Summary: "Order of closure of evidence is set-aside on the said ground that to expect a person to be available at the same time at two different courts situated at distant places is asking him to do an impossible act which amounts to absurdity." ---- (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009---- (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act / Rent proceedings---- ----Ejectment petition---Tenant/respondent’s right to lead evidence closed---Non-appearance due to proceedings before another High Court---Effect---Petitioner’s right to lead evidence was closed by Additional Rent Controller on ground that despite passage of more than one year, he failed to produce witnesses for cross-examination and neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared on relevant date---Petitioner produced order of Peshawar High Court showing that on same date he had appeared there for grant of transitory pre-arrest bail in a criminal case---High Court held that petitioner could not reasonably be expected to appear before Peshawar High Court and Rent Controller at Lahore Cantonment at same time---Such non-appearance was due to circumstances beyond his control and could not be treated as contumacious. (b) Maxim---- ----Law does not compel performance of impossible act---Party required to appear before two Courts on same date---Effect---Where petitioner was required to appear before Peshawar High Court for transitory pre-arrest bail and also before Additional Rent Controller, Lahore Cantonment, on same date and probably at same time, requiring him to be present at both places would amount to requiring performance of impossible act---Law does not intend absurdity---Closure of evidence in such circumstances was not justified. Cited Case: • Pakistan Kuwait Investment Company (Pvt.) Limited through Authorized Representative v. Messrs Active Apparels International and 6 others 2012 CLD 1036 Sindh (c) Civil proceedings---- ----Non-appearance of counsel---Counsel busy before another Court---Sufficient cause---Counsel for petitioner could not appear before Rent Controller due to appearance in other Courts---High Court observed that genuine inability of counsel to appear because of engagement before another Court may constitute sufficient ground for setting aside adverse order passed in default---Same principle could apply where party or witness could not appear because he had to attend another Court at a distant place. Cited Case: • Salamat Bibi and others v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Multan PLD 1966 SC 467 (d) Rent proceedings---- ----Closure of evidence---Witnesses present in Court---Failure to record/cross-examine them---Effect---Two witnesses of petitioner were admittedly present before Rent Controller on date when evidence was closed, and one witness informed Court that counsel was busy in other Courts and sought adjournment---Impugned order did not disclose why statements of available witnesses were not recorded or why they were not cross-examined---Closure of entire evidence in such circumstances was not proper. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art. 199---Interference with interlocutory order in rent proceedings---Closure of right to produce evidence---High Court interfered where Rent Controller closed petitioner’s evidence despite sufficient cause for non-appearance and availability of two witnesses in Court---Impugned order caused denial of opportunity to lead evidence and was set aside to prevent injustice, while limiting petitioner to one further opportunity. (f) Rent proceedings---- ----Further opportunity to produce evidence---Restriction against unnecessary adjournments---High Court set aside order closing evidence and directed Additional Rent Controller to provide one opportunity only to petitioner for production of witnesses for cross-examination---Petitioner was bound to avail said opportunity---Rent Controller was further directed not to grant unnecessary adjournments while recording evidence or deciding matter finally. (g) Constitutional petition---- ----Notice to private respondent dispensed with---Short question of law and facts---Avoidance of delay and expense---High Court decided petition without notice to respondent No.2 because only a short question of law and fact was involved and issuance of notice would cause unnecessary delay in a matter already pending for years and impose unnecessary expense---However, respondent No.2 was given liberty to file application for rehearing if not agreeable to arrangement. (h) Rent proceedings---- ----Agreement to sell pleaded as defence to ejectment---Evidence stage---Petitioner contested ejectment by denying tenancy and asserting that owner had executed agreement to sell in favour of petitioner’s wife, received earnest money and possession was delivered, but legal heirs refused to honour agreement after owner’s death---Since issues had been framed and petitioner’s affidavits/witnesses were already filed, opportunity to complete evidence was necessary for adjudication of rival claims on merits. Disposition: Writ Petition No.25101 of 2026 was allowed; order dated 25.03.2026 passed by Additional Rent Controller, Lahore Cantonment, closing petitioner’s right to lead evidence was set aside; Rent Controller was directed to provide one opportunity only to petitioner to produce witnesses for cross-examination and to avoid unnecessary adjournments; respondent No.2 was given liberty to seek rehearing if aggrieved by disposal without notice.

