Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--- ----Ss. 211 & 215---Attorney and principal---Fiduciary obligation---Transfer of principal’s property by attorney in favour of his own sons---Validity---Attorney, acting under registered general power of attorney, transferred principal’s inherited property in favour of his own sons through registered sale deed and mutation---Principal subsequently revoked power of attorney and sought cancellation of sale deed and mutation on ground of misuse of authority, fraud and absence of consent---Held, that attorney stands in fiduciary relationship with principal and cannot validly transfer principal’s property in favour of himself or his close relatives without prior permission, approval and consent of principal after full disclosure of material circumstances---Transfer in favour of sons of attorney, without proof of express consent of principal, was legally unsustainable. Cited Cases: • Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan PLD 1985 SC 341 • Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Jamil Akhtar v. Las Baba PLD 2003 SC 494 • Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Malik PLD 2008 SC 389 • Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Riaz PLD 2025 SC 63 (b) Power of attorney--- ----General power of attorney---Authority to alienate immovable property---Scope---General power of attorney does not, merely by reason of being described as “general”, automatically include authority to sell or alienate property of principal---Such authority must be contained in a clear and specific clause, and even then Court must examine whether principal’s knowledge, intention and consent are clearly established---Held, that implied authority to alienate property is not readily deducible from vague or general words, particularly where principal alleges fraud or misrepresentation. Cited Case: • Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan PLD 1985 SC 341 (c) Power of attorney--- ----Attorney purchasing or transferring property for his own benefit or for benefit of close relatives---Special permission of principal---Requirement---Attorney transferred suit property in favour of his own sons---Held, that where attorney intends to deal with principal’s property for his own benefit or in favour of close fiduciary relations, he must obtain special permission/prior approval of principal---Failure to obtain such consent entitles principal to repudiate transaction---Burden lies heavily upon attorney and beneficiaries to establish valid consent and lawful authority. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmad v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Jamil Akhtar v. Las Baba PLD 2003 SC 494 • Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Malik PLD 2008 SC 389 • Allah Bakhsh v. Muhammad Riaz PLD 2025 SC 63 (d) Sale by attorney--- ----Transfer in favour of attorney’s sons---Absence of express written consent---Effect---No cogent or reliable evidence was produced to prove that principal had granted express consent or prior approval for transfer of suit property in favour of attorney’s sons---Held, that in absence of such consent, transaction was hit by settled principles governing fiduciary obligations of attorney and could not be sustained. (e) Sale transaction--- ----Payment through cheque---Proof of sale consideration---Evidentiary value---Attorney/brother relied upon alleged cheque payment in favour of principal/sister to support sale transaction---Held, that payment through cheque, by itself, was not conclusive proof of valid sale transaction, particularly where no agreement to sell or independent corroborative evidence existed to show lawful bargain---Mere production of payment, without proof of underlying transaction and principal’s informed consent, did not satisfy legal standard required to validate alienation of immovable property. (f) Fraud and misuse of authority--- ----Power of attorney executed due to close familial relationship---Subsequent sale in favour of attorney’s sons---Material alteration in written statement regarding consideration---Effect---Principal had executed power of attorney in favour of appellant due to close familial relations for management of suit property---Attorney later transferred property in favour of his sons---Appellants initially pleaded purchase for valuable consideration, but later materially altered alleged sale consideration in amended written statement without explanation---Held, that surrounding circumstances, fiduciary relationship, absence of proven consent and inconsistency regarding consideration supported conclusion that authority had been misused and transaction was not legally sustainable. (g) Civil suit--- ----Cancellation of sale deed and mutation---Attorney’s unauthorized transfer---Trial Court decree restored by High Court---Supreme Court refusal to interfere---Trial Court decreed suit for cancellation; appellate Court reversed; High Court restored Trial Court decree---Supreme Court held that core question was whether attorney could validly transfer principal’s property to his own sons without express written consent and whether such consent had been proved---No reliable evidence of prior approval or express consent having been produced, High Court rightly restored decree of Trial Court---Appeal was dismissed. Disposition: Appeal was dismissed. Supreme Court upheld High Court judgment dated 06.10.2025 whereby decree of Trial Court cancelling the impugned sale deed and mutation was restored. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit---Withdrawal with permission to file fresh suit---Effect on earlier judgment and decree---Plaintiff’s right to abandon suit---Court’s discretion to grant permission for fresh suit---Held, that under O.XXIII, R.1, CPC, a plaintiff may withdraw his suit or abandon part of his claim, but if such withdrawal is without permission under sub-rule (2), he is precluded from instituting a fresh suit on the same subject-matter---Where permission is granted under sub-rule (2), the withdrawal protects the plaintiff from the restrictive consequences of O.II, R.2 and S.11, CPC---Grant of such permission is not a matter of right but a judicial discretion to be exercised only where the suit must fail by reason of a formal defect or where other sufficient grounds exist for allowing a fresh suit---When a suit is withdrawn with permission to institute a fresh suit, parties are placed in the same legal position as if the original suit had never been filed. Cited Cases: • Balida Kamayya and others v. Paragada Papayya and another AIR 1918 Mad. 1287 • Behari Lal Pal v. Srimati Baran Mai Dasi 1894 ILR 17 All 53 • Becharam Chowdhuri and others v. Purna Chandra Chatterji and others AIR 1925 Cal. 845 • Baisnab Das Mohanta v. Nani Gopal Das and others PLD 1963 Dacca 504 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit at appellate stage---Permission to file fresh suit---Effect on decrees already passed---Judicial caution---Held, that an application under O.XXIII, R.1(2), CPC, especially when made at appellate or second appellate stage, requires strict judicial scrutiny---If permission is granted at such stage, it may enable an unsuccessful plaintiff to avoid adverse decrees already rendered against him and may deprive the contesting defendant of rights accrued through adjudication by courts below---Court must consider all relevant factors, including the effect of allowing a party to re-agitate the same dispute and the wastage of public judicial time---Backlog of cases and delay in disposal of litigation further require appellate courts to exercise such discretion with care and restraint. Cited Case: • Mrs. Afroz Shah and others v. Sabir Qureshi and others PLD 2010 SC 913 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal order with permission to file fresh suit---Finality of unchallenged order---Collateral attack---Subsequent proceedings---Held, that once a competent Court grants permission to withdraw a civil suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit, such order remains binding unless set aside in appeal, revision or other lawful direct proceedings---Court seized of a subsequent suit cannot examine whether the earlier permission was rightly or wrongly granted---Such order cannot be challenged collaterally in proceedings not intended to reverse, modify or annul it---Where the appellants did not challenge the withdrawal order through proper procedure, they could not later question its validity in subsequent proceedings. Cited Cases: • Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. 2004 1 SCR 629 • Raj Kumar Mahto v. Ram Khelawan Singh AIR 1922 Pat. 44 • Haridey Nath Roy v. Ramchandra AIR 1921 Cal. 34 • R v. Wilson 1983 2 SCR 594 • Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. 2001 2 SCR 460 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Declaratory suit based on earlier decree---Earlier suit withdrawn with permission to file fresh suit---Effect of withdrawal on earlier decree---Held, that where the first suit had been withdrawn with permission to institute a fresh suit, the judgment and decree previously passed in that first suit ceased to have operative legal value for founding a subsequent claim---Such judgment and decree became ineffective and could not be used as the basis for declaration of title---Appellants’ claim in the second suit was based solely on the earlier judgment and decree dated 26.02.1998, but after withdrawal of the first suit, that decree no longer furnished any foundation for claiming ownership---Courts below were justified in dismissing the declaratory suit. (e) Precedent---- ----Leave-refusing order---Applicability of precedent---Decision to be read in context of its own facts---Held, that every judicial opinion must be understood in relation to the facts established or assumed in that case---Broad observations in a judgment are not to be treated as complete expositions of law divorced from their context---A case is authority only for what it actually decides---Precedent of Haji Muhammad Boota was distinguishable because in that case the Supreme Court had itself permitted withdrawal and later revisited the withdrawal order due to indications of misrepresentation and possible fraudulent acquisition of escheated land---In the present case, withdrawal was allowed by the First Appellate Court and the appellants never challenged such order before any forum at the proper time---Reliance on Haji Muhammad Boota was therefore misplaced. Cited Cases: • Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 • Quinn v. Leathern 1901 AC 495 • Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 • Muhammad Shakeel and others v. Additional District Judge and others PLD 2025 SC 572 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VI, R.17---Amendment of plaint---Declaratory suit---Change in character of claim---Request for remand to amend plaint and prove independent title---Held, that although the proposed amended suit would