Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001----S. 15---Auction of mortgaged property by financial institution---Effect of Supreme Court ruling declaring S. 15 ultra vires---Scope---Auction of mortgaged property was conducted under the originally framed S. 15 of the Ordinance before its re-enactment pursuant to National Bank of Pakistan v. SAF Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 2014 SC 283, wherein the Supreme Court declared the provision unconstitutional---Held, that since the Apex Court did not invoke the doctrine of prospective overruling, past transactions were not automatically protected---Further held, that the auction sale under reference could not be treated as a past and closed transaction due to the pendency of the present appeal challenging the auction proceedings---Auction confirmed under an unconstitutional legal provision was void ab initio.Cited Cases:• National Bank of Pakistan v. SAF Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 2014 SC 283(b) Banking Law---Public Auction Principles----Validity of auction conducted with a single bid---Lack of competitive bidding---Effect---Respondent bank conducted auction proceedings and accepted a single bid, subsequently confirming the sale without ensuring competitive bidding---Held, that acceptance of a single bid without competition contradicts the concept of a public auction and fails to achieve the best possible price---Reliance placed on Al-Hadi Rice Mills (Pvt) Ltd. v. MCB Bank Ltd. 2023 CLD 85, wherein the Supreme Court declared that public auctions must involve competitive bidding to be legally valid.Cited Cases:• Al-Hadi Rice Mills (Pvt) Ltd. v. MCB Bank Ltd. 2023 CLD 85(c) Constitutional Law---Judicial Review of Auction Rules----Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Amendment Act 2016---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Rules 2018---Validity of single-bid acceptance under Rule 3(c)(iv)---Held, that amended S. 15 of the Ordinance and subsequent Rules introduced conditions permitting single-bid acceptance under certain circumstances---However, in Muhammad Shoaib Arshad v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 CLD 638, a larger bench declared Rule 3(c)(iv) unconstitutional---Thus, the auction sale in the instant case could not derive legitimacy from the amended law.Cited Cases:• Muhammad Shoaib Arshad v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 CLD 638(d) Civil Procedure---Restitution of Property After Invalid Auction----Effect of setting aside auction confirmation---Appellant’s right to seek restitution---Scope---Held, that the confirmation of auction sale was illegal and set aside---Appellant was granted liberty to initiate proceedings for restitution and reversal of actions taken pursuant to the confirmation order---Auction purchaser acquired no valid title under the annulled proceedings.Disposition: Appeal allowed; auction confirmation declared void; appellant permitted to seek restitution.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 27.02.2015 passed by Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench in C. R. No. 90-B of 2009). Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.42 & 54---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 19, 20 & First Sched., Art. 148---Suit for declaration, injunction and redemption of mortgage---Limita tion---Mortgage rights, purchase of---Effect---Petitioner / defendant purchased mortgage rights of suit property which was owned by respondents / plaintiffs---Held, that possession of petitioner / defendant over mortgaged property acted as an acknowledgement under Section 20(2) of Limitation Act, 1908 and period of fresh limitation had started running afresh---Purchase of mortgage rights from mortgagee also acted as acknowledgement under Section 19 of Limitation Act, 1908---Purchase of mortgage rights by petitioner / defendant had given a fresh start of limitation to respondent / plaintiff---Suit for redemption filed by respondents / plaintiffs was covered by both provisions of law i.e. Sections 19 and 20(2) of Limitation Act, 1908 and was well within the time and had rightly been so held by Courts below---Mortgagee was in possession and because of purchase of mortgage, fresh cause of action and fresh start of limitation had accrued to respondent / plaintiff---Petitioner / defendant purchased mortgagee rights which would confirm the fact that his right under prescription was not mature even till the cut-off date---Respondent / defendant could ask for redemption of his property from the charge of mortgage---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed against petitioner / defendant---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Nawaz Ali Khan and another v. Nawabzada and others PLD 2003 SC 425; Maqbool Ahmad v. Governm, ent of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 2063; Abdul Haq v. Ali Akbar and others 1999 SCMR 2531; Nawaz Ali Khan and another v. Nawabzada and others PLD 2003 SC 425; Durrani and 35 others v. Hamidullah Khan and 15 others 2007 SCMR 480; Muhammad Hussain and others v. Wahid Bakhs through Legal Heirs 2004 SCMR 1137 and Bilawar Khan v. Amir Sabar Rahman and others PLD 2013 Pesh. 38 ref. Shah Faisal, Advocate Supreme Court and Haji Muhammad Zahir Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Salahuddin, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 13th January, 2025.

