Summary: (a) Muhammadan Law----Hiba---Oral gift---Essential ingredients---Burden of proof---Exclusion of female heirs from inheritance---Where beneficiaries relied upon an alleged oral gift to exclude widow and daughters of deceased from inherited property, burden rested squarely upon beneficiaries to prove transaction through cogent and reliable evidence---Valid gift required proof of declaration by donor, acceptance by donee and delivery of possession---Beneficiary was required to prove gift itself and not merely mutation recording it---Courts were bound to scrutinize alleged gift with particular care where its effect was to bypass or artificially block inheritance rights of female heirs. Cited Cases: • Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85 • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 • Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276 (b) Muhammadan Law----Hiba by female heirs of inherited property---Knowledge and voluntary relinquishment---Proof---Inheritance rights of widow and daughters had already vested by operation of law upon death of predecessor---Beneficiaries of alleged gift were required to prove not only declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession but also that female heirs fully understood nature, extent and consequences of transaction and consciously and voluntarily elected to abandon their vested proprietary rights---No evidence established that female heirs had been apprised that alleged gift would permanently divest them of inherited estate---Transaction was in favour of male heirs who directly benefited from exclusion of women and therefore demanded closest judicial scrutiny---Mere mutation entry or long possession could not substitute proof of knowing and voluntary relinquishment. (c) Revenue record----Mutation---Evidentiary value---Oral gift---Mutation was maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and neither created nor extinguished title---Where ownership was claimed through oral gift, title flowed from gift itself and not from revenue entry recording it---Mutation could at most corroborate a transaction independently proved but could not establish declaration, acceptance or delivery of possession---Courts below committed error of law by treating Gift Mutation No.75 as substantive proof of title. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Sarwar deceased through LRs and others v. Ghulam Sakina 2019 SCMR 567 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim deceased through LRs and others 2025 SCMR 955 • Noor Ud Din deceased through LRs v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others 2023 SCMR 1928 • Mst. Barikhna and others v. Faiz Ullah Khan and others 2020 SCMR 1618 • Zohra Bibi and another v. Haji Sultan Mahmood and others 2018 SCMR 762 • Khan Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others 2017 SCMR 1476 • Muhammad Munir v. Muhammad Saleem and others 2004 SCMR 1530 • Muhammad Younus Khan and 12 others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Forest and Agriculture, Peshawar and others 1993 SCMR 618 • Noor Ahmad and 20 others v. Mst. Zeba and 12 others 1991 SCMR 1990 (d) Muhammadan Law----Oral gift---Subsequent consolidation proceedings, private partition and later revenue transactions---Evidentiary effect---Real controversy was whether valid oral gift had taken place in year 1955---Consolidation proceedings of 1968, preparation of Wanda Jaat, private arrangements amongst alleged donees and subsequent dealings could not relieve beneficiaries of burden to prove original transaction---Events occurring years later were incapable of retrospectively proving declaration, acceptance or delivery of possession at time of alleged gift. (e) Evidence---Oral gift---Witness not present at mutation proceedings---Hearsay testimony---Witness relied upon by beneficiaries was neither present before Revenue Officer at attestation of gift mutation nor participant in proceedings and could not identify persons who appeared or circumstances in which mutation was sanctioned---His testimony represented only what he subsequently learnt and was not evidence of transaction itself---Such testimony could not establish essential ingredients of valid gift. (f) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Knowledge of mutation---Proof of underlying transaction---Distinct questions---Knowledge of revenue mutation might be relevant to limitation but did not prove transaction entered therein---Even if female heirs knew of mutation years earlier, such knowledge did not dispense with beneficiaries’ obligation to independently prove valid gift---Courts below erred by conflating knowledge of mutation with proof of oral gift. (g) Muhammadan Law----Oral gift---Continued payment of share in produce to female heirs---Effect---Evidence indicated that female heirs continued to receive hissa batai from land after alleged gift---Such conduct cast doubt upon claim that they had completely and irrevocably divested themselves of all proprietary rights---Continued recognition of their entitlement in produce was inconsistent with assertion of absolute gift in favour of male heirs and was material evidence ignored by Courts below. (h) Muhammadan Law----Hiba---Delivery of possession---Co-heir already in possession---Proof---Delivery of possession was indispensable ingredient of valid gift---No witness identified act, date or manner by which donors allegedly relinquished dominion and delivered possession to donees---Male heirs were already cultivating property as co-heirs and their continued possession was not necessarily referable to alleged gift---Possession already held in capacity of heir could not, without independent evidence, establish delivery of possession pursuant to gift. (i) Muslim inheritance----Co-heirs---Possession of one heir---Constructive possession of all heirs---Possession of one co-heir was ordinarily deemed possession on behalf of all heirs unless rights of others were clearly and unequivocally repudiated---Exclusive physical possession by brothers did not by itself extinguish inheritance rights of sisters---Doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment and adverse possession generally did not operate amongst co-heirs in absence of express repudiation brought to their knowledge. