Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D, 337-F(i) & 337-F(ii)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342, 382-B & 544—Sentence of death—Commutation—Subsequent mental illness—Schizophrenia—Supervening and mitigating circumstance—The appellant was convicted for the murder of three minor sons of the complainant, who was his real brother, and for causing knife injuries to the complainant’s wife. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution case stood proved beyond doubt through the natural and confidence-inspiring ocular account of the injured mother, corroborated by the complainant and other witnesses as well as by medical evidence. The Court observed that, in the circumstances of the case, false implication was wholly improbable, particularly where the bereaved parents themselves were witnesses to the murder of their own children. The conviction on merits was, therefore, maintained. However, on the question of sentence, the Court held that although nothing had been brought on record to establish that at the time of commission of the offence the appellant was suffering from such mental infirmity as would impair his criminal responsibility, the subsequent medical evaluation ordered by the Court conclusively established that he was suffering from schizophrenia and was under treatment requiring regular follow-up. In these circumstances, the appellant’s diagnosed mental illness constituted a supervening and mitigating circumstance warranting commutation of the sentence of death to imprisonment for life on all three counts of murder. Criminal law—Mental illness—Execution of mentally ill convict—Humanity and conscience of law—The Supreme Court held that execution of a person suffering from profound mental illness offends the dictates of humanity and the settled conscience of law. The Court emphasized that the death penalty is premised on retribution and deterrence, both of which assume the offender’s rational capacity to comprehend the nature and wrongfulness of conduct and to be influenced by punishment. A person afflicted with severe mental illness, particularly one suffering from delusion or psychosis, stands outside these assumptions. Therefore, while such illness may not necessarily erase criminal liability for the past act in the absence of proof regarding the accused’s condition at the time of occurrence, it may nevertheless operate as a supervening factor rendering execution inhumane and unjust. The Court observed that when the State executes a person whose mental illness has eroded his capacity for reason, the punishment ceases to reflect the majesty of justice and instead becomes an exhibition of cruelty inconsistent with law. Evidence and procedure—Medical Board constituted by Supreme Court—Psychiatric evaluation—Schizophrenia established—The Court took note of the appellant’s assertion in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C. that the occurrence was linked to “mental health disorder” and, acting on that plea, directed constitution of a Medical Board. Pursuant to the Court’s order, the Punjab Institute of Mental Health, Lahore constituted a Board of Certification, admitted the appellant for comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, and reported that according to history and psychological assessment he was suffering from schizophrenia, was under treatment, and required regular follow-up for maintenance treatment. The Court treated this medical opinion as sufficient to establish the appellant’s present mental condition for purposes of sentence, though not for negating criminal responsibility at the time of the offence. Sentence—Concurrent running of sentences—Benefit under S. 382-B, Cr.P.C.—Directions for treatment in custody—While partially allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts, maintained all other sentences awarded by the courts below, and directed that all sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was also extended to the appellant. The jail authorities were further directed to ensure provision of necessary medical treatment in accordance with the appellant’s diagnosed mental condition, including referral to the concerned medical facility where specialized care may be required, and to adopt suitable precautionary and supervisory measures so that the appellant does not pose a threat to other inmates and his custody and treatment remain consistent with prison regulations and medical advice. Case references—The Court referred to and relied upon the following authorities and materials: Sir Edward Coke’s statement in The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1797); Ford v. Wainwright (477 U.S. 399, 1986); Panetti v. Quarterman (551 U.S. 930, 2007); Madison v. Alabama (586 U.S. ___, 2019); and Safia Bano’s case (PLD 2021 SC 488). These authorities were cited to affirm the settled principle that execution of a person who is insane or mentally incompetent is contrary to law, humanity, and fundamental human dignity, and that mental unsoundness may constitute a supervening circumstance justifying commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Appeal partially allowed—Death sentence commuted to imprisonment for life—Conviction and remaining sentences maintained—The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder and allied offences, but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts on account of his established schizophrenia as a supervening and mitigating circumstance. All remaining sentences were maintained, to run concurrently, with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and with further directions for continued psychiatric treatment and custodial supervision.