Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss. 92(1)(f), (g) & (h)---Public charitable trust---Sale of trust property---Scope of Court’s jurisdiction---Trust deed neither expressly authorized nor prohibited sale of trust property---Trustees sought permission to sell leasehold plot and apply proceeds towards objects of trust---Section 92(1), C.P.C. was couched in broad terms and empowered Court to authorize whole or any part of trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged---Where power of sale was not conferred by trust deed, Court could authorize sale under S.92(1)(f), C.P.C.---Sale proceeds were required to be applied exclusively towards objects stated in trust deed and could not be diverted to any other purpose---Law would not allow charitable intention of settlor to fail merely because trust lacked resources to construct institution upon originally allotted plot---Permission to sell could consequently be granted subject to a scheme ensuring realization of original charitable objects. Cited Cases: • Messrs Muhammad Ismail v. Messrs Sir Jahangir Kothari Trust 2011 CLC 1847 • Oldham Borough Council v. Attorney-General [1993] Ch 210 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.92(1)(f), (g) & (h)---Cy-pres doctrine---Application---Power to authorize sale and settle scheme---Cy-pres enabled Court, where precise fulfilment of charitable purpose had become impossible, inexpedient or impracticable, to substitute a mode of application as near as possible to donor’s original intention---Doctrine was based upon judicial determination of settlor’s charitable intention in changed circumstances and not upon arbitrary disregard of donor’s wishes---Section 92, C.P.C. gave Court wider latitude than common law and permitted Court simultaneously to authorize sale under clause (f), settle a scheme under clause (g) and grant further or other relief under clause (h)---Permission to sell trust property and application of cy-pres doctrine were not mutually exclusive under S.92, C.P.C.---Where statute conferred broader jurisdiction, Court was not required to reintroduce restrictions derived from common law. Cited Cases: • Kandawalla Trust through Trustees and another v. The State 2013 MLD 640 • Oldham Borough Council v. Attorney-General [1993] Ch 210 (c) Charitable trust---Sale of immovable trust property---Whether particular property was indispensable to charitable purpose---Test---Relevant consideration was whether qualities or characteristics of property itself made its retention essential to objects of charitable gift---Property would ordinarily be indispensable where its historical, architectural, environmental or other unique qualities constituted the very basis of charitable purpose---Where charitable purposes could equally be carried out upon another property, sale of original property did not amount to alteration or destruction of trust objects---Trust deed contemplated establishment of madrassa, Islamic school and college for Islamic, general and medical education, but allotted plot possessed no unique quality or characteristic making its retention indispensable---Objects of trust could be realized upon other suitable land---Sale of plot would not defeat or alter original charitable intention of author of trust. Cited Case: • Oldham Borough Council v. Attorney-General [1993] Ch 210 (d) Islamabad Capital Territory Trust Act, 2020----S.21---Trust property---Power of sale or disposal---Trust could hold movable and immovable property in its own name and could sell or otherwise dispose of property held by it---Responsibility for such sale or purchase rested upon trustees---Statutory power of trustees to sell property was recognized, subject to terms of trust and directions of Court under S.92, C.P.C. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss.92 & 107, O.XLI, R.33---Non-contentious suit concerning administration of public trust---Dismissal on technical grounds---Powers of second appellate Court---Trial Court dismissed suit on ground that trustees had not produced NOC from Building Control Directorate of Capital Development Authority, while First Appellate Court upheld dismissal because original allotment letter had not been produced---Such grounds were untenable where authenticity of available documents was not disputed and trustees had consistently maintained that CDA consent and NOCs would be obtained after permission of Court to sell property---Question before Courts was whether sale should be authorized under S.92, C.P.C., and not whether trustees had conclusively proved title through every original document---Title and leasehold interest stood demonstrated on balance of probabilities through CDA renewal letter of May, 2023---In a non-contentious suit, Courts could have directed production of required documents instead of dismissing suit and appeal---Second Appellate Court, exercising powers under S.107 read with O.XLI, R.33, C.P.C., possessed powers of Court of first instance and First Appellate Court and could consider attested allotment and renewal documents placed upon record. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.92(1)(f), (g) & (h)---Administration of charitable trust---Sale of trust property---Protective and supervisory scheme---Court authorized trustees to sell plot subject to obtaining CDA consent, permission for change of land use, determination of conversion charges and transfer dues, and issuance of necessary NOCs---CDA was directed not to withhold or deny such permissions unreasonably---Plot was to be independently valued by a valuer approved by Pakistan Banks’ Association, publicly marketed for at least sixty days and sold through auction---Reserve price was not to be less than eighty percent of valuation without prior approval of Court and highest compliant offer was to be accepted unless otherwise approved---Sale proceeds were to be deposited in trust account jointly operated by at least two trustees---Within six months of sale, trustees were required to utilize at least twenty-five percent of proceeds for purchase of suitable land and at least another twenty-five percent for commencement and completion of facilities advancing one or more objects of trust---Proceeds could be applied only towards objects enumerated in trust deed. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.92(1)(g) & (h)---Charitable trust---Preservation of permanent capital---Continuing supervisory jurisdiction---Approximately fifty percent, with variation of ten percent, of net sale proceeds was to remain preserved as permanent capital and could be invested only in Government securities, National Savings instruments, Islamic Sukuk, scheduled bank deposits and low to medium-risk mutual funds rated “A” by an SECP-approved credit-rating agency---High-risk equity investments were excluded and not more than fifteen percent of permanent capital could be invested in any single permitted category---Islamabad High Court retained supervisory jurisdiction over implementation of scheme---Trust was required to submit annual progress reports and audited accounts to Advocate General, who was to bring any matter of concern before Court---Trustees were granted liberty to approach Court in case of difficulty or for further directions. Disposition---Regular Second Appeal allowed---Judgments and decrees of Courts below set aside---Trustees authorized under S.92(1)(f), C.P.C. to sell trust property subject to directions and supervisory scheme framed under S.92(1)(g) and (h), C.P.C. Aslam Khan and another v. Taleem ul Quran ul Kareem and others, Regular Second Appeal No.7 of 2026, Islamabad High Court, decided on 03.06.2026 and announced in open Court on 09.