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 • Abrar Hussain v. Mst. Bibi Shahida and others PLD 2026 SC 42 (j) Muslim inheritance----Female heirs---Protection of vested inheritance rights---Public policy---Inheritance rights vested immediately upon death of predecessor and were neither bounty of male relatives nor concession dependent upon family custom, convenience or goodwill---Purported relinquishment by women required extreme caution because female heirs were frequently deprived through fabricated gifts, manipulated revenue entries, coercive arrangements and fraudulent documentation---Courts were duty-bound to protect inheritance rights of women and prevent procedural technicalities from perpetuating deprivation. Cited Cases: • Mirza Abid Baig v. Zahid Sabir deceased through legal representatives and others 2020 SCMR 601 • Mst. Aksar Jan and others v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2025 SCMR 88 • Tanvir Sarfraz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCMR 98 • Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 (k) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Inheritance rights---Old mutation---Subsequent exchange and gift transactions---Fresh assertions of exclusive title---Limitation could not be examined in isolation from nature of right and validity of transaction forming foundation of title---Before relying upon delay, Court was required first to determine whether alleged gift had been proved---Subsequent exchange and gift transactions founded upon disputed mutation constituted independent assertions of exclusive ownership and furnished fresh causes for judicial scrutiny---Claim could not be dismissed merely by counting years from original mutation while ignoring failure to establish foundational gift. Cited Case: • Haji Muhammad Yunis deceased through legal heirs v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others 2022 SCMR 1282 (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.2-A, 23, 24, 25, 35 & 227---Inheritance rights of women---Equality, property and Islamic injunctions---Constitution did not permit deprivation of women from lawful inheritance---Equality before law and protection of property would become illusory if rights vested through succession could be defeated by coercion, fraud, social pressure, manipulated revenue entries or dubious family arrangements---State, Courts and revenue authorities bore positive obligation to ensure that female heirs obtained, retained and enjoyed inheritance in practical and effective manner---Any custom, practice, arrangement or device excluding female heir from lawful share offended injunctions of Islam and constitutional commitments to equality, dignity, social justice and property rights. (m) Courts and revenue authorities---Inheritance disputes involving women---Duty of heightened scrutiny---Law leaned in favour of protecting rather than defeating inheritance rights of women and vulnerable members of society---Every transaction having effect of excluding female heir from succession was required to be examined with utmost care, caution and judicial scrutiny---Courts could not permit artificial devices, dubious gifts, manipulated entries or prolonged litigation to defeat Divine and statutory scheme of inheritance. (n) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---Interference by Supreme Court---Concurrent findings ordinarily commanded respect but lost sanctity where founded upon misconception of law, misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Courts below failed to require proof of gift independent of mutation, ignored legal character of possession amongst co-heirs, overlooked continued payment of produce to female heirs and treated delay and revenue entries as substitutes for proof---Such findings were infected by misapplication of settled legal principles and warranted interference. Cited Cases: • Habib Ur Rehman and others v. Abdul Karim deceased through L.Rs. and others 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited through its President and others v. Jamil Ahmed and others 2024 SCMR 164 • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed and others v. Khalid and others 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed---Judgments and decrees of Trial Court, Appellate Court and High Court set aside---Gift Mutation No.75 dated 17.04.1955 and all subsequent transactions founded thereon declared illegal, void and ineffective against inheritance rights of petitioners---Petitioners declared entitled to their respective shares in estate of Roshan son of Bora according to applicable law of inheritance---Revenue authorities directed to make consequential corrections and determine and separate shares in accordance with law---No order as to costs. Noor Muhammad and others v. Ghulam Haider and others, C.P.L.A. No.1103-L of 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 04.06.2026 and announced on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: The ultimate purpose of procedural law is to give voice to human suffering, not to silence it. Principally, the procedural framework under the Cr.P.C. facilitates the observance of due process and the right to a fair trial, thereby securing the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 10-A of the Constitution. Section 360(2) of the Cr.P.C. provides the procedure when a witness challenges the written record of his statement, mandating the Judge to append a “memorandum” of the objection, setting out Judge’s own remarks regarding the objection, and recording the correct version of the statement of the witness. --- (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Condonation of delay---Criminal petition for leave to appeal---Grounds stated in application were found plausible---Delay in filing petition was condoned. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360(1)---Recording of evidence of witness---Reading over and correction of statement---Trial Court was required, upon completion of testimony, to read over statement to witness in presence of accused or his counsel and correct any mistake, where necessary, before obtaining signature of witness---Object of provision was to ensure that testimony was reduced into writing accurately and substantially word for word---Recording of evidence through video link did not dilute statutory obligation to ensure correctness of written statement. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360(2)---Witness disputing correctness of recorded statement---Memorandum of objection---Where witness asserted that exact narrative had not been correctly reduced into writing, Magistrate or Sessions Judge was required, after hearing parties, to make memorandum of objection, append appropriate remarks and record correct version of testimony---Provision vested Trial Court with jurisdiction to rectify discrepancies, omissions and inaccuracies in written statement and cross-examination---Such jurisdiction was required to be exercised whenever accuracy of judicial record was legitimately questioned. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.10-A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.360---Fair trial and due process---Accurate recording of testimony---Procedural framework governing recording and correction of evidence served vital purpose of ensuring fairness and transparency in criminal trial---Procedure was an instrument for advancement of justice and could not be applied through purely technical approach so as to frustrate ends of justice---Failure to correct material inaccuracies in statement of witness could seriously impair evidentiary value of testimony and prejudice merits of criminal case---Ultimate purpose of procedural law was to give voice to human suffering rather than silence it. (e) Criminal trial---Evidence recorded through video link---Written statement inconsistent with video recording---Rectification---Witness stated in video recording that incident occurred on 31.05.2018, whereas Trial Court inadvertently recorded date as 30.05.2018---Supreme Court examined video recording and written statement and found material discrepancies and inaccuracies---Respondent also conceded mistakes and raised no objection to correction---Video recording constituted reliable contemporaneous source for comparison and rectification of written judicial record. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss.360(2) & 435---Trial Court and Revisional Court---Failure to exercise jurisdiction---Witness specifically sought comparison of written statement with available video recording, but Trial Court declined application and High Court maintained such order---Both fora were required to exercise jurisdiction conferred by Ss.360(2) and 435, Cr.P.C. to examine and rectify irregularity in proceedings---Non-exercise of such jurisdiction, despite admitted non-verbatim recording of testimony, amounted to illegality. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.360(2)---Correction of testimony---Presence of parties---Procedure after remand---Trial Court was required to re-examine video recording and compare it with written examination-in-chief and cross-examination in presence of accused, counsel for parties and Prosecutor---Where discrepancy, omission or inaccuracy was found, Trial Court was to incorporate correct version of witness’s statement through memorandum containing its remarks and make same part of judicial record---Correction exercise was to preserve transparency and protect rights of all parties rather than permit unilateral alteration of evidence. Disposition---Criminal miscellaneous application allowed and delay in Criminal Petition No.1033 of 2024 condoned---Criminal petitions disposed of---Orders of Trial Court and High Court set aside---Trial Court directed to compare video recording with written statement, prepare memorandum under S.360(2), Cr.P.C. containing correct version and complete exercise within fifteen working days from receipt of certified copy of order---Thereafter parties to be afforded opportunity of re-arguments and criminal case to be decided within thirty working days strictly in accordance with law and on merits. Mst. Nayab v. The State through Prosecutor General, Sindh and others, Criminal Petitions Nos.1033 and 1036 of 2024 along with Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.1207 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 23.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss. 119, 122, 126 & 127---Central Depositories Act (XIX of 1997), Ss. 3, 5 & 11---Rectification of register of members---Central Depository System---Distinction between company’s register of members and central depository register---Scope of statutory bar under S.11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997---Held, that the register of members maintained by a company under S.119 of the Companies Act, 2017 and the central depository register maintained by the Central Depository Company were distinct statutory records serving different legal functions---Section 11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997 barred the Court from ordering rectification of the central depository register but did not prohibit rectification of the company’s own register of members---Overriding effect under S.3 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997 did not impliedly repeal or override the remedy under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017, as both statutes could harmoniously coexist within their respective fields---Right to seek rectification of the company’s register under S.126 remained intact---Petition under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017 was therefore maintainable notwithstanding the bar contained in S.11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997. Cited Cases: • Packages Limited through its General Manager and others v. Muhammad Maqbool and others PLD 1991 SC 258 • Muhammad Mohsin Ghuman and others v. Government of Punjab through Home Secretary, Lahore and others 2013 SCMR 85 • Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investigation Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218 (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 2(10), 3 & Art.120---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Rectification of register of members---Whether proceedings under S.126 constituted a “suit”---Article 120 of Limitation Act, 1908---Applicability---Held, that proceedings under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017 were initiated by application/petition and not by plaint---Although such proceedings involved determination of civil rights and were before the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction, neither the Companies Act, 2017 nor the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997 treated them as a suit---Expression “suit” under the Limitation Act, 1908 had a specific and limited meaning and was expressly distinguishable from an appeal and an application---Proceedings under S.126 could not be treated as a suit merely because they concerned property or civil rights---Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was therefore not applicable. Cited Cases: • Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1 • Kishan Chand & Co. v. Nur Muhammad PLD 1949 Lahore 30 (c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Rectification of register of members---Application for rectification---Residuary limitation---Applicability of Art.181---Held, that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply to petitions/applications under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017---Preamble of the Limitation Act, 1908 referred to suits and appeals generally but only to “certain applications”, showing that the Act did not prescribe limitation for every conceivable application before Courts---Article 181 was historically confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and, by extension in limited contexts, to arbitration proceedings owing to the special provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940---Proceedings for rectification of register under S.126 were not applications putting into motion the machinery of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the sense contemplated by Article 181---High Court’s reliance on Article 181 for dismissing petitions under S.126 as time-barred was not justified. Cited Cases: • Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. AIR 1933 PC 63 • Baimanekbai v. Manekji Kavasji 1880 ILR 7 Bom 213 • Naeem Finance Ltd. and another v. Bashir Ahmad Rafiqui, Administrator, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. and another PLD 1971 SC 8 • M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through the Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad PLD 1972 SC 123 • Brother Steel Mills Ltd. and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and 14 others PLD 1996 SC 543 