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—S. 302(b)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342 & 544-A—Murder case—Appraisal of ocular account—Chance witnesses—Benefit of doubt—Acquittal—The Supreme Court held that where the prosecution case rests upon the testimony of alleged eyewitnesses who, in the ordinary course of events, would not be expected to be present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time, such witnesses fall within the category of chance witnesses and their evidence must be scrutinized with greater caution. In the present case, the complainant and his brother, both sons of the deceased, claimed to have witnessed the occurrence at 11:30 a.m., despite the fact that one was a mechanic at Pirmahal and the other a labourer working in village lands. The Court held that they failed to furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation for their presence at the spot, and their conduct during and after the occurrence was highly unnatural. Their silence while their mother was fired at, failure to make any meaningful resistance, omission to take immediate steps for her removal, and the unexplained delay of about two hours in reporting the matter materially impaired the credibility of their testimony. The ocular account was, therefore, held to be doubtful and unsafe for sustaining conviction without independent corroboration. Criminal evidence—Chance witness—Test of credibility—The Supreme Court elaborated that a chance witness is one who, in the normal pursuit of life, would not ordinarily be present at the place of occurrence but claims such presence by chance. The Court held that testimony of such a witness is admissible, yet it cannot be accepted as a matter of course and must be assessed in the light of natural conduct, surrounding circumstances, and available corroboration. A satisfactory, probable, and natural explanation of presence is indispensable; failing that, the testimony becomes unsafe to rely upon, especially in cases involving severe punishment. The Court reaffirmed that criminal liability cannot be founded upon doubtful or inherently improbable evidence and that, in case of doubt, benefit must accrue to the accused. Investigation—Successive inquiries declaring accused innocent—Evidentiary value of consistent investigative findings—The Supreme Court held that although courts are not bound by the mere opinion of the investigating agency and must independently appraise the evidence, consistent findings recorded through successive investigations by different officers and verified by senior supervisory authorities cannot be brushed aside without cogent reasons. In the present case, the petitioner-convict had repeatedly been found innocent during investigation, and it had surfaced that the actual assailant was his father, Akhtar Ali, while the petitioner himself was present in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court noted that this conclusion had been successively scrutinized and verified at various levels, including by officers of the Investigation Branch and the office of the I.G. Punjab. In the absence of any evidence of mala fide, collusion, or extraneous influence on the part of the investigating officers, such consistent investigative findings were held to carry persuasive value and to lend support to the defence plea. Defence plea—Presence of accused elsewhere at the relevant time—Support from investigative material—The Supreme Court observed that in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C., the petitioner-convict admitted the occurrence but stated that his aunt, the deceased, had been killed by his father Akhtar Ali and that he himself was on duty in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court held that this plea was not a bald denial but found support from investigative material, including statements recorded by the investigating officers from the owner of the hotel in Lahore, who confirmed the petitioner’s presence there on the date and time of occurrence. This circumstance, when read with the doubtful ocular account and other infirmities in the prosecution case, further strengthened the entitlement of the petitioner to benefit of doubt. Benefit of doubt—Right of accused—The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of petitioner-convict Muhammad Nadeem through cogent, reliable, and confidence-inspiring evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The doubtful testimony of chance witnesses, contradictions in their account, unnatural conduct, absence of independent corroboration, and the consistent investigative material affirming the petitioner’s absence from the place of occurrence created serious doubt regarding his involvement. In such circumstances, the Court held that benefit of doubt was to be extended to the accused as a matter of right and not of grace. Case references—No specific reported precedent was expressly cited by name in the judgment text provided. The Court discussed and applied settled principles relating to chance witnesses, cautious appraisal of ocular account, non-binding yet persuasive value of consistent investigative findings, and the rule that benefit of doubt must go to the accused; however, no reported case law was specifically mentioned in the text, and none should therefore be added as cited authority. Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 converted into appeal and allowed—Conviction and sentence set aside—Acquittal—The Supreme Court converted Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 into an appeal, allowed the same, set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner-convict recorded by the courts below, and acquitted him of the charge, with direction for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No. 305-L of 2018 dismissed as infructuous—Leave refused—In view of the acquittal of the respondent-convict, the complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence became infructuous and was dismissed, with leave refused.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S.302(b)--- Murder---Proof---Ocular and medical evidence---Concurrent findings---Occurrence proved from record and depositions---Accused held to have caused death of Sadiq Mehboob and injury to Anees Ahmad---Ocular account and medical evidence found mutually supportive---Post-mortem injuries indicating firearm wounds on chest, lip and arm; lungs and heart ruptured; death due to severe bleeding---Conviction upheld. (b) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S.324--- Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd/causing injury by firearm---Injured witness and medical corroboration---Injury to Anees Ahmad proved through medical evidence and ocular account---Conviction and sentence maintained. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S.342--- Statement of accused---Trial process---Trial Court examined multiple prosecution witnesses and recorded statement of accused under S.342, Cr.P.C.---Trial concluded with conviction and sentences. (d) Evidence appreciation in murder trials ----Ocular account---Medical corroboration---Interested/chance witnesses---Contradictions--- Accused’s plea of false implication, interested/chance witnesses and contradictions not accepted---Court held that commission of offence stood proved and that ocular account and medical evidence corroborated each other---No legal basis found to extend benefit of doubt for acquittal in presence of sufficient incriminating evidence connecting accused with offence. (e) Motive ----Prosecution allegation not proved---Effect--- Motive alleged as prior killings of complainant’s brother and uncle and alleged compromise restraining accused from entering Kundian city---Held: prosecution failed to prove motive as no supporting record of prior case, no compromise document, and no proof of alleged restraint produced---Absence of proved motive treated as relevant factor while determining appropriate sentence. (f) Recovery and forensic evidence ----Weapon and motorcycle---Evidentiary value--- Recovery of gun held doubtful/inconsequential---Forensic Science Laboratory report only showed weapon was in working condition; no evidence produced to connect weapon with commission of offence---Manner of arrest and recovery on 30.07.2011 rendered recovery doubtful---Recovery/ownership of motorcycle not properly established as no registration/ownership record produced. (g) Sentencing ----Death penalty and life imprisonment---Mitigating deficiencies---Principles--- Where motive and recovery were not proved and recoveries were doubtful, case held to fall in category warranting life imprisonment rather than death penalty---However, notwithstanding absence of motive and weak recovery, other evidence (ocular account, medical corroboration, depositions) sufficiently connected accused with offence; therefore neither acquittal nor enhancement to death sentence justified. Cited Cases: • Ahsin Ali v. The State (2025 SCMR 1367). • Fida Hussain v. The State (2025 SCMR 993). • Muhammad Yasin v. The State (2024 SCMR 128). (h) Criminal petition for enhancement ----Life to death---Non-sustainability--- Complainant’s petition seeking enhancement from life imprisonment to death penalty declined---Held: in absence of proved motive and reliable recovery, death penalty not warranted; High Court’s conversion of death sentence to life imprisonment remained justified. Disposition: Jail Petition No. 872 of 2017 and Criminal Petition No. 1642-L of 2017 dismissed; High Court judgment dated 06.11.2017 converting death sentence to life imprisonment and maintaining other convictions/sentences upheld; no acquittal granted and no enhancement to death sentence allowed. (Order dated 03.12.2025).

