Summary: Bail granted----(a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C) – S. 497 – Bail in bailable and non-prohibitory offences – Principle. Offence under Section 489-F PPC (dishonour of cheque) carries a maximum sentence of three years, hence falling in the second category of non-bailable offences (i.e., punishable with imprisonment of less than ten years) – As per settled principle laid down in Tariq Bashir v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 34), grant of bail is a rule and refusal is an exception in such offences – No exceptional circumstances were shown by the prosecution or the complainant’s counsel to justify denial of bail. Tariq Bashir v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 34) Muhammad Sarfraz v. The State (2014 SCMR 1032) Muhammad Tanveer v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 733) Abdul Saboor v. The State (2022 SCMR 592) (b) Penal Code, 1860 – S. 489-F – Scope – Post-arrest bail – Dishonoured cheque – Prima facie business transaction – Civil proceedings pending – Relevance. Allegation against the petitioner was issuance of two cheques for Rs. 32,00,000/- and Rs. 500,000/-, the latter of which was dishonoured – Petitioner and complainant had prior business dealings under the name “Qarni & Haider Traders” – Bank statements evidenced commercial transactions – A civil suit was already pending for recovery – Whether the cheque was issued dishonestly or in discharge of a lawful obligation is a factual controversy to be determined by the trial Court upon evidence. Muhammad Anwar v. The State (2024 SCMR 1567) Abdul Rasheed v. The State (2023 SCMR 1948) (c) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XXXVII – Alternate remedy for recovery – Bail not to be denied due to pendency of civil liability. The civil nature of the dispute and existence of civil remedies under Order XXXVII CPC do not bar grant of bail – Involvement of large amount does not enhance penal consequences under Section 489-F PPC nor does it constitute a ground to refuse bail. Jehanzeb Khan v. The State (2020 SCMR 1268) (d) Criminal Law – Bail – Previous involvement in other cases – Effect. Mere registration of other FIRs against the petitioner does not disqualify him from bail if on merits he has a prima facie case – Bail cannot be refused solely based on past criminal record. Moundar v. The State (PLD 1990 SC 934) Muhammad Rafique v. The State (1997 SCMR 412) Syeda Sumera Andaleeb v. The State (2021 SCMR 1227) Nazir Ahmad alias Bhaga v. The State (2022 SCMR 1467) Ali Anwar Paracha v. The State (2024 SCMR 1596) (e) Post-arrest bail – Continued detention – When unjustified. Petitioner had been in custody since 22.01.2025 – Investigation already concluded and no further physical custody required by the police – Prolonged incarceration, in absence of necessity, amounts to pre-trial punishment, which is impermissible. ----Disposition: Post-arrest bail allowed. Petitioner admitted to bail upon furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 200,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court. Observations made are tentative in nature and shall not prejudice trial proceedings.

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001----S. 15---Auction of mortgaged property by financial institution---Effect of Supreme Court ruling declaring S. 15 ultra vires---Scope---Auction of mortgaged property was conducted under the originally framed S. 15 of the Ordinance before its re-enactment pursuant to National Bank of Pakistan v. SAF Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 2014 SC 283, wherein the Supreme Court declared the provision unconstitutional---Held, that since the Apex Court did not invoke the doctrine of prospective overruling, past transactions were not automatically protected---Further held, that the auction sale under reference could not be treated as a past and closed transaction due to the pendency of the present appeal challenging the auction proceedings---Auction confirmed under an unconstitutional legal provision was void ab initio.Cited Cases:• National Bank of Pakistan v. SAF Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 2014 SC 283(b) Banking Law---Public Auction Principles----Validity of auction conducted with a single bid---Lack of competitive bidding---Effect---Respondent bank conducted auction proceedings and accepted a single bid, subsequently confirming the sale without ensuring competitive bidding---Held, that acceptance of a single bid without competition contradicts the concept of a public auction and fails to achieve the best possible price---Reliance placed on Al-Hadi Rice Mills (Pvt) Ltd. v. MCB Bank Ltd. 2023 CLD 85, wherein the Supreme Court declared that public auctions must involve competitive bidding to be legally valid.Cited Cases:• Al-Hadi Rice Mills (Pvt) Ltd. v. MCB Bank Ltd. 2023 CLD 85(c) Constitutional Law---Judicial Review of Auction Rules----Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Amendment Act 2016---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Rules 2018---Validity of single-bid acceptance under Rule 3(c)(iv)---Held, that amended S. 15 of the Ordinance and subsequent Rules introduced conditions permitting single-bid acceptance under certain circumstances---However, in Muhammad Shoaib Arshad v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 CLD 638, a larger bench declared Rule 3(c)(iv) unconstitutional---Thus, the auction sale in the instant case could not derive legitimacy from the amended law.Cited Cases:• Muhammad Shoaib Arshad v. Federation of Pakistan 2020 CLD 638(d) Civil Procedure---Restitution of Property After Invalid Auction----Effect of setting aside auction confirmation---Appellant’s right to seek restitution---Scope---Held, that the confirmation of auction sale was illegal and set aside---Appellant was granted liberty to initiate proceedings for restitution and reversal of actions taken pursuant to the confirmation order---Auction purchaser acquired no valid title under the annulled proceedings.Disposition: Appeal allowed; auction confirmation declared void; appellant permitted to seek restitution.

