afzal Mehmood (2011 SCMR 551) Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Mrs. Nusrat Rasool (PLD 2008 SC 146) (b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, R. 2—Limitation—Fresh suit after withdrawal—Effect— Where earlier suit is withdrawn, plaintiff in any fresh suit remains bound by limitation “as if the first suit had not been instituted”—Section 14, Limitation Act, 1908—Exclusion of time—Not attracted merely because earlier suit was filed and later withdrawn—Petitioners neither pleaded nor proved due diligence/good faith prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or other defect of like nature—Challenge to registered lease deed of 1995 after lapse of years held manifestly time-barred. Cited Cases: Mrs. Akram Yaseen v. Asif Yaseen (2013 SCMR 1099) Muhammad Saeed Bacha v. Late Badshah Amir (2011 SCMR 345) (c) Civil procedure— ----Estoppel/acquiescence—Finality of withdrawal order— Withdrawal order passed in presence of parties and remained unchallenged despite availability of remedies—Petitioners estopped from disputing its consequences and from reopening settled position by alleging unrecorded compromise—Private arrangement not reflected in judicial record cannot defeat statutory bar under Order XXIII. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused; Civil Petition dismissed; judgment of High Court in revision upheld, holding subsequent suit barred under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC and also time-barred.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Medical Commission Act, 2020--- ----S. 37---Alternate remedy---Maintainability of writ petition---Respondent, claiming to be a 1st Class State Subject residing abroad, challenged exclusion from MBBS merit list under the Overseas Pakistani quota---Held, that if aggrieved by the policy or order of the Pakistan Medical Commission (PMC), respondent had a statutory alternate remedy of appeal before the Medical Tribunal under S.37 of the Pakistan Medical Commission Act, 2020---High Court, therefore, erred in exercising writ jurisdiction without directing recourse to the prescribed appellate forum. (b) Pakistan Medical & Dental Council Regulations--- ----Medical and Dental Undergraduate Education (Admissions, Curriculum and Conduct) Policy and Regulations, 2023---Eligibility for Overseas Quota---Interpretation---PMC’s letter dated 23.12.2022 mandated that candidates seeking admission under the 10% Overseas Pakistani quota must possess dual or permanent foreign nationality and have completed HSSC or equivalent from abroad while residing abroad on a permanent residence permit---First merit list issued by the Joint Admission Committee was not in conformity with PMC’s criteria---Final merit list prepared in compliance with PMC’s instructions was valid and binding---Respondent having admitted his ineligibility and failure to meet the prescribed criteria could not claim a vested right to admission merely based on a provisional list. Cited Case: • Pakistan Medical Commission through President v. Huma Anwar (2020 SCR 348) (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction--- ----Estoppel and acquiescence---Doctrine applied---Respondent, having participated in the admission process without objecting to PMC’s policy, was estopped from subsequently challenging the same---Held, that the High Court’s direction to grant admission on the basis of the first merit list was contrary to law and not sustainable. (d) Academic policy--- ----Future applicability---The Medical and Dental Undergraduate Education (Admissions, Curriculum and Conduct) Policy and Regulations, 2023 now govern all future admissions, and the Joint Admission Committee is bound to adhere to them till any change by competent authority. Disposition: ---Appeal allowed. ---Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside; directions issued that future admissions be governed by the 2023 Regulations.