Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302, 324, 353, 396, 435, 427, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----S. 7---Appreciation of evidence---Unnamed accused---Conviction on capital charge---Sustainability---FIR was lodged against unknown assailants and appellants were not nominated by name---Informant attempted to give physical descriptions of only some assailants, but gave no identifying particulars of the remaining alleged offenders including the driver and the LMG operator---Prosecution case rested mainly on ocular account of two witnesses who, despite alleged indiscriminate firing, remained completely unhurt and whose conduct in immediately chasing heavily armed assailants, though they were in plain clothes, unarmed, and had already witnessed one death and multiple serious injuries, was held to be unnatural and contrary to normal human behaviour---Their claimed ability, during a sudden life-threatening attack, to observe and retain minute features such as age, height, complexion and clothing of the assailants was also found inherently improbable---Presence of said witnesses at the place of occurrence was not established through any independent and unimpeachable evidence---Held, that prosecution version suffered from material improbabilities and could not safely sustain conviction on capital charge. (b) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Evidentiary value---Joint identification parade of multiple accused---Effect---Identification parade in the present case was not conducted through injured witnesses, but through two alleged eyewitnesses, and that too jointly in respect of multiple accused---It is a settled rule that each accused is to be put to identification separately and a joint identification parade is unsafe, unreliable and has consistently been disapproved by the Supreme Court---Such defective identification proceedings lost their corroborative value and could not be safely relied upon for maintaining conviction. Cited cases: Gulfam and another v. The State (2017 SCMR 1189); Lal Pasand v. The State (PLD 1981 SC 142); Ziaullah alias Jaji v. The State (2008 SCMR 1210); Bacha Zeb v. The State (2010 SCMR 1189); Shafqat Mehmood and others v. The State (2011 SCMR 537). (c) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Prior disclosure of identity of accused to police---Effect---Appellants had already been arrested in another criminal case and were in judicial custody when, according to the prosecution itself, they allegedly disclosed involvement in the present occurrence and were thereafter formally arrested in this case---Where identity of accused already stands disclosed to police before holding of identification parade, sanctity and evidentiary worth of such parade becomes highly doubtful---Held, that identification evidence so procured had lost legal significance as corroborative evidence. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat / criminal jurisprudence principles---Disclosure by accused in another case---Acquittal in that case---Effect---Appellants had allegedly been linked with the present occurrence through disclosures made by them in FIR No.73 dated 24.04.2010, but in that very case they had already been acquitted by the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 17.02.2025 in Criminal Appeal No.627 of 2022---In such circumstances, the alleged disclosure lost legal weight and could not validly connect the appellants with the present crime---Prosecution further failed to produce any independent direct or circumstantial evidence reasonably connecting the appellants with commission of the offence. (e) Criminal trial---Benefit of doubt---Scope---Where prosecution evidence is afflicted with material inconsistencies, inherent improbabilities and defects going to the root of the case, benefit of doubt must be extended to accused---Such benefit is not a matter of grace or concession but a matter of right---Even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person is sufficient to dislodge prosecution case---Held, that Courts below failed to properly notice serious infirmities in prosecution evidence and thereby fell into error in maintaining conviction and death sentence. Appeal was allowed, convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court and maintained by the High Court were set aside, appellants were acquitted of the charge on benefit of doubt, and were directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—S. 382-B—Double murder case—Appraisal of ocular and medical evidence—Partial acceptance of prosecution case—Conviction of one accused maintained, co-accused acquitted on benefit of doubt—The Supreme Court held that where the ocular account against one accused was straightforward, confidence-inspiring and fully corroborated by medical evidence, his conviction under S. 302(b), P.P.C. was rightly maintained. In the present case, the role of effective firing upon both deceased was consistently attributed to petitioner-convict Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu, and the post-mortem evidence supported the prosecution version regarding the firearm injuries caused by him. The Court, therefore, found that the prosecution had successfully established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, as regards co-accused Rab Nawaz, although a role of a single effective fire shot with a .30-bore pistol was attributed to him qua one deceased, the medical evidence did not support that version: the relevant injury was not shown to have been caused by a .30-bore pistol, no bullet was recovered from the body, pellets were recovered instead, and the prosecution failed to produce any forensic material connecting