Summary: Background: This case involved a longstanding dispute over a financial agreement, mortgage, and subsequent sale of a property. In 1996, Blossom Towels Industries obtained a loan from Small Business Finance Corporation (SBFC), later renamed SME Bank, which was secured by a mortgage on a property. In 1999, the CEO of Blossom entered an agreement to sell the mortgaged property to a buyer, who was unaware of the mortgage. The buyer later sought specific performance of the sale agreement after discovering the mortgage, leading to protracted litigation between the buyer, seller, and SME Bank. -----Issues: 1- Whether the decree for loan recovery, issued in favor of SME Bank against Blossom and the CEO, could be enforced on the property sold to the buyer. -----2- Whether the buyer, having deposited the decretal amount, should bear further liability for accrued interest on the mortgage. -----3- Whether the agreements between the CEO and the buyer should be set aside due to the CEO’s non-disclosure of the mortgage. -----4- Whether the decree for specific performance obtained by the buyer should be treated as final and binding. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Mortgage Liability: The court upheld the decree against Blossom and the CEO, confirming SME Bank’s right to recover the decretal amount from the mortgaged property. Since the buyer had stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor, they assumed responsibility for any outstanding liabilities. --Interest Accrual: The court found that SME Bank was justified in applying payments first to interest, as per established principles. It ruled that interest continued to accrue on the unpaid principal despite partial payments by the buyer. --Non-Disclosure and Fraud: The court deemed the CEO’s failure to disclose the mortgage as fraudulent, as it misled the buyer into the transaction. --Finality of Decree: The court applied the doctrine of res judicata, treating the earlier decree of specific performance as final. It rejected the CEO’s attempts to challenge the decree through subsequent litigation, asserting that the decree acted as a binding compromise between the parties. -----Citations/Precedents: Meghraj v. Bayabai (AIR 1970 SC 161) - Principle of applying debtor payments first to interest. Meka Venkatadri v. Raja Parthasarathy (AIR 1922 PC 233) - Principle of payment allocation in debt cases. Najam Koreshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank (2015 SCMR 1461) - Application of payment principles under the decree. Government of Balochistan v. Abdul Rashid Langove (2007 SCMR 518) - Limitation Act applicability in revision petitions. Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah (2001 SCMR 286) - Exclusion of Section 5 Limitation Act in revision cases. Mahmud Alam v. Mehdi Hussain (PLD 1970 Lahore 6) - Specific limitation provisions for special laws.

