Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 141, 142(a), 142(c), 143, 175F(3), 185(3)—Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010—Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025—Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967—S. 3—Balochistan Finance Act, 2020—S. 7—Legislative competence—Provincial autonomy—Labour welfare—Excise duty on minerals—Doctrine of pith and substance—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Cooperative federalism—The Federal Constitutional Court considered whether the amendment made through S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 to S. 3 of the Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967, enhancing the rate of duty on minerals, was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan on the ground that duties of excise fall within the exclusive federal domain under Entry 44 of the Federal Legislative List. The Court held that, after the Eighteenth Amendment, legislative power is distributed such that the Federation legislates only on subjects enumerated in the Federal Legislative List, while residual subjects vest exclusively in the Provinces; labour welfare, not being part of the Federal Legislative List, is therefore a provincial subject. The Court further held that the 1967 Act, when read as a whole and especially in light of its preamble, was enacted not merely to impose a fiscal levy, but to finance measures for promoting the welfare of labour employed in the mining industry. Accordingly, although the statutory mechanism employed was the levy and collection of excise duty, the dominant constitutional purpose and essential character of the legislation lay in labour welfare, which squarely fell within provincial competence. The amendment made by the Province was, therefore, not unconstitutional merely because it touched upon a fiscal instrument also known to federal legislative entries. Constitutional law—Doctrine of pith and substance—Incidental encroachment—Validity of legislation—The Court reaffirmed that where legislative spheres appear to overlap, the true nature and character of the impugned law must be determined through the doctrine of pith and substance. A law does not become invalid merely because it incidentally trenches upon a field otherwise assigned to another legislature; only a substantial encroachment disturbing the constitutional distribution of powers may render it ultra vires. Applying that doctrine, the Court held that the impugned provincial amendment did not amount to an impermissible invasion of federal legislative authority, because its real object was to support labour welfare in the mining industry and the enhancement of the levy was only a means adopted to advance that constitutionally legitimate provincial purpose. Constitutional law—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Same subject viewed from different constitutional aspects—The Court also invoked the doctrine of double aspect legislation and explained that a single subject may, in one aspect and for one purpose, fall within federal competence, and in another aspect and for another purpose, fall within provincial competence. Thus, while the levy of excise duty as a fiscal subject may ordinarily fall within the federal domain, the same measure, when examined from the standpoint of labour welfare and public interest in relation to mine workers, may validly operate within the provincial sphere. In such circumstances, both legislative aspects may co-exist in constitutional harmony, and the Court should prefer an interpretation that sustains rather than destroys legislation enacted by democratically elected bodies. Federalism—Post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional structure—Cooperative federalism—The Court emphasized that the post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional arrangement broadens provincial autonomy and reflects a commitment to participatory and cooperative federalism. The Federation and Provinces are not to be viewed as functioning in isolated compartments; rather, constitutional interpretation should favour harmonious operation of their respective powers. A rigid or formalistic reading that disregards the practical interaction of fiscal measures and welfare objectives would be inconsistent with the constitutional design. The impugned amendment, therefore, was held to represent a lawful and harmonious exercise of legislative power in furtherance of a legitimate provincial objective. Case references—Prafulla v. Bank of Commerce (AIR 1947 PC 28); Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (1982 CanLII 55 (SCC)); Sui Northern Gas Pipelines v. S.K. Pvt Limited (2025 SCMR 570); DG Khan Cement v. The Province of Punjab (2014 PTD 478); Pakistan College of Law v. University of the Punjab (W.P. No. 45178 of 2017, Lahore High Court). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the amendment introduced by S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 did not fall outside the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan. The petition was accordingly dismissed, leave was refused, and no order as to costs was made.

Summary: Background: A petitioner challenged a notification dated November 27, 2018, which canceled the permission to extract limestone from a 200-acre area near Goth Ghogharo, District Thatta and Jamshoro. Initially, the petitioner received permission to extract limestone on July 2, 2009, which was extended in March 2011 for five years, supposedly ending in March 2016. The petitioner continued occupying the land beyond the expiry of the permit, claiming the renewal process was not transparent and a notice should have been issued. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner's continued occupation of the land was lawful after the expiration of the extended permit in March 2016. 2- Whether the process of granting and extending the limestone extraction permit was transparent and in accordance with the law. 3- Whether the petitioner's payment of fees after the permit's expiration gave them any legal right to occupy the land. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court held that: There was no evidence of a transparent process in awarding or extending the permit for limestone extraction. The petitioner had no right to occupy the land after the permit expired in March 2016, despite the continued payment of fees, as these payments were made without the authority's permission. The petitioner was deemed a trespasser under the Easement Act once the renewed license expired. The petitioner's initial occupation of the land was not shown to be transparent, warranting a detailed inquiry into the responsible officers. The Court ordered the concerned ministry to immediately retrieve the land from the petitioner and submit a report within a week. The petition was dismissed, and listed applications were disposed of accordingly.

