Summary: Bail denied --- (a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----Ss. 497 & 498—Pakistan Penal Code, Ss. 141, 149, 354-A, 452, 147, 148, 149—Pre-arrest bail—Scope—Extraordinary relief—Conditions— Petitioners sought pre-arrest bail in case involving house trespass, assault, and outraging modesty of complainant’s daughter—Pre-arrest bail declined by Trial Court and High Court—Validity—Supreme Court held that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary discretionary relief to be granted only in extraordinary circumstances to protect innocent persons from mala fide arrest and abuse of process—Petitioner must establish reasonable grounds showing prima facie innocence, existence of further inquiry, and mala fide intention behind arrest—Such relief cannot be used as substitute for post-arrest bail nor granted as matter of course—Petitioners failed to satisfy mandatory conditions—Pre-arrest bail rightly refused. Cited Case: Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafique (PLD 2009 SC 427) (b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898— ----S. 497—Pakistan Penal Code, S. 354-A—Prohibitory clause—Heinous offence—Effect on bail— Offence under Section 354-A PPC (assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage modesty) falls within prohibitory clause of Section 497 Cr.P.C.—Such offences are treated as heinous and serious in nature—Where accused are specifically nominated in FIR with active roles and supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., bail cannot be granted in absence of exceptional circumstances—Petitioners’ involvement prima facie established—Case did not fall within ambit of further inquiry. (c) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860— ----Ss. 141 & 149—Unlawful assembly—Common object—Vicarious liability— Where accused persons form unlawful assembly and commit offence in prosecution of common object, each member becomes vicariously liable for acts done by others—Common object can be inferred from conduct of accused, weapons carried, and circumstances of occurrence—Specific overt act by each accused is not essential where offence is committed in prosecution of common object—Presence and participation of petitioners in unlawful assembly sufficiently alleged—Liability under Section 149 PPC attracted. (d) Criminal jurisprudence— ----Further inquiry—Scope— Further inquiry arises where tentative assessment creates reasonable doubt regarding involvement of accused—Expression “reasonable grounds” refers to legally admissible and credible grounds appealing to judicial mind—Where FIR is prompt, accused specifically nominated, roles assigned, and allegations supported by statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C., case does not fall within further inquiry. Disposition: Criminal Petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused; pre-arrest bail declined; observations held tentative and not to prejudice trial.

Summary: (a) Criminal trial ---- Appreciation of ocular, medical and forensic evidence ---- Murder of accused in judicial lockup; injuries to police constables; recovery of weapon; serological and ballistic reports ---- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 353 ---- Sindh Arms Act, 2013, S. 24 ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 382-B ----- Abdul Wahab, an accused remanded to judicial custody in a case under Ss. 365-B, 452, 148, 149, P.P.C., was brought to Sub-Jail/Judicial Lockup Warrah in pursuance of a ten-days’ remand order. Due to the absence of the Jailor, he was made to sit handcuffed in the courtyard of the judicial lockup when the appellant, along with co-accused, armed with pistols, entered the lockup and opened indiscriminate fire upon him and the police party, resulting in the deceased’s death on the spot and firearm injuries to Constables Zahid Ali and Muhammad Ayoub. Ocular account was furnished by the Incharge Judicial Lockup (ASI Muhammad Idrees Wahoocho) and the two injured constables, who were independent, disinterested witnesses with no animosity against the appellant; their presence at the scene was natural and unimpeachable, and their testimony was consistent and confidence-inspiring on all material particulars and remained unshaken in cross-examination. The appellant was apprehended at the spot and a 30-bore pistol recovered from his possession; four empties of the same calibre, recovered from the spot, on forensic examination matched the said pistol, thereby providing scientific corroboration to the ocular account. Recovery of blood-stained earth from the place where the deceased fell and his blood-stained clothes, together with a positive serological report, further substantiated the prosecution version. Medical evidence, including M.L.Cs. of the injured constables and post-mortem of the deceased, confirmed fresh firearm injuries on the injured witnesses, categorized as Ghayr Jaifah Hashimah and Ghayr Jaifah Mutalahimah respectively, and four firearm entry wounds on the deceased, with death opined as due to firearm injuries. Held, that on re-appraisal of the entire evidence, the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court regarding the appellant’s guilt under Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, P.P.C. and S. 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 were based on proper appreciation of reliable ocular, medical and forensic evidence; no misreading or non-reading was found warranting interference. Convictions under the said provisions were, therefore, maintained; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and direction that all sentences run concurrently, was affirmed. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n), Ss. 2(j), 2(w), 7(a), 7(b), 7(h) ---- Terrorism ---- Mens rea; “design” and “purpose”; serious coercion/intimidation of public servants; serious violence against members of police force ---- Clarification and refinement of Ghulam Hussain’s case ---- A larger Bench in Ghulam Hussain v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 61) had held that not every heinous offence causing fear or panic amounts to terrorism; where the primary motive is personal vendetta or private enmity, the act, even if it incidentally induces fear, does not per se constitute terrorism unless it satisfies the statutory criteria under S. 6, ATA. In the present case, the Supreme Court examined a specific class of incidents not squarely addressed in Ghulam Hussain’s case, namely where law enforcement personnel suffer injuries or lose their lives in the course of a private dispute between third parties while acting in the line of duty. The Court reiterated that the three cumulative elements of terrorism under S. 6(1), ATA are: (i) commission of an act enumerated in S. 6(2); (ii) the requisite “design” under S. 6(1)(b) or “purpose” under S. 6(1)(c); and (iii) the impact of such act in terms of intimidating or creating fear and insecurity in the public or a section thereof. By substituting the word “design”, the legislature broadened the inquiry to include the scheme or object in the offender’s mind, not merely the actual consequences. Thus, the decisive consideration is whether the act was designed to coerce, intimidate or overawe the Government, its officials, or law enforcement agencies, as opposed to being confined to private vengeance. Serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force or prevent the discharge of lawful duties (S. 6(2)(m)), and serious violence against a member of the police force or a public servant (S. 6(2)(n)), read with the definitions of “serious violence” and “grievous bodily injury” in Ss. 2(w) and 2(j), ATA, cover violent conduct that endangers life or causes grievous harm to officials/public servants. Comparative reference to “serious violence offence” under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (New South Wales, Australia) was made only to illustrate that, in other jurisdictions also, “serious violence” is reserved for extreme forms of harm, especially those endangering life or causing grievous injury, thus aligning with the legislative intent underlying Ss. 6(2)(m), (n), ATA. The Court held that this refined analysis does not depart from but supplements the principles in Ghulam Hussain’s case by recognizing that serious violence against law enforcement agencies, even in the context of private feuds between third parties, may, in given circumstances, assume the character of terrorism when it systematically targets those upholding the rule of law. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Hussain v. The State PLD 2020 SC 61 (c) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Harm to law enforcement personnel during private vendetta; categories of situations; design to resist and overawe law enforcement ---- When private disputes cross into terrorism ---- The Court distinguished two broad situations relating to harm caused to law enforcement personnel: firstly, where police or security officials are directly and deliberately targeted (e.g., ambushes or bombings) with the clear objective of spreading fear or disrupting the State; such attacks straightforwardly fulfill the physical and mental elements of terrorism under the ATA. Secondly, where violence arises from a private conflict but harm is caused to law enforcement officials who intervene or are inherently present, including in premises where police presence is explicit and inevitable, such as courts, police stations or lock-ups, or during transit of accused persons to or from such premises. In the latter category, if the offender arms himself with the deliberate intention to use the weapon against security officials in the event of their intervention or apprehension, the law enforcement authority becomes the foreseeable and primary target of resistance, and violence employed to evade arrest or neutralize resistance constitutes “serious coercion or intimidation” of public servants under S. 6(2)(m) and “serious violence” under S. 6(2)(n), ATA. Likewise, where the offender’s primary target is a private individual but the attack is launched in a location where police presence is inevitable, and the assailant acts with knowledge that harm to security officials is a foreseeable consequence of executing the plan, the resulting injuries or risk to law enforcement personnel can attract the provisions of S. 6(2)(m) & (n), ATA, provided that the design or purpose satisfies S. 6(1)(b) or (c), namely, to intimidate, overawe, or deter law enforcement agencies and undermine State authority. The Court emphasized that in such cases, the harm to police officers/officials is not merely incidental or collateral but forms an integral component of the criminal plan to neutralize lawful resistance and thereby constitutes an attack on the law enforcement machinery of the State. (d) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Attack in judicial lockup; injuries to police personnel escorting accused; transformation of private vendetta into terrorism; objective test for “serious violence” against police ---- Application to present case ---- In the instant matter, the initial motive of the accused arose from a personal vendetta against the deceased Abdul Wahab, who had been nominated in a case of abduction of the daughter-in-law of a co-accused and was under lawful judicial custody within the precincts of the judicial lockup. Fully aware of the deceased’s custodial status and the inevitable presence of police officials, the appellant and co-accused