Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199----Dowry and bridal gifts---Recovery of alternate value of dowry articles---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner/wife challenged concurrent family court judgments whereby trial court had granted 30% alternate value of dowry articles but appellate court had set aside even that relief---Held, dowry articles and personal belongings of a wife remain her exclusive property and, where not returned in specie, she may claim their alternate value, subject to proof of existence, entrustment and retention---Appellate Court failed to appreciate material admissions and surrounding circumstances, including respondent/husband’s own stance that household articles were available in the house and his admission that no traditional dowry was given at the time of marriage, coupled with his assertion that he purchased various household luxuries during matrimony---Where original financial details were withheld by husband and wife’s bank record showed regular withdrawal of her salary for household consumption, presumption operated in favour of wife’s contribution---Appellate Court had, therefore, misdirected itself in discarding claim in toto merely on ground that wife had not produced her parents or further documentary proof. (b) Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act (LXXVIII of 1976)----Ss. 2 & 5---Dowry---Meaning and legal status---Property given to bride before or after marriage by her parents in connection with marriage constitutes dowry, excluding inherited property---Wife has absolute right in her dowry and bridal gifts---Any property rights available to a woman cannot be restricted, controlled or limited, and every gift becomes her exclusive property---There is no legal bar to a wife purchasing household articles herself after marriage and claiming them as dowry articles within the meaning of law, if such articles were acquired in connection with marriage and matrimonial home. Reliance placed on Ghulam Rasool v. Family Court 1991 CLC 1696 and Syeda Mehwish v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West) 2018 CLC 1337. (c) Family proceedings---Proof of dowry articles---Nature of evidence required---Strict rules of evidence---Held, wife’s solitary statement may be sufficient to prove existence of dowry items in a recovery suit, and oral testimony can substantiate a dowry claim because Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not apply in its strict sense to family proceedings---There is no rigid formula requiring receipts, shopkeepers’ details or production of parents in every case---Determination depends upon facts of each case and overall probabilities emerging from evidence. Reliance placed on Aziz-Ur-Rehman v. Mst. Bibi Jameela 2020 CLC 380 and Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous 2017 SCMR 393. (d) Dowry articles---Valuation of used household goods---Principles---Held, valuation of dowry articles is to be made case to case with reference to nature, quality, user period and prevailing market conditions---Judge, Family Court cannot adopt a bare rule of thumb without objective criteria---For assessing alternate value of used household articles, relevant factors include: present and past market value; years of use; average life of article; sentimental value attached to item; need to account for replacement at current price where article remains with husband; online market sources and auction platforms for valuation; reasonable depreciation; inflation and consumer price data; and average market prices supplied by parties---Used item may generally be considered at half price, but not below that level, unless marital breakdown occurred within first one or two years, in which case value may be considered around 80% in view of inflation and taxation---Family Court may use modern scientific tools, data, websites and market applications without requiring expert evidence in every case. Reliance placed on Mst. Ayesha Shaheen v. Khalid Mehmood 2013 SCMR 1049; Muhammad Zahid v. Mst. Ghazala Mazhar 2014 CLC 895; Mst. Samreen Bibi v. Judge Family Court PLD 2015 Lahore 504; and Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal 2017 SCMR 321. (e) Matrimonial property---Assets acquired during subsistence of marriage---Vehicle purchased in husband’s name---Claim of wife on basis of contribution---Islamic jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence and equitable principles---Petitioner/wife claimed that vehicle bearing Registration No. AAK-478, Suzuki Cultus, though standing in husband’s name, was acquired with her financial contribution including initial seed money---Held, such asset required consideration not merely as dowry but as matrimonial property---Though under existing Pakistani law a wife does not automatically acquire ownership in husband’s assets merely by marriage, proprietary interest may still be established through proof of contribution, partnership, trust, gift or joint acquisition---Non-financial contributions such as homemaking, childcare and domestic management possess economic significance and can justify recognition of beneficial interest in assets accumulated during marriage---Marriage operates as a cooperative partnership and there should be no bias in favour of sole titled money-earner against homemaker or child-carer. (f) Islamic law---Marriage and property rights---Separate ownership of spouses---Legislative competence to protect women’s matrimonial rights---Held, under classical Islamic jurisprudence husband and wife remain distinct legal persons with separate property rights; wife retains control over her own property and does not, by marriage alone, become owner of husband’s property, nor does husband acquire wife’s property automatically---However, Islamic law does not prohibit legislation for protection of women in respect of matrimonial property where justice and prevention of hardship so require---Concepts of mut‘at al-talaq, maslahah, ijtihad and compensation for women’s contribution provide room for development of protective legal norms---Silence of classical law on community or matrimonial property does not bar modern legislation safeguarding women from post-divorce destitution and exploitation. (g) Comparative jurisprudence---Recognition of marital partnership and non-financial contribution---Held, in a number of jurisdictions including Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Brunei, United Kingdom, United States and Canada, courts and legislation recognize direct and indirect contributions of spouses in distribution of matrimonial assets---Homemaking and childcare are treated as contributions of equal worth to financial input in appropriate cases---Principles of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, equitable distribution and community property regimes demonstrate a broader modern trend that marriage is an economic partnership and domestic contribution materially aids acquisition and preservation of wealth---Such comparative experience may legitimately guide development of family law principles in Pakistan. (h) Women’s rights---Constitutional protection---International obligations---CEDAW---Held, Pakistan, having ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is under an obligation to reconsider its legal framework so as to eliminate discrimination against women in matters concerning ownership, acquisition, management and disposition of property, including consequences of dissolution of marriage---Equal protection of women, particularly homemakers and working wives, requires meaningful legal and policy safeguards in respect of assets acquired during marriage. (i) Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Writ jurisdiction---Limits on enhancement of relief---Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily reappraise evidence to enhance relief granted by trial court---Although appellate court had erred in law and fact by denying wife’s rights altogether, High Court could not itself enhance trial court’s award from 30% to a higher quantified share on writ side---Proper course was to set aside both judgments and remand matter to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties and applying correct legal principles. (j) Recommendations/observations---Legislative reform---Nikahnama---Protection of wife’s property rights---High Court observed that every wife who cohabits with husband during subsistence of marriage should be deemed to have contributed, through domestic labour, childcare and household management, to establishment and maintenance of matrimonial home and family welfare---Recommended that Government initiate comprehensive legislation for equitable distribution of assets acquired during marriage, with enhanced protection for working wives and recognition of homemaker’s contribution---Further observed that Nikahnama may be amended, or appropriate condition inserted in existing form, to record agreement regarding equal division of property acquired after marriage, so as to better protect matrimonial property rights of women. Petition was allowed, judgments and decrees of Family Court and Appellate Court were set aside, and matter was remanded to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties, to be decided within two months.