Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D, 337-F(i) & 337-F(ii)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342, 382-B & 544—Sentence of death—Commutation—Subsequent mental illness—Schizophrenia—Supervening and mitigating circumstance—The appellant was convicted for the murder of three minor sons of the complainant, who was his real brother, and for causing knife injuries to the complainant’s wife. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution case stood proved beyond doubt through the natural and confidence-inspiring ocular account of the injured mother, corroborated by the complainant and other witnesses as well as by medical evidence. The Court observed that, in the circumstances of the case, false implication was wholly improbable, particularly where the bereaved parents themselves were witnesses to the murder of their own children. The conviction on merits was, therefore, maintained. However, on the question of sentence, the Court held that although nothing had been brought on record to establish that at the time of commission of the offence the appellant was suffering from such mental infirmity as would impair his criminal responsibility, the subsequent medical evaluation ordered by the Court conclusively established that he was suffering from schizophrenia and was under treatment requiring regular follow-up. In these circumstances, the appellant’s diagnosed mental illness constituted a supervening and mitigating circumstance warranting commutation of the sentence of death to imprisonment for life on all three counts of murder. Criminal law—Mental illness—Execution of mentally ill convict—Humanity and conscience of law—The Supreme Court held that execution of a person suffering from profound mental illness offends the dictates of humanity and the settled conscience of law. The Court emphasized that the death penalty is premised on retribution and deterrence, both of which assume the offender’s rational capacity to comprehend the nature and wrongfulness of conduct and to be influenced by punishment. A person afflicted with severe mental illness, particularly one suffering from delusion or psychosis, stands outside these assumptions. Therefore, while such illness may not necessarily erase criminal liability for the past act in the absence of proof regarding the accused’s condition at the time of occurrence, it may nevertheless operate as a supervening factor rendering execution inhumane and unjust. The Court observed that when the State executes a person whose mental illness has eroded his capacity for reason, the punishment ceases to reflect the majesty of justice and instead becomes an exhibition of cruelty inconsistent with law. Evidence and procedure—Medical Board constituted by Supreme Court—Psychiatric evaluation—Schizophrenia established—The Court took note of the appellant’s assertion in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C. that the occurrence was linked to “mental health disorder” and, acting on that plea, directed constitution of a Medical Board. Pursuant to the Court’s order, the Punjab Institute of Mental Health, Lahore constituted a Board of Certification, admitted the appellant for comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, and reported that according to history and psychological assessment he was suffering from schizophrenia, was under treatment, and required regular follow-up for maintenance treatment. The Court treated this medical opinion as sufficient to establish the appellant’s present mental condition for purposes of sentence, though not for negating criminal responsibility at the time of the offence. Sentence—Concurrent running of sentences—Benefit under S. 382-B, Cr.P.C.—Directions for treatment in custody—While partially allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts, maintained all other sentences awarded by the courts below, and directed that all sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was also extended to the appellant. The jail authorities were further directed to ensure provision of necessary medical treatment in accordance with the appellant’s diagnosed mental condition, including referral to the concerned medical facility where specialized care may be required, and to adopt suitable precautionary and supervisory measures so that the appellant does not pose a threat to other inmates and his custody and treatment remain consistent with prison regulations and medical advice. Case references—The Court referred to and relied upon the following authorities and materials: Sir Edward Coke’s statement in The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1797); Ford v. Wainwright (477 U.S. 399, 1986); Panetti v. Quarterman (551 U.S. 930, 2007); Madison v. Alabama (586 U.S. ___, 2019); and Safia Bano’s case (PLD 2021 SC 488). These authorities were cited to affirm the settled principle that execution of a person who is insane or mentally incompetent is contrary to law, humanity, and fundamental human dignity, and that mental unsoundness may constitute a supervening circumstance justifying commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Appeal partially allowed—Death sentence commuted to imprisonment for life—Conviction and remaining sentences maintained—The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder and allied offences, but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts on account of his established schizophrenia as a supervening and mitigating circumstance. All remaining sentences were maintained, to run concurrently, with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and with further directions for continued psychiatric treatment and custodial supervision.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Fatal road accident---Offences under Ss. 322, 337-G & 279, P.P.C.