Summary: (a) Evacuee Trust Property (Management & Disposal) Act, 1975 — Ss. 14, 17, 21 & 23 — Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A — Cancellation of lease — Registered 99-year lease — Fraud allegation — Fair trial — Jurisdictional error Lease cancelled without due process — Authority acted without evidence or proper hearing — Jurisdictional overreach — Violation of fair trial rights — Petitioners acquired evacuee trust property through public auction in 1974; lease registered for 99 years in 1992 — ETPB issued notice dated 17.09.2020 alleging fraud and forgery in lease approval — Petitioners challenged cancellation in High Court, which dismissed petition on ground of alternate remedy under S.17 of ETP Act — Supreme Court held that cancellation order dated 14.09.2020 passed by Chairman ETPB was issued without affording proper opportunity of hearing, no evidence was recorded, and adjournment requests due to medical reasons were arbitrarily denied — Court ruled that such serious matters must not be decided summarily without trial — Chairman ETPB did not exercise appellate or revisional jurisdiction under Ss.16 & 17, and acted under Clause 23 of the 1977 Scheme — Nevertheless, power under Clause 23 requires “reasonable opportunity of being heard” — Held, violation of natural justice and Art.10-A occurred. Cited Cases: Junaid Wazir v. SP (2024 SCMR 181) Federation v. Zahid Malik (2023 SCMR 603) Usman Ghani v. GPO Karachi (2022 SCMR 745) Muhammad Yaseen v. Province of Sindh (2024 PLC(CS) 111) Govt. of Balochistan v. Ghulam Rasool (2024 SCMR 1155) (b) Evacuee Trust Property Act, 1975 — Ss. 14, 21 — Exclusion of civil court jurisdiction — Scope and limitations — Special jurisdiction under statute Bar on civil court jurisdiction does not imply unbridled powers — Procedural safeguards and due process mandatory — Court reiterated that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction under S.14 imposes greater responsibility on statutory forums to act judicially — Power under S.21 confers civil court-like powers to ETPB officials for conducting enquiries, recording evidence, and deciding disputes — Any deviation from procedural fairness undermines justice — In the instant case, Chairman ETPB failed to fix date for decision, kept order in limbo, and denied proper hearing, thus violating settled principles of quasi-judicial decision-making. (c) Contract Act, 1872 — Ss. 13, 14 — Lease — Void agreement — Consent and fraud Lease cannot be cancelled for fraud without affording full opportunity to rebut — Allegation of forged approval must be judicially established — Petitioners claimed valid lease under due process; ETPB alleged fake approval for 99-year term — Court held that cancellation of lease requires strict proof of fraud, proper enquiry, and fair opportunity — Summary decision based solely on document verification, without confrontation or trial, was invalid — Chairman ETPB exceeded lawful authority. Final Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Impugned High Court judgment dated 08.12.2022, cancellation order dated 14.09.2020, and notice dated 17.09.2020 set aside. Matter remanded to Chairman ETPB for fresh decision after full hearing within 3 months.

Summary: (a) Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 ----Ss. 5 & 7---Ownership and possession---Maintainability of complaint during pendency of civil proceedings---Complainant (female owner) sought possession of commercial property (Shop No.2, Block No.6, Civic Centre, Melody Market, Islamabad) gifted to her by her parents through registered Gift Deed dated 16-01-2018---Respondents (tenants’ sons) claimed ownership through an alleged oral agreement to sell made by their deceased father in 1982---Held, complaint maintainable under S.7(1) of the Act notwithstanding pendency of civil suit for declaration and recovery of rent---Provision expressly empowers Ombudsperson to entertain complaint even when court proceedings are pending concerning ownership or possession of property claimed by a woman. (b) Ownership and title---Registered gift deed---Evidentiary value---Gift deed duly executed and registered with Sub-Registrar, Islamabad, constituted valid and conclusive title in favor of Complainant---Respondents’ reliance on electricity bill and tax notice held immaterial as these do not confer proprietary rights---Absence of proof of payment, consideration, or written sale instrument rendered alleged oral sale unenforceable in law---Complainant thus declared sole lawful owner of the suit shop. (c) Leasehold rights---Chain of title established---Report from Capital Development Authority confirmed that leasehold rights of the commercial property were originally granted to Colonel Saeed Tariq, later transferred to Mrs. Parveen Tariq, and thereafter sold to Dr. Abdul Wahid and Dr. Haseena Parveen (Complainant’s parents), who gifted it to the Complainant---Respondents had no legal title or tenancy subsisting upon termination of the earlier arrangement. (d) Possession---Right to eviction of unlawful occupants---Scope of Section 5 of the Act---Where a woman proves ownership and shows that others unlawfully retain her property, Ombudsperson empowered to order immediate restoration of possession---Respondents directed to vacate shop and hand over vacant possession within one month, failing which coercive measures for eviction to follow. (e) Disposition— Complaint allowed---Respondents held to be illegal occupants of Shop No.2, Ground Floor, Block No.6, Civic Centre, Melody Market, G-6/4, Islamabad---Directed to vacate and hand over possession to Complainant within one month---Compliance fixed for 14-02-2025.

