Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 212(1)(a)---Service Tribunals Act, 1973----S. 4(1)---Civil Servants Act, 1973---Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal to examine vires of statutory service rules---Scope---Where a statutory rule or notification adversely affects the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, it assumes the character of an order for purposes of S. 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 and may be challenged before the Service Tribunal---Jurisdiction to examine vires of a statutory rule is incidental to the Tribunal's jurisdiction over service matters and does not operate independent of it---Mere fact that the grievance is framed as a challenge to vires of a rule is not determinative; it is the subject and effect of the impugned provision that determine whether the matter falls within the Tribunal's jurisdiction---Exercise of that jurisdiction requires that the impugned rule both concern the terms and conditions of service falling within the Tribunal's jurisdiction and operate adversely upon the claimant---Adverse effect may arise where the rule violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, is repugnant to or travels beyond the parent statute under which it is framed, operates retrospectively to the detriment of conditions of service enjoyed over years, or is discriminatory or arbitrary and tainted by mala fide---Tribunal must, as a first step, identify the legal limitations that the rule has transgressed in relation to terms and conditions of service before proceeding to strike them down---Within this ambit the Service Tribunal exercises exclusive jurisdiction under Art. 212, which by virtue of Art. 212(2) ousts jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 199 and of other civil courts in matters falling within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Iqan Ahmad Khurram v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1980 SC 153 • I.A Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041 • Abid Mahmood v. Government of Pakistan 1996 PLC (C.S.) 1061 • Khalid Mahmood Wattoo v. Government of Punjab 1998 SCMR 2280 • Government of the Punjab v. Muhammad Zafar Bhatti 2004 PLC (C.S.) 881 • Muhammad Hassanullah v. Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan 2025 SCMR 134 • Farkhanda Talat v. Federation of Pakistan 2007 SCMR 886 • Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Shamim Usman 2021 SCMR 1390 --------- (b) Service law---Recruitment Rules, 2014 of the Controller General of Accounts---Promotion from Junior Auditor (BS-11)---Challenge to vires---Maintainability and adverse effect---Respondent, a Junior Auditor (BS-11), challenged the Recruitment Rules, 2014 seeking insertion of a promotional jump from BS-11 to Assistant Accounts Officer (BS-17) upon passing the PIPFA examination, and also complained of reduction of the promotion quota for Senior Auditor (BS-16) to 10%---Recruitment Rules, 2012 had already discontinued the promotional jump from BS-11 to BS-17 while retaining the promotional avenue from BS-11 to BS-16; the Recruitment Rules, 2014 merely retained that same avenue---Respondent never challenged the Recruitment Rules, 2012, which essentially introduced the change---Respondent admittedly availed the promotional avenue under the Recruitment Rules, 2014 when promoted from BS-11 to BS-16 on 01.01.2021, and failed to establish how the absence of a further promotional jump to BS-17 rendered the Recruitment Rules, 2014 unlawful---Respondent failed to establish any adverse impact on his terms and conditions of service, whether by way of violation of any fundamental right, vested right, mala fide, arbitrariness or discrimination---Grievance as to promotional quota for Senior Auditor (BS-16) was subsequently addressed by Notification dated 29.05.2019, which increased the promotion quota from 10% to 50%---Government retains authority to revise service structures and recruitment rules in accordance with administrative needs; promotion is not itself a vested right, and a policy decision restricting promotional opportunities for a particular category of employees is not, by itself, ultra vires---Tribunal could neither strike down the Recruitment Rules, 2014 nor direct the Government to frame rules according to a particular promotional avenue, qualification or eligibility criterion, nor substitute its own view for that of the Executive. Cited Cases: • Falak Sher Khan v. Mukhtar Ahmad PLD 1989 SC 262 • Federal Public Service Commission v. Shiraz Manzoor 2023 SCMR 2087 --------- (c) Rules of Business, 1973---Recruitment Rules, 2014---Approval of Establishment Division---Subsequent approvals---Tribunal correctly identified that, although the Establishment Division had approved the initial draft on 21.11.2013, the final Recruitment Rules, 2014 were notified on 15.07.2014 without being resubmitted for approval---Before striking down the Rules, however, the Tribunal ought to have considered subsequent approval by the Establishment Division of amendments made in 2017, 2019 and 2021, each proceeding on the basis of the Recruitment Rules, 2014---Those subsequent approvals, together with continued operation of the Rules and the respondent's subsequent promotion, were relevant considerations in determining whether the Rules should be invalidated---In the particular circumstances of the case, subsequent approvals and continued operation of the Recruitment Rules, 2014 supported preserving them, consistent with the principle that courts should favour sustaining rather than invalidating a legal instrument. Cited Cases: • Saad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan 2026 SCMR 22 --------- (d) Service Tribunal---Limits of jurisdiction---Good governance---While the Executive bears primary responsibility for framing and implementing service laws, rules and regulations, the Tribunal performs a complementary function by ensuring that decisions affecting rights of civil servants conform to the law---Tribunal serves as a check on administrative power by ensuring that such power is lawfully exercised, but cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Executive or assume functions of the competent authority---Effectiveness of service adjudication lies in correction of unlawful administrative actions and not in their substitution. Disposition: Civil petitions converted into appeals and allowed; impugned judgment dated 17.10.2022 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No.10(Q)/CS/2018 set aside; Recruitment Rules, 2014 restored. (C.P.L.A. Nos.8 and 371 of 2023, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 24.09.2026; Ayesha A. Malik and Shahid Waheed, JJ. Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Medical negligence---Civil liability---Public hospital / Health Department---Directions for patient safety, complaint mechanism, training and compliance---Held, Civil Appeal allowed with connected Civil Petition No. 788 of 2018 converted into an appeal and allowed in the same terms---Court issued inclusive (not exhaustive) institutional directions including surprise monitoring, accessible time-bound medical negligence complaint mechanism/grievance desk, periodic patient-safety and infection-control training, supervision of trainee/junior doctors, and filing of compliance report through Registrar within ninety days with copies to Health Department, PM&DC and Healthcare Commission---Secretary Health at liberty to issue further fit and necessary instructions---Appellant also entitled to costs. Disposition: Civil Appeal allowed; C.P.L.A. No. 788 of 2018 converted into appeal and allowed in above terms with costs. Announced in open Court. Approved for Reporting. Dated hearing 07.07.2026.