---Further custody/investigation not required---Petitioner-accused sought pre-arrest bail in case registered under Ss. 322, 337-G and 279, P.P.C., arising out of a road accident wherein three persons had died after a Mazda Coaster allegedly hit their motorcycle in rash and negligent manner---Supreme Court observed that although three innocent persons had expired in the unfortunate incident, the material consideration was whether petitioner was still required for extracting further facts or for further inquiry/investigation---Investigating Officer, when specifically asked by Court, failed to give any plausible reason for further requirement of petitioner and conceded that petitioner was no more required for further inquiry or investigation---Held, in such circumstances no fruitful purpose would be served by refusing pre-arrest bail merely for extracting more facts from petitioner. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 322 & 279---Qatl-bis-sabab and rash/negligent driving---Bail before arrest---Nature of offences---Supreme Court observed that offence under S.322, P.P.C. entails diyat only, whereas offence under S.279, P.P.C. is bailable---When these factors were considered together with the fact that petitioner was no longer required for investigation, petitioner was entitled to grant of pre-arrest bail. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Name of accused not appearing in FIR---Allegation of fake driving licence---Effect---Petitioner’s name did not appear in the FIR, which was initially registered against an unknown driver---Allegation regarding petitioner possessing a fake driving licence was treated as a separate matter---Supreme Court observed that even if it was assumed that petitioner had a fake driving licence, such offence was bailable and did not justify refusal of pre-arrest bail in the circumstances of the case. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 498---Bail before arrest---Tentative assessment at bail stage---Supreme Court clarified that observations made in bail before arrest order were tentative in nature and would not prejudice case of either party before Trial Court. Disposition: Petition seeking bail before arrest was converted into appeal and allowed; petitioner was granted pre-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.100,000 with one surety in the like amount to satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court; observations were declared tentative and not to prejudice trial.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-A(i), 337-A(ii), 337-F(ii), 337-F(iv) & 34---Triple murder with dagger blows---Injured eyewitnesses---Presence at place of occurrence---Stamp of truth---Prosecution alleged that petitioner, along with absconding co-accused, deceitfully called deceased persons one after another to haveli/cattle farm and murdered them with daggers, while two eyewitnesses sustained sharp-edged injuries when they attempted to intervene---Supreme Court held that medico-legal reports showed injuries on injured eyewitnesses caused by sharp-edged weapon, which constituted a stamp of truth and lent intrinsic assurance to their presence at place of occurrence---Presence of injured witnesses was natural and free from doubt---Despite searching cross-examination, defence failed to extract anything capable of casting doubt on their presence or veracity. (b) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Broad daylight occurrence---Accused known to witnesses---Mistaken identity ruled out---Occurrence took place at about 3:00 p.m. in broad daylight inside haveli/cattle farm where petitioner was admittedly employed by complainant and deceased persons for care of cattle---Supreme Court held that petitioner was known to eyewitnesses as their employee; therefore possibility of mistaken identity stood completely ruled out---Eyewitnesses gave harmonious account on material particulars including date, time, place, manner of occurrence, prelude and aftermath---Ocular account was confidence-inspiring and rightly relied upon by Courts below. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Related witnesses---Murder of close relatives---Substitution of real offender rare---Complainant was real brother of two deceased persons and uncle of third deceased, while injured witnesses were sons/nephews within same family---Supreme Court held that it was beyond realm of prudence to believe that closely related witnesses, having seen brutal murder of their own kith and kin, would allow real culprits to escape and falsely implicate an innocent person with whom they had no prior animosity---Substitution of real offenders is a rare phenomenon, particularly where eyewitnesses have lost loved ones before their eyes. Cited Cases: • Asfandiyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009 • Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487 (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302(b) & 324---Medical evidence corroborating ocular account---Sharp-edged weapon injuries---Medical officer found seven injuries on injured witness Abdullah and four injuries on injured witness Ihtisham, all caused by sharp-edged weapon---Postmortem examination revealed eleven injuries on deceased Attique Ullah, twenty-two injuries on deceased Zaka Ullah and five injuries on deceased Shafaat Ullah---Medical officer opined that injuries were ante-mortem and sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death---Defence cross-examined medical officers at length but failed to undermine their opinions or suggest that injuries were caused otherwise than by sharp-edged weapon---Medical evidence fully supported and fortified ocular account. (e) Criminal trial---- ----Recoveries---Bloodstained earth and incriminating articles---Positive PFSA report---Corroboration---Investigating Officer secured bloodstained earth and other incriminating articles from places where deceased and injured were found through recovery memos---Articles were sent to Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore, and positive forensic report corroborated prosecution version by confirming crime scene and connecting bloodstained articles and weapons with occurrence---Supreme Court held that medical and circumstantial evidence, including recoveries and PFSA report, completed and corroborated prosecution case. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Motive---Demand of advance amount relating to cattle farm---Proof---Motive alleged by complainant was that accused persons demanded advance amount from deceased in respect of cattle farm and, upon refusal, became annoyed and committed murders---Supreme Court held that prosecution proved motive through testimony of informant, which supported the ocular account and overall prosecution version. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Capital sentence---Triple murder---No mitigating circumstance---Extreme brutality and betrayal of trust---Supreme Court held that no mitigating or extenuating circumstance existed to justify leniency---Petitioner, acting with co-accused, deceitfully called deceased persons one after another to cattle farm and subjected them to merciless dagger attacks, resulting in cold-blooded murder of three persons and serious injuries to two intervening eyewitnesses---Number of injuries, particularly twenty-two wounds on one deceased, reflected extreme brutality and shocking disregard for human life---Occurrence was committed at place where petitioner was employed, trusted and residing with his family; abuse of such trust aggravated guilt---No sudden provocation, grave and immediate cause, remorse or exceptional factor was available to warrant lesser sentence---Capital punishment was justified. (h) Criminal appeal---- ----Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court---Conviction and death sentence maintained---Supreme Court, upon independent reappraisal of evidence, held that Courts below had rightly appreciated ocular testimony in conjunction with medical and circumstantial evidence---Chain of evidence was complete and unbroken---Prosecution successfully established commission of triple murder, injuries to two eyewitnesses, and motive---Conviction and sentence were based on confidence-inspiring evidence and called for no interference. Disposition: Jail Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; conviction of petitioner under S.302(b), P.P.C. on three counts with death sentence as Ta’zir, compensation under S.544-A, Cr.P.C., and sentences under Ss.324, 337-A(i), 337-A(ii), 337-F(iv) and 337-F(ii), P.P.C. were maintained; Murder Reference answered in affirmative by Lahore High Court remained undisturbed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i) & 337-F(ii)---Double murder of wife and daughter---Injured daughter as eyewitness---Natural presence inside house---Petitioner was charged with murdering his wife Mst. Kausar Ghani and daughter Mst. Zunaira Amin, attempting to murder his daughter Mst. Insa Amin and brothers-in-law, and causing injuries with dagger---Occurrence took place inside petitioner’s own house during Ramzan, where deceased, injured daughter and son were residing---Supreme Court held that presence of eyewitnesses Zain-ul-Amin and injured Mst. Insa Amin was most natural, probable and free from doubt, being inmates of the house and children of petitioner and deceased---Injuries on Mst. Insa Amin constituted unimpeachable evidence of her presence at the scene. (b) Criminal trial---- ----Injured witness---Evidentiary value---Special status---Supreme Court reiterated that testimony of an injured witness, if it rings true and is supported by medical evidence, is accorded special status in law of evidence---An injured witness carries built-in guarantee of presence at spot and would ordinarily not falsely substitute real culprit unless strong and compelling reasons exist---Injured daughter Mst. Insa Amin directly and consistently charged petitioner with dagger attacks on her mother, sister and herself; her testimony was coherent, natural and confidence-inspiring. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Children as eyewitnesses against father---False implication of own father---Improbability---Eyewitnesses Zain-ul-Amin and injured Mst. Insa Amin were children of petitioner and deceased---Supreme Court held that it was highly improbable and contrary to normal human conduct that children, having lost their mother and sister in the same occurrence, would allow real culprit to escape and falsely implicate their own innocent father, thereby depriving themselves of his support and protection---In Pakistani social setup, where family bonds and respect for father are strong, son and daughter would not ordinarily level such grave accusation against their own father unless constrained by truth of occurrence---Defence failed to show any motive, animus or extraneous reason for false implication. (d) Criminal trial---- ----Related witness---Brother of deceased---Presence explained---Complainant/brother of deceased had reached house of his sister a day earlier after receiving information regarding altercation between petitioner and deceased over sale of land---After Fajr prayer, he returned and witnessed occurrence---Supreme Court held that his presence was natural and satisfactorily explained---Being brother-in-law of petitioner, there was no reason to presume that he would shield real culprit and falsely substitute petitioner---No material contradiction was extracted from his cross-examination. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i) & 337-F(ii)---Medical evidence---Repeated dagger blows---Corroboration of ocular account---Postmortem examination showed 21 incised wounds on deceased wife Mst. Kausar Ghani and 8 incised wounds on deceased daughter Mst. Zunaira Amin---Medical examination of injured Mst. Insa Amin showed two incised wounds and a linear abrasion---Supreme Court held that nature, seat and number of injuries were fully consistent with ocular account that petitioner inflicted repeated dagger blows upon deceased persons and injured eyewitness---Medical evidence strongly supported trustworthy ocular account. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Motive---Sale of agricultural land---Documentary proof---Prosecution alleged that petitioner wanted to sell one acre agricultural land and wife/children opposed the sale---Supreme Court held that motive was proved through copy of sale deed and bank receipts showing sale of land and deposit of sale consideration in petitioner’s account---Positive PFSA report regarding bloodstained dagger further corroborated prosecution case. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302, 304 & 306---Qatl-i-amd---Proof for qisas---Father causing death of child---Wali being direct descendant of offender---Effect on sentence---Supreme Court considered Ss.302, 304 and 306, P.P.C. with Art.17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Held that S.304 prescribes forms of proof required to render qatl-i-amd liable to qisas, namely voluntary true confession before competent Court or evidence contemplated under Art.17, Q.S.O.---S.306 expressly excludes qisas where offender causes death of his child or grandchild, and also where any wali of victim is direct descendant of offender---As petitioner was father of deceased daughter and husband of deceased wife whose wali included his direct descendant, qisas was not enforceable in such circumstances. (h) Sentencing---- ----Capital sentence---Doctrine of “judiciary-sponsored orphanhood”---Minor child of accused---Mitigating factor---Supreme Court observed that in capital cases involving a parent, the child is a silent victim---When State executes surviving parent, innocent descendants who have already lost one parent to crime are deprived of the second parent by State action---Court described such result as “judiciary-sponsored orphanhood”---Relying on welfare principle under Art.3 of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Court held that presence of minor children can serve as mitigating factor in capital sentencing---Where accused is sole surviving parent of minor child, commuting death sentence to life imprisonment preserves remaining familial link without excusing crime. (i) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Death sentence as Ta’zir---Commutation to imprisonment for life---Brutality proved but mitigating legal considerations present---Supreme Court found conviction fully proved beyond reasonable doubt and noted extreme brutality: petitioner inflicted 21 incised wounds on his wife, 8 wounds on his daughter and injuries on another daughter---However, keeping in view non-applicability of qisas under S.306, P.P.C. and presence of minor surviving daughter, death sentence awarded under S.302(b), P.P.C. on two counts was commuted to imprisonment for life on two counts. (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of period already undergone---Discretionary relief---Extreme brutality---Supreme Court declined benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. despite modifying death sentence to life imprisonment---Occurrence reflected extreme brutality and mercilessness, involving 21 incised wounds on wife, 8 stab wounds on daughter and injuries to another daughter---Manner of commission and conduct of petitioner disentitled him from discretionary relief under S.382-B, Cr.P.C. Disposition: Jail Petition was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentences of petitioner under relevant provisions, except sentence under S.302(b), P.P.C., were maintained; death sentence as Ta’zir on two counts under S.302(b), P.P.C. was commuted to imprisonment for life on two counts; all substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was declined; appeal stood disposed of with modification in sentence.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC---Conversion to S.302(c), PPC---Sudden provocation---Heat of passion---Deceased allegedly murdered by petitioner/convict by inflicting churri blows, while two other prosecution witnesses also received injuries during the same occurrence---Trial Court convicted petitioner under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced him to death, while High Court maintained conviction but commuted death sentence to imprisonment for life---Supreme Court, upon reappraisal of evidence, found that prosecution version regarding occurrence inside complainant’s chobara was materially doubtful---Defence version was that deceased had illicit relations with petitioner’s wife and was seen by petitioner inside his house during late hours of night, whereafter deceased fled and petitioner chased him in a state of emotional disturbance---Medical and investigative evidence showed that deceased was not wearing shalwar at the time of post-mortem, which materially supported defence version and rendered prosecution version highly unbelievable---Occurrence was held to be neither premeditated nor result of prior design, but had taken place suddenly in the heat of passion upon grave and sudden provocation---Prosecution failed to establish requisite ingredients of S.302(b), PPC---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC was set aside and petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC instead. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(c)---Grave and sudden provocation---Scope---Where homicide was committed without pre-planning, in heat of passion, upon sudden provocation, and without taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner, offence would fall within S.302(c), PPC and not S.302(b), PPC---Petitioner, after allegedly seeing deceased with his wife at late night, lost self-control and chased deceased, culminating in fatal assault---Such facts brought case within S.302(c), PPC---Sentence of rigorous imprisonment for twenty years was awarded under S.302(c), PPC. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Appreciation of evidence---Two divergent versions of same occurrence---Suppression of material facts by both sides---Duty of Court---Where prosecution and defence presented divergent versions and both sides appeared to have suppressed material facts to minimize their respective roles, Court was required to sift evidence and form its own view consistent with probabilities of case and capable of satisfying a prudent mind---Supreme Court found defence version substantially corroborated by medical officer, investigating officer and constable who escorted dead body---Circumstance that deceased remained without shalwar up to post-mortem was highly unbelievable if prosecution version of murder inside complainant’s chobara were accepted, but strongly supported defence version that deceased had fled from petitioner’s house after being found with petitioner’s wife. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 342---Statement of accused---Evidentiary value---Admission by accused---Petitioner/convict, in his statement under S.342, Cr.P.C., admitted inflicting injuries but explained occurrence as result of sudden loss of self-control after seeing deceased with his wife---Such statement, when supported by surrounding circumstances and prosecution evidence itself, was considered for determining true nature of offence---Admission did not sustain conviction under S.302(b), PPC, but supported alteration of conviction to S.302(c), PPC. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 337-L(2) & 337-F(ii)---Causing injuries to prosecution witnesses---Convictions maintained---Injured prosecution witnesses received injuries during the same transaction when they intervened in occurrence---Although murder conviction was altered from S.302(b) to S.302(c), PPC, convictions and sentences under remaining offences were maintained---Sentence for causing injuries to Mst. Umme Farwa and Syed Gohar Hussain remained intact. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of previous detention---Sentences to run concurrently---After converting Jail Petition into appeal and partly allowing same, Supreme Court extended benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. to petitioner/convict---Substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. (g) Sentence---- ----Enhancement of sentence---Petition by complainant seeking restoration/enhancement to death sentence---Effect of conversion of conviction from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC---Since conviction of respondent/convict was converted from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC, complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence from imprisonment for life to death lost efficacy and became infructuous---Criminal Petition seeking enhancement was dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Jail Petition No.716 of 2017 was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentence under S.302(b), PPC were set aside; petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for twenty years; compensation and default sentence were maintained; convictions and sentences under remaining offences were maintained; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended and substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Criminal Petition No.1475-L of 2017 seeking enhancement of sentence was dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi) & 34---Qatl-i-amd---Double murder---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd---Firearm injuries to injured witness---Appreciation of evidence---Petitioner/convict was alleged to have fired with 12-bore rifle at two deceased ladies, namely Mst. Khatoon Bibi and Mst. Batool Bibi, who died at the spot, and also caused firearm injuries to injured witness Qadar Yar---Trial Court convicted petitioner under S.302(b), PPC on two counts and sentenced him to death on two counts, along with convictions under Ss.324, 337-F(iii) and 337-F(vi), PPC---High Court maintained conviction and confirmed death sentence---Supreme Court, on reappraisal of evidence, held that prosecution had successfully established guilt of petitioner through trustworthy ocular testimony duly corroborated by medical evidence---Conviction and sentences under all offences were upheld, however, death sentence under S.302(b), PPC was commuted to imprisonment for life on two counts due to mitigating circumstances. (b) Criminal trial---- ----Prompt FIR---Effect---Occurrence took place at about 7:30 a.m. and was reported at police station at 8:30 a.m., within one hour of incident---Police station was about seven kilometres from place of occurrence---Complainant was confronted with unnatural death of his mother and sister-in-law and injuries to his brother, and time consumed in arranging transportation and shifting dead bodies/injured was natural and reasonable---FIR was held to have been lodged with promptitude, ruling out possibility of consultation or deliberation. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Related witnesses---Injured witness---Evidentiary value---Complainant, eyewitness Muhammad Akram and injured witness Qadar Yar furnished consistent, natural and confidence-inspiring account of occurrence---They specifically attributed firing at two deceased ladies and injured witness to petitioner/convict---Their statements were consistent on material particulars, including date, time, place, manner of arrival of accused on motorcycle and use of 12-bore rifle---Presence of injured witness Qadar Yar could not be doubted as he had sustained firearm injuries during occurrence---Eyewitnesses were natural witnesses as occurrence took place in front of complainant’s house in early morning when they were taking cattle out, which was common rural practice---Petitioner was co-villager and already known to eyewitnesses, and occurrence took place in broad daylight; therefore, question of mistaken identity did not arise---Related witnesses who had lost close family members were unlikely to spare real culprit and falsely implicate innocent person---Ocular account was accepted. Cited Cases: • Aman Ullah v. The State 2023 SCMR 723 • Imran Mehmood v. The State 2023 SCMR 795 • Asfandiyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009 • Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487 (d) Criminal trial---- ----Related witnesses---Mere relationship not sufficient to discard testimony---Principle---Closely related eyewitnesses who had personally witnessed occurrence and suffered loss of close family members could not be discarded merely on ground of relationship---Possibility of substitution in such circumstances was extremely remote and, in facts of case, beyond realm of probability---Eyewitnesses had not exaggerated role of co-accused by assigning firing to him, rather confined their version to what they had actually witnessed, which supported their bona fides. (e) Criminal trial---- ----Medical evidence---Corroboration of ocular account---Injured witness received firearm entry wounds on right thigh, left thigh and little finger of left hand---Post-mortem evidence showed that firearm injuries sustained by both deceased ladies were ante-mortem and sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death---Nature and bunch of firearm injuries on deceased persons, when examined with injuries on injured witness, established use of 12-bore firearm---Medical evidence fully supported and independently corroborated prosecution’s ocular account. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Death sentence---Mitigating circumstances---Commutation to imprisonment for life---Although guilt of petitioner/convict was established, death sentence required reconsideration in view of peculiar facts and circumstances---Occurrence was not outcome of any pre-planned or premeditated design---Petitioner and complainant party were neighbours and their houses were adjacent in same Mohallah---Incident originated when complainant party was taking cattle alongside petitioner’s house and petitioner’s wife became annoyed, went to complainant party’s house, and grappled with Mst. Khatoon Bibi deceased---Petitioner was attracted to spot upon grappling between his wife and deceased, and occurrence ensued thereafter---Such circumstances constituted mitigation sufficient to commute death sentence to imprisonment for life. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Motive---Failure to prove---Effect on sentence---Prosecution alleged that petitioner had previously been implicated in a criminal case regarding theft of buffalo at instance of complainant party and, due to such grudge, committed offence---No independent or documentary evidence, such as copy of FIR or judgment in said case, was produced---In absence of supporting material, alleged motive could not be held proved---Failure to establish motive was considered as a mitigating circumstance for reducing death sentence to imprisonment for life. (h) Criminal trial---- ----Recovery of weapon---No crime empties recovered from place of occurrence---Effect---Recovery of crime weapon allegedly effected at petitioner’s pointation and reported by Punjab Forensic Science Agency to be in working condition was held inconsequential because no crime empties were recovered from place of occurrence---Such recovery did not materially advance prosecution case and was considered while assessing sentence. (i) Sentence---- ----Advanced age of convict---Mitigating circumstance---At time of recording statement under S.342, Cr.P.C. on 21.09.2019, petitioner was approximately seventy years old, and on date of hearing before Supreme Court, i.e., 03.02.2026, he was about seventy-six years, six months and six days old---Advanced age of petitioner was considered as a mitigating circumstance---Ends of justice were held to be adequately met by commuting death sentence awarded on two counts to imprisonment for life on two counts. (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of previous detention---Concurrent sentences---Supreme Court maintained conviction and sentences under all offences, but commuted death sentence under S.302(b), PPC to rigorous imprisonment for life on two counts---All substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to petitioner/convict. Cited Cases: • Shah Hussain v. The State PLD 2009 SC 460 • Sayad Ikram and others v. Sikandar Hayat and others 2016 SCMR 467 Disposition: Jail Petition No.348 of 2024 was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentences of petitioner/convict under all offences were upheld; however, sentence under S.302(b), PPC was commuted from death on two counts to rigorous imprisonment for life on two counts; all substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to petitioner/convict.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 147, 148, 337-F(ii), 337-F(iii) & 34---Murder, attempt to murder and causing hurt with common intention---Joint attribution of role---Single fatal injury---Medical evidence---Where prosecution alleged joint firing by three accused but medical evidence showed only one firearm injury on body of deceased---No specific role or injury attributed to petitioner---Impossibility of determining which accused caused fatal injury---Benefit of doubt---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC unsustainable. (b) Criminal trial ----Ocular account---Specific attribution of injury---Requirement---Where general and omnibus role assigned to several accused without specific attribution of fatal or injury-causing act---Conviction cannot be sustained---Principle reaffirmed that prosecution must prove specific role where single injury is found---Failure fatal to prosecution case. (c) Recovery of weapon ----Non-recovery---Corroboration---Allegation of firearm use not supported by recovery of weapon of offence from petitioner---Lack of corroborative evidence---Prosecution version weakened. (d) Motive ----Vague and ambiguous motive---Old enmity---Not established---Alleged motive jointly attributed without particulars---Evidence showed petitioner not involved in