Summary: Background: The State of Libya, through its Head of Mission in Pakistan, entered into a five-year lease agreement with the respondent for a property in Islamabad used as the Libyan Diplomatic Mission. The agreement permitted early termination by mutual consent. Libya sought early termination in 2018, leading to disputes over repair responsibilities for paint and polish work. The respondent sued for repair costs, which Libya contested, citing immunity under diplomatic privileges. -----Issues: 1- Whether the State of Libya waived its diplomatic immunity under the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act for claims unrelated to rent or possession. -----2- Whether the lease agreement was a commercial transaction under the State Immunity Ordinance, thus removing immunity from Libya. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Diplomatic Immunity: The court found Libya maintained immunity, as the lease agreement did not constitute a waiver of immunity for claims beyond rent or possession disputes. The claim for repair costs fell outside this scope. --Commercial Transaction Argument: The court held that the lease agreement, serving diplomatic purposes, was not a commercial transaction. Section 5 of the State Immunity Ordinance excludes immunity for commercial transactions, but Section 17 exempts property used for diplomatic missions, reaffirming Libya’s immunity. --Federal Government’s Position: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed Libya’s immunity, emphasizing its role in maintaining diplomatic relations and the reciprocal nature of immunity. The court allowed the petition, set aside the Civil Court’s order, and dismissed the respondent’s suit, imposing a cost of Rs. 100,000 on the respondent. -----Citations/Precedents: A.M. Qureshi v. USSR (PLD 1981 SC 377) - Interpretation of immunity scope under diplomatic and consular privileges. Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972 - Affirmed immunity for diplomatic missions in Pakistan. State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 - Sections 5 and 17 on exclusions from immunity for commercial transactions and diplomatic mission properties.

Summary: Determination of lease under section 111 of Transfer of Property Act of 1882. The determination of the lease has been provided u/s 111 of the transfer of Property Act, 1882 and sub-clause (g) of section 111 provides that whenever there would be any breach of express condition of the lease, it shall come to an end, which results into forfeiture of the lease. Similarly, section 114 of the ibid Act provides the relief against forfeiture for non- payment of rent. The respondent/ lessor filed the suits with specific assertion that from a particular date, rent has not been paid and before filing the suits, the petitioners were also served with notices sent under the cover of registered Acknowlegment Due, and this fact has neither been denied nor challenged by them through these petitions. The present petitioners might continue with the lease provided they would have paid the entire outstanding rent while appearing before the Court, however, they have disputed the status of their lessor and lease has not been denied. It is significant to mention here that the petitioners have changed their version/ stance at different times i.e., they have admitted the lease, they have disputed the status of lessor and they have admitted the payment of rent but rent is still outstanding against them. They have alleged the tenancy for 99 years besides the tenancy in perpetuity. Be that as it may, it is an admitted fact that the respondent was the lessor with whom, the lease was executed, whereby rent was fixed and that was paid regularly, however, as per the whims and wishes of the petitioners, now they have stopped the payment of rent. In view of the different versions of the petitioners, it could not be held that there was a perpetual lease rather record reflects that after the expiry of the initial period of lease, it has been extended with the mutual consent of the parties from time to time and now when the petitioners have stopped the payment of rent and they have disputed the statute of their lessor, their possession at the spot has become adverse to the rights of the lessor, which could not be allowed to remain in their possession and that too without any express tenancy between the parties. The moment, the petitioners have disputed the status and locus standi of their lessor, their possession at the spot has become as that of a trespasser and law could not provide any protection to a person who has violated the specific condition of the settled lease agreement.

