Summary: (a) West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962----S.2-A---Muslim inheritance---Rights of female heirs---Custom or tribal practice excluding women from inheritance---Validity---Property of deceased Muslim was required to devolve strictly in accordance with injunctions of Islam and applicable Hanafi law---Any custom purporting to suppress, defeat or exclude inheritance rights of women was directly opposed to Islamic Sharia and could not be recognized by law---Petitioners failed to prove existence of alleged customary law under which male members could exclusively retain property to exclusion of female heirs---Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, invalidated customary action or tribal mechanism inconsistent with Islamic injunctions---Female heirs could not be deprived of their Quranic shares through custom, family arrangement, tribal practice or any other device. (b) Jirga---Decision affecting inheritance rights---Legal effect---A Jirga had no lawful authority to divest a legal heir of inheritance rights conferred by Holy Quran and Sunnah---Any Jirga proceeding or decision made in derogation of Islamic law of inheritance was patently illegal and void ab initio---Purported arrangement allegedly made on oath upon Holy Quran could not defeat lawful inheritance rights, particularly where such arrangement had not been proved through cogent evidence. (c) Fraud---Fraudulent mutation of inherited property---Effect upon subsequent devolution---Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh were not legal heirs of deceased Mitha Khan but had fraudulently represented themselves as such and procured mutation of his land in their names---Fraud vitiated even the most solemn proceedings---Where foundational transfer was tainted by fraud, subsequent devolution of property upon legal heirs of persons responsible for fraud was also illegal and unsustainable---When foundation of title was unlawful, entire superstructure erected upon it was bound to fall. Cited Cases: • Fazal Ellahi (deceased) through his legal heirs v. Mst. Zainab Bi 2019 SCMR 1930 • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Fraudulent mutation---Limitation---Knowledge of fraud---Fraudulent mutation had not been within knowledge of Mst. Ayesha Bibi---Respondents approached Court for cancellation after mutation came to their knowledge---Objection regarding limitation was misplaced where right to sue arose upon discovery of fraudulent entries and no knowledge of fraud at an earlier stage was established. (e) Mutation---Revenue entries---Evidentiary value---Mutation entries were maintained for fiscal and revenue purposes and did not constitute documents of title---Mere existence of mutations in names of Abdul Razzaq Khan, Wahid Bakhsh or their successors could not confer ownership upon them or exclude legally entitled heirs---Revenue entries founded upon fraud carried no legal sanctity and were liable to cancellation. Cited Case: • Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani and 10 others 1992 SCMR 1832 (f) Evidence---Claim of ownership through Court decision or private agreement---Proof---Petitioners asserted that property had been transferred to Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh through a Court decision, but no such order was produced---They also relied upon an alleged agreement dated 31.10.1968 but failed to establish it through cogent material---Neither alleged judicial transfer nor purported family arrangement could be acted upon in absence of legal proof---Petitioners also failed to establish any blood relationship between Abdul Razzaq Khan or Wahid Bakhsh and deceased Mitha Khan---Lengthy cross-examination of plaintiffs’ witnesses did not discredit their testimony regarding lawful line of succession. (g) Islamic law of inheritance---Hanafi law---Sole surviving daughter---Quranic share and residuary estate---Mitha Khan died leaving only his daughter, Mst. Lal Khatoon---Under Surah An-Nisa, verse 11, and settled Hanafi law, a sole surviving daughter inherited one-half of her deceased father’s estate as her Quranic share---Remaining residue devolved upon residuaries and would return to Quranic heir through doctrine of Radd only where no residuary existed---Upon death of Mst. Lal Khatoon, her sole daughter, Mst. Ayesha Bibi, similarly inherited one-half of property held by her mother, resulting in her entitlement to one-fourth of estate originally owned by Mitha Khan---Upon death of Mst. Ayesha Bibi, one-half of her property devolved upon her son, Bostan Khan, while remaining one-half devolved equally upon her two daughters---Respondent daughters were not direct legal heirs of Mitha Khan but derived entitlement through their mother, Mst. Ayesha Bibi---Their entitlement was confined to their respective shares in one-fourth interest lawfully held by their mother and did not extend to entire estate originally owned by Mitha Khan. (h) Civil decree---Declaration of exclusive ownership and distribution according to inheritance shares---Harmonious construction---Trial Court had declared Mst. Ayesha Bibi to be exclusive owner of properties described in plaint but had simultaneously directed Tehsildar to enter names of respondents and deliver possession according to their respective shares under Hanafi law---Both parts of decree were required to be read harmoniously---Expression “exclusive owner” could not enlarge inheritance beyond shares permitted by Sharia---Revenue entries and possession were to be effected strictly according to actual Islamic shares determined by Court---Trial Court was directed to reframe decree sheet accordingly. (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference by Supreme Court---Concurrent findings recorded by Trial Court and High Court were not to be disturbed unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, arbitrariness or jurisdictional defect---Record established that findings regarding fraudulent mutations, absence of relationship with deceased and lawful succession of female heirs were based upon evidence and did not suffer from any such defect---No ground existed for interference under Art.185(3), except correction of actual quantum of inheritance shares. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 • Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1454 • Faqir Syed Anwar ud Din deceased through LRs v. Syed Raza Haider and others PLD 2025 SC 31 Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal dismissed and leave refused---Concurrent judgments and decrees maintained subject to modification regarding actual inheritance shares---Respondents held entitled only to their respective shares in one-fourth interest inherited by their mother, Mst. Ayesha Bibi, and not to entirety of estate originally owned by Mitha Khan---Trial Court directed to reframe decree sheet and ensure revenue entries and delivery of possession strictly in accordance with Islamic law of inheritance---No order as to costs. Mst. Ameer Begum and others v. Rahima Khatoon and others, Civil Petition No.97-Q of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 13.05.