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----S. 134A---Alternate dispute resolution---State-owned enterprises---Successive iterations of S. 134A---Appeal under proviso to S. 134A(13)---Maintainability---Appellant, Universal Service Fund, a company limited by guarantee and an SOE within the meaning of the State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023, challenged a decision of the ADR Committee dated 21.03.2025---Under the fifth iteration of S. 134A as amended by the Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024, it became mandatory for SOEs to refer tax disputes to ADR, and an SOE had to withdraw pending litigation immediately, with the result that the ADR Committee's decision became binding on the SOE and remedies under the Ordinance stood closed---Appellant correctly concluded that its only remaining challenge lay under Art. 199 of the Constitution, and filed W.P. No.1181 of 2025 in the Islamabad High Court---Upon substitution of S. 134A by the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2026 (Act No. IX of 2026) (sixth iteration), three categories of taxpayers emerged: taxpayers in general; all SOEs (for whom ADR remains mandatory); and SOEs which are, directly or indirectly, wholly owned by the Federal Government (for whom the ADR Committee's decision is final and binding on both the SOE and the Commissioner)---S. 134A(12) provides that petitions filed by SOEs wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by the Federal Government, against pre-commencement ADR decisions, pending before the Federal Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court or a High Court, shall abate---S. 134A(13) provides that petitions filed by SOEs which are not wholly owned by the Federal Government, pending before a High Court against such pre-commencement decisions, shall abate, but the proviso permits such SOEs to prefer an appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court within sixty days from commencement of the 2026 Act---Held, that for the proviso to subsection (13) to apply, two conditions had to be fulfilled: the SOE must not be wholly owned, either directly or indirectly, by the Federal Government; and at the time the sixth iteration came into force it had to have a petition pending in a High Court against a decision of the ADR Committee---Both conditions being in issue, the crux was the meaning of "wholly owned". (b) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----S. 134A(12) & (13)---"Wholly owned", directly or indirectly, by the Federal Government---Guarantee-company without share capital---Strict and literal construction---Phrase "wholly owned" in the specific fiscal context of whether a right of appeal lies against a decision of the ADR Committee has to be given a strict and literal meaning: "wholly" means in its entirety, completely, to the fullest extent, leaving nothing behind, no matter how minor; the maxim de minimis non curat lex has no application---Word "indirectly" cannot be given too expansive an effect---Whenever and wherever possible the better interpretation is to allow for preservation of recourse to Courts and for judicial remedies to continue---Definition of "public sector company" in S. 2(54) of the Companies Act, 2017, which sets minimal threshold requirements of 51% voting power or power to appoint a majority of directors, does not resolve whether the Federal Government "wholly owns" the company; the question is cast in maximal terms of ownership---For a company limited by shares, whole ownership is determined by whether the Federal Government, directly or indirectly, owns the whole of the shareholding---For a guarantee-company, which has no share capital and whose members each have but one vote, it must be shown that all the members are, directly or indirectly, nominees of the Federal Government. (c) Companies Act, 2017----Ss. 129, 130 & 153(i)---Universal Service Fund Rules, 2006----Rr. 10, 11 & 12---State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023----Ss. 2(h), 2(i), 9, 10, 12 & 13---Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996----Ss. 33A, 33B & 57---Membership of a guarantee-company serving as USF company---Directors representing licensees and consumer groups---Appellant's annual return for 2023 showed three members, all nominees of the Federal Government, but S. 153(i) of the Companies Act, 2017 provides that a person who is not a member of a company cannot be its director, save specified exceptions---Exception for a person representing a creditor or other special interests "by virtue of contractual arrangements" did not apply to directors listed in clauses (e) to (h) of R. 11(1) of the USF Rules, who are nominated under those Rules and not by contractual arrangement---Requirement of S. 153(i) could not be disapplied by subordinate legislation---Members' register and annual return are only prima facie evidence under Ss. 129 and 130---Persons who are directors in terms of clauses (e) to (h) of R. 11(1) must, so long as they are directors, be deemed also to be members as a matter of law, so as to ensure simultaneous compliance with S. 153(i) and R. 11(1)---Those directors are nominees of the respective licensee groups and of consumer groups, not of the Federal Government: R. 11(1) itself describes them as nominees of the licensees, and R. 12(1) at most gives the Federal Government a vetting or veto power after nomination by the concerned group; the consumer-group representative, by R. 12(2), must come from a registered body over which the Federal Government has no interest or control---SOE Act requires that the majority of the Board of a company-SOE consist of independent directors who are not ex-officio or nominee directors of the Federal Government---Directors in clauses (e) to (h) must be regarded either as the independent directors contemplated by the SOE Act or at least as directors independent of the Federal Government---A substantial number of the appellant's members are therefore not nominees of the Federal Government---Appellant is not wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by the Federal Government for purposes of the proviso to S. 134A(13)---Appeal was maintainable; preliminary objection dismissed. (d) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----Ss. 153(1)(b) & 21(c)---Deduction of advance tax---Payments by Universal Service Fund to telecommunication licensees as subsidy grants for projects in unserved or underserved areas---Third-party beneficiaries---Strict construction of withholding provisions---Department amended the deemed assessment for Tax Year 2023 under S. 122, invoking S. 21(c) on the footing that the appellant was obligated to deduct tax under S. 153(1)(b) on payments totalling about Rs.17.7 billion to licensees under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Reorganization) Act, 1996, resulting in a tax liability of Rs.4,793,282,885---ADR Committee held that deduction was obligatory but limited the consequence to Rs.1,533,018,333 if paid by a stipulated date, so as to annul application of S. 21(c)---Held, that S. 153, viewed from the perspective of the person said to be under a duty to deduct, may be regarded as akin or analogous to a charging provision because of the severe