Summary: Next date of hearing 29th April 2024 ---- BackgroundThe case involves multiple civil petitions and applications related to the use of land in the Margalla Hills National Park, specifically focusing on the lease agreements and commercial activities, such as the operation of restaurants, within the National Park. The central parties include the Monal Group of Companies, which operates a restaurant in the National Park, the Capital Development Authority (CDA), the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board, and various government and defense departments. The primary issue revolves around the legality of the lease agreements, the permissible use of the National Park under the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979, and the conservation of the park's natural resources.----Issues:The validity of the lease agreement dated 30 September 2019 between the Monal Group of Companies and the Remount, Veterinary and Farms Directorate.Compliance with the Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979, and the Islamabad Capital Territory (Zoning) Regulations, 1992, regarding commercial activities in the Margalla Hills National Park.The broader environmental and conservation concerns associated with commercial activities in the National Park.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan raised concerns about the validity of the lease agreement between the Monal Group and the Directorate, highlighting that the Directorate, being not a legal entity, could not have executed the agreement, rendering it void. The Court emphasized the legal provisions that restrict commercial activities in the National Park, pointing out violations and environmental degradation due to such activities. Directions were given to various parties, including CDA and the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board, to submit detailed reports and proposals for the conservation of the National Park and the regulation of commercial activities within its bounds. The Court stressed the importance of preserving the National Park and the necessity for all parties to propose solutions for restoring its integrity.-----Citations/Precedents:Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979, specifically Section 21, which prohibits setting up and running restaurants in the Margalla Hills National Park.Islamabad Capital Territory (Zoning) Regulations, 1992, specifically Regulation 4(3)(b), which stipulates that no change in land use is permissible in the National Park except for projects related to conservation, preservation, afforestation, and recreation.Previous rulings and legal interpretations by the Supreme Court of Pakistan regarding the Fundamental Right to life (Article 9 of the Constitution), emphasizing access to parks and natural resources as part of living a meaningful life. To come up on 29th April 2024

Summary: Issues:The validity of Muhammad Yousaf's entitlement to purchase leased state land under a temporary cultivation scheme.The legality of the second review by the Board of Revenue that negated an earlier review order favoring Yousaf.The jurisdiction and authority of the Board of Revenue to conduct a second review of its previous order.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court dismissed the civil revision petition filed by the Province of Punjab. The court upheld the appellate court's decision, which favored Muhammad Yousaf, based on the following findings:The initial allotment of land to Yousaf was lawful, and the subsequent resumption order due to non-payment of rent was not in accordance with the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, as it lacked prior notice to rectify the breach.The appellate court correctly found that the land, at the time of allotment, was not within a prohibited zone, making the resumption based on this ground unjustifiable.The second review by the Board of Revenue, negating an earlier order that allowed Yousaf to purchase the land, was beyond its jurisdiction as the law did not provide for a second review.The court relied on precedents that established the principles regarding the review process, the rights of lessees, and the conditions under which land allotments can be rescinded or altered.----Citations/Precedents:The court referenced several legal principles and previous judgments, including "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH DISTRICT COLLECTOR V. GHULAM MUHAMMAD" (1994 SCMR 975) and "PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH SECRETARY COLONIES, BOARD OF REVENUE AND OTHERS V. CH. ABDUL SATTAR" (2012 SCMR 1007), which discuss the rights of tenants under temporary cultivation schemes and the conditions under which land within a prohibited zone can be allotted or revoked.The judgment also cited "YAR MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS V. MST. SAMEENA TAYAB AND OTHERS" (2022 SCMR 1592) regarding the non-permissibility of a second review petition when the first has been decided on its merits.