Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199----Dowry and bridal gifts---Recovery of alternate value of dowry articles---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner/wife challenged concurrent family court judgments whereby trial court had granted 30% alternate value of dowry articles but appellate court had set aside even that relief---Held, dowry articles and personal belongings of a wife remain her exclusive property and, where not returned in specie, she may claim their alternate value, subject to proof of existence, entrustment and retention---Appellate Court failed to appreciate material admissions and surrounding circumstances, including respondent/husband’s own stance that household articles were available in the house and his admission that no traditional dowry was given at the time of marriage, coupled with his assertion that he purchased various household luxuries during matrimony---Where original financial details were withheld by husband and wife’s bank record showed regular withdrawal of her salary for household consumption, presumption operated in favour of wife’s contribution---Appellate Court had, therefore, misdirected itself in discarding claim in toto merely on ground that wife had not produced her parents or further documentary proof. (b) Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act (LXXVIII of 1976)----Ss. 2 & 5---Dowry---Meaning and legal status---Property given to bride before or after marriage by her parents in connection with marriage constitutes dowry, excluding inherited property---Wife has absolute right in her dowry and bridal gifts---Any property rights available to a woman cannot be restricted, controlled or limited, and every gift becomes her exclusive property---There is no legal bar to a wife purchasing household articles herself after marriage and claiming them as dowry articles within the meaning of law, if such articles were acquired in connection with marriage and matrimonial home. Reliance placed on Ghulam Rasool v. Family Court 1991 CLC 1696 and Syeda Mehwish v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West) 2018 CLC 1337. (c) Family proceedings---Proof of dowry articles---Nature of evidence required---Strict rules of evidence---Held, wife’s solitary statement may be sufficient to prove existence of dowry items in a recovery suit, and oral testimony can substantiate a dowry claim because Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not apply in its strict sense to family proceedings---There is no rigid formula requiring receipts, shopkeepers’ details or production of parents in every case---Determination depends upon facts of each case and overall probabilities emerging from evidence. Reliance placed on Aziz-Ur-Rehman v. Mst. Bibi Jameela 2020 CLC 380 and Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous 2017 SCMR 393. (d) Dowry articles---Valuation of used household goods---Principles---Held, valuation of dowry articles is to be made case to case with reference to nature, quality, user period and prevailing market conditions---Judge, Family Court cannot adopt a bare rule of thumb without objective criteria---For assessing alternate value of used household articles, relevant factors include: present and past market value; years of use; average life of article; sentimental value attached to item; need to account for replacement at current price where article remains with husband; online market sources and auction platforms for valuation; reasonable depreciation; inflation and consumer price data; and average market prices supplied by parties---Used item may generally be considered at half price, but not below that level, unless marital breakdown occurred within first one or two years, in which case value may be considered around 80% in view of inflation and taxation---Family Court may use modern scientific tools, data, websites and market applications without requiring expert evidence in every case. Reliance placed on Mst. Ayesha Shaheen v. Khalid Mehmood 2013 SCMR 1049; Muhammad Zahid v. Mst. Ghazala Mazhar 2014 CLC 895; Mst. Samreen Bibi v. Judge Family Court PLD 2015 Lahore 504; and Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal 2017 SCMR 321. (e) Matrimonial property---Assets acquired during subsistence of marriage---Vehicle purchased in husband’s name---Claim of wife on basis of contribution---Islamic jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence and equitable principles---Petitioner/wife claimed that vehicle bearing Registration No. AAK-478, Suzuki Cultus, though standing in husband’s name, was acquired with her financial contribution including initial seed money---Held, such asset required consideration not merely as dowry but as matrimonial property---Though under existing Pakistani law a wife does not automatically acquire ownership in husband’s assets merely by marriage, proprietary interest may still be established through proof of contribution, partnership, trust, gift or joint acquisition---Non-financial contributions such as homemaking, childcare and domestic management possess economic significance and can justify recognition of beneficial interest in assets accumulated during marriage---Marriage operates as a cooperative partnership and there should be no bias in favour of sole titled money-earner against homemaker or child-carer. (f) Islamic law---Marriage and property rights---Separate ownership of spouses---Legislative competence to protect women’s matrimonial rights---Held, under classical Islamic jurisprudence husband and wife remain distinct legal persons with separate property rights; wife retains control over her own property and does not, by marriage alone, become owner of husband’s property, nor does husband acquire wife’s property automatically---However, Islamic law does not prohibit legislation for protection of women in respect of matrimonial property where justice and prevention of hardship so require---Concepts of mut‘at al-talaq, maslahah, ijtihad and compensation for women’s contribution provide room for development of protective legal norms---Silence of classical law on community or matrimonial property does not bar modern legislation safeguarding women from post-divorce destitution and exploitation. (g) Comparative jurisprudence---Recognition of marital partnership and non-financial contribution---Held, in a number of jurisdictions including Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Brunei, United Kingdom, United States and Canada, courts and legislation recognize direct and indirect contributions of spouses in distribution of matrimonial assets---Homemaking and childcare are treated as contributions of equal worth to financial input in appropriate cases---Principles of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, equitable distribution and community property regimes demonstrate a broader modern trend that marriage is an economic partnership and domestic contribution materially aids acquisition and preservation of wealth---Such comparative experience may legitimately guide development of family law principles in Pakistan. (h) Women’s rights---Constitutional protection---International obligations---CEDAW---Held, Pakistan, having ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is under an obligation to reconsider its legal framework so as to eliminate discrimination against women in matters concerning ownership, acquisition, management and disposition of property, including consequences of dissolution of marriage---Equal protection of women, particularly homemakers and working wives, requires meaningful legal and policy safeguards in respect of assets acquired during marriage. (i) Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Writ jurisdiction---Limits on enhancement of relief---Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily reappraise evidence to enhance relief granted by trial court---Although appellate court had erred in law and fact by denying wife’s rights altogether, High Court could not itself enhance trial court’s award from 30% to a higher quantified share on writ side---Proper course was to set aside both judgments and remand matter to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties and applying correct legal principles. (j) Recommendations/observations---Legislative reform---Nikahnama---Protection of wife’s property rights---High Court observed that every wife who cohabits with husband during subsistence of marriage should be deemed to have contributed, through domestic labour, childcare and household management, to establishment and maintenance of matrimonial home and family welfare---Recommended that Government initiate comprehensive legislation for equitable distribution of assets acquired during marriage, with enhanced protection for working wives and recognition of homemaker’s contribution---Further observed that Nikahnama may be amended, or appropriate condition inserted in existing form, to record agreement regarding equal division of property acquired after marriage, so as to better protect matrimonial property rights of women. Petition was allowed, judgments and decrees of Family Court and Appellate Court were set aside, and matter was remanded to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties, to be decided within two months.