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2----Suit to include whole claim––Pendency of first suit––Whether status or stage of first suit affects bar under O. II, R. 2––Doctrine of election. Order II Rule 2 CPC is a mandatory and prohibitory provision requiring a plaintiff to include the entire claim and all available reliefs arising from the same cause of action in one comprehensive suit, subject only to leave under O. II, R. 2(3)––Its object is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to prevent a defendant from being vexed repeatedly on the same cause of action––Held, the provision does not require that the first suit be decided before the bar under O. II, R. 2 can operate; the stage or status (pending or decided) of the earlier suit is immaterial––To insist on disposal of the first suit before applying O. II, R. 2 would defeat its purpose, allow parallel suits on the same cause of action, waste judicial time and amount to abuse of process––What is material is: (i) whether the cause of action in both suits is in substance the same; and (ii) whether the plaintiff had the opportunity, at the time of the first suit, to claim the reliefs later sought in the second suit––Principle reaffirmed with reference, inter alia, to Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd. (AIR 2025 SC 849) and Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills (PLD 2018 SC 828). (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2––Doctrine of election––Multiple remedies arising from same cause of action––Effect of omission. Order II Rule 2 embodies the doctrine of election: where a single cause of action gives rise to multiple possible remedies or reliefs, the plaintiff must elect and include all such reliefs in one suit, unless leave to omit is obtained––Once such election is made and the suit is filed without claiming other coexistent reliefs, the plaintiff cannot subsequently “shop” for further remedies by instituting a separate suit arising from the same cause of action; any omitted or intentionally relinquished relief would be barred in later proceedings by force of sub-rules (2) and (3) of O. II, R. 2––This bar applies notwithstanding that the earlier suit is pending. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2––Inheritance dispute––Challenge to family settlement and surrender deeds––Cause of action––Application to facts. Parties, being close family members, were in dispute over the estate of their predecessor-in-interest, Mian Muhammad Sharif––A first suit (filed 12.05.2016) by petitioner No.1 challenged the surrender deed; during its pendency a second suit (filed 16.01.2020) was instituted for declaration, possession and cancellation of the family settlement deed, surrender deed and Hibas––Both instruments (family settlement deed dated 03.08.1991 and surrender deed dated 13.08.1999) were already in existence and available when the first suit was filed; the right to challenge them and seek cancellation flowed from a single cause of action, namely the death and succession of Mian Muhammad Sharif––Held, all such reliefs could and ought to have been claimed in the first suit; having failed to do so, the petitioners were barred by O. II, R. 2 from maintaining the second suit––Learned Additional District Judge rightly held the second suit hit by O. II, R. 2, and the Lahore High Court correctly affirmed that view. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. II, R. 2, O. VII, R. 11(a) & (d)––Rejection of plaint on ground of bar under O. II, R. 2––Whether recording of evidence is sine qua non. Contention that where a bar under O. II, R. 2 is pleaded, the plaint cannot be rejected under O. VII, R. 11 without framing a preliminary issue and recording evidence, was repelled––Held, the primary question in applying O. II, R. 2 is whether the causes of action in the two suits are the same; this can, and ordinarily should, be determined from the averments and “proposed evidence” discernible from the plaints themselves, without recording oral evidence––Where from the pleadings it is clear that the same cause of action is being split and the omitted relief could have been claimed earlier, the subsequent suit is barred and the plaint is liable to rejection under O. VII, R. 11(d) CPC––Recording of evidence is not a mandatory pre-condition in every case; the procedure under O. II, R. 2 read with O. VII, R. 11 is intended to be summary, to prevent multiplicity and vexation––Earlier observations suggesting that evidence must always be recorded (e.g. certain readings of Jeewan Shah v. Muhammad Shah, PLD 2006 SC 202) were explained as not laying down an inflexible rule; what is required is careful examination of the plaint and record, which was duly undertaken by the courts below––Reliance placed, inter alia, on M/s Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation v. Abdus Sattar (PLD 1985 Kar 481), PLD 1966 Kar 126 and PLD 1948 PC 131. (e) Result. The second suit filed by the petitioners having been rightly held barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC, rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 by the Additional District Judge, as upheld by the Lahore High Court, called for no interference––Civil Petition dismissed; leave to appeal declined; impugned judgment affirmed; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Muhammadan Law----Inheritance----Devolution of estate on death of Muslim; co-heirs’ rights; unlawful exclusion of sharers----Predecessor-in-interest, father of parties, died on 1.1.2002 leaving behind five sons and four daughters; suit filed by daughter (respondent No.1/plaintiff) seeking declaration/partition, mesne profits and injunction regarding property admittedly owned by deceased; petitioner/defendant No.6, a son, took exclusive possession, rented out portions and appropriated rent, refusing to recognise shares of other heirs----Held, that under Mohammadan Law, inheritance devolves automatically and immediately upon all legal heirs at the moment of the propositus’ death; every heir, male or female, acquires ownership in the estate as a matter of right, and no heir can lawfully exclude or dispossess another; possession of one co-sharer is deemed, in law, to be on behalf of all co-sharers, and delay in asserting share or challenging mutation does not extinguish such right----Doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment or adverse possession do not apply inter se co-heirs so as to deprive any heir of his or her share in the inherited property; in the present case, petitioner’s long possession could not ripen into exclusive title against his siblings nor justify their deprivation from inheritance; trial court and first appellate court rightly declared