Summary: Sentence upheld --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor---FIR initially lodged against unknown accused---Subsequent nomination through supplementary statement---Effect---Minor girl was abducted from a public place by a person riding a motorcycle---Informant initially lodged FIR against unknown accused and gave description of the culprit and motorcycle used in commission of offence---Petitioner was subsequently nominated when witnesses informed the complainant that they had seen the minor in the company of petitioner shortly after the abduction---Held, that non-nomination of petitioner in the FIR, in the peculiar circumstances, reflected bona fides of the informant---Had there been any ulterior motive, ill-will or previous enmity, the informant could have nominated petitioner at the first instance---Subsequent nomination, on the basis of information received from witnesses, was natural and consistent with ordinary human conduct. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Delay in lodging FIR---Explanation furnished---Effect---FIR was lodged with delay of about six hours---Informant explained that after occurrence he remained engaged in searching for the missing child, informing police and making public announcements for tracing her---Held, that delay in lodging FIR was satisfactorily explained---Conduct of informant was natural in the circumstances and did not adversely affect prosecution case. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Last seen evidence---Independent witness---Minor seen with accused shortly after abduction---Evidentiary value---Witness deposed that shortly after abduction he saw petitioner taking the minor towards his house on motorcycle and later saw petitioner in a disturbed condition carrying a bag on motorcycle---Witness was independent and unrelated to complainant or deceased---No previous enmity, motive or ill-will was elicited during cross-examination---Held, that testimony of last seen witness was consistent, confidence-inspiring and worthy of reliance---Close proximity of time between abduction and deceased being seen with petitioner provided strong corroboration to prosecution case. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Recovery-related circumstance---Dead body recovered from bag---Independent witness---Corroborative value---Witness stated that he saw a bag fall from petitioner’s motorcycle and, when petitioner did not stop, the bag was opened and the dead body of the minor was found therein---Witness was independent and no motive for false implication was established---Held, that such testimony materially corresponded with last seen evidence and provided further assurance to prosecution case---Inter se consistency between independent witnesses strengthened the chain of circumstances against petitioner. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Art. 122---Facts especially within knowledge of accused---Last seen theory---Duty to explain---Scope---Where prosecution established that deceased was last seen alive in company of accused, accused was expected to explain how and when he parted company with deceased---Held, that Art.122 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not shift the general burden of proof in criminal trial, which remains upon prosecution---However, where facts are especially within knowledge of accused, failure to offer a plausible explanation may constitute an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence---Petitioner’s failure to furnish a satisfactory explanation further strengthened prosecution case. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Last seen theory---Conviction not to be based solely thereon---Requirement of supporting circumstances---Held, that last seen theory is an important link in the chain of circumstances, but conviction cannot rest solely upon such theory---Court must examine the prosecution case as a whole, including circumstances preceding and following the point when deceased was last seen with accused---In the present case, last seen evidence was supported by independent recovery-related evidence, medical evidence and DNA evidence, forming a complete chain against petitioner. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Medical evidence---Sexual assault and murder of minor---Post-mortem examination and forensic sampling---Effect---Medical officer conducted post-mortem examination and secured necessary samples for chemical and forensic analysis---Medical evidence established that the minor had been subjected to sexual assault and thereafter murdered by smothering---Held, that medical evidence materially supported the prosecution version and corroborated other circumstances relied upon against petitioner. (h) Criminal trial--- ----DNA evidence---Scientific evidence---Identity of accused---Sexual offence---PFSA report---DNA profile obtained from samples secured from deceased was found consistent with DNA profile of petitioner---Held, that DNA evidence, due to its scientific accuracy and conclusiveness, is regarded as a strong corroborative piece of evidence, particularly in cases involving sexual offences---DNA report connected petitioner with commission of offence and strongly corroborated prosecution case. Cited Cases: • Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain • Salman Akram Raja case 2013 SCMR 