the alleged recovered pistol with the crime. In these circumstances, the evidence against Rab Nawaz was held to be shaky, deficient and insufficient to sustain conviction, entitling him to acquittal on the principle that benefit of doubt, however slight, must go to the accused. Criminal evidence—Ocular account and medical evidence—Extent of corroboration—Rule of cautious scrutiny—The Supreme Court observed that the testimony of the complainant and ocular witnesses had to be examined separately with regard to the specific role assigned to each accused. The ocular account was accepted to the extent that it matched the medical evidence concerning the fatal injuries caused to the deceased. In relation to Muhammad Sarwar deceased, the role of effective firing was specifically attributed to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu and co-accused Shoukat Ali, and the post-mortem findings fully supported that account. In relation to Muhammad Ashraf deceased, the fatal injuries affecting the brain and left lung were likewise attributed to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu and co-accused Shoukat Ali, whereas the alleged injury assigned to Rab Nawaz was neither shown by medical evidence to have been caused by a .30-bore pistol nor found to be the cause of death. The Court thus applied the settled principle of sifting the grain from the chaff and accepted the prosecution case only to the extent it was supported by independent medical evidence. Criminal law—Recovery of weapon—Inconsequential recovery—Mitigating circumstance—The Supreme Court endorsed the view of the Lahore High Court that the alleged recoveries did not materially strengthen the prosecution case for purposes of sentence enhancement. The recovery of the .30-bore pistol allegedly on the pointation of Rab Nawaz was held inconsequential because the Punjab Forensic Science Agency report merely showed that the weapon was in working condition and did not connect it with any crime empty. Likewise, the High Court had rightly treated the recovery of the alleged 12-bore rifle as inconsequential in the matter of sentence. The Court held that inconsequential recovery, particularly when not forensically linked to the occurrence, cannot by itself justify maintaining or enhancing the extreme penalty. Sentence—Death sentence—Commutation to imprisonment for life—Non-proof of motive—Inconsequential recovery as mitigating circumstance—The Supreme Court held that the Lahore High Court had rightly commuted the sentence of death awarded to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu to imprisonment for life on two counts. It was observed that the motive set up by the prosecution had not been proved, and the alleged weapon recovery had also remained inconsequential. Both factors constituted mitigating circumstances in terms of the settled principles governing capital punishment, and no legal infirmity was found in the High Court’s view that these circumstances warranted commutation. Accordingly, the complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence from life imprisonment to death was dismissed on merits. Case references—No specific reported precedent was expressly named or cited in the text of the judgment provided. The Court only referred generally to the “settled principle” of sifting the grain from the chaff, the rule that benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused, and the settled principle that non-proof of motive and inconsequential recovery are mitigating circumstances warranting commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Since no case names or citations were mentioned in the judgment text, none can properly be added as judicially cited authorities. Jail Petition No. 448 of 2023 dismissed—Leave refused—The conviction and sentence of petitioner-convict Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu were maintained. Jail Petition No. 557 of 2023 converted into appeal and allowed—The conviction and sentence of Rab Nawaz were set aside and he was acquitted of the charge, with direction for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No. 1080-L of 2023 dismissed—The complainant’s request for enhancement of Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu’s sentence from imprisonment for life to death was refused on merits, while the petition against Rab Nawaz was dismissed as infructuous owing to his acquittal.

Summary: Bail denied --- (a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----Ss. 497 & 498—Pakistan Penal Code, Ss. 141, 149, 354-A, 452, 147, 148, 149—Pre-arrest bail—Scope—Extraordinary relief—Conditions— Petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in case involving house trespass, assault, and outraging modesty of complainant’s daughter—Pre-arrest bail declined by Trial Court and High Court—Validity—Supreme Court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary discretionary relief to be granted only in extraordinary circumstances to protect innocent persons from mala fide arrest and abuse of process—Petitioner must establish reasonable grounds showing prima facie innocence, existence of further inquiry, and mala fide intention behind arrest—Such relief cannot be used as substitute for post-arrest bail nor granted as matter of course—Petitioners failed to satisfy mandatory conditions—Pre-arrest bail rightly refused. Cited Case: Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafique (PLD 2009 SC 427) (b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----S. 497—Pakistan Penal Code, S. 354-A—Prohibitory clause—Heinous offence—Effect on bail— Offence under Section 354-A PPC (assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage modesty) falls within prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C.