Summary: (a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss. 119, 122, 126 & 127---Central Depositories Act (XIX of 1997), Ss. 3, 5 & 11---Rectification of register of members---Central Depository System---Distinction between company’s register of members and central depository register---Scope of statutory bar under S.11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997---Held, that the register of members maintained by a company under S.119 of the Companies Act, 2017 and the central depository register maintained by the Central Depository Company were distinct statutory records serving different legal functions---Section 11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997 barred the Court from ordering rectification of the central depository register but did not prohibit rectification of the company’s own register of members---Overriding effect under S.3 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997 did not impliedly repeal or override the remedy under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017, as both statutes could harmoniously coexist within their respective fields---Right to seek rectification of the company’s register under S.126 remained intact---Petition under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017 was therefore maintainable notwithstanding the bar contained in S.11 of the Central Depositories Act, 1997. Cited Cases: • Packages Limited through its General Manager and others v. Muhammad Maqbool and others PLD 1991 SC 258 • Muhammad Mohsin Ghuman and others v. Government of Punjab through Home Secretary, Lahore and others 2013 SCMR 85 • Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investigation Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218 (b) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 2(10), 3 & Art.120---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Rectification of register of members---Whether proceedings under S.126 constituted a “suit”---Article 120 of Limitation Act, 1908---Applicability---Held, that proceedings under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017 were initiated by application/petition and not by plaint---Although such proceedings involved determination of civil rights and were before the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction, neither the Companies Act, 2017 nor the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997 treated them as a suit---Expression “suit” under the Limitation Act, 1908 had a specific and limited meaning and was expressly distinguishable from an appeal and an application---Proceedings under S.126 could not be treated as a suit merely because they concerned property or civil rights---Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was therefore not applicable. Cited Cases: • Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1 • Kishan Chand & Co. v. Nur Muhammad PLD 1949 Lahore 30 (c) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.181---Rectification of register of members---Application for rectification---Residuary limitation---Applicability of Art.181---Held, that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 did not apply to petitions/applications under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017---Preamble of the Limitation Act, 1908 referred to suits and appeals generally but only to “certain applications”, showing that the Act did not prescribe limitation for every conceivable application before Courts---Article 181 was historically confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and, by extension in limited contexts, to arbitration proceedings owing to the special provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940---Proceedings for rectification of register under S.126 were not applications putting into motion the machinery of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the sense contemplated by Article 181---High Court’s reliance on Article 181 for dismissing petitions under S.126 as time-barred was not justified. Cited Cases: • Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. AIR 1933 PC 63 • Baimanekbai v. Manekji Kavasji 1880 ILR 7 Bom 213 • Naeem Finance Ltd. and another v. Bashir Ahmad Rafiqui, Administrator, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. and another PLD 1971 SC 8 • M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through the Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad PLD 1972 SC 123 • Brother Steel Mills Ltd. and others v. Mian Ilyas Miraj and 14 others PLD 1996 SC 543 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Art.181---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss.37 & 41---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.126---Applicability of residuary Article 181 beyond Code of Civil Procedure---Distinction between arbitration proceedings and company rectification proceedings---Held, that the applicability of Article 181 to applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940 rested upon the special statutory scheme of Ss.37 and 41 of the Arbitration Act, which applied the Limitation Act and the Code of Civil Procedure to arbitration proceedings before Court---Such reasoning could not automatically be extended to proceedings under S.126 of the Companies Act, 2017---No inconsistency existed between Naeem Finance and Imam-ud-Din Janjua, as both operated in different statutory contexts---Article 181 was not to be applied to company register rectification proceedings merely because it had been applied to certain arbitration applications. Cited Cases: • Naeem Finance Ltd. and another v. Bashir Ahmad Rafiqui, Administrator, Muslim Insurance Company Ltd. and another PLD 1971 SC 8 • M. Imam-ud-Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through the Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad PLD 1972 SC 123 • Mrs. Naila Naeem Younus and others v. Messrs Indus Services Limited through Chief Executive and others 2022 SCMR 1171 (e) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.29(2)---Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, Rr.5 & 7---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.6---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S.509(4)---Proceedings under Companies Act---Petition and application---Special law---Whether Limitation Act applicable through S.29(2)---Held, that the Companies Act, 2017 was a special law and was self-contained in respect of limitation for several company proceedings, prescribing timelines in some provisions and omitting them in others---Under R.5 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1997, all applications except interlocutory applications were to be made by petition---A petition under S.126 for rectification of register was therefore not an “application” within the meaning of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908---Since proceedings under S.126 were neither suit, appeal nor application within the meaning of S.29(2), the Limitation Act, 1908 could not be invoked to prescribe a limitation period where the Companies Act, 2017 itself had not done so. Cited Cases: • Government of Canada v. Aronson 1989 2 All ER 1025 • A v. B (Investigatory Powers Tribunal: Jurisdiction) 2009 UKSC 12 • Dr. Muhammad Amin v. President Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited 2010 SCMR 1458 (f) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss.126 & 127---Rectification of register---Fraudulent entries or omissions---No prescribed limitation period---Reason for legislative omission---Equitable and public-law character of register rectification---Held, that absence of a statutory limitation period for proceedings under S.126 was consistent with the equitable nature of the Court’s jurisdiction in register rectification matters---Section 126 was designed not merely to resolve private disputes but to preserve the accuracy and integrity of the company register, which determined legal ownership, governance rights and corporate control---Where fraudulent or unjustified entries were alleged, imposing a limitation period at the threshold could reward concealment and obstruct the Court’s power under S.126(4) to refer matters for adjudication of offences under S.127---Fraud may remain concealed for years and the wrongdoer could not be permitted to take advantage of such concealment---Rectification jurisdiction protected proprietary rights in shares and membership interests, and an inaccurate register could not be allowed to persist merely because an ordinary civil limitation period was invoked. Cited Case: • In Re Southern