Summary: Sentence upheld --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Murder of sister by brother---Sororicide---Nature of offence---Petitioner was convicted for committing murder of his sister, who had married complainant of her own choice many years prior to occurrence---Supreme Court observed that killing of one’s own sister was not merely a criminal act but a grave breach of family trust and moral responsibility---Such offence struck at the bond of companionship, care and protection inherent in sibling relationship and reflected a disturbing social phenomenon---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC was maintained. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Prompt FIR---Delay of one hour and ten minutes---Effect---Occurrence took place at about 12:30 p.m. and matter was reported to police at 01:40 p.m. on same day, despite police station being about 13 kilometers away---Held, that prompt reporting of FIR ruled out possibility of deliberation, consultation or fabrication---Petitioner was specifically nominated in FIR as sole accused with definite role of causing fatal firearm injury---Prompt FIR substantially supported truthfulness of prosecution version. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Identification of accused---Close familial relationship---Mistaken identity---Effect---Complainant was husband of deceased and petitioner was brother of deceased---Both parties were closely known to each other---Held, that where accused is a close relative and is specifically nominated in promptly lodged FIR, possibility of mistaken identity stands effectively excluded---No material existed to show ulterior motive or animus on part of complainant to falsely implicate petitioner while allowing real culprit to escape. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Ocular account---Natural witnesses---Presence at place of occurrence---Confidence-inspiring testimony---PW-5 complainant and PW-7 furnished ocular account of occurrence and consistently deposed that petitioner, armed with carbine, fired at deceased---Both witnesses were natural witnesses present at the place of occurrence and their presence stood established---Despite searching cross-examination, their testimony remained unshaken on material particulars---Held, that ocular account inspired confidence and was sufficient to connect petitioner with commission of offence. (e) Criminal trial--- ----Ocular account corroborated by medical evidence---Effect---Medical evidence supported mode and manner of occurrence narrated by prosecution witnesses and established that deceased died as result of firearm injury---Held, that consistency between ocular account and medical evidence reinforced prosecution narrative and rendered it cogent, reliable and confidence-inspiring---No doubt remained regarding manner of occurrence. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Motive---Marriage of own choice by deceased---Motive disbelieved---Effect on prosecution case---Prosecution alleged that petitioner bore grudge because deceased and complainant had contracted marriage of their own choice approximately seventeen years before occurrence---Held, that such motive was implausible because couple had lived together for nearly two decades and had five children without any untoward incident---Prosecution failed to produce evidence substantiating alleged motive---High Court rightly disbelieved motive. (g) Criminal trial--- ----Motive not proved---Effect where ocular account reliable---Held, that failure to prove motive did not demolish prosecution case where ocular account was confidence-inspiring and stood corroborated by medical evidence---Even after excluding motive from consideration, prosecution evidence remained sufficient to prove charge against petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. (h) Criminal trial--- ----Recovery of firearm---Forensic report showing weapon mechanically operational only---Evidentiary value---Recovery of 12-bore carbine on pointing out of petitioner was relied upon by prosecution---Forensic report merely established that weapon was mechanically operational and did not prove that fatal shot had been discharged from said firearm---Held, that High Court rightly disbelieved recovery evidence---Recovery was excluded from consideration. (i) Criminal trial--- ----Recovery disbelieved---Effect on conviction---Held, that even if recovery evidence was excluded, prosecution case could still stand where direct ocular account was reliable and corroborated by medical evidence---Benefit regarding recovery had already been afforded to petitioner, but such exclusion did not create reasonable doubt in prosecution case. (j) Criminal trial--- ----Substitution of real culprit---Close relative murdered---Principle---Held, that substitution of real culprit is a rare phenomenon, particularly where eyewitness has witnessed murder of a close relative---In such circumstances, it is highly improbable that actual offender would be allowed to escape while an innocent person is falsely implicated---Record contained no material showing complainant had reason to falsely implicate petitioner in murder of his wife and mother of his children. (k) Criminal petition for leave to appeal--- ----Concurrent conviction by Trial Court and High Court---No legal infirmity---Scope of interference---Trial Court convicted petitioner under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life with compensation under S.544-A, Cr.P.C.; High Court dismissed appeal and maintained conviction and sentence---Supreme Court found ocular account reliable, medical evidence corroborative, and conviction neither baseless nor tainted with legal infirmity---No ground existed for grant of leave to appeal. Disposition: Jail petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Conviction of petitioner under S.302(b), PPC and sentence of imprisonment for life, compensation of Rs.100,000 under S.544-A, Cr.P.C., default sentence and benefit under S.382-B, Cr.P.C. were maintained.

Summary: Sentence upheld --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor---FIR initially lodged against unknown accused---Subsequent nomination through supplementary statement---Effect---Minor girl was abducted from a public place by a person riding a motorcycle---Informant initially lodged FIR against unknown accused and gave description of the culprit and motorcycle used in commission of offence---Petitioner was subsequently nominated when witnesses informed the complainant that they had seen the minor in the company of petitioner shortly after the abduction---Held, that non-nomination of petitioner in the FIR, in the peculiar circumstances, reflected bona fides of the informant---Had there been any ulterior motive, ill-will or previous enmity, the informant could have nominated petitioner at the first instance---Subsequent nomination, on the basis of information received from witnesses, was natural and consistent with ordinary human conduct. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Delay in lodging FIR---Explanation furnished---Effect---FIR was lodged with delay of about six hours---Informant explained that after occurrence he remained engaged in searching for the missing child, informing police and making public announcements for tracing her---Held, that delay in lodging FIR was satisfactorily explained---Conduct of informant was natural in the circumstances and did not adversely affect prosecution case. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Last seen evidence---Independent witness---Minor seen with accused shortly after abduction---Evidentiary value---Witness deposed that shortly after abduction he saw petitioner taking the minor towards his house on motorcycle and later saw petitioner in a disturbed condition carrying a bag on motorcycle---Witness was independent and unrelated to complainant or deceased---No previous enmity, motive or ill-will was elicited during cross-examination---Held, that testimony of last seen witness was consistent, confidence-inspiring and worthy of reliance---Close proximity of time between abduction and deceased being seen with petitioner provided strong corroboration to prosecution case. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Recovery-related circumstance---Dead body recovered from bag---Independent witness---Corroborative value---Witness stated that he saw a bag fall from petitioner’s motorcycle and, when petitioner did not stop, the bag was opened and the dead body of the minor was found therein---Witness was independent and no motive for false implication was established---Held, that such testimony materially corresponded with last seen evidence and provided further assurance to prosecution case---Inter se consistency between independent witnesses strengthened the chain of circumstances against petitioner. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Art. 122---Facts especially within knowledge of accused---Last seen theory---Duty to explain---Scope---Where prosecution established that deceased was last seen alive in company of accused, accused was expected to explain how and when he parted company with deceased---Held, that Art.122 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not shift the general burden of proof in criminal trial, which remains upon prosecution---However, where facts are especially within knowledge of accused, failure to offer a plausible explanation may constitute an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence---Petitioner’s failure to furnish a satisfactory explanation further strengthened prosecution case. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Last seen theory---Conviction not to be based solely thereon---Requirement of supporting circumstances---Held, that last seen theory is an important link in the chain of circumstances, but conviction cannot rest solely upon such theory---Court must examine the prosecution case as a whole, including circumstances preceding and following the point when deceased was last seen with accused---In the present case, last seen evidence was supported by independent recovery-related evidence, medical evidence and DNA evidence, forming a complete chain against petitioner. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Medical evidence---Sexual assault and murder of minor---Post-mortem examination and forensic sampling---Effect---Medical officer conducted post-mortem examination and secured necessary samples for chemical and forensic analysis---Medical evidence established that the minor had been subjected to sexual assault and thereafter murdered by smothering---Held, that medical evidence materially supported the prosecution version and corroborated other circumstances relied upon against petitioner. (h) Criminal trial--- ----DNA evidence---Scientific evidence---Identity of accused---Sexual offence---PFSA report---DNA profile obtained from samples secured from deceased was found consistent with DNA profile of petitioner---Held, that DNA evidence, due to its scientific accuracy and conclusiveness, is regarded as a strong corroborative piece of evidence, particularly in cases involving sexual offences---DNA report connected petitioner with commission of offence and strongly corroborated prosecution case. Cited Cases: • Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain • Salman Akram Raja case 2013 SCMR 203 • Atif Zareef and others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 550 (i) Criminal trial--- ----Circumstantial evidence---Complete chain---Capital sentence---Standard of proof---Held, that conviction, even in cases involving capital punishment, may be based on circumstantial evidence if circumstances form a complete and unbroken chain excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence---Each circumstance must be independently proved and must be interlinked with other proved circumstances---In the present case, cumulative effect of last seen evidence, recovery-related circumstance, medical evidence and DNA evidence formed a complete chain consistent only with guilt of petitioner and incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Cited Cases: • Khurshid v. The State PLD 1996 SC 305 • Munawar Hussain v. Imran Waseem 2013 SCMR 374 (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 340(2) & 342---Statement of accused---Bare denial---Failure to appear as witness or produce defence evidence---Effect---Petitioner neither appeared as witness under S.340(2), Cr.P.C. nor produced defence evidence---His statement under S.342, Cr.P.C. was a bare denial---Held, that such bare denial, being not on oath and not subject to cross-examination, did not rebut prosecution evidence after prosecution had established a prima facie case through reliable circumstantial and scientific evidence. (k) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Sentence---Death penalty---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor---No mitigating circumstance---Deterrence---Petitioner abducted a minor girl, subjected her to sexual assault and murdered her---Held, that offences were of extreme brutality and no leniency was warranted---Although accused is favourite child of law, Court also owes duty to society and legal heirs of victim---Sentence must be proportionate to gravity of offence and serve as deterrence---Death sentence awarded by Trial Court and confirmed by High Court was maintained. Disposition: Jail petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Convictions and sentences awarded by Trial Court under Ss.302(b), 364-A and 376, P.P.C., and confirmed by Lahore High Court, were maintained.

Summary: Sentence upheld --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Kidnapping, rape and murder of minor girl---Circumstantial evidence---Last seen evidence---Sufficiency---Minor deceased aged about 5/6 years was abducted in broad daylight from a bazaar---F.I.R. was initially lodged against an unknown culprit, but accused was later nominated through supplementary statement on information supplied by independent witnesses who had seen the deceased in his company on motorcycle shortly after abduction and later saw accused in perplexed condition loading a bag on his motorcycle---Another independent witness saw a bag fall from accused’s motorcycle in evening hours, and on opening the same found dead body of minor girl inside---Supreme Court held that last seen evidence, when read with subsequent conduct of accused, recovery of dead body, medical evidence and forensic material, constituted a complete and coherent chain of circumstances, consistent only with guilt of accused and incompatible with any hypothesis of innocence---Conviction was rightly maintained. (b) First Information Report---Delay in lodging F.I.R.