Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997----S.9(1), category 3(c)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.497(2)---Post-arrest bail---Further inquiry---Alleged recovery of 2,000 grams charas from personal possession of accused---Record showed that habeas corpus petition alleging accused’s illegal detention since 17.12.2025 had been filed before High Court before noon on 19.12.2025, whereas narcotics FIR was subsequently registered at 3:20 p.m. on same date---Close chronology between institution of habeas corpus proceedings and registration of recovery case constituted exceptional factual anomaly, created noticeable dent in prosecution story, compromised transparency of alleged recovery and placed case under serious doubt---Matter consequently called for further inquiry. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.497(2)---Bail---Mala fides and ulterior motive---Accused had already been granted post-arrest bail in an earlier murder case---Plea that subsequent narcotics case had been engineered through connivance of police and rival complainant party could not be brushed aside at bail stage---Friction between local police and accused’s family, prior criminal litigation and immediate filing of habeas corpus petition constituted material indicating possible mala fides and ulterior motive---Question of false implication required appraisal of evidence at trial and rendered case one of further inquiry. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.497(2)---Further inquiry---Rule of bail---Where material available at tentative stage created reasonable doubt regarding genuineness of recovery and suggested possible mala fide implication, concession of bail was to be extended as a rule---Detailed examination of defence plea or final determination of credibility of prosecution evidence was not permissible at bail stage. Cited Cases: • Tariq Bashir and 5 others v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34 • Ehsan Ullah v. The State 2012 SCMR 1137 • Salman Mushtaq and others v. The State through P.G. Punjab and another 2024 SCMR 14 (d) Bail---Tentative assessment---Observations not to prejudice trial---Findings recorded while granting bail were provisional and confined to determining whether case required further inquiry---Trial Court was to decide prosecution case independently on evidence without being influenced by observations made in bail order. Disposition---Petition converted into appeal and allowed---Petitioner granted post-arrest bail in FIR No.2518 of 2025, Police Station Noshehra Virkan, District Gujranwala, subject to furnishing bail bond of Rs.100,000 with one surety in like amount to satisfaction of Trial Court. Mst. Robina Bibi alias Rubina Kausar v. The State and another, Criminal Petition No.731 of 2026, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 16.06.2026, not approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Fatal road accident---Offences under Ss. 322, 337-G & 279, P.P.C.---Further custody/investigation not required---Petitioner-accused sought pre-arrest bail in case registered under Ss. 322, 337-G and 279, P.P.C., arising out of a road accident wherein three persons had died after a Mazda Coaster allegedly hit their motorcycle in rash and negligent manner---Supreme Court observed that although three innocent persons had expired in the unfortunate incident, the material consideration was whether petitioner was still required for extracting further facts or for further inquiry/investigation---Investigating Officer, when specifically asked by Court, failed to give any plausible reason for further requirement of petitioner and conceded that petitioner was no more required for further inquiry or investigation---Held, in such circumstances no fruitful purpose would be served by refusing pre-arrest bail merely for extracting more facts from petitioner. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 322 & 279---Qatl-bis-sabab and rash/negligent driving---Bail before arrest---Nature of offences---Supreme Court observed that offence under S.322, P.P.C. entails diyat only, whereas offence under S.279, P.P.C. is bailable---When these factors were considered together with the fact that petitioner was no longer required for investigation, petitioner was entitled to grant of pre-arrest bail. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Name of accused not appearing in FIR---Allegation of fake driving licence---Effect---Petitioner’s name did not appear in the FIR, which was initially registered against an unknown driver---Allegation regarding petitioner possessing a fake driving licence was treated as a separate matter---Supreme Court observed that even if it was assumed that petitioner had a fake driving licence, such offence was bailable and did not justify refusal of pre-arrest bail in the circumstances of the case. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Tentative assessment at bail stage---Supreme Court clarified that observations made in bail before arrest order were tentative in nature and would not prejudice case of either party before Trial Court. Disposition: Petition seeking bail before arrest was converted into appeal and allowed; petitioner was granted pre-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.100,000 with one surety in the like amount to satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court; observations were declared tentative and not to prejudice trial.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S.91, Sr. No. (3)(c)----Possession of contraband charas weighing 1500 grams---Post-arrest bail, grant of---Non-conclusion of trial for considerable period---Delay not attributed to accused---Although the petitioner was named in the FIR, however, he was behind the bars for more than last one year and two months without any material progress in the trial---Report of Trial Court reflected that it was the prosecution which contributed to the delay in the conclusion of the trial as on several occasions prosecution witnesses were not in attendance---The guilt of the petitioner would be determined by the Trial Court after recording of evidence---Petitioner had been in custody since the time of his arrest---Investigation had been completed and his physical custody was no longer required by the investigating agency for further probe---Petitioner had no previous conviction to his discredit, and his continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose---Petitioner was admitted to bail after arrest, is in circumstances. Sagheer Ahmed v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 913 and Abbas Raza v. The State 2020 SCMR 1859 ref. Shahid Rafiq Mayo for Petitioner. Abdul Samad, Additional Prosecutor General with Muhammad Zahid SI along with police record.