penal consequences of default, including personal liability under S. 161 and disallowance under S. 21(c), and must therefore be strictly and narrowly construed---If more than one reasonable interpretation is possible as to whether there was any obligation to deduct, the one more favourable to the person allegedly required to so act ought to be adopted---S. 153(1) operates against the legal backdrop of the law of contracts---In the contracts at hand, the appellant was the payer and the licensees the payees, but the benefits accrued wholly or substantially to residents of unserved or underserved areas, being third-party beneficiaries and in substance the public at large; the appellant was expending public money, as it was statutorily obliged to do under the USF Rules, to fund special projects for the provision of telecommunication services to those areas---Two senses of the word "for" in S. 153(1)(b) ("payment ... for the rendering of or providing of services") are reasonable: in the first, it suffices to identify payer, payee and that the payment is for services, irrespective of who benefits; in the second, the obligation to deduct is triggered only where the services are provided or rendered to the payer---In the vast majority of contracts the two senses align because rights, obligations and benefits move only between the parties; where third-party beneficiaries are introduced, the senses diverge---Both senses being reasonable, the second, more favourable to the person said to be under a duty to deduct, prevails---Appellant was not the recipient of the services rendered by the licensees; those services were in their very nature intended for, and could only be provided to, the residents of the unserved or underserved areas---Appellant was not under an obligation to deduct tax under S. 153(1)(b)---S. 21(c) had no application. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue Lahore v Coca-Cola Pakistan Ltd. Lahore 2026 SCMR 130, 2026 PTD 29, 2025 SCP 364 --------- Disposition: Preliminary objection to maintainability dismissed; appeal allowed; decision dated 21.03.2025 of the ADR Committee set aside, as is the amending order dated 31.01.2024 to the extent relevant; declared that S. 21(c) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 had no application. (Civil Appeal No.430 of 2026, under the proviso to S. 134A(13) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, Supreme Court of Pakistan, announced at Islamabad this 20 day of October, 2026; Munib Akhtar, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ. Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984----Arts. 117 & 118---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VI, R. 4---Registered sale deed---Challenge on ground of fraud---Burden of pleading, production and persuasion---Whoever asks the Court to give judgment on a legal right depending on existence of facts must prove those facts, and the burden lies on the person who would fail if no evidence were given on either side---A registered instrument stands until the person who attacks it brings it down; mere allegation of fraud does not do so---Presumption attaching to a registered instrument is rebuttable, but rebuttal is work the challenger must first perform---That work has three cumulative and sequential parts: burden of pleading material facts constituting the fraud or illegality; burden of producing evidence in support of those pleaded facts; and burden of persuasion that the evidence, taken as a whole, satisfies the Court that the challenge is made out---A plaintiff who fails at the first stage cannot be rescued at the third, for evidence cannot be led on a case never pleaded---O. VI, R. 4, C.P.C. requires that where a party relies on misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence, particulars, with dates and items if necessary, shall be stated in the pleading---Object is fairness: the defendant must know the case he is to meet, and the Court must know the issue it is to try---Plaint contained one bare assertion that the plaintiff never appeared before any competent officer; it did not deny her thumb impression on the deed, did not deny receipt of sale consideration, did not say who practised the fraud, when, by what means, or to what end, and made no allegation that the Sub-Registrar acted in collusion or registered the deed in breach of statutory procedure---Plaintiff therefore did not discharge the burden of pleading, and the burden of proof did not, and could not, shift to the beneficiaries. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Munir and others v. Nazira Umar Hayat and others 2023 SCMR 1339 • William Derry, J.C. Wakefield, M. M. Moore, J. Pethick, and S.J. Wilde v. Sir Henry William Peck, Baronet (1889) 14 App Cas 337 • John Wallingford v. The Directors, & C., of the Mutual Society, and the Official Liquidator thereof (1880) 5 App Cas 685 • Davy v. Garrett (1878) 7 Ch D 473 (b) Registration Act, 1908----Ss. 34, 35, 58 & 60---Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984----Art. 129(e)---Registered instrument---Presumption of regularity---Registration is no clerical formality---Registering officer must enquire whether the document was executed by the person by whom it purports to have been executed and satisfy himself as to identity of those appearing before him, and registers only where execution is admitted---Certificate of registration is admissible to prove that the document was duly registered and that the facts endorsed on it occurred---These are official acts of a public officer; Art. 129(e) permits the Court to presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed (omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta)---Presumption is not conclusive, but is not displaced by a bare denial; it yields only to cogent evidence, and its force grows where the instrument has been acted upon for two decades through mutation, entries in the record of rights and possession---Attesting witness, who was the plaintiff's own brother, stated categorically that she executed the deed in his presence---Plaintiff's solitary uncorroborated statement could not displace the presumption---First Appellate Court and High Court examined whether the appellants had proved the transaction before asking whether the plaintiff had made out a case that called for such proof---Burden does not shift to the beneficiary merely because he is the beneficiary, and a suit cannot be decreed simply because the defendant's evidence is thought thin, without first deciding whether the plaintiff discharged her own burden. (c) Pardanashin lady---Deed---Burden of proof---Doctrine protects a woman who, because of seclusion, illiteracy or dependence, may not have grasped what she signed or may not have signed freely---Weight of the burden is variable: the simpler the transaction and the plainer its terms, the lighter the burden on the beneficiary; the more complex the transaction, or the closer the relationship of trust, the heavier it becomes---Status as a pardanashin lady is itself a question of fact, which must be pleaded and proved like any other---Doctrine is a shield for the vulnerable; it is not a sword that strikes down every instrument a pardanashin woman executes---It operates on a properly pleaded case of want of understanding or consent and does not dispense with pleading altogether---Plaintiff did not plead that she was illiterate, that the deed was not read over or explained to her, that she lacked independent advice, or that she was under domination of the appellants---Her pleaded case was that she never appeared before the registering officer at all; she did not deny her thumb impression or receipt of consideration---Transaction was a simple sale for a price, attested by her own brother, and her husband was then alive---Relief cannot be granted on a case that was never pleaded. Cited Cases: • Kali Bakhsh Singh and others v. Ram Gopal Singh and others (1913) 41 Indian Appeals 23 • Farid-un-Nisa v. Munshi Mukhtar Ahmad and another (1925) 52 Indian Appeals 342 • Ghulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 • Saunders v. Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004 (d) Transfer of Property Act, 1882----S. 54---Registration Act, 1908----Ss. 32, 34 & 35---Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984----Arts. 17(2) & 79---Registered sale deed---Absence of vendees' signatures or thumb impressions---Effect---High Court treated a conveyance as though it were a contract, holding that absence of vendees' signatures or thumb impressions rendered the registered sale deed incapable of being treated as a valid contract of sale---S. 54 defines a sale as a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised, required to be made only by a registered instrument where the property is of the value of one hundred rupees or upwards, and provides that a contract for sale does not of itself create any interest in or charge on the property---An agreement to sell looks to the future; a sale deed speaks in the present---A sale deed is, in form, the instrument of the transferor; it is he who parts with title, and it is his execution that the law requires---Vendee's assent is ordinarily manifested by payment of the price, acceptance of the deed, entering into possession and having mutation sanctioned---Precedents concerning attestation and proof of an agreement to sell, and unenforceability of an agreement not signed by vendees who sought specific performance, concerned executory contracts and did not lay down that a registered sale deed is invalid unless signed or thumb-marked by the purchaser---Absence of vendees' signatures, standing alone, is no ground for declaring a registered sale deed invalid. Cited Cases: • Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din through legal heirs and others PLD 2011 SC 241 • Farzand Ali and anther v. Khuda Bakhsh and others PLD 2015 SC 187 • Quinn v. Leathem [1901] AC 495 (e) Limitation Act, 1908----Ss. 3 & 18 and Art. 91, First Schedule---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VII, R. 6---Suit to cancel or set aside registered sale deed---Limitation---Knowledge---S. 3 obliges the Court to dismiss a suit instituted after the prescribed period, whether or not limitation has been set up as a defence---Art. 91 prescribes three years for a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for; time runs from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have it cancelled became known to her---S. 18 provides that where a person has, by means of fraud, been kept from knowledge of her right, time runs from when the fraud first became known to her---O. VII, R. 6 requires that where a suit is instituted after expiry of the period of limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption is claimed---A plea of late knowledge is a plea of fact; it must be pleaded with particulars and proved with evidence---Deed was registered on 10.05.1976; mutation was sanctioned on 09.10.1977; suit was filed on 08.05.1997, some twenty-one years after registration---Plaint said nothing about how the plaintiff remained unaware of the transfer for two decades, what took her to the Patwari, or what the appellants did to conceal the transaction, and did not comply with O. VII, R. 6---Plaint's assertion that she was in possession collapsed when she admitted as PW-1 that the appellants were in possession---An owner who is out of possession of her agricultural land for twenty years cannot, without more, be heard to say that she knew nothing of the transfer under which her opponents held it---First Appellate Court and High Court reversed the Trial Court's decree without addressing limitation at all, which was itself an error of law, for S. 3 required them to examine limitation whether or not it was pressed---Suit was barred by time, and the plaintiff established no factual foundation for postponing commencement of limitation under S. 18. Cited Cases: • Rolfe v. Gregory (1865) 4 De G J & S 576 • Bulli Coal Mining Company v. Patrick Hill Osborne and another [1899] AC 351 --------- Disposition: Appeals allowed; judgment and decree of the Lahore High Court dated 22.06.2015 in C.R. Nos.1921 and 1922 of 2006, and judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court dated 23.08.2006, set aside; judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 23.12.2005 dismissing the suit restored; no order as to costs. (Civil Appeals Nos.231-L and 232-L of 2015, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 20.10.2026; Ayesha A. Malik and Shahid Waheed, JJ. Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-Amd---Ocular account---Unnatural conduct of eyewitnesses---Petitioner was charged in FIR No.71 dated 15.02.2017, Police Station Sadar, District Jhang, under S. 302, PPC, for committing Qatl-i-Amd of Mst. Tasleem Akhtar---Trial Court convicted him under S. 302(b), PPC and sentenced him to death as tazir, with compensation of Rs.100,000 under S. 544-A, Cr.P.C., or in default six months' simple imprisonment---High Court maintained the conviction but altered the sentence to imprisonment for life with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C.---Prosecution case was that three men, including the husband of the deceased (PW-4) and PW-5, saw the petitioner strangulating the deceased with a rope inside a room and that, upon a lalkara, the petitioner pulled the rope with force and fled by scaling a 7-ft courtyard wall---Held, that it was not possible that three adult men would witness such an incident, involving a victim related to them, and do absolutely nothing---They failed either to intervene to stop the assault or to attempt to apprehend the petitioner---It was highly improbable that the petitioner could successfully scale and escape over a 7-ft wall in the presence of three men without being intercepted---Conduct of the husband at the exact time of the occurrence was entirely unnatural; it was not convincing that a husband would stand passively watching his wife being strangulated with a rope without taking any action to subdue the petitioner---Even if the petitioner scaled the wall, the witnesses could still have pursued and apprehended him outside---Conduct of the eyewitnesses appeared highly unnatural and contrary to ordinary human conduct. (b) Criminal trial----Recovery of blood-stained clothes---DNA match---Integrity of recovery---Clothes allegedly of the petitioner were recovered from an iron trunk inside his house---PFSA Forensic DNA Analysis Report showed that a blood stain on the jersey attributed to the petitioner matched the victim's DNA---Held, that recovery of the blood-stained jersey was unconvincing---Eyewitnesses never described the clothes worn by the accused at the time of the occurrence, and it could not be conclusively established that the recovered clothes belonged to the petitioner, such garments being mass-produced, readily available in the market and not unique---House and trunk were not in the exclusive possession of the