Summary: ''The Supreme Court held that ex-post facto approval by the cabinet cannot grant retrospective applicability to a notification. The impugned notification was authenticated by the cabinet after its issuance, and its effect began from the date of authentication''----Background:The Government of Balochistan through the Secretary Mines And Minerals Department challenged a judgment dated 17th April 2023 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Constitutional Petitions No.1294 of 2017 and 1826 of 2021. The impugned notification revised and enhanced rates related to mining activities. The respondents, Attock Cement Pakistan Limited and D.G Khan Cement Company Limited, challenged this notification through constitutional petitions, which were partially allowed by the High Court. The government, dissatisfied with the judgment, filed the present petitions before the Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan.----Issues:Whether a notification receiving ex-post facto approval by the cabinet can have retrospective applicability.----Holding:The Supreme Court held that ex-post facto approval by the cabinet cannot grant retrospective applicability to a notification. The impugned notification was authenticated by the cabinet after its issuance, and its effect began from the date of authentication. The Court dismissed the petitions as devoid of merit and refused leave.----Citations/Precedents:Mustafa Impex Karachi and others v. The Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad (PLD 2016 SC 808)

Summary: The petitioner, Muhammad Tariq Sahi, challenges the Government of Punjab's decision to increase the reserve price of Block No.116-A South District Sargodha for mining by 500%. The petitioner alleges that this increase is without lawful authority and is motivated by mala fide intentions to prevent their participation in the bidding process.According to the respondents, the reserve price was determined by the Special Experts Committee, considering factors such as market trends and the sizes and bids of surrounding blocks. They argue that the petitioner has fully enjoyed the leased area and is now attempting to sabotage the legitimate auction process with a malicious petition.The Assistant Advocate General contends that the petitioner, in collaboration with existing lease holders, aims to maintain a regional monopoly over the sandstone business. The fixation of the reserve price is justified, and the petitioner's actions go against the fundamental right of other citizens to participate in the auction, as per Article 18 of the Constitution of Pakistan.The petitioner's counsel argues that despite multiple attempts, the auction could not be successful due to the exorbitant reserve price. They claim that if an auction fails several times, the matter should be sent back to the Special Experts Committee for a review of the reserve price.The court, in its decision, emphasizes that the fixation of the reserve price is within the prerogative of the government, and judicial scrutiny is limited. The court states that the petitioner has not established that the reserve price is so unreasonable that no prudent authority could have fixed it. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly, leaving the option to refer the matter back to the Committee of Special Experts for a review if future auctions fail to meet the reserve price. ''Fixation of reserve price is prerogative of the concerned governmentdepartment and in this regard, neither any existing lessee nor anyprospective bidder can seek fixation of the reserve price of his own choice.There is no cavil to the proposition that while fixing reserve price, theexercise of discretion by the public authority must be just, fair andreasonable and any arbitrary, whimsical and capricious exercise of suchauthority is amenable to judicial scrutiny, however, the scope of jurisdictionunder Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973in that regard is very limited. For such a challenge to succeed in writjurisdiction, it is imperative for the petitioner to establish that the reserveprice fixed by the public functionaries is so unreasonable that no authority 4Writ Petition No.55800 of 2023with prudent mind could have fixed the same. This is also known as thewednesbury principle. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the casesof Messrs 3N-Lifemed Pharmaceuticals Vs. Government of Punjab throughSecretary Primary and Secondary Healthcare Department and others(2023 CLC 948) and Hajj Organizers Association of Pakistan throughAuthorised Officer and 11 others Vs. Federation of Pakistan throughSecretary Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony, Islamabadand 2 others (PLD 2020 Sindh 42)''

