Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Ss. 42, 44, 52, 53, 166 & 172(2)(vi)—Specific Relief Act, 1877—S. 42—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 175F(1)(c) & 199—Revenue record—Old sanctioned mutations—Non-implementation for over a century—Correction of entries—Clerical or arithmetical mistake—Contentious dispute—Jurisdiction of revenue authorities—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the alleged non-implementation of Mutation No. 117 dated 29.12.1907 and Mutations Nos. 401 and 402 dated 30.01.1913 could not be treated as a mere clerical or arithmetical mistake capable of correction by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967. The Court observed that where implementation of century-old mutations would potentially disturb long-standing revenue entries, affect possible intervening alienations, and prejudice third parties not before the forum, the matter plainly assumes a contentious character. In such circumstances, the limited power of correction available to revenue authorities cannot be invoked for deciding substantive controversies affecting proprietary rights. The Court further held that the discretion under S. 166 is not unbridled and is confined to cases free from factual controversy and incapable of adversely affecting vested rights without proper adjudication. Revenue law—Record-of-rights—Presumption of correctness—Remedy against adverse entry—The Court held that Ss. 42, 44, and 52 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 collectively regulate the preparation, evidentiary value, and correction of the record-of-rights, and once entries are incorporated therein, a presumption of truth attaches to them until the contrary is proved or lawful substitution is made. To dislodge such presumption, the law itself provides a remedy through S. 53 of the Act, enabling an aggrieved person to institute a suit for declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, where he is prejudiced by an entry in the record-of-rights or periodical record relating to a right of which he is in possession. The Court reaffirmed that the statute does envisage an appropriate remedy even where summary correction before revenue authorities is unavailable. In this regard, reliance was placed on Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334). Jurisdiction—Civil court and revenue authorities—Section 172(2)(vi), Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Bar of jurisdiction not absolute in contentious matters—The Federal Constitutional Court examined the petitioners’ contention that, because S. 172(2)(vi) bars civil court jurisdiction regarding correction of entries in the record-of-rights, periodical record, or register of mutations, only revenue authorities could grant relief. Rejecting the broad proposition, the Court held that the exclusion recognized in S. 172(2)(vi) operates in matters of correction that are not controversial in nature. Where, however, the dispute involves contentious questions, competing rights, and possible effect on absent parties, the matter cannot be summarily resolved by revenue authorities. The Court relied upon Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906), wherein the Supreme Court clarified that only non-controversial corrections in revenue record fall within the exclusive domain of revenue authorities to the exclusion of civil courts. Delay and equity—Laches and acquiescence—Unexplained silence for more than a century—The Court held that the petitioners’ claim was hopelessly belated, having been raised for the first time in the year 2020 in relation to mutations sanctioned in 1907 and 1913. It was observed that the petitioners had failed to produce any material explaining why their predecessors-in-interest did not seek implementation during their lifetime, or why the petitioners themselves remained silent for decades. Such inordinate and unexplained delay attracted the principles of laches and acquiescence with full force. The mere existence of old sanctioned but unimplemented mutations did not automatically entitle the petitioners to their implementation after a lapse of over one hundred years, particularly in the face of possible competing claims and long-standing contrary entries in the revenue record. Constitutional jurisdiction—Article 199—Disputed questions of fact and title—Scope of writ jurisdiction—The Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 is meant to provide prompt relief where illegality or impropriety is apparent on the face of the record and can be determined without elaborate inquiry or recording of evidence. Where, however, the controversy involves disputed or intricate questions of fact, title, or enforceability of old mutations, requiring proper evidence and adjudication, the High Court cannot assume the role of a fact-finding forum. Such matters fall within the domain of courts of plenary jurisdiction. In support of this proposition, the Court referred to Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61), Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990), and Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). The Court accordingly held that the Lahore High Court rightly declined to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction. Natural justice—Affected third parties—No adverse order behind the back of interested persons—The Court observed that during the extraordinarily long interregnum between the sanction of the mutations and the filing of the petitioners’ application, it was highly probable that various transactions, alienations, or changes in possession had taken place, and that third parties may have acquired rights on the basis of the existing revenue entries. Any order directing implementation of the old mutations without impleading such persons or affording them opportunity of hearing would violate the principles of natural justice and risk grave miscarriage of justice. This consideration further demonstrated that the matter was not one of a simple ministerial correction but of substantive adjudication. Case references—Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334); Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906); Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61); Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990); Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the controversy regarding implementation of century-old mutations was contentious in nature, could not be resolved by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, and was not amenable to determination in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution. Finding no legal infirmity in the orders of the Member Board of Revenue, the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), and the Lahore High Court, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave.