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Art.181---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss.37 & 41---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.126---Applicability of residuary Article 181 beyond Code of Civil Procedure---Distinction between arbitration proceedings and company rectification proceedings---Held, that the applicability of Article 181 to applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940 rested upon the special statutory scheme of Ss.37 and 41 of the Arbitration Act, which applied the Limitation Act and the Code of Civil Procedure to arbitration proceedings before Court---Such reasoning could not automatically be extended to proceedings under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017---No inconsistency existed between Naeem Finance and Imam-ud-Din Janjua, as both operated in different statutory contexts---Article 181 was not to be applied to company register rectification proceedings merely because it had been applied to certain arbitration applications. Cited Cases: • Naeem Finance Ltd. and another v. Bashir Ahmad Rafiqui, Administrator, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. and another PLD 1971 SC 8 • M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through the Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad PLD 1972 SC 123 • Mrs. Naila Naeem Younus and others v. Messrs Indus Services Limited through Chief Executive and others 2022 SCMR 1171 (e) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.29(2)---Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, Rr.5 & 7---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.6---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.509(4)---Proceedings under Companies Act---Petition and application---Special law---Whether Limitation Act applicable through S.29(2)---Held, that the Companies Act, 2017 was a special law and was self-contained in respect of limitation for several company proceedings, prescribing timelines in some provisions and omitting them in others---Under R.5 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, all applications except interlocutory applications were to be made by petition---A petition under S.126 for rectification of register was therefore not an “application” within the meaning of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908---Since proceedings under S.126 were neither suit, appeal nor application within the meaning of S.29(2), the Limitation Act, 1908 could not be invoked to prescribe a limitation period where the Companies Act, 2017 itself had not done so. Cited Cases: • Government of Canada v. Aronson 1989 2 All ER 1025 • A v. B (Investigatory Powers Tribunal: Jurisdiction) 2009 UKSC 12 • Dr. Muhammad Amin v. President Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited 2010 SCMR 1458 (f) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss.126 & 127---Rectification of register---Fraudulent entries or omissions---No prescribed limitation period---Reason for legislative omission---Equitable and public-law character of register rectification---Held, that absence of a statutory limitation period for proceedings under S.126 was consistent with the equitable nature of the Court’s jurisdiction in register rectification matters---Section 126 was designed not merely to resolve private disputes but to preserve the accuracy and integrity of the company register, which determined legal ownership, governance rights and corporate control---Where fraudulent or unjustified entries were alleged, imposing a limitation period at the threshold could reward concealment and obstruct the Court’s power under S.126(4) to refer matters for adjudication of offences under S.127---Fraud may remain concealed for years and the wrongdoer could not be permitted to take advantage of such concealment---Rectification jurisdiction protected proprietary rights in shares and membership interests, and an inaccurate register could not be allowed to persist merely because an ordinary civil limitation period was invoked. Cited Case: • In Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd. 2008 EWHC 2810 (g) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Rectification of register---Delay---Doctrine of laches---Equitable discretion of Court---No fixed limitation period---Effect of stale claims---Held, that although no statutory limitation period applied to proceedings under S.126, the Court was still bound to examine delay, neglect and stale claims through the equitable doctrine of laches---Court could consider the length of delay, reasons for delay, late discovery of facts, ongoing investigations, complexity of corporate transactions, regulatory hurdles, prejudice to opposite parties and conduct of the parties---Where respondent’s fraud, concealment, misrepresentation or obstruction prevented timely proceedings, the respondent could be estopped from relying upon delay---However, party seeking rectification had to approach the Court before rights of innocent third parties accrued, and must provide a satisfactory and credible explanation for any apparent delay---No fixed upper or lower time limit could be judicially created, as that would amount to legislation---Each case had to be assessed on its own facts, and in appropriate cases avoidable delay could disentitle a party from equitable relief. Cited Cases: • Archbold v. Scully 1861 9 HL 360 • THG Plc v. Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd. 2026 UKSC 6 • Shoreham Hills, LLC v. Sagaponack Dream House LLC 2020 NY Slip Op 50326 • Poiss v. Lambert Health Authority 1978 2 All ER 125 • Verrall v. Great Yarmouth Borough Council 1981 QB 202 • Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd LR 5 PC 239 (h) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Rectification of register---Allegations of fraud---Summary dismissal on limitation---Remand---Held, that petitions under S.126 involving allegations of fraud raised complex and delicate questions of law and fact and ought not to have been dismissed summarily on the basis of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908---In one matter, although the High Court had also examined merits, such findings were considerably influenced by its opinion on limitation and were recorded without affording parties full opportunity to present their best case---Matters required fresh adjudication after hearing all parties and permitting them to present their complete case. Disposition: Leave petitions, i.e. CPLA No.559 of 2025 and CPLA No.2624 of 2025, were converted into appeals and allowed along with Civil Appeal No.125 of 2025; impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court were set aside; matters were remitted to the High Court for fresh decision after affording each party fair opportunity of hearing; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Challenge to mutation---Suit filed after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Effect---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas suit challenging the same was instituted on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years---Plaintiff remained silent during such prolonged