chose to launch an armed attack in the very courtyard of the judicial lockup, indiscriminately firing not only at their intended private target but also at the police escort, resulting in firearm injuries to Constables Zahid Ali and Muhammad Ayoub. Held, that the location (judicial lockup), timing, and manner of the attack demonstrated preparation, anticipation of resistance by law enforcement, and a willingness to overcome lawful authority through serious violence; harm to the police officials was not collateral or unintended but formed part of the accused’s broader design to execute a targeted killing in custody by neutralizing the resistance of police. Such conduct amounted to serious violence against members of the police force and serious coercion/intimidation of public servants within the meaning of S. 6(2)(m) & (n), ATA, viewed through the objective test whether the act posed a real and substantial danger to the lives of law enforcement personnel acting in the discharge of official duties. Actual fatality among police was not a prerequisite; the use of deadly weapons and indiscriminate firing in a volatile custodial environment where officials were known to be present satisfied both actus reus and mens rea under the ATA. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (PLD 2014 SC 383) to affirm that firing upon a police party in uniform engaged in lawful duties, thereby obstructing discharge of their functions, constitutes serious violence against members of the police force. Accordingly, the Court held that where officers/officials of law enforcement agencies are harmed or killed not due to personal enmity but solely because of their deployment for the discharge of lawful duty, and such attacks are deliberately planned as part of an assault on a person in custody, the intent and effect transcend private vendetta and attract the provisions of the ATA; such acts fall within the statutory definition of terrorism. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz v. The State PLD 2014 SC 383 (e) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Harm to officials arising out of discharge of official functions versus purely personal enmity ---- Scope ---- The Court clarified that where harm is inflicted on an official/officer of a law enforcement agency on account of, or as a consequence of, acts performed by such official in discharge of his official duties, even if such harm is caused outside duty hours, the act is to be treated as arising from the official’s role and would fall within the ambit of terrorism, subject to fulfillment of the other statutory elements under S. 6, ATA. Conversely, where a police or law enforcement official is harmed solely due to personal enmity, without any intention of attacking or intimidating law enforcement in its institutional or official capacity, such conduct, though criminal and punishable, does not amount to terrorism and is to be dealt with under the ordinary provisions of the P.P.C. or other applicable laws. The distinction rests on whether the violence is directed at the individual in his personal capacity, or at the authority of the State and law enforcement system which he represents. (f) Anti-Terrorism Courts ---- Joint trial of scheduled and connected offences ---- Effect on nature of offences ---- Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, S. 21-M ---- While trying a scheduled offence, an Anti-Terrorism Court is empowered under S. 21-M, ATA to jointly try any other offence committed by the accused, provided such offence is connected with the offence triable under the Act. Held, that merely by virtue of being tried in the Anti-Terrorism Court, a scheduled or non-scheduled offence does not ipso facto assume the character of a terrorism offence; it remains punishable under the ordinary criminal law unless it independently meets the definitional and mens rea requirements of terrorism as laid down in S. 6, ATA. The jurisdictional competence of the Anti-Terrorism Court to try connected offences is thus procedural and does not alter the substantive nature or ingredients of the underlying offences. (g) Criminal appeal ---- Convictions under P.P.C. and Sindh Arms Act maintained ---- Convictions under S. 7(a) & 7(b), ATA altered to S. 7(h), ATA ---- Sentence modified ---- On the basis of re-appraisal of evidence, the Supreme Court found no justification to interfere with the appellant’s convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court and maintained by the High Court under Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, P.P.C., and S. 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013; these convictions were upheld. However, in light of the refined legal position regarding the scope and application of the Anti-Terrorism Act to acts of serious violence against law enforcement personnel in the line of duty, the Court set aside the appellant’s convictions under Ss. 7(a) and 7(b), ATA and altered them to a conviction under S. 7(h) of the said Act. Consequently, the appellant was sentenced under S. 7(h), ATA to five years’ imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to the appellant and all convictions were ordered to run concurrently. Appeal was, thus, partly allowed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 452, 436, 109, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, mischief by fire or explosive substance with the intent to destroy a building, abetment, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Petitioner was nominated in the FIR with specific role of causing firearm injury below the right chest of deceased---During the course of investigation, the petitioner claimed a specific plea that he only tried to rescue the children and had not participated in the