still remain one for declaration, the character of the appellants’ claim would materially change because the original plaint was founded solely on the earlier judgment and decree---Amendment which changes the character of the original claim is not permissible under O.VI, R.17, CPC---Appellants had not produced any foundational material or supplementary documents showing that they could establish title independently of the earlier decree---Remanding the matter merely on counsel’s assertion would serve no practical purpose and would create unnecessary litigation. Cited Cases: • Alokeshi Banik v. Aftabuddin PLD 1963 Dacca 87 • Syed Muhammad Ali and others v. Syed Dabir Ali and others 2016 SCMR 2164 (g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Declaratory suit---Declaration of title---Burden to establish independent legal foundation---Earlier ineffective decree relied upon as sole basis of title---Held, that a plaintiff seeking declaration of ownership must establish a valid legal foundation for such title---Where the only foundation pleaded was an earlier judgment and decree which had become ineffective due to withdrawal of the suit with permission to file fresh proceedings, no declaration of title could be granted---In absence of any other evidence or documentation proving ownership of the disputed land, appellants were rightly non-suited. Disposition: Appeal was dismissed with costs throughout; judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, maintaining dismissal of appellants’ declaratory suit, was upheld.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Declaratory suit---Recruitment process---Candidate failing minimum eligibility threshold---No vested right---Respondents were excluded from merit lists for recruitment to posts of Primary School Teachers after failing to obtain minimum 40% marks in NTS test prescribed by recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017---Supreme Court held that declaratory decree can only be granted where plaintiff establishes an existing legal character or vested legal right which has been denied or threatened---S.42 does not permit adjudication of abstract questions or creation of rights where none exist---A candidate in competitive recruitment process has only right to fair, equal and non-discriminatory consideration, but no vested right to appointment or inclusion in merit list unless eligibility criteria are fulfilled---Failure to meet prescribed minimum marks extinguished even limited expectancy of consideration. (b) Recruitment policy---- ----Minimum qualifying marks in NTS test---Condition precedent for eligibility---Recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017 expressly provided that obtaining minimum 40% marks in NTS test was mandatory, otherwise candidate would not be eligible for post---Supreme Court held that requirement was unambiguous and left no room for departure---Courts below erred in disregarding express mandate of 2017 policy and relying upon earlier policy dated 30.04.2014, which had removed previous 50% marks requirement---Governing policy at relevant time was 2017 policy, and candidates who failed to secure 40% marks were ineligible for inclusion in merit list. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Suit based on mere expectation---Not maintainable---Respondents’ claim was founded upon anticipation of inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet prescribed threshold---Supreme Court held that declaratory suit cannot be based on mere expectation or disagreement with policy; it must involve infringement of a subsisting right---Claim for inclusion despite non-fulfilment of criteria was, in substance, challenge to recruitment policy itself---Unless such policy was shown to be ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, or violative of constitutional guarantees, no enforceable legal right arose in favour of respondents. (d) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985---- ----R. 5(1)---Departmental policy---Competence of Minister---Recruitment standards---High Court had observed that directions issued by Provincial Minister regarding 40% marks requirement had no legal effect---Supreme Court held that under R.5(1) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985, framing of departmental policy falls within competence of Minister---Recruitment criteria emanated from policy framed by competent authority---In absence of finding that policy was ultra vires, beyond authority, or unconstitutional, prescription of minimum qualifying marks fell within domain of executive policy. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction / judicial review---- ----Recruitment policy---Executive domain---Limited scope of Court interference---Supreme Court held that where competent authority is empowered to frame policy relating to recruitment standards, such policy carries executive authority---Courts ordinarily refrain from interfering with such policy unless it is shown to be unconstitutional, ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, mala fide, or violative of constitutional guarantees---Courts below erred in substituting their view for express eligibility criterion prescribed by competent authority. (f) Estoppel---- ----Recruitment process---Candidate participating without protest---Challenge after failure---Respondents participated in recruitment process with full knowledge of prescribed 40% NTS qualifying threshold and raised challenge only after failing to secure