Summary: Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976—S. 22(1)(b), S. 22A, Ss. 2(e), 2(g), 2(q), 33, 34, 35 & Schedule, Cl. 1—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Art. 185(3)—Old-age pension—Qualifying period of fifteen years’ insurable employment—Rounding off of fractional service—Beneficial legislation—Administrative circulars vis-à-vis statute—Legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel—The controversy before the Federal Constitutional Court was whether insured employees who had completed more than fourteen years and six months of insurable employment, but less than fifteen full calendar years, were entitled to monthly old-age pension under S. 22(1)(b) of the Employees’ Old-Age Benefits Act, 1976, by applying the rule in Cl. 1 of the Schedule that a period of six months or more of insurable employment shall be treated as one full year. The Court held that the Act created two distinct benefit regimes: monthly old-age pension under S. 22(1) and lump-sum old-age grant under S. 22A; however, the statutory requirement of fifteen years’ insurable employment could not be read in isolation from the Schedule, which formed an integral part of the Act. The Schedule was not merely a computational appendage but a substantive legislative mechanism intended to account for fractional periods of insurable employment and to prevent denial of pension on account of marginal shortfalls. Therefore, where an insured person had completed fourteen years and six months or more of insurable employment, such period had, by legislative deeming fiction, to be treated as fifteen years, thereby satisfying the mandatory threshold under S. 22(1)(b). The Court emphasized that beneficial and social welfare legislation must receive a liberal, purposive and equitable construction to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief, and that a rigidly literal interpretation defeating pensionary entitlement because of negligible deficiency would be unjust and contrary to legislative intent. Administrative law—Executive circulars—Statute overriding administrative instructions—Legitimate expectation—Promissory estoppel—The petitioner Institution relied on Circular No. 1/2022 dated 17.02.2022 to contend that service of 14.5 years or more could not be rounded off for pension eligibility and that rounding off applied only after eligibility had independently been established. Rejecting that contention, the Court held that an executive circular could not override, curtail or dilute the parent statute or the Schedule appended thereto. The Court further noted that the Institution itself had earlier, through Circular dated 03.09.2019, acknowledged that shortfall of six months or less was to be treated as one full year for purposes of old-age pension, and that no material had been produced to show that the decisions forming the basis of that earlier circular had ever been set aside or displaced by a competent forum. In such circumstances, the subsequent executive attempt to undo an accrued and settled legal position was held ineffective. The Court also observed that where a public authority, by representation or consistent practice, creates rights or legitimate expectations in favour of beneficiaries under a social welfare scheme, such expectation cannot be arbitrarily defeated, and promissory estoppel restrains the authority from resiling from a consciously adopted position to the detriment of vested rights, absent overriding public interest sanctioned by law. Statutory interpretation—Schedule as integral part of enactment—Mandatory requirement and deeming fiction—The Court clarified that the High Court’s result was correct, though one aspect of its reasoning required refinement. The condition of fifteen years’ service in proviso (b) to S. 22(1) remained mandatory and had to be adhered to strictly; however, the Schedule did not negate or relax that requirement but supplied the legislatively sanctioned method of determining when that requirement stood fulfilled in cases involving fractional service. Thus, an employee who had not completed fifteen years in strict arithmetical terms could nevertheless be deemed, by force of the Schedule itself, to have completed fifteen years where the shortfall was six months or less. The respondents were therefore to be treated as having fulfilled all statutory conditions for monthly old-age pension. Case references—Colony Sarhad Textile Mills Ltd., Rawalpindi v. Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1976 SC 227); Abdus Salam Khan v. Salim-Ud-Din Ahmad Siddiqui and two others (PLD 1979 Lah. 85); Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division and another v. Abdul Rasheed Memon (2025 SCMR 532); State of U.P. and others v. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others (AIR 2005 SC 658); Messrs MCB Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (2014 PTD 1874); Mars, Incorporated through Authorized Signatory and others v. the Registrar of Trade Marks and others (2019 CLD 27); Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi (PLD 1969 SC 407). Petitions dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court were legally correct, suffered from no illegality, perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence, and rightly directed grant of monthly old-age pension to the respondents. Consequently, leave was refused and the petitions were dismissed, with all pending applications also disposed of.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 141, 142(a), 142(c), 143, 175F(3), 185(3)—Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010—Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025—Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967—S. 3—Balochistan Finance Act, 2020—S. 7—Legislative competence—Provincial autonomy—Labour welfare—Excise duty on minerals—Doctrine of pith and substance—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Cooperative federalism—The Federal Constitutional Court considered whether the amendment made through S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 to S. 3 of the Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967, enhancing the rate of duty on minerals, was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan on the ground that duties of excise fall within the exclusive federal domain under Entry 44 of the Federal Legislative List. The Court held that, after the Eighteenth Amendment, legislative power is distributed such that the Federation legislates only on subjects enumerated in the Federal Legislative List, while residual subjects vest exclusively in the Provinces; labour welfare, not being part of the Federal Legislative List, is therefore a provincial subject. The Court further held that the 1967 Act, when read as a whole and especially in light of its preamble, was enacted not merely to impose a fiscal levy, but to finance measures for promoting the welfare of labour employed in the mining industry. Accordingly, although the statutory mechanism employed was the levy and collection of excise duty, the dominant constitutional purpose and essential character of the legislation lay in labour welfare, which squarely fell within provincial competence. The amendment made by the Province was, therefore, not unconstitutional merely because it touched upon a fiscal instrument also known to federal legislative entries. Constitutional law—Doctrine of pith and substance—Incidental encroachment—Validity of legislation—The Court reaffirmed that where legislative spheres appear to overlap, the true nature and character of the impugned law must be determined through the doctrine of pith and substance. A law does not become invalid merely because it incidentally trenches upon a field otherwise assigned to another legislature; only a substantial encroachment disturbing the constitutional distribution of powers may render it ultra vires. Applying that doctrine, the Court held that the impugned provincial amendment did not amount to an impermissible invasion of federal legislative authority, because its real object was to support labour welfare in the mining industry and the enhancement of the levy was only a means adopted to advance that constitutionally legitimate provincial purpose. Constitutional law—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Same subject viewed from different constitutional aspects—The Court also invoked the doctrine of double aspect legislation and explained that a single subject may, in one aspect and for one purpose, fall within federal competence, and in another aspect and for another purpose, fall within provincial competence. Thus, while the levy of excise duty as a fiscal subject may ordinarily fall within the federal domain, the same measure, when examined from the standpoint of labour