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 18.03.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in W.P. No. 1954 of 2019). (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched. & S.10(5)---Suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---High Court directing return of entire prompt dower, challenge to---Marriage remaining unconsummated---Effect---Wife’s liability confined to surrender up to 25% of admitted prompt dower---Statutory limit in Punjab---Scope---Briefly, after the parties’ nikah was solemnized, prompt dower was admitted as 15 tolas of gold; however, rukhsati did not take place and marriage remained unconsummated; wife filed a suit for dissolution through khula; she did not plead that the admitted prompt dower was unpaid; Family Court decreed khula subject to surrender of 25% of the admitted prompt dower; Appellate Court upheld that decree, whereas, High Court set aside the concurrent judgments and directed return of the entire prompt dower of 15 tolas on the ground of non-consummation---Question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to “whether, in a khula case in Punjab governed by Section 10(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, the wife could be directed to return the entire prompt dower due to non-consummation, or her liability was statutorily limited to surrender up to 25% of the admitted prompt dower?”---Held: Section 10(5) of the Act, 1964 (specifically in the province of Punjab) empowered the Family Court, in cases of khula, to direct the wife to surrender up to twenty five percent of her admitted prompt dower to the husband and it did not make any distinction between consummated and unconsummated marriages---In the present case the admitted prompt dower being 15 tolas of gold, the maximum liability of the petitioner under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1964 could not exceed twenty-five percent i.e. 3.75 tolas of gold --- Impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside---Present petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, in circumstances. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.& 10(5)---Husband claiming recovery of various items given to wife relating to wedding functions---Permissibility---Law draws a clear distinction between dower, dowry, bridal gifts and presents---Items given by a husband or his family in connection with marriage fall within the category of bridal gifts or presents and, as such, vest absolutely in the bride---Such items cannot be reclaimed by the husband, as they do not constitute dower nor are they recoverable as personal property of the husband. Amicus Curiae: Barrister Umar Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms. Maliha Zia, Advocate. Iftikhar Ahmed Awan, Advocate Supreme Court along with the Petitioner in person. Atif Nisar Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 24th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 9(1) ---Suit for dissolution of marriage, maintenance, recovery of dowry articles and delivery expenses---Right to file written statement struck off---Fire incident in court premises on the date fixed for filing written statement---Effect---Where earlier date becomes in fructuous due to court not functioning due to fire incident---Right to fair trial---Scope---Facts:---In the present constitutional petition, the petitioner/defendant challenged the Family Court’s order whereby his right to file a written statement was closed; the petitioner/defendant was initially proceeded ex parte and later appeared, and his application to set aside ex parte proceedings was allowed subject to costs, with the case fixed for written statement---Due to a fire incident in the building, the case was adjourned, when the written statement and costs were not submitted and the right was closed---Issue: “Whether, in these circumstances, the Family Court lawfully and judiciously exercised its discretion under Section 9(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 in closing the petitioner’s right to file the written statement, or whether the order was passed without proper application of mind and in derogation of the right of fair trial?”---Held: Ex-parte proceedings previously initiated against the petitioner/defendant were set-aside on 15.10.2025 and matter was adjourned to 25.10.2025 for submission of written statement and payment of costs, however, on the adjourned date due to previous outbreak fire on 16.10.2025 in the building, where court was situated, the case was adjourned for 19.11.2025, when said right had been closed---Thus, practically, 19.11.2025 was the first date fixed for filing of written statement as on the previous date fixed on 25.10.2025, court work was not possible as per showing of the court order itself that case had been adjourned due to outbreak of fire in the building---The counsel for the petitioner on the said adjourned date made a request for adjournment to comply with the previous orders, which was declined and the right of the petitioner was closed, which appeared to be prima facie done in a hasty manner and without appreciation of record and application of mind as the court did not point out in the said order that how many opportunities had been previously granted that were treated as sufficient time and opportunity by the court to proceed against the petitioner---Impugned order prima facie appeared to have been passed in a haste without consultation of record and was a non-speaking order resulting in prejudice to the right of the petitioner of fair trial provided under Art.10-A of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Mst. Safia Bano and another v. Home Department Government of Punjab through Secretary and others PLD 2021 SC 488 rel. Sajawal v. Judge Family Court, District Multan and another 2020 YLR 359; Hanif Brothers v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1999 CLC 520; Muhammad Shamim Siddiqui v. Mrs. Kausar Aziz 1988 MLD 1613; Sheikh Abdul Majeed v. Tayab Ali 1984 MLD 793; Habib Bank Limited v. Hazrat Hussain 2005 CLD 1541; Muhammad Waseem v. Rehana Kausar and others 2025 LHC 5566 ref. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.9(1)---Family suit---Written statement, filing of---Statutory timeline, extension of---Scope---In terms of subsection (1) of S.9 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, the defendant in a family suit is required to file written statement within 15-days of his appearance before the court, which time may be extended by the court if the defendant shows sufficient cause that prevented him to file written statement within time. (c) Administration of justice--- ----Mere expediency of a case could not always mean a hasty and hurried decision without application of judicious mind, yet the court where the said decision has been called in question is always competent to see whether the decision issued due to expediency has advanced the cause of justice or has resulted in prejudice to the rights of any party and for that purpose the court has always to keep in mind the two time tested principles that ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’ and ‘Justice hurried is justice buried’ and balance has to be kept between these two principles to avoid prejudice to any party---Hasty decisions that cause prejudice to a party are generally deprecated by courts. Syed Saeed Muhammad Shah and another v. The State 1993 SCMR 550 rel. Rai Sarfraz Ahmed Kharl for Petitioner. Muhammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General Punjab, Syed Ali Allow-u-Din, Syed Imran Ehsan, Ch. Imtiazullah Warraich, Sh. Waseem Ahmed, Aitzaz Aslam Chaudhry, Syed Muhammad Haider Kazmi for Respondents. Mir Haroon-ur-Rasheed, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondents.