required marks---Supreme Court held that candidate who voluntarily enters selection process under known terms cannot, after being unsuccessful, challenge criteria---Such conduct attracts doctrines of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence---Respondents were estopped from disputing eligibility requirements after participation without protest. (g) Civil litigation---- ----Declaratory suit versus constitutional challenge---Recruitment policy---Proper remedy---Supreme Court held that in absence of pre-existing legal right, declaratory suit under S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 was not maintainable---Mere dissatisfaction with recruitment policy did not confer enforceable civil claim---Proper remedy, if any, was to challenge vires of policy through appropriate constitutional proceedings, not to seek declaration for inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet eligibility condition. Disposition: Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; consolidated judgment of Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench dated 23.09.2024, along with concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court and Appellate Court, were set aside; respondents’ suits seeking inclusion in PST merit lists despite failure to secure minimum 40% NTS marks stood dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 117---Burden of proof---Suit for declaration of ownership over alleged allotted land---Foundational allotment document not produced---Respondents/plaintiffs claimed title over 66 kanals 9 marlas on basis of alleged allotment in favour of respondent No.9 through R.L-II No.188, followed by Mutation No.1 and subsequent purchase by respondents No.1 to 8---Supreme Court held that entire claim rested upon R.L-II No.188, but said foundational document was never produced in evidence, nor proved through competent witness from concerned department---Mere oral assertions or mutation entries could not establish lawful allotment or title---Plaintiff must succeed on strength of his own case and not on weakness of defendant’s case. Cited Case: • Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar 2022 SCMR 1054 (b) Evidence---- ----Document mentioned during cross-examination---No substitute for formal proof---Respondents argued that R.L-II No.188 stood admitted or established because it surfaced during cross-examination---Supreme Court rejected contention and held that mere mention of a document in cross-examination does not prove its existence, authenticity, contents or legality---Obligating statement in cross-examination may at best be treated as inferential evidence and cannot replace strict proof of foundational transaction. Cited Case: • Mst. Farrukh Jabin v. Maqbool Hussain through LRs and others PLD 2004 SC 499 (c) Revenue record---- ----Mutation entries---Fiscal nature---No conferment of title---Respondents relied upon Mutation No.1 and subsequent revenue entries to establish ownership---Supreme Court reiterated that mutation entries are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and do not by themselves create, extinguish or confer title---Once mutation was disputed, party relying upon it was bound to prove original transaction giving rise thereto through lawful evidence---Mutation could not become substitute for unproved allotment record. (d) Government / State land---- ----TDA land---Alleged allotment by Settlement Department---Public property not to be lost through negligence or collusion of officials---Petitioners pleaded that suit land belonged to Thal Development Authority/Government and was not capable of lawful allotment by Settlement Department---Supreme Court held that even if subordinate officials failed to safeguard Government interest, their omission, negligence or possible connivance could not operate to deprive State of its property---Courts must exercise heightened vigilance in matters involving public land, alleged allotments, collusive decrees and engineered revenue entries. Cited Case: • Ashiq Hussain Shah v. Province of Punjab through Collector District, Attock and others 2003 SCMR 1840 (e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----First Sched., Art. 14---Suit to set aside act/order of Government officer---One year limitation---Respondents sought to question official orders passed in 1992 and 1995, including resumption order dated 17.10.1995, but instituted suit long thereafter---Supreme Court held that where relief is sought to set aside act or order of Government officer made in official capacity, limitation is one year from date of such act or order under Art.14 of First Schedule to Limitation Act, 1908---No plausible explanation for delay was furnished; claim was prima facie barred by limitation. Cited Case: • Muhammad Din v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner and others 2022 SCMR 1481 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 9---Civil Court jurisdiction after revenue hierarchy has decided matter---Scope limited to legality of orders, not full retrial---Matter had already travelled through revenue hierarchy, including orders of Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Chief Settlement Commissioner and resumption in favour of Government---Supreme Court held that after statutory revenue remedies are exhausted, Civil Court may examine whether acts/orders of special tribunal were made in accordance with law, but cannot sit as appellate authority or conduct complete retrial on