Summary: Bail denied --- (a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----Ss. 497 & 498—Pakistan Penal Code, Ss. 141, 149, 354-A, 452, 147, 148, 149—Pre-arrest bail—Scope—Extraordinary relief—Conditions— Petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in case involving house trespass, assault, and outraging modesty of complainant’s daughter—Pre-arrest bail declined by Trial Court and High Court—Validity—Supreme Court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary discretionary relief to be granted only in extraordinary circumstances to protect innocent persons from mala fide arrest and abuse of process—Petitioner must establish reasonable grounds showing prima facie innocence, existence of further inquiry, and mala fide intention behind arrest—Such relief cannot be used as substitute for post-arrest bail nor granted as matter of course—Petitioners failed to satisfy mandatory conditions—Pre-arrest bail rightly refused. Cited Case: Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafique (PLD 2009 SC 427) (b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----S. 497—Pakistan Penal Code, S. 354-A—Prohibitory clause—Heinous offence—Effect on bail— Offence under Section 354-A PPC (assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage modesty) falls within prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C.—Such offences are treated as heinous and serious in nature—Where accused are specifically nominated in FIR with active roles and supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., bail cannot be granted in absence of exceptional circumstances—Petitioners’ involvement prima facie established—Case did not fall within ambit of further inquiry. (c) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860— ----Ss. 141 & 149—Unlawful assembly—Common object—Vicarious liability— Where accused persons form unlawful assembly and commit offence in prosecution of common object, each member becomes vicariously liable for acts done by others—Common object can be inferred from conduct of accused, weapons carried, and circumstances of occurrence—Specific overt act by each accused is not essential where offence is committed in prosecution of common object—Presence and participation of petitioners in unlawful assembly sufficiently alleged—Liability under Section 149 PPC attracted. (d) Criminal jurisprudence— ----Further inquiry—Scope— Further inquiry arises where tentative assessment creates reasonable doubt regarding involvement of accused—Expression “reasonable grounds” refers to legally admissible and credible grounds appealing to judicial mind—Where FIR is prompt, accused specifically nominated, roles assigned, and allegations supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., case does not fall within further inquiry. Disposition: Criminal Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused; pre-arrest bail declined; observations held tentative and not to prejudice trial.

Summary: Acquittal ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 354 & 452 — Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898), Ss. 544-A, 382-B & 374 Murder, criminal trespass, and assault with intent to outrage modesty — Allegation of fatal assault by petitioner with a Danda, followed by trespass and physical assault upon women — Initial FIR registered under Ss. 324, 354 & 452, PPC; subsequently converted to S. 302 PPC after victim’s death — Conviction recorded by Trial Court under all charges; sentence of death under S. 302(b), PPC altered to life imprisonment by High Court — Supreme Court found multiple material doubts in the prosecution’s case — Discrepancy between complainant's statement about accomplices and absence of co-accused — Delay of over 13 hours in lodging FIR without plausible explanation — Medical evidence found inconsistent with prosecution's version of injury and manner — Prosecution failed to prove chain of events conclusively — Conviction set aside and benefit of doubt extended — Petitioner acquitted of all charges. Disposition: Appeal allowed — Judgment of High Court set aside — Petitioner acquitted of all charges under Ss. 302(b), 354 & 452, PPC — To be released if not required in any other case. (b) Criminal Trial — Appreciation of Evidence — Delay in FIR — Credibility of Witnesses Delay of 13 hours and 20 minutes in FIR without sufficient justification — Supplementary statement used to introduce two eyewitnesses whose names were not in original FIR — Such delay and subsequent additions deemed to cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s version — Supreme Court observed that if the witnesses had actually been present, their names would have been disclosed at the earliest — Testimony of complainant held to be hearsay in parts, weakening its evidentiary value — Introduction of key witnesses after substantial delay found to affect reliability and truthfulness of entire narrative. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Hassan v. The State 2024 SCMR 1427 • Tariq Parvez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 • Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 (c) Criminal Trial — Motive — Vague and Unsubstantiated Motive Weakening Prosecution Case Prosecution claimed dispute over house as motive — No documentary evidence or independent testimony produced to substantiate existence or intensity of dispute — Mere assertion of motive unsupported by credible material held insufficient — High Court also noted absence of corroboration — Inconsistent or vague motive considered inadequate to support conviction. Held: Failure to prove motive casts doubt on prosecution's narrative — Where motive is set up but not established, benefit must go to accused.