Summary: Background: This case involves a suit filed under section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, seeking recovery of Rs. 23,49,86,002.72/- along with the cost of the suit and the cost of funds against the defendants by the sale of mortgaged, pledged, and hypothecated properties. The plaintiff bank sanctioned various finance facilities to the principal borrower, which were secured through mortgage, hypothecation, and pledge stock, with additional personal guarantees from other defendants. ----Issues: 1- Whether the personal guarantees executed by defendants No. 4 to 7 are still enforceable. 2- Responsibility for any shortfall in the pledged stock. 3- Legitimacy of markup charged beyond the expiry date of the finance agreement. 4- Validity of the finance facilities in the absence of fresh offer letters. 5- Justification of outstanding amounts in the statements of accounts. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Personal Guarantees: The court found that the personal guarantees of defendants No. 4 to 7, executed on 15.01.2013, were discharged when the terms of the finance facilities were varied and renewed without requiring fresh guarantees from them. Consequently, defendants No. 4 to 7 were not held liable for the outstanding amount. Pledged Stock: The court determined that the question of the availability or shortfall in the pledged stock can be decided during the execution proceedings. Thus, this issue was not a ground for leave to defend the suit. Markup Beyond Expiry Date: The court acknowledged that the markup of Rs. 1.437 Million charged beyond the expiry date of 31.03.2016 was unjustified. Therefore, this amount was excluded from the suit amount. Sanction Letters for Finance Facilities: The court held that the absence of fresh sanction letters does not affect the validity of the finance agreements, which override internal bank documents like sanction advices. Outstanding Amounts: The court concluded that the statements of accounts and charge documents substantiated the plaintiff bank's claim against defendants No. 1, 2, and 3. The arguments regarding unexplained "Brought Forward" and "transfer entries" were rejected since these entries were admitted in the loan applications and annual audit reports. -----Citations/Precedents: Bank of Punjab Versus International Ceramics Ltd and others (2013 CLD 1472) Messrs DHRALA OIL MILLS through Partners/Guarantors and 4 others Versus The Bank of Punjab through Branch Manager (2014 CLD 153) Messrs WORLD TRANS LOGISTICS and others vs. SILK BANK LIMITED and others (2016 SCMR 800) I.C.P. and others vs. Messrs Chiniot Textile Mills Ltd. (PLD 1998 Karachi 316) Bashir Begum and 5 others vs. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (2005 CLD 373) National Bank of Pakistan through Zonal Chief vs. Messrs Saif Nadeem Electro Limited and others (2003 CLD 1468) Haji Fazal Elahi & Sons through Muhammad Tariq vs. Bank of Punjab and another (2004 CLD 162) Askari Commercial Bank Limited and others vs. Pakland Cement and others (PLD 2000 Karachi 246) United Bank Limited vs. M/s Hassan Muhammad Cotton Industries & Oil Mills and others (PLJ 2017 Lah. 415 (DB) Habib Bank vs. Messrs Qayyyum Spinning Ltd. (2001 MLD 1351) United Bank Ltd. Karachi vs. Messrs Gravure Packaging (Pvt.) Ltd. and 4 others (2001 YLR 1549) United Bank Limited vs. Messrs Central Cotton Mills Ltd. and 5 others (2001 MLD 78) Haq Nawaz and another vs. Habib Bank Limited through Manager, PAF Branch, Peshawar and 5 others (2021 CLD 1367) Messrs Naeem Zafar Industries and others vs. Bank of Punjab (2017 CLD 397) National Bank of Pakistan vs. Chenab Limited and others (2017 CLD 1539) Messrs Razzaq and Company v. Messrs Riazeda (Pvt.) Ltd; and International Finance Corporation v. Sarah Textiles Ltd. and 3 others (2009 CLD 761) Askari Bank Limited vs. Syed Zulfiqar Rizvi (2017 CLD 1298) Allied Bank Limited vs. Messrs Fatima Enterprises Limited and others (2017 CLD 1711) Mrs. Asma Hassan and another vs. Askari Bank Limited (2019 SCMR 1873) Abrar Ahmed and another vs. Irshad Ahmed (PLD 2014 SC 331) ----Quote: Legal status of sanction advice, status of Brought Forward entries, transfer entries in Statement of Account and restructuring of loan; Scope of section 133 of the Contract Act, 1972; Scope of pledge stock; No markup beyond Finance agreement

