Summary: Following question of law has been put before this Court for opinion: Whether the learned Full Bench of the NIRC is competent to remand the matter for recording of evidence of the parties in the presence of the consent of the parties before the learned Single Bench to decide the case on the basis of the available record, particularly in the light of Regulation 60 of the Regulations, which permits dispensation with recording of the evidence? Held that perusal of Regulation 60 of the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure and Functions) Regulations, 2016 indicates that it is designed to facilitate expeditious disposal of the industrial disputes, by permitting adjudication on the basis of the available record where recording of evidence is not necessary, or where it can be curtailed or dispensed with. However, the scope of Regulation 60 is neither absolute nor exercisable at the cost of effective factual determination. Further held that learned Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission, remains fully competent to examine whether the controversy could have been justly resolved without recording of evidence by giving cogent reasons as to why such dispensation was not appropriate. 30Family 51854/24 Mst. Sosan Jaan & 3 others Vs ADJ Lahore etc. Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 26-01- 2026 2026 LHC 1241

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 141, 142(a), 142(c), 143, 175F(3), 185(3)—Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010—Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025—Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967—S. 3—Balochistan Finance Act, 2020—S. 7—Legislative competence—Provincial autonomy—Labour welfare—Excise duty on minerals—Doctrine of pith and substance—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Cooperative federalism—The Federal Constitutional Court considered whether the amendment made through S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 to S. 3 of the Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967, enhancing the rate of duty on minerals, was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan on the ground that duties of excise fall within the exclusive federal domain under Entry 44 of the Federal Legislative List. The Court held that, after the Eighteenth Amendment, legislative power is distributed such that the Federation legislates only on subjects enumerated in the Federal Legislative List, while residual subjects vest exclusively in the Provinces; labour welfare, not being part of the Federal Legislative List, is therefore a provincial subject. The Court further held that the 1967 Act, when read as a whole and especially in light of its preamble, was enacted not merely to impose a fiscal levy, but to finance measures for promoting the welfare of labour employed in the mining industry. Accordingly, although the statutory mechanism employed was the levy and collection of excise duty, the dominant constitutional purpose and essential character of the legislation lay in labour welfare, which squarely fell within provincial competence. The amendment made by the Province was, therefore, not unconstitutional merely because it touched upon a fiscal instrument also known to federal legislative entries. Constitutional law—Doctrine of pith and substance—Incidental encroachment—Validity of legislation—The Court reaffirmed that where legislative spheres appear to overlap, the true nature and character of the impugned law must be determined through the doctrine of pith and substance. A law does not become invalid merely because it incidentally trenches upon a field otherwise assigned to another legislature; only a substantial encroachment disturbing the constitutional distribution of powers may render it ultra vires. Applying that doctrine, the Court held that the impugned provincial amendment did not amount to an impermissible invasion of federal legislative authority, because its real object was to support labour welfare in the mining industry and the enhancement of the levy was only a means adopted to advance that constitutionally legitimate provincial purpose. Constitutional law—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Same subject viewed from different constitutional aspects—The Court also invoked the doctrine of double aspect legislation and explained that a single subject may, in one aspect and for one purpose, fall within federal competence, and in another aspect and for another purpose, fall within provincial competence. Thus, while the levy of excise duty as a fiscal subject may ordinarily fall within the federal domain, the same measure, when examined from the standpoint of labour welfare and public interest in relation to mine workers, may validly operate within the provincial sphere. In such circumstances, both legislative aspects may co-exist in constitutional harmony, and the Court should prefer an interpretation that sustains rather than destroys legislation enacted by democratically elected bodies. Federalism—Post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional structure—Cooperative federalism—The Court emphasized that the post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional arrangement broadens provincial autonomy and reflects a commitment to participatory and cooperative federalism. The Federation and Provinces are not to be viewed as functioning in isolated compartments; rather, constitutional interpretation should favour harmonious operation of their respective powers. A rigid or formalistic reading that disregards the practical interaction of fiscal measures and welfare objectives would be inconsistent with the constitutional design. The impugned amendment, therefore, was held to represent a lawful and harmonious exercise of legislative power in furtherance of a legitimate provincial objective. Case references—Prafulla v. Bank of Commerce (AIR 1947 PC 28); Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (1982 CanLII 55 (SCC)); Sui Northern Gas Pipelines v. S.K. Pvt Limited (2025 SCMR 570); DG Khan Cement v. The Province of Punjab (2014 PTD 478); Pakistan College of Law v. University of the Punjab (W.P. No. 45178 of 2017, Lahore High Court). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the amendment introduced by S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 did not fall outside the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan. The petition was accordingly dismissed, leave was refused, and no order as to costs was made.