occurrence---Said version of the petitioner was also verified by the Investigating Officer in its findings incorporated in daily case diary, leading to the conclusion that the petitioner did not participate in the crime, therefore, the petitioner's case became one requiring further inquiry into his alleged guilt---Furthermore, considering the outcome of the investigations, the petitioner's case presented two conflicting versions; one stated by the complainant in the FIR and the other revealed by the Investigating Officer---Which version was correct was a matter to be determined by the Trial Court after recording the evidence---Apart from the above, the crime empties which were secured from the crime scene were found shot from one crime weapon which did not belong to the petitioner---Principal perpetrator of the crime committed suicide at the crime scene---Nothing was recovered upon the disclosure of the petitioner---Investigation had been completed and the petitioner was no more required for the purpose of any further investigation---Petitioner was arrested on 18.05.2025 and had been in custody since, without significant progress in the trial---In such state of affairs, the case of the petitioner fell within the ambit of subsection (2) of S.497 of Cr.P.C. calling for further inquiry into his guilt---Petitioner was behind the bars and was no more required for further investigation---Bail petition was allowed, in circumstances. Ehsan Ullah v. The State 2012 SCMR 1137; Saif Ullah v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 1458; Najeeb Ullah v. The State and another 2020 SCMR 1241 and Muhammad Ramzan v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 1914 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in the bail order are tentative in nature and shall not influence the Trial Court. Barrister Danyal Ijaz Chadhar for Petitioner. Fakhar Abbas, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State with Naveed S.I.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) & Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 302(b) & S. 452, read with S. 374, Cr.P.C. Conviction on indivisible, tainted evidence where co-accused with identical role stood acquitted—Rule of consistency—Held, on the same set of prosecution evidence disbelieved qua co-accused Asghar (attributed a head blow with an axe greater in dimension than that ascribed to the appellant), the courts below could not, without cogent distinction or independent corroboration, maintain appellant’s conviction under S. 302(b), PPC; conviction under S. 452 had already been set aside by the High Court—Findings of acquittal of co-accused having attained finality, parity in treatment was required—Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence under S. 302(b), PPC set aside. (b) Law of Evidence (Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984) ----Art. 129(g)—Withholding of best evidence—Adverse inference. Two closely-related female eyewitnesses (named later as injured) were abandoned without justification; their absence, coupled with unexplained late medical examination of PW-7, warranted an adverse presumption under Art. 129(g) against the prosecution version—Prosecution thus failed to produce the best available evidence, creating serious doubt in its case. (c) Criminal trial—Unnatural conduct—Presence of witness doubtful—Benefit of doubt. Complainant-father, claiming to have witnessed armed assailants drag his son out and inflict fatal head injuries, neither intervened nor suffered any injury—Such passivity was found inconsistent with ordinary human conduct; presence held doubtful—Where presence of a star witness is doubtful, benefit of doubt must go to the accused. (d) Criminal trial—Motive—Failure to prove. Alleged motive based on prior FIR by the deceased against the accused was expressly disbelieved by the courts below; with motive out of the case and no other reliable corroboration, prosecution case further weakened. (e) Criminal trial—Recovery—Inconsequential recovery. Recovery of hatchet on appellant’s pointation held devoid of evidentiary value as the weapon was unstained with blood; such recovery could not provide the missing corroboration. (f) Criminal trial—“Sifting the grain from the chaff”—Limits—“Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.” Court reaffirmed that while rigid application of “falsus in uno…” is eschewed, selective reliance (sifting) must be sparing and only where the truthful part is clearly distinguishable and independently corroborated—It cannot be used to salvage a conviction from the same inseparable, discredited evidence already rejected for identically-placed co-accused, nor to compensate for investigative or prosecutorial lapses—Standard of proof must remain beyond reasonable doubt. Cited cases: • Lal Khan v. The State, 2006 SCMR 1846 • Riaz Ahmed v. The State, 2010 SCMR 846 • Abdul Qadeer v. The State, 2024 SCMR 1146 • Riasat Ali v. The State, 2024 SCMR 1224 • Sher Afzal v. The State, Crim. Apps. No. 229 & 230 of 2021 (25.02.2025). Disposition—Criminal Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence under S. 302(b), PPC set aside; appellant acquitted and to be released forthwith if not required in any other case—Connected Criminal Petition for enhancement dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: Acquittal ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 354 & 452 — Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898), Ss. 544-A, 382-B & 374 Murder, criminal trespass, and assault with intent to outrage modesty — Allegation of fatal assault by petitioner with a Danda, followed by trespass and physical assault upon women — Initial FIR registered under Ss. 324, 354 & 452, PPC; subsequently converted to S. 302 PPC after