Counties Fresh Foods Ltd. 2008 EWHC 2810 (g) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Rectification of register---Delay---Doctrine of laches---Equitable discretion of Court---No fixed limitation period---Effect of stale claims---Held, that although no statutory limitation period applied to proceedings under S.126, the Court was still bound to examine delay, neglect and stale claims through the equitable doctrine of laches---Court could consider the length of delay, reasons for delay, late discovery of facts, ongoing investigations, complexity of corporate transactions, regulatory hurdles, prejudice to opposite parties and conduct of the parties---Where respondent’s fraud, concealment, misrepresentation or obstruction prevented timely proceedings, the respondent could be estopped from relying upon delay---However, party seeking rectification had to approach the Court before rights of innocent third parties accrued, and must provide a satisfactory and credible explanation for any apparent delay---No fixed upper or lower time limit could be judicially created, as that would amount to legislation---Each case had to be assessed on its own facts, and in appropriate cases avoidable delay could disentitle a party from equitable relief. Cited Cases: • Archbold v. Scully 1861 9 HL 360 • THG Plc v. Zedra Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd. 2026 UKSC 6 • Shoreham Hills, LLC v. Sagaponack Dream House LLC 2020 NY Slip Op 50326 • Poiss v. Lambert Health Authority 1978 2 All ER 125 • Verrall v. Great Yarmouth Borough Council 1981 QB 202 • Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd LR 5 PC 239 (h) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.126---Rectification of register---Allegations of fraud---Summary dismissal on limitation---Remand---Held, that petitions under S.126 involving allegations of fraud raised complex and delicate questions of law and fact and ought not to have been dismissed summarily on the basis of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908---In one matter, although the High Court had also examined merits, such findings were considerably influenced by its opinion on limitation and were recorded without affording parties full opportunity to present their best case---Matters required fresh adjudication after hearing all parties and permitting them to present their complete case. Disposition: Leave petitions, i.e. CPLA No.559 of 2025 and CPLA No.2624 of 2025, were converted into appeals and allowed along with Civil Appeal No.125 of 2025; impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court were set aside; matters were remitted to the High Court for fresh decision after affording each party fair opportunity of hearing; no order as to costs.

Summary: i. The third and equally significant question is whether medical negligence, by its very nature, can be determined without expert evaluation. ii. The issue here is not merely whether complications occurred, but whether such complications were attributable to negligence, omission, lack of due care, or whether they were recognized risks inherent in the medical process itself. iii. For a considerable period, the legal landscape remained deficient in providing a specialized and effective mechanism for determination of liability arising out of the delicate relationship between a medical practitioner and a patient. The relationship, by its very nature, is founded upon trust, professional skill, and the expectation of due care, yet, whenever the expected result did not materialize, or complications emerged, the question of accountability invariably arose. iv. Thus, whether the controversy enters the Criminal Law stream or the Civil Law domain, the central deficiency remains the same, absence of technical expertise at the threshold. And that deficiency is not merely procedural, it goes to the root of justice itself. v. The peculiar nature of medical disputes, their technical complexity, and the potentially irreversible consequences flowing from an erroneous determination compelled legislative bodies to devise a more structured and expert-driven framework, and the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was no exception. vi. Before embarking upon the determination of the rival claims and the legal consequences flowing therefrom, we consider it both appropriate and judicially necessary to first examine the statutory framework within which the present controversy is required to be viewed. vii. The establishment of healthcare commissions in various provinces of the country was not an isolated legislative experiment, nor an accidental statutory innovation; rather, it was the product of an evolving legal realization that disputes involving medical negligence, professional misconduct, deficient healthcare Service Laws, and patient safety require a forum possessing technical competence, professional expertise, and regulatory authority, qualities which ordinary investigative and adjudicatory forums may not inherently possess. viii. Comparative legal analysis, though not binding, often serves as a valuable judicial aid, particularly where domestic legislation reflects principles already tested and refined in foreign jurisdictions. It enables this Court to examine how modern legal systems have responded to the delicate balance between professional autonomy and public accountability, how allegations of medical negligence are screened, assessed, and determined and how legal systems ensure that neither medical professionals are exposed to unjustified prosecution nor patients are left remediless against genuine wrongs. ix. The creation of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission was neither accidental nor ornamental, it was the result of legislative recognition of a practical and recurring problem, that allegations against medical practitioners, by their very nature, occupy a field fundamentally distinct from ordinary Criminal Lawity. x. Thus, when viewed in comparative perspective, the establishment of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Health Care Commission appears neither isolated nor experimental. It is part of a larger legal Civil Lawization of healthcare governance, one built upon the recognition that where science is under scrutiny, law must proceed with the assistance of science. xi. At the threshold, it is to be observed that every statute draws its legitimacy from the Constitution. A legislative instrument does not exist in abstraction; it operates within a Constitutional Lawly demarcated field, therefore, its validity is tested on two distinct planes, first, legislative competence, and second, operational exclusivity. xii. A general law is one which regulates a subject in broad and universal terms, however, a special law is enacted for a specific class, a specific subject, or a specific contingency, thereby creating a self-contained code. xiii. The settled canon of interpretation remains that where there is conflict between general law and special law, the special law prevails. xiv. To permit parallel invocation of general law in such circumstances would defeat legislative intent, create forum-conflict, and erode the discipline of statutory architecture. xv. Therefore, the true interpretative exercise lies not merely in reading the text of the statute, but in understanding the purpose behind its promulgation, for the legislative intent remains the guiding star in determining its applicability. xvi. The statutory scheme, when read as a whole, clearly demarcates a boundary between executive correction and judicial function, and that boundary cannot be transgressed under any guise or pretext. xvii. No court or authority, however well-intentioned, can assume jurisdiction by implication or convenience. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius aptly applies, meaning that the express conferment of limited powers necessarily excludes all other powers not so conferred. xviii. The authority so exercised cannot be traced to any enabling provision of the Code, nor can it be justified on the basis of any implied jurisdiction. It represents, in essence, an unwarranted transgression into a domain which the legislature has not assigned to that office. xix. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is circumscribed by the boundaries expressly delineated by the statute, and it is by now a settled principle of jurisprudence that where the legislature has consciously defined the extent of jurisdiction, the same cannot be enlarged through interpretative innovation or judicial supplementation.