welfare and public interest in relation to mine workers, may validly operate within the provincial sphere. In such circumstances, both legislative aspects may co-exist in constitutional harmony, and the Court should prefer an interpretation that sustains rather than destroys legislation enacted by democratically elected bodies. Federalism—Post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional structure—Cooperative federalism—The Court emphasized that the post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional arrangement broadens provincial autonomy and reflects a commitment to participatory and cooperative federalism. The Federation and Provinces are not to be viewed as functioning in isolated compartments; rather, constitutional interpretation should favour harmonious operation of their respective powers. A rigid or formalistic reading that disregards the practical interaction of fiscal measures and welfare objectives would be inconsistent with the constitutional design. The impugned amendment, therefore, was held to represent a lawful and harmonious exercise of legislative power in furtherance of a legitimate provincial objective. Case references—Prafulla v. Bank of Commerce (AIR 1947 PC 28); Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (1982 CanLII 55 (SCC)); Sui Northern Gas Pipelines v. S.K. Pvt Limited (2025 SCMR 570); DG Khan Cement v. The Province of Punjab (2014 PTD 478); Pakistan College of Law v. University of the Punjab (W.P. No. 45178 of 2017, Lahore High Court). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the amendment introduced by S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 did not fall outside the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan. The petition was accordingly dismissed, leave was refused, and no order as to costs was made.

Summary: Punjab Police Rules, 1934—R. 12.16 & Appendix 12.16—Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2022—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 4, 9 & 25—Recruitment in Punjab Police—Medical fitness—Visual acuity—Appointment as Constable—Disabled quota—Candidate suffering from impaired vision—The petitioner applied on open merit for appointment as a Constable in the Punjab Police but was declared medically unfit by the competent medical authorities because his visual acuity in one eye did not meet the prescribed standard under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. The Federal Constitutional Court held that medical fitness is an essential and mandatory qualification for enrolment in the police force and assumes greater significance in a disciplined law-enforcement agency, where the nature of duties requires strict physical and medical standards. Rule 12.16 expressly mandates that every recruit must, before enrolment, be medically examined and certified physically fit for service, and Appendix 12.16 specifically requires that each eye independently meet the prescribed visual standard. Since the petitioner’s vision in one eye was recorded as “CF @ 1M,” which fell below the set criterion, he failed to satisfy the mandatory threshold of medical fitness and was, therefore, ineligible for appointment as Constable. The Court held that these provisions admit of no discretion and a candidate who does not meet the prescribed visual standard cannot claim appointment to the post. Service law—Comparison with serving officials on desk duties—No parity with candidate lacking threshold eligibility—The petitioner argued that similarly placed serving police officials with physical limitations were performing office duties and, therefore, he too should be appointed either as Constable or adjusted against some suitable post. The Court rejected the contention and held that such serving officials were not comparable to the petitioner because they had entered service after being declared medically fit and were later assigned administrative or office work due to service exigencies or subsequent limitations. The petitioner, on the other hand, never crossed the initial threshold of eligibility for recruitment, namely compliance with the prescribed medical standards for the post of Constable. Therefore, no case of discrimination or arbitrariness was made out merely because certain already-serving officials were performing desk assignments. Persons with disabilities—Protective legislation—Job quota—Beneficial interpretation—The Court nevertheless examined whether the petitioner’s case attracted protection under the Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2022, observing that society and law must move with the times to protect persons with disabilities from discrimination, particularly in employment. The Court noted that the 2022 Act, in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, reflected principles of dignity, non-discrimination, equality of opportunity, accessibility and inclusion, and that courts must play their role in implementing such beneficial legislation. The Court further observed that the absence of an express disabled quota in the advertisement was immaterial, as the statutory regime governing disabled persons formed an inbuilt part of all job advertisements to which the Act applied. Relying approvingly on Peerzada Waqar Alam v. National Accountability Bureau (2023 SCMR 742), the Court reiterated that disability quota is not confined to lower-grade posts and applies across an organization. It also cited, with approval, the Supreme Court’s order in the matter of Yousaf Saleem, a blind candidate for appointment as Civil Judge, and persuasive Lahore High Court precedent recognizing that disability cannot, by itself, justify exclusion from public employment where the candidate can perform the functions of the office. Persons with disabilities—Disability certificate—Conflict between disability assessment and recruitment standards—The Court found that the petitioner had fallen into an anomalous position. On the one hand, the police medical authorities declared him unfit for recruitment as Constable because of defective vision; on the other hand, the Assessment Board for Persons with Disabilities, District Attock, had not certified him as disabled for purposes of the 2022 Act, notwithstanding that low vision is recognized in the statutory schedule. The Court also noted an earlier certificate issued by Holy Family Hospital, Rawalpindi, opining that with his present visual status the petitioner was fit for office/light work as Constable only in the Punjab Police Department. In these circumstances, the Court held that the petitioner appeared to have been caught between two inconsistent administrative positions: not medically fit under police standards, yet not recognized as disabled for purposes of claiming employment under the disability quota. Administrative directions—Reconsideration of medical standards—Fresh medical examination—Reassessment by disability board—While declining to interfere with the recruitment policy or direct appointment of the petitioner as Constable, the Court observed that the Police Rules, 1934, were framed nearly ninety years earlier and that considerable advances in medical science and technology may necessitate re-examination of the police medical rules, especially those concerning vision. The Court, therefore, requested the Punjab Home Minister and the Inspector General of Police to re-examine the issue and to consider, if permissible under law, relaxation or accommodation in the petitioner’s case for appointment against a post ordinarily reserved for the disabled quota, such as desk or office work, provided he fulfilled all other requirements. The Court further directed the IGP Punjab to arrange a fresh medical examination from another independent hospital for an additional opinion regarding the petitioner’s eyesight and his suitability for employment as police Constable or any other position within Punjab Police, and also directed the Social Welfare and Bait-ul-Maal Department, Assessment Board for Persons with Disabilities, District Attock, to reassess whether the petitioner suffered from a disability in terms of low vision under the 2022 Act. Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that, at the present stage, the petitioner could not be appointed as Constable in Punjab Police because he had failed the mandatory medical test under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, and had not been issued a disability certificate enabling consideration under the disability quota. Finding no legal infirmity in the impugned order of the Lahore High Court, the Court refused leave and dismissed the petition, subject to the observations and directions issued for fresh medical examination, reassessment of disability status, and possible policy reconsideration by the competent authorities.