all heirs entitled to their respective shares and ordered partition/sale with distribution of proceeds. Cited cases: Mst. Khalida Azhar v. Viqar Rustom Bakhsi and others (2018 SCMR 30); Islam-ud-Din through LRs and others v. Mst. Noor Jehan through LRs and others (2016 SCMR 986); Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1); Anwar Muhammad and others v. Shard Din and others (1983 SCMR 626); Haji v. Khuda Yar (PLD 1983 SC 453); Mirza Abib Baig v. Zahid Sabir (decd.) through LRs and others (2020 SCMR 601); Farhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and others (2021 SCMR 179). (b) Muhammadan Law----Gift (Hiba) by predecessor-in-interest pleaded to defeat inheritance claim----Burden of proof and essential ingredients----Petitioner/defendant No.6 set up plea that deceased father had gifted suit property to him during his lifetime out of love and affection, supported by an alleged iqrar nama dated 30.06.2000 and a purported certificate of possession issued by Nazim of the union council----Held, that person asserting exclusive title on the basis of gift bears a heavy onus to prove valid hiba; he must establish that donor made a clear and bona fide offer of gift, that it was accepted, and that possession was delivered in pursuance thereof; donor/donee must prove date, time and place of offer and acceptance and produce credible, confidence-inspiring evidence including attesting witnesses----In instant case, iqrar nama was devoid of particulars of witnesses, such as addresses and CNIC numbers, rendering it “dubious and unreliable”; no attesting witnesses were produced; alleged certificate of possession by Nazim was likewise not proved; it was undisputed that till his death predecessor-in-interest continued to exercise possessory rights and utility connections remained in his name----Petitioner failed to discharge burden of proof; plea of gift was rightly rejected by trial court and concurrently by appellate fora as untenable and an attempt to defeat co-heirs’ inheritance. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss. 96 & 100----First appeal; second appeal; concurrent findings of fact; scope of interference by High Court and Supreme Court----Suit for declaration/partition and mesne profits decreed by trial court after framing of issues and recording evidence; first appeal under S.96, CPC dismissed on merits; second appeal under S.100, CPC dismissed by High Court vide impugned judgment dated 04.03.2023, finding no legal infirmity or misreading/non-reading of evidence in concurrent judgments----Petitioner nonetheless invoked Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, assailing concurrent findings on facts without pointing to any substantial question of law----Held, that concurrent findings of fact recorded by two competent courts carry great sanctity and are not to be lightly interfered with in second appeal or at leave stage unless shown to be arbitrary, perverse, based on misreading/non-reading of evidence or in derogation of settled law; in present case, judgments of courts below were well-reasoned, rooted in proper appreciation of evidence, consistent with principles of Muhammadan Law regarding inheritance and gift, and raised no question of law warranting interference; petition amounted merely to another attempt to reopen concluded findings and delay enjoyment of lawful inheritance by other heirs; leave to appeal was, therefore, refused and civil petition dismissed. (d) Civil procedure----Partition suit; mesne profits; co-sharer collecting rent to exclusion of others----Trial court decreed suit, declaring all heirs entitled to their respective shares and directing partition or sale; further directed petitioner to pay mesne profits at rate of Rs.25,000/- per month for three years preceding institution of suit, representing rent collected from property; petitioner restrained from creating third-party interest----Held, that where one co-sharer is in exclusive control of income from joint estate and appropriates rent without accounting to others, he is liable to render accounts and pay mesne profits corresponding to co-heirs’ shares; trial court’s approach in awarding mesne profits and protecting estate from alienation was in accordance with law and equity; concurrent affirmation by appellate court and High Court called for no interference. (e) Inheritance of women----Islamic law and public policy----Divine nature of right; impermissibility of curtailment; social evil of deprivation----Federal Shariat Court in Syeda Fauzia Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2025 FSC 1) after detailed examination of Quran, Sunnah and principles of sharia declared that right of inheritance vested in every legal heir, male or female, is a divine right which cannot be curtailed directly or indirectly; practice of depriving women of inheritance is a social evil and contrary to public policy----In present case, petitioner’s conduct in excluding sister (respondent No.1) and other siblings from estate and contesting their lawful shares stood in clear conflict with settled sharia principles and constitutional policy; Supreme Court reiterated that estate of deceased vests automatically and immediately in heirs without intervention of any authority, and violation of inheritance laws amounts to exploitation of vulnerable family members, particularly women, and is wholly impermissible under Islamic law and constitutional norms. Cited case: Syeda Fauzia Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2025 FSC 1). (f) Civil procedure----Frivolous and vexatious litigation; abuse of process; costs as corrective measure----Petitioner, despite having no sustainable case on merits and facing concurrent findings from trial and appellate courts, persisted in litigation up to Supreme Court, causing prolonged deprivation of co-heirs, especially female heir, from their lawful inheritance since 1.1.2002----Held, that continued resort to courts in face of clear and concurrent findings amounted to abuse of judicial process, contributed to mounting backlog and undermined efficient dispensation of justice; such conduct warrants deterrent costs----Accordingly, Supreme Court not only dismissed petition for leave but also imposed cost of Rs.5,00,000/- on petitioner, to be deposited with Registrar within seven days and distributed among legal heirs declared by trial court, thereby both penalizing abuse and partially compensating those whose rights were delayed. (g) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973----Islamic injunctions; women’s inheritance rights; State’s constitutional duty----Scope----Court, while affirming decrees in favour of female heir, underscored that under Constitution and clear injunctions of Islam, State is obliged to ensure effective and unfettered realization of women’s right to inheritance; such right is not a concession by human law but a divinely ordained command explicitly declared in Holy Quran; any denial or obstruction of this right is not merely unlawful but a transgression against Divine Will----Cultural or societal practices that deprive women of inheritance are rooted neither in faith nor justice but in ignorance which Islam came to abolish; State bears sacred constitutional duty to uproot such practices by ensuring that every woman is informed of, and enabled to claim, her rightful share without delay, fear or dependence on lengthy litigation; it must develop proactive, accessible mechanisms to identify entitled women, reach out to them and assist in securing their entitlements----Those who, through coercion, deceit or undue influence, deprive women of inheritance must be held accountable under law; a society indifferent to such deprivation defies spirit of Constitution and express Command of Almighty Allah; a State that fails to safeguard women’s inheritance rights fails in its duty to uphold principles of equity, faith and justice.