victim’s death — Conviction recorded by Trial Court under all charges; sentence of death under S. 302(b), PPC altered to life imprisonment by High Court — Supreme Court found multiple material doubts in the prosecution’s case — Discrepancy between complainant's statement about accomplices and absence of co-accused — Delay of over 13 hours in lodging FIR without plausible explanation — Medical evidence found inconsistent with prosecution's version of injury and manner — Prosecution failed to prove chain of events conclusively — Conviction set aside and benefit of doubt extended — Petitioner acquitted of all charges. Disposition: Appeal allowed — Judgment of High Court set aside — Petitioner acquitted of all charges under Ss. 302(b), 354 & 452, PPC — To be released if not required in any other case. (b) Criminal Trial — Appreciation of Evidence — Delay in FIR — Credibility of Witnesses Delay of 13 hours and 20 minutes in FIR without sufficient justification — Supplementary statement used to introduce two eyewitnesses whose names were not in original FIR — Such delay and subsequent additions deemed to cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s version — Supreme Court observed that if the witnesses had actually been present, their names would have been disclosed at the earliest — Testimony of complainant held to be hearsay in parts, weakening its evidentiary value — Introduction of key witnesses after substantial delay found to affect reliability and truthfulness of entire narrative. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Hassan v. The State 2024 SCMR 1427 • Tariq Parvez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 • Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 (c) Criminal Trial — Motive — Vague and Unsubstantiated Motive Weakening Prosecution Case Prosecution claimed dispute over house as motive — No documentary evidence or independent testimony produced to substantiate existence or intensity of dispute — Mere assertion of motive unsupported by credible material held insufficient — High Court also noted absence of corroboration — Inconsistent or vague motive considered inadequate to support conviction. Held: Failure to prove motive casts doubt on prosecution's narrative — Where motive is set up but not established, benefit must go to accused.

Summary: (a) Criminal Law: --- Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(ii), 452 --- Murder, attempted murder, trespass --- Commutation of death sentence --- The appellant was convicted for Qatl-e-Amd (murder) under Section 302(b) PPC on three counts for the murder of two women and an unborn child and was sentenced to death on all three counts. Additionally, he was convicted under Sections 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(ii), and 452 PPC for causing injuries to two other individuals and for trespassing. The trial court's conviction was upheld by the High Court. Held, while the prosecution proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the two murders and the injuries, the conviction for the death of the unborn child was set aside due to the non-framing of a charge for this distinct offence. The omission to frame a charge under Section 233 Cr.P.C. rendered the trial defective for this count, violating the fundamental right to a fair trial. Consequently, the conviction for the unborn child's death was set aside. Further, considering mitigating factors, including the absence of premeditation and the failure to prove motive, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. (b) Criminal Procedure: --- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898), Ss. 221-240, 342 --- Right to fair trial --- Defective charge framing --- Impact on conviction --- A separate charge must be framed for each distinct offence under Sections 221-240 Cr.P.C.. The failure to frame a charge for the alleged murder of the unborn child deprived the accused of a proper opportunity to defend himself, constituting a substantial illegality that vitiated the trial in respect of that count. Held, a person cannot be convicted for an offence for which they were not charged. The prosecution's failure to frame a charge violated the principles of natural justice and the procedural safeguards enshrined in Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, necessitating the setting aside of the conviction for the unborn child’s death. (c) Constitutional Law: --- Art. 10-A --- Right to a fair trial --- Due process in criminal trials --- The right to a fair trial and due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, requires that an accused be made fully aware of the charges against them and be given an opportunity to present a defense. Held, failing to frame a charge for the unborn child's death and not confronting the accused with the specific allegation under Section 342 Cr.P.C. amounted to a denial of this constitutional guarantee, rendering the conviction unsustainable. (d) Sentencing: --- Murder trial --- Commutation of death sentence --- Consideration of mitigating factors --- The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to the presence of mitigating factors, including the absence of premeditation, the failure to prove motive, and the circumstances suggesting a sudden altercation rather than a planned murder. Held, courts must ensure that the punishment is proportionate to the circumstances of the offence, and where reasonable doubt exists regarding premeditation, capital punishment should not be imposed. The principle that an unsubstantiated motive benefits the accused was reaffirmed. (e) Disposition: Appeal partly allowed. Death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. Conviction for the unborn child’s death set aside. Other sentences remain unchanged.