203 • Atif Zareef and others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 550 (i) Criminal trial--- ----Circumstantial evidence---Complete chain---Capital sentence---Standard of proof---Held, that conviction, even in cases involving capital punishment, may be based on circumstantial evidence if circumstances form a complete and unbroken chain excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence---Each circumstance must be independently proved and must be interlinked with other proved circumstances---In the present case, cumulative effect of last seen evidence, recovery-related circumstance, medical evidence and DNA evidence formed a complete chain consistent only with guilt of petitioner and incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Cited Cases: • Khurshid v. The State PLD 1996 SC 305 • Munawar Hussain v. Imran Waseem 2013 SCMR 374 (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 340(2) & 342---Statement of accused---Bare denial---Failure to appear as witness or produce defence evidence---Effect---Petitioner neither appeared as witness under S.340(2), Cr.P.C. nor produced defence evidence---His statement under S.342, Cr.P.C. was a bare denial---Held, that such bare denial, being not on oath and not subject to cross-examination, did not rebut prosecution evidence after prosecution had established a prima facie case through reliable circumstantial and scientific evidence. (k) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Sentence---Death penalty---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor---No mitigating circumstance---Deterrence---Petitioner abducted a minor girl, subjected her to sexual assault and murdered her---Held, that offences were of extreme brutality and no leniency was warranted---Although accused is favourite child of law, Court also owes duty to society and legal heirs of victim---Sentence must be proportionate to gravity of offence and serve as deterrence---Death sentence awarded by Trial Court and confirmed by High Court was maintained. Disposition: Jail petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Convictions and sentences awarded by Trial Court under Ss.302(b), 364-A and 376, P.P.C., and confirmed by Lahore High Court, were maintained.

Summary: Sentence upheld --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Kidnapping, rape and murder of minor girl---Circumstantial evidence---Last seen evidence---Sufficiency---Minor deceased aged about 5/6 years was abducted in broad daylight from a bazaar---F.I.R. was initially lodged against an unknown culprit, but accused was later nominated through supplementary statement on information supplied by independent witnesses who had seen the deceased in his company on motorcycle shortly after abduction and later saw accused in perplexed condition loading a bag on his motorcycle---Another independent witness saw a bag fall from accused’s motorcycle in evening hours, and on opening the same found dead body of minor girl inside---Supreme Court held that last seen evidence, when read with subsequent conduct of accused, recovery of dead body, medical evidence and forensic material, constituted a complete and coherent chain of circumstances, consistent only with guilt of accused and incompatible with any hypothesis of innocence---Conviction was rightly maintained. (b) First Information Report---Delay in lodging F.I.R.---Effect---Occurrence took place at about 3:00 p.m. whereas F.I.R. was lodged after about six hours---Informant explained that immediately after abduction he remained busy in tracing abducted child, informed police, and made mosque announcements in nearby localities---Held, delay stood plausibly and satisfactorily explained and, in peculiar circumstances of case, did not detract from prosecution version---Omission to nominate accused in first instance rather reflected bona fides of informant, for had there been prior enmity or ulterior motive, accused could conveniently have been named in F.I.R. itself. (c) Criminal trial---Last seen theory---Scope and evidentiary value---Independent witness saw deceased shortly after abduction in company of accused while accused was taking her inside his house on motorcycle---Same witness later noticed accused near his house in perplexed condition loading a bag on his motorcycle---Another witness subsequently saw bag fall from accused’s motorcycle and dead body of deceased was recovered therefrom---Held, last seen evidence is an important link in chain of circumstantial evidence and may warrant expectation from accused to explain how and when he parted company with deceased---Though conviction cannot rest solely on last seen theory, it may safely be relied upon where prosecution case as a whole furnishes strong corroboration and circumstances preceding and following such sighting point unerringly towards guilt of accused. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)----Art. 122---Fact especially within knowledge of accused---Burden of explanation---Where prosecution by cogent evidence established that minor victim was last seen alive in company of accused, it became incumbent upon accused to explain what transpired thereafter---Held, Art.122 does not shift legal burden of proof from prosecution, but where accused fails to explain facts within his special knowledge, such failure may constitute an additional link in chain of circumstantial evidence---In present case, accused failed to furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation, which further strengthened prosecution case. (e) Medical evidence---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor girl---Proof---Medical officer noticed multiple ante-mortem injuries on the body of deceased and found clear signs of recent sexual violence---Cause of death was opined to be asphyxia due to smothering---Held, medical evidence fully corroborated prosecution case regarding sexual assault upon minor deceased followed by her murder. (f) Forensic science---DNA evidence---Evidentiary value---Punjab Forensic Science Agency report showed that DNA profile obtained from biological samples secured from body of deceased matched DNA profile of accused---Held, DNA evidence, due to its scientific accuracy and conclusiveness, is regarded as gold standard for establishing identity of accused and constitutes one of the strongest corroborative pieces of evidence, particularly in sexual offence cases---Such forensic evidence provided highly incriminating corroboration against accused. Cited Cases: Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain. Salman Akram Raja case 2013 SCMR 203. Atif Zareef and others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 550. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss. 342 & 340(2)---Statement of accused---Effect of bare denial---Accused neither appeared as witness under S.340(2), Cr.P.C. nor produced any defence evidence---He merely denied prosecution allegations in statement under S.342, Cr.P.C.---Held, bare denial, being not on oath and not tested through cross-examination, does not by itself rebut prosecution evidence or discharge burden arising once prosecution establishes a prima facie case through complete circumstantial chain. (h) Circumstantial evidence---Principles for conviction in capital cases---Held, conviction, even involving capital punishment, may safely be based on circumstantial evidence provided each circumstance is independently proved and all proved circumstances form an unbroken chain excluding every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence---In present case, chain comprising abduction, last seen evidence, accused’s suspicious conduct, throwing of bag containing dead body, medical evidence and DNA evidence was complete beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. Cited Cases: Khurshid v. The State PLD 1996 SC 305. Munawar Hussain v. Imran Waseem 2013 SCMR 374. (i) Sentencing---Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Death sentence---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor girl of 5/6 years---Principles---Accused abducted minor girl in daylight from open bazaar, subjected her to brutal sexual violence, murdered her, placed dead body in sack and disposed of it---Held, such acts were brutal and gruesome in extreme and called for no leniency---Sentence must serve purposes of retribution, deterrence and, where possible, reformation, but in case of such heinous offences death sentence was justified to act as deterrent and to protect peace, tranquillity and harmony of society---Convictions and sentences awarded by Trial Court and maintained by High Court were upheld. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and jail petition was dismissed; convictions and sentences of death under Ss. 302(b), 364-A and 376, P.P.C., as maintained by the High Court, were upheld. I can also make it even more “website-safe” by replacing “rape and murder” in the headings with “sexual assault and murder” throughout.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.376---Carnal intercourse with wife---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Medico Legal Report---Negative DNA Report---Benefit of doubt---Case of further inquiry---Criminal case was registered by wife alleging commission of sodomy with her by her husband/accused---Validity---Complainant alleged in FIR that she had been repeatedly subjected to carnal intercourse by accused/her husband---Such version of complainant was negated by Medico Legal Report as allegation of committing unnatural offence by accused could only be corroborated by medical evidence---Medico Legal Report was in direct conflict with the version of complainant and had reduced its veracity almost to a non-entity---DNA report in such respect was also negative---Benefit of doubt could be extended to accused even while deciding pre-arrest bail application---Investigation to the extent of accused was complete and there was no allegation of his misusing concession of ad interim bail already granted to him---Pre-arrest bail was allowed in circumstances. Khair Muhammad and another v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2021 SCMR 130; Adeel Manzoo v. The State and others 2023 SCMR 967; Fahad Hussain and another v. The State through Prosecutor General Sindh 2023 SCMR 364; Khalil Ahmed Soomro v. The State PLD 2017 SC 730; Shahzada Qaiser Arfat alias Qaiser v. The State and another PLD 2021 SC 708; Abdul Rehman v. The State and others 2023 SCMR 2081; Saad Zia v. The State and others 2023 SCMR 1898 and Muhammad Aziz alias Mana v. The State and others 2023 SCMR 1773 rel. M. Imran Asmat Chaudhry for Petitioner. Hafiz Asghar, DPG with Arusa, Inspector for the State. Rana M. Raza for the Complainant.