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 9 & S. 42 ---- Declaratory suit --- Inheritance claim based on benami transaction ---- Maintainability and burden of proof ---- Scope Plaintiffs, the daughters of the deceased Nasiruddin Ansari, filed a declaratory suit claiming that two properties—House No. C-35, Block-9, Works Cooperative Housing Society, Karachi and House No. A-153, Block-L, North Nazimabad, Karachi—though titled in the name of their mother, were benami assets purchased by their late father. They sought declaration of benami ownership and their share in inheritance. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish the benami nature of the transactions. Supreme Court observed that the assertion of benami ownership was based on inferences and lacked documentary or credible oral evidence. The mere assertion in the plaint without explaining the motive or mechanics of the alleged benami arrangement was insufficient. Held, that for a transaction to be declared benami, the burden lies heavily on the party making such assertion, which must be proven through unimpeachable evidence, and not merely on suspicion. Key indicators such as possession of title documents, financial sources, property control, enjoyment of usufruct, and conduct of parties must align to prove a benami transaction. In the present case, there was no evidence that the deceased husband ever disputed the ownership of the properties during his lifetime, nor was there any express or implied agreement to hold the properties benami. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. Cited Cases: • Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Nusrat Rasool PLD 2008 SC 146 • Abdul Majeed v. Amir Muhammad 2005 SCMR 577 • Pether Perumal v. Muniandy ILR 35 Cal 551 (PC) • Gurkaran v. Shella AIR 1918 PC 140 • 4 BLC 17 • Rotofrusy on Civil Law and Rulings, Vol. 1, p. 115 (b) Islamic Law ---- Inheritance --- Challenge to mother’s exclusive ownership by legal heirs (children) after father’s death ---- Requirements for establishing ostensible ownership Under Islamic inheritance principles, the ownership of a spouse cannot be presumed to be ostensible or fictitious merely due to the relationship or timing of purchase. Supreme Court held that once a wife acquires property in her name, it cannot be presumed benami unless a clear agreement or arrangement exists between the actual payer and the named owner. Even where purchase funds might be linked to the husband, absent a specific agreement and evidence that the wife held the property for the husband's benefit, children cannot challenge the title decades later without conclusive proof. Held, that silence or inaction of the deceased during his lifetime regarding the ownership of the properties is a strong indicator of intent to transfer beneficial ownership to the wife. Properties were acquired in 1960 and 1970, and the father passed away in 1985 without raising any dispute. As such, challenge by legal heirs in 1993 lacked legal foundation and was rightly rejected. (c) Benami Transactions ---- Concept, essential elements, and evidentiary burden ---- Source of funds not conclusive ---- Judicial principles restated A benami transaction implies that the property is held by an ostensible owner for the benefit of the person who funded it. However, the source of funds, while relevant, is not conclusive to prove benami character. The Court reiterated that essential conditions include: (i) an express or implied agreement between the real and ostensible owner for the benefit of the former, and (ii) proof that the transaction was directly between the real owner and the seller. Additionally, corroborative factors such as who retained control, paid taxes, and enjoyed possession are critical. Held, that suspicion or delayed assertions by heirs are insufficient to displace documented title, particularly where the alleged real owner (deceased husband) never questioned the wife's ownership during his lifetime. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. No interference warranted in the judgment of the High Court.

Summary: (a) Islamic law --- Gift (Hiba) --- Essentials --- Offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession --- Proof --- Failure to prove valid oral gift --- Effect. Petitioners, legal heirs of deceased Imdad Ali, claimed title to inherited property through alleged oral and registered gift deeds. Supreme Court reaffirmed that a valid gift requires: (i) offer by the donor, (ii) acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession. Petitioners failed to plead or prove these elements. Neither the date, time, nor place of the alleged oral gift was provided, nor were any attesting witnesses of the gift transaction produced. No cogent or confidence-inspiring evidence was led to establish offer and acceptance. The petitioners also failed to produce key evidence such as the scribe, marginal witnesses, stamp vendor, sub-registrar, or Patwari to prove the execution and attestation of the registered gift deeds. Consequently, the gift was held to be invalid, and the petitioners' claim was rejected. Cited Cases: • Bilal Hussain Shah v. Dilawar Shah PLD 2018 SC 698 • Khalid Hussain v. Nazir Ahmad 2021 SCMR 1986 • Faqir Ali v. Sakina Bibi PLD 2022 SC 85 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim 2025 SCMR 955 • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 (b) Law of evidence --- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 --- Arts. 129(g) & 133 --- Best evidence rule --- Withholding material witnesses --- Adverse inference --- Application. Petitioners failed to produce essential witnesses, including the scribe, attesting witnesses, and relevant revenue officials, raising an adverse presumption under Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Court held that in cases where a party fails to present the best available evidence, the court is justified in drawing a presumption against that party. Oral claims