—Such offences are treated as heinous and serious in nature—Where accused are specifically nominated in FIR with active roles and supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., bail cannot be granted in absence of exceptional circumstances—Petitioners’ involvement prima facie established—Case did not fall within ambit of further inquiry. (c) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860— ----Ss. 141 & 149—Unlawful assembly—Common object—Vicarious liability— Where accused persons form unlawful assembly and commit offence in prosecution of common object, each member becomes vicariously liable for acts done by others—Common object can be inferred from conduct of accused, weapons carried, and circumstances of occurrence—Specific overt act by each accused is not essential where offence is committed in prosecution of common object—Presence and participation of petitioners in unlawful assembly sufficiently alleged—Liability under Section 149 PPC attracted. (d) Criminal jurisprudence— ----Further inquiry—Scope— Further inquiry arises where tentative assessment creates reasonable doubt regarding involvement of accused—Expression “reasonable grounds” refers to legally admissible and credible grounds appealing to judicial mind—Where FIR is prompt, accused specifically nominated, roles assigned, and allegations supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., case does not fall within further inquiry. Disposition: Criminal Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused; pre-arrest bail declined; observations held tentative and not to prejudice trial.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 148, 149 & 109---Murder---Attempt to murder---Rioting with deadly weapons---Common intention---Broad daylight occurrence---Identification---Where parties were known to each other and incident occurred in daylight, question of misidentification ruled out---Ocular account of complainant and eye-witnesses found confidence-inspiring and fully corroborated by medical evidence---Single fatal firearm injury attributed specifically to petitioner---Prosecution version proved beyond reasonable doubt qua occurrence and role of petitioner. (b) Motive ----Proof---Failure to establish---Effect---Alleged motive based on prior altercation not proved---No contemporaneous complaint of alleged morning scuffle---No independent witness examined to support motive---Prosecution failed to prove motive satisfactorily---Non-proof of motive held not fatal to conviction where ocular and medical evidence are reliable, but relevant for determination of sentence. (c) Recovery of weapon ----Delayed recovery---Evidentiary value---Pistol allegedly recovered after long lapse of time during which accused remained proclaimed offender---Forensic report only confirmed mechanical fitness of weapon and did not link crime empties with recovered pistol---Recovery rightly disbelieved---Benefit extended to accused on this aspect. (d) Sentence ----Capital punishment---Conversion to life imprisonment---Principles---Where motive not proved and recovery of weapon doubtful---Single shot fired without repetition---Consistent judicial view that in absence of proved motive, sentence of death ordinarily not warranted---Life imprisonment appropriate punishment---High Court justified in commuting death sentence to imprisonment for life. (e) Criminal jurisprudence ----Parity of sentence---Co-accused---Argument of equal treatment rejected---Co-accused convicted for causing injuries only, whereas petitioner assigned specific role of causing fatal injury---Cases not identical---No question of further reduction of sentence on ground of parity. Cited cases: • Bashir-ud-Din and others v. The State, 2025 SCMR 1380 • Muhammad Bilal v. The State, 2025 SCMR 1580 • Nawab Ali v. The State, 2019 SCMR 2009 • Mst. Nazia Anwar v. The State and others, 2018 SCMR 911 • Arshad Beq v. The State, 2017 SCMR 1727 • Allah Wasaya and another v. The State, 2017 SCMR 1797 • Mazhar Abbas alias Baddi v. The State, 2017 SCMR 1884 • Ghulam Muhammad and another v. The State and another, 2017 SCMR 2048 Disposition: Jail Petition No.6 of 2018 dismissed; leave to appeal refused; judgment of Lahore High Court dated 30.11.2017 upheld; conviction under section 302(b), PPC maintained; sentence of imprisonment for life, compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C., benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C., and sentence in default confirmed.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 147, 148, 337-F(ii), 337-F(iii) & 34---Murder, attempt to murder and causing hurt with common intention---Joint attribution of role---Single fatal injury---Medical evidence---Where prosecution alleged joint firing by three accused but medical evidence showed only one firearm injury on body of deceased---No specific role or injury attributed to petitioner---Impossibility of determining which accused caused fatal injury---Benefit of doubt---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC unsustainable. (b) Criminal trial ----Ocular account---Specific attribution of injury---Requirement---Where general and omnibus role assigned to several accused without specific attribution of fatal or injury-causing act---Conviction cannot be sustained---Principle reaffirmed that prosecution must prove specific role where single injury is found---Failure fatal to prosecution case. (c) Recovery of weapon ----Non-recovery---Corroboration---Allegation of firearm use not supported by recovery of weapon of offence from petitioner---Lack of corroborative evidence---Prosecution version weakened. (d) Motive ----Vague and ambiguous