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964 ----Ss. 9(6) & 10(5)----Ex parte decree----Withdrawal of application for setting aside ex parte decree----Effect----Scope----Petitioner filed an application under S. 9(6) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 for setting aside an ex parte decree but subsequently withdrew the same, thereby acquiescing to the decree and waiving his right to further challenge it----Filing of a subsequent application for recalling the withdrawal order on the ground that no such instructions were given to counsel was dismissed, as the petitioner’s counsel was duly engaged under O. III, R. 1, C.P.C., 1908, and his acts were binding upon the petitioner----High Court and Supreme Court held that an engaged counsel has the authority to make statements, compromise, or withdraw suits, unless explicitly restricted in the Wakalatnama----Principle of estoppel applied against the petitioner, barring him from retracting the withdrawal. Cited Cases: • Fateh Khan v. Manzoor PLD 1993 Lahore 76 • Noor Muhammad v. Muhammad Siddique 1994 SCMR 1248 • Hassan Akhtar v. Azhar Hameed PLD 2010 SC 657 • Afzal v. Abdul Ghani 2005 SCMR 946 (b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ----O. III, R. 1----Authority of counsel----Binding nature of counsel's statements and actions----Scope----A party is bound by the actions and statements of its engaged counsel unless the Wakalatnama explicitly restricts such authority----Withdrawal of an application by counsel was valid and binding upon the petitioner, as engagement under O. III, R. 1, C.P.C. functions as a delegated power akin to a principal-agent relationship----Supreme Court reiterated that a duly appointed counsel’s decision to withdraw, compromise, or take any procedural steps is enforceable against the client, barring any specific limitations placed in the power of attorney. Cited Cases: • Fateh Khan v. Manzoor PLD 1993 Lahore 76 • Noor Muhammad v. Muhammad Siddique 1994 SCMR 1248 • Hassan Akhtar v. Azhar Hameed PLD 2010 SC 657 (c) Estoppel----Waiver of rights----Principle of finality of litigation----Scope ----Petitioner’s attempt to recall the withdrawal of his application for setting aside the ex parte decree was barred by the principle of estoppel----Having withdrawn the application once, petitioner could not later claim he had no intention of doing so, as such an act constituted waiver of the right to challenge the decree----Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, affirming that subsequent attempts to retract procedural decisions taken by counsel could not be entertained. (d) Appeal----Appellate Court’s review of trial court’s findings----Concurrence with judgment----Scope ----Appellate Court reviewed and upheld the trial court’s decree as being in accordance with pleadings, evidence, and law----Supreme Court found no illegality or jurisdictional error in the decisions of the lower courts----Petition dismissed, leave to appeal refused. Disposition: Petition dismissed. Leave to appeal refused.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 189---Precedent---Binding effect of Supreme Court decisions---Scope--- Judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal (“Tribunal”) was set aside for relying upon an earlier judgment [Appeal No.1815(R)CS/2017] that had already been reversed by the Supreme Court prior to the impugned decision---Held, once the Supreme Court has set aside a judgment, it ceases to be binding or authoritative for future reference---Tribunal’s reliance on a judgment no longer in the field was declared per incuriam and contrary to binding precedent under Art.189 of the Constitution---Even obiter dicta of the Supreme Court carries significant persuasive value---Legal principle reiterated that judgments rendered in ignorance of binding authority are not valid precedents. Cited Cases: • Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2010 SC 483 • Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson, (1947) 2 All ER 193 • Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling, (1955) 2 QB 379 • Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944 KB 718) (b) Civil Service---Service Tribunals Act, 1973 ----Fixation of pay---Rounding off---Point-to-point formula---Tribunal’s jurisdiction--- Federal Government employees sought re-fixation of pay under the Basic Pay Scales, 2007, asserting denial of a 15% increase as approved by the President---Tribunal allowed the appeal by relying on earlier precedent---Held, fixation was carried out as per point-to-point formula and international accounting standards involving rounding off to nearest 5th or 10th increment---Such rounding practices are valid under IFRS and GAAP and cannot be termed arbitrary or discriminatory---Tribunal has no jurisdiction to interfere in policy matters unless the policy is shown to be patently illegal or unreasonable---Respondent’s claim was unsupported by law or evidence. Cited Cases: • Federation of Pakistan v. Abdul Rasheed Memon, SC Judgment dated 28.04.2022 (CPLA No.947/2019 & 974/2019) • Founding Minds, “Rounding Numbers in the Financial Domain”, [Online Source] • CPLA