merits---Civil Court’s role is to examine legality, jurisdictional defect, mala fide, absence of evidence or lack of lawful authority on existing record. Cited Case: • Nausher v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Khanewal and another PLD 2022 SC 699 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XV, Rr. 3 & 4---Summary procedure---Challenge to orders of administrative/revenue tribunal---Supreme Court observed that in suits questioning legality of administrative/revenue orders, Civil Court may adopt summary procedure and treat complete record of proceedings before administrative tribunal as sufficient evidence---Parties should not ordinarily be allowed to reopen whole controversy through full-fledged civil trial with fresh oral and documentary evidence after revenue forums have already adjudicated matter. (h) Doctrine of election---- ----Exhaustion of statutory remedy before revenue hierarchy---Fresh civil suit to relitigate same controversy---Not permissible---Respondents, after revenue hierarchy decided matter against them, instituted fresh civil suit and led evidence as if dispute were being tried at first instance---Supreme Court held that such course was inconsistent with doctrine of election---A litigant who has consciously chosen and pursued one statutory remedy to its logical conclusion cannot seek another bite of cherry by reopening same matter through original civil jurisdiction merely because earlier result was unfavourable. Cited Cases: • Qazi Mumtaz Hussain and others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary Revenue and others 2025 SCMR 939 • Mir Mujib-Ur-Rehman Muhammad Hassani v. Returning Officer and others PLD 2020 SC 718 • Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Limited PLD 2018 SC 828 (i) Public property---- ----Revenue entries, alleged allotments and collusive proceedings---Duty of Courts---Supreme Court emphasized that Courts are under solemn obligation to jealously guard public property and ensure that revenue entries, alleged allotments or fiscal mutations do not become instruments for unlawful deprivation of State land through defective proof, procedural laxity or collusive conduct---Parallel and protracted civil trials after statutory revenue adjudication undermine finality, encourage forum-shopping and burden civil courts with disputes falling essentially within revenue administration. (j) Civil revision---- ----High Court restoring Trial Court decree in favour of private claimants---Interference by Supreme Court---Trial Court decreed suit; Appellate Court set aside decree and dismissed suit; High Court in civil revision restored Trial Court decree---Supreme Court held that respondents failed to establish lawful title and valid allotment, foundational document remained unproved, mutation entries did not confer title, claim was hit by limitation, and fresh civil trial after revenue hierarchy was legally objectionable---High Court’s judgment could not be sustained. Disposition: Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgment of Lahore High Court dated 23.05.2014 was set aside; judgment and decree of Appellate Court dated 31.01.2006 was restored; suit filed by respondents No.1 to 8 was dismissed with costs throughout.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XX, R. 3 & S. 152---Judgment once signed---Finality---Exception for clerical/arithmetical mistakes and accidental slips---Supreme Court held that although a judgment, once dated and signed in open Court, ordinarily cannot be altered or added to, the legislature has expressly carved out an exception under S.152, C.P.C. for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes, or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions---Such correction may be made by Court either suo motu or on application of any party. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Correction of judgment---Scope---Power exercisable “at any time”---Discretionary nature---Supreme Court reiterated that power under S.152, C.P.C. may be exercised at any time and even suo motu, but such power remains discretionary and must be exercised in light of facts and circumstances of each case, particularly where third-party rights may be affected. Cited Case: • Mst. Farosha v. Fazal Gul and others PLD 1983 SC 220 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Error apparent on face of record---No elaborate inquiry into facts or law---Supreme Court held that S.152, C.P.C. is confined to correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes and errors arising from accidental slips or omissions---Such error must be apparent on face of record and should not require elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. Cited Case: • Baqar v. Muhammad Rafique and others 2003 SCMR 1401 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Accidental slip in name of party---Father’s name mentioned instead of correct owner---Correction allowed---Appellate Court, while recording findings on certain issues, inadvertently mentioned name of “Behram Khan” instead of “Azad Khan”, although pleadings, evidence, and other parts of judgment consistently acknowledged Azad Khan as owner of disputed property---Supreme Court held that such mistake was clerical/accidental and correction merely brought judgment into conformity with manifest intention of Court as discernible from record. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Correction not amounting to review or alteration of merits---Effect---Correction substituting correct name of owner did not introduce any new relief, alter substantive findings, reopen merits of case, or materially change judgment---Supreme Court held that such correction squarely fell within expression “error arising from accidental slip or omission” under S.152, C.P.C. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 152---Third-party rights---No prejudice shown---Supreme Court observed that correction made by Appellate Court was neither inequitable nor prejudicial and no third-party rights were shown to have intervened or been infringed---Exercise of jurisdiction under S.152, C.P.C. was therefore lawful and proper. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 12(2)---Application challenging correction under S.152, C.P.C.---Conversion into revision---Dismissal---Petitioners challenged correction of accidental mistake by filing application under S.12(2), C.P.C., which was converted into revision and dismissed---High Court also dismissed civil revision---Supreme Court found no illegality, irregularity, jurisdictional defect or misreading of law in High Court judgment. (h) Judgment---- ----Pronouncement and signature---Operative judgment---Alteration after signing---Supreme Court referred to principle that a judgment becomes operative upon formal pronouncement in open Court and signature; drafts, tentative views or exchanged opinions do not constitute judgment---After pronouncement and signature, alteration/addition is impermissible except through S.152, review or exceptional inherent jurisdiction. Cited Case: • Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University and others 1989 MLD 3215 Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal was dismissed and leave refused; order of Appellate Court correcting accidental mistake under S.152, C.P.C. by substituting name of “Azad Khan” in place of “Behram Khan” was maintained; High Court judgment dated 14.10.2022 dismissing petitioners’ revision was upheld; connected CMA was disposed of as infructuous.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, Rr. 1 & 3—Withdrawal of suit—Effect—Bar to fresh proceedings—Compromise not recorded— Petitioners’ predecessor earlier instituted suit challenging registered lease deed concerning disputed shop, which suit was dismissed as withdrawn (simpliciter) without seeking permission to file a fresh suit on same cause of action—Subsequently, petitioners’ predecessor instituted another suit seeking declaration, injunction and alternate possession on same subject-matter and challenging same lease deed—Trial Court decreed suit and Appellate Court maintained decree; High Court in revision set aside concurrent judgments and dismissed suit—Validity— Supreme Court held that where earlier suit is withdrawn unconditionally without liberty under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC, a subsequent suit on the same subject-matter/cause of action is barred—Plea that earlier withdrawal was based on private compromise was rejected as no compromise/terms were ever placed on judicial record, nor disclosed in withdrawal application, nor recorded by Court—Court can only record compromise on material formally presented—Unchallenged withdrawal order attained finality; petitioners, having acquiesced, could not later re-characterize unconditional withdrawal as conditional—Bar under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC squarely applied. Cited Cases: Ghulam Abbas v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs (2016 SCMR 1403) Azhar Hayat v. Karachi Port Trust (2016 SCMR 1916) Muhammad Yar (Deceased) through LRs v. Muhammad Amin (Deceased) through LRs (2013 SCMR 464) Malik Shahid Mehmood v. Malik Afzal Mehmood (2011 SCMR 551) Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Mrs. Nusrat Rasool (PLD 2008 SC 146) (b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, R. 2—Limitation—Fresh suit after withdrawal—Effect— Where earlier suit is withdrawn, plaintiff in any fresh suit remains bound by limitation “as if the first suit had not been instituted”—Section 14, Limitation Act, 1908—Exclusion of time—Not attracted merely because earlier suit was filed and later withdrawn—Petitioners neither pleaded nor proved due diligence/good faith prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or other defect of like nature—Challenge to registered lease deed of 1995 after lapse of years held manifestly time-barred. Cited Cases: Mrs. Akram Yaseen v. Asif Yaseen (2013 SCMR 1099) Muhammad Saeed Bacha v. Late Badshah Amir (2011 SCMR 345) (c) Civil procedure— ----Estoppel/acquiescence—Finality of withdrawal order— Withdrawal order passed in presence of parties and remained unchallenged despite availability of remedies—Petitioners estopped from disputing its consequences and from reopening settled position by alleging unrecorded compromise—Private arrangement not reflected in judicial record cannot defeat statutory bar under Order XXIII. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused; Civil Petition dismissed; judgment of High Court in revision upheld, holding subsequent suit barred under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC and also time-barred.