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001----S. 9---Suit for recovery of finance---Liability of partners and guarantors---Determination of outstanding amount---Scope---Plaintiff Bank instituted suit under S. 9 of the Ordinance for recovery of Rs.118,998,622.14/- along with markup, costs, and cost of funds due to default on financial facilities extended to Defendant No.1 (a partnership firm)---Defendants contested liability, arguing that certain partners had been wrongly impleaded and that the Plaintiff Bank’s claims included unauthorized markup beyond facility expiry---Held, that Defendants No. 4 and 5 had executed personal guarantees securing the liabilities of Defendant No.1 and its associated entities---Letter relied upon by Defendants to claim waiver of guarantee conditions (dated 02.02.2011) was never acted upon and did not absolve them from liability---Supreme Court precedent established that an unimplemented variation in contract terms does not release guarantors from original liability---Amount recoverable limited to Rs.82,088,376/- after deduction of excess markup charged beyond facility expiry.Cited Cases:• Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Hyderabad Beverage Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. 2016 SCMR 451• Mian Aftab A. Sheikh v. Messrs Trust Leasing Corp. Ltd. 2003 CLD 702(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VI, R. 17---Amendment of pleadings---Scope in financial litigation---Defendant sought amendment in application for leave to defend (PLA), introducing new evidence regarding waiver of guarantee conditions by the Plaintiff Bank---Held, that amendments which supplement rather than contradict original pleadings can be allowed under O. VI, R. 17, CPC, even in financial suits under the Ordinance---Amendment allowed to place relevant letters on record, but no substantive relief granted as waiver was never acted upon.Cited Cases:• Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Bela Automotives Ltd. 2010 CLD 1243• Messrs Maroof Knitwear (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. 2003 CLD 1610(c) Banking Law---Pledged Stock and Fiduciary Duty----Obligation of borrower to manage pledged assets---Effect of expired stock---Defendants argued that Plaintiff Bank was responsible for expiry of pledged pesticide stock, causing financial losses---Held, that in pledge transactions, the creditor holds only constructive possession while the borrower maintains physical custody and operational control---Defendants failed to replace expired stock despite Bank’s requests, eroding its value and leading to default---Plaintiff Bank justified in initiating criminal proceedings against Defendants for mismanagement and fraud.Cited Cases:• World Trans Logistics v. Silk Bank Ltd. 2016 SCMR 800• Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd. v. Nazir Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. 2020 CLD 796(d) Banking Law---Financial Default and Execution of Decree----S. 19, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Automatic conversion of decree into execution---Failure to pay decreed amount within thirty days results in execution under S. 19(1) of the Ordinance without requiring a separate execution petition---Court granted decree for Rs.82,088,376/- against Defendants jointly and severally, with costs of suit and cost of funds from date of default (31.07.2011) till realization---Defendants’ liability affirmed based on financial documents and admissions in pleadings---Decree to automatically stand converted into execution proceedings if unpaid.Cited Cases:• Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Bela Automotives Ltd. 2010 CLD 1243Disposition: Suit decreed in favor of Plaintiff Bank for Rs.82,088,376/- with costs and cost of funds; decree to convert into execution if unpaid within 30 days.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----O. VIII, R.10---Striking off defence---Failure to file written statement---Multiple opportunities granted---Deliberate delay and misuse of procedural law---Appellant/defendant bank failed to submit written statement over a period of one year and seven months, despite issuance of notices, imposition of costs, and grant of multiple opportunities---Instead of complying with Court’s repeated directions, appellant kept filing successive applications under various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), such as O. VI, Rr. 2 & 5; O. VII, R.1 & 10; and O. I, R.10, thereby intentionally delaying proceedings---Trial Court was justified in striking off appellant’s right to file written statement under O. VIII, R.10, CPC---Held, mere filing of an application on a date fixed for compliance does not automatically suspend or extend time for mandatory procedural obligations unless so permitted by Court---Striking off right to defend in such circumstances is consistent with principles of procedural discipline and justice. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----S. 20---Territorial jurisdiction---Determination---Relevant considerations---Appellant contended that Trial Court at Islamabad lacked territorial jurisdiction since its head office was in Karachi and cause of action arose in Jhelum---Held, as per S. 20, CPC, a suit may be instituted where the defendant resides, carries on business, or where cause of action wholly or in part arises---Jurisdiction can be attracted even if part of cause of action occurs within Court’s local limits or any one of the defendants resides therein. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----S. 21---Objection to jurisdiction---Belated challenge barred---Appellant raised objection regarding territorial jurisdiction after prolonged delay and failure to file written statement---Held, objection to jurisdiction must be raised at the earliest stage before settlement of issues---Failure to do so results in waiver of such objection---Raising objection after causing delay and procedural abuse cannot be permitted---Trial Court correctly dismissed objection as barred under S. 21, CPC. Relied on: Malik Khan Muhammad Tareen v. Nasir and Brother Coal Company (2018 SCMR 2121) (d) Administration of justice: ----Procedural abuse---Use of delay tactics---Principles of natural justice---Appellant’s conduct exhibited repeated procedural maneuvering aimed at delaying justice---Held, procedural law is a means to achieve justice, not to obstruct it---Courts are duty-bound to reject attempts to misuse procedural provisions to frustrate the adjudication of substantive rights---Appeal dismissed in the interest of preserving the integrity of judicial process. ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed.

Summary: -----Quote: Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the CPC")? Scope -- Were the Auctioneers justified, in terms of Rule 84 of Order XXI of the CPC, to offer option to purchase the property to second highest bidder, and upon his failure to extend option to purchase to the third highest bidder [decree holder bank] ? the only bidder standing. Learned counsel for the decree-holder bank submitted that where successful bidder is the decree holder bank requirements under Sub-Rule 1 of Rule 84 of Order XXI of the CPC can be dispensed with and there was no need for re-sale. Held: The argument is flawed inasmuch as concession available under Sub-rule 2 of Rule 84 of Order XXI of the CPC is confined to the extent of requirement of deposit of 20% of the purchase money and does not spill to statutory direction regarding forthwith re-sale if payment of purchase money was not deposited by the successful bidder. Expression of re-sale of the property has to be examined in the context of Rule 84 ibid, which does not imply sale of property to the next bidder. In the present case, offering of option to the second highest bidder and then to the third highest bidder (decree holder bank) was contrary to Rule 84 of Order XXI of the CPC. -----Background: The appellants challenged the confirmation of an auction sale conducted by a decree-holder bank, following a default in loan repayment. The auction was conducted multiple times, and ultimately, the decree-holder bank (respondent) was confirmed as the successful bidder. The appellants contended that the auction process violated the statutory mandates under Rule (84) of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as the property was not re-sold immediately after the default by the highest bidder to deposit 25% of the purchase money. -----Issues: 1- Compliance with Rule (84), Order XXI, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Whether the auctioneer violated the requirement to immediately re-sell the property upon the highest bidder’s failure to deposit 25% of the purchase money. -----2- Validity of Sale Without Re-Sale: Whether the auction sale could be confirmed without re-selling to new bidders after the default. -----3- Effect of Non-Compliance with Rule (90) Order XXI: Whether the failure of appellants to deposit 20% of the auction proceeds affected their right to contest the sale’s validity. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the auction sale was invalid, null, and void due to substantial procedural violations. The court's reasoning included: --Violation of Rule (84) of Order XXI: When the highest bidder failed to deposit 25%, the auctioneer should have re-sold the property instead of offering it to the subsequent bidders. Continuing with the aborted sale contravened the mandate of Rule (84), which requires an immediate re-sale in such cases. Single-Bidder Concern: The auction ultimately had only one valid participant, the decree-holder bank, which failed to meet the requirements of a competitive public auction, thus undermining the transparency and fairness essential to public auctions. --Non-Applicability of Rule (90): The court determined that the requirement for the appellants to deposit 20% under Rule (90) was not applicable because the auction sale was legally invalid due to the significant statutory violations. The court allowed the appeal, declaring the auction sale void and setting aside the confirmation order of 13.10.2022. -----Citations/Precedents: Rule (84) & Rule (90) of Order XXI, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Pertinent legal guidelines for deposit and re-sale requirements. Mst. Nadia Malik v. Messrs Makki Chemical Industries Pvt. Ltd. (2011 SCMR 1675) Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2, Lahore (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 470) Muhammad Ashraf v. U.B.L (2019 SCMR 1004) Al-Hadi Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. MCB Bank Limited (2023 CLD 85) Summit Bank Limited v. Messrs M. M. Brothers (2023 CLD 297) - Highlighted the requirement for competitive bidding in auctions.