petitioner; the Investigating Officer (PW-9) stated that both were unlocked at the time of recovery---No independent private witnesses were associated with the recovery, nor were any other occupants of the house present---Occurrence took place on 15.02.2017 whereas the accused was arrested on 02.03.2017, a gap of 15 days---It defied ordinary human prudence that a person who committed a murder would flee the crime scene, return to his residence knowing that the complainant and victim were related to him, and then place blood-stained clothing in an unlocked iron trunk, remaining unarrested for 15 days without disposing of such incriminating evidence---Record was silent regarding the condition of the garments at recovery (wet, damp or dry) and as to how they were kept in the police malkhana prior to dispatch to the laboratory---For recovery of clothes to become relevant, particularly when the accused is said to have been seen in such clothes, the clothes must be described in advance so as to be identified as the exact garments worn during the occurrence; they must be recovered from a place in the exclusive possession of the accused and not in open access of other people; and details of their condition must be meticulously recorded. (c) Criminal trial----Forensic DNA evidence---Unidentified contributors---Omission to submit reference samples---Rope from the place of occurrence contained a DNA mixture of three individuals, of which the major component matched the victim, while the sources of two additional individuals remained of unknown origin---Bloodstains on the jersey comprised a mixture of two individuals, with the deceased the major contributor and the minor component unidentified---Sources of bloodstains on the petitioner's qameez and shalwar were not identified, and the deceased was expressly excluded as a contributor to the bloodstains on the shalwar---FSL report contained a note requiring submission of buccal swab standards of the suspect and of the husband of the victim at PFSA, Lahore, but neither sample was subsequently facilitated---Held, that presence of unidentified DNA contributors, though not conclusive of involvement of any other person, raised legitimate questions regarding origin of the biological material---Omission left material questions concerning identity and attribution of biological traces unresolved---Considered cumulatively with the doubtful circumstances of recovery, these deficiencies materially undermined the evidentiary value of the alleged bloodstained clothes and rope and rendered it unsafe to place implicit reliance upon them as incriminating evidence against the petitioner. (d) Criminal trial----Bloodstain DNA match as sole ground of conviction---Scope---Where eyewitness testimony had been disregarded, mere presence of the victim's blood on the petitioner's alleged clothes, even if confirmed through DNA analysis, could not, in isolation, be treated as conclusive incriminating evidence in the absence of other independent, cogent and corroborative evidence connecting the petitioner with the offence---Court referred to Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, where recovery of a blood-stained shirt kept in an iron trunk was discarded because the accused, remaining a free bird, would reasonably have discarded or washed it, and even an FSL match could not solely serve as incriminating evidence without other corroborative evidence establishing the incriminating chain---Court also referred to Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan, holding that a blood group found on clothes does not by itself establish guilt unless connected with the murder by other evidence---Held, that a bloodstain DNA match is a strong piece of evidence when corroborated by other evidence establishing a chain linking the accused with the victim and the offence, but such evidence cannot be taken in isolation as incriminating evidence---Evidentiary value depends not only upon scientific reliability of the DNA match but also upon integrity of the recovery and the circumstances connecting the recovered articles with the accused---In the present case, although bloodstains on clothes allegedly associated with the petitioner yielded a positive DNA match with the deceased, the recovery itself remained doubtful, rendering the evidentiary chain unreliable---Blood matching DNA report could not be taken as incriminating evidence in isolation. Cited Cases: • Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan 2026 INSC 217 • Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan (2011) 11 SCC 724 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 473 (e) Jail petition converted into appeal----Acquittal---No case for enhancement---Petition converted into appeal and allowed; appellant acquitted of the charge and directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case---No case of enhancement was made out. Disposition: Jail Petition No.495 of 2021 converted into appeal and allowed; appellant acquitted of the charge and to be released forthwith if not required in any other case; Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1483-L of 2021 dismissed and leave refused. (J.P. No.495 of 2021 and Crl.P.L.A. No.1483-L of 2021, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment of Ishtiaq Ibrahim, J., heard on 29.09.2026; Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakkar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ. Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-Amd---Ocular account---Related and interested witnesses---Domestic occurrence inside residential dwelling---Petitioner, along with a co-accused since acquitted by the Trial Court, was charged in FIR No.20 of 2017 dated 11.01.2017, Police Station Minchinabad, District Bahawalnagar, for allegedly committing Qatl-i-Amd of Mst. Sakhian Bibi---Trial Court convicted the petitioner under S. 302(b), PPC as tazir and sentenced him to death with compensation of Rs.200,000 under S. 544-A, Cr.P.C., or in default six months' simple imprisonment---High Court maintained the conviction but modified the sentence from death to imprisonment for life---Prosecution case rested primarily upon the ocular account of two eyewitnesses, namely the son and the brother-in-law of the deceased, both ordinary residents of the same premises---Held, that their presence at about 01:45 p.m. inside and immediately outside the house was natural and expected---Although they were close relatives of the victim and technically interested witnesses, relationship alone could not be a ground to discard otherwise credible evidence---In domestic occurrences taking place inside a residential dwelling, presence of close family members was standard---Both eyewitnesses remained consistent on essential facts, including the sequence of events and the manner of execution---Incident occurred in broad daylight with clear visibility, and the petitioner was already known to the witnesses due to ongoing litigation between the families, ruling out mistaken identity or substitution---Account that the petitioner was approximately 5-6 feet from the deceased when shots were fired was corroborated by blackening and burning around the wounds, as noted in the post-mortem report and explained by the doctor---Testimony of natural eyewitnesses inspired full confidence. (b) Criminal trial----Ocular and medical evidence---Numerical discrepancy in firearm injuries---Human conduct under trauma---Complainant and the other eyewitness stated that the petitioner fired