Summary: Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act (XII of 1957)--- ----Ss.25(2)(l) & 25(2)(s)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19 & First Sched. Art. 148---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54--- Declaration of title---Redemption of land mortgaged to a non-Muslim lady, who left the country at the time of partition in the year 1947---Non-issuance of notice to mortgagor to redeem the property---Effect---Limitation period, commencement of---Possession of the petitioners was not disputed---Federal Government terming the suit property as evacuee property transferred it in favour of Federal Government and then to a person respectively, who later on transferred it in favour of predecessor of respondents---Mortgage came to knowledge of the petitioners, when predecessor of the respondents instituted a suit against petitioners alleging to be the owners of the suit property, which prompted the petitioners to file a declaratory suit for redemption of the suit property--- Trial Court dismissed the suit treating it to be barred by time under Art. 148 of Limitation Act, 1908---Appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree of Trial Court on the ground that it was not clear that non-Muslim lady had left the country after 1947, therefore, petitioners were required to have asked for redemption of the property within a period of sixty years---Validity---Such determination of the Appellate Court was completely against the record and did not have any relevance to the present controversy for the reason that if such argument of the Appellate Court was accepted then there was no occasion for the Federal Government to have declared the suit property as evacuee and transferred it in the year, 1990, therefore, Appellate Court had dismissed the appeal on wrong premises---Powers under S.25(2)(l) of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, were delegated to the Deputy Rehabilitation and Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner to issue notice to local mortgagors to redeem the property within one month failing which the property would be liable to be auctioned under S.25(2)(s) of the Act, but the petitioners were not given any notice, as such, from the acknowledgment of the right of redemption, a fresh period of limitation would be computed for the exercise of such right in terms of S.19 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Thus, if the period of limitation was counted from the year, 1947, still the suit of the petitioners was not barred by time---After the acknowledgement of the rights of the petitioners vide letter Memo dated 08.12.1959, a fresh period of limitation would be computed for exercise of such rights in terms of S.19 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and as such, from the year, 1959 too, the suit of the petitioners was not barred by time---Both the Courts below had failed to consider the question of limitation in its true perspective, as suit filed by petitioners for redemption was well within time in terms of Art.148 of the Limitation Act, 1908, therefore, Civil revision was allowed and judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below were set-aside and the suit of the petitioners was decreed as prayed for accordingly. Muhammad Hanif and another v. Ghulam Rasool through LRs and others 2005 SCMR 1004 rel. Altaf Ahmad for Petitioners. Shams-ul-Haq for Respondents. Date of hearing: 13th May, 2024.

Summary: Background:This case concerns a civil revision petition challenging the judgments and decrees dated October 23, 2017, and February 4, 2019, by the Civil Judge and the Additional District Judge of Lahore. These judgments decreed a suit for specific performance in favor of Respondent No. 1, Syed Amjad Hussain Gillani, against Mst. Abida Rafique Ghouri, now represented by her legal heir Mst. Ambreena Azeem, regarding a property transaction.---Issues:Whether the petitioner failed to execute a sale deed for a triple-storey house as per the agreement despite receiving earnest money.Whether the respondent was financially capable and willing to fulfill the terms of the agreement by the stipulated target date.Whether the concurrent findings of the lower courts in favor of the respondent were justified.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, finding that the petitioner did not fulfill her obligations under the agreement to sell the property located in Gulberg-III, Lahore. Key points from the court's reasoning include:The petitioner received earnest money as agreed but failed to initiate the transfer process of the property by the target date, nor did she attempt to execute the sale deed.The respondent demonstrated willingness and financial capability to complete the transaction, evidenced by issuing a cross cheque before the target date and attempting to deposit the balance sale consideration into court following litigation.The argument that the respondent lacked financial ability was dismissed by the court as speculative and unsupported by evidence, particularly since the respondent had made efforts to deposit the remaining funds in compliance with court orders.The claim by the petitioner that the property was free from encumbrances was contradicted by evidence showing the property was mortgaged, which the petitioner had failed to disclose in the agreement.