Summary: Per Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J; Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, J, Agreeing; Salahuddin Panhwar, J, dissenting. (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 376 & 496-B---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103---Rape and fornication---Re-appraisal of evidence---Delay of 7 months in registration of FIR---Consenting party---Recovery of weapon---Non-associating witness to recovery of weapon---Effect---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for committing rape with complainant / alleged victim and was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years---Validity---After the occurrence, complainant / alleged victim came back to her house where her brother and other family members were admittedly living but she remained mum for almost 07 months---Long silence of complainant / alleged victim for a period of 07 months spoke volumes against her conduct---Story narrated by complainant / alleged victim with the delay of 07 months regarding forcible rape could not be relied upon blindly---Pistol was allegedly recovered on the pointing out of accused but the same was not used during the occurrence---Pistol was recovered from a residential house and no witness of the locality was associated during recovery proceedings, which was violative of the provisions of Section 103, Cr.P.C., therefore, such recovery could not be relied upon---It was not a case of rape as envisaged under Section 376, P.P.C. rather it was a case of fornication i.e. zina with consent, punishable under Section 496-B, P.P.C.---Supreme Court was conscious of the fact that once it was held that it was a case of fornication punishable under Section 496-B, P.P.C. then complainant / alleged victim was also liable to be proceeded against and punished as an accused of the offence of illicit intercourse with consent---Supreme Court did not punish the complainant / alleged victim at this present stage without providing her opportunity of defence, as she had not been challaned by Police and no charge of fornication under Section 496-B, P.P.C. was framed against her by Trial Court, and she had no opportunity to defend herself---Supreme Court modified conviction and sentence of accused under Section 376, P.P.C. to one under Section 496-B, P.P.C. and sentenced him to imprisonment for five years along with fine---Appeal was disposed of. [Majority View] Muhammad Sharif v. The State 2006 SCMR 1170; Ijaz Ahmed v. The State 2010 SCMR 141; Amir Muhammad v. The State 2007 SCMR 452 and Muhammad Shabbir v. The State 1992 SCMR 2063 rel. Per Salahuddin Panhwar, J. dissenting: (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 376---Rape---DNA sample---Buccal swab standards---Preservation---It would be a fallacy to only focus on preservation period of Buccal swab standards alone, to examine its authenticity---It is the DNA extracted from Buccal swab standards which can stay for years---Period of approximately 1 ½ year after collection of swabs does not seem as a period which can discredit evidentiary value of such DNA in given circumstances. Mehboob Ahmad v. The State 1999 SCMR 1102; Zahid and another v. The State 2020 SCMR 590 and Guidelines for Evidence Collection, Preservation and Transportation-PFSA rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 376 & 496-B---Rape and fornication---Re-appraisal of evidence---Delay of 7 months in registration of FIR---Consenting party---Proof, absence of---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for committing rape with complainant / alleged victim and was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years---Validity---Fornication is distinct from Section 376 P.P.C., which means that it is concerned with the act which is not consensual and it is against the will of the person who is the victim of such offense---Modification of offence was not justified, unless element of consent was established through independent and cogent evidence and not merely on the basis of assumptions or surmises---Accused was not initially charged with Section 496-B, P.P.C. and was charged under Section 376, P.P.C.---His Lordship declined to modify conviction under Section 376, P.P.C. to a conviction under Section 496-B, P.P.C. just to reduce sentence of accused---Such modification of conviction would be against the basic principles of law which stated that to convict a person under a particular offense all ingredients of that offense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt---This Lordship declined to interfere in conviction and sentence awarded to accused by Trial Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused. Irfan Ali Sher v. The State PLD 2020 SC 295; Sher Afzal v. The State 2025 SCMR 894 and Quran, (17:70) (Al-Isra-iil) rel. Syed Muhammad Tayyab Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Sajjad Hussain Bhatti, DPG Punjab for the State. Date of hearing: 2nd December, 2025.