Summary: Section 49 of The Land Revenue Act and Section 2-A of The Mines and Minerals Act, 2017. These sections unequivocally state that all mines and minerals are the property of the government --- (a) Under The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act 2017, all mines and minerals as well as minor minerals are the ownership of the Provincial Government whether such mines and minerals are embodied in the land owned by the Provincial Government or in the land of a private person and thus the Provincial Government has every right of their use and enjoyment.(b) Under the erstwhile Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Minor Mineral Mining Concessions Rules 1971, The ?minor minerals? were excluded from the ?Minerals? whereas under The Act of 2017 no exception qua the minor minerals has been provided and thus ?minor Minerals? are to be treated with the yardstick as that of minerals.(c) Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous then a Court of law could neither add or omit something from it and Court are bound to attach the same meaning as ordinarily spelling out from the language of the statute.(d) A private person in whose land minor minerals are embodied then such land owner could excavate such minor minerals for the purpose of agriculture or building purposes only but such land owner could not excavate such minerals for commercial purposes.(e) Under the provision of The Act 2017, the minor minerals available in the land of a private person could be excavated by a lessee after getting a lease as per the provision of S-78 of The Act 2017.(f) A lessee is bound to pay the surface rent to the land owner having minor minerals at the rate as agreed upon between the lessee and the land owner or in case of their disagreement at such rate as determined by the District Surface Rent Committee.(g) A land owner shall also be entitled for a compensation for the damage, if any, caused to his property as result of the mining operation by the lessee --- The judgment, dated December 6, 2023, by the Peshawar High Court Abbottabad Bench, pertains to two connected writ petitions (WP No. 811-A/2018 and WP No. 994-A/2018). The petitioners, owners of certain properties, challenged the government's actions of making blocks of their properties and auctioning leasehold rights for extracting minor minerals from their land. The petitioners sought the quashing of these actions, restraint from auctioning their property, removal of their property from the auction list, and prevention of damage to their property.The court noted that the key issue was the ownership of minor minerals embedded in the land. The petitioners claimed ownership based on their recorded ownership of the properties in revenue records. However, the court emphasized the legal provisions, specifically citing Section 49 of The Land Revenue Act and Section 2-A of The Mines and Minerals Act, 2017. These sections unequivocally state that all mines and minerals are the property of the government.The court highlighted that the petitioners' claim was misconceived as per the clear mandate of the law. It clarified that while private owners could use minor minerals for specific purposes, commercial use required a lease. The court referred to provisions in The Mines and Minerals Act, 2017, outlining the process of leasing for mining minor minerals.The judgment distinguished a precedent cited by the petitioners, emphasizing the differences in the legal frameworks. Ultimately, the court dismissed both writ petitions, finding them devoid of merit.

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Act (XXXVI of 2017)--- ----Ss. 10, 21 & 62---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Mining lease---Failure to apply for grant of lease---Petitioners were aggrieved of not conducting auction for grant of mining lease---Validity---Area was situated within the limits of area under the control of armed forces, thus, ordinarily organizations avoided coming forward to participate in the process---If petitioners had submitted their applications in the prescribed manner with their due acknowledgement by respondent / authorities, their cases would have been at better footing---Petitioners stood as strangers to the process of granting titles---Petitioners failed to show any application placed on the record, which was duly filled with fulfillment of key requirements for the process---Remedy under Constitutional jurisdiction is in the nature of equitable and extraordinary relief---Any party claiming such remedy must come to the Court with clean hands and do equity while seeking equity---High Court declined to interfere in the matter---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Creative Electronics (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan through Prime Minister and others PLD 2020 Islamabad 319; Muhammad Hussain Jaffary v. Maryam Bibi 1985 CLC 451; Syed Shah v. Political Agent Bajaur Agency and 3 others PLD 1981 Peshawar 57; Ahmad Khan and others v. Custodian of Evacuee Property West Pakistan and others PLD 1963 Karachi 450; Mohammad Sajjad v. Secretary Higher Education Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Muzaffarabad and 4 others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 735; Shabraz Shabir v. District Education Officer (Male) Elementary and Secondary Education, Muzaffarabad 2023 PLC (C.S.) 718 and Junaid Abbasi v. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir PLD 2023 (H.C AJ&K) 116 rel. Kamran Gul for Petitioner. Tahir Hussain Lughmani and Asghar Khan Kundi for Respondents. Syed Asif Jalal, Additional Advocate General for Official Respondents. Date of hearing: 9th August, 2023.

Summary: (A)Rule 19 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Minerals Appellate Tribunal Rules 2022, was mandatorily requiring that any person who was interested in result of the appeal should be impleaded and given an opportunity of hearing in the appeal before the appeal is decided by the Appellate Tribunal. (B) All the members and Chairman of Mines and Minerals Appellate Tribunal, must write their full names alongwith their designations on the decisions made by them in appeals.