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b) & 302(c)---Murder---Single firearm shot in sudden quarrel---No premeditation---Case falling within ambit of clause (c)---Held, though prosecution proved actus reus through confidence-inspiring ocular and supporting medical evidence, attending circumstances showed occurrence took place on spur of the moment without prior planning; conviction under S.302(b) converted to S.302(c); sentence modified accordingly. (b) Criminal trial ----Ocular account---Related witnesses---Credibility---Complainant father and paternal uncle of deceased as eye-witnesses---Occurrence in broad daylight---Accused co-villager known to witnesses---Cross-examination failed to shake testimony---Held, mere relationship not a ground to discard evidence where presence is natural, statements are consistent on material particulars and inspire confidence; substitution of real offender with innocent person by close relatives treated as highly improbable. (c) Medical evidence ----Postmortem---Corroboration---Single firearm entry wound on chest with corresponding exit---Injury sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature---Held, medical evidence materially supported ocular account and reinforced reliability of prosecution witnesses. (d) Motive and forensic recovery ----Motive---Non-proof---Effect---FSL report and ballistic linkage---Transmission defect (empties and weapon sent together)---Held, non-proof of motive and inconsequential forensic linkage did not dent trustworthy ocular and medical evidence regarding occurrence, but were treated as mitigating circumstances while considering quantum of punishment. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 342 & S. 340(2)---Defence plea---Accidental discharge by others; shop allegedly closed; accused claimed he helped shift injured---Defence evidence produced at trial stage---Held, defence plea was belated and unsupported by contemporaneous assertion during investigation; defence witnesses never approached IO or higher authorities; site plan showing blood recovery inside shuttered portion of accused’s shop contradicted plea that shop was closed; defence treated as afterthought and rightly discarded. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(c)---Scope---Judicial discretion---Clause (c) intended to cover cases earlier falling under exceptions to old S.300 read with old S.304---Held, determination under S.302(c) is case-specific; where homicide occurs without premeditation in sudden fight/heat of passion and without undue advantage or cruel/unusual manner, it falls within clause (c) (aligned with Exception 4 to old S.300). Cited Cases: • Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad and another PLD 1996 SC 274 • Azmat Ullah v. The State 2014 SCMR 1178 • Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487 Disposition: Criminal Appeal No.503 of 2022 was partly allowed; conviction under section 302(b) PPC was converted to conviction under section 302(c) PPC and sentence modified to twenty years rigorous imprisonment; compensation and sentence in default remained intact; benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. granted. Criminal Appeal No.504 of 2022 for enhancement became infructuous and was dismissed.

Summary: Acquittal --- (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 295-C—Blasphemy—Mens rea—Mental disorder—Benefit of doubt—Held, conviction under S. 295-C being penal and capital requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of both actus reus and mens rea—Medical Board (constituted per Supreme Court directions) diagnosed the appellant with Bipolar Affective Disorder, with contemporaneous symptoms of hypomania, grandiose/paranoid delusions and auditory hallucinations; the contents of the impugned letters themselves reflected delusional grandeur and flight of ideas—Medical opinion created a serious doubt regarding the existence of criminal intent at the relevant time; such doubt must go to the accused—Conviction and death sentence set aside; appellant acquitted. (b) Criminal law—Mental illness & criminal responsibility ----Safia Bano’s case applied—Constitution of Medical Board—Diagnosis and retrospective assessment—Where an accredited Board opined that, at the time of the alleged offence, the accused likely acted under delusional beliefs/hallucinations consistent with Bipolar Affective Disorder, the presumption of sanity is rebutted sufficiently to raise reasonable doubt as to mens rea—Benefit of doubt extended; capital conviction cannot stand. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 243 & 342—Plea of guilty/statement of accused—Prosecution’s burden—Even where an accused pleads guilty or admits authorship of a document, the prosecution’s duty to prove all ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt persists—Failure to secure timely psychiatric evaluation; complainant SHO and investigating officer did not testify; proof that letters were communicated to copied recipients lacking—Prosecution shortcomings reinforced the doubt already raised by medical evidence. (d) Religious freedom / Evidentiary context ----Propagating own faith—Limits—Council of Islamic Ideology (interim report) noted that all faiths may be professed/practised/propagated subject to law and without encroaching others’ beliefs—On the facts, the letters were suffused with delusional assertions (e.g., claims to kingship of Israel, prophetic self-identification), corroborating the medical finding of disorder and undermining culpable intent rather than proving deliberate transgression. (e) Prisoners—Health care ----Treatment continuity—Appellant (over 74 years; incarcerated ~23 years, mostly on death row) had shown improvement on medication; Executive Director, Punjab Institute of Mental Health, directed to ensure treatment is not discontinued. Held: Medical Board’s diagnosis and the letters’ content created reasonable doubt as to mens rea for S. 295-C; prosecution otherwise failed to dispel doubt. Benefit of doubt extended; convictions of the Trial Court (18.07.2002) and High Court (30.06.2014) set aside. Appellant acquitted and to be released forthwith if not required in any other case; psychiatric treatment to continue. Cited Cases: • Safia Bano v. Home Department, Government of Punjab & others, PLD 2021 SC 488. Disposition: Appeal allowed—Conviction and death sentence set aside; appellant acquitted and released, treatment to continue.

Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----Ss. 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d) & 7(i); Explosive Substances Act, 1908----Ss. 3, 4 & 5-A; Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898)----Ss. 164, 173, 265-H(2), 342, 497(2) & 544-A----Terrorism case---Bomb blast outside PIDC House, Karachi, causing five deaths, injuries to more than twenty persons and extensive damage to property---Appellants arrested in a separate explosives case and then formally shown arrested in the present case---Convicted by Anti-Terrorism Court and sentenced to death on four counts with multiple terms of imprisonment, fines, forfeiture of property and compensation; conviction and sentences upheld by High Court; reference for confirmation of death sentence answered in affirmative---Reappraisal of evidence by Supreme Court---Held, that prosecution case rested essentially on (i) testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses who claimed to have seen the appellants park the explosive-laden vehicle and leave in another car, (ii) a test identification parade, and (iii) judicial confessions recorded under S.164, Cr.P.C.---On independent scrutiny, presence of alleged eyewitnesses at the crime scene remained doubtful; their omission from the crime report and failure to immediately disclose material facts to the complainant (an officer of the same police station), inconsistency regarding the time and circumstances of parking of the vehicle, lack of independent proof of their duty or presence at the site, and their failure to provide concrete particulars of the vehicles or accused rendered their testimony not confidence-inspiring---Test identification proceedings were conducted jointly for three accused with dissimilar dummies, possible exposure of accused to witnesses prior to parade, and without recording or ascribing distinct roles of each accused, contrary to settled principles---Judicial confessions were recorded after an unexplained delay of nearly three weeks while appellants remained in police custody; no safeguards or precautionary measures were shown to have been taken by the Magistrate to ensure voluntariness; statements were sketchy, devoid of details of commission of offence or specific individuals, were later retracted and stood contradicted by other prosecution evidence---Investigation itself was tainted by failure to secure and produce complete CCTV footage from the highly surveilled area, thereby withholding the best available evidence without explanation---In such circumstances prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; benefit of doubt must go to the accused even if arising from a single circumstance---Conviction and sentences of appellants set aside; they were acquitted of all charges and death sentences not confirmed. Cited cases: Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others (2016 SCMR 274); Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 704); Majeed v. The State (2010 SCMR 55); Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob and others v. The State and others (1992 SCMR 1983); Mst. Naseem Akhtar and another v. The State (1999 SCMR 1744); Shamoon alias Shamma v. The State (1995 SCMR 1377); Naseer Hussain v. Nawaz and others (1994 SCMR 1504). (b) Criminal trial---Eyewitnesses---Non-mention in first information report and unexplained silence---Effect---Complainant, a Station House Officer who reached the spot immediately after the blast, lodged crime report giving details of place, time and vehicle used, but did not mention the presence of traffic constable (PW-26) or taxi driver (PW-25) who later claimed to be eyewitnesses or that any person had seen the perpetrators park the vehicle---Traffic constable (PW-26), being a police official of the same station, admitted that he returned to the scene after the blast and remained there but did not disclose to the complainant or investigating officer that he had allegedly seen the accused; crime report noted that the car had been parked at “unknown time” which conflicted with his statement---No independent proof (such as duty roster) was produced to show that he was posted on duty at the relevant point---Taxi driver (PW-25) was also not named in the crime report or by any official; prosecution failed to prove he was actually driving a taxi or present at the spot---He admitted that he did not provide physical descriptions or features of the perpetrators except a vague reference to their “accent”, even though his own version showed that he never conversed with them; description of vehicle as “biscuity-coloured Suzuki Mehran” was inconsistent with other evidence---Such unexplained omissions, contradictions and lack of corroboration rendered presence of both witnesses at the scene doubtful---Held, that evidence of such witnesses was not confidence-inspiring and could not safely be relied upon for sustaining conviction in a capital terrorism case. (c) Criminal trial----Test identification parade----Joint parade; dissimilar dummies; possible prior exposure; omission to allocate roles---Effect---Proceedings of test identification parade were conducted by Judicial Magistrate (PW-24)---It stood admitted that all three accused were lined up together in a single parade amongst only twelve dummies, who did not have similar features or physical characteristics; accused were seated