motive---Old enmity---Not established---Alleged motive jointly attributed without particulars---Evidence showed petitioner not involved in earlier incident relied upon for motive---Absence of motive further weakened prosecution case. (e) Abscondence ----Evidentiary value---Abscondence by itself not sufficient to sustain conviction---Fear of false implication or police torture may explain conduct---Abscondence cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. (f) Benefit of doubt ----Criminal jurisprudence---Single doubt sufficient for acquittal---Where multiple circumstances created serious doubt regarding prosecution version---Accused entitled to acquittal as of right. Cited cases: • Farman Ali and others v. The State, PLD 1980 SC 201 • Liaqat Hussain and others v. Falak Sher and others, 2003 SCMR 611 • Rahimullah Jan v. Kashif and another, PLD 2008 SC 298 • Tariq Pervez v. The State, 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State, 2009 SCMR 230 Disposition: Criminal Petition No.607 of 2020 converted into appeal; appeal allowed; judgments of the Trial Court dated 08.10.2019 and High Court of Balochistan dated 31.03.2020 set aside; petitioner acquitted of all charges by benefit of doubt; petitioner ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Criminal trial ---- Appreciation of ocular, medical and forensic evidence ---- Murder of accused in judicial lockup; injuries to police constables; recovery of weapon; serological and ballistic reports ---- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 353 ---- Sindh Arms Act, 2013, S. 24 ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 382-B ----- Abdul Wahab, an accused remanded to judicial custody in a case under Ss. 365-B, 452, 148, 149, P.P.C., was brought to Sub-Jail/Judicial Lockup Warrah in pursuance of a ten-days’ remand order. Due to the absence of the Jailor, he was made to sit handcuffed in the courtyard of the judicial lockup when the appellant, along with co-accused, armed with pistols, entered the lockup and opened indiscriminate fire upon him and the police party, resulting in the deceased’s death on the spot and firearm injuries to Constables Zahid Ali and Muhammad Ayoub. Ocular account was furnished by the Incharge Judicial Lockup (ASI Muhammad Idrees Wahoocho) and the two injured constables, who were independent, disinterested witnesses with no animosity against the appellant; their presence at the scene was natural and unimpeachable, and their testimony was consistent and confidence-inspiring on all material particulars and remained unshaken in cross-examination. The appellant was apprehended at the spot and a 30-bore pistol recovered from his possession; four empties of the same calibre, recovered from the spot, on forensic examination matched the said pistol, thereby providing scientific corroboration to the ocular account. Recovery of blood-stained earth from the place where the deceased fell and his blood-stained clothes, together with a positive serological report, further substantiated the prosecution version. Medical evidence, including M.L.Cs. of the injured constables and post-mortem of the deceased, confirmed fresh firearm injuries on the injured witnesses, categorized as Ghayr Jaifah Hashimah and Ghayr Jaifah Mutalahimah respectively, and four firearm entry wounds on the deceased, with death opined as due to firearm injuries. Held, that on re-appraisal of the entire evidence, the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court regarding the appellant’s guilt under Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, P.P.C. and S. 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 were based on proper appreciation of reliable ocular, medical and forensic evidence; no misreading or non-reading was found warranting interference. Convictions under the said provisions were, therefore, maintained; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and direction that all sentences run concurrently, was affirmed. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n), Ss. 2(j), 2(w), 7(a), 7(b), 7(h) ---- Terrorism ---- Mens rea; “design” and “purpose”; serious coercion/intimidation of public servants; serious violence against members of police force ---- Clarification and refinement of Ghulam Hussain’s case ---- A larger Bench in Ghulam Hussain v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 61) had held that not every heinous offence causing fear or panic amounts to terrorism; where the primary motive is personal vendetta or private enmity, the act, even if it incidentally induces fear, does not per se constitute terrorism unless it satisfies the statutory criteria under S. 6, ATA. In the present case, the Supreme Court examined a specific class of incidents not squarely addressed in Ghulam Hussain’s case, namely where law enforcement personnel suffer injuries or lose their lives in the course of a private dispute between third parties while acting in the line of duty. The Court reiterated that the three cumulative elements of terrorism under S. 6(1), ATA are: (i) commission of an act enumerated in S. 6(2); (ii) the requisite “design” under S. 6(1)(b) or “purpose” under S. 6(1)(c); and (iii) the impact of such act in terms of intimidating or creating fear and insecurity in the public or a section thereof. By substituting the word “design”, the legislature broadened the inquiry to include the scheme or object in the offender’s mind, not merely the actual consequences. Thus, the decisive consideration is whether the act was designed to coerce, intimidate or overawe the Government, its officials, or law enforcement agencies, as opposed to being confined to private vengeance. Serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force