Summary: Acquittal granted----Background: The appellant was convicted by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Mirpurkhas for offences under Sections 452 PPC, and was acquitted for charges under Sections 376 and 511 PPC. The conviction led to a sentence of three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000, with a default sentence of four months of simple imprisonment. The appellant was accused of forcibly entering the complainant's house and attempting to commit rape, but during the trial, the evidence for Sections 376 and 511 PPC was found insufficient, leading to his acquittal on these charges. However, he was convicted for the offence under Section 452 PPC. ----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant under Section 452 PPC. 2- Whether the compromise reached between the parties can lead to the appellant's acquittal despite the non-compoundable nature of the offence. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Compromise Between Parties: The complainant and the appellant stated that they had settled their differences through community intervention and no longer wished to pursue the case against each other. State's Position: The Additional Prosecutor General acknowledged the complainant's unwillingness to continue prosecuting the appellant but highlighted that the offence under Section 452 PPC is non-compoundable. ---Court's Reasoning: The court recognized the prolonged agony faced by the appellant due to the trial and appeal process. Noting the superior courts' guidance that, in some situations, parties may be allowed to live peacefully even in non-compoundable offences, the court deemed it appropriate to consider the compromise and settle the matter in the interest of justice. The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment dated 18-08-2017 to the extent of the appellant's conviction under Section 452 PPC. The appellant was acquitted of the charge, and his bail bond was canceled, and surety discharged. -----Citations/Precedents: Ashiq Solangi and another vs. The State (PLD 2008 Karachi 420) Aamir and 2 others vs. The State and another (2011 MLD 1468 [Lahore]) Ghulam Shabbir and 2 others vs. The State (2003 SCMR 663) Ali Raza and another vs. The State and another (PLD 2013 Lahore 651) Tasawar Hussain vs. The State and another (2021 YLR Note 124 [Islamabad]) Muhammad Jamil and others vs. The State and another (2013 P Cr. L J 1458 [Lahore])

Summary: Acquittal granted----Background: The appellants, were convicted of murder and other charges under sections 302-B, 324, 452, and 148 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, by the Anti-Terrorism Court-I, Multan. The Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment but maintained the other convictions. The appellants and the complainants filed appeals before the Supreme Court, challenging both the conviction and the acquittal of co-accused, as well as seeking enhancement of the sentences. -----Issues: 1- Were the convictions justified based on the evidence presented? ----2- Was the acquittal of the co-accused appropriate, considering the lack of independent corroboration? ----3- Did the discrepancies in the prosecution's case create reasonable doubt, warranting acquittal of the appellants? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court acquitted Hazaray Khan and Muhammad Sadiq, finding several key inconsistencies and flaws in the prosecution's case. The Court noted that while multiple weapons were allegedly recovered from the appellants, no forensic analysis was conducted to link the weapons to the crime scene. Additionally, the complainant, who was closely related to all the victims and claimed to have witnessed the incident, did not suffer any injuries despite the alleged indiscriminate firing by the accused. His detailed attribution of firearm injuries to specific accused also raised doubts about his presence at the crime scene. The Court further highlighted the failure to produce key witnesses, such as Mukhtiar Ahmed and the injured victims, leading to the presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, that these witnesses would not have supported the prosecution's case. The testimony of the remaining witnesses was found to be inconsistent and tainted by dishonest improvements. Given the material contradictions, lack of independent corroboration, and failure to conclusively link the appellants to the crime, the Court extended the benefit of the doubt to the accused. The appellants were acquitted, and the appeals seeking enhancement of their sentences were dismissed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 452--- House trespass by armed accused---Compromise between parties---Effect---Appellant was convicted under S.452, P.P.C. for forcibly entering the complainant's house with co-accused and attempting to commit rape---Trial Court acquitted the appellant of charges under Ss.376 & 511, P.P.C. but convicted him under S.452, P.P.C.