Summary: Bail granted ---Background:This case involves two criminal petitions (Nos. 1174 and 1202 of 2023) filed by Faheem Ullah against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, dated 25.09.2023, which denied post-arrest bail. The petitions arose from separate FIRs (Nos. 691/2022 and 693/2022) registered at Police Station Badber, District Peshawar, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.), including 452, 427, 354, 506, 148, and 149, among others.??Issues:Whether the offenses listed in the FIRs fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which would generally restrict the granting of bail.Whether there is potential enmity that might have led to the wrongful implication of Faheem Ullah in the alleged crimes due to familial disputes related to another criminal case.?Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court observed that the offenses mentioned in both FIRs do not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C., which means that bail cannot be automatically denied based solely on the nature of the offenses. The Court also considered potential motives for the petitioner?s implication arising from family disputes and previous criminal proceedings involving relatives. Notably, the petitioner?s mother is an eyewitness in a related murder case, suggesting possible motives for retaliation or wrongful implication.Both petitions were converted into appeals and allowed. The Supreme Court granted bail to Faheem Ullah in both cases, subject to him furnishing a bail bond of Rs. 200,000 with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court.?Citations/Precedents:Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.): Sections 452 (house-trespass), 427 (mischief causing damage), 354 (assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty), 506 (criminal intimidation), 148 (rioting, armed with deadly weapon), and 149 (every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offense committed in prosecution of common object).Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.): Discusses the conditions under which bail may be granted or denied, particularly noting cases that fall under the prohibitory clause where bail is generally more restricted.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199— Constitutional petition—Quashing of FIR—Scope and limitations—Petitioners sought quashing of FIRs registered under Section 25-D of the Telegraph Act, 1885 and Sections 354, 506, 337-H(2), and 34, P.P.C.—Held, that Article 199 of the Constitution affords a discretionary and summary remedy which is not meant for determination of disputed facts or factual controversies requiring recording of evidence—Where FIRs disclose commission of cognizable offences, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to quash the same—Remedy under Article 199 cannot be used to obstruct or preempt investigation and trial—Such intervention by High Courts has consistently been deprecated by the superior judiciary—Jurisdiction under Article 199 must be exercised only where no adequate alternate remedy is available— Cited Cases: • Amir Jamal v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq 2011 SCMR 1023 • Muhammad Younas Khan v. Government of N.W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Mst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim 2001 SCMR 1493 • Muslimabad Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mrs. Siddiqa Faiz PLD 2008 SC 135 • President, All Pakistan Women Association v. Muhammad Akbar Awan 2020 SCMR 260 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 63, 190, 249-A & 551— Alternative remedies—Exhaustion of statutory avenues before invoking writ jurisdiction—Accused person seeking quashing of FIR must first avail statutory remedies—Held, that a person aggrieved by registration of an FIR has multiple remedies: (i) before the Investigating Officer, (ii) before supervisory police officers under Section 551, Cr.P.C., (iii) before a Magistrate under Section 63, Cr.P.C. for discharge, (iv) under Rule 24.7 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, (v) before a Magistrate under Section 190, Cr.P.C., and (vi) acquittal under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Only after exhaustion of such remedies can constitutional jurisdiction be invoked. Cited Case: • Qaisar Mahmood v. Muhammad Sham PLD 1998 Lahore 72 **(c) Criminal Procedure—Investigation— ----Quashing of FIR— Disputed questions of fact—Scope of interference by High Court—Held, that investigation of criminal offences falls within the exclusive domain of the Investigating Officer and the Trial Court—High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, cannot act as a fact-finding forum or interfere in ongoing investigations—Where FIRs contain allegations attracting cognizable offences, any interference at pre-trial stage is unwarranted and amounts to judicial overreach—Such interference has been disapproved in multiple precedents— Cited Cases: • Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 • Shahnaz Begum v. Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Baluchistan PLD 1971 SC 677 • Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan 1994 SCMR 2142 • Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq 2006 SCMR 276 • Dr. Ghulam Mustafa v. The State 2008 SCMR 76 • Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim PLD 2009 SC 102 (d) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10-A— Fair trial—Direction to Investigation Officer—Petitioners urged the Court to direct the Investigating Officers to conduct investigation in a fair and impartial manner—Held, that Investigation Officers are legally bound to investigate fairly and transparently—Court expressed confidence that Investigating Officers shall proceed without fear or favour and in accordance with law to protect petitioners' rights under Article 10-A of the Constitution. Disposition: Petitions dismissed—High Court declined to quash FIRs in constitutional jurisdiction—Held that factual controversies and ongoing investigations are beyond the scope of Article 199—Petitioners advised to pursue statutory remedies and let investigation and trial take their lawful course.