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 9 & S. 42 ---- Declaratory suit --- Inheritance claim based on benami transaction ---- Maintainability and burden of proof ---- Scope Plaintiffs, the daughters of the deceased Nasiruddin Ansari, filed a declaratory suit claiming that two properties—House No. C-35, Block-9, Works Cooperative Housing Society, Karachi and House No. A-153, Block-L, North Nazimabad, Karachi—though titled in the name of their mother, were benami assets purchased by their late father. They sought declaration of benami ownership and their share in inheritance. The Trial Court decreed the suit, but the High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish the benami nature of the transactions. Supreme Court observed that the assertion of benami ownership was based on inferences and lacked documentary or credible oral evidence. The mere assertion in the plaint without explaining the motive or mechanics of the alleged benami arrangement was insufficient. Held, that for a transaction to be declared benami, the burden lies heavily on the party making such assertion, which must be proven through unimpeachable evidence, and not merely on suspicion. Key indicators such as possession of title documents, financial sources, property control, enjoyment of usufruct, and conduct of parties must align to prove a benami transaction. In the present case, there was no evidence that the deceased husband ever disputed the ownership of the properties during his lifetime, nor was there any express or implied agreement to hold the properties benami. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. Cited Cases: • Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Nusrat Rasool PLD 2008 SC 146 • Abdul Majeed v. Amir Muhammad 2005 SCMR 577 • Pether Perumal v. Muniandy ILR 35 Cal 551 (PC) • Gurkaran v. Shella AIR 1918 PC 140 • 4 BLC 17 • Rotofrusy on Civil Law and Rulings, Vol. 1, p. 115 (b) Islamic Law ---- Inheritance --- Challenge to mother’s exclusive ownership by legal heirs (children) after father’s death ---- Requirements for establishing ostensible ownership Under Islamic inheritance principles, the ownership of a spouse cannot be presumed to be ostensible or fictitious merely due to the relationship or timing of purchase. Supreme Court held that once a wife acquires property in her name, it cannot be presumed benami unless a clear agreement or arrangement exists between the actual payer and the named owner. Even where purchase funds might be linked to the husband, absent a specific agreement and evidence that the wife held the property for the husband's benefit, children cannot challenge the title decades later without conclusive proof. Held, that silence or inaction of the deceased during his lifetime regarding the ownership of the properties is a strong indicator of intent to transfer beneficial ownership to the wife. Properties were acquired in 1960 and 1970, and the father passed away in 1985 without raising any dispute. As such, challenge by legal heirs in 1993 lacked legal foundation and was rightly rejected. (c) Benami Transactions ---- Concept, essential elements, and evidentiary burden ---- Source of funds not conclusive ---- Judicial principles restated A benami transaction implies that the property is held by an ostensible owner for the benefit of the person who funded it. However, the source of funds, while relevant, is not conclusive to prove benami character. The Court reiterated that essential conditions include: (i) an express or implied agreement between the real and ostensible owner for the benefit of the former, and (ii) proof that the transaction was directly between the real owner and the seller. Additionally, corroborative factors such as who retained control, paid taxes, and enjoyed possession are critical. Held, that suspicion or delayed assertions by heirs are insufficient to displace documented title, particularly where the alleged real owner (deceased husband) never questioned the wife's ownership during his lifetime. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. No interference warranted in the judgment of the High Court.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 01.06.2016 passed by Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in C.R. No. 382 of 2010). Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for declaration and injunction---Withdrawal of suit---Formal defect--- Proof--- Petitioners / plaintiffs were aggrieved of order passed by High Court declining withdrawal of suit with permission to file fresh suit on the plea of some formal defect---Validity---Petitioners / plaintiffs could not refer to any 'formal defect' which could be: misdescription of partis, incorrect valuation, procedural errors or technical defects, which did not affect merits of the case and if such defects went to the root of the case, the same could not be considered as formal defects---When there was a verdict against petitioners / plaintiffs existing in field, they could not be allowed to step back, without disclosing formal defect in the plaint by using shoulders of Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court as there was no illegality, and the law on the subject had correctly and judiciously been appreciated and construed---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Muhammad Yar (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Muhammad Amin (deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2013 SCMR 464; Khawaja Bashir Ahmed and Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Messrs Martrade Shipping and Transport and others PLD 2021 SC 373 and Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 rel. Mian Muhammad Tayyib Watto, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Assisted by: Owais Nasir, L.C. Date of hearing: 3rd April, 2025.