Summary: The petitioner, Muhammad Aslam, challenged the auction of sand blocks in Lahore by the Mines and Mineral Department, Punjab (MMD), claiming it was conducted without obtaining the necessary approval from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The petitioner argued that the auction contravened a previous court decision and an undertaking by MMD, potentially causing loss to him if he succeeded in the auction due to delays in obtaining the NOC.--- Issue:Whether the auction of sand blocks by MMD without obtaining an NOC from EPA was lawful and in accordance with environmental and procedural requirements.--- Judgment:The petition was dismissed. The court found that the MMD had obtained the necessary NOC from EPA and taken measures to ensure compliance with environmental regulations in future auctions.--- Reasoning:The court referred to a previous case (Ch. Ghulam Rasool vs. Province of Punjab, etc.) and a Supreme Court judgment (Public Interest Law Association of Pakistan vs. Province of Punjab) to establish that MMD is responsible for obtaining environmental approvals before initiating the auction process. The court was satisfied that MMD had complied with these requirements and taken steps to prevent unauthorized mining and ensure transparency in the auction process. The court also criticized the petitioner's conduct, noting inconsistencies in his stance in different legal proceedings, which indicated that he was not genuinely interested in participating in the auction but rather in stopping it for personal gain.Precedents Cited:Chaudhry Ghulam Rasool vs. Province of Punjab and others, Writ Petition No. 9428 of 2019, Lahore High CourtPublic Interest Law Association of Pakistan vs. Province of Punjab and others, Constitutional Petition No. 55 of 2020, Supreme Court of PakistanMrs. Zeenat Ahmed vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and others, 2015 PLC (C.S.) 719Wali Muhammad and others vs. Sakhi Muhammad and others, PLD 1974 Supreme Court 106Faiz Bakhsh and others vs. Deputy Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer, Bahawalpur and others, 2006 SCMR 219Major (Retd.) Ahmed Nadeem Sadal and 3 others vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Sports, Islamabad and 3 others, 2015 CLC 34Legal Principles:The Mines and Mineral Department (MMD) must obtain environmental approvals before initiating the auction process for mining blocks.The High Court's discretion under Article 199 of the Constitution is exercised equitably, and relief is granted only to petitioners who demonstrate good faith and compliance with legal standards.Litigants are expected to disclose related pending litigations and maintain transparency to ensure fair judicial proceedings.

Summary: (Mining and Mineral Department is responsible for obtaining environmental approvals for small-scale mining licences and leases) The petitioner argued that the Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002 did not require environmental approval from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for small-scale mining operations, despite the Environmental Protection Act, 1997 mandating such approvals. The respondents informed the court that meetings were held to resolve the issue, and it was agreed that the Mines and Minerals Department (MMD) would submit Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports for each project, obtaining environmental approval before the bidding process. The Punjab Environmental Protection (Review of Initial Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 2022 were also promulgated to clarify the projects requiring IEE or EIA. However, the petitioner argued that there was no enforcement procedure in place and requested guidelines and a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to ensure compliance. The court acknowledged the importance of considering environmental impacts in mining and emphasized the need for IEE and EIA reports, which assess and address such concerns. The court agreed with the petitioner that the MMD should obtain these reports before initiating the bidding process and suggested the provision of guidelines, SOPs, and penalties for non-compliance. The court emphasized the importance of responsible and sustainable mining practices for economic growth while protecting the environment. As a result, the petition was disposed of.

Summary: On the face of it, this lease was a mining lease for minor minerals for some area for a period of two years that later on may be submerged in the GBHP Barrage or adversely affected in any manner but the lease hold rights were not in perpetuity and could not be so being property of the Provincial Government.Lessee could avail remedy either for return of his bid amount deposited alongwith any improvements, if made but from the Mineral Department.It is the basic rule for weighing the preponderance of evidence in a civil matter to discuss the evidence but it has to be used in corroboration of material facts alleged by a party but when a party does not appear in Court as a witness not only that a presumption could be drawn against him within the contemplation of Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 but it has to be accepted that the case is based on no evidence. The pleadings in objection petition and statements of officials could not be considered as evidence in the instant case when the respondents/objectors have opted not to appear as witnesses in support of their objection petitions perhaps to avoid facing the cross examination in Court.