period and took no steps to question validity of mutation or underlying transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---Held, that person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraudulent document or transaction---Suit for declaration/cancellation---Limitation---Plaintiff attempted to avoid bar of limitation by alleging that mutation was procured through fraud and misrepresentation---Held, that although fraud vitiates solemn acts, allegation of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Where a document or transaction is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 and suit seeking declaration or cancellation must be filed within limitation prescribed under Art.91 of Limitation Act, 1908, i.e. three years from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Plea of fraud could not be invoked merely to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Burden of proof---Mutation challenged after long delay---Plaintiff alleged that mutation was result of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and had been sanctioned without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, concurrently held that plaintiff failed to prove fraud through independent evidence---Held, that bald allegations of fraud were insufficient---Fraud being a question of fact had to be established by reliable, convincing and cogent evidence---Plaintiff’s long silence for more than two decades further undermined credibility of allegation. (d) Revenue record--- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Laches, limitation and third-party rights---Effect---Mutation in question remained incorporated in revenue record for decades without challenge and third-party rights had also come into existence---Held, that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights accrued on their basis---Challenges to old mutation entries after prolonged inaction must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 (e) Revenue record--- ----Mutation incorporated in Jamabandi---Presumption of correctness---Burden to rebut---Once mutation was sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it formed part of regular revenue record and carried statutory presumption of truth---Plaintiff failed to produce convincing evidence to rebut such presumption---Held, that presumption of regularity and correctness attached to revenue entries could not be lightly displaced---Courts below rightly gave due weight to revenue record and held that plaintiff failed to discharge heavy burden required to dislodge presumption attached thereto. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (f) Land Revenue Act--- ----Mutation proceedings---Procedural irregularity---Effect on otherwise established sale transaction---Plaintiff raised objections regarding procedure adopted in attestation of mutation---Held, that even if certain procedural irregularities existed in attestation of mutation, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Where authenticity and genuineness of underlying sale transaction is established, mere irregularity in mutation procedure does not affect binding effect of mutation---Technical defects in mutation process cannot defeat substantive rights where transaction is proved by credible oral and documentary evidence. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (g) Revenue record--- ----Mutation entries---Nature and evidentiary value---Mutation entries by themselves do not create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, such entries may validly reflect transfer of rights---In the present case, subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and plaintiff had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Held, that procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings recorded by subordinate Courts. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently held that mutation reflected genuine sale transaction, fraud was not proved and suit was time-barred---High Court, in revision, reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, perversity or material illegality in findings of Courts below---Held, that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into a third Court of fact---Concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed unless based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, or suffering from perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits of case---High Court exceeded settled limits of revisional jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Misreading, non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---Distinction---Scope of revisional Court---Held, that misreading or non-reading of evidence may justify revisional interference where finding is perverse, absurd, jurisdictionally defective or contrary to law---Mere misappreciation or possibility of another view does not permit revisional Court to substitute its own conclusion for concurrent findings of Courts below---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and both reached same conclusion, High Court should not revisit evidence merely to draw another conclusion. (j) Civil suit--- ----Challenge to mutation---Solitary statement of plaintiff versus documentary proof---Effect---Plaintiff alleged that he did not visit Patwari’s office on date of mutation but produced no independent witness and remained confined to his solitary statement---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day with same identifying witnesses, which negated plaintiff’s stance---Held, that solitary statement was insufficient to dislodge documentary proof and revenue record produced by defendants---Subordinate Courts correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation. (k) Civil suit--- ----Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Concurrent dismissal by Trial Court and First Appellate Court---High Court decreeing suit in revision---Supreme Court interference---Held, that cumulative effect of record showed that suit was hopelessly barred by limitation; allegations of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation remained unsubstantiated; mutation incorporated in revenue record for decades carried presumption of correctness; third-party rights had intervened; and High Court transgressed limits of revisional jurisdiction by interfering with concurrent findings without showing misreading or non-reading of evidence---Impugned High Court judgment could not be sustained. Disposition: Appeals were allowed. Judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court was set aside. Concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored. Civil suit filed by respondent No.1 stood dismissed. Pending CMAs were disposed of as infructuous. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas respondent No.1 instituted suit on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years alleging fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Supreme Court held that unexplained delay in challenging a mutation renders the claim legally untenable---Respondent remained completely silent for more than two decades and took no step to question validity of mutation or underlying sale transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---A person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Law of limitation is designed to bring certainty and finality to legal relations and prevent reopening of stale claims---Suit was clearly and hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and 10 others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and 4 others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraud alleged in respect of mutation/sale transaction---Fraud vitiates all solemn acts, but must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved---Supreme Court reiterated that fraud vitiates solemn acts and any instrument, deed, judgment or decree obtained through fraud is a nullity, but allegation of fraud cannot be accepted on mere assertion---Fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Question of fraud involves finding of fact regarding conduct of party concerned---Even where fraud is alleged in relation to an instrument or transaction, party challenging such instrument is required to seek cancellation within prescribed limitation period---Where document is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act and suit seeking declaration/cancellation must be filed within three years under Art.91 of Limitation Act from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Respondent failed to produce convincing evidence of fraud and remained silent for more than two decades; plea of fraud could not be used to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Proof of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Independent and reliable evidence required---Respondent alleged that Mutation No.684 dated 15.03.1980 was procured through fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, held that respondent failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation through independent evidence---Supreme Court held that such allegations remained unsubstantiated and were rightly disbelieved by subordinate Courts---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day and identifying witnesses were the same, which negatived respondent’s stance that he had not visited office of Patwari on relevant date---Respondent remained confined to his solitary statement and did not produce independent witnesses sufficient to dislodge documentary proof brought on record. (d) Revenue record---- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Presumption of correctness---Jamabandi---Revenue entries remaining unquestioned for decades---Supreme Court held that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they have remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights have subsequently accrued on their basis---Once mutation is duly sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it forms part of regular revenue record and carries statutory presumption of truth unless rebutted by strong and cogent evidence---Mutation in question remained part of revenue record for more than two decades without challenge---Respondent produced no convincing evidence to rebut presumption attached to revenue entries---Courts below were justified in giving due weight to revenue record and holding that respondent failed to discharge heavy burden required to displace statutory presumption. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (e) Mutation---- ----Procedural irregularity in attestation---Effect on proved sale transaction---Mutation entries do not themselves create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, technical defects in mutation proceedings cannot invalidate transaction---Supreme Court held that even if certain procedural irregularities in attestation of mutation were assumed, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and respondent had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently dismissed suit after proper appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, holding that sale transaction was genuine, fraud was not proved and suit was barred by limitation---Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits---Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into third court of fact---High Court reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, material illegality or perversity in findings of subordinate Courts---Such approach was inconsistent with settled limits of revisional jurisdiction and amounted to impermissible interference with concurrent findings of fact. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim, etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Difference between misreading/non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---High Court’s limits in revision---Supreme Court reiterated that scope of appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be confused---Revisional Court cannot upset finding of fact merely because another view appears more plausible---Interference is permissible only where finding is result of misreading, non-reading, perverse or absurd appraisal of material evidence, jurisdictional error, illegality or serious miscarriage of justice---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and same conclusion has been reached concurrently, revisiting evidence in second appeal or revision to draw another conclusion would offend doctrine of finality---High Court cannot independently reassess evidence to supplant its own conclusion unless findings below are legally flawed. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (h) Revenue record / Limitation---- ----Third-party rights and finality of long-standing entries---Mutation remaining incorporated for decades---Effect---Supreme Court held that where revenue entries have remained unchallenged for prolonged period and third-party rights have intervened, challenges to such entries must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained---In present case, during long interregnum of over twenty-two years, third-party rights had come into existence, further strengthening need to uphold sanctity and finality of long-standing revenue entries---Belated suit challenging mutation could not be permitted to unsettle settled rights. Disposition: Appeals were allowed; judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court in Civil Revision No.410 of 2017 was set aside; concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored; civil suit filed by respondent No.1 was dismissed; no order as to costs; connected CMAs No.12138 and 12580 of 2019 and CMA No.2581 of 2022 were disposed of as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, Rr. 1 & 3—Withdrawal of suit—Effect—Bar to fresh proceedings—Compromise not recorded— Petitioners’ predecessor earlier instituted suit challenging registered lease deed concerning disputed shop, which suit was dismissed as withdrawn (simpliciter) without seeking permission to file a fresh suit on same cause of action—Subsequently, petitioners’ predecessor instituted another suit seeking declaration, injunction and alternate