or prevent the discharge of lawful duties (S. 6(2)(m)), and serious violence against a member of the police force or a public servant (S. 6(2)(n)), read with the definitions of “serious violence” and “grievous bodily injury” in Ss. 2(w) and 2(j), ATA, cover violent conduct that endangers life or causes grievous harm to officials/public servants. Comparative reference to “serious violence offence” under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (New South Wales, Australia) was made only to illustrate that, in other jurisdictions also, “serious violence” is reserved for extreme forms of harm, especially those endangering life or causing grievous injury, thus aligning with the legislative intent underlying Ss. 6(2)(m), (n), ATA. The Court held that this refined analysis does not depart from but supplements the principles in Ghulam Hussain’s case by recognizing that serious violence against law enforcement agencies, even in the context of private feuds between third parties, may, in given circumstances, assume the character of terrorism when it systematically targets those upholding the rule of law. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Hussain v. The State PLD 2020 SC 61 (c) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Harm to law enforcement personnel during private vendetta; categories of situations; design to resist and overawe law enforcement ---- When private disputes cross into terrorism ---- The Court distinguished two broad situations relating to harm caused to law enforcement personnel: firstly, where police or security officials are directly and deliberately targeted (e.g., ambushes or bombings) with the clear objective of spreading fear or disrupting the State; such attacks straightforwardly fulfill the physical and mental elements of terrorism under the ATA. Secondly, where violence arises from a private conflict but harm is caused to law enforcement officials who intervene or are inherently present, including in premises where police presence is explicit and inevitable, such as courts, police stations or lock-ups, or during transit of accused persons to or from such premises. In the latter category, if the offender arms himself with the deliberate intention to use the weapon against security officials in the event of their intervention or apprehension, the law enforcement authority becomes the foreseeable and primary target of resistance, and violence employed to evade arrest or neutralize resistance constitutes “serious coercion or intimidation” of public servants under S. 6(2)(m) and “serious violence” under S. 6(2)(n), ATA. Likewise, where the offender’s primary target is a private individual but the attack is launched in a location where police presence is inevitable, and the assailant acts with knowledge that harm to security officials is a foreseeable consequence of executing the plan, the resulting injuries or risk to law enforcement personnel can attract the provisions of S. 6(2)(m) & (n), ATA, provided that the design or purpose satisfies S. 6(1)(b) or (c), namely, to intimidate, overawe, or deter law enforcement agencies and undermine State authority. The Court emphasized that in such cases, the harm to police officers/officials is not merely incidental or collateral but forms an integral component of the criminal plan to neutralize lawful resistance and thereby constitutes an attack on the law enforcement machinery of the State. (d) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Attack in judicial lockup; injuries to police personnel escorting accused; transformation of private vendetta into terrorism; objective test for “serious violence” against police ---- Application to present case ---- In the instant matter, the initial motive of the accused arose from a personal vendetta against the deceased Abdul Wahab, who had been nominated in a case of abduction of the daughter-in-law of a co-accused and was under lawful judicial custody within the precincts of the judicial lockup. Fully aware of the deceased’s custodial status and the inevitable presence of police officials, the appellant and co-accused chose to launch an armed attack in the very courtyard of the judicial lockup, indiscriminately firing not only at their intended private target but also at the police escort, resulting in firearm injuries to Constables Zahid Ali and Muhammad Ayoub. Held, that the location (judicial lockup), timing, and manner of the attack demonstrated preparation, anticipation of resistance by law enforcement, and a willingness to overcome lawful authority through serious violence; harm to the police officials was not collateral or unintended but formed part of the accused’s broader design to execute a targeted killing in custody by neutralizing the resistance of police. Such conduct amounted to serious violence against members of the police force and serious coercion/intimidation of public servants within the meaning of S. 6(2)(m) & (n), ATA, viewed through the objective test whether the act posed a real and substantial danger to the lives of law enforcement personnel acting in the discharge of official duties. Actual fatality among police was not a prerequisite; the use of deadly weapons and indiscriminate firing in a volatile custodial environment where officials were known to be present satisfied both actus reus and mens rea under the ATA. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (PLD 2014 SC 383) to affirm that firing upon a police party in uniform engaged in lawful duties, thereby obstructing discharge of their functions, constitutes serious violence against members of the police force. Accordingly, the Court held that where officers/officials of law enforcement agencies are harmed or killed not due to personal enmity but solely because of their deployment for the discharge of lawful duty, and such attacks are deliberately planned as part of an assault on a person in custody, the intent and effect transcend private vendetta and attract the provisions of the ATA; such acts fall within the statutory definition of terrorism. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz v. The State PLD 2014 SC 383 (e) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Harm to officials arising out of discharge of official functions versus purely personal enmity ---- Scope ---- The Court clarified that where harm is inflicted on an official/officer of a law enforcement agency on account of, or as a consequence of, acts performed by such official in discharge of his official duties, even if such harm is caused outside duty hours, the act is to be treated as arising from the official’s role and would fall within the ambit of terrorism, subject to fulfillment of the other statutory elements under S. 6, ATA. Conversely, where a police or law enforcement official is harmed solely due to personal enmity, without any intention of attacking or intimidating law enforcement in its institutional or official capacity, such conduct, though criminal and punishable, does not amount to terrorism and is to be dealt with under the ordinary provisions of the P.P.C. or other applicable laws. The distinction rests on whether the violence is directed at the individual in his personal capacity, or at the authority of the State and law enforcement system which he represents. (f) Anti-Terrorism Courts ---- Joint trial of scheduled and connected offences ---- Effect on nature of offences ---- Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, S. 21-M ---- While trying a scheduled offence, an Anti-Terrorism Court is empowered under S. 21-M, ATA to jointly try any other offence committed by the accused, provided such offence is connected with the offence triable under the Act. Held, that merely by virtue of being tried in the Anti-Terrorism Court, a scheduled or non-scheduled offence does not ipso facto assume the character of a terrorism offence; it remains punishable under the ordinary criminal law unless it independently meets the definitional and mens rea requirements of terrorism as laid down in S. 6, ATA. The jurisdictional competence of the Anti-Terrorism Court to try connected offences is thus procedural and does not alter the substantive nature or ingredients of the underlying offences. (g) Criminal appeal ---- Convictions under P.P.C. and Sindh Arms Act maintained ---- Convictions under S. 7(a) & 7(b), ATA altered to S. 7(h), ATA ---- Sentence modified ---- On the basis of re-appraisal of evidence, the Supreme Court found no justification to interfere with the appellant’s convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court and maintained by the High Court under Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, P.P.C., and S. 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013; these convictions were upheld. However, in light of the refined legal position regarding the scope and application of the Anti-Terrorism Act to acts of serious violence against law enforcement personnel in the line of duty, the Court set aside the appellant’s convictions under Ss. 7(a) and 7(b), ATA and altered them to a conviction under S. 7(h) of the said Act. Consequently, the appellant was sentenced under S. 7(h), ATA to five years’ imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to the appellant and all convictions were ordered to run concurrently. Appeal was, thus, partly allowed.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302, 324, 109, 148 & 149---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 204---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly---Application for summoning the respondents/accused to face trial in case FIR---Scope---Complainant got lodged FIR in respect of offences under Ss.302, 324, 109, 148 & 149, P.P.C, and after the conclusion of the investigation, the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were declared as not involved in the case and in report under S. 173, Cr.P.C their names were placed in Column No. 2---After the Trial Court had taken cognizance of the case, the petitioner moved an application seeking the summoning of said respondents to face the trial, but same was dismissed---Validity---Record showed that the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were not only named in the FIR as accused but were also named as accused in the statements of the witnesses recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C---Though the Investigating Officers of the case had declared the said respondents not involved in the incident at all, however, the said opinions of the Investigating Officers of the case were not even relevant to be considered while adjudicating upon the application of the petitioner seeking summoning of the said respondents to face the trial of the case, as the question of the summoning was to be decided within the parameters of S.204, Cr.P.C---In this particular case, it was obvious that there was evidentiary material in the shape of not only the FIR but also the statements of the witnesses recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C to proceed with the trial of the said respondents---Moreover, the trial Court, while passing the order dated 25.08.2025, only referred to the result of the investigation as conducted by one of the Investigating Officers of the case, however, did not at all advert to the statements of the witnesses recorded during the investigation of the case, wherein the said respondents