Summary: The brief facts of the case involved a complaint by Respondent No.4 against the petitioner, alleging that the petitioner barged into his house and assaulted his maternal cousin, Razia Bibi. The FIR was initially registered under Section 354 PPC. The petitioner contended that the Magistrate had no authority to interfere with the investigation and that the complaint against him is false. The petitioner's counsel argued that medical evidence is essential to corroborate the alleged assault, and since the petitioner is the brother-in-law of Respondent No.4, Section 452 PPC should not be invoked against him. The judge cites guidelines for the exercise of powers by Magistrates under Sections 167 and 344 Cr.P.C. The judge emphasized the separation of roles between the police and the judiciary in the investigation process and highlighted the limitations on the court's authority to interfere with police proceedings. Ultimately, the judge upheld the Magistrate's order, stating that the Magistrate can direct the Investigating Officer to add, delete, or substitute an offense mentioned in the FIR if circumstances warrant. However, the Magistrate cannot dictate the manner in which the Investigating Officer submitted the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The petition was dismissed based on these considerations.

Summary: Bail granted----Background:In the Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court, Gilgit, the petitioners Mujeeb Ullah, Fazal ur Rehman, and Hafaaz ur Rehman sought post-arrest bail under Section 497 Cr.PC, read with Section 21-D of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Previously, their bail application was dismissed by the Anti-Terrorism Court No.1, Gilgit.---Issues:Whether the petitioners are entitled to post-arrest bail under the rule of consistency given that the principal accused had already been granted bail.Whether the fact that the petitioners absconded soon after the incident affects their eligibility for bail.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court granted the petitioners' request for post-arrest bail.The FIR did not directly name the petitioners, who were charged as unknown culprits.The principal accused and co-accused had already been granted bail by the court, establishing a rule of consistency that should apply to the petitioners.The complainant had reached a compromise with the principal accused, further weakening the case against the petitioners.The argument that the petitioners absconded did not hold sufficient weight to deny bail, especially considering the compromise with the principal accused.Outcome: The court admitted the petitioners to post-arrest bail, subject to their furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 300,000/- with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial court.----Citations/PrecedentsSections 149, 341, 365-B, 368, 354, 506(ii) PPCSections 21(L) and 6/7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997Section 497 Cr.PC (bail provisions)Section 21-D ATA (bail provisions in anti-terrorism cases)

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 302(b), 354, 449, 452 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, assault or use of criminal force to womanwith intent to outrage her modesty, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault orwrongful restraint---Appreciation of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Complainant asprosecution witness had correctly narrated the story as contained in the FIR and nowhere hewas derailed from his previous deposition---Statements of the most important and starwitnesses, the daughter and widow of the deceased, were similar with each other---Saidwitnesses had correctly identified accused in the Trial Court and correctly stated the date,time, the place of occurrence and the manner in which the occurrence had taken place---Saidwitnesses being dwellers of the house where occurrence took place, their presence in thehouse could not be doubted, rather their presence at the relevant time, was natural---Otherprosecution witness, the neighbourer of the deceased, had also identified the accused in thecourt---All prosecution witnesses were reliable, trustworthy and credible---Identity ofaccused, could not be doubted as prior to the incident, accused remained Buzgar ofdeceased's family---Defence had cross-examined the witnesses at sufficient length, but hadfailed to give any dent or damage to their testimony---Some minor discrepancies in theevidence of prosecution witnesses, were not substantive enough to create reasonable doubt inthe case of prosecution about the involvement and guilt of accused---Recovery of crimeweapon i.e. T.T. Pistol, was effected on the pointation of accused---Accused had confessedhis guilt by disclosing the names of absconding accused persons who persuaded him forcommitting the murder of deceased---Case of prosecution, had further been strengthened bythe confessional statement of accused under S.164, Cr.P.C.