No.1815(R)CS/2017, FST Judgment (relied upon but set aside) (c) Evidence Act / Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Undertaking---Estoppel---Refund of monetary benefits--- Respondent employee had submitted a written undertaking agreeing to refund excess pay if the earlier Tribunal judgment (on which his case was based) was set aside---Despite this, respondent sought to benefit from the reversed ruling---Held, in view of the binding undertaking, respondent was estopped from claiming entitlement to revised fixation and consequential benefits---Court stressed enforceability of such acknowledgments and rejected subsequent contrary claims. (d) General Clauses Act, 1897 ----S. 21---Reversal of administrative benefit---Scope--- Tribunal misapplied S.21 of the General Clauses Act by holding that reduction of pay increase from 15% to 14.92% violated Presidential orders---Held, marginal rounding during fixation as per accounting standards does not amount to reduction of the sanctioned benefit---Administrative rounding aligned with financial policy, and no illegality was shown in the method adopted. (e) Limitation & Judicial Conduct ----Review petition---Concealment---Finality of judgments--- Respondent failed to disclose before Supreme Court that a review petition against the impugned Tribunal judgment had been dismissed---Such concealment was material and affected adjudication---Held, judgments attain finality unless challenged properly and transparently---Attempt to seek relief by suppression of material facts undermines judicial integrity. Disposition: Civil Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 27.07.2023 set aside. Service Appeal No.134(K)CS/2021 dismissed.

Summary: (a) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935 & 1962 ----Inheritance---Limited ownership of widow under custom---Devolution of property on death of widow---Scope and effect---Widow shown as full owner in revenue record---Reversion of property to legal heirs of deceased husband---Petitioners, being legal heirs of deceased Muhammad Ayub, filed a suit claiming that his widow, Mst. Bibi Hawa (later shown as Mst. Hashmat Bibi), was entered as a limited owner under prevailing custom and that upon her death, property should have devolved upon Ayub’s legal heirs under Islamic law---Mutation No. 2844 (dated 05.06.1983) had transferred full ownership to legal heirs of the widow, to the exclusion of other legal heirs of Muhammad Ayub---Held, under prevailing Riwaj before the promulgation of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935, a widow inherited as limited owner, and on her death, the property reverted to the husband’s legal heirs---After promulgation of the Shariat Act, the widow became full owner only to the extent of her Islamic share---Property in dispute was wrongly mutated to her legal heirs as though she owned the entire share of her deceased husband, which was contrary to law. (b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of courts below---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---Interference justified---Trial court and appellate court concurrently dismissed petitioners’ suit without appreciating material on record, including entries in Jamabandis and the implications of customary and Islamic inheritance laws---High Court held that both lower courts misread the evidence and wrongly applied estoppel and limitation, necessitating revisional interference. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 112(2)---Judicial notice of custom---Court may take judicial notice of well-established custom having the force of law---No need to prove customary limitation of widow’s rights in each case where settled precedent exists. **(d) Estoppel---Scope---Petitioners not estopped from asserting legal entitlement merely due to non-objection to compensation received by legal heirs of widow---Such acquiescence did not negate their claim under Islamic law, particularly when only 16 marlas of property were acquired, and petitioners admitted entitlement of respondents to widow’s Shari share. (e) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Art. 120---Continuous possession---Refreshing cause of action---Wrong entries in revenue record---Effect---Where plaintiffs remain in continuous possession and only a portion of the land is acquired or claimed adversely, recurring entries constitute continuing wrongs and refresh the cause of action---Petition held not barred by limitation. **(f) Relief---Correction of mutation---Declaratory relief---Civil court and