of gift unsupported by credible documentary or witness testimony were held insufficient. (c) Succession --- Inheritance --- Gift by ancestor to exclusion of daughters --- Burden of proof --- Reason for exclusion must be shown --- Presumption against disinheritance. The Court noted that no reason was given by the petitioners for the exclusion of daughters from the inheritance. In cases involving alleged gifts by a deceased ancestor in favour of male heirs to the exclusion of female heirs, courts must scrutinize the claim with greater care. Absence of evidence showing affection or reward-based motivation for the gift raised strong suspicion. Petitioners bore the heavy burden to justify exclusion, which they failed to discharge. (d) Pleadings and evidence --- Relief beyond pleadings --- Impermissibility --- Case to be proved within bounds of pleadings. Supreme Court reiterated that no party may lead evidence beyond its pleadings. Petitioners did not clearly plead the particulars of the alleged oral gift in their written statements and thus were barred from leading evidence in that regard. Courts below correctly refused to entertain unpleaded facts. Cited Cases: • Zulfiqar v. Shahdat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582 • Combined Investment Ltd. v. Wali Bhai PLD 2016 SC 730 • Saddaruddin v. Sultan Khan 2021 SCMR 642 (e) Limitation Act, 1908 --- Art. 120 --- Declaratory suits --- Right to sue --- When accrues --- Continuing right in suits based on inheritance. Court held that in inheritance-based declaratory suits, the right to sue is a continuing right so long as the plaintiff retains a claim over the property. Where fraud or concealment is alleged, limitation begins from the date of knowledge. Respondents in this case only discovered the fraudulent gift when attempting to obtain a revenue extract in 2009. All three courts below rightly held the suit within time under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act. Cited Case: • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim 2025 SCMR 955 (f) Civil procedure --- Concurrent findings of fact --- Scope of interference by Supreme Court --- Principles. The Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of three courts below, holding that the judgments were based on proper appraisal of evidence and application of settled legal principles. The petitioners had failed to dislodge those findings through any legal or factual error warranting interference under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. Disposition: Leave refused. Petition dismissed. Judgments of trial court, appellate court, and High Court upheld concurrently.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 28.02.2025, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 65590 of 2017). Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962)--- ----Ss. 3 & 5---Islamic law---Inheritance---Share in the legacy of deceased who left behind a widow (defendant No.1) and a daughter (plaintiff)---Property received by widow from inheritance of her deceased husband as limited owner---Limited owner status, termination of---Effect---After termination of status as limited owner the property occupied by Muslim female would be considered as a property of last male owner and same would revert back to his legal heirs and any sale made by her would be effective only to the extent of her own share---Facts in brevity were that the respondent No.1/plaintiff, daughter of the deceased filed a suit for declaration seeking her legal share in her deceased father's property---The defendant Nos. 2 to 9, (legal heirs of deceased's brother)disputed her claim alleging she was not his daughter and that deceased died issueless---However, defendant No.4 (stepbrother of respondent No.1/plaintiff) supported her claim through his written statement and oral evidence, confirming her status as deceased's daughter and he also appeared as PW-3 and his testimony remained un-shattered---The Trial Court, appellate court and High Court concurrently accepted respondent No.1's (plaintiff/daughter) claim---The petitioners, legal heirs of defendant No.10, who had purchased the property from widow of deceased (mother of plaintiff/respondent No.1) challenged the concurrent findings through civil revision, which was dismissed---Validity---Held: Defendant No. 10 (predecessor of the petitioners) purchased the share of widow of deceased/mother of plaintiff (the property inherited by her as widow of deceased)---This was the property of mother of respondent No.1/plaintiff's which was received by her from the inheritance of her deceased husband (father of respondent No.1) as limited owner and her status as limited owner was terminated under section 3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962---After termination of her status as limited owner the property occupied by her was considered as the property of last male owner and in the present case the last male owner was her last husband (father of respondent No.1/plaintiff) and according to the Act of 1962 the property had to be reverted back to his legal heirs---The record established the fact that the plaintiff as daughter of deceased, defendant No.1 as widow and remaining brother of the deceased (as deceased had no male issue) were entitled to inherit the legacy of the deceased predecessor of respondent No.1/plaintiff and this very status of the parties as declared by three courts below had attained finality---The predecessor of the petitioner, defendant No.10, legally stepped into the shoes of defendant No.1/widow of deceased as he purchased the property from her and could ask only for the share which was received by her after promulgation of the Act of 1962 and the rest had to go to the other legal heirs of the deceased predecessor---Hence, the sale made by defendant No. 1 (mother of plaintiff / respondent No. 1 and widow of deceased predecessor) was only effective to the extent of her own share and that it was invalid, void and ineffective to the extent of rights of plaintiff (respondent No.1) and brother of the deceased---Since the actual defendants (respondent Nos. 3-9) accepted the decrees in favour of plaintiff (respondent No.1) the status of defendant No.1 (predecessor of the petitioners) was simply that of a purchaser who legally could not challenge / question the legal and sharia status of respondent No.1/plaintiff or the other respondents---The petitioners for that matter had no locus standi and cause of action to challenge the same---Present petition, petitioners' appeal before the District Court and civil revision before the High Court were not maintainable---Concurrent findings of facts recorded by three courts could not be questions in absence of any misreading or non-reading of material evidence or any other material irregularity or illegality---Present petition being meritless was dismissed and leave was refused, in circumstances. Sheikh Sakhawat Ali, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd June, 2025.