Summary: (a) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973--- ----Rr. 2, 3 & 9---Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010), Ss. 3, 4 & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Misconduct---Disciplinary proceedings---Harassment at workplace---Proceedings---Object, purpose and scope---Petitioner / civil servant was aggrieved of show cause notice issued to him regarding departmental inquiry on the allegation of sexual harassment of a female employee---Validity---Proceedings initiated under provisions of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 are a matter between Federal Government in its capacity as an employer and a civil servant in his/her capacity as an employee---Purpose of such proceedings is to ensure that an employee is abiding by the terms and conditions of service prescribed for purposes of his/her conduct in discharge of his/her duties---Object and scope of Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 is altogether different as the rationale for enactment of such law, as explained in its Preamble, is to provide for protection of women from harassment at workplace---Set of facts on the basis of which a complaint was founded against accused under provisions of Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 needed to be inquired into, which if proved, consequences and penalties prescribed under Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 were to flow toward petitioner / civil servant---Proceedings under Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 are adversarial in nature, where a complainant makes allegations against an accused and the same have to be proved on the basis of cogent evidence---Penalties prescribed in terms of S. 4 of Protection Against Harassment of Women At the Workplace Act, 2010 may be similar to, or overlap with, the penalties prescribed in terms of R. 4 of Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, and the same has no bearing on the object, purpose and effect of the proceedings under Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 on one hand and Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, on the other---High Court declined to interfere in show cause notice issued to petitioner / civil servant--- Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Nadia Naz v. The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 2023 SC 588; Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen and others PLD 2024 SC 795; Faraz Naveed v. District Police Officer Gujrat 2022 SCMR 1770; Imran Amir v. Mst. Ismat Bibi and another 2023 CLC 1059; Dr. Sohail Hassan Khan v. Director General (Research), Livestock and Dairy Development Department, Punjab 2020 SCMR 1708; Asif Mehmood Butt v. Regional CEO, NBP 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1462; Falak Sher v. Inspector General Police, Lahore 2005 SCMR 1020; DIG of Police v. Anees ur Rehman Khan PLD 1985 SC 134; Syed Muhammad Iqbal Jafri v. Registrar, Lahore High Court 2004 PLC (C.S.) 809; Saifur Rahman v Chairman, National Accountability Bureau PLD 2022 SC 409; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 1995 SCMR 626; The State v. Jehangir Akhtar 2018 SCMR 733; I.A. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041; Pir Muhammad v. Government of Balochistan 2007 SCMR 54 and Muhammad Hassan Ullah v. Chief Secretary Government of Balochistan 2025 SCMR 134 ref. (b) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973--- ----R.3---Disciplinary proceedings---Scope---Proceedings under Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 are not necessarily adversarial in nature---Such proceedings are meant to confirm and ensure that terms and conditions of service prescribed for purposes of Civil Servants Act, 1973 including requirements as to conduct and efficiency of an employee, are being complied with. Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Raja Muhammad Jawad Arsalan, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents. Muhammad Ahmad Pansota, Barrister Scheherzaday Shehryar and Guzel Mobeen for Respondent No.4. Sher Alam Khan and Zeeshan Raza Zaidi, SOs, Establishment Division for Respondents. Ms. Zaib Tayyab, Director SS(A) and Ghulam Mustafa, APS, MOFA for Respondents. Date of hearing: 26th August, 2025.

Summary: Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993 (XI of 1994) --- ----Ss.5, Sched., 7 & 14---Suit for recovery of dower, maintenance allowance, and return of dowry articles---Maintenance allowance---Entitlement and computation---Wife being ousted from matrimonial home ---Effect ---List of dowry articles not being signed by wife or her counsel, plea of---Burden of proof---Present appeals arose from a consolidated judgment passed by the family court, whereby suits filed by the plaintiff (wife) against the defendant (husband) for recovery of dower, maintenance allowance, and return of dowry articles were decided---Marriage was solemnized with agreed dower of Rs.5,00,000/-, and the plaintiff (wife) was ousted from the matrimonial home and divorce took place---The family court dismissed the suit for dowry articles, decreed dower partly in the form of a house valued at Rs.2,00,000/- and Rs.3,00,000/- in cash, and awarded maintenance at Rs.10,000/- per month from 03.02.2022 till divorce and for the iddat period---Held: The defendant though levelled the allegation of bad character against the plaintiff but he failed to prove the same rather such conduct of defendant was a proof of the fact that his behavior was cruel towards the plaintiff/wife so if wife left the house of husband due to allegations of bad character by the husband, her desertion could not be declared as willful, thus the court below rightly declared the plaintiff entitled to get the dower as well as maintenance allowance---Since the plaintiff herself pleaded in her plaint that after marriage she was re-settled with the defendant many times and lastly she was ousted from home on 03.02.2022, hence the court below rightly declared her entitled to get the maintenance form 03.02.2022---The quantum of maintenance fixed by court below was also justified because the parties agreed that in case of desertion the defendant was bound to pay maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month---Plaintiff/wife was also entitled to receive the dowry articles mentioned in the list or their depreciation price since the marriage remained valid for four years and plaintiff failed to mention the price of every item separately---Moreover, plea from husband that list of dowry articles was not signed by wife or her counsel had no force---Documenting of dowry articles was not necessary to be proved in strictosensu---Appeal filed by wife was accepted and those filed by husband were dismissed, in circumstances. Saqib Ahmed Abbasi for Appellant (in Family Appeal No. 416 of 2024). Fazal Mehmood Baig for Plaintiff/Appellant (in Family Appeal No. 419 of 2024). Date of hearing: 14th October, 2025. Verdict: (i) the Appeals Nos. 416/2024, 417 2024 and 420/2024 are hereby dismissed. (ii) The Appeal No. 419/2024 is hereby accepted by declaring the plaintiff entitled to receive the dowry articles as per dowry list or its present price.

