Summary: Bail denied --- (a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----Ss. 497 & 498—Pakistan Penal Code, Ss. 141, 149, 354-A, 452, 147, 148, 149—Pre-arrest bail—Scope—Extraordinary relief—Conditions— Petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in case involving house trespass, assault, and outraging modesty of complainant’s daughter—Pre-arrest bail declined by Trial Court and High Court—Validity—Supreme Court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary discretionary relief to be granted only in extraordinary circumstances to protect innocent persons from mala fide arrest and abuse of process—Petitioner must establish reasonable grounds showing prima facie innocence, existence of further inquiry, and mala fide intention behind arrest—Such relief cannot be used as substitute for post-arrest bail nor granted as matter of course—Petitioners failed to satisfy mandatory conditions—Pre-arrest bail rightly refused. Cited Case: Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafique (PLD 2009 SC 427) (b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----S. 497—Pakistan Penal Code, S. 354-A—Prohibitory clause—Heinous offence—Effect on bail— Offence under Section 354-A PPC (assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage modesty) falls within prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C.—Such offences are treated as heinous and serious in nature—Where accused are specifically nominated in FIR with active roles and supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., bail cannot be granted in absence of exceptional circumstances—Petitioners’ involvement prima facie established—Case did not fall within ambit of further inquiry. (c) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860— ----Ss. 141 & 149—Unlawful assembly—Common object—Vicarious liability— Where accused persons form unlawful assembly and commit offence in prosecution of common object, each member becomes vicariously liable for acts done by others—Common object can be inferred from conduct of accused, weapons carried, and circumstances of occurrence—Specific overt act by each accused is not essential where offence is committed in prosecution of common object—Presence and participation of petitioners in unlawful assembly sufficiently alleged—Liability under Section 149 PPC attracted. (d) Criminal jurisprudence— ----Further inquiry—Scope— Further inquiry arises where tentative assessment creates reasonable doubt regarding involvement of accused—Expression “reasonable grounds” refers to legally admissible and credible grounds appealing to judicial mind—Where FIR is prompt, accused specifically nominated, roles assigned, and allegations supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., case does not fall within further inquiry. Disposition: Criminal Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused; pre-arrest bail declined; observations held tentative and not to prejudice trial.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 147, 148, 337-F(ii), 337-F(iii) & 34---Murder, attempt to murder and causing hurt with common intention---Joint attribution of role---Single fatal injury---Medical evidence---Where prosecution alleged joint firing by three accused but medical evidence showed only one firearm injury on body of deceased---No specific role or injury attributed to petitioner---Impossibility of determining which accused caused fatal injury---Benefit of doubt---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC unsustainable. (b) Criminal trial ----Ocular account---Specific attribution of injury---Requirement---Where general and omnibus role assigned to several accused without specific attribution of fatal or injury-causing act---Conviction cannot be sustained---Principle reaffirmed that prosecution must prove specific role where single injury is found---Failure fatal to prosecution case. (c) Recovery of weapon ----Non-recovery---Corroboration---Allegation of firearm use not supported by recovery of weapon of offence from petitioner---Lack of corroborative evidence---Prosecution version weakened. (d) Motive ----Vague and ambiguous motive---Old enmity---Not established---Alleged motive jointly attributed without particulars---Evidence showed petitioner not involved in earlier incident relied upon for motive---Absence of motive further weakened prosecution case. (e) Abscondence ----Evidentiary value---Abscondence by itself not sufficient to sustain conviction---Fear of false implication or police torture may explain conduct---Abscondence cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. (f) Benefit of doubt ----Criminal jurisprudence---Single doubt sufficient for acquittal---Where multiple circumstances created serious doubt regarding prosecution version---Accused entitled to acquittal as of right. Cited cases: • Farman Ali and others v. The State, PLD 1980 SC 201 • Liaqat Hussain and others v. Falak Sher and others, 2003 SCMR 611 • Rahimullah Jan v. Kashif and another, PLD 2008 SC 298 • Tariq Pervez v. The State, 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State, 2009 SCMR 230 Disposition: Criminal Petition No.607 of 2020 converted into appeal; appeal allowed; judgments of the Trial Court dated 08.10.2019 and High Court of Balochistan dated 31.03.2020 set aside; petitioner acquitted of all charges by benefit of doubt; petitioner ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 341, 186, 188, 143 & 147---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 249-A & 417---Wrongful restraint, obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant, unlawful assembly, rioting---Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Accused-respondents were charged for protesting and blocking a main road---In the instant case S.147, P.P.C., was not applicable, because four ingredients as defined in S.141 of P.P.C regarding unlawful assembly had not been established specially use of criminal