---Effect---Occurrence took place at about 3:00 p.m. whereas F.I.R. was lodged after about six hours---Informant explained that immediately after abduction he remained busy in tracing abducted child, informed police, and made mosque announcements in nearby localities---Held, delay stood plausibly and satisfactorily explained and, in peculiar circumstances of case, did not detract from prosecution version---Omission to nominate accused in first instance rather reflected bona fides of informant, for had there been prior enmity or ulterior motive, accused could conveniently have been named in F.I.R. itself. (c) Criminal trial---Last seen theory---Scope and evidentiary value---Independent witness saw deceased shortly after abduction in company of accused while accused was taking her inside his house on motorcycle---Same witness later noticed accused near his house in perplexed condition loading a bag on his motorcycle---Another witness subsequently saw bag fall from accused’s motorcycle and dead body of deceased was recovered therefrom---Held, last seen evidence is an important link in chain of circumstantial evidence and may warrant expectation from accused to explain how and when he parted company with deceased---Though conviction cannot rest solely on last seen theory, it may safely be relied upon where prosecution case as a whole furnishes strong corroboration and circumstances preceding and following such sighting point unerringly towards guilt of accused. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)----Art. 122---Fact especially within knowledge of accused---Burden of explanation---Where prosecution by cogent evidence established that minor victim was last seen alive in company of accused, it became incumbent upon accused to explain what transpired thereafter---Held, Art.122 does not shift legal burden of proof from prosecution, but where accused fails to explain facts within his special knowledge, such failure may constitute an additional link in chain of circumstantial evidence---In present case, accused failed to furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation, which further strengthened prosecution case. (e) Medical evidence---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor girl---Proof---Medical officer noticed multiple ante-mortem injuries on the body of deceased and found clear signs of recent sexual violence---Cause of death was opined to be asphyxia due to smothering---Held, medical evidence fully corroborated prosecution case regarding sexual assault upon minor deceased followed by her murder. (f) Forensic science---DNA evidence---Evidentiary value---Punjab Forensic Science Agency report showed that DNA profile obtained from biological samples secured from body of deceased matched DNA profile of accused---Held, DNA evidence, due to its scientific accuracy and conclusiveness, is regarded as gold standard for establishing identity of accused and constitutes one of the strongest corroborative pieces of evidence, particularly in sexual offence cases---Such forensic evidence provided highly incriminating corroboration against accused. Cited Cases: Ali Haider alias Papu v. Jameel Hussain. Salman Akram Raja case 2013 SCMR 203. Atif Zareef and others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 550. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----Ss. 342 & 340(2)---Statement of accused---Effect of bare denial---Accused neither appeared as witness under S.340(2), Cr.P.C. nor produced any defence evidence---He merely denied prosecution allegations in statement under S.342, Cr.P.C.---Held, bare denial, being not on oath and not tested through cross-examination, does not by itself rebut prosecution evidence or discharge burden arising once prosecution establishes a prima facie case through complete circumstantial chain. (h) Circumstantial evidence---Principles for conviction in capital cases---Held, conviction, even involving capital punishment, may safely be based on circumstantial evidence provided each circumstance is independently proved and all proved circumstances form an unbroken chain excluding every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence---In present case, chain comprising abduction, last seen evidence, accused’s suspicious conduct, throwing of bag containing dead body, medical evidence and DNA evidence was complete beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. Cited Cases: Khurshid v. The State PLD 1996 SC 305. Munawar Hussain v. Imran Waseem 2013 SCMR 374. (i) Sentencing---Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302(b), 364-A & 376---Death sentence---Kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of minor girl of 5/6 years---Principles---Accused abducted minor girl in daylight from open bazaar, subjected her to brutal sexual violence, murdered her, placed dead body in sack and disposed of it---Held, such acts were brutal and gruesome in extreme and called for no leniency---Sentence must serve purposes of retribution, deterrence and, where possible, reformation, but in case of such heinous offences death sentence was justified to act as deterrent and to protect peace, tranquillity and harmony of society---Convictions and sentences awarded by Trial Court and maintained by High Court were upheld. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and jail petition was dismissed; convictions and sentences of death under Ss. 302(b), 364-A and 376, P.P.C., as maintained by the High Court, were upheld. I can also make it even more “website-safe” by replacing “rape and murder” in the headings with “sexual assault and murder” throughout.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 233, 235 & 239---Separate charges for distinct offences---Joint trial---Same transaction---General rule and exceptions---Held, that S.233, Cr.P.C. embodies the general rule that every distinct offence shall carry a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately---Such rule is, however, subject to the exceptions contained in Ss.234, 235, 236 and 239, Cr.P.C.---Section 235 permits one accused to be charged and tried in one trial for multiple offences where the offences arise from one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction---Section 239(d), Cr.P.C. extends the principle to joint trial of several accused for different offences committed in the course of the same transaction---Provisions of Ss.235 and 239 are enabling and discretionary, not mandatory, because the legislature used the expression “may”---Mere legal possibility of joinder does not create a legal duty to consolidate trials. Cited Cases: • MD. Mosaddar Hoque and another v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131 • Shahadat Khan and another v. Home Secretary PLD 1969 SC 158 • Nadir Shah v. The State 1980 SCMR 402 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 235 & 239---Expression “same transaction”---Tests for determination---Continuity of action---Community of purpose or design---Causal connection---Held, that the expression “transaction” is not defined in the Code and it is for the Court to determine whether a given set of facts constitutes the “same transaction”---Tests include proximity of time and place, community of purpose or design, continuity of action and causal connection---Proximity of time and place alone is insufficient; the essential elements are community of purpose or design and continuity of action---Where offences are separable in nature, purpose and motive, they cannot automatically be treated as forming the same transaction---In the present matter, allegations relating to physical occurrence and allegations relating to later dissemination of the event were separable; former could relate to sexual gratification while the latter could relate to humiliation, degradation or blackmail---Same transaction was therefore not established. Cited Cases: • MD. Mosaddar Hoque and another v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131 • Emperor v. Datto Hanmant Shahapurkar ILR 30 Bom 49 • Babulal Chaukhani v. King Emperor 65 IA 158 • Emperor v. Sejmal