were duly implicated---Trial Court can summon any accused whose name has been placed in column No.2 of the report under S.173, Cr.P.C, to face the trial of the case before recording of any evidence when there is sufficient material available against them and there is no bar whatsoever in that regard placed on the Trial Court---Moreover, the accused having been declared by the Investigating Officer not to be involved in the case should not be made a consideration while adjudicating upon the application under S.204, Cr.P.C for the simple reason that the opinion of the Investigating Officer of the case was not only irrelevant but also not admissible in evidence---In said circumstances, petition was allowed and the Trial Court was directed to summon the respondents Nos. 3 to 5 to face the trial of the case. Safdar Ali v. Zafar Iqbal and others 2002 SCMR 63; Waqar-ul-Haq alias Nithoo and another v. The State 1988 SCMR 1428; Sher Muhammad Umar and others v. The State PLD 2012 SC 179 and Falak Sher and another v. The State PLD 1967 SC 425 rel. Ch. Mussadiq Munir for Petitioner. Ch. Sarfraz Noor Meo for Respondents Nos. 3 to 5. Zafar Iqbal Somro, Deputy District Public Prosecutor for the State. Date of hearing: 16th October, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 452, 436, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, mischief by fire or explosive substance with the intent to destroy a building, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Petitioner was nominated in the FIR with specific role of causing firearm injury below the right chest of deceased---During the course of investigation, the petitioner claimed a specific plea that he only tried to rescue the children and had not participated in the occurrence---Said version of the petitioner was also verified by the Investigating Officer in its findings incorporated in daily case diary, leading to the conclusion that the petitioner did not participate in the crime, therefore, the petitioner's case became one requiring further inquiry into his alleged guilt---Furthermore, considering the outcome of the investigations, the petitioner's case presented two conflicting versions; one stated by the complainant in the FIR and the other revealed by the Investigating Officer---Which version was correct was a matter to be determined by the Trial Court after recording the evidence---Apart from the above, the crime empties which were secured from the crime scene were found shot from one crime weapon which did not belong to the petitioner---Principal perpetrator of the crime committed suicide at the crime scene---Nothing was recovered upon the disclosure of the petitioner---Investigation had been completed and the petitioner was no more required for the purpose of any further investigation---Petitioner was arrested on 18.05.2025 and had been in custody since, without significant progress in the trial---In such state of affairs, the case of the petitioner fell within the ambit of subsection (2) of S.497 of Cr.P.C. calling for further inquiry into his guilt---Petitioner was behind the bars and was no more required for further investigation---Bail petition was allowed, in circumstances. Ehsan Ullah v. The State 2012 SCMR 1137; Saif Ullah v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 1458; Najeeb Ullah v. The State and another 2020 SCMR 1241 and Muhammad Ramzan v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 1914 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in the bail order are tentative in nature and shall not influence the Trial Court. Barrister Danyal Ijaz Chadhar for Petitioner. Fakhar Abbas, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State with Naveed S.I.

Summary: a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 302(b), 148, 149 ---- Murder trial ---- Ocular account, delayed FIR, and chance witnesses ---- Benefit of doubt. Appellants were convicted under S.302(b), P.P.C. and sentenced to death by the Trial Court, which sentence was reduced to life imprisonment by the High Court. Supreme Court found that the prosecution’s case suffered from fatal infirmities. The complainant reported the occurrence to police at 12 p.m. on the day of the incident, yet no accused was named until the following evening—FIR being lodged after 29 hours without plausible explanation. Such unexplained delay created serious doubt of consultation, deliberation, and false implication. The alleged eye-witnesses were residents of Sukkur, far from the crime scene at Shikarpur, and offered no credible reason for being present there. Their statements conflicted with that of Pathan Khan (PW-4) and lacked corroboration from medical and circumstantial evidence. Held, that prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; benefit of doubt must go to accused as of right, not as concession. Conviction and sentence set aside; appellants acquitted. Cited Cases: Zafar Ali Abbasi v. Zafar Ali Abbasi (2024 SCMR 1773); Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (2024 SCMR 1731); Muhammad Bashir v. SHO, Okara Cantt (PLD 2007 SC 539); Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh (2024 SCMR 1123). (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- S. 154 ---- Delay or refusal in registration of FIR ---- Statutory duty of police ---- Consequences. Supreme Court expressed grave concern over systemic dereliction by police officials in registering FIRs promptly as mandated by S.154, Cr.P.C. Delay or refusal to record information of a cognizable offence violates mandatory statutory duty and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system. It facilitates manipulation of evidence and false implication of accused, eroding public trust and the rule