force by the accused during protest was missing---No statement was available on case file regarding any person who was prevented from proceedings in any direction in which he had right to proceed, hence the attraction of S.341, P.P.C., in the FIR against the accused/respondents was also not justified---As for S.186 and 188, P.P.C., mentioned in FIR, no Police Officer was authorized to register FIR for the violation of S.144, Cr.P.C., unless complaint in writing was made by the authority in terms of S.1951(a), Cr.P.C., which stipulated that, “No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Ss.172 to 188 of P.P.C, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he was subordinate---Section 249-A, Cr.P.C., categorically empowers Magistrate of acquitting the accused persons at any stage of the case, if after hearing the prosecutor and the accused, for reasons to be recorded, he considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence, which has judiciously been done by him after hearing the parties---In the instant case, after full trial of the matter, there was no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence mentioned in the FIR, as such further proceedings in the Court amounted to wastage of time and abuse of process of the Court---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed being devoid of any merit. Malik Sherbaz Khan Addl. A.G for the State. Respondent/accused in person along with Counsel Athar Hussain. Date of hearing: 27th August, 2025.

Summary: Acquittal granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– Ss. 4(k), 154, 156(3), 157, 173, 190, 200–204, 265-K, 342 –– Cognizable offence –– Entry in daily diary instead of FIR –– Scope and effect of Magistrate’s power under S.156(3) –– Legality of arrest prior to registration of FIR. Information given by complainant regarding disappearance and suspected abduction of two young men clearly disclosed commission of a cognizable offence, yet the officer incharge did not register an FIR under S.154 Cr.P.C. and only made an entry in the daily diary while seeking “inquiry” under S.156(3) Cr.P.C. –– Held, “such an investigation” in S.156(3) refers to investigation under S.156(1) which presupposes registration of a case under S.154 –– S.156(3) cannot be invoked to order an “inquiry” and Magistrate has no authority to direct such inquiry; to read such power into S.156(3) would amount to adding words not intended by the legislature –– The duty to register and investigate cognizable offences rests exclusively with the officer incharge of the police station; entry in the roznamcha/daily diary does not convert information into a cognizable case nor authorize investigation under Chapter XIV –– An arrest prior to registration of FIR, save in exceptional circumstances expressly covered by Ss.54, 55, 57 or 151 Cr.P.C., is illegal and without lawful authority –– In the present case, the appellants were arrested on the basis of a diary entry before registration of the crime report; such arrest was held illegal and the purported “inquiry” under S.156(3) without an FIR was without lawful sanction, having direct bearing on the reliability of subsequent proceedings including judicial confession. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 –– Arts. 38 & 40 –– Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– Ss. 164, 364 –– Judicial confession –– Requirements of voluntariness and safeguards –– Delay and custody in police control –– Evidentiary value. Under Art.38 of the Order of 1984, confession made to or in presence of a police officer is inadmissible; confession in custody is admissible only if recorded by a Magistrate under S.164 Cr.P.C. or where it leads to discovery of a fact within Art.40 –– S.364 Cr.P.C. and Ch.13 of High Court Rules & Orders impose mandatory safeguards: Magistrate must explain to accused that he is not bound to confess, that the confession may be used against him, and must not record the statement unless he has “reasons to believe” it is voluntary, which requires objective satisfaction based on his own observations –– Judicial confession may form basis of conviction if true, voluntary and corroborated, but delay in recording, especially when accused remains in police influence, casts serious doubt on voluntariness and calls for heightened scrutiny –– In the present case, appellants were illegally arrested on 17.02.2016 and their judicial confessions recorded on 23.02.2016, six days later; there were material contradictions between the Magistrate and investigating officer regarding custody and handing over of the accused after recording of confession –– Confessions were not corroborated by independent evidence and even conflicted with prosecution’s own narrative –– Held, in such circumstances, the alleged judicial confessions were surrounded by serious doubts regarding voluntariness and safety, and could not be relied upon as a basis for conviction. (c) Criminal trial –– Evidence –– Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report –– Chain of custody –– Delay in dispatch –– Recovery of incriminating articles –– Effect. Prosecution relied on recovery at instance of appellant of a Kalashnikov rifle, blood-stained axe, churri (knife), a portion of blood-stained chitae (mat) and blood-stained stones, as well as positive FSL reports –– Evidence showed that alleged recoveries were made earlier but ballistic and serological exhibits were dispatched to FSL almost four weeks after the occurrence, impairing sanctity of chain of custody –– Firearm and spent crime-empties were sent together, further compromising evidentiary integrity –– Medical evidence indicated injuries that would cause profuse bleeding, yet there was no evidence of extensive blood at the alleged crime scene, nor was it the prosecution case that blood had been washed to remove traces –– Investigating officer did not corroborate complainant’s assertion that personal effects of the