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Post-arrest bail, grant of---Offences not attracting the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Further inquiry---Record revealed that petitioner was nominated in the FIR with the allegation of having issued a cheque valuing Rs.21,00,000/- in favour of complainant to discharge his financial obligation, which upon presentation before the bank was dishonored due to insufficient funds---The offence under S.489-F, P.P.C., entails maximum punishment up to three (03) years and does not attract the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Regarding the offences which do not attract the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C. grant of bail is a rule, whereas, refusal is an exception---Petitioner is behind the bars since 28.04.2025 and he cannot be kept confined for an unlimited period---Thus, the case of petitioner comes within the ambit of further inquiry, entitling him to the concession of post arrest bail---Petitioner was admitted to post arrest bail, in circumstances. Ch. Rashad Ali Gujjar for Petitioner. Ch. Muhammad Ishaq, APG with Nadeem, ASI for the State. Shahid Rafiq Mayo for the Complainant.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497 (2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 337-U, 337-A (1), 337-L (2), 148 & 149---Injury on teeth, shajja-i-khafifa, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Post-arrest bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Injury on lips---Itlaf-i udw to be determined by Trial Court---Allegation against the petitioner/accused was that he inflicted pistol butt blow on mouth of complainant due to which his lip was fractured and one tooth was broken---There was a delay of about six days in reporting the matter to the police without there being any satisfactory explanation---According to contents of FIR, the petitioner inflicted pistol butt blow on mouth of complainant due to which his lip was fractured and one tooth was broken, however, the injuries allegedly attributed to the petitioner had been declared under Ss.337-L(2) & 337-A(i), P.P.C, which were bailable and S.337-U, P.P.C, which carried the punishment of arsh i.e. one-twentieth of the diyat---Whether or not S.337-U, P.P.C would be read with S.334, P.P.C, would be answered by the Trial Court after recording of evidence---Petitioner was not involved in any other case of such like nature---Petitioner was behind bars since his arrest and no more required for the purpose of investigation---No useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars for an indefinite period---Thus, case of the petitioner called for further inquiry within the ambit of Subsection (2) of S.497, Code of Criminal Procedure---Petitioner was admitted to post arrest bail, in circumstances. Shahid Rafique Mayo for Petitioner. Sh. Muhammad Nouman Siddique, DPG along with Muhammad Sona, ASI with record. Farrukh Mehmood for the Complainant.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 497(1)---Prohibitory clause---Scope and determination---Whether “minimum” or “maximum” statutory punishment controls applicability of prohibitory clause---Held, where statute prescribes a sentencing range with a mandatory minimum and higher maximum (in this case, nine to fourteen years under S. 9(c) of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997), the offence falls within the prohibitory clause if the maximum sentence equals or exceeds ten years---The maximum punishment, not the minimum, governs the inquiry for purposes of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C.---High Court fell into error by treating nine-year minimum as a discrete “lesser punishment” and concluding that the case lay outside the prohibitory clause---Such reasoning misconstrues the legislative intent and statutory structure---Proper test is whether the maximum punishment prescribed by law attracts the clause. (b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 ----S. 9(c) [as amended on 06.09.2022]---Punishment “not less than nine years and may extend to fourteen years”---Interpretation---Statute does not create two distinct punishments but fixes a lower and upper limit---For determining application of the prohibitory clause under S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., the upper limit of fourteen years is controlling---Minimum term only sets a sentencing floor below which Court cannot go---To treat it as a “lesser alternative punishment” is contrary to settled law. (c) Bail ----Grant of bail in offences falling within prohibitory clause---Discretion and exceptional grounds---Even where prohibitory clause applies, bail may be granted on well-recognised exceptional considerations, such as further inquiry under S. 497(2), mala fides, false implication, glaring infirmities, or violation of statutory requirements (e.g., chain of custody)---However, in the present case, no perversity or misuse of concession shown---Order granting bail not recalled, though reasoning corrected. (d) Appellate jurisdiction---Interference with bail orders ----Principles---Supreme Court generally refrains from interfering with bail once granted unless order is perverse, arbitrary, or based on misreading of record---Though High Court erred in reasoning, no such perversity found---Bail maintained but reasons substituted. Held: High Court’s reasoning that offence under S. 9(c) of the CNSA, 1997, falls outside prohibitory clause because minimum punishment was nine years, was erroneous. For determining applicability of prohibitory clause under S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., maximum punishment prescribed (fourteen years) is decisive. Petition disposed of; impugned order of bail maintained to extent of relief but reasons substituted. Trial Court directed to decide case expeditiously on merits, uninfluenced by observations herein. Cited Cases: Jabran and another v. The State through DG FIA & others, 2025 SCMR 1099 Muhammad Haroon v. The State, 2004 SCMR 89 Jamal-ud-Din v. The State, 2012 SCMR 573 Socha Gul v. The State, 2015 SCMR 1077 Anti-Narcotics Force v. Qasim Ali, 2019 SCMR 1928 Hazrat Amin v. The State, 2020 SCMR 418 Gul Rehman v. The State, PLD 2021 SC 795 Khuda Bux v. The State, 2010 SCMR 1160 Ghulam Murtaza v. The State, PLD 2009 Lah. 362 Majid Ali v. The State, 2022 PCr.LJ 981 Disposition: Petition disposed of—bail order maintained; reasoning corrected.