Summary: Exercise of jurisdiction by the Officer(s) of Directorate General of Intelligence & Investigation, Peshawar without limits as to area, persons or class of persons under SRO-776(1) of 2011 was violative of section 30 of Sales Tax Act, 1990. It is settled law that an audit must be conducted under Section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. A ‘desk audit’ or mere ‘analysis of data’ is not a substitute for a proper audit under law. While such analysis may generate information that could lead to a proper audit under Section 25, it cannot itself be the basis for imposition of tax liability.

Summary: Ejectment Petition under section 13 of Rent Restriction Ordinance1959. Application for impleadment in the ejectment petition under order 1 rule 9&10 CPC. It is an established law that Rent Controller cannot decide the question of title as to whether the vendor of the petitioner was the owner from whom he allegedly derives title of the rented premises and, thereafter, had entered into any agreement of tenancy with Malik Javed because these matters are pending adjudication before the Civil Court and even an application under Section 12(21 CPC is also subjudice. Learned Rent Controller has got limited jurisdiction to determine the relationship of landlord and tenant and ancillary matters thereto, determination of the ejectment of the tenants and fair rent. The petitioner may have purchased the property, but based on such purchase, neither could he resist the application for ejectment of the tenant nor his presence before the Rent Controller is indispensable. The petitioner may get determine his right of ownership not only against respondents No. I to 3, but also prove the validity, authenticity, and correctness of the deed through which he has allegedly purchased the rented premises, but before the court of ultimate jurisdiction and the Rent Controller cannot enter into any such dispu0e because of his limited jurisdiction. The tenant has already admitted his relationship with respondents No. I to 3 being their tenant, thus, on establishment of the grounds alleged by respondent No. I to 3 the tenant will have to surrender the possession of the rented premises to the landlord and thereafter, he or anyone including petitioner could file a suit for determination of his right before the civil court or through pending cases he may establish his title.

Summary: The proper way to construe a non obstante clause is first to ascertain the meaning of the enacting part through a fair construction of its words. The meaning so ascertained is then to be taken as overriding anything inconsistent with it in the provisions mentioned in the non obstante clause. A non obstante clause is usually used in a provision to indicate that such provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provisions referred to in the clause. In case of any inconsistency between the non obstante clause and another provision, one of the purposes of such a clause is to ensure that it prevails over the conflicting provision. However, it does not necessarily mean that there must be repugnancy between the two provisions in all cases. The principle underlying a non obstante clause may be invoked only in cases of irreconcilable conflict.

Summary: (a) The meaning and concept of Waqf, its literally means 'detention, 'stoppage' or 'tying up' Technically it means a dedication in perpetuity of some specific property for a pious purpose or a succession of pious purpose. (B) Cy-prés means following as nearly as possible the intention of donor. When a particular mode of charity indicated by donor is not capable of being carried into effect but the donor has expressed a general intention of charity, the Court does not allow the trust to fail but execute it 'Cy-prés' that is in some way as nearly as possible to that which the testator specified.Failure of object given by the testator essential. For the application of Cy-prés, the failure of the particular object specified by the testator is an essential pre-condition. Alternatively, this doctrine can be applied when surplus is left after satisfying the purpose specified by donor.The prime rule to be observed in the application of the Cy-prés doctrine is that donor intention must be observed as far as possible.

Summary: Where a mistake is discoverable from face of the record same may be rectified under section 221 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and its scope cannot be limited to correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes only.

Summary: (a) Section 126A as well as section 133 of the Income Tax Ordinance 2001 were found having retrospective effect t to the extent as expressly provided in the amended sections of law. (b) Where legislature gives retrospective effect to provisions of an amending act by express words or necessary intendment then the principle enshrined in section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not apply and express intention of the legislature in new enactment has to be given effect.

Summary: Surplus accruing to a member`s club from amounts received from its members in respect of activities/services provided to them could not be considered to be income as profit of the said Club. Due to doctrine of mutuality no one could make a profit out of oneself.

Summary: Where tax statutes prescribe a definitive time frame using prohibitive or restrictive language such provisions are deemed mandatory rendering any action beyond the prescribed period invalid. This approach prevents tax authorities from exercising unfettered discretion in initiating or concluding proceedings outside the statutory framework. The statutory provisions governing the exclusion of time due to adjournments sought by the taxpayer are enshrined in Sections 40(4) and 68(5) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act 2013. Although both provisions share similar language in principle a fundamental distinction exists: Section 68(5) explicitly imposes a maximum cap of thirty days on the exclusion of time due to such adjournments whereas Section 40(4) does not prescribe any such limitation. This distinction is pivotal in determining the correct computation of the limitation period in each case.