Summary: --- (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----S.14---Suit for maintenance allowance---Dismissal for want of evidence---Claim exceeding Rs.5,000 per month---Appealability---Constitutional petition filed directly before High Court---Held, that where maintenance allowance claimed was higher than Rs.5,000 per month, and the suit was dismissed, decreed, or partly decreed, remedy of appeal under S.14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 was available---Direct constitutional petition before High Court was premature where an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal was still available. Cited Case: • Muhammad Aslam v. Judge Family Court, Ferozewala and others PLD 2024 Lahore 300 (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----S.14(3)---Interlocutory order---Closure of right to lead evidence---Final judgment and decree subsequently passed---Merger of interim order into final order---Held, that where the Family Court closed the plaintiffs’ right to produce evidence and, on the same date, dismissed the suit for want of evidence through final judgment and decree, the interlocutory order of closure of evidence merged into the final judgment---After final adjudication, the challengeable order was not the interlocutory order closing evidence, but the final judgment and decree dismissing the suit---Aggrieved party could raise the ground relating to closure of evidence while challenging the final decree in appeal. Cited Cases: • Khalid Pervaiz Ul Haq and another v. Mst. Minha Asif and another PLD 2025 SC 847 • Shamshad Khan and another v. Arif Ashraf Khan and others 2008 SCMR 269 (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----S.14(3)---Bar against challenge to interim/interlocutory orders---Family suit---Strict adherence to special procedure---Held, that the Family Courts Act, 1964 restricts and prohibits direct challenge to interim/interlocutory orders under S.14(3)---Even where a party alleges that a right has been curtailed by an interim order, such grievance may merge into the final order and can be agitated, if required, along with other grounds against the final judgment---Special procedure under the Family Courts Act must be strictly followed so that the object and effectiveness of the statute are not frustrated. Cited Case: • Khalid Pervaiz Ul Haq and another v. Mst. Minha Asif and another PLD 2025 SC 847 (d) Civil Procedure / General procedural law---- ----Interim orders---Doctrine of merger---Final adjudication---Held, that interim orders are passed in aid of the final order which the Court may ultimately make---Once original proceedings come to an end through final adjudication, interlocutory orders do not survive independently and merge into the final order---Accordingly, after dismissal of the maintenance suit through judgment and decree, the petitioners could not independently challenge only the earlier closure of evidence through constitutional petition. Cited Cases: • Mian Azam Waheed and 2 others v. Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs, Karachi 2023 SCMR 1247 • Gen. (Retd.) Pervaiz Musharraf through Attorney v. Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 2014 Sindh 389 • Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/O Interior v. General (R) Pervez Musharraf and others PLD 2016 SC 570 (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Availability of alternate statutory remedy---Family Court decree---Premature petition---Held, that where judgment and decree had been passed by the Family Court dismissing the petitioners’ suit for maintenance allowance, and appeal against such decree was available under S.14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, constitutional petition before High Court was premature---Petitioners, if so advised, were required to avail remedy of appeal before the Appellate Court. (f) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---- ----Maintenance suit---Evidence not produced despite opportunities---Dismissal for want of evidence---Effect---Held, that where issues had been framed and the onus to prove entitlement to maintenance was on the plaintiffs, but they failed to produce evidence despite sufficient opportunities, the Family Court decided the issue against them and dismissed the suit for want of evidence---However, any grievance against closure of evidence or dismissal of suit had to be raised in appeal against the final judgment and decree, not through a premature constitutional petition. Disposition: Constitutional petition was disposed of as premature with observation that petitioners, if advised, may seek remedy of appeal before the Appellate Court against the judgment and decree dated 24.01.2026 passed by the Judge Family Court, Lahore. "Where right of the plaintiff to produce evidence is closed and family suit is dismissed, the said order may be challenged as a ground along with other grounds of appeal against a final order of dismissal of suit."