deceased were recovered during a joint police/Chitral Scouts raid on accused’s house –– Held, in view of unexplained delays, contradictions, scant physical traces in a case involving decapitation and dismemberment, and compromised chain of custody, reliance on FSL reports and alleged recoveries to sustain a capital conviction was unsafe. (d) Criminal trial –– Circumstantial evidence –– Standard of proof –– Absence of “last seen” and direct ocular account –– Benefit of doubt. Entire case rested on circumstantial evidence: there was no direct ocular testimony placing the appellants in the company or proximity of the deceased at the relevant time, nor any credible “last seen” evidence beyond generalized statements regarding crossing of a bridge –– Human remains in two sacks were not recovered at the instance of the appellants –– Crucial evidence regarding movement of the victims across a bridge controlled by Chitral Scouts, with a maintained register and temporary retention of identity cards, was not properly collected –– Prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars, including search and recovery –– In such circumstances of illegal arrest, doubtful confessional statements, compromised recoveries, weak forensic support and incomplete investigation, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt –– Held, appellants were entitled to benefit of doubt, capital convictions under Ss.302(b) and 34 PPC, as well as convictions under Ss.201 and 15(AA) PPC, could not be sustained; acquittal was warranted. (e) Criminal justice system –– Investigation and prosecution –– Judicial censure. The case was described by the Supreme Court as a classic illustration of the abysmal state of the criminal justice system, reflecting lack of integrity, competence and professionalism in investigation and prosecution, and inability of investigation officers to discharge statutory duties –– Failure to promptly register FIR, resort to an impermissible “inquiry” under S.156(3) Cr.P.C., illegal arrest, poor collection and preservation of physical and forensic evidence, and contradictions in prosecution case collectively undermined the search for truth and risked miscarriage of justice in a double-murder case involving decapitation and dismemberment of two young men –– Court reiterated that Cr.P.C. structure, including judicial supervision of police powers, exists to protect both accused and victims from abuse of coercive authority, and disregard of these safeguards vitiates the worth of resulting evidence. (f) Result. Criminal Petition No.1674 of 2021 was converted into appeal and allowed; convictions and sentences recorded by trial court on 08.01.2020 and upheld by High Court on 09.06.2021 were set aside and appellants, Said-ur-Rehman and Noor Rehmat, were acquitted by extending benefit of doubt and ordered to be released if not required in any other case –– Criminal Petitions Nos.135-P and 136-P of 2021 filed by complainant against acquittal of co-accused were dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 341, 500, 147 & 34---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, wrongful restraint, defamation, rioting, common intention---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the accused-petitioner was that he made firing upon the complainant and his son with the intention to kill them---All offences reflected in the FIR except S.324, P.P.C., were bailable---Admittedly, the allegation pertained to ineffective aerial firing and no one had sustained injuries, as such it would be moot question for the Trial Court to determine whether the allegation of attempt to murder was established in the case or not, which could be done at the time of conclusion of trial, which made the instant case of prosecution as one of further inquiry under S.497(2),Cr.P.C.---Investigation of case was complete and the accused petitioner was behind bar since his arrest---Accused was no more required for further investigation or for any other case to the prosecution---Speedy trial was the right of the accused and was now guaranteed under the Constitution but trial of the case did not witness any progress because complete challan of the case was still awaited---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Sajjad Hussain v. State 2021 YLR Note 150; 2020 MLD 1187; 2018 MLD 724; 2020 YLR Note 147; 2019 MLD 724 and 2022 YLR 2082 ref. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail---Observations of the Court---Scope---Findings of the Court made in bail order are tentative in nature and the Trial Court need not be influenced in any way---Trial Court may reach its own conclusions after recording evidence in the case. Burhan Wali for Petitioner. Malik Sher Baz Addl. AG for the State. Shehbaz Ali for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 436, 427, 504, 147, 148 & 149---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, mischief by fire and explosive substance, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Bail, cancellation of---Record reflected that after registration of case the accused moved an application for grant of pre-arrest bail before the Trial Court, which granted ad-interim pre-arrest bail to him and later on his interim pre-arrest bail was confirmed vide order dated 19.07.2024, which was impugned---Admittedly, there was a dispute between the parties, as disclosed in the memo of FIR as well as Trial Court's order---Furthermore, the strong and cogent reasons were required for recalling of bail granting order, if the bail granting order was perverse or disregarded to the principle regulating grant of bail---Applicant/complainant was unable to demonstrate the principles governing the cancellation of bail---As per tentative assessment, the grounds for cancellation of bail as agitated by the complainant could only be thrashed out at the time of recording evidence of the parties---Since the trial was yet to begin thus no fruitful result would come out to recall the pre-arrest bail order as impugned---No cogent grounds had been established by the applicant to warrant the cancellation of bail---Order granting bail was founded upon settled legal provisions, and thus, no interference was justified---Application for cancellation of bail was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Muhammad Azhar v. Dilawar 2009 SCMR 1202 rel. Abdul Rasheed Abro for Applicant/Complainant. Date of hearing: 13th February, 2025. Order Abdul Hamid Bhurgri, J .