Poonamchand ILR 51 Bom 310 • Ata Muhammad Khan Alvi v. Crown PLD 1950 Lahore 288 (c) Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act (XXXI of 2021)---- ----Ss. 9 & 16(4)---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss.29 & 30---Special statutes---Separate investigative and trial mechanisms---Joint trial of scheduled and non-scheduled offences---Scope of S.16(4) of Anti-Rape Act---Held, that the Anti-Rape Act and PECA are special statutes with distinct investigative and procedural regimes---Scheduled sexual offences under the Anti-Rape Act are to be investigated by Special Sexual Offences Investigation Units, whereas offences under PECA are investigated by the notified cybercrime investigation agency---Section 16(4) of the Anti-Rape Act, 2021, which provides that the Special Court “may also try” connected non-scheduled offences, is an enabling provision and must be read narrowly so as not to displace the forum and procedure contemplated by PECA---Consolidation across separate statutory regimes may raise issues of jurisdictional enlargement not expressly conferred by law. (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.175(2)---Jurisdiction of courts---Special courts---Joint trial across statutory regimes---Held, that in view of Art.175(2) of the Constitution, Courts must avoid any impression of enlarging jurisdiction beyond what is expressly conferred by law---Where legislature has created separate court structures for distinct categories of offences, consolidation of proceedings across different regimes is not to be ordered mechanically---Court must exercise caution before requiring a trial court to assume jurisdiction not clearly conferred by the relevant statute. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 173, 233, 235 & 239---Separate FIRs under different statutory regimes---Separate investigations and challans---Charges framed and evidence partly recorded---Consolidation after commencement of trial---Held, that where separate FIRs were registered under two different statutory regimes, separate investigations were undertaken by distinct agencies, separate reports under S.173, Cr.P.C. were submitted, separate charges had been framed and prosecution evidence had partly been recorded, formal consolidation at such advanced stage would require alteration of charges and restructuring of proceedings---Consolidation after commencement of evidence is an exception rather than the norm---Discretion under Ss.235 and 239, Cr.P.C. is to be exercised judiciously and not mechanically. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 235 & 239---Joint trial---Apprehension of conflicting judgments---Same Court conducting both trials---Held, that apprehension of conflicting judgments did not arise in the peculiar facts where both matters stood entrusted to the same Court---Possibility of inconsistency is substantially minimized when the same judicial forum evaluates the evidence---Simultaneous continuation of separate trials before the same Court sufficiently safeguards coherence in proceedings without disturbing the procedural structure already in place. (g) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.10-A & 14---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984), Arts.131 & 143 to 148---Cross-examination---Right of accused---Protection of witness dignity---Role of trial Judge---Held, that the right of an accused to cross-examine a complainant or witness exists, but it is neither unlimited nor unbridled---Trial Judge must balance the right of cross-examination with the right of fair trial and human dignity guaranteed under Arts.10-A and 14 of the Constitution---Questions which are irrelevant, indecent, without reasonable grounds, or intended to insult or annoy the witness must not be permitted---Prolonged cross-examination designed to exhaust the witness or manipulate error amounts to misuse of such right---Presiding Judge must not remain a silent spectator and should intervene where cross-examination is abused. (h) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.9, 10-A & 14---Witness protection and dignity---Witness box---No requirement that witness must remain standing---Provision of seating arrangements---Held, that there is no legal requirement under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 that a witness must remain standing while giving evidence---Compelling a witness, particularly in sexual offence cases, to remain standing for prolonged periods during testimony imposes unnecessary physical and psychological burden and may impair clarity and composure of evidence---Allowing a witness to remain seated does not diminish the sanctity of oath or dignity of judicial proceedings; rather, it promotes fairness, composure and orderly administration of justice---Witnesses assist the administration of justice and must be treated with dignity, security and respect. (i) Witness protection statutes---- ----Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, 2017---Sindh Witness Protection Act, 2013---Balochistan Witness Protection Act, 2016---Punjab Witness Protection Act, 2018---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Witness Protection Act, 2021---Protection of witnesses and complainants---Constitutional duty of State---Held, that protection of witnesses and complainants is grounded in Arts.9, 10-A and 14 of the Constitution and reinforced by federal and provincial witness protection laws---State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that witnesses and victims are protected from intimidation, coercion, humiliation and undue hardship so that testimony may be rendered freely and judicial proceedings may proceed in accordance with law. (j) Administration of justice---- ----Witness seating arrangements---Directions to subordinate courts, Special Courts and Tribunals---Held, that all District and Sessions Judges, courts subordinate to them, Administrative Judges of Special Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan were directed to ensure that appropriate seating arrangements are mandatorily provided to persons in the witness box, whether by chair, seat or bench---Registrar of Supreme Court was directed to circulate the judgment to the Chief Justices of all High Courts for implementation and compliance in all courts where evidence is recorded, including civil courts, criminal courts, special courts and tribunals. (k) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.185(3)---Leave to appeal---Consolidation of trials---Discretion exercised by Courts below---Interference by Supreme Court---Held, that the impugned order did not suffer from any jurisdictional defect, illegality or perversity warranting interference under Art.185(3) of the Constitution---Question raised related essentially to exercise of judicial discretion by Courts below and did not call for intervention in absence of injustice. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and Criminal Petition No.1160 of 2025 was dismissed; directions were issued for mandatory seating arrangements for witnesses in courts and for circulation of the judgment to all High Courts for implementation.