Summary: Short order ---- Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Ss. 4B & 4C—First Schedule, Part I, Division IIA & Division IIB—Fifth Schedule, Rules 4, 4AA & 4AB—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 25, 73(2)(a), 175F, 185(3)—Fourth Schedule, Federal Legislative List, Part I, Entry 47—Super tax—Constitutional validity—Nature of levy—Tax on income—The Federal Constitutional Court considered the vires of super tax imposed under S. 4B, introduced through the Finance Act, 2015 for raising revenue for internally displaced persons, and under S. 4C, introduced through the Finance Act, 2022 on high-earning persons. The Court held that both S. 4B and S. 4C were validly enacted taxes on income falling squarely within Entry 47 of Part I of the Federal Legislative List, and that Parliament was fully competent to impose, alter, regulate, or abolish such taxes through a Finance Act as part of a Money Bill under Art. 73(2)(a) of the Constitution. It was further held that super tax under S. 4B was a “tax” and not a “fee”, and that neither S. 4B nor S. 4C suffered from any inherent lack of legislative competence or facial constitutional infirmity warranting invalidation. Constitutional law—Fiscal legislation—Article 25—Classification—Income-based and sector-based distinctions—The Court held that the classification created under S. 4B was income-based, founded on intelligible differentia, and bore a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved; therefore, it was neither discriminatory nor productive of unreasonable or hostile discrimination among persons similarly situated. Likewise, the classification of fifteen sectors in the First Proviso to Division IIB, Part I, First Schedule, subjected to a higher rate of super tax under S. 4C for tax year 2022, was held to be reasonable and constitutionally permissible under Art. 25 of the Constitution. Consequently, the judgments of the Sindh, Lahore and Islamabad High Courts, insofar as they had declared the said proviso discriminatory, were set aside. Taxation—Retrospective operation of fiscal statutes—Tax year 2022 and onwards—Past and closed transactions—The Court held that the legislature possesses plenary power to enact laws with retrospective as well as prospective effect, subject to the limitation that such laws must not operate upon past and closed transactions. Applying that principle, it was held that S. 4C validly applied to tax year 2022 and onwards, and that the closing of accounts for a tax year did not, in the scheme of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, constitute such an event as would preclude imposition of a fresh charge, particularly when returns for tax year 2022 were yet to be filed. On the same reasoning, the rates in Division IIB amended through the Finance Act, 2023 were held applicable to tax year 2023. Accordingly, the contrary findings of the Sindh, Lahore and Islamabad High Courts, which had held S. 4C inapplicable to tax year 2022, and the amended rates inapplicable to tax year 2023, were set aside. Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—S. 4C(2)—Meaning of “income”—All sources of income—Capital gains on securities—The Court held that the statutory definition of “income” for purposes of S. 4C, insofar as it embraced income from all sources, was validly enacted. The judgments of the Islamabad High Court which had read down S. 4C were, to that extent, set aside. It was further held that super tax under S. 4C is a self-contained and standalone tax on income independent of the levy under S. 4 of the Ordinance, and, therefore, applies to capital gains falling under S. 37A and the Eighth Schedule, being within the ambit of S. 4C(2)(i) and (iv). Practice and procedure—Maintainability of appeals—Locus standi of CIR/FBR—Transposition of parties—The taxpayers raised a preliminary objection that appeals in the S. 4C matters were not maintainable because they had not been instituted by the Federation of Pakistan. The Court rejected the objection and held that it possessed inherent power to transpose a party where necessary for just and proper adjudication, and since the Federation was already before the Court as respondent, it could be transposed as appellant, which was accordingly done. The Court further noted that several connected matters had, in any event, been filed by the Federation itself in addition to the Commissioner Inland Revenue and Federal Board of Revenue; hence, the appeals were maintainable on that count as well. Exploration and petroleum companies—Fifth Schedule—Petroleum Concession Agreements—Aggregate tax ceiling—Super tax liability—The Court held that Ss. 4B and 4C, by virtue of Rules 4AA and 4AB of the Fifth Schedule, would apply to income arising to oil exploration and petroleum companies only to the extent that such application did not result in exceeding the aggregate rate of taxes provided in the Fifth Schedule and in their respective Petroleum Concession Agreements. In relation to S. 4C, the Court modified the Islamabad High Court judgment to the extent that the departmental determination of each Petroleum Concession Agreement was to be undertaken by juxtaposing its terms and conditions with the Regulation of Mines & Minerals (Government Control) Act, 1948 and the applicable tax law, whether the Income Tax Act, 1922, the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, or the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The Court further held that S. 4C would continue to apply to other income of such companies from all other sources falling under S. 4C(2)(i), (ii) and (iii), but the concerned Commissioner Inland Revenue must first determine liability afresh and afford an opportunity of hearing before taking recovery measures. Special statutory regimes—Sector-specific protection—No implied override—The Court held that S. 4C could not be construed to operate in a manner inconsistent with Rule 4 of the Fifth Schedule, because that rule embodied a sector-specific framework recognizing the unique nature, risks and investment requirements of the petroleum and exploration industry. Imposition of super tax beyond the prescribed threshold would override that legislative safeguard, impose an excessive and disproportionate burden, and frustrate the very purpose for which the special provisions had been enacted. In the absence of a clear and express legislative intention to abrogate or modify those sectoral thresholds, S. 4C could not be interpreted so as to produce that result. Banking companies—Super tax—Tax year 2023 onwards—The Court held that S. 4C, as enacted through the Finance