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Recruitment process---Challenge to appointment---Scope of judicial review---Held, that judicial review in recruitment matters is concerned with legality, rationality, procedural propriety and fairness of the decision-making process, not with substituting the Court’s own assessment for that of the Selection Committee---Where the selection process was conducted by a duly constituted multi-member expert body, evaluation method was applied uniformly to all candidates, and no illegality, arbitrariness, perversity or mala fide was established, High Court would not interfere in constitutional jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Asif Hassan and others v. Sabir Hussain and others 2019 SCMR 1720 • Tata Cellular v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 11 • Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 • Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick [2008] SCC 9 • Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (b) Service Law---- ----Recruitment---Advertisement---Eligibility criteria---Cut-off date---Effect---Held, that once an advertisement is issued, it constitutes the governing framework of the selection process and neither the candidates nor the selecting authority can travel beyond its terms---Eligibility conditions such as qualification and cut-off date are matters of objective determination and remain open to strict judicial scrutiny---Where the private respondent completed his degree within the prescribed cut-off period mentioned in the advertisement, challenge to his eligibility lost force. (c) Service Law---- ----Selection process---Objective eligibility distinguished from subjective evaluation---Tests, interviews and merit assessment---Held, that objective eligibility such as qualification, experience and cut-off date can be judicially examined, but assessment of merit through tests, interviews or other evaluative tools falls within the subjective satisfaction of the expert selection body---Courts do not ordinarily interfere with such assessment unless the process is shown to be vitiated by illegality, arbitrariness, perversity or mala fide. Cited Cases: • University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao AIR 1965 SC 491 • Secretary (Health) v. Dr. Anita Puri (1996) 6 SCC 282 • Waheed Gul Khan and another v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1701 (d) Service Law---- ----Recruitment---Mode of evaluation---Typing test---Uniform application---Selection Committee’s discretion---Held, that it lies within the domain of the selecting authority to determine the mode of evaluation so long as such mode is rational, uniformly applied and bears nexus with the object sought to be achieved---Where typing test was applied across the board without exception and formed part of a structured evaluation mechanism, and an expert was associated for conducting and assessing the test, the process could not be termed arbitrary merely because the petitioner performed poorly. (e) Service Law---- ----Selection by expert body---Interview/test evaluation---Court not to act as appointing authority---Held, that Court cannot take upon itself the function of the appointing authority to judge suitability of a candidate---Where a candidate possesses requisite qualification and is evaluated by the competent Selection Committee, Court will not re-evaluate comparative merit or substitute its own opinion for that of the expert body---Petitioner’s failure to secure sufficient marks was a matter of performance and not procedural infirmity. Cited Cases: • Asif Hassan and others v. Sabir Hussain and others 2019 SCMR 1720 • Waheed Gul Khan and another v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1701 (f) Service Law---- ----Mala fide---Allegation against Selection Committee---Burden of proof---Held, that mala fide is easy to allege but difficult to prove and the burden lies heavily on the person asserting it---Mere conjectures, vague imputations or suspicion are insufficient---Mala fide implies deliberate misuse of power and must be established through cogent material---Where no material was placed on record to show nexus, collusion or manipulation by the Selection Committee, allegation of favouritism could not be accepted. Cited Cases: • S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 72 • Waheed Gul Khan and another v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1701 (g) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Recruitment by multi-member Selection Committee---Presumption of regularity---Held, that decision of a duly constituted multi-member Selection Committee carries a presumption of regularity, particularly where technical expertise is associated in the evaluation process---Such presumption cannot be displaced in absence of clear and convincing evidence of illegality, discrimination, bias or mala fide---Uniform evaluation of all candidates by an expert-assisted committee warranted judicial restraint. (h) Service Law---- ----Recruitment---Comparative merit---Candidate failing to qualify test---No vested right to appointment---Held, that participation in recruitment process and possession of basic eligibility do not create a vested right to appointment---Where petitioner and private respondent were subjected to the same test, petitioner secured lower marks and failed to qualify, while private respondent performed better and stood at Serial No.1 in the final merit list, non-selection of petitioner did not furnish ground for constitutional interference. Disposition: Writ petition was dismissed; appointment of private respondent as Admin Officer (BPS-17) was maintained, as no illegality, arbitrariness, procedural impropriety or mala fide was found in the recruitment process. --- "1. It is well within the domain of a Selecting Authority to determine the mode of evaluation so long as it is rational, uniformly applied, and bears a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 2. Eligibility conditions, such as qualification and cut-off date, are matters of objective determination and fall within strict judicial scrutiny however, once eligibility is established, the assessment of merit through tests, interviews, or other evaluative tools falls within the realm of subjective satisfaction of an expert body. 3. Thus, the consistent judicial approach is that objective eligibility invites scrutiny, but subjective evaluation commands deference. 4. Viewed in this doctrinal framework, the present case falls squarely within the category where judicial restraint is required."