Summary: (a) Labour laws –– Gratuity, provident fund and pension –– Vested / inherent right of employee –– Financial crunch of employer or public sector entity –– Effect. Petitioners, officers/employees of Pakistan Steel Mills (PSM), assailed non-payment of gratuity and other terminal benefits and discriminatory amendments in Gratuity Fund Rules; High Court declined relief primarily on ground of PSM’s persistent financial losses –– Held, gratuity, provident fund and pension, where structured through trust deeds, rules or statutory provisions, constitute vested and inherent rights of employees, deeply rooted in industrial relations and civil service law, and are not dependent on the profit or loss of the employer –– Non-payment of such terminal dues “has nothing to do with losses or financial crunch”; an employer is bound to discharge these liabilities promptly upon superannuation and cannot indefinitely delay, shelve or render them uncertain on plea of financial constraints –– Such benefits, though sometimes described as “bounty”, when regulated by legal provisions or rules, assume the character of a legal obligation, not a mere act of grace –– Reference made to Inspector General of Police, Quetta v. Fida Muhammad (2022 SCMR 1583) and Annoor Textile Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1994 SC 568) on vested rights and legal character of “bounties”. (b) Service / labour benefits –– Gratuity Fund Rules –– Amendment reducing scope of benefit (gross pay vs basic pay) –– Vested rights, retrospectivity and promissory estoppel. Petitioners contended that amendments to PSM Gratuity Rules converted gratuity from gross-pay basis to basic-pay basis for them, while CBA-represented workers continued to receive gratuity on gross pay; vires of amendments and their discriminatory effect were specifically challenged –– High Court, however, gave no findings on validity, effective date or retrospective operation of such amendments and non-suited petitioners solely on ground of PSM’s financial crisis –– Supreme Court held that questions whether amendments were lawfully made, whether they prejudiced or impaired vested rights of employees, and whether they operate prospectively or retrospectively, were crucial and had to be determined with clear findings –– Citing Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 1652) and earlier authorities (Sheikh Fazal Ahmed v. Raja Ziaullah Khan, PLD 1964 SC 494; Works Cooperative Housing Society v. KDA, PLD 1969 SC 430; etc.), Court reiterated that a notification or rule which impairs existing or vested rights or imposes new liabilities cannot operate retrospectively without clear legal sanction, whereas beneficial notifications may operate retrospectively; doctrine of promissory estoppel may also preclude exercise of legal rights where unconscionable. (c) Constitutional jurisdiction –– Duty to decide all material issues –– Doctrine of sub silentio –– Precedential value of a judgment rendered without addressing crucial questions. Constitution petitions before High Court involved multifarious claims: non-payment of gratuity, challenge to amendments in gratuity rules, non-payment of special allowance and ad-hoc allowance, and alleged discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis CBA employees –– High Court confined itself essentially to issue of ad-hoc allowance and financial constraints, leaving other pleas and legal challenges unaddressed –– Supreme Court held that many crucial questions of law raised by petitioners were not considered; judgment, therefore, attracted doctrine of “sub silentio” in that the Court decided the matter without addressing specific points of law squarely raised for determination, thereby disturbing the precedential weight of such decision –– Reiterating earlier exposition in Syed Saad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (2025 SCP 318) and referring to Lancaster Motor Co. v. Bremith Ltd. (1941 1 KB 675), it was held that a decision reached without argument, without reference to critical statutory language and without citation of authority is not binding as precedent and cannot be followed. (d) Constitutional law –– Challenge to vires of rules –– Presumption of constitutionality –– Need for reasoned determination. Court reaffirmed that vires of laws, rules or regulations can be challenged if ex facie discriminatory, in which case actual proof of discriminatory treatment is not always necessary; however, there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality unless provisions are plainly violative of constitutional guarantees –– Where petitioners specifically assail amendments in service/gratuity rules as discriminatory or violative of vested rights, High Court is obliged to examine such challenge on the touchstone of applicable constitutional and statutory provisions and record definite findings, rather than dispose of the matter merely on administrative or financial grounds –– Reference made to Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739). (e) Industrial relations –– Public sector corporation in financial distress –– Retrenchment, VSS and residual claims. PSM’s plea that financial crunch had led to closure permission, retrenchment of a segment of employees through Labour Court and introduction of Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) was noted –– However, no record was before Supreme Court regarding which petitioners were retrenched or had opted for VSS, and whether, under the VSS scheme, any further claims survived –– Court directed that upon remand, High Court would examine, on record, which employees (if any) accepted VSS, and then determine, in accordance with law and the terms of the scheme, whether any residual claims or rights survive despite acceptance of VSS. (f) Result –– Petitions converted into appeals and allowed –– Remand. Civil Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; impugned consolidated judgment of High Court dated 16.01.2023 was set aside –– Matter remanded to High Court of Sindh to decide all issues raised by the parties, including vires and operation of amendments to Gratuity Rules and claims regarding gratuity and allowances, strictly in accordance with law after affording ample opportunity of hearing, preferably within three months of receipt of Supreme Court judgment.