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302, 324, 353, 396, 435, 427, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----S. 7---Appreciation of evidence---Unnamed accused---Conviction on capital charge---Sustainability---FIR was lodged against unknown assailants and appellants were not nominated by name---Informant attempted to give physical descriptions of only some assailants, but gave no identifying particulars of the remaining alleged offenders including the driver and the LMG operator---Prosecution case rested mainly on ocular account of two witnesses who, despite alleged indiscriminate firing, remained completely unhurt and whose conduct in immediately chasing heavily armed assailants, though they were in plain clothes, unarmed, and had already witnessed one death and multiple serious injuries, was held to be unnatural and contrary to normal human behaviour---Their claimed ability, during a sudden life-threatening attack, to observe and retain minute features such as age, height, complexion and clothing of the assailants was also found inherently improbable---Presence of said witnesses at the place of occurrence was not established through any independent and unimpeachable evidence---Held, that prosecution version suffered from material improbabilities and could not safely sustain conviction on capital charge. (b) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Evidentiary value---Joint identification parade of multiple accused---Effect---Identification parade in the present case was not conducted through injured witnesses, but through two alleged eyewitnesses, and that too jointly in respect of multiple accused---It is a settled rule that each accused is to be put to identification separately and a joint identification parade is unsafe, unreliable and has consistently been disapproved by the Supreme Court---Such defective identification proceedings lost their corroborative value and could not be safely relied upon for maintaining conviction. Cited cases: Gulfam and another v. The State (2017 SCMR 1189); Lal Pasand v. The State (PLD 1981 SC 142); Ziaullah alias Jaji v. The State (2008 SCMR 1210); Bacha Zeb v. The State (2010 SCMR 1189); Shafqat Mehmood and others v. The State (2011 SCMR 537). (c) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Prior disclosure of identity of accused to police---Effect---Appellants had already been arrested in another criminal case and were in judicial custody when, according to the prosecution itself, they allegedly disclosed involvement in the present occurrence and were thereafter formally arrested in this case---Where identity of accused already stands disclosed to police before holding of identification parade, sanctity and evidentiary worth of such parade becomes highly doubtful---Held, that identification evidence so procured had lost legal significance as corroborative evidence. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat / criminal jurisprudence principles---Disclosure by accused in another case---Acquittal in that case---Effect---Appellants had allegedly been linked with the present occurrence through disclosures made by them in FIR No.73 dated 24.04.2010, but in that very case they had already been acquitted by the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 17.02.2025 in Criminal Appeal No.627 of 2022---In such circumstances, the alleged disclosure lost legal weight and could not validly connect the appellants with the present crime---Prosecution further failed to produce any independent direct or circumstantial evidence reasonably connecting the appellants with commission of the offence. (e) Criminal trial---Benefit of doubt---Scope---Where prosecution evidence is afflicted with material inconsistencies, inherent improbabilities and defects going to the root of the case, benefit of doubt must be extended to accused---Such benefit is not a matter of grace or concession but a matter of right---Even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person is sufficient to dislodge prosecution case---Held, that Courts below failed to properly notice serious infirmities in prosecution evidence and thereby fell into error in maintaining conviction and death sentence. Appeal was allowed, convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court and maintained by the High Court were set aside, appellants were acquitted of the charge on benefit of doubt, and were directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D, 337-F(i) & 337-F(ii)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342, 382-B & 544—Sentence of death—Commutation—Subsequent mental illness—Schizophrenia—Supervening and mitigating circumstance—The appellant was convicted for the murder of three minor sons of the complainant, who was his real brother, and for causing knife injuries to the complainant’s wife. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution case stood proved beyond doubt through the natural and confidence-inspiring ocular account of the injured mother, corroborated by the complainant and other witnesses as well as by medical evidence. The Court observed that, in the circumstances of the case, false implication was wholly improbable, particularly where the bereaved parents themselves were witnesses to the murder of their own children. The conviction on merits was, therefore, maintained. However, on the question of sentence, the Court held that although nothing had been brought on record to establish that at the time of commission of the offence the appellant was suffering from such mental infirmity as would impair his criminal responsibility, the subsequent medical evaluation ordered by the Court conclusively established that he was suffering from schizophrenia and was under treatment requiring regular follow-up. In these circumstances, the appellant’s diagnosed mental illness constituted a supervening and mitigating circumstance warranting commutation of the sentence of death to imprisonment for life on all three counts of murder. Criminal law—Mental illness—Execution of mentally ill convict—Humanity and conscience of law—The Supreme Court held that execution of a person suffering from profound mental illness offends the dictates of humanity and the settled conscience of law. The Court emphasized that the death penalty is premised on retribution and deterrence, both of which assume the offender’s rational capacity to comprehend the nature and wrongfulness of conduct and to be influenced by punishment. A person afflicted with severe mental illness, particularly one suffering from delusion or psychosis, stands outside these assumptions. Therefore, while such illness may not necessarily erase criminal liability for the past act in the absence of proof regarding the accused’s condition at the time of occurrence, it may nevertheless operate as a supervening factor rendering execution inhumane and unjust. The Court observed that when the State executes a person whose mental illness has eroded his capacity for reason, the punishment ceases to reflect the majesty of justice and instead becomes an exhibition of cruelty inconsistent with law. Evidence and procedure—Medical Board constituted by Supreme Court—Psychiatric evaluation—Schizophrenia established—The Court took note of the appellant’s assertion in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C. that the occurrence was linked to “mental health disorder” and, acting on that plea, directed constitution of a Medical Board. Pursuant to the Court’s order, the Punjab Institute of Mental Health, Lahore constituted a Board of Certification, admitted the appellant for comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, and reported that according to history and psychological assessment he was suffering from schizophrenia, was under treatment, and required regular follow-up for maintenance treatment. The Court treated this medical opinion as sufficient to establish the appellant’s present mental condition for purposes of sentence, though not for negating criminal responsibility at the time of the offence. Sentence—Concurrent running of sentences—Benefit under S. 382-B, Cr.P.C.