revisional court have jurisdiction to mould relief even if mutation is not specifically challenged, where necessary to give effect to declaratory findings---Earlier inheritance mutation (No. 2844) in favour of legal heirs of widow set aside and direction issued for fresh mutation as per Shariah shares. Cited Cases: • Maqbool Ahmad v. Fazal-i-Haq 2012 SCMR 917 • Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1971 SC 791 • Fayyaz Hussain v. Haji Jan Muhammad 2018 SCMR 698 • Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353 • Saadat Khan v. Shahid ur Rehman PLD 2023 SC 362 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna 2001 SCMR 1700 • Samar Gul v. Mohabat Khan 2000 SCMR 974 Disposition: Revision allowed. Judgments of trial and appellate courts set aside. Mutation No. 2844 declared void to the extent of excess inheritance. Petitioners declared entitled to Shari shares. Revenue record to be corrected accordingly. Preliminary decree passed with liberty to seek final decree.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – S. 115 – Revisional jurisdiction – Concurrent findings – Interference by revisional court – Misreading, non-reading, and concealment of material facts- Concurrent findings of fact—Interference by High Court in revisional jurisdiction—Scope—High Court found that plaintiff/respondent filed two suits regarding the same property based on materially contradictory claims—In earlier suit (F.C. Suit No.118/2008), the plaintiff claimed to be a lessee of the Irrigation Department and admitted its ownership—In later suit (F.C. Suit No.171/2008), plaintiff asserted ownership by inheritance and alleged illegal possession by the Irrigation Department—Earlier suit was dismissed and not challenged, attaining finality—Second suit filed without disclosing pendency and dismissal of the earlier suit—Such concealment of material fact held to be fatal—Judgments and decrees of trial and appellate courts found to be vitiated by misreading, non-reading, and suppression of relevant facts—Violation of transparency and judicial candor warranted interference under S. 115, C.P.C.—Revisional court set aside concurrent findings and dismissed the suit. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – S. 11 & O. II, R. 2 – Res judicata – Bar to second suit – Same parties, same subject matter, different plea -Plea of res judicata—Bar to subsequent suit—Earlier suit filed by plaintiff on same subject matter and between same parties—Plaintiff adopted different plea in second suit by concealing the earlier litigation—Earlier judgment attained finality—Held, second suit barred under S. 11, C.P.C., and O. II, R. 2, C.P.C.—Plaintiff was not entitled to take mutually destructive pleas in separate suits regarding same property—Failure to challenge dismissal of earlier suit and deliberate concealment in subsequent suit amounted to abuse of process. Cited Cases: • 2000 MLD 1537 • 2000 CLC 1107 • 2012 YLR 156 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 – Arts. 111, 112, 113 & 114 – Judicial notice – Estoppel – Concealment – Effect Estoppel and judicial notice—Plaintiff’s contradictory claims in successive suits—One claiming lease from Government, other asserting ancestral ownership—Trial court failed to take judicial notice of prior suit and conflicting stance—Held, court must take judicial notice of prior proceedings and apply principle of estoppel under Art. 114, QSO, 1984—Plaintiff could not be allowed to approbate and reprobate—Such conduct undermines judicial integrity—Pleadings must be consistent; court cannot set up new case for party contrary to record—Present suit not filed with clean hands and stood vitiated by fraud and suppression. Cited Cases: • 2010 SCMR 17(3) • 2015 CLC 393 • 2005 YLR 2608 • 1999 SCMR 2167 • PLD 2009 Karachi 373 • 2021 SCMR 305 • 2020 CLC 1219 (d) Civil litigation – Obligation of full disclosure – Consequences of concealment – Duty of candor in pleadings -Duty of disclosure—Plaintiff’s failure to disclose earlier litigation on same property—Held, concealment of earlier suit amounts to hoodwinking the court and vitiates proceedings—Violation of Order VI, Rule 7, C.P.C.—Such concealment taints entire proceedings with illegality and renders decree unsustainable—Court reaffirmed principle that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done—Litigant approaching court must do so with clean hands—Suppression of prior claim bars equitable relief. Disposition: Revision allowed; judgments and decrees of lower courts set aside; suit dismissed.