---Such statement was recordedwithout any coercion, pressure, torture or blackmailing---No reason existed to disagree ordisbelieve such confessional statement---Plea of 'alibi' taken by accused, was not of worthcredence---Prosecution had succeeded in proving the charge against accused through direct,circumstantial and medical evidence---No major contradiction or dishonest improvement hadbeen pointed out by the defence---Accused, throughout the proceedings, had not taken anyspecific plea with regard to his false implication, nor he had brought any ill-will or ulteriormotives for his false implication by the witnesses---Trial Court had discussed and dilatedupon each and every aspect of the case and rightly convicted accused.Muhammad Amjad v. The State PLD 2003 SC 704 and Hashim Qasim v. The State2017 SCMR 986 ref.(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Awarding of capital punishment---Eight accused personsincluding the accused had been booked in the crime and except accused, all accused personswere absconding; their pleas were yet to be brought on record---Accused, his two sons andtwo other absconding accused persons, being armed with Kalashnikov and T.T. pistol hadmade indiscriminate firing upon the deceased, but the fact remained that the deceased hadonly received two bullet injuries and it was not certain that whose bullet hit the deceased---Awarding of capital punishment to accused was unwarranted, in circumstances---Whileupholding the conviction of accused, his sentence of death was converted into rigorousimprisonment for life---Amount of compensation and remaining sentence of accused weremaintained with benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C.

Summary: Background: Amjad Ali and Fakhar Imam were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge/Zilla Qazi, Buner at Daggar, for several offenses, including under Section 354-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), Section 294 PPC, and Section 18 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. The convictions stemmed from an incident in which the appellants allegedly stripped two women, Mst. Nagina and Mst. Akhtar Meena, and recorded obscene videos of them, which were later distributed. The complainant, Kamil Khan, father of Mst. Nagina, reported that this act led to the murder of Mst. Nagina by her father-in-law due to the disgrace brought upon the family. -----Issues: 1- Whether the evidence supported the conviction of Amjad Ali under Section 354-A PPC, which pertains to stripping a woman and exposing her to public view. 2- Whether the appellants were rightly convicted for preparing or attempting to commit zina (adultery/fornication). 3- Whether the conviction under Section 294 PPC, which deals with obscene acts in public places, was justified. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Conviction under Section 354-A PPC: The court set aside the conviction of Amjad Ali under Section 354-A PPC. The court found that the essential elements required for this offense—stripping the woman of her clothes and exposing her to public view—were not proven by the prosecution. The evidence, including photographs, did not show that Mst. Nagina was stripped and exposed to the public. Therefore, the court concluded that the conviction under this section was not supported by the evidence. --Conviction under Section 18 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979: The court altered the convictions of both appellants under Section 18 to convictions under Section 16 of the same Ordinance. Section 16 pertains to enticing or taking away a woman with criminal intent. The court found that while the evidence did not support a conviction for attempting to commit zina, it did support a conviction for taking the women with the intent to engage in illicit intercourse. The court sentenced the appellants to four years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 16, along with a fine, reducing the severity of their original sentences under Section 18. --Conviction under Section 294 PPC: The court maintained the conviction of both appellants under Section 294 PPC. The photographs provided evidence that the appellants were engaged in obscene acts in a place accessible to the public, thus justifying their conviction under this section. The court partially allowed the appeal by setting aside the conviction under Section 354-A PPC and altering the conviction under Section 18 to one under Section 16 of the Hudood Ordinance. The court maintained the conviction under Section 294 PPC, ensuring that the sentences would run concurrently and that the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. (consideration of time already spent in custody) would be extended to the appellants. -----Citations/Precedents: PLD 2005 Peshawar 128: The court referenced this case to define the term "stripping" and its implications under Section 354-A PPC. PLD 2008 Lahore 308: The court cited this case to reinforce the requirements for convicting someone under Section 354-A PPC, emphasizing the need for both stripping and public exposure to be present. PLD 1991 FSC 268: This case was used to discuss the legal definitions of "attempt" and "preparation" in the context of criminal law, particularly regarding offenses under the Hudood Ordinance.