--- The applicant / complainant through the captioned Criminal Miscellaneous Application under Section 497(5), Cr.P.C seeks cancellation of bail granted to respondent 1 by the learned Sessions Judge, Badin in Cr. Bail Application No.1007 of 2024 (Re-Maqsood v. The State), arising out of Crime No.356 of 2024 registered at Police Station Badin, under Sections 324, 436, 147, 148, 149, 504, 427, P.P.C vide order dated 19.07.2024. 2. The facts of the case are already stated in the memo. of this application, therefore, there is no need to reproduce the same for the sake of brevity. 3. The learned counsel contended that the grant of bail to the accused/respondent No.1 contravenes established principles of law, as a specific role has been explicitly assigned to the respondent/accused. He further argued that there exists compelling evidence on record, which unequivocally links the respondent to the alleged offense. He urged that the respondent / accused after granting bail by the trial Court is misusing the concession of bail by issuing threats to the applicant / complainant. He further submitted that the respondent / accused was nominated in the promptly lodged FIR with specific role, however, the learned trial Court by ignoring the same and without considering the record has granted bail to the accused. Additionally, he submitted that following the grant of bail, the accused resorted to intimidatory tactics, coercing the complainant into withdrawing from the case. He requested that bail of the accused may be recalled. 4. Having meticulously considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant, thoroughly examined the case material, and scrutinized the impugned order issued by the Trial Court, the learned Sessions Judge delivered the following operative findings: "Apparently, applicant/ accused person is nominated in FIR with the role that he made fire which hit to tractor. The main contention of learned defence counsel that no any person sustained any injury; apparently from perusal of FIR, no any person sustained any injury. The other main plea of learned defence counsel that there is civil nature dispute between the applicant's father and one Shakoor; such version was not rebutted by learned complainant's counsel. The other main plea of learned applicant's counsel that as per FIR, only one tire of tractor was shown to have been burnt. As per photographs provided by complainant, one cot was shown to have been burnt. S-far plea of learned complainant's counsel that applicant/ accused is involved in two other cases; admittedly, each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. When as per FIR no any person sustained any injury and no photograph showed the tractor was burnt. Moreover, when during the course of arguments the complainant was asked which tire of tractor either front or rear was damaged, he failed to reply satisfactorily. Moreover there is apparently dispute between the parties over the land, therefore, case of the applicant/ accused needed further inquiry." 5. Record reflects that after registration of case the accused moved an application for grant of pre-arrest bail before the learned trial Court, who granted ad-interim pre-arrest bail to him and later on his interim pre-arrest bail was confirmed vide order dated 19.07.2024, which is impugned. Admittedly, there was a dispute between the parties, as disclosed in the memo of FIR as well as trial Court's order. Furthermore, the strong and cogent reasons are required for recalling of bail granting order. For instance if the bail granting order is perverse or disregard to the settled principle regulating grant of bail. The learned Counsel for the applicant / complainant is unable to demonstrate the above settled principle governing the cancellation of bail. The Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Azhar v. Dilawar (2009 SCMR 1202) has observed as under:- "6. It needs no reiteration that considerations for the grant of bail are quite distinct from the consideration for cancellation of bail. Once bail has been granted by a competent Court of law strong and exceptional grounds are required for cancelling the same, as held by this Court on a number of occasions. It is to be seen as to whether order granting bail is patently, illegal, erroneous, factually incorrect and has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Considering the case of the respondent for grant of bail on the above touchstone, we are of the view that learned High Court has rightly reached the conclusion and no exception can be taken to it. The respondent is on bail since 26-1-2009 and he is not shown to have misused the concession of bail. He is entitled to remain on bail " 6. In my tentative assessment, the grounds for cancellation of bail as agitated by learned Counsel for the complainant could only be thrashed out at the time of recording evidence of the parties. Since the trial is yet to begin thus no fruitful result will come out to recall the pre-arrest bail order as impugned. 7. Upon careful deliberation, it is concluded that no cogent grounds have been established by the applicant to warrant the cancellation of bail. The order granting bail, issued by the learned Sessions Court, was founded upon settled legal provisions, and thus, no interference is justified. In such circumstances, the instant application for cancellation of bail is dismissed in limine. JK/A-36/Sindh Application dismissed.