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution 1974, seeking the annulment of a notification dated 23.07.2009 and the reinstatement of a lease for land measuring 119 kanals and 12 marlas. The petitioner also requested the ejection of the respondents, who were alleged trespassers on the land. The lease, initially granted on 10.11.1975, was canceled on 08.01.1979 due to political influence but was restored on 01.09.1990 after an inquiry. Subsequent challenges and notifications led to further disputes and litigation. ----Issues: 1- Whether the notification dated 23.07.2009, which revoked the lease of the land, was issued in accordance with the law. 2- Whether the petitioner was properly heard by the authorities before the cancellation of the lease. 3- Whether the petitioner concealed material facts regarding previous litigation and judgments. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Legality of Notification (23.07.2009): The court held that the notification dated 23.07.2009 was issued in accordance with the law and the conditions of the lease agreement. The land in question was occupied by refugees and other possessors, and the petitioner had violated the lease terms by constructing unauthorized structures. Thus, the lease cancellation was deemed lawful. --Hearing and Due Process: The court found that the petitioner was properly summoned and heard by the Commissioner Mirpur. The petitioner’s claim of not being heard was rejected, as records showed he had filed objections and was given an opportunity to present his case. --Concealment of Material Facts: The court noted that the petitioner had concealed previous litigation and judgments up to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir, which had already decided against him. The petitioner's actions were seen as an attempt to misuse political influence and gain undue advantage. The petition was dismissed due to lack of merit, with no order as to costs. The court emphasized that ill-gotten gains cannot be protected through equitable relief, and the petitioner’s conduct of concealing facts and repeated litigation was condemned. -----Citations/Precedents: Notification dated 23.07.2009: Issued in accordance with the law, cancelling the lease for land measuring 88 kanals and 11 marlas due to the petitioner’s violations and the land's occupation by refugees. Previous Judgments: Writ petition dismissed on 13.03.2002. Judgment upheld by the Supreme Court on 25.06.2002. Previous litigation and judgments against the petitioner concealed from the court.

Summary: Background: Gujranwala Steel Industries appealed against orders dated 19.01.2023 and 23.01.2023 by the Banking Court, which declared the allotment in favor of the appellant void and directed the respondent Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) to redeem the mortgaged property to the judgment debtors (Respondents No. 2 and 3) and deliver possession. The property in question, Plot No.24/B, SIE-II, PSIC, Gujranwala, was originally leased to Respondent No. 2 by the Punjab Small Industries Corporation (Respondent No. 8) and later mortgaged to IDBP. The leasehold rights were canceled, and IDBP sued for recovery, obtaining a decree in 2002. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Banking Court had jurisdiction to declare the allotment in favor of the appellant void after the decree was satisfied. 2- Whether the cancellation of the lease and subsequent allotment to the appellant were legally valid. 3- Whether Section 23 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO) applied to the transaction between the lessee and the appellant. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Jurisdiction of Banking Court: The Banking Court's jurisdiction to declare the allotment void was questioned as the decree had already been satisfied. The court held that once the decree was satisfied, the Banking Court's jurisdiction ended, and it could not adjudicate disputes regarding the cancellation of the lease and subsequent allotment. ---Validity of Lease Cancellation and Allotment: The validity of the cancellation of the lease and the subsequent allotment to the appellant was not determined by the Banking Court. The court noted that the issue of the legality of the cancellation of the lease needed adjudication, which fell outside the Banking Court's jurisdiction after the decree was satisfied. ---Application of Section 23 FIO: Section 23 FIO, which protects the interests of the mortgagee, was deemed irrelevant once the decree was satisfied. The court explained that the voidness of the transaction under Section 23 applies only as long as the decree is outstanding or the mortgage is enforceable. Once the decree is satisfied, the Banking Court cannot declare the transaction void. The appeal was allowed to the extent that the declaration of voidness of the allotment in favor of the appellant was set aside. The court directed the lessor, lessee, and allottee to seek remedies in law for enforcement of their respective claims without being prejudiced by the observations in the impugned orders. The process of redemption of the property was to be completed, and possession delivered to the lessee. The lessee was given thirty days to challenge the cancellation of the lease, failing which the lessor could invoke remedies against the lessee. ----Citations/Precedents: The court referred to several precedents, including: “Mst. Farhat Fareed Sheikh Vs. NIB Bank Limited” (2019 CLD 632) “Siraj Din Vs. Khushi Muhammad” (2002 YLR 1643) “Muslim Commercial Bank Limited Vs. Syed Ataullah Shah” (2003 CLD 888) “The Bank of Punjab Vs. Messrs Magic River Services” (2016 CLD 171) “Haji Dad Muhammad Vs. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited” (2011 CLD 785) “Mazco Industries Ltd Vs. Habib Bank Ltd” (2011 CLD 186) “Messrs Data Laboratories (Pvt) Ltd Vs. Judge Banking Court No.III, Lahore” (2008 CLD 1326)

Summary: The dispute revolved around the transferability of plot No. 12-H/2, G-8 Markaz, Islamabad, which the CDA claimed was a non-transferable plot restricted to the family of the original allottee. The CDA argued that the High Court failed to consider the relevant provisions of the allotment letter and lease agreement. They contended that certain plots, including the disputed plot, reserved for social welfare projects like clinics, could not be transferred except in exceptional cases. On the other hand, the respondent, Ahmed Murtaza, filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of the disputed plot. The suit was decided in his favor through a consent decree, and the plot was transferred to him. The CDA challenged the judgment and decree, leading to a series of legal proceedings and appeals. The Supreme Court examined the facts of the case and found that the CDA had previously transferred the disputed plot to various individuals outside the family members, despite its claim of non-transferability. The court also noted that the CDA did not disclose these facts in its petition and deliberately neglected to mention the orders related to the objection petition and the civil petition filed before the Supreme Court. The court emphasized that the CDA had already challenged the transfer in a previous case, which was decided against them, and subsequently withdrew their petition. The court concluded that the matter had been decided on its merits in a previous case, and the CDA was bound by the findings of that case. The court criticized the CDA for pursuing frivolous litigation, wasting the time of the court and the respondents. It noted that the CDA had transferred the plot to non-family members multiple times without raising any objections, but chose to dispute the transfer to the respondents. The court denounced this behavior and emphasized the need for institutions like the CDA to take responsibility for their actions and decisions. In light of these findings, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and imposed special costs on the CDA for their conduct in pursuing meritless litigation. The court expressed its concern over the wasted time and resources caused by such actions and emphasized the importance of acting in good faith and disclosing relevant facts in legal proceedings.

Summary: Background:Nestle Pakistan acquired a space in Packages Mall, Walton Road, Lahore, from Packages Real Estate on lease for ten years. The lease deed was presented for registration, but the Registry Moharrar raised an objection regarding deficient stamp duty. The petitioner company paid the deficient amount. However, the Lease Deed was again impounded by the Sub-Registrar, Nishtar Town, Lahore, due to further alleged deficiencies.---Issues:Whether the Sub-Registrar had the authority to impound the document after the petitioner company had rectified the alleged deficiency in stamp duty.Whether the petitioner company is liable to pay stamp duty against the amount for services mentioned in the Lease Deed.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court found that the Sub-Registrar had exceeded authority by impounding the Lease Deed after the petitioner company rectified the stamp duty deficiency. Additionally, it was determined that the petitioner company was not liable to pay stamp duty against the amount for services mentioned in the Lease Deed. The Court ordered the registration of the Lease Deed and directed the return of the original to the petitioner company.---Citations/Precedents:Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908Section 33, 38, 40, 41 of the Stamp Act, 1899Justice Qazi Faez Isa and others v. The President of Pakistan and others (PLD 2021 SC 1)Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. Ltd. of India (A.I.R. 1933 Allahabad 735)Hotel Metropole Ltd. v. Government of Sindh and 2 others (PLD 1982 Karachi 810)Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Petroleum and Natural Resources and another v. Durrani Ceramics and others (2014 SCMR 1630)Reference No.1 of 2012 (PLD 2013 SC 279)Nadeem Ellahi through Special Attorney v. Deputy District Officer (Registration)/Sub-Registrar and another (2011 MLD 1961)