Summary: Bail granted ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 302, 324, 148 & 149 ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497 ---- Post-arrest bail—Cross-firing between rival groups—Delay in recording injured witness statement—Scope of inquiry—Further probe. Occurrence arose out of cross-firing between two rival groups in which a minor bystander later died. FIR attributed a joint role of firing to both parties without specifying who caused the injury to Abdul Jabbar (injured). Statement of Abdul Jabbar under S.161, Cr.P.C., attributing the knee injury to the petitioner, was recorded after 1 month and 6 days, without any explanation or medical certification that he was unfit to give statement earlier. Such delayed implication rendered the matter doubtful and required further inquiry. The solitary non-vital injury (on the knee) also weakened the applicability of S.324, P.P.C., as it did not show an intent to commit murder. As for S.302, P.P.C., death of the minor occurred due to firing from the rival group, not the petitioner’s side. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Umer v. The State and another (PLD 2004 SC 477) • Umer Hayat v. The State (2008 SCMR 1621) (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 302, 324, 148 & 149 ---- Cross-cases—Determination of aggressor—Bail—Principles. Where both parties engage in cross-firing and the question as to who was the aggressor or aggressed upon can only be determined after recording of evidence, such cases fall within the ambit of further inquiry warranting grant of bail. Petitioner was not alleged to have caused any fatal injury, was not involved in any other case, and had a specific, non-vital role. Cited Cases: • Noor Muhammad v. The State (2009 SCMR 324) • Abdul Hameed v. Zahid Hussain (2011 SCMR 606) • Khalid Mehmood v. Muhammad Kashif Rasool (2013 SCMR 1415) Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Impugned order of Lahore High Court dated 02.06.2025 set aside. Petitioner Asad Khalil granted post-arrest bail in FIR No.97/2025, P.S. Sabzi Mandi, Gujranwala, subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs.100,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.

Summary: Bail granted ----- a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- S. 497 ---- Post-arrest bail ---- Further inquiry ---- Principles and scope. Petitioner was implicated through a supplementary statement recorded ten days after lodging of the F.I.R. against unknown persons for offences under Ss. 457, 380 and 411, P.P.C. Supplementary statement did not disclose any source of information leading to the petitioner’s nomination. Held, that such belated implication, based on undisclosed and unverified information, created serious doubt regarding the petitioner’s involvement and, therefore, the case squarely fell within the ambit of further inquiry under S. 497(2), Cr.P.C. It is well settled that “further inquiry” presupposes a tentative assessment of the prosecution material which raises reasonable doubt about the accused’s participation, and where such doubt exists, bail is to be granted. The maxim that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has repeatedly been affirmed by the Supreme Court. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- S. 497 ---- Reasonable grounds and further inquiry distinguished. The expressions “reasonable grounds” and “further inquiry” connote distinct thresholds: the former requires legally tenable and admissible evidence appealing to a reasonable judicial mind to show guilt, while the latter arises where the prosecution evidence leaves room for doubt or necessitates deeper scrutiny at trial. In the present case, prosecution failed to produce any tangible evidence or recovery connecting the petitioner with the theft, nor any material substantiating the assertion that he was a hardened criminal. Hence, no reasonable grounds existed to withhold bail. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- S. 173 ---- Expeditious trial direction. Report under S. 173, Cr.P.C., having been submitted with only 4–5 witnesses, Supreme Court directed the Trial Court to expedite the proceedings and conclude the trial preferably within six months, ensuring no unnecessary adjournments. Observations in the bail order were declared tentative and not to prejudice either party at trial. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Impugned order of High Court set aside. Petitioner Abid granted post-arrest bail on furnishing solvent surety of Rs. 100,000 with personal bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, subject to good conduct and cooperation during trial; Trial Court empowered to cancel bail upon misuse.