Summary: Background: Gujranwala Steel Industries appealed against orders dated 19.01.2023 and 23.01.2023 by the Banking Court, which declared the allotment in favor of the appellant void and directed the respondent Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) to redeem the mortgaged property to the judgment debtors (Respondents No. 2 and 3) and deliver possession. The property in question, Plot No.24/B, SIE-II, PSIC, Gujranwala, was originally leased to Respondent No. 2 by the Punjab Small Industries Corporation (Respondent No. 8) and later mortgaged to IDBP. The leasehold rights were canceled, and IDBP sued for recovery, obtaining a decree in 2002. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Banking Court had jurisdiction to declare the allotment in favor of the appellant void after the decree was satisfied. 2- Whether the cancellation of the lease and subsequent allotment to the appellant were legally valid. 3- Whether Section 23 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO) applied to the transaction between the lessee and the appellant. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Jurisdiction of Banking Court: The Banking Court's jurisdiction to declare the allotment void was questioned as the decree had already been satisfied. The court held that once the decree was satisfied, the Banking Court's jurisdiction ended, and it could not adjudicate disputes regarding the cancellation of the lease and subsequent allotment. ---Validity of Lease Cancellation and Allotment: The validity of the cancellation of the lease and the subsequent allotment to the appellant was not determined by the Banking Court. The court noted that the issue of the legality of the cancellation of the lease needed adjudication, which fell outside the Banking Court's jurisdiction after the decree was satisfied. ---Application of Section 23 FIO: Section 23 FIO, which protects the interests of the mortgagee, was deemed irrelevant once the decree was satisfied. The court explained that the voidness of the transaction under Section 23 applies only as long as the decree is outstanding or the mortgage is enforceable. Once the decree is satisfied, the Banking Court cannot declare the transaction void. The appeal was allowed to the extent that the declaration of voidness of the allotment in favor of the appellant was set aside. The court directed the lessor, lessee, and allottee to seek remedies in law for enforcement of their respective claims without being prejudiced by the observations in the impugned orders. The process of redemption of the property was to be completed, and possession delivered to the lessee. The lessee was given thirty days to challenge the cancellation of the lease, failing which the lessor could invoke remedies against the lessee. ----Citations/Precedents: The court referred to several precedents, including: “Mst. Farhat Fareed Sheikh Vs. NIB Bank Limited” (2019 CLD 632) “Siraj Din Vs. Khushi Muhammad” (2002 YLR 1643) “Muslim Commercial Bank Limited Vs. Syed Ataullah Shah” (2003 CLD 888) “The Bank of Punjab Vs. Messrs Magic River Services” (2016 CLD 171) “Haji Dad Muhammad Vs. Muslim Commercial Bank Limited” (2011 CLD 785) “Mazco Industries Ltd Vs. Habib Bank Ltd” (2011 CLD 186) “Messrs Data Laboratories (Pvt) Ltd Vs. Judge Banking Court No.III, Lahore” (2008 CLD 1326)

Summary: Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides right of mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property . Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908, being relevant, is reproduced for convenience as under:- 20. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy. 1) Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy, or by his duly authorised agent, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made:Provided that an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment.(2) Effect of receipt of produce of mortgaged land. Where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment for the purpose of subsection (1).Explanation. Debt includes money payable under a decree or order of Court .Thus, in terms of Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908, receipt of produce during the subsistence of mortgage gave a fresh cause of action to the mortgagor on the receipt of produce of every harvest and it is deemed acknowledgment. This view has been enunciated in the case of Abdul Haq (1999 SCMR 2531) . In Abdul Haq case, the apex Court, while dealing with a similar question, held as under:- As mentioned earlier, the mortgage in hand is created and continues throughout under the conditions that squarely fall within the parameter contemplated by subsection (2) of section 20 of the Limitation Act, and hence amounts to acknowledgement under section 20(1) of the Limitation Act; which acknowledgement is repeated with every crop every year, if not twice a year. Thus, with the existing circumstances, no period of limitation would run against the mortgagor at all beyond one year. The property can be redeemed to any stage without the mischief of the law of Limitation barring redemption after the passage of sixty years.On the parity of reasoning aforesaid, the learned Single Judge held the view that when the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property and in receipt of the usufruct, such receipts are treated as payments to the mortgagee for the purpose of limitation regardless of what the intention of the party receiving the produce may be or might have been. Subsection (2) of section 20 of the Limitation Act, was held to have not expressly referred to the intention of such party. Particular insertion of subsection (2) of section 20 and the specific words thereof were construed to render it altogether self-contained and even independent of the proviso preceding it concerning handwriting or signature of the persons making acknowledgement. Therefore, the learned Single Judge concluded that simple possession of mortgagee and the receipt of rent or produce by him are sufficient ingredients to constitute absolute acknowledgement .