Summary: (a) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ----Standing Orders 1, 12, 13 & 14---Seasonal factory---Sugar mill---Classification of workman---Respondent initially appointed as seasonal worker and subsequently promoted to technical and skilled posts culminating in appointment as Centrifugal Operator---Nature of duties attached to the post of Centrifugal Operator held to be permanent and indispensable for functioning of sugar factory---Respondent continuously engaged for several years including off-season retention on partial salary to ensure availability for next crushing season---Length and continuity of service coupled with permanent nature of duties brought respondent within definition of “permanent workman” under Standing Order 1---Employer failed to establish that respondent remained merely a temporary or seasonal worker. (b) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ----Standing Order 12---Termination of service---Mandatory requirement of written order stating reasons---Respondent removed from service without compliance of statutory procedure---No lawful notice, no valid termination order and no explicit reasons furnished---Termination held illegal and void. (c) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ----Standing Order 13---Retrenchment---Last come first go---Burden of proof on employer---Employer pleaded retrenchment on account of financial constraints and claimed respondent was last employed in the relevant category---No evidence produced to substantiate alleged financial crunch---No proof that respondent was in fact last person employed as Centrifugal Operator---Employer took mutually destructive pleas of seasonal termination and retrenchment---Failure to satisfy statutory conditions of lawful retrenchment. (d) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ----Standing Order 14---Re-employment of retrenched workman---Seasonal factory---Statutory obligation to give preference---Employer neither pleaded nor proved compliance with requirement of offering re-employment or preference to respondent in subsequent crushing season---Violation of mandatory statutory mandate---Termination rendered unlawful. (e) Service jurisprudence ----Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference by Supreme Court---Labour Appellate Tribunal and High Court returned concurrent findings after proper appreciation of facts and law---No perversity, illegality or misreading of evidence established---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings. (f) Case-law ----Indian Supreme Court precedents relating to cessation of purely seasonal employment and doctrine of “litigious employment” examined---Held, not applicable---Present case based on long continuous service on a permanent technical post and plea of retrenchment which remained unproved---Cited precedents held distinguishable on facts and law. Cited cases: • Morinda Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Kishan and others AIR 1996 SC 332 • Anil Bapurao Kanase v. Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. AIR 1997 SC 2698 • Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi (3) (2006) 4 SCC 1 • Town Administration and another v. Mohammad Khalid and others 2024 SCMR 1862 = 2024 SCP 295 Disposition: Civil appeal dismissed; impugned judgment of High Court of Sindh upheld; reinstatement of respondent sustained.