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962—S. 3—Limited ownership—Termination—Inheritance by widow—Scope— Widow of deceased, Mst. Bhagan Bibi, inherited property as limited owner under customary law. Her limited ownership stood terminated upon enforcement of S. 3 of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962. Consequently, the property reverted to the estate of the last full owner (her deceased husband) and was to be redistributed among all legal heirs as per Islamic law. Held, any alienation made by widow after enforcement of the Act was valid only to the extent of her share as heir under Islamic law. Sale beyond her share was ineffective and void vis-à-vis other heirs. (b) Civil Procedure—Declaration of inheritance rights—Plea of denial of paternity—Proof—Admissibility of concession by co-defendant— Plaintiff (Respondent No.1) claimed inheritance as daughter of Siraj Din. Though most defendants denied her status, one co-defendant (Defendant No.4), brother of other defendants, admitted plaintiff’s paternity and appeared as PW-3. His testimony remained consistent and unshaken under cross-examination. Held, clear and reliable admission by co-defendant, having same interest as others, constitutes strong corroborative evidence. Mere denial by other defendants, unsupported by documentary or persuasive evidence, was insufficient to rebut established claim. (c) Muhammadan Law—Inheritance—Daughter’s share—Transfer by widow—Effect—Scope of challenge by subsequent purchaser— Plaintiff, being a daughter, was entitled to inherit from father’s estate. Property purchased by Defendant No.10 from the widow was subject to legal limitation—he could only receive the widow’s lawful share. Held, a vendee from a widow has no locus standi to challenge the sharai status of other heirs, nor can he dispute the finality of their legal rights once established by courts. Sale deed (Exh. P-6) was ineffective beyond widow’s share and void vis-à-vis plaintiff’s and other heirs’ entitlements. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)—Concurrent findings of fact—Interference by Supreme Court—Scope— Concurrent findings of trial court, appellate court, and High Court in favour of plaintiff declaring her legal entitlement as heir could not be disturbed in absence of any misreading, non-reading, or perversity in appreciation of evidence. Held, no legal infirmity or jurisdictional defect identified to warrant interference by Supreme Court. (e) Civil litigation—Maintainability—Standing of purchaser—Questioning title of vendor’s co-heirs— Purchaser (Defendant No.10) of widow’s share was held not competent to challenge paternity or sharai rights of co-heirs. Held, petitioner lacked locus standi to contest decree passed in favour of plaintiff where original contesting defendants had not appealed the decision. Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave refused; concurrent judgments of trial court, appellate court, and High Court upheld.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 11---Res judicata---Applicability---Petitioner seeking to reopen issue of respondent's paternity and entitlement to inherit legacy of her father despite earlier adjudication regarding paternity up to the Supreme Court---Legality---Constructive res judicata---Scope---Grounds available but not taken in former suit deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue---Judgment in rem and in personam---A judgment on paternity, being both in personam and in rem, operates as res judicata on status and title, binding even those claiming under a party to the earlier suit---In the present case the petitioner sought to challenge inheritance mutation and deprive the respondent of her share---Primary issue in the present case was as to "whether the petitioner could re-litigate/agitate the question of the respondent's parentage and her entitlement to inherit from her father, despite that matter already having been conclusively decided in earlier proceedings up to the Supreme Court"?---Held: The submission of the cognovit by the respondent No. 2 raised serious question of maintainability vis-a-vis the application of res judicata---Undeniably, he was the main defendant in the former suit---It was he who disputed the parentage of the respondent No. 1, and to reiterate, he unsuccessfully contested the same issue till the Supreme Court---The materiality of this admission lay in the fact that he was the real maternal uncle of the petitioner---In this perspective, perhaps there was no need to say who was standing behind the petitioner in the background---Indeed, the cognovit stood as more than a mere admission---It constituted a tacit alignment with the petitioner's position, thereby effectively placing the respondent No. 2 in the shoes of the petitioner---By supporting the petitioner's plea, he then, by implication, challenged, in fact, re-agitated the parentage of the respondent No. 1, which, as an issue directly and substantially involved in the former suit, had been determined by all the Courts concurrently---Principles of applicability of constructive res judicata were squarely attracted to the present case---It was fully established on all canons of evidence in the former suit that the respondent No. 1 was the daughter of late "AH"---Even Mst. "HJ", mother of petitioner, who, too, was alive at that time, did not raise any such objection---It was to be noted that the paternity was never challenged in the lifetime of "AH"---Another key aspect of the case was the legal character of the earlier judgment concerning the paternity of the respondent No. 1, which partook both of a judgment in personam and in rem---While a judgment in personam bound the parties to the suit, a judgment in rem conclusively determined the legal status of a person or thing and was binding erga omnes, provided it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction---The adjudication in the former suit, upheld by the highest judicial fora, directly and conclusively determined the respondent No. 1's parentage as the biological daughter of "AH" and Mst. "MJ", an issue that was central to the dispute and decided after full contest---Although the petitioner was not a party to that litigation, he claimed under "AH" the same title as the respondent No. 2 did in the earlier suit-and was therefore bound by the earlier determination---Consequently, the former judgment operated as res judicata, both as to status and title, precluding the present challenge---High Court emphasized that the present case had serious implications for women's right to inheritance---It had been fully established from the record that in the former suit, the respondent No. 2 tried to deprive the respondent No. 1 in the inheritance of her father by fraudulently obtaining from her a sale deed which she challenged before the court and obtained a