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962----S.2-A---Muslim inheritance---Rights of female heirs---Custom or tribal practice excluding women from inheritance---Validity---Property of deceased Muslim was required to devolve strictly in accordance with injunctions of Islam and applicable Hanafi law---Any custom purporting to suppress, defeat or exclude inheritance rights of women was directly opposed to Islamic Sharia and could not be recognized by law---Petitioners failed to prove existence of alleged customary law under which male members could exclusively retain property to exclusion of female heirs---Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, invalidated customary action or tribal mechanism inconsistent with Islamic injunctions---Female heirs could not be deprived of their Quranic shares through custom, family arrangement, tribal practice or any other device. (b) Jirga---Decision affecting inheritance rights---Legal effect---A Jirga had no lawful authority to divest a legal heir of inheritance rights conferred by Holy Quran and Sunnah---Any Jirga proceeding or decision made in derogation of Islamic law of inheritance was patently illegal and void ab initio---Purported arrangement allegedly made on oath upon Holy Quran could not defeat lawful inheritance rights, particularly where such arrangement had not been proved through cogent evidence. (c) Fraud---Fraudulent mutation of inherited property---Effect upon subsequent devolution---Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh were not legal heirs of deceased Mitha Khan but had fraudulently represented themselves as such and procured mutation of his land in their names---Fraud vitiated even the most solemn proceedings---Where foundational transfer was tainted by fraud, subsequent devolution of property upon legal heirs of persons responsible for fraud was also illegal and unsustainable---When foundation of title was unlawful, entire superstructure erected upon it was bound to fall. Cited Cases: • Fazal Ellahi (deceased) through his legal heirs v. Mst. Zainab Bi 2019 SCMR 1930 • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Fraudulent mutation---Limitation---Knowledge of fraud---Fraudulent mutation had not been within knowledge of Mst. Ayesha Bibi---Respondents approached Court for cancellation after mutation came to their knowledge---Objection regarding limitation was misplaced where right to sue arose upon discovery of fraudulent entries and no knowledge of fraud at an earlier stage was established. (e) Mutation---Revenue entries---Evidentiary value---Mutation entries were maintained for fiscal and revenue purposes and did not constitute documents of title---Mere existence of mutations in names of Abdul Razzaq Khan, Wahid Bakhsh or their successors could not confer ownership upon them or exclude legally entitled heirs---Revenue entries founded upon fraud carried no legal sanctity and were liable to cancellation. Cited Case: • Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani and 10 others 1992 SCMR 1832 (f) Evidence---Claim of ownership through Court decision or private agreement---Proof---Petitioners asserted that property had been transferred to Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh through a Court decision, but no such order was produced---They also relied upon an alleged agreement dated 31.10.1968 but failed to establish it through cogent material---Neither alleged judicial transfer nor purported family arrangement could be acted upon in absence of legal proof---Petitioners also failed to establish any blood relationship between Abdul Razzaq Khan or Wahid Bakhsh and deceased Mitha Khan---Lengthy cross-examination of plaintiffs’ witnesses did not discredit their testimony regarding lawful line of succession. (g) Islamic law of inheritance---Hanafi law---Sole surviving daughter---Quranic share and residuary estate---Mitha Khan died leaving only his daughter, Mst. Lal Khatoon---Under Surah An-Nisa, verse 11, and settled Hanafi law, a sole surviving daughter inherited one-half of her deceased father’s estate as her Quranic share---Remaining residue devolved upon residuaries and would return to Quranic heir through doctrine of Radd only where no residuary existed---Upon death of Mst. Lal Khatoon, her sole daughter, Mst. Ayesha Bibi, similarly inherited one-half of property held by her mother, resulting in her entitlement to one-fourth of estate originally owned by Mitha Khan---Upon death of Mst. Ayesha Bibi, one-half of her property devolved upon her son, Bostan Khan, while remaining one-half devolved equally upon her two daughters---Respondent daughters were not direct legal heirs of Mitha Khan but derived entitlement through their mother, Mst. Ayesha Bibi---Their entitlement was confined to their respective shares in one-fourth interest lawfully held by their mother and did not extend to entire estate originally owned by Mitha Khan. (h) Civil decree---Declaration of exclusive ownership and distribution according to inheritance shares---Harmonious construction---Trial Court had declared Mst. Ayesha Bibi to be exclusive owner of properties described in plaint but had simultaneously directed Tehsildar to enter names of respondents and deliver possession according to their respective shares under Hanafi law---Both parts of decree were required to be read harmoniously---Expression “exclusive owner” could not enlarge inheritance beyond shares permitted by Sharia---Revenue entries and possession were to be effected strictly according to actual Islamic shares determined by Court---Trial Court was directed to reframe decree sheet accordingly. (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference by Supreme Court---Concurrent findings recorded by Trial Court and High Court were not to be disturbed unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, arbitrariness or jurisdictional defect---Record established that findings regarding fraudulent mutations, absence of relationship with deceased and lawful succession of female heirs were based upon evidence and did not suffer from any such defect---No ground existed for interference under Art.185(3), except correction of actual quantum of inheritance shares. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 • Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1454 • Faqir Syed Anwar ud Din deceased through LRs v. Syed Raza Haider and others PLD 2025 SC 31 Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal dismissed and leave refused---Concurrent judgments and decrees maintained subject to modification regarding actual inheritance shares---Respondents held entitled only to their respective shares in one-fourth interest inherited by their mother, Mst. Ayesha Bibi, and not to entirety of estate originally owned by Mitha Khan---Trial Court directed to reframe decree sheet and ensure revenue entries and delivery of possession strictly in accordance with Islamic law of inheritance---No order as to costs. Mst. Ameer Begum and others v. Rahima Khatoon and others, Civil Petition No.97-Q of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 13.05.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: The combined reading of the aforementioned provisions of Court Fees Act and sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XLVII CPC by placing the same in juxtaposition makes it clear that object and purpose of requiring affixation of court fee and deposit of security amount are based on entirely different concepts and requiring the simultaneous deposit of the same side by side for different purposes and intents does not tantamount to constitute double jeopardy by requisition of deposit of the same fee twice and cannot be set aside on the said ground. ---- (a) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870)----First Sched., Arts.3 & 4---Application for review of judgment---Court fee payable---Quantum---Review application presented on or after ninetieth day from date of decree was chargeable with fee equal to that leviable on plaint or memorandum of appeal---Review application presented before ninetieth day was chargeable with one-half of such fee---Distinction between Arts.3 and 4 depended solely upon time within which review application was instituted. (b) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870)----Ss.14 & 15---Court fee on review application---Nature and object---Refund---Court Fees Act was enacted to secure revenue for State and not to penalize litigants or provide technical weapon to one party against another---Where delayed review was not occasioned by applicant’s laches, Court could authorize refund of excess fee under S.14---Where review was admitted and former decision was reversed or modified because of mistake of law or fact, applicant was entitled to refund under S.15, subject to statutory exception concerning fresh evidence which could have been produced at original hearing. Cited Cases: • Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakoor Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289 • Naik Muhammad and another v. Additional District Judge, Vehari and 5 others 1985 CLC 1969 Lahore • Muhammad Shafi v. Rehmat Ali 1985 CLC 432 Lahore • Rashid Ahmad and another v. Khurshid Ahmad Khawar and another 1985 CLC 274 Lahore • Sikandar Din v. Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Rawalpindi Division, Rawalpindi and 2 others 1987 CLC 2428 Lahore • Hafiz Muhammad Mubeen through legal heirs v. Government of Sindh through Deputy Commissioner, Sukkur and 5 others 2014 MLD 419 Sindh (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.122, O.XLVII, R.1(3)---Review petition---Cash security of Rs.5,000---Purpose and consequence---No review application could be entertained unless applicant furnished cash security of Rs.5,000, except where applicant had been declared an undischarged insolvent or pauper---Security was liable to forfeiture where review petition was dismissed at initial stage without notice to opposite party---Where review petition was dismissed after contest, security amount was payable to opposite party---Object of security requirement was to discourage frivolous, unnecessary and unwarranted review petitions and to compensate successful opposite party for being compelled to contest renewed litigation---Where review petition succeeded, security amount was returnable to petitioner as rule did not prescribe any penal consequence upon acceptance of review. Cited Case: • Tauqir Ahmed v. Peshawar High Court, Peshawar through Registrar and 3 others PLD 2026 Peshawar 13 (d) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870)----First Sched., Arts.3 & 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLVII, R.1(3)---Review petition---Simultaneous payment of court fee and deposit of cash security---Double jeopardy---Applicability---Court fee and security deposit were founded upon entirely different statutory concepts, objects and consequences---Court fee constituted revenue payable to State and was subject to refund in circumstances provided by Ss.14 and 15 of Court Fees Act---Cash security was a refundable deposit intended to deter frivolous review proceedings and compensate opposite party where review failed---Requirement to pay prescribed court fee and simultaneously furnish cash security did not amount to requisition of same fee twice and did not constitute double jeopardy---Office objection demanding half of applicable court fee together with Rs.5,000 security was legally sustainable. Disposition---Office objection sustained---Petitioner granted fifteen days to remove deficiency by paying requisite court fee and depositing security amount---Office directed to number review petition and place it for hearing on judicial side upon removal of objection within stipulated period; otherwise matter was to be consigned to record. Shabbira Bebe v. Shabbir Ahmad and others, Diary No.64893 of 2026, Lahore High Court, decided on 06.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.199, 9, 10-A, 14, 18, 25 & 27---Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2022, Regln.28(b)---Recruitment to Provincial Management Service from Ministerial Quota---Shortlisting of candidates for interview in ratio of 1:5---Constitutional challenge---Advertisement expressly provided that candidates securing prescribed qualifying marks in written examination would be called for interview in ratio of 1:5---Petitioners applied, appeared in examination and subjected themselves to entire selection process with knowledge of said condition---Shortlisting criterion had been uniformly applied to all candidates---Policy, rules, regulations and criterion contained in advertisement did not warrant interference at advanced stage of recruitment process. (b) Service law---Recruitment---Qualifying marks---Right to interview---Candidate obtaining minimum qualifying marks merely became eligible for further consideration and did not acquire vested or indefeasible right to be called for interview---Recruiting authority could, for selection from amongst eligible candidates, prescribe a shortlisting standard higher than minimum eligibility requirement---Candidates who failed to fall within prescribed ratio of 1:5 could not demand interview merely because they had obtained minimum qualifying marks. Cited Case: • State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha and others (1974) 3 SCC 220 (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Recruitment process---Challenge to advertised condition after participation---Estoppel, waiver and acquiescence---Candidate who consciously participated in recruitment process under expressly notified terms and conditions could not, after an unfavourable result, challenge criterion governing same process---Petitioners participated with open eyes and raised no objection before examination or during selection process---Acceptance of advertisement and participation thereunder amounted to acquiescence and attracted principles of estoppel and waiver---Candidate could not simultaneously accept benefit of selection process and subsequently assail its governing condition. Cited Case: • Waheed Khan and others v. Chief Secretary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1114 (d) Estoppel---Doctrine of approbation and reprobation---Applicability to recruitment---Person having choice between two courses of conduct and electing one could not subsequently resile from such election---Petitioners certified in their application forms that they had read, understood and accepted all requirements, conditions and general instructions governing advertised posts---Having expressly undertaken to abide by applicable rules, regulations, directions and procedures, petitioners could not approbate by participating in examination and reprobate by challenging shortlisting criterion after failing to secure position within prescribed ratio. Cited Case: • Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1454 (e) Delegated legislation---Publication in official Gazette---Challenge to amendment in Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2022---Shortlisting criterion independently and expressly incorporated in recruitment advertisement before submission of applications---Petitioners possessed prior notice of criterion and voluntarily participated subject thereto---Authorities cited regarding enforceability of statutory instruments upon publication in official Gazette were distinguishable in peculiar circumstances, as impugned action was founded upon an express condition of advertisement accepted by all candidates---Petitioners could not invoke alleged non-publication of amendment to challenge criterion only after participating unsuccessfully in recruitment process. Distinguished Cases: • Dr. Shahbaz Mujtaba Ghauri v. Punjab Public Service Commission through Chairman, Lahore and 2 others 2020 PLC (C.S.) 127 • Messrs Bio Leads (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice and others 2025 CLC 1715 • Tariq Aziz-ud-Din and others, Human Rights Cases Nos.8340, 9504-G and 13936-G 2010 SCMR 1301 • Messrs Mustafa Impex, Karachi and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 808 (f) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Public recruitment---Policy, shortlisting and selection---Scope of judicial review---Formulation of recruitment policy, framing of rules and shortlisting of candidates fell primarily within domain of competent authority and Punjab Public Service Commission---Constitutional Court could examine such action only on grounds of illegality, mala fide, arbitrariness or violation of law---No discrimination or arbitrary application was established where same 1:5 ratio had been disclosed beforehand and uniformly applied to all candidates---Court would not substitute its own assessment for recruitment policy merely because some candidates obtaining qualifying marks had not been shortlisted. Disposition---Writ petition and connected writ petitions dismissed for being devoid of merit---Criterion requiring candidates qualifying written examination to be called for interview in ratio of 1:5 maintained---No direction issued to call petitioners for interview. Muhammad Naeem and 21 others v. Punjab Public Service Commission through its Secretary and 3 others, Writ Petition No.9086 of 2026 along with connected petitions, Lahore High Court, decided on 06.