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 376 & 496-B---Rape versus fornication (zina with consent)---Scope and distinction---Petitioner was convicted by Trial Court under S.376 PPC and sentenced to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment with compensation---High Court upheld conviction---Supreme Court examined whether allegation constituted rape or consensual illicit intercourse---Delay of about seven months in lodging FIR without plausible explanation---Alleged occurrence near residential area but no hue and cry raised---No resistance offered by complainant---No marks of violence found on body---Clothes of complainant neither torn nor produced---Medical evidence did not corroborate allegation of forcible rape---Conduct of complainant in remaining silent for long period after alleged occurrence found unnatural---Held, prosecution failed to prove element of force or compulsion necessary to constitute offence of rape under S.376 PPC---Evidence, however, established commission of illicit sexual intercourse---Case held to be one of fornication (zina with consent) punishable under S.496-B PPC and not rape. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 496-B---Fornication---Proof---Evidence of complainant regarding sexual intercourse remained unshaken and confidence inspiring---Medical evidence supported prosecution to extent of sexual intercourse---Held, prosecution proved offence of fornication beyond reasonable doubt against accused. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 238(2)---Conviction for minor offence---Charge framed for major offence of rape---Evidence disclosed commission of minor offence of fornication---Held, accused could be convicted for minor offence though not specifically charged for same---Principle affirmed that conviction for minor offence is permissible where facts establish such offence. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 103---Recovery proceedings---Alleged recovery of pistol on pointation of accused from residential house---No independent witness of locality associated---Recovery held violative of mandatory provisions of S.103 Cr.P.C. and thus unreliable. (e) Criminal trial ----Delay in lodging FIR---Effect---Unexplained delay of seven months in reporting alleged rape---Held, such delay, in circumstances of case, seriously impaired credibility of prosecution version. (f) Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 and Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 2006 ----Substitution of offences---Offence of zina with consent under S.10(2) of Ordinance substituted by offence of fornication under S.496-B PPC---Principles laid down in earlier cases under Hudood laws held applicable. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Sharif v. The State 2006 SCMR 1170 • Ijaz Ahmed v. The State 2010 SCMR 141 • Amir Muhammad v. The State 2007 SCMR 452 • Muhammad Shabbir v. The State 1992 SCMR 2063 Disposition: By majority of 2:1, Criminal Petition was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentence of petitioner under S.376 PPC were set aside and petitioner was acquitted of charge of rape; petitioner was instead convicted under S.496-B PPC and sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/- or in default two months’ simple imprisonment. (Justice Salahuddin Panhwar dissenting; leave refused by dissent).

Summary: ----S.376---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S.7(3)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Quashing of FIR---Rape---Necessary ingredients, absence of---Revoking of divorce---Petitioner / accused and respondent / complainant were husband and wife inter se---Respondent / complainant got FIR registered on the allegation that after divorce petitioner / accused had raped her on gun point---Petitioner sought quashing of FIR on the plea that he had already revoked divorce prior to its becoming effective and claimed that respondent / complainant was his lawful wife---Validity---Petitioner / accused admitted that he had strained relations with respondent / wife and divorced her through written Divorce Deed dated 14-10-2024---Petitioner / accused sent notice of such pronouncement to Chairman of Union Council concerned under S.7(1) of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 through registered post on the same date---Petitioner/accused employed the form of Talaq-ul Bidaat but before expiry of 90days period contemplated by S.7(3) of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 he had submitted a written revocation to the Chairman through registered post on 23-12-2024---Such facts were not disputed by the State or respondent / complainant---Petitioner/accused revoked pronouncement within the statutory window of time, therefore, divorce did not take effect, and the marriage continued to subsist in the eyes of law---Marital bond between petitioner/accused and respondent/complainant existed in law at the time of alleged occurrence---Conduct of petitioner could be considered immoral or inappropriate under religious or social norms, but he could not be prosecuted under S.376, P.P.C. on the facts pleaded in FIR, as the essential ingredients of the offence were not disclosed---High Court does not exercise jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution to quash criminal proceedings where matter requires determination of disputed facts or appraisal of evidence---Where allegations in FIR, taken at their face value, do not disclose essential legal ingredients of offence, or where continuation of proceedings amounts to abuse of process, High Court may exercise its jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice---High Court quashed the FIR registered against petitioner/accused as essential ingredient of S.376, P.P.C. was not attracted---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances. Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Yusuf PLD 1963 SC 51; Abdul Mannan v. Safuran Nessa 1970 SCMR 845; Muhammad Salahuddin Khan v. Muhammad Nazir Siddiqi and others 1984 SCMR 583; Malik Javid Ali and another v. Abdul Kadir and another 1987 SCMR 518; Allah Dad v. Mukhtar and another 1992 SCMR 1273; Mst. Zahida Shaheen and another v. The State and another 1994 SCMR 2098; Mst. Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Muhammad and another PLD 1993 SC 901; Mst. Fahmida Bibi v. Mukhtar Ahmad and another PLD 1972 Lah. 694; Almas Mubashar v. Mubashar Hanif PLD 2014 Lah. 494; Fawad Ahsan and another v. Chairman, Arbitration Council, and another PLD 2017 Isl. 364; Muhammad Afzal Khan v. Chairman Arbitration Council, and another 2018 CLC 1125; Princess Aiysha Yasmeen Abbasi v. Maqbool Hussain Qureshi and others PLD 1979 Lah. 241; Mst. Sana Shehzad v. Secretary Union Council No.81 and others PLD 2014 Lah. 632; Muhammad Shahbaz Ahmad v. Sher Muhammad and another 1987 CLC 1496; Abdul Rashid and others v. SHO, Police Station Saddar Renala and others 1995 PCr.LJ 1247; Mst. Shamshad Mai v. Chairman Arbitration Council, Ahmedpur East, District Bahawalpur, and others 2000 MLD 173; Mst. Ambreen Shah v. Chairman, Union (Arbitration) Council/Administrator, Union Committee, and others 2002 MLD 778; Najaat Welfare Foundation v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 FSC 1; Gulzar Ahmad and another v. Ayesha Naz Sarwar and others 2022 CLC 675; Mst. Mumtaz Bibi v. Qasim and others PLD 2022 Isl. 228; Mahnoor Shabbir v. Additional District Judge and others 2024 CLC 513 and Mst. Mussarat Fayyaz and others v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 2025 FSC 18 rel. (b) Words and phrases--- ----Sin, crime and offence---Distinction---Law distinguishes between sin, crime and offence---“Sin” is a moral or religious transgression, an act considered wrong according to divine command or ethical principles, judged by one’s faith or conscience---Consequences of “sin” are spiritual or moral, such as guilt or divine punishment---In contrast, under the statutory framework of Pakistan, a “crime” is an act or omission that is made punishable by law---“Crime” is a public wrong that affects society at large, and offender may be punished by death, imprisonment, fine or other legal penalties---Courts established under the Constitution adjudicate only statutory offences and do not concern themselves with moral or religious conduct---Term “offence” is a technical expression that refers to any act (or omission) that violates the law---“Offence” encompasses both regulatory violations, such as traffic infractions and serious penal acts like murder---“Offence” is a broader concept than “crime”, the latter being generally reserved for serious offences involving public wrongs---Every crime is an offence, but not every offence amounts to a crime in this sense---Under Shariah, crime is an act prohibited by divine injunction and punishable with Hadd or Ta’zir penalties. Tariq Mahmood Khan for Petitioner. Zafar Iqbal Awan, Additional Advocate General with Shabbir, SI for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4. Respondent No. 5 in person. Nemo for Respondent No. 6. Amicus curiae: Syed Zeeshan Haider. Date of hearing: 14th November, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 376, 377, 342, 506 & 34---Rape, unnatural offence, wrongful confinement, criminal intimidation, common intention---Bail, dismissal of---Allegations of abduction and unnatural offence were levelled against the accused/petitioner---Apparently the FIR suffered a delay of almost twenty-seven days---Perusal of the document revealed that complainant, a teenage boy, reported the egregious incident on 02-07-2025 and had justified the said lapse of time by stating that he was under serious threat extended by the accused/petitioner---Keeping the said statement of the victimized boy, the record of the case was examined---During the perusal of record, statement of witness caught the attention---Said witness had corroborated the statement of victim boy regarding the alleged intimidation for taking leverage---Said witness also stated about some video recording of the alleged abhorrent incident and the alleged threat of the accused/petitioner for displaying the same on social media---Regarding abduction for un-natural lust, the statement of the victim was corroborated by the witness---There was prima facie evidence of abduction and un-natural offence on record and offence under S. 367-A, P.P.C provided capital punishment---Delay in lodging of the report was explained by the complainant and same was corroborated by the witness---Other point regarding age of the accused/petitioner was not convincing---Keeping in view the particular nature of the offence, point of