Summary: Pecuniary Jurisdiction Determination: Pre-Decretal vs. Post-Decretal Proceedings The pecuniary jurisdiction of the executing court under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is determined based on the value of the claim at the time of filing the suit, not on the adjudicated amount (decreed claim). Once a court assumes jurisdiction for a suit under the Ordinance, it retains jurisdiction for the execution of the decree, irrespective of whether the decreed amount falls below the threshold for pecuniary jurisdiction. (Relevant Cases: Dr. Pir Muhammad Khan v. Khuda Bukhsh, PLD 2015 SCMR 1243; Messrs United Bank Ltd. v. Mst. Rehana Raza, PLD 1983 Karachi 467) -------- 2. Automatic Conversion of Suit into Execution: Under Section 19(1) of the Ordinance, 2001, a suit automatically converts into execution proceedings upon the pronouncement of a judgment and decree. This automatic conversion negates the need for the decree-holder to reapply for execution or for the court to reassess its jurisdiction based on the decreed amount. -------- 3. The Role of "Cost of Funds" in Execution: Cost of funds under Section 3(3) of the Ordinance, 2001 forms part of the decree and is recoverable until the realization of the decretal amount. The inclusion of cost of funds ensures that the amount recoverable under the decree may increase with time, rendering post-decretal jurisdictional challenges impractical and unnecessary. -------- 4. Special vs. General Jurisdiction: The Ordinance, 2001, provides a unique procedural framework distinct from the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. While Section 39 of the CPC permits transfer of decrees, such provisions are not strictly applicable where the special jurisdiction under the Ordinance is invoked, emphasizing legislative intent for continuity of jurisdiction. -------- 5. Rejection of Faran Maiz Industries Precedent: The decision in Faran Maiz Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited (EFA No. 1059/2016), which allowed transfer of execution proceedings based on the decreed amount falling below the pecuniary threshold, was declared per incuriam for failing to account for Section 19(1) of the Ordinance. The court clarified that such an approach disrupts the legislative intent of seamless transition from suit to execution proceedings. -------- 6. Execution of Interim Decrees: The Ordinance allows for the execution of interim decrees under Section 11, reinforcing the principle that the original court retains jurisdiction over the entirety of the proceedings, irrespective of the decreed amount or subsequent pecuniary adjustments. -------- 7. Legislative Intent and Continuity: The intent of the Ordinance is to ensure procedural efficiency by preventing jurisdictional disputes post-decree. The High Court retains jurisdiction to execute its decrees irrespective of the adjudicated claim's value, provided it originally held jurisdiction over the suit. -------- 8. Dismissal of EFA No. 248622/2018: The court upheld the order dated 16.10.2018, rejecting the judgment debtor’s objection to the High Court’s jurisdiction in execution proceedings. EFA No. 248622/2018 was dismissed, affirming the High Court’s jurisdiction. -------- 9. Setting Aside of EFA No. 43805/2021: The court overturned the order transferring execution proceedings in EFA No. 43805/2021, declaring that such transfers violate the Ordinance's statutory mandate. The High Court remains the appropriate forum for execution in such cases. -------- Conclusion: The High Court is the sole forum for executing decrees it has passed under the Ordinance, irrespective of subsequent pecuniary valuation challenges. Judicial consistency was reinforced by declaring conflicting precedents as per incuriam. Both appeals were resolved accordingly.