—Directions for treatment in custody—While partially allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts, maintained all other sentences awarded by the courts below, and directed that all sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was also extended to the appellant. The jail authorities were further directed to ensure provision of necessary medical treatment in accordance with the appellant’s diagnosed mental condition, including referral to the concerned medical facility where specialized care may be required, and to adopt suitable precautionary and supervisory measures so that the appellant does not pose a threat to other inmates and his custody and treatment remain consistent with prison regulations and medical advice. Case references—The Court referred to and relied upon the following authorities and materials: Sir Edward Coke’s statement in The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1797); Ford v. Wainwright (477 U.S. 399, 1986); Panetti v. Quarterman (551 U.S. 930, 2007); Madison v. Alabama (586 U.S. ___, 2019); and Safia Bano’s case (PLD 2021 SC 488). These authorities were cited to affirm the settled principle that execution of a person who is insane or mentally incompetent is contrary to law, humanity, and fundamental human dignity, and that mental unsoundness may constitute a supervening circumstance justifying commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Appeal partially allowed—Death sentence commuted to imprisonment for life—Conviction and remaining sentences maintained—The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder and allied offences, but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts on account of his established schizophrenia as a supervening and mitigating circumstance. All remaining sentences were maintained, to run concurrently, with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and with further directions for continued psychiatric treatment and custodial supervision.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—S. 382-B—Double murder case—Appraisal of ocular and medical evidence—Partial acceptance of prosecution case—Conviction of one accused maintained, co-accused acquitted on benefit of doubt—The Supreme Court held that where the ocular account against one accused was straightforward, confidence-inspiring and fully corroborated by medical evidence, his conviction under S. 302(b), P.P.C. was rightly maintained. In the present case, the role of effective firing upon both deceased was consistently attributed to petitioner-convict Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu, and the post-mortem evidence supported the prosecution version regarding the firearm injuries caused by him. The Court, therefore, found that the prosecution had successfully established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, as regards co-accused Rab Nawaz, although a role of a single effective fire shot with a .30-bore pistol was attributed to him qua one deceased, the medical evidence did not support that version: the relevant injury was not shown to have been caused by a .30-bore pistol, no bullet was recovered from the body, pellets were recovered instead, and the prosecution failed to produce any forensic material connecting the alleged recovered pistol with the crime. In these circumstances, the evidence against Rab Nawaz was held to be shaky, deficient and insufficient to sustain conviction, entitling him to acquittal on the principle that benefit of doubt, however slight, must go to the accused. Criminal evidence—Ocular account and medical evidence—Extent of corroboration—Rule of cautious scrutiny—The Supreme Court observed that the testimony of the complainant and ocular witnesses had to be examined separately with regard to the specific role assigned to each accused. The ocular account was accepted to the extent that it matched the medical evidence concerning the fatal injuries caused to the deceased. In relation to Muhammad Sarwar deceased, the role of effective firing was specifically attributed to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu and co-accused Shoukat Ali, and the post-mortem findings fully supported that account. In relation to Muhammad Ashraf deceased, the fatal injuries affecting the brain and left lung were likewise attributed to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu and co-accused Shoukat Ali, whereas the alleged injury assigned to Rab Nawaz was neither shown by medical evidence to have been caused by a .30-bore pistol nor found to be the cause of death. The Court thus applied the settled principle of sifting the grain from the chaff and accepted the prosecution case only to the extent it was supported by independent medical evidence. Criminal law—Recovery of weapon—Inconsequential recovery—Mitigating circumstance—The Supreme Court endorsed the view of the Lahore High Court that the alleged recoveries did not materially strengthen the prosecution case for purposes of sentence enhancement. The recovery of the .30-bore pistol allegedly on the pointation of Rab Nawaz was held inconsequential because the Punjab Forensic Science Agency report merely showed that the weapon was in working condition and did not connect it with any crime empty. Likewise, the High Court had rightly treated the recovery of the alleged 12-bore rifle as inconsequential in the matter of sentence. The Court held that inconsequential recovery, particularly when not forensically linked to the occurrence, cannot by itself justify maintaining or enhancing the extreme penalty. Sentence—Death sentence—Commutation to imprisonment for life—Non-proof of motive—Inconsequential recovery as mitigating circumstance—The Supreme Court held that the Lahore High Court had rightly commuted the sentence of death awarded to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu to imprisonment for life on two counts. It was observed that the motive set up by the prosecution had not been proved, and the alleged weapon recovery had also remained inconsequential. Both factors constituted mitigating circumstances in terms of the settled principles governing capital punishment, and no legal infirmity was found in the High Court’s view that these circumstances warranted commutation. Accordingly, the complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence from life imprisonment to death was dismissed on merits. Case references—No specific reported precedent was expressly named or cited in the text of the judgment provided. The Court only referred generally to the “settled principle” of sifting the grain from the chaff, the rule that benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused, and the settled principle that non-proof of motive and inconsequential recovery are mitigating circumstances warranting commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Since no case names or citations were mentioned in the judgment text, none can properly be added as judicially cited authorities. Jail Petition No. 448 of 2023 dismissed—Leave refused—The conviction and sentence of petitioner-convict Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu were maintained. Jail Petition No. 557 of 2023 converted into appeal and allowed—The conviction and sentence of Rab Nawaz were set aside and he was acquitted of the charge, with direction for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No. 1080-L of 2023 dismissed—The complainant’s request for enhancement of Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu’s sentence from imprisonment for life to death was refused on merits, while the petition against Rab Nawaz was dismissed as infructuous owing to his acquittal.