Summary: ----Ss.2(n), 4(4) & 8---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.13---Harassment at workplace complaint---Occurrence not taking place at workplace, plea of---Jurisdiction of Ombudsman, challenge to---Abuse of authority by supervisor---‘Whatsapp’ messages, evidentiary value of---Facts: Petitioner challenged the order whereby the Governor of Punjab dismissed his representation and upheld the Ombudsperson (Mohtasib) decision passed on a harassment complaint filed by respondent No.3, an ad hoc teacher at a government vocational institute where the petitioner was her supervisory officer; after inquiry and recording evidence, the Ombudsperson held the petitioner guilty of “harassment” under the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 and imposed the major penalty of removal from service, which was affirmed in representation, leading to the filing of present constitutional petition---Issue: “Whether, in the circumstances, the Ombudsperson lawfully assumed jurisdiction and the impugned findings/penalty could be sustained, particularly regarding the requisite nexus with ‘workplace’?”---Held: Plea of petitioner/accused regarding occurrence not taking place at workplace was misconceived as the mandate and scope of Act, 2010 travelled beyond the boundaries of office building---The facts of the present case unmistakably disclosed a sufficient workplace nexus, thereby excluding the hypothesis that the petitioner’s conduct was purely personal in nature---In the present case, the parties did not interact as equals in a private capacity; rather, their relationship was structured by hierarchy and dependence---Factors highlighted provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation under the standard of preponderance of probabilities, justifying reliance on the ‘Whatsapp’ messages to establish harassment and abuse of authority within the workplace, without necessitating formal forensic certification---The petitioner’s alleged visit to the complainant’s residence could not be viewed in isolation; it appeared, prima facie, to be a continuation of a pattern of harassment that had already manifested through workplace-linked communication and misuse of supervisory authority---The conclusion regarding the guilt of the petitioner reached by the Ombudsperson, affirmed by the Governor, appeared to be not only in consonance with law but also reasonable and logical inference that could be drawn from the material available on the record in the given facts and circumstances of the case---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010), Ss.4(4)(ii) & 8---Harassment at workplace proceedings---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, exercise of---Scope---In the challenge qua proceedings under the Act, 2010,jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution is supervisory in nature---High Court does not sit as a court of second appeal to re-appraise evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the competent forum---Interference is warranted only where findings are perverse, contrary to law or based on no evidence at all. Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen and others 2024 PLC (C.S.) 957 ref. (c) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----S.2(n)---Harassment at workplace complaint---Occurrence not taking place at workplace and Ombudsman lacking jurisdiction, pleas of---Legality---Harassment not confined to boundaries of office building---Scope---Private misconduct distinguished---Jurisdiction of Ombudsman, invoking of---Pre-requisites---The Act, 2010 does not confine its operation to the physical boundaries of an office building---Section 2(n) defines “workplace” in expansive terms, expressly including “any situation that is linked to official work or official activity outside the office”---At the same time, it must be clarified that the Act, 2010 does not convert every private dispute or personal misconduct between two individuals into workplace harassment merely because they happen to be colleagues---The jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson is attracted only where the impugned conduct arises out of, is facilitated by, or is inseparably connected with the employment relationship, or where the authority, influence, or power derived from office is used, explicitly or implicitly, to exert pressure, seek compliance, or create a hostile environment. (d) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----Preamble---Harassment at workplace---Delay in reporting---Initial silence---Effect---Initial silence would not be construed as waiver / estoppel---Scope---Within the cultural context of our society, it is a reality that women often refrain from immediately disclosing incidents of harassment, not due to acquiescence, but out of concern for their dignity, family honour, and social stigma---Their initial silence, therefore, cannot be construed as waiver, acquiescence, or estoppel against later seeking redress once they gather the courage to report. Uzma Naveed Chaudhary and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2022 SC 783 rel. (e) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----Ss.4 & 8---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.13---Harassment complaint---Simultaneous criminal proceedings, pendency of---Double jeopardy, plea of---Scope---The principle of protection against double punishment or double prosecution as embodied in Art.13 of the Constitution is directed against successive criminal trials or punishments based on the same offence---In stark contrast, the complaint before the Ombudsperson under the 2010 Act engages a separate statutory discipline and administrative-disciplinary regime, designed to safeguard workplace dignity, regulate conduct, and impose service-related consequences (minor or major penalty), not criminal punishment---The object, purpose, and consequences of such proceedings are distinct from those of a criminal trial---As such, the mere pendency of a criminal case does not automatically oust or suspend the statutory jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson. Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen and others 2024 PLC (C.S.) 957 ref. (f) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----Ss.3, 7 & 8(1)---Harassment complaint, filing of---Appropriate forum---Options for the complainant---Scope---Under the Act, 2010 the forum for lodging a complaint of harassment is either the Inquiry Committee constituted under S.3 of the Act or the Ombudsperson appointed under S.7 thereof---Section 8(1) of the Act explicitly gives option to an employee to prefer a complaint before either of the said forums. (g) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (IV of 2010)--- ----Ss. 8 & 10---Workplace harassment complaint---Jurisdiction of Ombudsman---Procedure of entertaining complaint---Non-adherence to Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Penal Code, 1860 and Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Scope---The legislature has intentionally refrained from subjecting the Ombudsperson to the rigid, technical and formalistic procedural framework applicable to civil suits or criminal trials---This conferment of procedural flexibility is neither accidental nor superfluous---It reflects a deliberate legislative design to ensure that complaints of workplace harassment often sensitive, interpersonal and context-specific are resolved in a manner that is fair but not encumbered by the technicalities that might stifle or frustrate the delivery of justice---Significantly, neither the Act nor the Rules contain any express provision mandating the Ombudsperson to adhere to the formal rules of procedure that govern civil courts (such as the Code of Civil Procedure,1908) or criminal courts (such as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898)---Equally, there is no requirement necessitating compliance with the strict rules of evidence contained in the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Courts have consistently held that administrative and disciplinary authorities vested with quasi-judicial powers are required to observe principles of natural justice, but are not bound by the technical rules of criminal evidence and procedure---The Ombudsperson’s forum functions on the civil standard of proof i.e. preponderance of probabilities and not on the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Nadia Naz and another v. The President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan Islamabad and others PLD 2023 SC 588 rel. Rahat Naseem Malik v. President of Pakistan and others 2003 PLC (C.S.) 759 ref. (h) Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Rules, 2013--- ----R.5---Workplace harassment complaint---Complaint not being verified and supporting material not being annexed, objections of---Legality---Rule 5 lays down the contents and ideal form of a complaint but does not prescribe any penal consequence for non-compliance, nor does it declare such omissions to be fatal to the maintainability of the complaint---The requirement of verification in sub-rule (3) must be construed as directory rather than mandatory---Non-verification or improper verification of plaint/complaint is merely an irregularity which does not entail penal consequences of rejection of plaint/complaint. Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. through Authorized Attorney v. Needle Point (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive and others 2016 CLD 2066 ref. Muhammad Shoaib Rashid for Petitioner. Mohammad Osman Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents. Ch. Umar Hayat Kamran Rajoka for Respondent No. 3. Amicus Curiae: Aiyan Tariq Bhutta. Date of hearing: 15th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 17-A(2)(a)---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance by wife and minor children---Minor needing special care---Obligation of father to maintain minor children---Quantum of maintenance, determination of---Father contracting second marriage---Effect---Financial capacity of father, consideration of---Power of family court to fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint---Scope---Facts in brevity were that the petitioner/wife contracted marriage with respondent/husband and from the wedlock a son was born---During her pregnancy, the respondent/husband expelled the petitioner/wife from his house and failed to provide any financial support during pregnancy or after childbirth---The petitioner filed suit for recovery of past and future maintenance for herself and the minor child, along with dowry articles and dower amount---The family court decreed partial maintenance i.e. Rs. 20,000 per month for the petitioner till the iddat period and Rs.25,000 per month for the minor till an interim order, followed by Rs. 30,000 per month with annual increment, while dismissing her claim for dowry and delivery expenses---The appellate court later reduced the maintenance by Rs.10,000/-, leading the petitioner/wife to file the present writ petition---Held: When the quantum of maintenance was examined in the context of double-digit inflation, the rising cost of living, and the specialized requirements of an autistic child, it became manifest that the sum of Rs.10,000/- reduced by the appellate court did not align with either the welfare of the minor or the established principles of law---Moreover, plea of father of having contracted second marriage and having more dependents to maintain was misconceived---Obligations arising from subsequent marriage could not operate to the detriment of children from an earlier marriage particularly where the child needed special care---Father could not absolve himself from his primary and continuous duty of maintaining such a child merely on the plea that he had additional dependents---Amount determined by the appellate court was inadequate to meet even the most basic needs of a child, much less a special child requiring continuous medical and therapeutic attention---As and when the final order was passed the amount fixed by the family court could be modified and revisited in that the quantum of maintenance could be increased or decreased after appraising, evaluating and examining the evidence produced during the trial---Thus, the mere fact that the interim maintenance was initially fixed at Rs.7000/- could not have constrained the Trial Court from enhancing the quantum of final maintenance to Rs.30,000/- due to peculiar needs of the minor who was a special child---Appellate court was directed to make a fresh determination of maintenance keeping in view the updated medical, special, educational and other living expenses of the minor---However, the assessment was to be made whilst considering the father's actual income and financial capacity which required determination through cogent evidence---Impugned order was set aside to the extent of the quantum of maintenance fixed for the minor---Constitutional petition was partially allowed, in circumstances. Murad Khan v. Mst. Humaira Qayyum 2025 SCMR 739 rel. Syeda Farhat Jahan v. Syed Iqbal Hussain Rizvi and another 2010 YLR 3275; Dr. Muhammad Jawad Jan Arif v. Dr. Ayesha Chaudhry and 2 others 2022 CLC 89 and Syed Zain Muntazar Mehdi v. Mst. Sara Naqvi 2024 CLC 1580 ref. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, Sched.---Maintenance allowance for minor children---Minor with special needs---Obligation of father to maintain his minor children---Scope---A father is not only under a legal obligation but it is also his moral and religious duty to maintain his children---This obligation is firmly rooted in the injunctions of the Holy Qur'an, which in Surah Al-Baqarah declares, "And clothing and maintenance must be borne by the father in a fair manner." [Al-Baqarah: 233]---The dictate of the Qur'an, therefore, places upon the father a continuous responsibility to provide sustenance, clothing, education, and medical care to his children in a just and equitable manner, commensurate with his means and status---This duty becomes even more accentuated where the child requires special care---Any attempt to dilute or evade such responsibility would be contrary not only to the law of the land but also to the spirit of Shariah, which emphasizes compassion, fairness, and protection of the vulnerable---Father is under a legal and moral obligation to maintain his children---The concept of maintenance is not confined merely to food and shelter; rather, it encompasses all necessary expenses relating to education, clothing, medical treatment, transportation, and recreational activities, so as to enable the child to live a life of dignity consistent with the status of his father. Humayun Hassan v. Arslan Humayun and another PLD 2013 SC 557 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----Ss.5, Sched. & 17A(4)---Maintenance allowance for minor children---Minor requiring special needs---Obligation of father---Quantum of maintenance---Determination---Factors to considered---Scope---Quantum of maintenance requires due consideration of all factors on the basis of which the court can determine the actual need of the minor---In this regard, it is important for the court to first determine the expenses incurred or likely to be incurred on the minors---For this purpose the court must look into the living conditions of the minor and the manner and means by which the mother is maintaining the minors which will include factors like where they reside, whether the mother is dependent upon her family, if so what is the income on the basis of which the minor is also being cared, whether she has a job and whether she has any source of independent income---Special needs of the minor which will include medical or physical needs or special educational needs should also be seen---Special needs will vary from case to case, if relevant, as it is unique to the situation and individual---Yet for the purpose of maintenance it is the obligation of the father to fulfill these special needs---In the case of enhancement, the court must also determine as to what extent the maintenance already fixed meets the requirement and expenses of the minor and for what purpose, further enhancement is required---At the same time the court must determine the income of the father either through proper documentary evidence or on the basis of the social status and earning capacity of the father---In order to ensure that proper information is before the court, it may always require the father to produce documents such as his salary slips or any bank statement or property