Act, 2022, applied to banking companies for tax year 2023 and onwards, and at the rates made applicable to tax year 2023 by the Finance Act, 2023. Exempt entities—Provident and benevolent funds—Statutory exemption—Super tax not chargeable—The Court held that, without prejudice to the foregoing declaration upholding S. 4C, the said provision would not apply to income, particularly of benevolent funds, enjoying exemption from tax under S. 53 read with the relevant provisions of the Second Schedule to the Ordinance. Such funds constituted a distinct class expressly exempted by the Legislature in furtherance of recognized charitable and welfare objectives, and subjecting them to super tax would defeat the statutory exemption and be inconsistent with the legislative scheme. In the case of provident and benevolent funds before the Court, it was held that those holding valid exemption certificates under the Ninth Schedule read with the relevant entries in the Second Schedule were not liable to pay super tax under S. 4C. The Court directed such funds to furnish their exemption certificates for the relevant tax years to the concerned Commissioners Inland Revenue within fifteen days, whereupon written orders absolving them of liability were to be passed within seven days. Constitutional transition—Transfer of pending matters—The Court noted that, owing to the complexity of the issues and the large number of pending cases concerning Ss. 4B and 4C for multiple tax years, the Supreme Court had, by order dated 12.03.2025 under the erstwhile Art. 186A of the Constitution, directed that all such cases pending in various High Courts and the Supreme Court be transferred and clubbed for final adjudication. Upon the coming into force of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, all such cases stood transferred to the Federal Constitutional Court by virtue of Art. 175F of the Constitution. Appeals, petitions and transfer cases disposed of—The Federal Constitutional Court upheld S. 4B as intra vires and applicable for tax year 2015 and onwards; upheld S. 4C as intra vires and applicable for tax year 2022 and onwards; upheld the amended rates for tax year 2023; sustained the statutory definition of income and the sectoral classification under the First Proviso; declared S. 4C applicable to capital gains on securities and to banking companies for tax year 2023 onwards; limited the application of Ss. 4B and 4C to exploration and petroleum companies in accordance with the Fifth Schedule and their Petroleum Concession Agreements; protected exempt provident and benevolent funds from liability under S. 4C; set aside the contrary findings of the High Courts to the extent indicated; and disposed of all appeals, petitions and transfer cases accordingly.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 199, 201, 175F(1)(c) & 25A—Judicial review—Constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts—Equitable relief—Compassion and conscience of Judge—Courts as courts of law and not of personal sentiment—The Federal Constitutional Court held that High Courts, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199, are strictly bound to decide cases in accordance with law and cannot grant relief on the basis of compassion, hardship, equity, or personal notions of justice where no legal right or statutory basis exists. The Court emphasized that Pakistan’s constitutional order is founded on rule of law and constitutionalism, under which judges are required to interpret and apply the law rather than substitute it with individual morality or subjective conscience. It was held that the Constitution does not confer upon High Courts any general authority to do “complete justice” or to fill perceived gaps in law through equitable intervention, and that every case must be adjudicated within constitutional and statutory limits. Constitutional jurisdiction—Mandamus—Requirement of pre-existing legal duty and enforceable legal right—No writ can issue in absence of law—The Court held that a writ of mandamus under Art. 199(1)(a)(i) can only issue where the law imposes a duty upon a person or authority and a corresponding legal right exists in favour of the petitioner. In the present case, there was admittedly no law, rule, or regulation permitting a “special/super supplementary examination” for the respondent MBBS student. Therefore, the Sindh High Court acted without lawful authority in directing the University to conduct such examination and in effectively creating, through judicial order, a power and duty not recognized by law. The impugned direction was thus held to be beyond the permissible scope of mandamus and an instance of judicial overreach. Educational institutions—Autonomy in academic matters—Judicial restraint—Special/super supplementary examination—The Federal Constitutional Court reiterated that courts must sparingly interfere in the internal governance, academic structure, and disciplinary affairs of educational institutions, which possess specialized expertise and are entitled to regulate their own examinations and policies in accordance with law. Since the statutes and academic framework governing the medical university did not contemplate or permit a “special/super supplementary examination,” the Sindh High Court could not, under the guise of equitable relief or enforcement of rights, compel the University to hold an examination unknown to law. Judicial intervention in educational matters was held permissible only where the governing rules or policies offend natural justice or transgress statutory or constitutional limits, which was not the case here. Fundamental rights—Art. 25A—Right to education—Limits of enforcement jurisdiction—The Court observed that although Art. 25A recognizes the right to education, the enforcement of a fundamental right under Art. 199(1)(c) does not authorize a High Court to grant disproportionate or legally unsanctioned relief. Even in matters touching upon fundamental rights, the High Court remains confined by law and cannot invent remedies contrary to the statutory framework. The Court further found that the respondent’s plea that the relevant examination schedule was not uploaded on the website lacked substance, particularly when he admittedly appeared in the other supplementary examinations and the record showed that all other students were aware of the timetable. Precedent—Arts. 189 & 201—Binding effect of superior court judgments—Court cannot confine precedential value of its own decision—The Federal Constitutional Court held that once a court delivers a judgment deciding a question of law or laying