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—S. 302(b)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342 & 544-A—Murder case—Appraisal of ocular account—Chance witnesses—Benefit of doubt—Acquittal—The Supreme Court held that where the prosecution case rests upon the testimony of alleged eyewitnesses who, in the ordinary course of events, would not be expected to be present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time, such witnesses fall within the category of chance witnesses and their evidence must be scrutinized with greater caution. In the present case, the complainant and his brother, both sons of the deceased, claimed to have witnessed the occurrence at 11:30 a.m., despite the fact that one was a mechanic at Pirmahal and the other a labourer working in village lands. The Court held that they failed to furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation for their presence at the spot, and their conduct during and after the occurrence was highly unnatural. Their silence while their mother was fired at, failure to make any meaningful resistance, omission to take immediate steps for her removal, and the unexplained delay of about two hours in reporting the matter materially impaired the credibility of their testimony. The ocular account was, therefore, held to be doubtful and unsafe for sustaining conviction without independent corroboration. Criminal evidence—Chance witness—Test of credibility—The Supreme Court elaborated that a chance witness is one who, in the normal pursuit of life, would not ordinarily be present at the place of occurrence but claims such presence by chance. The Court held that testimony of such a witness is admissible, yet it cannot be accepted as a matter of course and must be assessed in the light of natural conduct, surrounding circumstances, and available corroboration. A satisfactory, probable, and natural explanation of presence is indispensable; failing that, the testimony becomes unsafe to rely upon, especially in cases involving severe punishment. The Court reaffirmed that criminal liability cannot be founded upon doubtful or inherently improbable evidence and that, in case of doubt, benefit must accrue to the accused. Investigation—Successive inquiries declaring accused innocent—Evidentiary value of consistent investigative findings—The Supreme Court held that although courts are not bound by the mere opinion of the investigating agency and must independently appraise the evidence, consistent findings recorded through successive investigations by different officers and verified by senior supervisory authorities cannot be brushed aside without cogent reasons. In the present case, the petitioner-convict had repeatedly been found innocent during investigation, and it had surfaced that the actual assailant was his father, Akhtar Ali, while the petitioner himself was present in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court noted that this conclusion had been successively scrutinized and verified at various levels, including by officers of the Investigation Branch and the office of the I.G. Punjab. In the absence of any evidence of mala fide, collusion, or extraneous influence on the part of the investigating officers, such consistent investigative findings were held to carry persuasive value and to lend support to the defence plea. Defence plea—Presence of accused elsewhere at the relevant time—Support from investigative material—The Supreme Court observed that in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C., the petitioner-convict admitted the occurrence but stated that his aunt, the deceased, had been killed by his father Akhtar Ali and that he himself was on duty in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court held that this plea was not a bald denial but found support from investigative material, including statements recorded by the investigating officers from the owner of the hotel in Lahore, who confirmed the petitioner’s presence there on the date and time of occurrence. This circumstance, when read with the doubtful ocular account and other infirmities in the prosecution case, further strengthened the entitlement of the petitioner to benefit of doubt. Benefit of doubt—Right of accused—The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of petitioner-convict Muhammad Nadeem through cogent, reliable, and confidence-inspiring evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The doubtful testimony of chance witnesses, contradictions in their account, unnatural conduct, absence of independent corroboration, and the consistent investigative material affirming the petitioner’s absence from the place of occurrence created serious doubt regarding his involvement. In such circumstances, the Court held that benefit of doubt was to be extended to the accused as a matter of right and not of grace. Case references—No specific reported precedent was expressly cited by name in the judgment text provided. The Court discussed and applied settled principles relating to chance witnesses, cautious appraisal of ocular account, non-binding yet persuasive value of consistent investigative findings, and the rule that benefit of doubt must go to the accused; however, no reported case law was specifically mentioned in the text, and none should therefore be added as cited authority. Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 converted into appeal and allowed—Conviction and sentence set aside—Acquittal—The Supreme Court converted Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 into an appeal, allowed the same, set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner-convict recorded by the courts below, and acquitted him of the charge, with direction for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No. 305-L of 2018 dismissed as infructuous—Leave refused—In view of the acquittal of the respondent-convict, the complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence became infructuous and was dismissed, with leave refused.

Summary: Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010—Ss. 3, 4, 21(1)(a), 22, 2(xxvi), 2(xxviii) & Schedule-I, Entry XIIA—Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Ss. 192, 192A & 199—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 173 & 498—Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Art. 185(3)—Pre-arrest bail—Money laundering prosecution founded on alleged tax evasion—Need for prior determination of tax liability—Predicate offence—The Supreme Court held that where an FIR under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 is founded on allegations of concealment of income, tax evasion, and non-reconciliation of wealth statement with bank entries, but no prior determination of tax liability has been made through the process of assessment or adjudication under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, initiation of criminal proceedings is prima facie illegal. The Court observed that, in the present case, the FIR alleged concealment of income during Tax Years 2017 and 2018 and tax sought to be evaded on that basis, yet the prosecution had proceeded straightaway under AMLA, 2010 without first establishing the tax liability through the legally prescribed fiscal process. It was further held that, unless the amount allegedly evaded is first determined and it is thereafter shown that any asset acquired therefrom constitutes “proceeds of crime” relatable to a predicate offence under the Schedule to AMLA, the