decree in her favour---The respondent No. 2 contested the suit till the Supreme Court, dragging her in litigation till the final Court---Now, in the present suit, he again approached the High Court being hands in glove with the petitioner, to re-agitate the issue which was deemed to have been taken on the doctrine of constructive res judicata---Present case was a typical example of creating a pretext to deprive a woman of her property rights in the inheritance of her parents---Higher Courts, particularly, the Supreme Court consistently condemned the practice of depriving female legal heirs of their rightful shares in inheritance, as ordained by Shari'ah---Petitioner's suit was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata---The concurrent findings of the Courts below dismissing the petitioner's claim were affirmed---Present suit constituted an impermissible attempt to reopen issues conclusively determined till the Supreme Court---The judgments and orders of the Courts below, being well-reasoned, did not warrant interference in revisional jurisdiction---Consequently, present petition, being devoid of merit, was dismissed in limini. Mst. Parveen (deceased) through L.Rs. v. M. Pervaiz and others 2022 SCMR 64 rel. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 11, 'Explanation IV'---Constructive res judicata---Principles stated---Explanation IV to S. 11 of C.P.C. postulates that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in a subsequent suit---Five principles of constructive res judicata as laid down by the Supreme Court are that: (i) The matter is directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly or substantially in issue either in actually or constructively in the former suit; (ii) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or anyone of them claim; (iii) The parties as aforesaid must have litigated under the same title in the former suit; (iv) The Court which decided the former suit must have been a Court competent to try the subsequent suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; (v) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit. Province of Punjab v. Ibrahim and Sons 2000 SCMR 1172 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 11---Constructive res judicata---Principle---Scope---A party cannot circumvent a final judgment by introducing new grounds or claims in a subsequent suit which were available but not asserted earlier---Even if certain questions were not raised in the earlier proceedings, the omission to do so attracted the principle of constructive res judicata---Where the parties had the opportunity to assert all available grounds in a prior suit but failed to do so, such unraised grounds shall be deemed to have been heard and decided, and the parties would be precluded from agitating the same in subsequent litigation. Ch. Maqbool Raza v. Ashfaq Ahmad 2013 YLR 407; Khushi Muhammad v. Province of Punjab 1999 SCMR 1633; Amanul Mulk v. Ghafoor-ur-Rehman 1997 SCMR 1796 and Ghulam Akbar Lang v. Deewan Ashiq Hussain Bukhari and others 2012 SCMR 366 rel. (d) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 42---Paternity, challenge to---Legality---Throwing a legal challenge to the paternity of someone is not an assertion of one's own legal character in terms of S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1887---A person whose legal character, including paternity, is denied, can file a suit to assert entitlement. Munir Hussain and others v. Riffat Shamim and others 2023 SCMR 6; Mst. Laila Qayyum v. Fawad Qayyum and others PLD 2019 SC 449; Rehmatullah Khan v. Government of Pakistan 2003 SCMR 50; Ghazala Tehsin Zohra v. Ghulam Dastagir Khan PLD 2015 SC 327 and Salman Akram Raja v. Government of Punjab 2013 SCMR 203 rel. Deokali v. Kedar Nath ILR 39 Cal. 704, 709; Khanchand v. Jacobabad Municipality AIR 1946 Sindh 98; Abdur Rahman Bhuyia v. Commission of Narayanganj Municipality PLD 1959 Dacca 5; Abdul Rahman Mobashir v. Amir Ali Shah PLD 1978 Lah. 113; Daw Pone v. Ma Hnin May AIR 1941 Rangood 220, 221 and Abdul Karim v. Sarray Begum AIR 1945 Lah. 266 ref. (e) Judgment--- ----Judgment in rem and judgment in personam---Scope---Distinction---Judgment in rem-determines the status of a thing or a person and is conclusive against the world at large---Judgment in personam binds specific parties to the litigation. Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Karachi International Container Terminal Limited, (K.I.C.T.) 2010 CLC 1666 ref. Majid Karim for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 12th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 185(3)---Civil revision---Leave to appeal---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference by Supreme Court---Petitioner’s suit for declaration of ownership based on a gift deed was dismissed by Trial Court, Appellate Court, and High Court---Held, when three Courts below concurrently appreciate evidence and reach same factual findings, Supreme Court ordinarily does not interfere unless miscarriage of justice or gross illegality is shown---No case for interference made out---Leave refused and petition dismissed. Cited Cases: • Mst. Farzana Zia v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb (2024 SCMR 916) • Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLJ 2023 SC 8) (b) Gift (Hiba)---Islamic law---Declaration and validity of oral/registered gift---Requirements---Scope **Donor's retention of possession---Effect---**Gift deed relied upon by petitioner showed that donor had retained possession during his lifetime---Held, retention of possession negates one of the essential elements of a valid gift---Where gift deed imposes future rights or obligations, it must be compulsorily registered---In absence of valid delivery of possession, no lawful title passes to donee. Cited Provisions: • Registration Act, 1908, S. 49 • Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 123 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (X of 1984) ----Art. 79---Proof of document required by law to be attested---Marginal witnesses---Failure to produce---Effect---Petitioner failed to produce attesting witnesses of the gift deed---Witnesses presented only confirmed signatures without establishing reasons for non-production of marginal witnesses or invoking secondary evidence---Held, mandatory requirements of Art. 79 not fulfilled---No evidentiary value attached to such testimony. ---(d) Islamic Inheritance Principles---Exclusion of legal heirs---Scope and burden of proof---**Petitioner, being grandsons, failed to justify why donor would exclude his sons (legal heirs) from inheritance---Held, burden was on donee to establish circumstances justifying exclusion of heirs---Such facts were neither pleaded nor proved---Courts rightly rejected claim. Cited Cases: • Fareed v. Muhammad Tufail (2018 SCMR 139) • Mst. Tahira Samina v. Javed Saeed Tariq (2024 SCMR 24) ---- (e) Evidence---Oral transaction of gift---Burden and standard of proof---Constructive possession-------In oral or informal transactions, donee must prove gift through unimpeachable evidence, including specific details such as date, time, location, and witnesses---Possession by one heir is presumed to be on behalf of all legal heirs unless rebutted---Held, none of these requirements were fulfilled in the present case. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shafiq Ullah v. Allah Bakhsh (2021 SCMR 763) • Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi (2020 SCMR 276) • Mst. Tahira Samina v. Javed Saeed Tariq (2024 SCMR 24) ---- (f) Limitation Act, 1908---Inheritance---Right not extinguished by passage of time---Held, mere passage of time does not defeat rightful claims to inheritance---Limitation is not applicable where fraud is alleged or inheritance right is being claimed. Cited Cases: • Mohammad Boota v. Mst. Fatima (2023 SCMR 1901) • Syed Kausar Ali Shah v. Syed Farhat Hussain Shah (2022 SCMR 1558)