of law. No officer in charge has discretion to refuse or delay registration or to verify correctness before recording; any inquiry prior to registration is hit by S.162, Cr.P.C. Provincial governments are constitutionally obliged to ensure strict compliance with S.154 and to impose accountability and deterrence against violations. Reference made to Muhammad Bashir v. SHO, Okara Cantt (PLD 2007 SC 539) and Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh (2024 SCMR 1123). (c) Evidence ---- Testimony of chance witnesses ---- Caution in reliance. Eye-witnesses who were residents of a distant city were categorized as “chance witnesses.” Court reiterated settled principles: evidence of chance witnesses requires convincing explanation for presence at the scene, must be confidence-inspiring, and demands strong corroboration. In absence of plausible justification, such evidence is unsafe for conviction, particularly in capital offences. Reliance placed on Mst. Sughra Begum v. Qaiser Pervez (2015 SCMR 1142); Umar Hayat v. The State (1998 SCMR 1101); The State v. Ghulam Rasool (2007 SCMR 1944); Inayat Ali v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 77); Mst. Anwar Begum v. Akhtar Hussain (2017 SCMR 1710). (d) Criminal law ---- Recovery of weapon and forensic report ---- Doubtful recovery. Weapons allegedly recovered on joint pointation 17 days after arrest were sent to FSL along with empties on same date, raising suspicion of fabrication. Held, that such recovery was not free from doubt and positive FSL report could not cure defective prosecution evidence. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Convictions and sentences of appellants set aside; they were acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No.25-K of 2021 (complainant’s appeal for enhancement) dismissed as infructuous. Direction: Copies of judgment to be sent to Secretary Interior, Government of Pakistan, and Chief Secretaries of all provinces for policy action ensuring enforcement of mandatory duties under S.154, Cr.P.C., and accountability of delinquent officials.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b), 148, 149, 109—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342—Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129(g)—Murder trial—Unreliable ocular account—Benefit of doubt. For one deceased, ten persons were implicated, including eight as direct participants and two for abetment. Wide-net implication and acquittal of all co-accused except petitioner reflected exaggeration and mala fide. The complainant’s own son, alleged motive witness, was withheld; motive thus remained unproved. Recovery of pistol was inconsequential as empties did not match in PFSA report. The Court held that where motive and recovery are disbelieved, conviction cannot rest solely on uncorroborated ocular account—particularly when co-accused sharing same evidence stand acquitted. Akhtar Ali v. State (2008 SCMR 6), Muhammad Pervaiz v. State (PLD 2019 SC 592), Liaqat Ali v. State (2021 SCMR 455) and Shaukat Hussain v. State (2024 SCMR 929) followed. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Arts. 71 & 129(g)—Chance witnesses—Burden to explain presence—Failure to produce local witnesses. Occurrence took place near a graveyard in a different village (Mandi Bhattian); complainant and his witnesses were residents of Mandi Jattan. They claimed attendance at a funeral to justify presence but produced no local or family member of deceased Fazal Karim to confirm attendance. Their uncorroborated claim rendered them “chance witnesses.” Chance witnesses must establish presence through convincing evidence; mere assertion is insufficient. Mst. Sughra Begum v. Qaiser Pervez (2015 SCMR 1142) and Muhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta (2017 SCMR 142) relied upon. (c) Medical evidence—Contradiction with ocular account—Effect. Ocular witnesses alleged entry wounds on back and thigh, but medical evidence showed both as exit wounds. Such contradiction undermined ocular account’s reliability. Bashir Muhammad Khan v. State (2022 SCMR 986), Tajamal Hussain Shah v. State (2022 SCMR 1567) and Mansab Ali v. State (2019 SCMR 1306) applied. (d) Motive—Failure to prove—Conduct inconsistent with alleged grudge. Motive alleged that complainant’s son had previously shot the petitioner; thus complainant should have been target. Yet he, though present, remained unhurt, while unrelated deceased was killed. This incongruity further discredited prosecution story. Muhammad Zaman Mangat v. Muhammad Akhtar (2004 SCMR 757), Saleem Khan v. State (2021 SCMR 1472) and Rohtas Khan v. State (2010 SCMR 566) followed. (e) Acquitted co-accused—No independent corroboration—Same evidence rule. Two co-accused (Khalid Hussain and Farzand Ali) attributed specific firearm injuries corresponding to post-mortem injuries but were acquitted; no appeal was filed, and acquittal attained finality. With no independent corroboration against petitioner, same disbelieved evidence could not sustain conviction. (f) Criminal jurisprudence—Principle of benefit of doubt—Reiterated. If a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted; here, several infirmities—disbelieved motive, doubtful presence, medical inconsistency, and acquittal of co-accused—rendered prosecution case unreliable. Tariq Pervez v. State (1995 SCMR 1345) and Muhammad Akram v. State (2009 SCMR 230) followed. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Judgments of High Court (20-09-2017) and Trial Court (30-01-2014) set aside—Iftikhar Ahmad alias Meena acquitted of charge on benefit of doubt—To be released forthwith unless required in any other case. ChatGPT can make mistakes. Check important info.