Summary: Insurance Appeal under Section 124 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000--- Proviso of Sub Section 1 of Section 121 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000---- Conferment of Power of Insurance Tribunal upon the District or Addl. District & Sessions Judge--- Validity of the decision made by the District & Session Judge as Insurance Tribunal at the touchstone of Sub Section 4 and 6 of Section 121 of the Ordinance ibid--- Held that in absence of constitution of Insurance Tribunal under Section 121(2) of the Ordinance, ibid, the Government has the jurisdiction to confer power of Insurance Tribunal to the District & Sessions Judge/ Addl. District & Sessions Judge to function as Tribunal under proviso to sub Section 1 of Section 121 of the Ordinance. In exercise of such conferred power any proceedings observed or interim or final decision made, such proceedings/ decision cannot be invalidated due to any flaw in constitution of the Tribunal and same are protected under sub section 4 & 6 of the Ordinance ibid. Further the decision of a larger Bench or equal members of Bench is binding upon the subsequent smaller or similar number of a Bench. If subsequent Bench comprising equal number of the members passed dictum contrary to the earlier one, the latter decision will have no binding force. This issue is settled accordingly. -----Background: This appeal addresses the legality of the constitution of Insurance Tribunals under the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, specifically focusing on whether tribunals not composed as per Section 121(2) fulfill the mandate of the law. An appellant raised concerns that the Insurance Tribunals were not constituted with the required Chairperson (a High Court Judge) and two expert members, questioning their jurisdiction and the validity of their decisions. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Insurance Tribunals, operating without the composition mandated by Section 121(2) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, are legally constituted. -----2- Whether the Federal Government has the authority under the proviso of Section 121(1) to confer tribunal powers on District and Additional District & Sessions Judges temporarily. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court held that under the proviso to Section 121(1) of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000, the Federal Government, in consultation with the High Court Chief Justices, has the authority to temporarily confer Insurance Tribunal powers on District and Additional District & Sessions Judges. This arrangement is valid until a fully constituted tribunal under Section 121(2) is established. The Court ruled that the previous judgment invalidating the tribunals was inconsistent with binding precedent and did not consider the legislative intent behind the proviso of Section 121(1), which allows a temporary arrangement. The Court reaffirmed that any tribunal constituted under the proviso is legally empowered to adjudicate insurance cases, ensuring no jurisdictional gap until a tribunal is composed as per the Ordinance. -----Citations/Precedents: Premier Insurance Limited through Authorized Officer Vs Messrs Ihsan Yousaf Textile Private Limited (2023 CLD 135) Province of Sindh v Shahzad Hussain Talpur (2022 SCMR 439) Haji Muhammad Hanif Vs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman (2007 CLD 490) State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and another Vs Mst. Naseem Begum (2009 CLD 1413) State Life Insurance Corporation Vs Razi-ur-Rehman (2011 CLD 746) Multiline Associates Vs. Ardeshir Cowasjee and 2 others (PLD 1995 SC 423) Qaiser & Another Vs The State (2022 SCMR 1641) Mst. Samrana Nawaz v. M.C.B. Bank Ltd. (PLD 2021 SC 581) Wak Limited Multan Road Lahore V. Collector Central Excise and Saks Tax Lahore (now Commissioner Inland Revenue LTU Lahore) (2018 SCMR 1474) Union of India & others v. S.K. Kapoor (2011 4 SCC 589) Ardeshir Cowasjee and 10 others Vs. Karachi Building Control Authority KMCL Karachi and 4 others (1999 SCMR 2883) Muhammad Jawad Hamid Vs Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif & Others (PLD 2018 Lahore 836)

Summary: Background: This case involved a longstanding dispute over a financial agreement, mortgage, and subsequent sale of a property. In 1996, Blossom Towels Industries obtained a loan from Small Business Finance Corporation (SBFC), later renamed SME Bank, which was secured by a mortgage on a property. In 1999, the CEO of Blossom entered an agreement to sell the mortgaged property to a buyer, who was unaware of the mortgage. The buyer later sought specific performance of the sale agreement after discovering the mortgage, leading to protracted litigation between the buyer, seller, and SME Bank. -----Issues: 1- Whether the decree for loan recovery, issued in favor of SME Bank against Blossom and the CEO, could be enforced on the property sold to the buyer. -----2- Whether the buyer, having deposited the decretal amount, should bear further liability for accrued interest on the mortgage. -----3- Whether the agreements between the CEO and the buyer should be set aside due to the CEO’s non-disclosure of the mortgage. -----4- Whether the decree for specific performance obtained by the buyer should be treated as final and binding. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Mortgage Liability: The court upheld the decree against Blossom and the CEO, confirming SME Bank’s right to recover the decretal amount from the mortgaged property. Since the buyer had stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor, they assumed responsibility for any outstanding liabilities. --Interest Accrual: The court found that SME Bank was justified in applying payments first to interest, as per established principles. It ruled that interest continued to accrue on the unpaid principal despite partial payments by the buyer. --Non-Disclosure and Fraud: The court deemed the CEO’s failure to disclose the mortgage as fraudulent, as it misled the buyer into the transaction. --Finality of Decree: The court applied the doctrine of res judicata, treating the earlier decree of specific performance as final. It rejected the CEO’s attempts to challenge the decree through subsequent litigation, asserting that the decree acted as a binding compromise between the parties. -----Citations/Precedents: Meghraj v. Bayabai (AIR 1970 SC 161) - Principle of applying debtor payments first to interest. Meka Venkatadri v. Raja Parthasarathy (AIR 1922 PC 233) - Principle of payment allocation in debt cases. Najam Koreshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank (2015 SCMR 1461) - Application of payment principles under the decree. Government of Balochistan v. Abdul Rashid Langove (2007 SCMR 518) - Limitation Act applicability in revision petitions. Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah (2001 SCMR 286) - Exclusion of Section 5 Limitation Act in revision cases. Mahmud Alam v. Mehdi Hussain (PLD 1970 Lahore 6) - Specific limitation provisions for special laws.