Summary: (a) Islamic law--- ----Will---Proof---Follower of 'Shia' sect---Relevant revenue record exhibited by one of the witnesses of plaintiff /respondent revealed that the deceased (father of respondent/lady-plaintiff) was the owner of the property-in-question---Respondent/plaintiff not only produced/exhibited the will-deed but also produced the scribe and marginal witnesses of the same (will-deed) as her witnesses---In said will-deed the deceased disclosed that he was follower of Shia sect and directed to conduct his funeral ceremony according to Shia sect and to burry him in a shia graveyard; he further directed that the respondent/plaintiff is his sole legal heir and his legacy will be devolved according to Shia sect---Petitioners/defendants were not able to shatter the evidence qua writing of the will-deed---As many as six witnesses produced by the respondent/plaintiff, including one who led the funeral prayer of deceased, remained consistent to the effect that the deceased was follower of Shia sect till his death---Respondent/plaintiff had proved on record that her father was follower of Shia sect and he validly scribed the will-deed---No mis-reading, non-reading or unlawful exercise of jurisdiction could be pointed out and both the Courts below had passed the impugned judgments/decrees after proper appreciation of the record/evidence, thereof the concurrent finding could be interfered with---Revision petition, being meritless, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (b) Maxim--- ----'Actori incumbit onus probandi'---Meaning and scope---He who asserts a fact must prove the same, which is based on latin maxim "onus probandi actori incumbit"---Mode of proof is the procedure by which the "facts in issue" as also "the relevant facts " have to be proved during the trial---In the present case, the petitioners/defendants were unable to produce medical record showing their assertion regarding disease of the deceased suffering from mouth cancer and that at the time of writing will deed, he was unable to talk---Revision petition was dismissed. (c) Islamic law--- ----Sect/sub-sect by birth, renouncing of---Scope and effect---Sect of the deceased---Proof---Inheritance---One of the witnesses produced by the respondent/plaintiff stated that he led the Janaza (funeral) prayer of deceased as per Shia sect---One of the witnesses of the petitioners/defendants (DW-1) stated that two funeral prayers of the deceased were offered; one, as pre Shia sect, and the other, as per Sunni sect led by a Maulvi (prayer leader)---On the request of said witness, prayer leader was summoned but he was abandoned---Subsequently, the prayer leader was examined as a Court Witness (CW-1), who stated in his statement that the deceased was follower of Shia sect and that he (prayer leader) had not led his Janaza (funeral) prayer---Two of the (six) witnesses of respondent/plaintiff admitted in their cross-examination that by birth the deceased was Sunni but that he (deceased) later on adopted Shia sect---Under Para 31 of Chapter 3 of Principles of Muhammadan Law, a Muhammadan male or female who has attained the age of puberty, may renounce the doctrines of the sect or sub-sect to which he or she belongs and adopt the tenets of the other sect or any other sub-sect and he or she will thenceforth be subject to the law of the new sect or sub-sect---Respondent/plaintiff had proved on record that her father was follower of Shia sect and he validly scribed the will-deed---No mis-reading, non-reading or unlawful exercise of jurisdiction had been pointed out and both the Courts below had passed the impugned judgments/decrees after proper appreciation of the record/evidence, thereof the concurrent finding could not be interfered with---Revision petition, being meritless, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (d) Islamic law--- ----Inheritance---Shia law---Principles---Shia Law of inheritance divides heirs into two groups, namely, (1) heirs by consanguinity, that is, blood relation, and (2) heirs by marriage, that is, husband and wife---Heirs by consanguinity are divided into three classes and each class is sub-divided into two sections---Para 88 of Chapter 8 of the principles of Muhammadan Law provided three classes of heirs; I (1) Parents; II (ii) Children and other lineal descendants h.l.s; II (i) Grandparents h.h.s. (true as well as false); II (ii) Brothers and sisters and their descendants h.l.s; III (i) Paternal and (ii) maternal, uncles and aunts of the deceased and of his parents and grandparents h.h.s, and their descendants h.l.s. Of three classes of heirs, first excludes the second from inheritance and second excludes third---In the present case, admittedly, the respondent/plaintiff was the only daughter of the deceased while he divorced his wife during his lifetime---Respondent (plaintiff/lady), being heir of first class, excluded the petitioners, who were the heirs of third class---Even otherwise, it is settled principle of Islamic Law that nearer in degree excludes the more remote, therefore, as per the pedigree table and the law, the petitioners were not only distant kindred of the deceased but also remoter in degree---No mis-reading, non-reading or unlawful exercise of jurisdiction had been pointed out and both the Courts below had passed the impugned judgments/decrees after proper appreciation of the record/evidence, therefore the concurrent finding could not be interfered with---Revision petition, being meritless, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Syed Ansar Hussain v. Syed Risalat Hussain and 10 others 1985 MLD 265 and Rasool (deceased) through L.Rs and 6 others v. Jano and 10 others 2021 MLD 1759 ref. Khalida Shamim Akhtar v. Ghulam Jaffar and another PLD 2016 Lahore 865 distinguished. Burhan Latif Khaisori for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents (motion case). Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.