Summary: The original suit filed by Mat. Zebun Nisa and her daughter sought declaration for their shares in the property against their dower and legal/sharia rights, respectively. The defendants resisted the suit, leading to multiple remands and the eventual dismissal of the suit.---Issue:Whether the offer by plaintiff No.1 (Mat. Zebun Nisa) to resolve the dispute through an oath on the Holy Quran and the subsequent acceptance and fulfillment of this offer by the defendants barred plaintiff No.1 from pursuing her claim further?Whether plaintiff No.2 (Ms. Hurmat) had a competent claim to her share in the property during the lifetime of Muhammad Sherin (her grandfather), given the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?---Holding:The court held that plaintiff No.1 was estopped from pressing her claim further due to her offer to resolve the dispute through an oath, which was accepted and fulfilled by the defendants.The court found plaintiff No.2's claim to be incompetent and premature, as she had no locus standi to claim her share in the property during the lifetime of her grandfather, Muhammad Sherin.--Reasoning:The court reasoned that the principle of estoppel and the doctrine of election barred plaintiff No.1 from retracting her offer, which was duly accepted and fulfilled by the defendants. Additionally, the court referenced multiple precedents, including the Supreme Court cases, to reinforce the doctrines of estoppel, election, and the rights of property owners to alienate their property. For plaintiff No.2, the court noted that the suit was filed during the lifetime of Muhammad Sherin, making her claim for a share in his property incompetent and premature, as her legal right to inheritance had not yet materialized.---Rule of Law:The judgment relied on the principles of estoppel and election to bar claims that have been resolved by mutual agreement or where the claimant has made a definitive choice in resolving a dispute. It also emphasized the legal right of a property owner to alienate their property and the timing of inheritance claims under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.---Precedents relied by the court: Stir Miviib-Rehman Muhammad Hassani Washuk and others (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 718): This case established that once a litigant has chosen a certain course of action or abandoned a particular plea, they cannot reopen the matter simply because the initial choice did not yield favorable results.---Silver Star Insurance Company Limited Lahore through Chief Executive Vs. Messrs Kamal Pipes Industries, Lahore and another (2028 CLD 1342, Lahore): This case likely deals with the principles of estoppel and/or the finality of decisions made based on chosen remedies.---Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Vs. Devan Sugar Mills Limited and others (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 828): This case might discuss the implications of legal choices and the consequences of such choices on subsequent legal actions.---Lucky Cement Ltd. through Authorized Attorney Vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division and 03 others (2021 PTD 835): This precedent might be related to the legal doctrine of estoppel or the principles governing the finality of decisions in commercial or tax-related disputes.----Ghulam Muhammad Vs. Mian Muhammad and another (2007 SCMR 231): This case affirmed the right of a Muslim owner to dispose of their property by way of gift, and such action cannot be contested by the heirs who are deprived of their shares as a result.---Br. Muhammad Javaid Shah Vs. Syed Rashid Arshad and others (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 212): This case likely discusses the principles of estoppel and waiver, particularly in the context of failing to object to a fact or action that could affect one's legal rights.