document on the basis of which he is able to show his monthly income or earning or his financial status---In this regard, the assets owned by the father are relevant as it contributes towards establishing the financial status of the father that has to be probed into by the court and based on attending circumstances the court can conclusively establish the means through which the father will be able to maintain the minors---It is also important to take into consideration any liability of the father, that is whether he is paying any bank loan or debt, whether he has remarried or has other children or whether his parents are dependent on him---In this way the court can determine the manner in which the income of the father is spent and balance the income and capacity with the reasonable requirements of the minors seeking maintenance---In this regard, it is noted that S.17(A) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 specifically provides in subsection (4) that for the purposes of fixing maintenance, the court may summon the relevant documentary evidence from any organization, body or authority to determine the estate and resources of the defendant---The purpose of this provision is to facilitate the court to determine the financial position of the father---The court therefore is not dependent on documents or information provided by the father and can call for relevant documents or information be it from the relevant department or organization or as the case requires, in order to determine the income of the father. Nazia Bibi and others v. Additional District Judge, Ferozewala and others PLD 2018 Lahore 916 ref. (d) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.17-A(2)(a)---Power of family court to fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint---Scope---Family court is empowered to fix an amount of maintenance higher than the amount prayed for in the plaint or higher than what was fixed as interim maintenance, having regard to the afflux of time or other relevant circumstances. Ms. Hajira Zakir Shah and Ms. Sana Liaqat for Petitioner. Sardar Muhammad Nasir Khan along with the Respondent No. 1. Date of hearing: 16th November, 2025.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, ‘Sched.---Suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, dower and dowry articles---Non-consummation of marriage, plea of---Paternity, denial of---DNA test, request for---Legitimacy of a child born during subsistence of marriage, presumption of---Scope---Constitutional petition filed after 23 months but connected petitions filed promptly---Effect---Laches, non-applicability of---Facts:---The petitioner/wife filed a suit against the respondent/husband for maintenance, dower and dowry; the respondent/husband filed a counter-suit for jactitation of marriage; the family court dismissed suit of husband, but on the view that consummation was not proved, awarded only 50% dower and declined maintenance/dowry; the appellate court upheld this decision; later, the parties reconciled and cohabited and a minor was born, and the petitioner filed the minor’s maintenance suit against the minor’s father and the grandfather; the family court refused DNA testing and fixed minor’s maintenance at Rs.5,000 per month with 10% annual increase---Issue:---“Whether, after a registered nikah stood proved (and a child is born during its subsistence), denial of the petitioner’s matrimonial claims on “non-consummation” and reopening issue of paternity through seeking DNA testing was justified?”---Held: At the outset, it was noted that the petitioner instituted her constitutional petition against the impugned judgment after a delay of more than 23 months and as such, was badly hit by laches, however, when a common question of law being decided in one case, another case involving the same point that was time barred was liable to be heard on merits---Petitioner approached the High Court though belatedly yet during the pendency of petition of respondent No.1 and assailed the same judgments and decrees in the wake of subsequent developments including birth of the minor and as such, delay on account of laches was condoned as the same did not cause any prejudice to respondent No.1---Petitioner successfully proved her marriage including consummation of marriage---The issue of non-consummation of marriage lost its relevance after the birth of the minor during subsistence of valid and proven ‘nikah’, hence, the family as well as the appellate court fellin error to award half dower and dismiss the claims of dowry and maintenance due to love and non-consummation of marriage---Petitioner could not lead substantive evidence as to her claim of gold as dowry articles, whereas, other articles such that were normally given to a bride as part of her dowry, by applying reasonable depreciation due to subsistence of marriage, the petitioner was held entitled to recover her dowry articles to the tune of Rs.200,000/- as alternative value of dowry articles---Adjusting four months of post-reconciliation period from the claimed period of maintenance, the petitioner was held entitled to receive maintenance at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month from the date of institution of the suit with 10% annual increase till her legal entitlement---Application of the respondent/husband for conducting DNA test was rightly turned down since it was trite law that a child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage was presumed legitimate and the mode of determining paternity through DNA test had been deprecated by the Supreme Court---Suit of the petitioner/wife was decreed and judgments and decrees of the courts below were modified---Constitutional petition was partly allowed, in circumstances. Ghazala Tehsin Zohra v. Mehr Ghulam Dastagir Khan and another PLD 2015 SC 327 rel. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S.5, ‘Sched.’---Maintenance allowance to wife and minor---Obligation of husband---Under the law, a husband is duty bound to maintain his wife and children till their legal entitlement---Right of maintenance flows unconditionally from the date of a valid Nikah and constitutes a binding legal duty. Ambreen Akram v. Asad Ullah Khan and others C.Ps. Nos. 1107-L of 2015 and 247-L of 2017 rel. (c) Administration of justice--- ---Laches---Not an absolute bar---A litigant cannot be non-suited by allowing laches to be stumbling block in the way of dispensation of justice since rule of laches is applied in accordance with facts and circumstances of each case and it cannot be made rule of universal application. FBR through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Messrs Wazir Ali and Company and others 2020 SCMR 959 ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ---Art.199---Time-barred connection constitutional petition---Laches, inapplicability of---Hearing on merits---Scope---When a common question of law is decided in one case, another case involvingthe same point that is time barred is liable to be heard on merits. FBR through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Messrs Wazir Ali and Company and others 2020 SCMR 959 rel. (e) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is extra-ordinary, corrective, remedial, supervisory and equitable to redress grave miscarriage of justice occasioned on account of misapplication of law and failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the courts below. S.M. Javed Thaheemi for Petitioner. Tariq Mahmood Khan for Respondent No. 3 and for Petitioner (in Writ Petition No. 3949 of 2025). Muhammad Ahmad Khan for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (in Writ Petition No. 3949 of 2025). Date of hearing: 22nd September, 2025. Abid Hussain Chattha, J .--- This single Judgment shall decide the titled Petitions intrinsically connected to each other qua mutual family claims of Benish Ghaffar, Muhammad Essa, Muhammad Umar Farooq and Muhammad Aslam, hereinafter referred to as (the “Petitioner”, the “Minor”, “Respondent No. 1” and “Respondent No. 2” or the latter two collectively as the “Respondents”), whereby, they have questioned the impugned Judgments and Decrees dated 22.10.2021 and 24.04.2025 passed by Judge Family Court and 01.02.2022 by Additional District Judge, Liaquatpur, District Rahim Yar Khan.