Summary: Bail denied ---- (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ----S. 497—Bail after arrest—Murder case—Specific role—FSL report—Tentative assessment— Applicant sought post-arrest bail in a murder case registered under Ss. 302, 147, 148, and 149, P.P.C.—He was specifically nominated in FIR with allegation of directly firing upon the deceased—FIR was promptly lodged, leaving no room for deliberation—Recovery of pistol from applicant matched with empties recovered from scene as per FSL report—Held, prosecution evidence prima facie connected applicant with commission of offence—Case fell within prohibitory clause—No ground for bail—Application dismissed. (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ----S. 497—Deeper appreciation of evidence—Scope at bail stage— Held, deeper scrutiny of evidence is not warranted at bail stage as it may prejudice trial—Court is to conduct only tentative assessment of available material—Evidence on record, including eyewitness statements and forensic recovery, was sufficient for denying bail at this stage. (c) Penal Code, 1860 ----Ss. 302, 147, 148, 149—Common object—Multiple accused—Role attribution— Though general allegations were raised against all accused, applicant was attributed a specific role of firing—Recovery of matching weapon corroborated prosecution case—Mere pendency of trial or delay in its commencement not sufficient ground for bail in presence of strong prima facie evidence. Disposition: Bail application dismissed—Applicant specifically charged with firing upon deceased—Recovery supported by FSL report—Case falls within prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.—Co-accused with similar role also denied bail—Observations made are tentative and not to influence trial. Cited Cases: • Haji Gulu Khan v. Gul Daraz Khan 1995 SCMR 1765 • 2021 SCMR 2011, 2011 SCMR 1392, 1980 SCMR 784, 1985 SCMR 1946, 1997 SCMR 32, 2014 PCrLJ 1430, 2014 YLR Note 66

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Criminal Law---- ----Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 337-D, 337-F(ii), 337-F(iii), 147, 148, 149----Attempt to commit murder, Shajjah-i-Mudihah, Shajjah-i-Ghayr Mudihah, rioting, unlawful assembly---Benefit of doubt---Appreciation of evidence---Appellant was convicted by the trial court for causing injuries to the complainant and sentenced under various provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code---Held, that prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt due to material contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses and delay in lodging the FIR---Unexplained delay of 10 hours in registering FIR when the police station was only 1.5 km from the place of incident was fatal for the prosecution case---Prosecution witnesses, including the complainant, failed to provide a consistent account, and their statements were riddled with contradictions---Acquittal of co-accused on the same evidence strengthened the appellant’s case under the rule of consistency---Injuries sustained by the complainant alone did not stamp the witnesses as truthful in the absence of corroborating evidence---Appeal allowed, and appellant acquitted of all charges. (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898---- ----S. 342---Examination of accused---Failure to produce defense evidence---Legal implications---Appellant denied the allegations when examined under Section 342, Cr.P.C., and did not record a statement under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C., or produce any defense witnesses---Held, that the burden remained on the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, which it failed to do---Mere failure to lead defense evidence does not absolve the prosecution from establishing guilt. (c) Delay in FIR---- ----Effect on prosecution case---FIR was lodged with a delay of 10 hours without a plausible explanation despite the police station being only 1.5 km away from the crime scene---Such delay indicated the possibility of deliberation and false implication of the accused---Reliance placed on Shaukat Hussain v. The State (2024 SCMR 929), where an unexplained delay of 4 hours in lodging FIR was held to be fatal for the prosecution case. (d) Contradictions in Medical and Ocular Evidence---- ----Statements of prosecution witnesses were not corroborated by medical evidence---Doctor's testimony revealed that only one injured person's clothes were bloodstained, whereas police produced bloodstained clothes of both injured persons, creating doubt about the prosecution’s version---Injured witness claimed unconsciousness at the time of the incident, but the medical report stated that both injured persons were conscious at the time of examination---Held, that such inconsistencies rendered the prosecution evidence unreliable---Reliance placed on Muhammad Asif v. The State (2017 SCMR 486). (e) Eyewitness Testimony---- ----Reliability---Presence of