---Complainant/victim appeared before Appellate Court stating she had resolved the matter amicably and no longer wished to prosecute the accused---Offence under S.452, P.P.C. being non-compoundable---Held, while offence is statutorily non-compoundable, superior courts have recognized that courts may accept compromise in such cases to promote harmony and avoid protracted litigation when complainant expresses no intent to continue prosecution---Appellant had already faced trial and appeal proceedings for eight years---In view of compromise and settled precedents, conviction set aside and appellant acquitted.----Cited Cases: • Ashiq Solangi and another v. The State PLD 2008 Kar. 420• Aamir and 2 others v. The State and another 2011 MLD 1468• Ghulam Shabbir and 2 others v. The State 2003 SCMR 663• Ali Raza and another v. The State and another PLD 2013 Lah. 651• Tasawar Hussain v. The State and another 2021 YLR Note 124 [Islamabad]• Muhammad Akram v. The State 1995 MLD 1826• Mst. Mussarat Elahi alias Bibi v. The State 1997 PCr.LJ 1193• Ghulam Ali v. The State 1997 SCMR 1411• Muhammad Jamil and others v. The State and another 2013 PCr.LJ 1458

Summary: Acquittal granted --- Appellants Amanullah and Parvez were convicted under section 302(b) PPC for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with additional charges under sections 324, 452, 34 PPC, etc., for an incident dated August 19, 2016. The prosecution alleged that the appellants, armed with deadly weapons, entered the complainant's house and fired shots, resulting in the death of Mst.Gul Fareena and Jamil Ahmad, and injuring others.--- Issue:The central issue was the validity of the convictions and sentences based on the evidence presented.---- Holding:The Peshawar High Court acquitted the appellants of all charges, granting them the benefit of doubt due to significant inconsistencies and gaps in the prosecution's case.---Reasoning:The Court's decision was based on several key findings:Eyewitness Presence: The presence of alleged eyewitnesses at the crime scene was not credibly established, casting doubt on their accounts.---Identification of Accused: The prosecution failed to convincingly explain how the appellants were identified during the nighttime incident.---Recovery and Forensic Evidence: The court found the recovery of weapons and cartridge cases (empties) and their forensic analysis inconclusive in linking the appellants to the crime.----Motive and Withheld Witnesses: The motive presented by the prosecution was found to be unsubstantiated, and the non-presentation of crucial witnesses raised questions about the completeness of the evidence.---Inconsistencies and Procedural Lapses: The court noted various inconsistencies and procedural lapses in the prosecution's case, such as the misalignment of charges and the accused's actions, and the delayed forensic analysis of recovered evidence.---- Citations and Precedents Relied Upon:Sufyan Nawaz and another vs. The State and others, 2020 SCMR 192: Highlighted the importance of the credibility of eyewitness presence.Abdul Jabbar and another vs. The State, 2019 SCMR 129: Discussed the impact of a single loophole in the prosecution's case on the accused's right to benefit of doubt.Usman alias Kaloo vs. The State, 2017 SCMR 622: Emphasized the significance of accurate assailant identification in nighttime incidents.Mst. Asia Bibi vs. The State and others, PLD 2019 Supreme Court 64: Addressed discrepancies between the complainant's examination-in-chief and the lodged complaint.Nawab Siraj Ali and others vs. The State through A.G. Sindh, 2023 SCMR 16: Discussed the evidentiary value of crime empties and weapons sent jointly to the Forensic Science Laboratory.Muneer Malik and others vs. The State through P.G. Sindh, 2022 SCMR 14934: Addressed the inadmissibility of evidence due to delayed forensic analysis.Saghir Ahmad vs. The State and others, 2023 SCMR 241, and Khalid Mehmood alias Khaloo vs. The State, 2022 SCMR 1148: Reiterated that any doubt in the prosecution's case should be resolved in favor of the accused.----Significance:This decision reinforces the principle that the accused must be given the benefit of doubt in the face of uncertain, inconsistent, or incomplete prosecution evidence, adhering to the cornerstone of criminal justice that it is better for many guilty persons to be acquitted than for one innocent person to be wrongfully convicted.