down a principle of law, such judgment enters the stream of precedent and cannot be insulated by the court itself through a direction that it shall not serve as precedent. Such a course was held to undermine legal certainty, invite arbitrariness, and weaken judicial accountability. The Court emphasized that the doctrine of stare decisis is embedded in the constitutional structure, and that judges remain bound by the principles they pronounce as well as by the precedents of superior courts operating within the relevant constitutional hierarchy. It was further observed that the practice of granting relief in an individual case while disclaiming precedential effect would permit unchecked discretion and destabilize the rule of law. Constitutional structure—Federal Constitutional Court and Supreme Court jurisprudence—Partial disagreement with earlier precedent—The Court observed that while prior jurisprudence of the Supreme Court remains valid unless overruled, the Federal Constitutional Court, within its own constitutional domain, is competent to interpret the law independently. In that context, the Court partially disagreed with the proposition in Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174) to the extent it suggested that equity may step in where law has no answer to provide justice, holding instead that even in cases of perceived silence in law, courts must seek answers consistent with constitutional order, legal principle, and precedent rather than resort to free-standing compassion. Case references—The Court referred to and discussed the following authorities: Muhammad Umar Wahid v. University of Health Sciences, Lahore (PLD 2006 SC 300); Dossani Travels Pvt. v. Messers Travels Shop (PLD 2014 SC 1); Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum (PLD 2013 SC 174); Riaz Hussain through Legal Representatives v. Chairman Federal Land Commissioner (CPLA Nos. 962, 963 and 964 of 2023); DeShaney v. Winnebago County (489 U.S. 189, 1989); Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (597 U.S. 215); Khalid Mehmood v. Pakistan, through Ministry of Finance (2025); Muhammad Azam Khan Swati v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2023 Islamabad 184); Prof. Dr. Sheikh Israr Ahmed v. Government of Punjab (2025 PLC (C.S.) 182); Muhammad Azam Khan v. Government of N.W.F.P through Chief Secretary NWFP (1998 SCMR 204); and Khyber Medical University v. Aimal Khan (PLD 2022 SC 92). The Court also cited A.K. Brohi’s Fundamental Law of Pakistan and an academic article by Susan A. Bandes on compassion and rule of law. Appeal accepted—Impugned order set aside—Writ petition dismissed—The petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and allowed. The impugned order of the Sindh High Court directing the holding of a “special/super supplementary examination” was set aside, and the respondent’s constitutional petition stood dismissed.

Summary: Insurance Ordinance, 2000—Ss. 118(2), 130(1) & 156—Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013—S. 9(4)—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Art. 185(3)—Takaful claim—Nominee/beneficiary—Repudiation of claim—Alleged concealment and misrepresentation—Burden to substantiate repudiation—The Federal Constitutional Court held that where the deceased policyholder had obtained a life/Takaful policy, his death was admitted, and the respondent was the sole nominee duly recorded in the policy documents, the insurer could not lawfully repudiate the claim on bare allegations of concealment, delayed intimation, or alleged drug addiction without producing independent, contemporaneous, and reliable documentary evidence in support of such grounds. The Court observed that the insurer had failed to place on record any material substantiating misrepresentation or concealment at the time of obtaining the policy, and even the investigation report did not disclose any such incriminating material. In these circumstances, the Federal Insurance Ombudsman had rightly allowed the complaint and directed payment of the claim amount to the nominee under S. 130(1) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, together with liquidated damages under S. 118(2), while also referring the matter to SECP for action under S. 156 read with S. 9(4) of the Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013. Insurance law—Nominee—Entitlement to policy proceeds—The Court held that once the respondent’s status as sole nominee under the policy was undisputed, and the death of the insured was also admitted, her entitlement to receive the insured amount stood established, particularly when the insurer failed to prove any legally sustainable ground for avoiding the contract or denying liability. The mere assertion that the nominee was not the “real sister” of the deceased did not dislodge her position as the recorded beneficiary under the policy. Insurance law—Delayed intimation of death—Whether sufficient to defeat claim—The Court held that the principal objection regarding non-immediate intimation of death was, by itself, insufficient to justify rejection of the claim. In the absence of proof that such delay caused legal prejudice or was tied to any proved breach going to the root of the contract, repudiation of the claim on that basis alone was unsustainable. Insurance law—Allegation of drug addiction—Unsubstantiated allegation—The Court further held that the insurer’s plea that the deceased was a drug addict remained wholly unsubstantiated, because no medical record was produced to show that the death was attributable to addiction or that any relevant fact had been concealed at the proposal stage. Mere allegation, unsupported by medical or other documentary evidence, could not defeat the nominee’s claim under the policy. Constitutional jurisdiction—Concurrent challenge and enforcement proceedings—High Court judgment affirmed—The Federal Constitutional Court found no illegality in the Islamabad High Court’s judgment whereby the writ petition of the nominee seeking implementation of the Ombudsman’s order was allowed and the writ petition of the insurer challenging the Ombudsman’s order, the review order, and the President’s order was dismissed. The Court, therefore, declined to interfere. Case references—No precedent or case law appears to have been cited in the text provided in this order; accordingly, none can properly be added as judicially relied-upon authorities. Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, maintaining the impugned judgment of the Islamabad High Court and, thereby, the Ombudsman’s direction for payment of the Takaful claim and related relief.