eyewitness at the crime scene remained doubtful as he failed to justify his presence at the time of occurrence and did not take the injured to the hospital or lodge an immediate FIR---Discrepancies between medical reports and his version further weakened his testimony---Reliance placed on Mst. Rukhsana Begum v. Sajid (2017 SCMR 596), which held that an eyewitness must establish his presence through credible evidence. (f) Withholding of Material Witnesses---- ----Prosecution failed to produce an eyewitness without justification, leading to an adverse presumption against the prosecution---Reliance placed on Shaukat Hussain v. The State (2024 SCMR 929). (g) Disposition: Criminal appeal allowed---Impugned judgment dated 26.07.2024 set aside---Appellant acquitted of all charges under FIR No. 210 of 2022 and ordered to be released forthwith unless required in another case.

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Criminal Law—Murder Case (S. 302, P.P.C.)—Acquittal Due to Lack of Evidence:----Conviction under S. 302(b), P.P.C.—Reversal due to insufficient evidence and misappreciation of factsThe appellant was convicted under Section 302(b), P.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment as Tazir, along with Rs. 100,000/- compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased, or in default, to suffer three months’ simple imprisonment. He was also convicted under Sections 458, 147, and 148, P.P.C. The High Court overturned the conviction, ruling that the prosecution failed to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in proving a common intention to commit murder.----Cited Law:• Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (P.P.C.), S. 302(b) (Punishment for murder)• Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (P.P.C.), S. 147 (Punishment for rioting)• Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (P.P.C.), S. 148 (Rioting with a deadly weapon)• Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (P.P.C.), S. 458 (House trespass or lurking house-trespass by night)(b) Acquittal of Co-Accused in the First Trial—Same Evidence Used Against Appellant:----Conviction of appellant unjustified when co-accused were acquitted on identical evidenceThe appellant was an absconder at the time of the first trial, during which his co-accused Para Din and Pai Din were acquitted, while Gul Muhammad was convicted. The roles attributed to the appellant and the acquitted co-accused were identical, as they were all present at the scene but unarmed and did not participate in the murder. The High Court held that if the same evidence was disbelieved in favor of the co-accused, it could not be relied upon to convict the appellant.----Precedent Applied:• Tariq Pervaiz v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345)—If a set of evidence is disbelieved for some accused, it cannot be used to convict others facing the same trial.(c) Common Intention (S. 34, P.P.C.)—Not Established by Prosecution:----Mere presence at the crime scene does not constitute common intentionThe prosecution failed to establish any overt act or instigation by the appellant, which is necessary for invoking Section 34, P.P.C.. The trial court convicted the appellant based on the assumption that he "provoked and instigated" others against the deceased, but no direct evidence or corroborating testimony supported this claim. The High Court ruled that common intention must be inferred from proven facts, not mere conjecture.----Cited Law:• Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (P.P.C.), S. 34 (Common intention)----Precedent Applied:• Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (2016 SCMR 267)—Vicarious liability under S. 34, P.P.C. cannot be imposed without clear evidence of a shared intention to commit the crime.(d) Defective Recording of Accused’s Statement Under S. 342, Cr.P.C:----Failure to put incriminating evidence to accused—Impact on convictionThe trial court relied on evidence that was never put to the appellant during his examination under Section 342, Cr.P.C., violating the principle that an accused must be given the opportunity to explain all circumstances against him. The High Court held that such an omission rendered the conviction legally unsustainable.----Cited Law:• Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C.), S. 342 (Examination of accused)----Precedent Applied:• Muhammad Shah v. The State (2010 SCMR 1009)—If any piece of evidence is not put to the accused under S. 342, Cr.P.C., it cannot be used for conviction.• Qaddan v. The State (2017 SCMR 148)—Failure to question the accused about incriminating circumstances violates fair trial rights.(e) Failure of Prosecution to Prove Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt:----Prosecution evidence relied on conjectures rather than conclusive proofThe motive presented by the prosecution (deceased’s visits to his fiancée’s house) was inconsistent with witness testimonies, and no direct evidence linked the appellant to planning or committing the murder. The trial court convicted the appellant based on assumptions, not legal evidence, violating the fundamental principle that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.