Summary: -----Quote: The petitioner claimed that she had a joint account with her deceased father, however, after death of her father, the legal heirs (her siblings and mother) were not entitled to claim share in 50% of the deposit lying in the account on the ground that the account was being operated in terms of "either or survival" clause. Held: While such clause has already been declared as unislamic in multiple cases by the Superior Courts, including this Court qua rights of legal heirs of deceased depositor, it has been further observed that the guidelines or stipulations contained in a Bank Account Opening Form are mere operating instructions and are meant to safeguard the banks in situations where one of the joint account holders dies and it does not come to the knowledge of the bank and/or any claim by the legal heirs of the deceased joint account holder is not intimated to the bank and the bank in good faith pays the amount, lying with it, to the surviving account holder(s). In such situation, the bank may be absolved from any liability keeping in view the facts of a particular case and the legal heirs of the deceased account holder can claim the recovery from the surviving joint account holders; however, it does not give unfettered power to the bank to unilaterally facilitate the surviving joint account holder(s) to withdraw all the money. -----Background: This case involved a dispute over the funds in a joint bank account following the death of one of the account holders. The petitioner claimed sole ownership of the funds, arguing that the account, originally opened with her father, was intended only for her use, and her father was added merely as a joint account holder for convenience. The lower court issued a succession certificate in favor of the petitioner’s co-heir (respondent), entitling them to a share in the account based on inheritance laws. Both the trial court and appellate court dismissed the petitioner’s appeals, leading to the present civil revision. -----Issues: 1- Does the surviving joint account holder have an exclusive right to the account funds, or are those funds subject to inheritance laws? -----2- What legal impact does an "either or survivor" clause have in a joint account upon the death of one account holder? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that joint account instructions like "either or survivor" are intended for operational convenience in managing the account and do not override inheritance rights under Islamic law. These instructions allow for either account holder to operate the account but do not confer exclusive rights to the surviving holder after the other’s death. The petitioner’s argument that the entire amount in the account was hers was unsubstantiated, as she did not provide clear evidence of her income source or contributions to the account. The lower courts, therefore, ruled correctly based on the available evidence. Without an Account Opening Form explicitly stating "either or survivor" privileges, the bank could not unilaterally transfer the funds to the petitioner without proper succession documentation. The court affirmed the lower courts' concurrent findings, emphasizing that without significant procedural errors or misinterpretation of law, there was no basis for interference in a revision petition. -----Citations/Precedents: Syed Shah Pr Mian Kazmi v. Mst. Nelofer (PLD 2012 Peshawar 101): Established that inheritance laws prevail over any "either or survivor" clauses or nominations in bank accounts. Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan, etc. v. Mst. Saima Yasin etc. (Civil Revision No. 55-D of 2020): Clarified that joint account survivorship instructions do not supersede inheritance rights, and the surviving account holder cannot unilaterally withdraw funds after the other holder’s death. The State through Advocate General, N.W.F.P., Peshawar vs. Naeemullah Khan (2001 SCMR 1461): Interpreted “proceedings” to mean every legal step taken from commencement to disposal, applicable here in considering legal requirements for succession and inheritance.

Summary: Functions Test Applicability to Habib Bank Limited