juvenility was out of consideration---Mere fact that accused/petitioner was a juvenile could be considered in other offences, but in a case where the accused was charged for un-natural offence and prima facie evidence supported the allegation, it would be erroneous to declare the accused a juvenile---Without recording and discussing this point any further, lest the Trial Court would get influenced, the matter was left at the discretion of Trial Court---However, keeping in view the gravity of offences, the accused/petitioner could not be granted benefit of him being one year below the age of adulthood at this stage---Bail application being devoid of merits was dismissed, in circumstances. Umair v. The State 2021 MLD 527 and Farman Ali v. The State and another 2018 PCr.LJ 343 rel. Muntazir Abbas for Petitioner. Malik Sherbaz Khan Additional Advocate General for the State. Complainant in person along with counsel Imtiaz Huassain. Date of hearing: 29th September, 2025.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)— —S. 497—Post-arrest bail—Principles—Case of further inquiry— Accused charged under S. 376 PPC with allegation of committing zina with complainant’s daughter—DNA and medical report confirmed sexual intercourse, but medico-legal certificate disclosed no marks of violence—Victim’s statement under S. 164 Cr.P.C. raised material contradictions: FIR registered by mother who was not present at the occurrence; father and relative allegedly nearby but incident not explained satisfactorily; inconsistencies in victim’s narration during cross-examination—Held, case against accused fell within ambit of “further inquiry” under S. 497 Cr.P.C.—Where trial is delayed despite submission of challan, and accused is no longer required for investigation, bail cannot be withheld merely as punishment—Accused admitted to post-arrest bail. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)— —S. 164—Statement of victim—Evidentiary value at bail stage— Victim’s S. 164 Cr.P.C. statement being inconsistent and raising doubts regarding occurrence circumstances, coupled with absence of corroborative violence marks, constituted valid grounds for further inquiry—Statement not sufficient by itself to deny bail where contradictions and improbabilities exist—Matter left for determination at trial. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)— —S. 497—Bail—Delays in trial—Effect— Despite submission of challan in December 2024, no witness including victim examined by trial court till hearing of petition in August 2025—No plausible explanation offered by prosecution—Held, inordinate delay in trial strengthens case for bail, as bail cannot be used as pre-trial punishment. Disposition Petition converted into appeal—Allowed—Post-arrest bail granted subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 200,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of trial court.

Summary: ----S. 376---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 19---Rape of child---Appreciation of evidence---Doctrine of res gestae---Hearsay, exception to---Fact connected with fact in issue---Accused was convicted for committing rape with a minor girl of four years and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---Held: Doctrine of ‘res gastae’ has been defined under Art. 19 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 which is an exception to hearsay---Res gastae means matter incidental to the main fact explanatory of it---Requirement of res gastae is that the statement must have been made contemporaneously with the act or immediately after it and not at such an interval of time as to make it a narrative of past events---Acts which constitute or explain fact in issue are admissible as forming part of res gestea---Witness saw the victim weeping and followed her and asked the reason for weeping; the victim told him that she had been sexually abused upon by the accused---Such statement was admissible in evidence---Victim told her parents that she was feeling abdominal pain because she was subjected to rape by accused---Victim had disclosed the incident to her parents on the same date, therefore, statements of her parents were admissible under Art. 19 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Trial Court rightly relied upon both the witnesses as their statements were corroborated by that of the victim---High Court declined to interfere in conviction and sentence awarded to accused as prosecution had established its case beyond shadow of doubt and Trial Court had already taken a lenient view,as normal penalty under S. 376, P.P.C. was death---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Imran v. The State 2024 PCr.LJ 1048; Ghulam Mustafa v. The State 2024 MLD 1073; Amjad Ali v. The State 2022 PCr.LJ Note 17; Sumera v. State 2024 PCr.LJ 1783; Mst. Yasmeen v. Dr. Fahad Ahmed 2024 PCr.LJ 1881; Muhammad Hanif v. State 2003 SCMR 1237; Irfan Ali Sher v. State PLD 2020 SC 295 and Abdul Ghani v. State 2022 SCMR 544 ref. Muhammad Ayub Sherani for Appellant. Syed Kamal Hussain, State Counsel for Respondent/State. Date of hearing: 15 July, 2025.