Summary: It is an undisputed fact that the petitioners had been working on daily wage basis with the respondents for several years and had been receiving monthly salaries as per the settled terms and conditions outlined in their appointment letters, which was also admitted by the respondents in their written statement submitted before the Labour Court. A significant divergence between the findings of courts below lies in the status of the petitioners. The Labour Court treated them as "permanent workmen" under Section 1(b) of the Ordinance, whereas, Appellate Tribunal declared them to be "temporary workmen" and dealt with under Section 12(2) of the Ordinance. From perusal of the impugned judgment, it shows that while the Appellate Tribunal applied Section 12(2) of the Ordinance in this case, however the court failed to consider the implications of Section 12(3), which mandates that no workman shall be terminated, removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed except by a written order explicitly stating the reasons for such action. This omission renders the findings of the Appellate Tribunal legally flawed and without justification. Termination of service through a verbal order is not only inconsistent with the labour and service laws but also violates the principles of good governance. 2022 SCMR 636. 584Crl. Revision 13684/22 Kameer Khan Vs The State etc. Justice Abher Gul Khan 09- 04- 2025 2025 LHC 2310 2025 MLD 1565 (Lahore)

Summary: (a) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 (2010 Act) & Constitution of Pakistan ----Secs. 2(h), 4(4)(ii), 7, 8; Arts. 14, 18, 25, 34, & 184(3) Sexual harassment—Scope and legal framework—Petitioner, a driver, was accused of workplace harassment by respondent No.5, a lady doctor—Allegations included verbal abuse, character assassination, unethical conduct with female patients, and unauthorized video recording of respondent No.5 during an ultrasound procedure—Ombudsperson, Punjab, found the allegations established under Sec. 2(h) of the 2010 Act and imposed the major penalty of compulsory retirement under Sec. 4(4)(ii)—Governor of Punjab dismissed petitioner’s representation, and Lahore High Court upheld the decision—Petitioner’s constitutional petition was also dismissed by the Supreme Court. Held, sexual harassment in workplaces is not an individual grievance but a systemic issue perpetuating gender inequality—It restricts women’s economic participation and violates fundamental rights under Arts. 14 (dignity), 18 (right to a safe working environment), and 25 (equality) of the Constitution—Laws against workplace harassment, including the 2010 Act and its Amendment Act, 2022, align with constitutional protections and international obligations—No jurisdictional error or illegality was found in the impugned judgment—Petition dismissed. Cited Cases: • Uzma Naveed Chaudhry v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 783 • Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57 (1986) • Harris v. Forklift System 510 U.S. 17 (1993) • Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 • Janzen v. Platy Enterprises [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 • Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) (b) Workplace Harassment—Gendered Power Dynamics ----Power imbalance—Hostile work environment—Intersectionality Petitioner, despite holding a subordinate position as a driver, exerted informal power through social reinforcement and gender privilege, creating a hostile work environment for a senior female doctor—Harassment in workplaces stems from entrenched societal norms and gender hierarchies rather than formal authority—Power imbalances allow subordinates to undermine women in leadership roles—Workplace harassment laws must be interpreted in light of systemic discrimination and gendered power structures. Cited Literature: • Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (1979) • Paula Nicolson, Gender, Power and Organization: A Psychological Perspective on Life at Work (1996) • Deborah Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Equality (1999) (c) International Human Rights Standards & Legal Obligations ----ILO Violence and Harassment Convention No. 190—CEDAW—UN Sustainable Development Goals Pakistan’s workplace harassment laws align with international legal instruments, including: • ILO Violence and Harassment Convention No. 190—First binding treaty against workplace harassment, not yet ratified by Pakistan. • CEDAW (1979)—Protects women’s right to a safe working environment free from discrimination. • UN Sustainable Development Goals (Goals 5 & 8)—Mandate elimination of workplace violence and ensuring decent work conditions. Held, ratifying the ILO Violence and Harassment Convention would strengthen Pakistan’s legal protections against harassment, promote human dignity, and reinforce gender equality commitments under international law—Copy of the judgment directed to the Attorney-General of Pakistan for consideration of ratification. Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal dismissed.