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989—R. 3(2)—Recruitment to post of Qari (BPS-12)—Advertisement conditions—Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya—Exclusion of additional marks—Validity of recruitment criteria—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the petitioner, who had applied for the post of Qari (BPS-12) in the Elementary and Secondary Education Department, could not claim award of additional marks for the qualification of Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya, because the advertisement expressly provided that such marks would not be counted for cadres other than Theology Teacher (TT) and Arabic Teacher (AT). The Court observed that the prescribed qualification for the post of Qari was Bachelor’s Degree from a recognized university together with Qirat Sanad from a recognized institution, and that the petitioner had applied subject to those declared conditions. Since the advertisement unambiguously excluded marks of Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya for the post in question, the petitioner’s claim that those marks ought to have been added for improvement of his merit position was held to be without substance. Service law—Recruitment qualifications—Advertisement backed by statutory rules and notifications—No condition without lawful authority—The Court further held that the qualifications and conditions mentioned in the advertisement were not arbitrary or without legal basis, but were anchored in law. Reliance was placed on Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC/Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre dated 13.11.2012, whereby the minimum qualification for the post of Qari (BPS-12) had been prescribed, and on subsequent Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC (Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre/2017 dated 30.01.2018), through which the qualification was enhanced to Bachelor’s Degree along with Qirat Sanad and mandatory in-service training. The Court also noted that these notifications had been issued in pursuance of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989. Accordingly, the challenge to the impugned condition on the ground that it lacked legal backing was repelled. Equality clause—Uniform treatment of candidates—No discrimination—The Federal Constitutional Court held that no case of discrimination had been made out, as the petitioner was not singled out for hostile treatment. Rather, all competing candidates for the post of Qari were treated alike, and none was given marks for Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya in respect of that cadre. Since the exclusion applied uniformly to all applicants and was founded on the governing recruitment framework, the petitioner could not successfully invoke any claim of unequal treatment. Recruitment to public post—Candidate not possessing qualification as recognized for the advertised cadre—No enforceable right to appointment—The Court concluded that the petitioner did not fulfill the qualifications in the manner recognized for the post for which he had applied, and that his grievance was rooted in an attempt to import marks from a qualification expressly excluded for that cadre. In such circumstances, he had no enforceable right to seek revision of his merit position or appointment on the basis of marks not admissible under the advertisement and the governing legal framework. Case references—No judicial precedent or prior case law was cited or discussed in the text of the reported order. The Court relied on the following statutory and administrative instruments: Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC/Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre dated 13.11.2012; Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC (Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre/2017 dated 30.01.2018; and Rule 3(2) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989. Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court found that the petitioner was not entitled to marks for Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya for the post of Qari (BPS-12), that the recruitment conditions were lawful and uniformly applied, and that the impugned judgment of the Peshawar High Court called for no interference. Leave to appeal was, therefore, refused and the petition dismissed.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 10A, 40, 184(3) & 175E(4)—Criminal Procedure Code, 1898—S. 4(1)(l)—Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020—Ss. 2(1)(c), 4 & 7—Suo motu proceedings—Murder of journalist abroad—Independent and transparent investigation—Judicial supervision of investigation—Limits of constitutional jurisdiction—The Federal Constitutional Court, while dealing with the suo motu case regarding the murder of journalist Arshad Sharif in Kenya, held that although the State is under an obligation to ensure a fair, independent and transparent investigation, the constitutional courts cannot continuously supervise, monitor, or control the conduct and manner of investigation merely by keeping proceedings pending. The Court observed that Article 10A guarantees not only a fair trial but also an investigation free from undue pressure and interference, and such protection begins from the inception of the investigative process. However, the statutory sphere of investigation belongs to the police and investigating agencies, and judicial assumption of ongoing supervisory control would be prejudicial to fairness, inconsistent with settled jurisprudence, and beyond the proper constitutional role of the Court. Since no objection had been raised to the findings of the fact-finding process or the Special Joint Investigation Team, and the real concern related only to the pace of progress in a matter involving a foreign sovereign state, no justification existed for continued judicial monitoring. Criminal law—Investigation—Functions of judiciary and police—Non-overlapping spheres—Relying on Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim (PLD 2009 SC 102), the Court reiterated that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary but not overlapping, and that the conduct and manner of investigation normally cannot be scrutinized in constitutional jurisdiction. It further relied on Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani (PLD 1994 SC 281) for the principle that continued court control over investigation is prejudicial to the accused and detrimental to fairness of procedure. Referring also to S. 4(1)(l), Cr.P.C., the Court held that investigation means proceedings for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or other authorized person, and does not contemplate continuous supervision by courts. The Court noted that judicial intervention in investigation is confined to exceptional situations, such as habeas corpus matters, mala fide investigation, or cases of jurisdictional excess, as recognized in Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof (2025 PCrLJ 1140). Accordingly, the request of the deceased’s family to keep the suo motu proceedings pending for ongoing oversight of the investigation was declined. Constitutional law—Foreign affairs—Article 40—International forums—Judicial restraint—The Court further held that it could not issue directions requiring the Federal Government to raise the matter at international forums, because such a course would intrude into the domains of foreign policy and diplomatic engagement, which constitutionally belong to the Federal Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Article 40, though reflective of constitutional aspirations to foster goodwill and friendly relations among nations, did not justify judicial management of foreign relations. The Court noted that the Supreme Court had earlier accepted the position that mutual legal assistance and diplomatic channels should first be allowed to run their course, with recourse to international forums to be considered only if the need subsequently arose. The matter was therefore left to the good sense and discretion of the Federal Government. Mutual Legal Assistance—Cross-border criminal investigation—Pakistan and Kenya—Statutory framework in both states—The Court observed that both Pakistan and Kenya have enacted legal regimes governing mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. In Pakistan, the Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020 establishes the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, as the central authority empowered to make requests for assistance in criminal investigations and proceedings; while in Kenya, the Mutual Legal Assistance Act, 2011 vests corresponding authority in the Office of the Attorney General. A request for mutual legal assistance had been made by Pakistan to Kenya on 22.02.2023, accepted by Kenya, and the agreement was signed on 10.12.2024. In addition, the record showed constitution of the SJIT, diplomatic contacts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, communication between the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the President of Kenya, examination of the Kenyan case file, engagement with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions of Kenya, contact with the pathologist who conducted the post-mortem, and issuance of black warrants against the alleged perpetrators. In these circumstances, the Court held that the matter was actively proceeding through lawful investigative and diplomatic channels in both sovereign states and did not warrant judicial interference. Case references—Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim (PLD 2009 SC 102); Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani (PLD 1994 SC 281); Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof (2025 PCrLJ 1140). The Court also referred to the earlier orders passed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the same proceedings dated 13.02.2023 and 17.03.2023, particularly regarding the impermissibility of judicial supervision over investigation and the propriety of allowing mutual legal assistance and diplomatic processes to continue. Suo motu action disposed of—Pending applications disposed of—The Federal Constitutional Court held that, in light of the steps already taken by the Federal Government and the legal frameworks operating in Pakistan and Kenya, no further judicial intervention was required. The suo motu proceedings were accordingly disposed of, with observation that if the legal heirs of Arshad Sharif had any specific grievance, they could approach the court of competent jurisdiction.