----Cited Law:• Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129(g) (Adverse inference for failure to produce best evidence)----Precedent Applied:• Muhammad Asif v. The State (2017 SCMR 486)—Conviction cannot be based on "high probabilities" or mere suspicions.• Tariq Pervaiz v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345)—An accused must be acquitted if a single reasonable doubt exists regarding their guilt.(f) Final Judgment—Acquittal of Accused:----Conviction set aside—Benefit of doubt extended to appellantThe High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered the immediate release of the appellant, stating that the trial court’s findings were based on speculation rather than credible evidence.----Disposition:Appeal allowed—Conviction set aside—Accused acquitted—Immediate release ordered if not required in any other case.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Criminal Trial—Benefit of Doubt & Presumption of Innocence----S. 324, S. 353, S. 225, S. 337-A(i), S. 337-F(i), S. 337-H(ii), S. 147, S. 148, S. 149, P.P.C. r/w Ss. 6 & 7 of ATA, 1997—ScopeCriminal trial—Principle of benefit of doubt—Presumption of innocence—Applicability—Held, the prosecution case, as advanced, was fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies—The ocular account was unconvincing, forensic evidence was inconclusive, and no public witnesses were associated despite the incident allegedly occurring in a populated area—Ballistic examination of the recovered firearm was delayed by seven days without explanation, and malkhana entries were found tampered with and incomplete—Failure of prosecution to establish the chain of custody of case property rendered the forensic report unreliable—Court reaffirmed that the burden lies on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, failing which the accused is entitled to acquittal.(b) Police Testimony—Reliability & Standards of Proof----Conviction solely based on police witnesses—Evidentiary valueHeld, police witnesses must be subject to the same level of scrutiny as any other witness, and their testimony cannot be accepted merely because they are public officials—The trial court erred in placing undue reliance on police statements, despite glaring contradictions in the prosecution’s version—Lack of independent corroboration and improvement in witness depositions cast serious doubt on the veracity of the case.(c) Unexplained Delay in Forensic Examination & Case Property Handling----Effect of procedural lapses on evidentiary valueHeld, the delay of seven days in sending the weapon for forensic examination, absence of police station stamp on malkhana entries, and contradictory depositions by officials regarding case property handling cast serious doubts on the reliability of the forensic report—Failure to establish an unbroken chain of custody weakened the prosecution’s case and reinforced the defense's stance of false implication.(d) Test Identification Parade—Necessity & Legal Requirement----Failure to conduct TIP—Impact on accused identityHeld, no test identification parade was conducted for the unknown accused—In cases where identity is disputed, TIP becomes crucial to link the accused with the crime—Prosecution’s failure to establish the identity of unknown accused rendered their conviction unsustainable—Reliance on mere police assertions without concrete identification evidence violated the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence.(e) Application of Islamic & Common Law Principles of Justice----Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus—Presumption of innocenceHeld, the doctrine of benefit of doubt is deeply entrenched in Islamic jurisprudence and common law traditions—Islamic principles dictate that it is better to err on the side of acquittal than to convict an innocent person—The entire case was riddled with deliberate and dishonest improvements, casting grave doubts on the prosecution’s version—Superior courts have consistently held that when the prosecution evidence is doubtful, its benefit must go to the accused as a matter of right, not discretion.(f) Acquittal of the Accused Due to Lack of Corroboration----Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubtHeld, trial court erred in convicting the appellants despite weak and contradictory evidence—The prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that the injuries and firearm use were attributable to the accused—As a result, convictions and sentences were set aside, and all appellants were acquitted—They were ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.Disposition:Appeal allowed—Conviction set aside—Accused acquitted and ordered to be released.