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S.12(2)---Ex parte judgment and decree---Application alleging fraud, misrepresentation and want of jurisdiction---Scope of inquiry---Held, that jurisdiction under S.12(2), CPC is confined to examining whether the judgment, decree or order under challenge was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction---Court exercising S.12(2) jurisdiction is not required to conduct a full trial on all disputed questions relating to the merits of the original suit---Its function is to identify the vice affecting the impugned judgment within the meaning of S.12(2), CPC. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S.12(2)---Judgment procured on basis of allegedly forged/bogus document---Exemption letter allegedly never issued by Lahore Development Authority---Fraud and misrepresentation---Held, that where an ex parte judgment had been passed on the basis of representations made regarding an allegedly forged or bogus exemption letter, the procuring of such judgment on the basis of that document constituted a matter falling within fraud and misrepresentation for purposes of S.12(2), CPC---Such allegation was sufficient to bring the impugned ex parte judgment within the corrective jurisdiction of S.12(2), CPC. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S.12(2)---Genuineness of disputed document---Exemption letter---Triable issue in original suit---Held, that although genuineness of the exemption letter was the pivotal controversy between the parties, such question was not to be finally adjudicated in S.12(2) proceedings as if the court were deciding the original suit---Determination of authenticity/genuineness of the disputed exemption letter was a matter to be tried in the civil suit after restoration, through pleadings, framing of issues and recording of evidence---Court exercising S.12(2) jurisdiction travels beyond its scope if it finally determines disputed merits relating to the document itself. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S.12(2)---O.IX, R.13---Setting aside ex parte judgment---Distinct jurisdictions---Held, that jurisdiction under O.IX, R.13, CPC and jurisdiction under S.12(2), CPC are materially distinct---Proceedings under O.IX, R.13 concern setting aside an ex parte decree on grounds relating to absence/non-service/sufficient cause, whereas S.12(2), CPC addresses whether a judgment, decree or order was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction---Knowledge of the ex parte judgment or alleged avoidance of appearance was not by itself conclusive against a S.12(2) application where fraud or misrepresentation in procurement of judgment was alleged. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S.12(2)---Trial Court treating S.12(2) application as full trial of suit---Misconstruction of jurisdiction---Held, that the Trial Court misconstrued the scope of S.12(2), CPC by treating adjudication of the application akin to trial of the original suit and by proceeding to decide the genuineness of the disputed exemption letter on merits---Revisional Court also failed to appreciate the limited nature of S.12(2) jurisdiction---Such approach was legally unsustainable. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S.12(2)---Acceptance of application---Effect---Restoration of civil suit---Fresh decision uninfluenced by previous findings---Held, that once the S.12(2) application was accepted and the ex parte judgment set aside, the civil suits were to be treated as pending before the Trial Court---Trial Court was required to complete pleadings, frame issues, record evidence and decide the lis afresh---Findings previously recorded in impugned orders regarding genuineness of exemption letters were not to influence fresh adjudication. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S.12(2)---Doctrine of res judicata---Findings on genuineness of document in S.12(2) proceedings---Held, that if the Court exercising S.12(2) jurisdiction were to finally decide genuineness of the disputed document, subsequent re-adjudication of the same question in the restored suit could create complications relating to res judicata---Such consequence further supported the view that disputed merits of the document should be left for trial in the original suit, not conclusively determined in S.12(2) proceedings. Disposition: Constitutional petitions were allowed; orders dated 10.12.2024 and 30.05.2024 were set aside; applications under S.12(2), CPC were accepted; ex parte judgments were set aside; civil suits were deemed pending before the Trial Court for fresh decision after completion of pleadings, framing of issues and recording of evidence; no order as to costs. ---- "Jurisdiction under section 12(2) of CPC must not be confused with the jurisdiction to adjudicate genuineness of disputed document, subject matter of judgment under challenge."

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---- ----S.9(1)3(c)---Recovery of charas weighing 1500 grams---Conviction under amended provision---Sentence below statutory minimum---Legality---Held, that where the appellant was charged and convicted under S.9(1)3(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for possession of 1500 grams charas, the sentence had to be awarded according to the amended S.9, which was in force on the date of recovery/occurrence---For charas weighing between 1000 grams and 4999 grams, S.9(1)3(c) prescribes imprisonment which may extend to fourteen years but shall not be less than nine years, along with fine which may extend to Rs.400,000 but shall not be less than Rs.80,000---Sentence of rigorous imprisonment for four years and six months with fine of Rs.20,000 was below the statutory minimum and, therefore, against law. (b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---- ----S.9---Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2022---Effect of substitution of earlier S.9---Sentencing policy in Ghulam Murtaza’s case---Applicability after amendment---Held, that erstwhile S.9 of the Act was composite in nature and provided punishment broadly on the basis of quantity of narcotic drug, psychotropic substance or controlled substance---Since it did not provide separate punishment for each individual category of contraband, sentencing guidelines were laid down in Ghulam Murtaza’s case---After substitution of S.9 through the Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2022, the statute itself provides maximum and minimum thresholds of punishment according to both weight and type of narcotic substance---Therefore, after the amendment, punishment is to be awarded under amended S.9 and not by applying the earlier sentencing policy in Ghulam Murtaza’s case. Cited Case: • Ghulam Murtaza’s case PLD 2009 Lahore 362 (c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---- ----S.9(1)3(c)---Date of occurrence after amendment---Applicable sentencing regime---Held, that where the alleged recovery took place on 27.10.2023, after the Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2022 had come into force, the applicable sentencing regime was the amended S.9 of the Act---Trial Court was legally bound to consider the minimum threshold prescribed by the amended provision and could not award sentence lower than the statutory minimum. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Appellate jurisdiction---Conviction under special law---Illegal sentence below statutory minimum---Failure of justice---Non-curable error---Held, that awarding punishment below the minimum prescribed by law causes failure of justice and constitutes a non-curable legal error---Where the Trial Court convicted the accused under S.9(1)3(c), CNS Act but awarded sentence below the mandatory statutory minimum, the impugned judgment could not be sustained. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Remand for rewriting judgment---Illegal sentence---Merits not touched---Safe administration of justice---Held, that where the sentence awarded by the Trial Court was contrary to the mandatory sentencing provision, the appellate Court could set aside the judgment without touching merits and remand the case to the Trial Court for rewriting of judgment after hearing all concerned---During the remand period, the convict/appellant was to be treated as an under-trial prisoner. (f) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---- ----S.9(1)3(c)---Charas---1500 grams---Minimum sentence---Held, that for 1500 grams charas, the minimum punishment under amended S.9(1)3(c), CNS Act is imprisonment for nine years and fine not less than Rs.80,000---Any sentence below such minimum, including a sentence based on pre-amendment sentencing guidelines, is unlawful. Disposition: Appeal was allowed to the extent that the impugned judgment dated 02.04.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Judge Special Court CNS, Faisalabad was set aside without touching merits; case was remanded to the Trial Court for rewriting of judgment within one month after hearing all concerned; appellant was directed to be treated as an under-trial prisoner during the said period and to be produced before the Trial Court on 29.04.2026. ---- After amendment of Section: 9 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 through the Control of Narcotic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2022, now punishment is to be awarded to the convict under present Section: 9 of the Act (ibid) and not in the light of Sentencing Policy provided through Ghulam Murtaza's case (PLD 2009 Lahore 362).