possession on same subject-matter and challenging same lease deed—Trial Court decreed suit and Appellate Court maintained decree; High Court in revision set aside concurrent judgments and dismissed suit—Validity— Supreme Court held that where earlier suit is withdrawn unconditionally without liberty under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC, a subsequent suit on the same subject-matter/cause of action is barred—Plea that earlier withdrawal was based on private compromise was rejected as no compromise/terms were ever placed on judicial record, nor disclosed in withdrawal application, nor recorded by Court—Court can only record compromise on material formally presented—Unchallenged withdrawal order attained finality; petitioners, having acquiesced, could not later re-characterize unconditional withdrawal as conditional—Bar under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC squarely applied. Cited Cases: Ghulam Abbas v. Mohammad Shafi through LRs (2016 SCMR 1403) Azhar Hayat v. Karachi Port Trust (2016 SCMR 1916) Muhammad Yar (Deceased) through LRs v. Muhammad Amin (Deceased) through LRs (2013 SCMR 464) Malik Shahid Mehmood v. Malik Afzal Mehmood (2011 SCMR 551) Ch. Ghulam Rasool v. Mrs. Nusrat Rasool (PLD 2008 SC 146) (b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908— ----Order XXIII, R. 2—Limitation—Fresh suit after withdrawal—Effect— Where earlier suit is withdrawn, plaintiff in any fresh suit remains bound by limitation “as if the first suit had not been instituted”—Section 14, Limitation Act, 1908—Exclusion of time—Not attracted merely because earlier suit was filed and later withdrawn—Petitioners neither pleaded nor proved due diligence/good faith prosecution before court lacking jurisdiction or other defect of like nature—Challenge to registered lease deed of 1995 after lapse of years held manifestly time-barred. Cited Cases: Mrs. Akram Yaseen v. Asif Yaseen (2013 SCMR 1099) Muhammad Saeed Bacha v. Late Badshah Amir (2011 SCMR 345) (c) Civil procedure— ----Estoppel/acquiescence—Finality of withdrawal order— Withdrawal order passed in presence of parties and remained unchallenged despite availability of remedies—Petitioners estopped from disputing its consequences and from reopening settled position by alleging unrecorded compromise—Private arrangement not reflected in judicial record cannot defeat statutory bar under Order XXIII. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused; Civil Petition dismissed; judgment of High Court in revision upheld, holding subsequent suit barred under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC and also time-barred.

Summary: (a) Service law — Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975 — Dismissal on “involvement in a criminal case” — Acquittal on merits removes substratum — Where departmental proceedings rest solely on the allegation that the civil servant was nominated/implicated in an FIR, and no independent, probeable act of misconduct is alleged or established, the employee’s acquittal in the criminal case extinguishes the very basis of the charge; any penalty founded thereon is legally untenable — Reinstatement ordered. (Muhammad Iqbal v. RPO Sahiwal, 2022 SCMR 1520, applied; also referred: 2024 SCMR 1675; 2023 PLC (C.S.) 267, 884) (b) Departmental vs. criminal proceedings — Distinct domains & standards — Departmental inquiries proceed on preponderance of probability to protect service integrity; criminal trials require proof beyond reasonable doubt to determine penal liability — The pendency/outcome of one does not, per se, control the other; both may run concurrently — Exception: when the only departmental allegation is “involvement in a criminal case”, acquittal on that accusation before the criminal court leaves nothing for the department to prove. (c) Due process & constitutional guarantees — Arts. 10A, 14 & 9 — Dismissal premised merely on FIR nomination, despite acquittal, and without any independent evidentiary finding of misconduct, offends fair trial/due process (Art. 10A), dignity (Art. 14), and the right to livelihood as an incident of life (Art. 9). (d) Inquiry defects — Charge-sheet carried two heads: (i) failure to perform duty appropriately; (ii) involvement in a criminal case — Both inquiries ignored the first head entirely and recommended action only on the second — Reliance solely on criminal implication, without evidence of dereliction, is impermissible; inquiry reports are vitiated for non-application of mind and absence of proof of a standalone misconduct. (e) Limitation — Department’s plea that the service appeal was time-barred was not raised before the Tribunal; in the case’s circumstances, not entertained at this stage. (f) Disposition — Leave granted; petition converted into appeal and allowed — Impugned Tribunal judgment and dismissal order set aside — Petitioner reinstated in service.

Summary: (a) Civil Servants Acts, 1973-74 — Federal & Provincial Service Tribunals Acts ----Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 212; Limitation Act, 1908, Ss. 3, 5 & 29(2); Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977; Punjab Civil Services Rules (Vol-I), r. 14.21; Sindh Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1980; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986; Balochistan Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 2013— Service appeal—Departmental appeal barred by limitation—Whether appeal before Service Tribunal competent—Held: Yes. The Service Tribunal is the first independent judicial forum and is statutorily empowered to examine questions of limitation as well as merits. Departmental delay cannot extinguish a civil servant’s statutory right of appeal; the tribunal must itself determine whether “sufficient” or “reasonable” cause existed for delay, review the department’s exercise (or failure) of discretion to condone it, and proceed accordingly. Outright dismissal merely because the departmental appeal was time-barred amounts to abdication of jurisdiction and violates Art. 212(1)-(2). (b) Civil Servants Acts, 1973-74 — Departmental appeals — Power to condone delay — Limitation Act, 1908, S. 5 — Applicability—Held: Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not automatically attracted to departmental proceedings, as S. 29(2)(b) excludes its application unless expressly incorporated; nevertheless, the relevant Rules themselves confer discretion on departmental authorities either to withhold or condone appeals filed out of time on showing of “reasonable cause”. Thus, even under the “withholding” framework (Federal, Punjab) or “condonation” framework (Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan), the department must apply its mind and record reasons before rejecting an appeal as time-barred. (c) Service Tribunals Acts, 1973-74 — Appellate jurisdiction — Scope and duty— Tribunals, as constitutional creatures under Art. 212, exercise appellate and fact-finding powers akin to civil courts; they are obliged to examine legality, factual foundation, and procedural fairness of departmental decisions, including