Summary: (a) Balochistan Development Authority Act, 1974 ----S. 18(2)(d),(e); S. 30—Balochistan Ship-Breaking Industry Rules, 1979, R. 15(2)—Levy of “tonnage fee/charges”—Scope and pre-conditions—BDA may impose tonnage charges/royalty only with the *previous sanction of Government*; rule-making under S.30 operates within the statute and cannot bypass the sanction requirement—Cabinet approval of Rs.800 per ton (with escalation) validly authorized the levy; any unilateral departure by BDA without such approval lacked legal efficacy. (b) Executive approval & cabinet doctrine ----Mustafa Impex principle—Notification dated 23-02-2018 initially issued with Chief Minister’s approval was later cured by Provincial Cabinet approval on 29-05-2018; second Notification dated 24-07-2018 implemented cabinet decision—Challenge to competence on this score misconceived. (c) Settlement/administrative order inter se BDA and industry ----Chairman BDA order dated 29-03-2019 fixing Rs.350/LDT pursuant to “amicable settlement”—Legal effect—Absent *prior Government sanction*, such reduction created no crystallized right in favour of ship breakers; internal correspondence (27-06-2022) admitted lack of endorsement; settlement could not override cabinet-approved rate under the statutory scheme. (d) Construction of prior litigation history ----C.P. No. 411/2018, order dated 14-12-2018; C.P. Nos. 195/2020 etc., judgment dated 04-05-2023; C.P. No. 121/2023, judgment dated 20-12-2023; Review dismissed 16-05-2024—Courts recorded the cabinet-approved Rs.800 rate and noted that BDA was, by mutual arrangement, charging less; however, no judicial direction either mandated an increase to Rs.800 or validated Rs.350—Reliance by Director (Finance) in letter dated 27-02-2024 on the 04-05-2023 judgment as *source* of authority was out of context. (e) Administrative communication—Validity & directions ----Director (Finance) letter dated 27-02-2024 withdrawing the 29-03-2019 order and demanding Rs.800/ton “from the date of judgment 04-05-2023”—Misplaced reliance on court judgment identified; nevertheless, BDA is bound to act strictly under the BDA Act/Rules and cabinet-approved framework—Chairman BDA directed to charge tonnage fee strictly per statute/rules (i.e., with requisite Government sanction), uninfluenced by stray observations in earlier judgments. (f) Contract/estoppel against statute ----Claim that BDA’s Rs.350 rate created vested rights rejected—No estoppel where arrangement conflicts with the Act’s requirement of prior Government sanction; private settlements cannot dilute statutory/cabinet decisions. (g) Disposition — Petitions disposed of with directions: Chairman BDA to levy tonnage fee strictly under the BDA Act and Rules as sanctioned by Government; interim orders dated 15-03-2024, 03-04-2024 and 17-04-2024 recalled. No costs.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O.XLI, R.27---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Suit for declaration regarding inheritance rights---Petitioners, as legal heirs of Abdul Hameed Khan, challenged gift mutation No.1375 dated 08.10.1925, transferring the estate of Abdul Karim Khan solely to one son, Muhammad Nawaz Khan, claiming it to be fraudulent---Trial Court and Appellate Court concurrently dismissed the suit and appeal, citing lack of locus standi, estoppel, and limitation. Held, revisional jurisdiction does not extend to re-evaluating concurrent findings of fact by subordinate courts unless gross misreading of evidence or violation of law is evident---Petition dismissed. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----S.3---Law of limitation---Inheritance rights---Claim filed 34 years after the death of Muhammad Nawaz Khan and 74 years after the gift mutation was sanctioned---Petitioners contended that the claim involved inheritance and thus limitation was not applicable. Held, limitation applies to stale claims unless expressly relaxed under the Limitation Act---Reliance placed on "Umer Baz Khan through L.Hrs v. Syed Jehanzeb and others" (PLD 2013 SC 268). (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872)---- ----S.101---Burden of proof---Inheritance claim---Petitioners' contention that Abdul Karim Khan died prior to the impugned mutation lacked evidentiary support---Courts held petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof regarding the fraudulent nature of the mutation and the timing of the death of Abdul Karim Khan. (d) Estoppel and waiver---- ----Proforma defendants proceeded ex parte at the trial stage and joined proceedings at the appellate stage without challenging the ex parte decree or filing an appeal. Held, such conduct constitutes waiver and estoppel against petitioners to challenge the impugned judgment and decree. ----Cited Cases: Abdul Haq and another v. Mst. Surrya Begum and others (2002 SCMR 1330) Mst. Grana through Legal Heirs and others v. Sahib Kamala Bibi and others (PLD 2014 SC 167) Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh and others (2007 SCMR 1446) Umer Baz Khan through L.Hrs v. Syed Jehanzeb and others (PLD 2013 SC 268) ----Disposition: Petition dismissed with no order as to costs.