five shots, specifying locales of chest, belly and right arm, whereas the post-mortem report and the doctor's statement revealed seven firearm entry wounds---Held, that such a discrepancy could not ordinarily be treated as fatal to the credibility of the eyewitnesses---Human behaviour could not be subjected to a fixed formula, nor could every witness be expected to observe or retain events identically---To expect mathematical precision regarding the number of firearm shots or the exact locale of every injury from eyewitnesses exposed to a sudden horrific event was unnatural and impractical---A minor divergence as to the exact count of shots or the precise entry point of every bullet, where a mother was murdered before her son's eyes within a few seconds, was evidence of natural human limitation---Ocular evidence could not be discarded for a slight variation in wound mapping when the core firearm injuries described by the witnesses were present on the body---Had the witness intended to fabricate, he would have tailored his statement to align perfectly with the medical report---Complainant stated in cross-examination that the occurrence took place in 5-6 seconds---Minor variations in the number of injuries could not by themselves be treated as a material contradiction, particularly when the nature and extent of the injuries were subsequently established through post-mortem examination---Reliability of the eyewitnesses could not be discarded---Said evaluation was confined to the case at hand and was not to be applied as it is to other cases. (c) Criminal trial----Appreciation of evidence---Questions of fact---Case-to-case assessment---Every criminal case must be evaluated on its own distinct factual matrix---Testimony of every witness, as well as each surrounding fact and circumstance, must be dealt with on a case-to-case basis, as two criminal cases do not share identical factual settings, nor can human behaviour under stress be reduced to a fixed or uniform standard---While questions of law can be settled through fixed principles and binding precedents, pure questions of fact cannot be rigidly standardised across different trials and require an independent and objective assessment adapted to the unique evidentiary material on record---Slight divergence in the present case did not impair the truthfulness of the natural eyewitnesses, whose accounts remained consistent regarding identity of the assailant, the weapon used, the close range of firing, and the primary target areas on the victim's body. (d) Criminal trial----Eyewitness testimony---Microscopic precision as to trajectory of bullets---Weapon Focus Effect---Courts frequently observe prosecution witnesses deposing with microscopic precision, describing the exact trajectory and anatomical landing site of each individual bullet---It is humanly impossible for an eyewitness, placed under sudden terror of a deadly attack, to track a high-velocity bullet in mid-air and confirm with precision where each shot strikes---Such perception may be a possibility in the case of a single shot and a single perpetrator, coupled with observation of the perpetrator's body language, but when a single assailant unleashes a volley of shots within a few seconds, or when multiple assailants simultaneously shower bullets, no human mind or eye can observe, retain and recount which exact bullet, shot by which specific perpetrator, struck which particular part of the body---Court referred to the Weapon Focus Effect given by cognitive psychologist Elizabeth Loftus, that a witness faced with an assailant brandishing a firearm involuntarily fixes attention almost exclusively upon the weapon itself, limiting capacity to process or recall surrounding details---Given the extremely high velocity and fraction-of-a-second flight time of firearm projectiles, it is a physical and physiological impossibility for the human eye to see a bullet from barrel to impact site in real time---Practice of recording such unnatural precision was strongly discouraged---Eyewitness accounts should reflect genuine human observation---Any piece of evidence is not to be taken in isolation and is to be appraised cumulatively with other available evidence. (e) Jail petition and criminal petition for leave to appeal----Conviction under S. 302(b), PPC maintained---No case for enhancement of sentence---No ground for interference was found---Reasons given by the High Court for converting death into imprisonment for life were also plausible---No case for enhancement was made out. Disposition: Jail Petition No.424 of 2021 dismissed and leave refused; Criminal Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1567-L of 2021 also dismissed and leave refused. (J.P. No.424 of 2021 a/w Crl.P.L.A. No.1567-L of 2021, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment of Ishtiaq Ibrahim, J., heard on 01.10.2026; Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakkar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ. Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----S. 124---Effect of appellate order---Remand for re-examination of specified facts---Scope---Assessing officer, after remand by Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), made an addition of Rs.1,247,002,763 towards amount payable to related parties while invoking S. 20(1), on grounds not disclosed in the earlier show-cause notice---Commissioner (Appeals) had set aside the addition and remanded the matter only to re-examine whether the expenses claimed had been added to taxable income of the respondent during a subsequent year under S. 34(5) and, if such amount had been offered for taxation, directed that no disallowance could be made in the current year---Held, that once a matter or issue is remanded by the Commissioner (Appeals) for re-examination of certain facts only, the assessing officer is bound by such directions and cannot go beyond the mandate given in the appellate order, particularly while giving effect to such order under S. 124---Appellate proceedings are continuation of original proceedings; the original order merges into the appellate order, and the assessing officer is bound to give effect to the appellate order in its letter and spirit, without creating fresh grounds other than those disclosed in the show-cause notice issued under original assessment proceedings---S. 124 was not to be misconstrued with proceedings after remand for de novo assessment under S. 122(5A)---Explanation of the respondent that the unpaid amount had been offered to tax under S. 34(5) in Tax Year 2016, and that a portion pertained to sale of imported hardware taxable under the final tax regime and was never claimed as an expense, was in line with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and had been satisfactorily explained---Assessing officer did not assign valid reasons for not accepting that explanation. (b) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001----Ss. 124 & 122(5A)---Reference jurisdiction---Findings of fact of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Scope---Matter primarily related to findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, duly approved by the High Court---Finding of facts recorded by the Tribunal, unless found to be perverse or contrary to the record, cannot be disturbed by the High Court while exercising reference jurisdiction or even by the Supreme Court---Legal position relating to scope of S. 124 had been rightly interpreted by the Tribunal and the High Court, and no exception could be drawn---Counsel for the department failed to establish that the concurrent finding of facts was either perverse or contrary to the record. Disposition: Civil petitions dismissed in limine and leave refused. (C.P.L.A. Nos.534 and 535 of 2026, Supreme Court of Pakistan, order dated 15.10.2026; Munib Akhtar and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ. Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Limitation---Appeal under S. 32-A of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Delay of 61 days---Condonation---Appellant's incarceration at Central Jail, Adiala, Rawalpindi---Appeal was barred by 61 days and application (Crl.M.A. No.5023/2026) for condonation of delay was filed---Held, explanation furnished in the application, particularly appellant's incarceration at Central Jail, Adiala, Rawalpindi, constituted sufficient cause warranting condonation---Delay of 61 days condoned. (b) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999----S. 32-A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 426 & 561-A---Suspension of sentence pending appeal---Refusal by High Court on ground that main appeal was already fixed for hearing---Duty of counsel and NAB to assist in expeditious hearing of main appeal---Appellant assailed order of Islamabad High Court whereby her application under Ss. 426 & 561-A, Cr.P.C. for suspension of sentence awarded by Accountability Court No.1, Islamabad, was dismissed---High Court, without entering into merits of the application under S. 426, Cr.P.C., declined suspension principally on the ground that main appeal had already been fixed for hearing and counsel for the appellant was not extending requisite assistance towards its adjudication---Main appeal having already been fixed for hearing, appropriate course was to secure its expeditious adjudication rather than undertake a parallel examination of merits of suspension of sentence at that stage---Assertion that appeal involved a voluminous record necessitating elaborate arguments did not, by itself, furnish sufficient justification for interference with the impugned order---It was incumbent upon counsel for the appellant to extend full assistance to the High Court in hearing of the main appeal, whereafter NAB was equally obligated to advance its arguments without seeking unwarranted adjournments---No sufficient ground found warranting interference with impugned order at that stage---Court expected that High Court would endeavour to decide the main appeal, affording both sides adequate opportunity of hearing while discouraging unnecessary adjournments. Disposition: Delay of 61 days condoned and Crl.M.A. No.5023/2026 disposed of; appeal dismissed with the above observations; order dated 30.04.2026 passed by the Islamabad High Court in C.M. No.340/2025 in Criminal Appeal No.64/2025 not interfered with. Not approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 2025---Part IV, O. XXVIII---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Not a second appeal---Review petition against judgment dated 16.05.2025 of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.91 of 2024, whereby the petitioner's appeal against conviction and death sentence under S. 302(b), PPC for homicide of Mst. Memoona Shaheen by gunfire within the deceased's residence was dismissed---Held, that a review petition is not a second appeal or a vehicle for reopening issues that have already attained judicial determination---Unless the petitioner points to a patent error or omission evident from the record, or demonstrates circumstances warranting interference in the interest of justice, the Court cannot revisit its earlier conclusions---Impugned judgment reflected due consideration of the matters raised and disclosed no such apparent legal or jurisdictional defect---No case for review was made out. (b) Pakistan Penal Code----S. 302(b)---Death sentence---Commutation on the principle of life expectancy---Scope---Condemned prisoner and prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life---Distinction---Petitioner sought commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment on the ground that he had already served the substantive part of the sentence, 15/16 years in the death cell, relying upon Dilawar Hussain v. State and Hassan v. State---Current jurisprudence was discussed in Sher Afzal v. State, after considering Dilawar Hussain, Hassan and Zafar Iqbal v. State---Benefit of the life expectancy principle cannot be extended across the board to all death-row petitioners---For a condemned convict to invoke the principle: (i) he must have spent a minimum lifetime threshold of twenty-five (25) years behind bars; (ii) there must be presence of additional compelling mitigation; and (iii) the nature of the offence is not among the most aggravated---A prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life and a condemned prisoner cannot, in law, be placed in the same category and cannot be intermixed merely by reference to the period spent behind bars---To hold that because a condemned prisoner has remained incarcerated for fourteen or fifteen years---the period which, owing to remissions and the prevailing computation of a life sentence, a lifer may ordinarily undergo---he has thereby acquired an entitlement to have his sentence converted into imprisonment for life, would amount to a serious distortion of the sentencing scheme---Proposition is particularly unsustainable where the death sentence has been maintained by the courts after conscious consideration of the relevant facts---Condemned prisoner cannot claim, as a matter of right, that completion of 14 or 15 years in custody has placed him in the same position as a person upon whom the court, in the first instance, imposed imprisonment for life---Distinction does not lie in the number of years already spent in prison, but in the sentence which the court actually imposed---Prolonged incarceration of a death-row prisoner may, in an appropriate situation as integrated by judicial precedents, become a relevant circumstance for commutation and is a matter of judicial consideration---Once the period of 25 years is completed, the question assumes an altogether different complexion in the context of the principle of life expectancy, engaging whether continued incarceration in a death cell without execution is against human dignity---Petitioner was not eligible for the benefit of life expectancy as the record reflected that he was arrested on 05.09.2012 and had spent 14 years only. Cited Cases: • Dilawar Hussain v. State 2013 SCMR 1582 • Hassan v. State PLD 2013 SC 793 • Zafar Iqbal v. State PLD 2015 SC 307 • Sher Afzal v. State Crl. R.P. No.166 of 2025 in Crl. A. No.229 of 2021 (c) Pakistan Penal Code----S. 302(b)---Sentence of death---Motive---Refusal of marriage proposal---Whether a mitigating circumstance---Aggravated offence---Femicide---Patriarchal customs---Counsel contended that the deceased and her family had declined the petitioner's marriage proposal, which allegedly prompted the murder, and that such personal and emotional motive should be treated as a mitigating circumstance converting death into imprisonment for life---Held, that the contention was absolutely misconceived and untenable---Such a motive does not soften the offence but serves to aggravate the same---Act was not the result of any sudden, grave and immediate provocation; the petitioner was aggrieved merely because his marriage proposal was declined---Such a grievance