ingredients necessary to attract Ss. 3 and 4 of AMLA, 2010 are not prima facie made out. The Court, therefore, found that the very basis of the FIR and initiation of criminal proceedings stood substantially impaired. Taxation and criminal liability—Assessment proceedings under tax law distinguished from criminal prosecution—Direct resort to criminal process deprecated—The Supreme Court held that matters pertaining to concealment of income and evasion of tax are, in the first instance, to be addressed through the assessment, adjudicatory, and recovery mechanisms provided under the tax laws and before the specialized forums constituted thereunder. Although a fiscal dispute may, in a proper case, also attract criminal liability where dishonest conduct and statutory ingredients are established, the criminal process cannot be invoked in disregard of the foundational requirement of prior determination of liability where the alleged money laundering claim itself depends upon tax evasion as the predicate offence. In the present case, the Court found that no such pre-trial legal exercise had been properly exhausted before resort was made to registration of the FIR under AMLA, 2010. Pre-arrest bail—Documentary prosecution case—Custodial interrogation unnecessary—Further inquiry—The Supreme Court held that where the prosecution case rests primarily on documentary material such as tax record, bank accounts, and bank statements, no useful purpose is ordinarily served by taking the accused into custody, particularly when there is no real likelihood of tampering with such evidence. The Court reiterated that criminal law should not be used as a tool of harassment or as a substitute for lawful recovery proceedings in matters essentially grounded in documentary fiscal disputes. In the circumstances of the case, the allegations required deeper examination, the case called for further inquiry, and the possibility of false implication and mala fide on the part of the prosecution could not be ruled out at the bail stage. The petitioner was, therefore, held entitled to the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail. Effect of subsequent tax adjudication—Foundation of prosecution shaken—Annulment by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue—The Supreme Court took note of the admitted position that, subsequent to registration of the FIR, the tax liability determined by the tax authorities against the petitioner had been annulled by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue through order dated 30.06.2025. The Court held that where the criminal case is premised upon alleged tax liability, annulment of that liability by the competent fiscal forum materially weakens, at least for the time being, the foundation of the criminal proceedings. This circumstance constituted a strong consideration in favour of grant of pre-arrest bail. Investigation—Earlier placement in column No. 2—Subsequent change of stance by prosecution—Relevance at bail stage—The Supreme Court further noted that, after registration of the FIR, the first Investigating Officer had not found the petitioner guilty and had mentioned his name in column No. 2 of the report under S. 173, Cr.P.C., but in a subsequent investigation the petitioner had been found guilty on the same allegations. The Court treated this shift in investigative position as a relevant circumstance, which, when read with the documentary nature of the case and the unsettled state of the alleged tax liability, reinforced the conclusion that the matter called for further inquiry and that arrest of the petitioner was not warranted at that stage. Case references—The Court expressly referred to and relied upon Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation-FBR, through its Director and others v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. & others (PLD 2025 SC 633), holding that in the absence of determination of tax liability through assessment or adjudication, registration of FIR or initiation of criminal proceedings is illegal; Muhammad Asif v. The State etc. (2016 PTD 2393), wherein pre-arrest bail was granted in a tax-related prosecution after the underlying fiscal determination had been set aside; Aqeel Ahmed Khan v. The State (2025 SCMR 1955); Ali Anwar Paracha v. The State (2024 SCMR 1596); Noman Khaliq v. The State (2023 SCMR 2122); and Abdul Rasheed v. The State and another (2023 SCMR 1948), all cited in support of the proposition that where a case is primarily based on documents and custodial interrogation serves no useful purpose, relief in bail jurisdiction may be justified. Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Impugned order set aside—Pre-arrest bail confirmed—The Supreme Court converted the criminal petition into an appeal, allowed the same, set aside the impugned order of the Lahore High Court refusing pre-arrest bail, and confirmed the ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to the petitioner, subject to furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs.500,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Fatal road accident---Offences under Ss. 322, 337-G & 279, P.P.C.---Further custody/investigation not required---Petitioner-accused sought pre-arrest bail in case registered under Ss. 322, 337-G and 279, P.P.C., arising out of a road accident wherein three persons had died after a Mazda Coaster allegedly hit their motorcycle in rash and negligent manner---Supreme Court observed that although three innocent persons had expired in the unfortunate incident, the material consideration was whether petitioner was still required for extracting further facts or for further inquiry/investigation---Investigating Officer, when specifically asked by Court, failed to give any plausible reason for further requirement of petitioner and conceded that petitioner was no more required for further inquiry or investigation---Held, in such circumstances no fruitful purpose would be served by refusing pre-arrest bail merely for extracting more facts from petitioner. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 322 & 279---Qatl-bis-sabab and rash/negligent driving---Bail before arrest---Nature of offences---Supreme Court observed that offence under S.322, P.P.C. entails diyat only, whereas offence under S.279, P.P.C. is bailable---When these factors were considered together with the fact that petitioner was no longer required for investigation, petitioner was entitled to grant of pre-arrest bail. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Name of accused not appearing in FIR---Allegation of fake driving licence---Effect---Petitioner’s name did not appear in the FIR, which was initially registered against an unknown driver---Allegation regarding petitioner possessing a fake driving licence was treated as a separate matter---Supreme Court observed that even if it was assumed that petitioner had a fake driving licence, such offence was bailable and did not justify refusal of pre-arrest bail in the circumstances of the case. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Tentative assessment at bail stage---Supreme Court clarified that observations made in bail before arrest order were tentative in nature and would not prejudice case of either party before Trial Court. Disposition: Petition seeking bail before arrest was converted into appeal and allowed; petitioner was granted pre-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.100,000 with one surety in the like amount to satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court; observations were declared tentative and not to prejudice trial.