limitation issues. Failure to consider condonation applications or to address limitation constitutes non-exercise of jurisdiction. (d) Case law — Chairman, P.I.A.C. v. Nasim Malik, PLD 1990 SC 951 — per incuriam— Held: The rule derived from PIAC case and followed in later decisions (e.g. Abdul Wahid, 1998 SCMR 882; Anwar Ali Sahto, PLD 2002 SC 101; Razi Uddin, 2004 PLC (CS) 468; Muhammad Aslam, 2007 SCMR 513; Raja Khan, 2011 SCMR 676; Ghulam Shabbir, 2013 PLC (CS) 1087; Muhammad Asif Chatha, 2015 SCMR 165) that an appeal before the Service Tribunal becomes incompetent when the departmental appeal was time-barred, is declared incorrect in law and per incuriam. The PIAC Regulations themselves envisaged condonation (withholding) of delayed appeals; the omission to appreciate this and the relevant statutory framework vitiated that precedent. (e) Sufficient/Reasonable cause — Concept and application— Both expressions are interchangeable; cause must be bona fide, beyond the applicant’s control, and shown with diligence. Mistaken legal advice or negligence ordinarily not enough unless founded on genuine ambiguity. Public authorities must apply limitation rules equitably, treating them as instruments of fairness rather than exclusion. (f) Practice and procedure — Prospective and consequential directions— All pending appeals where dismissal rested solely on departmental limitation to be re-listed and decided on merits after examining sufficiency of cause; past and closed transactions (including disposed review petitions) remain unaffected. PIAC line of cases overruled to this extent. Cited Cases: • Chairman, P.I.A.C. v. Nasim Malik, PLD 1990 SC 951 ( per incuriam ) • Abdul Wahid v. Chairman, C.B.R., 1998 SCMR 882 • Anwar Ali Sahto v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2002 SC 101 • Muhammad Aslam v. WAPDA, 2007 SCMR 513 • Raja Khan v. Manager (Operation) FESCO, 2011 SCMR 676 • Muhammad Asif Chatha v. Chief Secretary Punjab, 2015 SCMR 165 • Khushi Muhammad v. Fazal Bibi, PLD 2016 SC 872 (5-M bench) • Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah, 2001 SCMR 286 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani, 2002 SCMR 1540 • Secretary to Govt. Punjab (Law & Parliamentary Affairs) v. Ali Ahmad Khan, 2025 SCMR 489 • Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Amin, 2025 SCMR 646 Disposition: Legal question answered in negative—Appeal before Service Tribunal not rendered incompetent merely because departmental appeal was time-barred—Earlier contrary view in PIAC and following cases overruled—All connected matters to proceed individually on merits before competent benches—Past and closed transactions unaffected—Approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure — Non-party appeals; leave to appeal — Test —Constitutional/Procedural practice; CPC, S.115; Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S.52 (lis pendens); Limitation Act, 1908, Art.113— A non-party may appeal with leave if they could properly have been a party to the proceedings and are affected by the impugned order. Applied: leave refused where applicants purchased subject property pendente lite, concealed the transaction, and could not show why they failed to seek impleadment at trial. Precedents reaffirmed: H.M. Saya, Sahib Dad, Munir Ahmed, Kanwar Arif Ali Khan. (b) Transfers pendente lite — Impleadment of transferee — Scope & discretion —TPA, S.52— Ordinarily, a transferee pendente lite may be joined to protect its interest; however, joinder is discretionary, and can be declined when the transfer appears not bona fide, is designed to frustrate proceedings, or where parties withheld disclosure from the court. Followed: Sajjad Hussain v. State; Fazal Karim v. Muhammad Afzal. (c) Bona fides & concealment — Effect Applicants were tenants who entered an agreement to purchase the disputed house during the suit without leave of court and kept it secret until after dismissal at trial. A contract clause envisaging loss of title and refund revealed awareness of the litigation risk; applicants therefore not bona fide purchasers and squarely hit by lis pendens. (d) Limitation for specific performance — Starting point & consequence —Limitation Act, 1908, Art.113— Agreement dated 22-01-2010 required balance payment by 22-07-2010; suit for specific performance filed 14-07-2016 was time-barred. A time-barred independent claim confers no enforceable interest warranting impleadment or leave to appeal. (e) Appellate/revisional posture — No right to protract litigation Applicants’ sequence—filing SP suit, then impleadment in appeal after a compromise between original parties—was viewed as a calculated attempt to prolong litigation; absent any valid reason for not joining at trial, they cannot intrude at the revisional stage. (f) Disposition: CMA No. 9923 of 2024 dismissed (leave to appeal refused); CMA No. 9924 of 2024 dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Service Law ----Adverse remarks—Promotion—Supersession—Effect of expunged adverse remarks on subsequent DPC decisions—Held: Once adverse remarks recorded in the respondent’s Annual Confidential Report were judicially set aside by the Federal Service Tribunal and the judgment attained finality up to the Supreme Court, such remarks stood obliterated from the service record ab initio. Any supersession based solely on those remarks automatically lost legal effect. Administrative orders resting on a foundation that has ceased to exist cannot survive. Non-challenge to individual DPC supersession orders, being derivative in nature, is of no consequence; law does not require a futile challenge to orders whose substratum has already been judicially extinguished. (b) Service Law ----Limitation—Condonation of delay—Tribunal’s discretion—Departmental representation filed after limitation period—Held: The Federal Service Tribunal recorded sufficient cause and exercised discretion judiciously in condoning the delay considering factual circumstances including security and access constraints of the respondent’s posting—No jurisdictional or legal error shown; interference by the Supreme Court unwarranted. (c) Promotion—Ante-dated or pro-forma promotion—Entitlement—Where adverse remarks forming the sole basis of supersession are subsequently expunged, the officer’s right to promotion relates back to the date he first became eligible—The respondent, having been wrongly superseded on a ground later declared void, was rightly granted promotion from 2015, when his entitlement first matured. (d) Case Distinction— Abdul Ghani Chaudhry v. Secretary Establishment (1998 SCMR 2544) distinguished; that case did not involve the setting aside of adverse remarks forming the foundation of supersession, hence its ratio inapplicable to the present facts. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ghani Chaudhry v. Secretary Establishment, Islamabad & others, 1998 SCMR 2544 (distinguished) Disposition: Leave to appeal declined—Petition dismissed—Federal Service Tribunal judgment dated 02.11.2022 upheld; respondent entitled to promotion retrospectively from 27.07.2015.