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----S.74---Performance guarantee---Forfeiture upon breach---Reasonable compensation---Scope---Performance guarantee was a contractual mechanism intended to secure due and satisfactory performance of obligations and could be conditional or unconditional, collateral to parent contract or incorporated within contractual framework---Where guarantee stipulated a financial consequence upon breach or non-performance, its invocation attracted S.74 of Contract Act, 1872---Section 74 did not prohibit stipulation of a fixed sum payable upon breach nor make proof of actual loss a condition precedent to enforcement---Party complaining of breach could recover reasonable compensation not exceeding stipulated amount even where actual loss was not proved---Court nevertheless retained supervisory jurisdiction to determine whether retention of stipulated amount represented reasonable compensation or operated as an unconscionable or disproportionate penalty---Existence of forfeiture clause did not entitle beneficiary to retain stipulated amount irrespective of surrounding circumstances, but judicial power under S.74 was not to be exercised routinely by substituting Court’s view for commercial allocation of risk agreed by parties---Reduction or refund was warranted only where forfeiture was excessive, harsh or unconscionable in context of nature of contract, conduct of parties and circumstances of breach. Cited Cases: • Province of West Pakistan v. Messrs Mistri Patel & Co. PLD 1969 SC 80 • Abdul Haq Khan Khattak v. WAPDA 1991 SCMR 436 (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----S.74---Commercial contract---Performance guarantee equal to three percent of contractual value---Time expressly made essence of contract---Failure to supply goods within extended period---Forfeiture---Reasonableness---Contract required seller to furnish performance guarantee for due and satisfactory performance and empowered buyer to forfeit same upon failure to supply goods within specified period or upon breach of any contractual condition---Form of performance bond expressly provided that buyer would be sole judge of performance and that any grant of time or indulgence would not absolve liability under guarantee---Extensions granted by buyer therefore did not amount to waiver or extinguishment of right to invoke guarantee upon continued non-performance---Seller failed to make any shipment even within extended deadlines and attributed failure to increase in international prices and shortage of supply rather than any actionable default of buyer---Performance guarantee securing only three percent of value of a high-value, time-sensitive public procurement contract for an essential commodity was neither excessive nor unconscionable---Forfeiture of entire guarantee constituted reasonable compensation under S.74 and was legally justified. (c) Contract---Extension of time---Revised contractual framework---Default---Earlier impediments---Legal effect---Once parties by mutual conduct extended timelines for performance, antecedent delays and difficulties stood absorbed into revised contractual schedule---Legally controlling question thereafter was whether seller performed within subsisting extended period and whether any legally cognisable justification existed when performance ultimately became due---Default under performance guarantee regime was triggered by non-performance within operative contractual framework and was not dependent upon abstract attribution of blame for earlier events---Arbitrator erred by treating prior delay in operationalisation of letter of credit as determinative and by failing to consider that no supply was made despite subsequent extensions---Finding conflated fault attribution with contractual default and substituted a non-contractual standard for agreed triggering condition of forfeiture. (d) Contract---Principle that no person may take advantage of his own wrong---Application---Principle could not operate as substitute for express contractual framework governing performance---It became relevant only where wrongful conduct of one party was shown to be legally operative cause of non-performance within subsisting contractual obligations---Where timelines had been revised by mutual conduct, relevant enquiry was legal causation at date performance fell due and not historical attribution of earlier difficulties---Seller’s eventual failure resulted from adverse market conditions and inability to procure goods rather than conduct of buyer---Principle against taking advantage of one’s own wrong was therefore inapplicable. (e) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----Arbitral award---Judicial interference---Misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Patent error of law---Court did not sit in appeal over arbitral award and could not reappraise evidence merely because another view was possible---Findings of arbitrator were ordinarily final where they represented a possible and legally tenable view---Court could not conduct roving enquiry to discover errors and interference was confined to infirmity apparent on face of award or material expressly relied upon therein---However, where finding rested upon misreading or non-reading of material evidence or an incorrect factual premise that directly vitiated application of law, error ceased to be mere factual appreciation and assumed character of patent error of law---Arbitrator ignored revised contractual timeline, extensions expressly granted without waiver, seller’s own stated reasons for non-performance and contractual conditions triggering forfeiture---Such omissions led to legally erroneous application of S.74 of Contract Act and justified judicial interference. Cited Case: • Pakistan Railways v. CCRC Ziyang Co. Limited PLD 2025 SC 706 (f) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----Arbitral award---Miscarriage of justice---Erroneous direction for refund of performance guarantee---Single Judge found serious errors in arbitral reasoning but declined interference on ground that refund would not cause substantial miscarriage of justice because buyer’s counterclaim for damages had failed---Once contractual breach and reasonableness of forfeiture were correctly appreciated, allowing refund would relieve defaulting seller of expressly agreed consequence of non-performance despite repeated indulgence and would distort contractual bargain---Such result itself amounted to miscarriage of justice and could not be sustained merely because separate counterclaim for damages had been rejected. (g) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----Damages---Independent upstream supply arrangement---Commercial risk---Causation and privity---Seller entered into contract with supplier before conclusion of principal contract with buyer and paid advance of US$3,465,000 under independent back-to-back arrangement---Buyer was neither party nor privy to such arrangement and had given no undertaking to indemnify seller against supplier default, market fluctuation or other upstream commercial exposure---Structuring of procurement chain and alignment of upstream obligations with principal contract were matters of seller’s own commercial judgment and risk allocation---Seller failed to open required letter of credit in favour of supplier, resulting in termination and forfeiture of advance---Consequences of independent supply arrangement could not be shifted to buyer in absence of express contractual assumption of liability or indemnity. (h) Contract Act (IX of 1872)----Damages---Legal causation---Intervening commercial event---Seller’s supplier forfeited advance before expiry of revised timelines under principal contract---Buyer continued to act within extended contractual framework while seller’s supply chain had already failed---Termination by supplier and forfeiture of advance constituted intervening commercial event breaking chain of legal causation between conduct of buyer and claimed loss---Claim for US$3,465,000 lacked legally cognisable nexus with any breach by buyer and award of damages would impermissibly convert performance guarantee under sale contract into warranty against seller’s upstream commercial risks---Seller was not entitled to recover said amount or any other damages from buyer. Disposition---Civil Appeal No.140-K of 2016 filed by Trading Corporation of Pakistan allowed---Judgments of learned Single Judge and Division Bench of Sindh High Court, to extent directing refund of performance guarantee, set aside---Forfeiture of entire performance guarantee held justified and reasonable---Decision setting aside award of US$3,465,000 as damages maintained---Civil Appeal No.141-K of 2016 filed by Company dismissed in entirety. Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. M/s Abdulla Mezroei Metal Trading Company and another; and M/s Abdulla Mezroei Metal Trading Company and another v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd., Civil Appeals Nos.140-K and 141-K of 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 05.05.2026 and announced on 03.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction---Scope---High Court ordinarily would not sit as Court of appeal to reappraise evidence merely because another view was possible---Interference was nevertheless warranted where judgment of Court below suffered from misreading or non-reading of material evidence, misapplication of settled law, material illegality or irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction resulting in miscarriage of justice---Appellate Court had reversed dismissal of pre-emption suit without properly examining mandatory statutory requirements and material deficiencies in evidence---Findings of Appellate Court were consequently open to correction in revisional jurisdiction. (b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13---Suit for possession through pre-emption---Talb-i-Muwathibat, Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat---Mandatory nature---Right of pre-emption was a special right and operated as restriction upon ordinary right of sale and purchase---Entire foundation of pre-emption suit rested upon due performance of statutory demands in prescribed order---Right stood extinguished unless pre-emptor strictly pleaded and proved Talb-i-Muwathibat, Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat through reliable and confidence-inspiring evidence---Any material defect, omission or doubt regarding performance or proof of Talbs ordinarily operated against pre-emptor. Cited Case: • Ch. Riaz Ahmad v. Munir Sultan Malik 2022 SCMR 667 (c) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(2)---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Proof of Majlis---Non-production of material witness---Plaintiff pleaded that information of sale was received in presence of informer and two named witnesses, but failed to produce one of such witnesses without explanation---Although a Majlis could legally consist only of pre-emptor and informer, once plaintiff himself pleaded a particular gathering and identified persons present therein, he was required to prove that version through best available evidence---Withholding a material witness of alleged Majlis justified adverse presumption under Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Appellate Court erred in treating non-production as immaterial merely because presence of more than two persons was not legally necessary. Cited Cases: • Zahid Khan and others v. Muhammad Ahsan and others 2024 MLD 396 Lahore • Muhammad Riaz through Special Attorney v. Ghulam Hussain through Legal Heirs 2016 YLR 56 Lahore • Abdul Qayyum Khan v. Sarfraz Khan and 4 others 2008 YLR 101 Lahore • Syed Waqas Bacha v. Jan Ali Shah and 2 others 2014 MLD 1325 Peshawar • Riaz Ahmad v. Molla Bux 2023 YLR Note 70 Lahore (d) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(2)---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Date of knowledge---Circumstantial evidence---Registered sale had been followed by delivery of possession to vendees, which was a visible occurrence in rural surroundings---Plaintiff, his close relatives and adjoining landowner claimed ignorance of transaction for more than three weeks despite surrounding circumstances indicating otherwise---Assertion regarding first knowledge, being personal and private act of pre-emptor, could be tested and rebutted through circumstantial evidence---Plea that knowledge was acquired only on later date appeared to have been introduced to bring notice of Talb-i-Ishhad within statutory period---Claimed date of knowledge did not inspire confidence. Cited Cases: • Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 • Mst. Zohra Khatoon v. Ghulam Farid 2020 SCMR 465 (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984----Art.122---Pre-emption---Date, time, place and source of knowledge---Burden of proof---Facts concerning precise point at which pre-emptor first acquired knowledge of sale were especially within his own knowledge---Burden to establish such facts rested upon pre-emptor and could not be discharged merely through stray answer elicited from vendee during cross-examination---Admission had to be read in context of entire statement and surrounding evidence---Plaintiff was required to establish pleaded date of knowledge through his own reliable and confidence-inspiring evidence. (f) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(2)---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Chain of source of information---Requirement---Informer claimed to have obtained information from another person, but such original source was neither disclosed at alleged Majlis nor produced in evidence---Chain from person having direct knowledge of sale to person ultimately informing pre-emptor was required to be complete---Incomplete and hearsay chain of information created serious doubt regarding time, date and source of first knowledge and immediate declaration of intention---Defect was particularly material where plaintiff also alleged actual sale consideration different from amount recorded in registered deed---Talb-i-Muwathibat was not proved in accordance with law. Cited Case: • Farid Ullah Khan v. Irfan Ullah Khan 2022 SCMR 1231 (g) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(3)---Talb-i-Ishhad---Written notice attested by two truthful witnesses---Nature of attestation---Statutory requirement was not fulfilled merely by dispatch of an envelope---Pre-emptor had to prove that written notice confirming earlier demand was duly prepared, attested by two truthful witnesses and sent under registered cover acknowledgment due to vendee---One attesting witness was illiterate and did not know contents of notice, while other merely signed document without showing that contents were read over or explained---Person signing document without knowledge of contents could not provide meaningful statutory attestation---Purpose of attestation stood defeated where witness could not state what had been attested. Cited Case: • Ijaz Ahmad v. Noor ul Ameen 2022 SCMR 1522 (h) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(3)---Talb-i-Ishhad---Proof of preparation and dispatch of notice---Non-production of scribe and dispatching clerk---Effect---Scribe was material witness to explain who dictated notice, what contents were incorporated, whether attesting witnesses were present and whether contents were read over or made known to them---Clerk who allegedly dispatched notices was likewise material where neither plaintiff nor attesting witnesses claimed personal dispatch---Failure to produce scribe and dispatching clerk left material gaps in proof of preparation, execution, attestation and posting of notices---Evidence regarding Talb-i-Ishhad was incomplete and not confidence-inspiring. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Din Anjum v. Muhammad Latif and others 2015 YLR 1042 Lahore • Abdul Qayyum Khan v. Sheikh Muhammad Azeem through Legal Heirs 2017 CLC Note 99 Lahore • Muhammad Ramzan through L.Rs. v. Atta Muhammad and another 2018 YLR Note 148 Lahore • Ashfaq Ahmad and others v. Mst. Khurshid Begum 2022 YLR 1373 Lahore • Abdul Haq and another v. Haji Muhammad Islam and 3 others 2020 CLC Note 52 Peshawar (i) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13(3)---Talb-i-Ishhad---Several vendees---Individual service---Suit property had been jointly purchased by three vendees---Postal evidence showed all notices as delivered only to one vendee---Service upon one co-vendee could not be treated as service upon remaining vendees merely because they were brothers or otherwise related---Each vendee was required to be duly served or shown to have refused service---Failure to prove service upon all vendees rendered Talb-i-Ishhad defective and legally ineffective. Cited Cases: • Munawar Hussain and others v. Afaq Ahmed 2013 SCMR 721 • Dayam Khan and others v. Muslim Khan 2015 SCMR 222 (j) Pre-emption---Preferential right based upon adjoining ownership---Factual foundation---Plaintiff claimed right on basis of ownership of adjoining land but admitted permanent residence in another district, absence of cultivation in locality and lack of familiarity even with suit land---Such circumstances, though not independently decisive, weakened probability of plaintiff’s version regarding sudden discovery of sale and his asserted connection with property---Burden remained upon claimant to establish factual basis of preferential right. Cited Case: • Ghazanfar Ali and others v. Malik Muhammad Ansar 2022 YLR 390 (k) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)----S.13---Burden and benefit of doubt---Pre-emptor failed to strictly prove due performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad---Where doubt arose regarding execution or legality of Talbs, benefit was required to go to vendee---Appellate Court failed to appreciate material omissions and defects and its findings suffered from misreading and non-reading of evidence as well as misapplication of settled pre-emption law. Cited Case: • Abdul Majeed and others v. Haji Haq Nawaz 2026 SCMR 138 Disposition---Both civil revisions allowed---Judgment and decree dated 10.02.2018 passed by Additional District Judge, Gujrat, whereby pre-emption suit was decreed, set aside---Judgment and decree dated 11.01.2013 passed by Civil Judge, Gujrat, dismissing suit for possession through pre-emption, restored---Parties left to bear their own costs. Shaukat Ali and another v. Muhammad Shoaib and others, Civil Revision No.174922 of 2018 along with Civil Revision No.212658 of 2018, Lahore High Court, decided on 08.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4, 18, 25 & 199---Pakistan Airports Authority Act, 2023, Ss.2(e), 4 & 13---Airport entry pass and taxi sticker---Nature of permission---Petitioner sought restoration of access permission for operating taxi service within restricted premises of Allama Iqbal International Airport---Issuance of airport entry pass or taxi sticker was not a vested or enforceable entitlement but a regulated permission subject to continuing statutory, administrative and security control---Airport Manager was a statutory functionary responsible for day-to-day administration, operational discipline, passenger facilitation, security and compliance with governing airport framework---Decisions concerning issuance, continuation, suspension or cancellation of access permissions were intrinsically connected with discharge of statutory responsibilities and could not be examined merely as private contractual rights. (b) Pakistan Airports Authority Act, 2023----Ss.4 & 13---Airport Manager---Powers and functions---Scope---Authority was established for better administration, operation and development of airports and related services---Airport Manager was required to oversee administration, secure compliance with Act, rules, regulations, Airport Orders and policies, coordinate security and border-management services, and ensure efficiency, economy and safety of airport operations---Powers exercised by Airport Manager in relation to taxi operators and access to restricted premises were regulatory in character and intended to protect safety, security, passenger interests and orderly functioning of strategically important public infrastructure. (c) Airport taxi services---Concession arrangement---Suitability of drivers---Regulation, suspension and cancellation of access---Tender conditions authorized Airport Manager to determine fitness and suitability of taxi drivers, issue stickers after verification, accept or reject applications and cancel permissions---Overall disciplinary and administrative control remained with airport licensor---Permission to operate within airport premises was conditional upon continuing suitability and compliance with applicable standard operating procedures and could be withdrawn where circumstances warranted. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.18---Freedom of trade, business or profession---Reasonable regulation---Restricted and security-sensitive public facility---Right to pursue lawful occupation was valuable but remained subject to lawful regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed in public interest---Denial of access to restricted airport premises did not prohibit petitioner from carrying on transportation business generally but only prevented continued operation from within controlled airport area---Restriction bore direct and rational nexus with airport security, passenger facilitation and operational discipline and was neither excessive nor disproportionate. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and others PLD 2016 SC 692 • Muhammad Imran and others v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others 2019 SCMR 1753 (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4, 18 & 25---Airport taxi operator---Lawful treatment and equality---Discrimination---Authority exercised by Airport Manager was traceable to statute and governing concession arrangement---Petitioner failed to establish that any other taxi operator with comparable complaints, antecedents or circumstances had been treated more favourably---Mere assertion of preferential treatment, monopoly or favoritism, unsupported by cogent material, did not establish hostile discrimination or violation of equality clause. (f) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Administrative decision---Due process and fair hearing---Scope of inquiry---Petitioner had earlier been afforded hearing pursuant to direction of High Court and competent authority thereafter passed a reasoned order---Relevant inquiry was not whether every complaint stood proved according to standard applicable to formal disciplinary proceedings, but whether authority acted fairly, considered relevant material, afforded opportunity of hearing and reached a decision rationally connected with record---Impugned order addressed petitioner’s grievances and assigned reasons---No denial of hearing or procedural irregularity was demonstrated. (g) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Administrative assessment of suitability---Complaints, vigilance reports, ASF communications and undertaking---Cumulative consideration---Some complaints related to earlier periods and might not independently justify refusal of access, but decision was not founded upon any isolated allegation---Competent authority considered complaints, vigilance communications, Airport Security Force reports, airport management material and petitioner’s written undertaking cumulatively for limited purpose of assessing suitability for continued access to restricted premises---Undertaking was not treated as conclusive proof of misconduct but as one relevant circumstance in administrative assessment---Material furnished rational basis for decision. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Judicial review---Administrative discretion---Scope---Judicial review was concerned with legality of decision-making process and not merits of decision itself---Constitutional Court was to examine whether authority acted within jurisdiction, considered relevant material, excluded irrelevant considerations, observed procedural fairness and avoided mala fides or patent arbitrariness---Court could not reappraise administrative material as appellate forum or substitute its own opinion merely because another conclusion was possible---Where statutory authority acted within lawful sphere, considered relevant material and recorded reasons, interference was not warranted. Cited Cases: • Suo Motu Case No.11 of 2011 PLD 2014 SC 389 • Suo Motu Case No.13 of 2009 PLD 2011 SC 619 (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Allegations of favoritism, monopoly and discriminatory operation of taxi services---Proof---Wide-ranging constitutional directions could not be issued upon general or unsupported allegations---Petitioners failed to place cogent material showing that concession arrangement or regulatory framework was tainted by mala fides, arbitrariness or hostile discrimination---Ancillary reliefs concerning equal business opportunities and alleged monopoly were consequently declined. (j) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.152---Accidental slip or clerical error in judgment---Correction after pronouncement---One paragraph substantially repeated reasoning contained in immediately preceding paragraph---Duplication was clerical and accidental in nature and could be corrected under S.152, C.P.C.---Duplicative paragraph was deleted and subsequent paragraphs were deemed renumbered accordingly---Correction order was directed to be uploaded with reported judgment. Disposition---Constitutional petition dismissed---Order dated 27.11.2025 refusing restoration of airport entry pass and taxi sticker maintained---No jurisdictional error, mala fides, procedural impropriety, discrimination or patent arbitrariness established---Petitioner remained at liberty to submit a future application before competent authority in accordance with applicable statutory and administrative framework---Subsequent correction order dated 06.07.2026 deleted duplicative paragraph under S.152, C.P.C. Allah Bakhsh and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others, Writ Petition No.12742 of 2026, Lahore High Court, judgment dated 02.07.2026; correction order dated 06.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: Dismissal of appeal is not an absolute bar to remedy of section 12(2) of CPC but facts and grounds of application are determining factors qua maintainability. --- (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Ss.4, 5 & 29(2), Art.162-A---Civil revision---Condonation of delay---Maintainability of application under S.5---Effect of reintroduction of Art.162-A---Objection that application under S.5 was barred by restrictive operation of S.29(2) was misconceived after reintroduction of Art.162-A---Application for condonation of delay in filing civil revision was maintainable---Earlier precedents concerning exclusion of S.5 in absence of Art.162-A had lost efficacy to that extent. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----S.4---Civil revision filed on first working day after summer vacation---Computation of limitation---Where prescribed period expired during Court vacation, filing on first day when Court reopened was within limitation---Civil revision instituted on first working day after summer vacation was competent and application for condonation had been filed merely by way of abundant caution---Absence of limitation objection in office objection sheet also supported conclusion that revision was instituted within time. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction---Suo motu exercise---Limitation objection---Where doubt existed regarding technical bar of limitation but impugned order disclosed jurisdictional illegality, High Court could exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice---Revisional power was available where subordinate Court had committed gross error in exercise of jurisdiction or material irregularity. Cited Case: • Hafeez Ahmad and others v. Civil Judge, Lahore and others PLD 2012 SC 400 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Fraud, misrepresentation and want of jurisdiction---Prior appeal against decree dismissed---Maintainability of subsequent application under S.12(2)---Dismissal of appeal did not create an absolute embargo against recourse to S.12(2), C.P.C.---Availability of remedy depended upon peculiar facts, nature of allegations and whether statutory requirements of S.12(2) were fulfilled---Court was required to examine contents of application and determine whether grounds of fraud, collusion or misrepresentation were distinct from grounds already adjudicated in appeal---Application could not be dismissed simpliciter merely because appellate remedy had previously been availed and decided. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Application filed after disposal of appeal---Distinct grounds of fraud---Jubilee General Insurance Company case---Distinguished---In cited case, application under S.12(2) had been filed during pendency of appeal and contents of application and grounds of appeal were found verbatim or analogous---Court in that case had examined substance of application rather than rejecting it solely because appeal was pending or had been decided---Where impugned order dismissed application merely on premise that appeal had already been availed, without scrutinizing pleaded fraud and concealment, reliance upon said precedent was erroneous. Distinguished Case: • Jubilee General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Ravi Steel Company through Proprietor 2020 CLC 1440 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Fraud, collusion, deceptive concealment and misrepresentation---Requirement of factual determination---Applicants specifically alleged that earlier suits concerning same grant and orders of withdrawal had been concealed to avoid adjudication of res judicata and that decrees had been obtained deceptively---Respondents disputed institution and ownership of such suits and asserted that proceedings were initiated after death of alleged grantee---Questions whether suits had been instituted by deceased, through alleged attorney or otherwise, and whether concealment thereof amounted to fraud or collusion, were disputed questions of fact---Such controversy could not be decided summarily and required framing of issues and recording of evidence. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Fraud alleged in procurement of judgment and decree---Summary dismissal on maintainability---Legality---Where application contained specific instances of fraud, misrepresentation and deceptive concealment, Court was required to test compliance with S.12(2) and adjudicate allegations on evidence---Dismissal without examining merits of pleaded fraud amounted to gross jurisdictional error and material irregularity warranting interference under S.115, C.P.C. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Forum---Challenge to original decree after appellate judgment---Application to Court passing last judgment---Where appeal had been decided, application under S.12(2) challenging legality of judgment and decree was maintainable before Court which had passed last judgment---Application filed within three years of appellate judgment was competent before Appellate Court. Cited Case: • Shahzadi Maharunisa and another v. Mst. Ghulam Sughran and another PLD 2016 SC 358 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.12(2)---Allotment under Tube-Well Scheme---Absence of conclusively executed allotment letter or deed---Factual and legal effect---Whether non-issuance of final allotment document affected rights claimed by alleged grantee was a material question---Court dealing with application under S.12(2) was left to determine whether an additional issue should be framed regarding effect of absence of conclusively executed allotment letter or deed. Disposition---Civil revision allowed---Order dated 24.05.2022 dismissing application under S.12(2), C.P.C. set aside---Application deemed pending before Court concerned---Court directed to frame issues, permit parties to lead evidence and decide application afresh on merits---Observations made by High Court declared tentative and not to prejudice either party or influence final adjudication. Province of Punjab and others v. Mst. Azra Begum and others, Civil Revision No.1845 of 2023, Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, heard on 01.07.2026 and announced on 02.