earlier incident relied upon for motive---Absence of motive further weakened prosecution case. (e) Abscondence ----Evidentiary value---Abscondence by itself not sufficient to sustain conviction---Fear of false implication or police torture may explain conduct---Abscondence cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. (f) Benefit of doubt ----Criminal jurisprudence---Single doubt sufficient for acquittal---Where multiple circumstances created serious doubt regarding prosecution version---Accused entitled to acquittal as of right. Cited cases: • Farman Ali and others v. The State, PLD 1980 SC 201 • Liaqat Hussain and others v. Falak Sher and others, 2003 SCMR 611 • Rahimullah Jan v. Kashif and another, PLD 2008 SC 298 • Tariq Pervez v. The State, 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State, 2009 SCMR 230 Disposition: Criminal Petition No.607 of 2020 converted into appeal; appeal allowed; judgments of the Trial Court dated 08.10.2019 and High Court of Balochistan dated 31.03.2020 set aside; petitioner acquitted of all charges by benefit of doubt; petitioner ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) & Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ----Ss. 302(b)/34, 324/34, 337-F(iii) PPC; Ss. 7(a), 7(c), 21-L ATA—Murder and terrorism charges—Standard of proof—Benefit of doubt. For one deceased and one injured, sixteen persons were implicated; thirteen co-accused stood acquitted at trial. Against the two petitioners, core features of the prosecution case suffered from material doubts: contradictions between ocular account and medical evidence; lack of corroboration from recoveries/forensics; and withholding of CCTV evidence from the courthouse scene. Held, where multiple material infirmities exist, benefit of doubt must go to the accused; convictions under PPC and ATA cannot rest on conjectures or inflated rosters of accused. Tariq Pervez v. State (1995 SCMR 1345); Muhammad Akram v. State (2009 SCMR 230) applied. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 129(g)—Withholding best evidence (CCTV)—Adverse inference. Occurrence was inside a courtroom; CCTV cameras were admittedly installed in the corridors and their presence inside the courtroom was disputed. Prosecution produced neither any report showing absence/non-function of cameras nor footage from corridor cameras to place the accused at the scene. Withholding such best evidence, without plausible explanation, warranted an adverse inference under Art. 129(g) QSO that the footage would not have supported the prosecution. Lal Khan v. State (2006 SCMR 1846); Riaz Ahmed v. State (2010 SCMR 846); Abdul Qadeer v. State (2024 SCMR 1146); Riasat Ali v. State (2024 SCMR 1224) followed. (c) Criminal evidence—Improvements vis-à-vis medical evidence—Credibility. Role initially assigned to Zafar Iqbal in the FIR (fire on “face”) was belied by the post-mortem; witnesses then introduced material “improvements” before the Trial Court to align with medical findings, and were confronted under s.161, Cr.P.C. Such dishonest improvements on material particulars erode credibility and cannot sustain conviction. Akhtar Ali v. State (2008 SCMR 6); Muhammad Rafique v. State (2010 SCMR 385) relied upon. (d) Forensic corroboration—Recovery. No weapon was recovered from Zafar Iqbal; the PFSA report regarding the pistol allegedly recovered at Azhar Iqbal’s pointing-out was negative. Prosecution thus lacked independent forensic corroboration of the ocular account. (e) Motive—Double-edged sword. Past enmity in prior murder cases, though asserted as motive, could not rescue a case otherwise rife with doubts and could also explain false implication via a wider net; convictions cannot be founded on motive alone where core proof fails. (f) Criminal Procedure—Victim’s locus / substitution of complainant. Crl.M.A. Nos. 2165 & 2166 of 2025 allowed: deceased complainant’s brother (also injured eye-witness) was permitted to contest and be heard through counsel. Cited Cases: • Tariq Pervez v. State (1995 SCMR 1345) • Muhammad Akram v. State (2009 SCMR 230) • Akhtar Ali v. State (2008 SCMR 6) • Muhammad Rafique v. State (2010 SCMR 385) • Lal Khan v. State (2006 SCMR 1846) • Riaz Ahmed v. State (2010 SCMR 846) • Abdul Qadeer v. State (2024 SCMR 1146) • Riasat Ali v. State (2024 SCMR 1224) Disposition: Crl.M.A. Nos. 2165 & 2166 of 2025 allowed (applicant permitted to contest). Crl.P. No. 189/2020 converted into appeal and allowed—Trial Court (05.12.2015) and High Court (04.12.2019) judgments set aside; Azhar Iqbal and Zafar Iqbal acquitted of all charges on benefit of doubt; to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Crl.P. Nos. 92-L/2020 & 1810-L/2019 (by complainant for enhancement/against acquittals) dismissed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b) read with Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129(g)—Homicide—Absence of post-mortem / death certificate—Effect. Prosecution proved that the accused (petitioner) fired upon the victim causing three firearm injuries (right neck, right chest, right arm). However, no post-mortem was conducted, no Medical Officer deposed to the cause/date of death, and even the death certificate was withheld. Adverse inference under Art. 129(g) QSO was drawn against the prosecution for suppressing the best evidence. In such circumstances, conviction for murder under S. 302(b) PPC could not be sustained merely on presumptions or probabilities that the injuries resulted in death. Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600), Ghulam Qadir v. The State (2008 SCMR 1221), Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan (PLD 2006 SC 538), and Muhammad Luqman v. The State (PLD 1970 SC 10) relied upon; principle that conjectures/probabilities cannot replace proof reiterated. Further reliance on Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846) as to withholding of material evidence; and Gul Muhammad v. The State (2021 SCMR 381) that external examination is not a substitute for post-mortem where cause of death is in issue. (b) Criminal jurisprudence ----Benefit of doubt—Standard of proof—Scope. Where a single material infirmity (non-production of mandatory medical evidence of death) creates reasonable doubt about the charge of homicide, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. Prosecution’s burden to prove each charge beyond reasonable doubt does not shift to the accused. Ghulam Qadir (2008 SCMR 1221), Naveed Asghar (PLD 2021 SC 600) reaffirmed. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 324 & 337-L(i)—Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd—Causing hurt by firearm—Proof and sentencing. Ocular account of natural witnesses (PW-1 complainant and PW-2 paternal uncle) was confidence-inspiring; occurrence was promptly reported (FIR within ~2 hours; distance 7/8 km); medical evidence (PW-5) noted three firearm injuries; recovery of TT pistol at accused’s pointation with positive FSL corroboration (Exh. P/6-G). Even though motive remained unproved, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally caused firearm injuries on vital parts, attracting S. 324 PPC. In absence of declared nature of hurt by the Medical Officer, S. 337-L(i) PPC was also attracted. (d) Evidence—Ocular, medical and corroborative ----Prompt FIR—Natural presence—Weapon recovery—Forensic corroboration. House-occurrence; presence of inmate PW-1 and close-by PW-2 held natural; cross-examination did not shake their testimony. Prompt FIR added assurance. Recovery of weapon and positive FSL provided independent corroboration of the prosecution’s ocular account regarding causing injuries. Cited Cases: • Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846) • Riaz Ahmed v. The State (2010 SCMR 846) • Abdul Qadeer v. The State (2024 SCMR 1146) • Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224) • Gul Muhammad v. The State (2021 SCMR 381) • Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600) • Ghulam Qadir v. The State (2008 SCMR 1221) • Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan (PLD 2006 SC 538) • Muhammad Luqman v. The State (PLD 1970 SC 10) Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and partly allowed. Conviction and sentence under S. 302(b) PPC set aside. Appellant convicted under S. 324 PPC and sentenced to 10 years’ RI with fine Rs. 50,000 (SI 6 months in default). Appellant further convicted under S. 337-L(i) PPC and sentenced to 7 years’ RI with Daman Rs. 100,000 payable to legal heirs (non-payment to be dealt with per S. 337-Y(2) PPC). Compensation under S. 544-A Cr.P.C. as ordered by Trial Court and upheld by High Court maintained. Benefit of S. 382-B Cr.P.C. extended.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Ss. 497(1) & 497(2) — Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) — Ss. 337-A(iii), 337-L(2), 337-N(2), 148 & 149 — Post-arrest bail — Scope and considerations. Where an injury falling under S. 337-A(iii), P.P.C. (Shajjah-i-Hashimah) was attributed to the accused, the High Court declined bail solely on the ground that the case fell within the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), Cr.P.C. — Held, that such approach was erroneous. The medical certificate merely reflected “external nasal deformity and bony crepitus,” and under S. 337-N(2), P.P.C., imprisonment by way of Ta’zir may only be imposed if the offender is shown to be a previous convict, habitual, hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal, or if the act was committed in the name or on the pretext of honour. — In the absence of such findings by the trial or appellate courts, no lawful imprisonment under Ta’zir could be imposed. — Consequently, the case of the petitioner attracted S. 337-N(2), P.P.C., making his incarceration unjustified at the bail stage. — Reliance placed on Abdul Wahab v. The State (2019 SCMR 516). (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 497(2) — Further inquiry — Grant of bail. Held, that the question whether S. 337-A(iii) P.P.C. truly attracted the prohibitory clause required further inquiry under S. 497(2), Cr.P.C., particularly when the petitioner was in custody since 24-04-2025, no recovery was to be made from him, and trial proceedings were unlikely to conclude soon. The unexplained 14-day delay in lodging the F.I.R. prima facie rendered the prosecution’s version doubtful and susceptible to deliberation or consultation. Background of prior enmity between parties reinforced the requirement of cautious judicial scrutiny. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 497 — Principle of consistency — Co-accused granted bail. Where a co-accused in the same case had already been granted bail, the petitioner was entitled to the same concession on grounds of consistency, there being no distinguishing features. (d) Criminal law — Bail as a rule and refusal as exception. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the gravity or heinousness of an alleged offence alone is not a sufficient ground for refusal of bail if the circumstances otherwise call for further inquiry into the guilt of the accused. Bail cannot be withheld as a substitute for punishment. Reference made to Husnain Mustafa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1914). (e) Delay in lodging F.I.R. — Effect. An unexplained delay of 14 days in registration of F.I.R. undermined the spontaneity of the occurrence, introduced doubt about the prosecution story, and created room for deliberation and fabrication — such delay strengthened the case for bail. (f) Disposition. — Petition converted into appeal and allowed. — Orders of the courts below set aside. — Petitioner admitted to post-arrest bail on furnishing surety bond of Rs.100,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. — Prosecution at liberty to seek cancellation of bail in case of misuse. — Observations made were tentative and confined to bail determination. Held: Petition allowed; bail granted.