Summary: (a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 54---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 8, 42 & 54---Suit for declaration, partition, possession and permanent injunction---Inheritance---Share of daughter, denial of---Plea of execution of an agreement to sell and receiving of share in inheritance---Failure to seek specific performance of agreement to sell within time---Absence of mutation and non-registration of sale---Contradictory evidence---Suit was decreed concurrently---Validity---Law assists the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights---Once the claim was denied by a co-owner, the applicants were under a legal obligation to approach the competent court and assert their claim against respondent/plaintiff, and their failure to do so raised serious questions about the credibility and maintainability of their stance---Such inaction reflected gross negligence and demonstrated a lack of bona fide intent, especially in matters relating to partition of joint property and enforcement of alleged sale agreements---Benefit of any equitable relief cannot be extended to those who have failed to act within the legal framework and prescribed time limits---If a valid and lawful sale had truly occurred, it would have been duly reflected in the revenue record and appropriate legal formalities such as registration of the sale deed and mutation would have been completed---Absence of these essential steps undermined the credibility of their claim---Mere attestation of agreement to sell does not establish the valid execution or consent of all co-sharers, especially in the absence of independent and consistent corroborative evidence---Overall evidence presented by the applicants lacked coherence, consistency and legal reliability---Contradiction between the statements of key witnesses cast serious doubt on the genuineness of the agreement to sell and reflected an attempt to create a false narrative---Mere production of a document could not affect the rightful claim of the respondent, whose existence as a legal heir was undisputed---Civil revision was dismissed, in circumstances. 2020 YLR 871; 2021 CLC 1987; 2021 CLC 2011; PLD 2021 Lahore 533; 2021 SCMR 829; 2020 SCMR 832 and 2021 SCMR 305 ref. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S. 54---Agreement to sell---Creation of title---Scope---Agreement to sell does not create any title over the property; it does not confer ownership of the land---Person in whose favour such an agreement is executed cannot claim a decree of title and even if the agreement includes an acknowledgment of receipt of earnest money or partial payment, it merely grants a right to seek execution of another document, the sale deed, until the same is duly executed and registered and the title formally transferred. Muhammad Israr v. Jehanzeb and others 2025 SCMR 841 and Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Nasrullah 2023 SCMR 273 rel. (c) Islamic law--- ----Inheritance---Execution of an agreement to sell by co-sharers---Right of deprived female/daughters---Scope---Right of inheritance of vulnerable members of society, including females, is a fundamental right that must be protected---Islamic law (Shariah) and statutory provisions clearly guarantee inheritance rights and any attempt to deprive legal heirs of what is rightfully theirs must be viewed with strict scrutiny---Regrettably, a disturbing practice has developed where parties, in defiance of Shariah and the law, resort to nefarious and frivolous pleas to deprive rightful heirs of their shares, which calls for the Courts to vigilantly safeguard the inheritance rights of women and other vulnerable heirs. Tanvir Sarfraz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCMR 98 ref. Ajmair Ali Bhutto for Applicants. Nadeem Ahmed Khoso and Shehryar Imdad Awan, Assistant Advocate General Sindh for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Muhammadan Law----Inheritance----Devolution of estate on death of Muslim; co-heirs’ rights; unlawful exclusion of sharers----Predecessor-in-interest, father of parties, died on 1.1.2002 leaving behind five sons and four daughters; suit filed by daughter (respondent No.1/plaintiff) seeking declaration/partition, mesne profits and injunction regarding property admittedly owned by deceased; petitioner/defendant No.6, a son, took exclusive possession, rented out portions and appropriated rent, refusing to recognise shares of other heirs----Held, that under Mohammadan Law, inheritance devolves automatically and immediately upon all legal heirs at the moment of the propositus’ death; every heir, male or female, acquires ownership in the estate as a matter of right, and no heir can lawfully exclude or dispossess another; possession of one co-sharer is deemed, in law, to be on behalf of all co-sharers, and delay in asserting share or challenging mutation does not extinguish such right----Doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment or adverse possession do not apply inter se co-heirs so as to deprive any heir of his or her share in the inherited property; in the present case, petitioner’s long possession could not ripen into exclusive title against his siblings nor justify their deprivation from inheritance; trial court and first appellate court rightly declared all heirs entitled to their respective shares and ordered partition/sale with distribution of proceeds. Cited cases: Mst. Khalida Azhar v. Viqar Rustom Bakhsi and others (2018 SCMR 30); Islam-ud-Din through LRs and others v. Mst. Noor Jehan through LRs and others (2016 SCMR 986); Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1); Anwar Muhammad and others v. Shard Din and others (1983 SCMR 626); Haji v. Khuda Yar (PLD 1983 SC 453); Mirza Abib Baig v. Zahid Sabir (decd.) through LRs and others (2020 SCMR 601); Farhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and others (2021 SCMR 179). (b) Muhammadan Law----Gift (Hiba) by predecessor-in-interest pleaded to defeat inheritance claim----Burden of proof and essential ingredients----Petitioner/defendant No.6 set up plea that deceased father had gifted suit property to him during his lifetime out of love and affection, supported by an alleged iqrar nama dated 30.06.2000 and a purported certificate of possession issued by Nazim of the union council----Held, that person asserting exclusive title on the basis of gift bears a heavy onus to prove valid hiba; he must establish that donor made a clear and bona fide offer of gift, that it was accepted, and that possession was delivered in pursuance thereof; donor/donee must prove date, time and place of offer and acceptance and produce credible, confidence-inspiring evidence including attesting witnesses----In instant case, iqrar nama was devoid of particulars of witnesses, such as addresses and CNIC numbers, rendering it “dubious and unreliable”; no attesting witnesses were produced; alleged certificate of possession by Nazim was likewise not proved; it was undisputed that till his death predecessor-in-interest continued to exercise possessory rights and utility connections remained in his name----Petitioner failed to discharge burden of proof; plea of gift was rightly rejected by trial court and concurrently by appellate fora as untenable and an attempt to defeat co-heirs’ inheritance. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss. 96 & 100----First appeal; second appeal; concurrent findings of fact; scope of interference by High Court and Supreme Court----Suit for declaration/partition and mesne profits decreed by trial court after framing of issues and recording evidence; first appeal under S.96, CPC dismissed on merits; second appeal under S.100, CPC dismissed by High Court vide impugned judgment dated 04.03.2023, finding no legal infirmity or misreading/non-reading of evidence in concurrent judgments----Petitioner nonetheless invoked Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, assailing concurrent findings on facts without pointing to any substantial question of law----Held, that concurrent findings of fact recorded by two competent courts carry great sanctity and are not to be lightly interfered with in second appeal or at leave stage unless shown to be arbitrary, perverse, based on misreading/non-reading of evidence or in derogation of settled law; in present case, judgments of courts below were well-reasoned, rooted in proper appreciation of evidence, consistent with principles of Muhammadan Law regarding inheritance and gift, and raised no question of law warranting interference; petition amounted merely to another attempt to reopen concluded findings and delay enjoyment of lawful inheritance by other heirs; leave to appeal was, therefore, refused and civil petition dismissed. (d) Civil procedure----Partition suit; mesne profits; co-sharer collecting rent to exclusion of others----Trial court decreed suit, declaring all heirs entitled to their respective shares and directing partition or sale; further directed petitioner to pay mesne profits at rate of Rs.25,000/- per month for three years preceding institution of suit, representing rent collected from property; petitioner restrained from creating third-party interest----Held, that where one co-sharer is in exclusive control of income from joint estate and appropriates rent without accounting to others, he is liable to render accounts and pay mesne profits corresponding to co-heirs’ shares; trial court’s approach in awarding mesne profits and protecting estate from alienation was in accordance with law and equity; concurrent affirmation by appellate court and High Court called for no interference. (e) Inheritance of women----Islamic law and public policy----Divine nature of right; impermissibility of curtailment; social evil of deprivation----Federal Shariat Court in Syeda Fauzia Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2025 FSC 1) after detailed examination of Quran, Sunnah and principles of sharia declared that right of inheritance vested in every legal heir, male or female, is a divine right which cannot be curtailed directly or indirectly; practice of depriving women of inheritance is a social evil and contrary to public policy----In present case, petitioner’s conduct in excluding sister (respondent No.1) and other siblings from estate and contesting their lawful shares stood in clear conflict with settled sharia principles and constitutional policy; Supreme Court reiterated that estate of deceased vests automatically and immediately in heirs without intervention of any authority, and violation of inheritance laws amounts to exploitation of vulnerable family members, particularly women, and is wholly impermissible under Islamic law and constitutional norms. Cited case: Syeda Fauzia Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2025 FSC 1). (f) Civil procedure----Frivolous and vexatious litigation; abuse of process; costs as corrective measure----Petitioner, despite having no sustainable case on merits and facing concurrent findings from trial and appellate courts, persisted in litigation up to Supreme Court, causing prolonged deprivation of co-heirs, especially female heir, from their lawful inheritance since 1.1.2002----Held, that continued resort to courts in face of clear and concurrent findings amounted to abuse of judicial process, contributed to mounting backlog and undermined efficient dispensation of justice; such conduct warrants deterrent costs----Accordingly, Supreme Court not only dismissed petition for leave but also imposed cost of Rs.5,00,000/- on petitioner, to be deposited with Registrar within seven days and distributed among legal heirs declared by trial court, thereby both penalizing abuse and partially compensating those whose rights were delayed. (g) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973----Islamic injunctions; women’s inheritance rights; State’s constitutional duty----Scope----Court, while affirming decrees in favour of female heir, underscored that under Constitution and clear injunctions of Islam, State is obliged to ensure effective and unfettered realization of women’s right to inheritance; such right is not a concession by human law but a divinely ordained command explicitly declared in Holy Quran; any denial or obstruction of this right is not merely unlawful but a transgression against Divine Will----Cultural or societal practices that deprive women of inheritance are rooted neither in faith nor justice but in ignorance which Islam came to abolish; State bears sacred constitutional duty to uproot such practices by ensuring that every woman is informed of, and enabled to claim, her rightful share without delay, fear or dependence on lengthy litigation; it must develop proactive, accessible mechanisms to identify entitled women, reach out to them and assist in securing their entitlements----Those who, through coercion, deceit or undue influence, deprive women of inheritance must be held accountable under law; a society indifferent to such deprivation defies spirit of Constitution and express Command of Almighty Allah; a State that fails to safeguard women’s inheritance rights fails in its duty to uphold principles of equity, faith and justice.