Summary: The main issue in the case was the commencement of the period of limitation for a mortgagor to redeem a mortgaged property. The petitioner argued that the period of limitation should start from the date of creation of the mortgage, while the lower courts and revenue authorities determined that it should start from the date of expiry of the mortgage term. The Supreme Court referred to Article 148 of The Limitation Act, 1908, which provides for the period of limitation for a mortgagor to redeem a mortgage. The court noted that the commencement of the period of limitation depends on the terms of the mortgage agreement. The court outlined three scenarios: when a specific date is fixed for payment, when the mortgage is for a fixed period without a specific date of expiry, and when neither a specific date nor a term is fixed. In the present case, the mortgage was created on 21.07.1935 for a fixed term of twenty years. The court concluded that the cause of action for the mortgagors to redeem the mortgage would accrue from the date of the expiry of the fixed term, and the limitation period of sixty years would commence thereafter. As the mortgagors filed their claim within the stipulated period of limitation, the court dismissed the petitions and refused leave.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a civil revision petition challenging the judgments and decrees of the Civil Judge and District Judge of Dera Ghazi Khan. The case revolved around a property initially mortgaged to an evacuee (Panjumal) in 1887-88, with the petitioner asserting rights of redemption. The petitioner claimed that after the evacuee left Pakistan in 1947, the land was wrongly allotted to a third party without addressing the petitioner's redemption rights. The lower courts dismissed the suit for being barred by limitation, leading the petitioner to seek revision. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner's right of redemption was barred by the limitation period. -----2- Whether the time period from 1947 (when the evacuee left Pakistan) could be excluded for the purposes of the limitation under Section 13 of the Limitation Act. -----3- Whether there was any acknowledgment within the limitation period that would restart the limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the suit for redemption was time-barred under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, which allows a 60-year period for filing such suits. The mortgage was created in 1887-88, and the limitation expired in 1947. The petitioner failed to show any acknowledgment or action within this 60-year period that could extend or revive the limitation. The petitioner's argument for excluding the period after 1947 (when the evacuee left Pakistan) under Section 13 of the Limitation Act was rejected. The court clarified that the exclusion applies only when the defendant leaves within the limitation period, which had already expired before 1947. The court found no evidence of any acknowledgment made within the original limitation period (60 years from 1887) that would restart the limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. As such, the petitioner's right to redeem the property had lapsed. The court dismissed the civil revision petition, affirming the judgments of the lower courts. -----Citations/Precedents: Ghulam Muhammad and 3 others v. Member, Board of Revenue Punjab, Lahore and 16 others (PLD 2005 Lahore 119) Muhammad Hanif and another v. Ghulam Rasool through L.Rs and others (2005 SCMR 1004) Abdul Haq v. Ali Akbar and others (1999 SCMR 2531) Samar Gul v. Central Government and others (PLD 1986 Supreme Court 35) Allah Ditta and others v. Sardar Khan and others (PLD 1997 Lahore 716) Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others (2001 SCMR 1700) Malik Muhammad Hussain v. District Returning Officer and Others (2008 SCMR 488) Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq v. Elahi Bakhsh and 2 others (2006 SCMR 12) Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and other (A.I.R. (38) 1951 Supreme Court 177) Muhammad Zaman and 8 others v. Abdul Malik Khan and 7 others (PLD 1991 Supreme Court 524) Udhavji Anandji Ladha & others v. Bapudas Ramdas Darbar (A.I.R (37) 1950 Bombay 94) Allah Dawaya and others v. Ghulam Mustafa and others (1990 CLC 1990) Nazeef v. Abdul Ghaffar and others (PLD 1966 Supreme Court 267) Kata Mir and others v. Mst. SHO Begum and others (2003 SCMR 589) Ghazi Marjan etc v. Alam Gul etc (PLJ 2009 Peshawar 102)