Summary: (a) Punjab Civil Service Pension Rules, 1963---- ----R.2.3---Ad hoc service---Continuous service followed by regularization---Counting towards pensionary benefits---Held, that where an employee continuously served on ad hoc basis for more than five years without interruption and such service was followed by regularization/confirmation without break, the said period was liable to be counted towards qualifying service for pension and gratuity---Ad hoc service, by its nature, is a species of temporary service and falls within the expression “temporary service followed by confirmation” for purposes of pensionary benefits. (b) Punjab Civil Service Pension Rules, 1963---- ----R.2.3(i) & (ii)---Temporary and officiating service---Beneficial interpretation---Held, that R.2.3(i) entitles a government servant borne on temporary establishment, who has rendered more than five years’ continuous temporary service, to have such service counted towards pension and gratuity---R.2.3(ii) further provides that temporary and officiating service, when followed by confirmation, shall also be reckoned for pension and gratuity---A conjoint, harmonious and purposive reading of the rule shows legislative intent to count all continuous qualifying service which ultimately culminates in confirmation. (c) Civil Service Regulations---- ----Art.371-A---Contractual/temporary service before confirmation---Counting towards pension---Provision in pari materia with R.2.3 of Punjab Civil Service Pension Rules, 1963---Held, that contractual service rendered prior to confirmation partakes the character of temporary service and is countable for pension/gratuity---Since Art.371-A of the Civil Service Regulations is in pari materia with R.2.3 of the Punjab Civil Service Pension Rules, 1963, the same principle applies to ad hoc service followed by regularization. Cited Case: • Chairman/Dean Sheikh Zayed Hospital, Lahore v. Amjad Mehmood Khan 2025 SCMR 168 (d) Service Law---- ----Pensionary benefits---Ad hoc/daily wage/contractual/temporary service---Subsequent regularization---Qualifying service---Held, that superior courts have consistently recognized that service rendered on daily wages, contractual, temporary or ad hoc basis, when followed by regularization or confirmation without break, may constitute qualifying service for pension and gratuity---Denial of such continuous service for pensionary computation, despite subsequent regularization, is inconsistent with settled principles of service jurisprudence. Cited Cases: • Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others v. Tayyab Halim Subhani and others 2022 SCMR 77 • Ministry of Finance through Secretary and others v. Syed Afroz Akhtar Rizvi and others 2021 SCMR 1546 • Chairman, Pakistan Railway, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Shah Jehan Shah PLD 2016 SC 534 • Muhammad Abbas Halephoto v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Govt. of Pakistan, Islamabad and another 2025 PLC (C.S.) 1559 • Imtiaz Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Defence and others 2024 PLC (C.S.) 382 • Bashir Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence through Secretary and 3 others 2021 PLC (C.S.) Note 18 • Justice (R) Karamat Nazir Bhandari v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2014 Lahore 506 • Akbar Shah v. Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan through Chairman 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1175 (e) Service Law---- ----Pension---Beneficial object of pensionary regime---Restrictive interpretation disfavoured---Held, that pensionary rules are to be interpreted in a beneficial manner so as to confer, rather than deny, accrued service benefits---A narrow interpretation excluding continuous ad hoc service followed by regularization would defeat the object of the pensionary regime and would be contrary to settled service jurisprudence. (f) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art.199---Non-counting of ad hoc service towards pension---Impugned departmental orders declining representation---Held, that where the petitioner’s continuous ad hoc service from 15.08.1985 to 13.10.1990 was followed by regularization on 14.10.1990 without any break, refusal by the competent authority to count such period towards pensionary benefits was unlawful---High Court set aside the impugned orders and directed recalculation and release of pensionary benefits. Disposition: Constitutional petition was allowed; impugned orders dated 07.05.2015 and 29.11.2019 were set aside; respondents were directed to count petitioner’s ad hoc service from 15.08.1985 to 13.10.1990 towards qualifying service for pensionary benefits and to recalculate and release pensionary benefits expeditiously. ---- Continuity of Ad hoc service without break, followed by regularization, is to be counted for the purpose of eligibility of gratuity and pension.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S.497(2)---Post-arrest bail---Further inquiry---Murder case---Unwitnessed occurrence---Case based on extrajudicial confession---Held, that where the occurrence was admittedly unwitnessed and the entire prosecution case against the accused was structured upon an alleged extrajudicial confession, the matter required further inquiry within the meaning of S.497(2), Cr.P.C.---Credibility of the supplementary statement and the alleged extrajudicial confession was to be determined by the Trial Court after recording evidence. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S.497---Post-arrest bail---Accused not nominated in FIR---Effect---Held, that where one of the petitioners was not nominated in the FIR in any capacity as a culprit, and his implication rested upon subsequent material, such circumstance was relevant for grant of bail, particularly where the prosecution case was otherwise dependent upon a belated extrajudicial confession. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S.497---Post-arrest bail---Belated supplementary statement---Extrajudicial confession introduced after identification of dead body---Evidentiary value---Held, that where the deceased disappeared on 13.09.2025, FIR was lodged on 14.09.2025, an unidentified dead body was recovered on 17.09.2025, the complainant identified it on 21.10.2025, and on the very next day introduced a supplementary statement alleging extrajudicial confession, the credibility of such delayed version required determination at trial---Such material, at bail stage, made the case one of further inquiry. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat / Criminal law---- ----Extrajudicial confession---Weak type of evidence---Joint confession---Admissibility---Held, that extrajudicial confession is generally considered a weak type of evidence and is often described as being easily procured---Where the alleged confession had the trappings of a joint confession, its evidentiary worth and admissibility required cautious examination by the Trial Court. Cited Cases: • Allah Ditta v. The State and others 2012 SCMR 184 • Muhammad Waseem v. The State and others 2012 SCMR 387 (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S.497---Post-arrest bail---Gravity of offence---Murder charge---Prohibitory clause---Held, that mere gravity of accusation or heinousness of offence does not by itself constitute a valid legal ground for refusal of bail where the accused has otherwise made out a case for concession of bail---Liberty of an accused cannot be curtailed as pre-trial punishment merely on the basis of nature of charge. Cited Case: • Hasnain Mustafa v. The State and another 2019 SCMR 1914 (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S.497---Post-arrest bail---Presumption of innocence---Suspicion and legal proof---Held, that presumption of innocence remains attached to an accused until guilt is proved by evidence of unimpeachable character---Where prosecution material fails to bridge the gap between suspicion and legal proof, the scales of justice tilt in favour of liberty at bail stage. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S.497---Post-arrest bail---Investigation completed---Further custody not required---Effect---Held, that where the investigating agency had completed necessary investigation and the presence of the accused was no longer required for supplementary inquiry, continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose and would amount to unnecessary hardship before adjudication of guilt. Disposition: Petition was allowed; petitioners were admitted to post-arrest bail in FIR No.955 dated 14.09.2025 under Ss.302, 365, 201, 114, 148, 149, PPC, subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,00,000 each with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court; observations were declared tentative and confined to disposal of bail petition.

Summary: Local Government—Levy—Pith and substance—Determination— “The validity of a fiscal levy is not to be determined by the label attached to it, nor by the identity of the property upon which the activity is carried out. The Court must examine its true nature and character, its object and its charging event.” Doctrine of pith and substance—Application— “The charging event and dominant purpose are decisive. A levy may incidentally touch upon subjects beyond its immediate field; that, by itself, does not render it invalid.” Ownership vs regulatory power—Distinction— “Ownership of property and regulation of activities carried on upon it are distinct concepts. They do not necessarily coincide.” Levy—Nature—Charging event— “The levy does not attach to the Dam as property; it attaches to the commercial and recreational activities carried on upon it.” Municipal taxation—Competence—Scope— “The statute confers wide fiscal and regulatory powers upon the local government in respect of activities carried out within its territorial jurisdiction.” Municipal functions—Scope—Recreational/commercial activities— “Boating, water sports, parasailing, parking and allied activities are organized commercial operations carried on in a public setting… These are matters squarely within municipal domain.” Taxation—Principle— “What the law forbids is taxation in the air; what it permits is taxation anchored in function.” Quid pro quo—Modern concept— “In the case of a cess or regulatory fee, strict quid pro quo is not required; it is sufficient if the levy is purpose-specific and bears a reasonable nexus to the object.” Fee—Validity—Test— “Exact equivalence between the amount collected and the Service Laws rendered is neither expected nor required.” WAPDA—Ownership—Effect— “Ownership of the Dam by WAPDA does not oust such jurisdiction. The levy does not fall upon the Dam; it falls upon the activity carried on upon it.” Local government jurisdiction—Territorial principle— “A person carrying on business within the territorial limits of a local government remains subject to its fiscal and regulatory regime irrespective of the ownership of the underlying land.”