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –- S. 497(1), 4th proviso –- Bail –- Statutory delay –- Female accused –- Exception to statutory bail due to being declared a "hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal" –- Scope and application –- Principles reiterated –- Petitioner, a female accused, sought post-arrest bail on the ground of statutory delay, having remained behind bars for over one year without conclusion of trial –- Allegation against petitioner was that she, along with two accomplices, robbed the deceased of cash and bed sheets, and upon resistance, threw red chili powder in his eyes and set him on fire with petrol, resulting in over 50% burn injuries and death after days of agony –- Held, although ordinarily a female accused not convicted of a capital offence is entitled to bail after a continuous detention of one year without conclusion of trial, such entitlement is not absolute –- Under 4th proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C., bail shall not be granted if the accused is, in the opinion of the Court, a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal –- Supreme Court in Shakeel Shah’s case explained that such determination is based on the nature and gravity of the offence, the violent means employed, the societal threat posed, and, if available, past criminal record –- In present case, the atrocious mode and manner of commission of offence, resulting in death by immolation, reflected the petitioner’s callous and violent disposition –- Court held petitioner to be a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal within the contemplation of 4th proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C. –- Bail refused despite statutory delay and gender of accused. Cited Case: • Shakeel Shah’s case (reference to Supreme Court interpretation of “hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal”) Disposition: Bail petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ---- S. 173 ---- Framing of charge ---- Trial commences only after framing of charge ---- Jurisdiction of Special Court under the Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021 ---- Petitioner's case was registered under S. 354 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (PPC), and the challan report was submitted to the Judicial Magistrate ---- The Magistrate, considering the offense as a scheduled offense under the Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021, referred the matter to the Sessions Judge, who subsequently assigned it to the Additional Sessions Judge ---- The Additional Sessions Judge, without framing charge, ruled that S. 354 PPC was not attracted and remanded the case back to the Area Magistrate for trial ---- Held, trial commences only after framing of charge, and any determination regarding the applicability of scheduled offenses must occur during trial as per S. 16(3) of the Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021 ---- Impugned order, having been passed before framing of charge, was held to be premature and beyond jurisdiction. (b) Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021: ---- S. 16(3) ---- Exclusive jurisdiction of Special Court to determine whether an offense falls within the schedule ---- Interpretation of "in the course of trial" ---- The Act empowers the Special Court to determine during the course of trial whether an offense is a scheduled offense or not ---- Trial, as settled in precedent, commences only upon framing of charge ---- Impugned order held to be in violation of S. 16(3) of the Act, as no charge had been framed before making such a determination ---- Case law relied upon: Haq Nawaz v. State (2000 SCMR 785) and Niaz Ahmed v. Aijaz Ahmed (PLD 2024 SC 1152) ---- Application of the legal maxim A communi observantia non est recedendum (when the law prescribes a particular procedure, it must be followed accordingly or not at all). (c) Administration of Justice: ---- Jurisdictional error ---- Special Court can only exercise powers prescribed under law ---- Decision rendered in absence of proper legal procedure is not sustainable ---- The Additional Sessions Judge, having disregarded the mandatory procedure under the Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021, acted beyond jurisdiction ---- The impugned order, therefore, was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication after framing of charge, ensuring compliance with procedural requirements. ----Disposition: Petition allowed. The impugned order dated 30.08.2023 was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Additional Sessions Judge, Chunian, for a fresh decision in accordance with law.