Summary: Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Ss. 42, 44, 52, 53, 166 & 172(2)(vi)—Specific Relief Act, 1877—S. 42—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 175F(1)(c) & 199—Revenue record—Old sanctioned mutations—Non-implementation for over a century—Correction of entries—Clerical or arithmetical mistake—Contentious dispute—Jurisdiction of revenue authorities—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the alleged non-implementation of Mutation No. 117 dated 29.12.1907 and Mutations Nos. 401 and 402 dated 30.01.1913 could not be treated as a mere clerical or arithmetical mistake capable of correction by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967. The Court observed that where implementation of century-old mutations would potentially disturb long-standing revenue entries, affect possible intervening alienations, and prejudice third parties not before the forum, the matter plainly assumes a contentious character. In such circumstances, the limited power of correction available to revenue authorities cannot be invoked for deciding substantive controversies affecting proprietary rights. The Court further held that the discretion under S. 166 is not unbridled and is confined to cases free from factual controversy and incapable of adversely affecting vested rights without proper adjudication. Revenue law—Record-of-rights—Presumption of correctness—Remedy against adverse entry—The Court held that Ss. 42, 44, and 52 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 collectively regulate the preparation, evidentiary value, and correction of the record-of-rights, and once entries are incorporated therein, a presumption of truth attaches to them until the contrary is proved or lawful substitution is made. To dislodge such presumption, the law itself provides a remedy through S. 53 of the Act, enabling an aggrieved person to institute a suit for declaration under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, where he is prejudiced by an entry in the record-of-rights or periodical record relating to a right of which he is in possession. The Court reaffirmed that the statute does envisage an appropriate remedy even where summary correction before revenue authorities is unavailable. In this regard, reliance was placed on Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334). Jurisdiction—Civil court and revenue authorities—Section 172(2)(vi), Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967—Bar of jurisdiction not absolute in contentious matters—The Federal Constitutional Court examined the petitioners’ contention that, because S. 172(2)(vi) bars civil court jurisdiction regarding correction of entries in the record-of-rights, periodical record, or register of mutations, only revenue authorities could grant relief. Rejecting the broad proposition, the Court held that the exclusion recognized in S. 172(2)(vi) operates in matters of correction that are not controversial in nature. Where, however, the dispute involves contentious questions, competing rights, and possible effect on absent parties, the matter cannot be summarily resolved by revenue authorities. The Court relied upon Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906), wherein the Supreme Court clarified that only non-controversial corrections in revenue record fall within the exclusive domain of revenue authorities to the exclusion of civil courts. Delay and equity—Laches and acquiescence—Unexplained silence for more than a century—The Court held that the petitioners’ claim was hopelessly belated, having been raised for the first time in the year 2020 in relation to mutations sanctioned in 1907 and 1913. It was observed that the petitioners had failed to produce any material explaining why their predecessors-in-interest did not seek implementation during their lifetime, or why the petitioners themselves remained silent for decades. Such inordinate and unexplained delay attracted the principles of laches and acquiescence with full force. The mere existence of old sanctioned but unimplemented mutations did not automatically entitle the petitioners to their implementation after a lapse of over one hundred years, particularly in the face of possible competing claims and long-standing contrary entries in the revenue record. Constitutional jurisdiction—Article 199—Disputed questions of fact and title—Scope of writ jurisdiction—The Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 is meant to provide prompt relief where illegality or impropriety is apparent on the face of the record and can be determined without elaborate inquiry or recording of evidence. Where, however, the controversy involves disputed or intricate questions of fact, title, or enforceability of old mutations, requiring proper evidence and adjudication, the High Court cannot assume the role of a fact-finding forum. Such matters fall within the domain of courts of plenary jurisdiction. In support of this proposition, the Court referred to Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61), Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990), and Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). The Court accordingly held that the Lahore High Court rightly declined to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction. Natural justice—Affected third parties—No adverse order behind the back of interested persons—The Court observed that during the extraordinarily long interregnum between the sanction of the mutations and the filing of the petitioners’ application, it was highly probable that various transactions, alienations, or changes in possession had taken place, and that third parties may have acquired rights on the basis of the existing revenue entries. Any order directing implementation of the old mutations without impleading such persons or affording them opportunity of hearing would violate the principles of natural justice and risk grave miscarriage of justice. This consideration further demonstrated that the matter was not one of a simple ministerial correction but of substantive adjudication. Case references—Muhammad Yousaf v. Khan Bahadur through Legal Heirs (1992 SCMR 2334); Dildar Ahmad and others v. Member (Judicial-III), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another (2013 SCMR 906); Nazir Ahmad and another v. Maula Bakhsh (1987 SCMR 61); Fida Hussain and another v. Mst. Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990); Waqar Ahmed and others v. the Federation of Pakistan (2024 SCMR 1877). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the controversy regarding implementation of century-old mutations was contentious in nature, could not be resolved by revenue authorities under S. 166 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967, and was not amenable to determination in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution. Finding no legal infirmity in the orders of the Member Board of Revenue, the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), and the Lahore High Court, the Court dismissed the petition and refused leave.