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: The power to arrest and detain a judgment-debtor in execution of a money decree is an exceptional mode of execution and can be exercised only upon strict compliance with the mandatory safeguards embodied in Section 51 and Order XXI Rule 40, CPC.---- (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51, O.XXI, Rr.37 & 40---Execution of money decree---Arrest and detention of judgment-debtor in civil prison---Mandatory procedure---Personal liberty could not be curtailed mechanically merely because decree remained unsatisfied---Before ordering detention, Executing Court was required to conduct judicial inquiry, afford judgment-debtor opportunity to show cause, permit parties to produce evidence and record reasons in writing showing existence of one or more statutory contingencies specified in proviso to S.51, C.P.C.---Inquiry contemplated by O.XXI, R.40 was substantive safeguard and not empty formality or procedural ritual---Section 51 prescribed substantive jurisdictional conditions for detention, while O.XXI, R.40 provided procedure for determining whether those conditions existed---Both provisions were complementary and had to be read harmoniously. Cited Cases: • Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lahore 290 • Raja Munsif Dad v. WAPDA through Chief Engineer, WAPDA, Mangla Dam Project, Mangla, Mirpur PLD 1991 AJ&K 8 • Ehtisham Ghazi v. Izharuddin and another 2001 YLR 526 Sindh • Muhammad Kaleem v. Arslan Aslam 2023 CLC 796 Lahore (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51 proviso---Execution by arrest and detention---Jurisdictional preconditions---Detention could be ordered only where Court, after hearing judgment-debtor and recording reasons, was satisfied that judgment-debtor, with object or effect of obstructing or delaying execution, was likely to abscond or leave jurisdiction; had dishonestly transferred, concealed or removed property or acted in bad faith after institution of suit; had or had had since decree sufficient means to pay decretal amount or substantial part thereof but wilfully refused or neglected payment; or was liable under decree for sum required to be accounted for in fiduciary capacity---Each condition, involving deprivation of liberty, required strict construction and affirmative establishment through cogent material---Mere non-payment of decretal amount did not satisfy statutory threshold. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51 proviso, clause (b)---Means to pay decretal amount---Burden of proof---Existence of sufficient means could not be presumed from status, occupation, social standing or mere fact that decree remained unpaid---Burden initially rested upon decree-holder to produce credible evidence showing that judgment-debtor possessed, or had possessed since decree, sufficient assets, income, resources or realizable means to satisfy whole or substantial part of decretal liability---Decree-holder was also required to establish that omission to pay resulted from deliberate or wilful refusal or neglect rather than genuine financial incapacity---Burden could be discharged through direct affirmative evidence or sufficient circumstances giving rise to lawful inference. Cited Case: • A.K. Subramania Chettiar v. A. Ponnuswami Chettiar AIR 1957 Madras 777 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51, O.XXI, R.40---Inquiry before civil imprisonment---Nature and scope---Executing Court was required to allow decree-holder to lead oral and documentary evidence supporting particular statutory ground invoked and provide judgment-debtor effective opportunity to rebut same by producing evidence regarding financial condition, liabilities and other relevant circumstances---Court could examine parties, summon financial or property records and adopt any lawful mode necessary to ascertain existence of statutory conditions---Mere assertions, apprehensions or allegations could not substitute judicial satisfaction based upon evidence. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51, O.XXI, R.40---Security furnished by judgment-debtor---Purpose---Pending statutory inquiry, security could be required to secure appearance of judgment-debtor when directed by Court---Such security did not mean security for payment of decretal amount---Failure to furnish security for decretal liability, without inquiry and findings required by S.51, could not by itself justify commitment to civil prison. Cited Case: • Precision Engineering Ltd. and others v. The Grays Leasing Limited PLD 2000 Lahore 290 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51---Civil imprisonment---Nature and object---Arrest and detention in execution of money decree was exceptional, coercive mode of execution and not penal or retributive punishment for inability to pay---Object was to secure compliance with decree where obstruction, bad faith, deliberate evasion, wilful refusal despite sufficient means or fiduciary liability was affirmatively established---In absence of such findings, detention would cease to be lawful execution and assume character of impermissible punitive incarceration. Cited Case: • Allah Bakhsh and others v. Royal Bank of Scotland 2017 AC 663 (g) Statutory interpretation---Act required to be performed in prescribed manner---Effect of non-compliance---Where legislature prescribed particular procedure as condition precedent to exercise of jurisdiction, act had to be performed strictly in that manner and no alternate mode was permissible---Requirement became particularly mandatory where consequence was deprivation of personal liberty---Order of detention passed without inquiry, evidence, opportunity of hearing and written reasons under S.51 read with O.XXI, R.40, C.P.C. was without lawful authority and legally unsustainable. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.51---Ex parte order of arrest---Recorded satisfaction---Even where judgment-debtor failed to appear or proceedings were ex parte, Court was still required to comply with mandatory provisions of S.51 and record reasons showing existence of statutory ground for arrest---Ex parte order of arrest and order after contest stood on same legal footing regarding statutory safeguards. Cited Case: • T. Kunhiraman v. Pootheri Illath Madhavan Nair AIR 1957 Madras 761 (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Execution proceedings---Judgment-debtor sent to civil prison for non-payment of decree---Judicial review---Executing Court neither conducted inquiry nor recorded evidence or findings regarding likelihood of absconding, dishonest transfer or concealment of property, sufficient means coupled with wilful refusal to pay, or fiduciary liability---Impugned order proceeded only on fact that decretal amount remained unpaid and judgment-debtor failed to furnish surety---Such mechanical approach ignored mandatory safeguards under S.51 and O.XXI, R.40, C.P.C., constituted patent error of law and unlawful curtailment of personal liberty---Constitutional interference was warranted. Disposition---Constitutional petition allowed---Order dated 13.05.2026 committing petitioner to civil prison set aside---Matter remanded to Executing Court with direction to conduct inquiry under O.XXI, R.40 read with proviso to S.51, C.P.C., afford parties adequate opportunity to adduce evidence and thereafter pass reasoned order strictly in accordance with law---Pending such determination, petitioner directed to be released forthwith subject to furnishing surety for appearance before Executing Court. Naseer Ahmad Nasir v. Ali Sher and others, Writ Petition No.31402 of 2026, Lahore High Court, decided on 01.07.2026, approved for reporting.