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----S. 376(3) & S. 83----Juvenile accused---Rape---Assessment of criminal capacity---Presumption of doli incapax---Standard of maturity under S.83 PPC---Held, prosecution must establish that child offender understood both the nature and penal consequences of the act---No effort made by trial court or prosecution to assess petitioner's maturity or rebut statutory presumption---Absence of psychological evaluation renders conviction unsafe---Petitioner, aged 13 at time of occurrence, not shown to possess criminal maturity to justify conviction under S.376 PPC---Conviction set aside. The Supreme Court held that Section 83 PPC introduces a rebuttable presumption that a child between ten and fourteen years lacks criminal capacity unless it is proven otherwise. In the instant case, no meaningful inquiry was conducted into the petitioner’s cognitive understanding of the nature or legal consequences of the act. The trial proceeded in a mechanical manner without any psychological assessment, in disregard of Pakistan’s obligations under the UNCRC and the protections envisaged under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018. The Court emphasized that in the absence of any rebuttal to the statutory presumption under Section 83 PPC, the conviction was unsustainable. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Arts. 25(2), 35----Protection of children---Juvenile justice---State's obligation to protect minors---Interpretation in light of UNCRC and domestic legislation---Held, JJSA, 2018 is not decorative but a binding statutory commitment to treat juveniles with care, dignity, and developmental sensitivity---Children are not little adults---Trial court failed to uphold the reformative purpose of juvenile justice laws. The Court reaffirmed the constitutional duty of the State under Articles 25(2) and 35 to protect children and to enact special provisions for their welfare. Referring to the UNCRC and General Comment No. 24 (2019), the Court stressed that cognitive and emotional immaturity in juveniles necessitates a distinct justice approach. The Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 was recognized as a substantive law that mandates child-sensitive treatment of juvenile offenders, which was absent in the petitioner’s trial. (c) Criminal trial----Appreciation of evidence---Contradictions in ocular account---Unexplained delay in medical examination---Failure to collect forensic evidence---Held, serious doubts arose due to inconsistent statements of eyewitnesses, contradictions with victim’s testimony, and absence of medical or forensic corroboration---Prosecution failed to establish case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court observed glaring inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. Witnesses gave contradictory accounts regarding pursuit of the accused, and the victim’s own testimony negated the claim that she raised cries heard by the eyewitnesses. No independent witness from the locality was produced. The medical examination, conducted 30 hours after the incident, did not reveal injuries usually consistent with minor sexual assault. No semen was found, no potency test conducted, and no circumstantial evidence was recovered. These deficiencies created reasonable doubt entitling the accused to acquittal. (d) Criminal jurisprudence----Benefit of doubt---Presumption of innocence---Held, conviction cannot be sustained solely on heinousness of the charge---When doubts arise from prosecution’s own evidence, accused must be acquitted---Courts below erred by failing to properly evaluate material contradictions. The Court reiterated the foundational principle that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that despite the gravity of the offence, the contradictions in evidence, failure to collect supporting material, and lack of legal safeguards for the juvenile rendered the conviction legally unsound. The benefit of doubt must always go to the accused. (e) Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018)----Ss. 15 & Preamble----Trial of juvenile offenders---Requirement of reformative approach---Improper conduct of trial---Held, child was handcuffed, age not recorded, no psychological inquiry conducted---Such procedural lapses violate the spirit of JJSA and international law---Directions issued for circulation of judgment among all Juvenile Courts. The Supreme Court condemned the handcuffing of the minor and failure to record his age in the charge-sheet, terming it a violation of statutory and constitutional safeguards. It emphasized that all criminal forums must treat age documentation as mandatory. The judgment was directed to be circulated to all Juvenile Courts for strict guidance and compliance. Disposition: Petition converted to appeal and allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; petitioner acquitted of charge and ordered to be released forthwith. Cited Law & Instruments: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 83 & 376(3) Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, Ss. 15 & Preamble Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Arts. 25(2), 35 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) General Comment No. 24 (2019) by UN Committee on the Rights of the Child