Summary: (a) National Commission for Human Rights Act, 2012 –– Ss. 9 & 18 –– Jurisdiction –– Scope of authority –– Limits of intervention –– Pension dispute involving private bank employee –– The National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) is empowered under Section 9 of the NCHR Act, 2012 to inquire into violations of human rights by public servants––The Commission’s jurisdiction does not extend to service or pension disputes of private sector employees––NCHR cannot adjudicate private contractual matters such as pension enhancement of employees of commercial banks like UBL––Such directive is ultra vires and amounts to jurisdictional overreach. (b) Constitutional Law –– Art. 9 –– Right to life –– Human dignity –– Pension as element of livelihood –– Scope and limitation –– While the right to a dignified life under Article 9 includes the right to livelihood and sustenance, disputes regarding pension are governed by statutory and contractual frameworks applicable to the relevant employment––Human rights bodies cannot convert service disputes into human rights violations unless gross abuse or discrimination by public authorities is established. (c) Labour Law –– Private Sector Employment –– UBL employee –– Nature of service rights –– Pension rights –– Contractual nature –– Remedies –– Retired employees of private commercial banks are governed by private employment contracts and labour statutes––Their service grievances, including pension claims, must be adjudicated by labour courts, tribunals, or forums specified under the applicable service or banking laws––Human rights bodies are not appropriate adjudicatory forums for such claims. (d) Jurisdiction –– Human Rights Commission –– Abuse of mandate –– Principles –– Doctrine of institutional competence –– Specialized forums –– NCHR’s attempt to direct a private bank to enhance pension of an employee intrudes into areas reserved for labour courts or civil jurisdiction––Intervention by NCHR in such matters undermines institutional comity and circumvents specialized adjudication––Held, NCHR order not sustainable and rightly set aside by learned Single Judge. Relied on: Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416) UBL v. National Commission for Human Rights (Judgment of IHC dated 16.06.2022) 2018 SCMR 736 (relied on in impugned order for scope of jurisdictional limits) (e) Practice and Procedure –– Intra-Court Appeal (ICA) –– Maintainability –– Dismissal in limine –– Appeal barred on jurisdictional grounds –– ICA filed by NCHR challenging the order of the learned Single Judge was found to be without merit––No legal infirmity in the finding that NCHR lacked jurisdiction––ICA dismissed in limine. Disposition: Appeal dismissed in limine; order of Single Judge upheld; remedy, if any, lies before appropriate labour or civil forum.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 185(3)---Master and servant---Contractual employment---Termination---Reinstatement---Maintainability of civil suit---Scope---Employees of petitioner-Bank were terminated under disciplinary proceedings---Suits for declaration and reinstatement were decreed by civil court, upheld in appeal and revision by High Court---Petitioner contended that relationship being purely contractual, reinstatement could not be ordered under well-settled rule that courts do not enforce contract of personal service---Held, the leading authority Malik and Haq v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury PLD 1961 SC 531 was cited in support of proposition that even if termination is unlawful, reinstatement cannot be granted---Court questioned continuing applicability of said principle in modern context of large impersonal corporate employers and formalized disciplinary regimes---Observed that rigid application of said rule fails to reflect evolution of employment law and economic realities, including the structure of multinational and state-owned corporations and vulnerability of wrongfully terminated employees---Noted that equity requires legal rules to remain adaptable and responsive to changing societal frameworks---Held, the principle laid down in Shamsul Islam Chowdhury requires reappraisal on basis of first principles and contemporary needs. Cited Cases: • Malik and Haq v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury PLD 1961 SC 531 • Jubilee General Insurance Co. Ltd. Karachi v. Ravi Steel Company, Lahore PLD 2020 SC 324 • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 (b) Employment law---Private sector employment---Reinstatement v. damages---Equitable jurisdiction---Scope---Held, modern employment with corporate entities governed by detailed service codes and internal hierarchies diverges from traditional notions of personal contract between master and servant---Application of rigid doctrine barring reinstatement may in fact amount to denial of justice in circumstances where wrongful termination renders employee effectively unemployable and damages offer inadequate redress---Equity and discretion of court cannot be restricted by ossified rules that prevent development of law---Courts must retain jurisdiction to grant effective and meaningful relief in appropriate cases. (c) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, S.2---Reference to larger bench---Binding precedent by five-member bench---Scope---Held, judgment in Malik and Haq v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury PLD 1961 SC 531 was rendered by a five-member bench---Any reconsideration of principle laid down therein requires larger bench of appropriate strength---Matter directed to be placed before Committee constituted under section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 for appropriate orders. Disposition: Leave to appeal granted. Interim relief granted on 15.04.2024 to continue. Office directed to place matter before Committee constituted under section 2 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 for referral to larger bench.

Summary: Although, matters relating to employees of trans-provincial organizations are to be dealt with by N.I.R.C. and not by forums constituted under provincial laws, yet where to determine that whether employer organization is a trans-provincial organization or not requires recording of evidence, claim before payment of wages authority cannot be summarily rejected. 793C.Ref. (Custom Reference) 34648/24 Jahanzaib . Vs Additional Collector Customs etc Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 12- 12- 2024 2024 LHC 5865

Summary: Employee(s) employed on work charge basis in Government departments are not always construed as employed in the administration of the State. 824Writ Petition- Service- Dismissal 1050-22 RAHEEM AHMAD VS FOP ETC Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha 26-11- 2024 2024 LHC 5414