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 489-F---Dishonestly issuing a cheque---Application for cancellation of bail, dismissal of---Allegations against the accused-respondent was that he issued cheque in consideration of purchasing of a vehicle from the petitioner/complainant and when the cheque was presented before the bank concerned, the same was dishonoured due to insufficient funds, hence the FIR was lodged---Accused-respondent was arrested in the said FIR---Accused-respondent filed bail application before the Judicial Magistrate but was rejected---Being aggrieved, the accused-respondent filed bail application before the Sessions Court, which was allowed---Validity---From perusal of the record, it was evident that the respondent/accused was granted bail by the Sessions Judge---Grounds urged by the petitioner/complainant for cancellation of bail revolved around deeper appreciation of evidence which was not permissible at bail stage and the grounds for cancellation of bail and grounds for granting bail were totally different---For cancellation of bail under S.497(5), Cr.P.C., it was mandatory that there should be repetition of offence; chance of absconsion; tempering of prosecution evidence; interference in the investigation; creation of hurdles in investigation, or a try to delay the trial; judgment/order passed by the lower Court being without jurisdiction or illegal exercis of jurisdiction, but no such like situation existed in the present case---Court had exercised its discretion in granting bail and the same did not appear to be perverse, illegal or arbitrary---Moreover, once a bail was granted by the Court of competent jurisdiction, then it could only be recalled on exceptional grounds, such exceptional grounds were not existing in the instant case---Furthermore, no grounds for cancellation of bail had been substantiated by the petitioner/complainant in the instant application---Application filed under S.497(5), Cr.P.C for cancellation of bail was dismissed, in circumstances. Farhan Ali for Petitioner/Complainant. Wahid Ali for Respondent. Malik Sher Baz, Additional Advocate General for the Proforma-respondent/State. Date of hearing: 17th September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Ss. 497(1) & 497(2) — Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) — Ss. 337-A(iii), 337-L(2), 337-N(2), 148 & 149 — Post-arrest bail — Scope and considerations. Where an injury falling under S. 337-A(iii), P.P.C. (Shajjah-i-Hashimah) was attributed to the accused, the High Court declined bail solely on the ground that the case fell within the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. — Held, that such approach was erroneous. The medical certificate merely reflected “external nasal deformity and bony crepitus,” and under S. 337-N(2), P.P.C., imprisonment by way of Ta’zir may only be imposed if the offender is shown to be a previous convict, habitual, hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal, or if the act was committed in the name or on the pretext of honour. — In the absence of such findings by the trial or appellate courts, no lawful imprisonment under Ta’zir could be imposed. — Consequently, the case of the petitioner attracted S. 337-N(2), P.P.C., making his incarceration unjustified at the bail stage. — Reliance placed on Abdul Wahab v. The State (2019 SCMR 516). (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 497(2) — Further inquiry — Grant of bail. Held, that the question whether S. 337-A(iii) P.P.C. truly attracted the prohibitory clause required further inquiry under S. 497(2), Cr.P.C., particularly when the petitioner was in custody since 24-04-2025, no recovery was to be made from him, and trial proceedings were unlikely to conclude soon. The unexplained 14-day delay in lodging the F.I.R. prima facie rendered the prosecution’s version doubtful and susceptible to deliberation or consultation. Background of prior enmity between parties reinforced the requirement of cautious judicial scrutiny. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 497 — Principle of consistency — Co-accused granted bail. Where a co-accused in the same case had already been granted bail, the petitioner was entitled to the same concession on grounds of consistency, there being no distinguishing features. (d) Criminal law — Bail as a rule and refusal as exception. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the gravity or heinousness of an alleged offence alone is not a sufficient ground for refusal of bail if the circumstances otherwise call for further inquiry into the guilt of the accused. Bail cannot be withheld as a substitute for punishment. Reference made to Husnain Mustafa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1914). (e) Delay in lodging F.I.R. — Effect. An unexplained delay of 14 days in registration of F.I.R. undermined the spontaneity of the occurrence, introduced doubt about the prosecution story, and created room for deliberation and fabrication — such delay strengthened the case for bail. (f) Disposition. — Petition converted into appeal and allowed. — Orders of the courts below set aside. — Petitioner admitted to post-arrest bail on furnishing surety bond of Rs.100,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. — Prosecution at liberty to seek cancellation of bail in case of misuse. — Observations made were tentative and confined to bail determination. Held: Petition allowed; bail granted.