cannot, by itself, be elevated to the status of mitigation so as to dilute the normal penalty of death---It was a result of ego-driven impulse of men---Sentencing is a judicial discretion that must be exercised with consideration for the nature of the act, the manner of its commission, the vulnerability of the victim, and the social message that the criminal justice system is required to convey---Murder of an innocent girl solely because she declined a marriage proposal is a grave offence---Marriage is a mutual, voluntary covenant that necessitates the free consent of both parties---A woman challenges the suitor's perceived ownership when she exercises her fundamental right to say "no"---Under a patriarchal mindset, that rejection is taken as a blow to "honor" (ghairat) resulting in stalking, home invasion, acid violence or femicide---Court discussed customary practices of ghag, swara (vani or badal-e-sulh) and watta-satta as manifestations of commodification of women, noting that the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Elimination of Custom of Ghag Act, 2013 declared ghag a cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable criminal offence, that swara was criminalized through the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2004 and further solidified by the Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Act, 2011, and that Pakistan is party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Art. 16 whereof obliges States to ensure that a woman has the same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with her free and full consent---It is impossible to reconcile the mindset that a woman's assent to her own marriage is irrelevant with Islam, which requires the woman's free assent as a prerequisite for a valid nikah---Attempt to present a woman's lawful refusal as "provocation" or as a mitigating circumstance is absurd; no human has the right to deprive another of life because of refusing a marriage proposal---Accepting such an argument would constitute judicial endorsement of the notion that a woman's will is subordinate to a man's preference---Case presented no mitigating circumstance, rather a very grave and aggravated form of offence, thereby strengthening non-applicability of the life expectancy principle. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 188---Review petition---Petitioner failed to point out any error apparent on the face of the record, or any ground otherwise falling within the narrow compass of review jurisdiction---Submissions advanced were, in substance, a request to reargue and reweigh matters, which the Court sitting in review cannot undertake. Disposition: Review petition dismissed and leave refused. (Criminal Review Petition No.73 of 2025 in Criminal Appeal No.91 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment of Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, J., heard on 21.09.2026 and announced in open Court at Islamabad; Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ. Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act, 1877----S. 8---Suit for possession of immovable property on the basis of title---Proof of title---Cancelled revenue mutations---Underlying sale deeds not produced---Unsuccessful plaintiff appealed against the judgment of the High Court which reversed the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed his suit for possession of one kanal of land at Kamalia---Appellant asserted that he had purchased the land from M/s Elahi Bakhsh and others through mutation No.8106 dated 30.09.1985 and instituted the suit on 21.07.1993---Respondents maintained that the land had been in the exclusive and uninterrupted possession of Government Normal School, Kamalia, since 1926---Appellant relied upon revenue mutation entries produced as Exh.P-1 to Exh.P-3---Admittedly, those entries had been cancelled by the District Officer (Revenue) through an order dated 23.11.2004---Held, that in the face of that order, the appellant could not claim to have established his title merely on the strength of the cancelled revenue entries---While the legal proposition that revenue entries are not documents of title and that their cancellation does not, by itself, invalidate the sale deeds upon which they were founded is, stated in the abstract, correct, it did not advance the appellant's case---Original sale deeds were neither produced before the Trial Court nor tendered as additional evidence before the First Appellate Court---Their mere production or reference at the Supreme Court stage could not cure the evidentiary deficiency---In the absence of the underlying instruments or other legally sufficient evidence establishing his title, the appellant failed to discharge the burden resting upon him---High Court rightly concluded that he had not established a legal basis for claiming possession of the disputed land. (b) Specific Relief Act, 1877----S. 8---Suit for possession simpliciter---Title disputed or clouded---Maintainability---Declaration of title---Respondents asserted longstanding possession of Government Normal School, Kamalia, now known as Government College Elementary Teachers, Kamalia, since 1926, and contested the appellant's claim of ownership---Contention that the written statement did not contain an express denial of title, and that the suit could not therefore have been dismissed on that ground, was not accepted---Written statement must be read as a whole, and its substance, rather than an isolated expression or omission, determines the nature of the defence---Respondents asserted their longstanding possession and resisted the appellant's claim to recover the land on the basis of his alleged ownership---Their defence, read in its entirety, could not reasonably be construed as an admission of the appellant's title---Distinction between a suit for possession simpliciter and one seeking a declaration of title together with consequential relief was explained in Khurshid Ali and others v. Miangul Adnan Aurangzeb (deceased) through LRs and others---Governing principle is that where a plaintiff is in possession but his title is disputed or clouded, or the defendant asserts a competing title that threatens his possession, the plaintiff must ordinarily seek a declaration of title and appropriate consequential relief---Similarly, where the plaintiff is out of possession and his title is disputed or clouded, a suit for declaration of title, possession and, where warranted, injunction is the appropriate remedy---In the present case the appellant sought possession on the strength of his asserted title, which the respondents did not admit---Controversy was not confined to recovery of possession; it also involved the very foundation of the appellant's asserted ownership---A suit for possession simpliciter, without seeking a declaration of title, was not maintainable in the form in which it was instituted. Cited Cases: • Khurshid Ali and others v. Miangul Adnan Aurangzeb (deceased) through LRs and others 2025 SCMR 34 (c) Civil appeal----No ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court---Conclusion supported by the evidentiary record and in accord with the applicable law. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs. (C.A. No.253-L of 2010, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment of Shahid Waheed, J., Lahore, 13.10.2026; Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Shahid Waheed and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ. Approved for Reporting.)