in the court corridor before proceedings thereby creating serious likelihood of prior exposure to witnesses; Magistrate did not record any precautionary measures to exclude possibility of such exposure; testimony and memorandum did not reflect that respective roles of the accused in the occurrence were either elicited or recorded; custody of appellants remained with CIA/police officials for several days prior to identification and prosecution did not establish that witnesses had no opportunity to see them earlier---Held, that identification parade was not conducted in accordance with settled law and principles laid down by Supreme Court; such defective proceedings were of no evidentiary value and could not be made the basis of conviction. Cited case: Kanwar Anwaar Ali (PLD 2019 SC 488). (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (X of 1984)----Art. 22----Identification parade---Nature and evidentiary value---Requirement of scrupulous care---Identification test is one of the modes of proof contemplated by Art.22 and is essentially corroborative in character; it is designed to enable a witness to identify the real offender and to exclude the possibility of witness merely confirming a vague impression or faint recollection; it must, therefore, be conducted with scrupulous care, fairness and regard to the exigencies of each case so that proceedings do not become collusive or suggestive---Where such parade is held jointly for multiple accused, with dissimilar dummies, without precautions against prior exposure and without recording individual roles, it loses all probative force and cannot be treated as corroboration of a doubtful ocular account. Cited cases: Muhammad Siddique and others v. The State (2020 SCMR 342); Javed Khan Bacha v. The State (2017 SCMR 524); Subha Sadiq v. The State (2025 SCMR 50). (e) Criminal trial----Judicial confession---Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898)----S. 164----Voluntariness, delay and police custody---Retraction---Requirement that confession be accepted or rejected as a whole---Scope---Appellants were arrested on 16-11-2005 in a separate explosives case and remained in police custody; prosecution alleged that they confessed their involvement in present case before police but investigating officer of that case was not produced as witness---They were brought before Magistrate on 23-11-2005 for test identification parade yet no expressed desire to confess was recorded; statements under S.164, Cr.P.C. were ultimately recorded on 05-12-2005, almost three weeks after arrest---Such unexplained delay while in police custody, absence of assurance by Magistrate that they would not be remanded back to police, and lack of material precautions rendered voluntariness highly doubtful---Contents of alleged confessions were cryptic and devoid of particulars; they merely stated that act was done at instance of unnamed “Sardars” and did not furnish details of planning, execution, means or identity of alleged instigators; description of vehicle in confession was contradicted by prosecution’s own witness; appellants later retracted from such statements---Held, that prosecution failed to establish that judicial confessions were voluntary, true and free from duress, coercion, inducement or influence of any kind; such statements could not legally form basis of conviction, particularly when prosecution case otherwise stood discredited---Further held, when prosecution’s story is rejected and conviction is sought to be rested solely on confession, the statement must be accepted or rejected as a whole; court cannot pick and choose parts of a confession to suit prosecution while discarding exculpatory portions. Cited cases: Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others (2016 SCMR 274); Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 704); Majeed v. The State (2010 SCMR 55); Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob and others v. The State and others (1992 SCMR 1983); Mst. Naseem Akhtar and another v. The State (1999 SCMR 1744); Shamoon alias Shamma v. The State (1995 SCMR 1377); Naseer Hussain v. Nawaz and others (1994 SCMR 1504). (f) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (X of 1984)----Art. 129(g)----Withholding best evidence---Adverse inference---Occurrence took place in front of PIDC House where offices of Karachi Electric Supply Company, branches of various commercial banks and an outlet of international fast-food chain were situated---Given nature of locality, likelihood of multiple CCTV cameras was obvious; investigating officer obtained only a limited portion of footage from camera installed outside PIDC House, which was confined to moment of explosion and resulting damage---Record indicated that camera was fully functional and had captured entire sequence of events prior to blast but neither complete footage from that camera nor footage from other cameras in vicinity was obtained or produced; no plausible explanation was offered for such omission---Held, that prosecution had deliberately withheld the best available evidence which could have conclusively shown presence or absence of eyewitnesses and perpetrators at relevant time; Court was justified in drawing adverse inference under Art.129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 that had such evidence been produced it would not have supported prosecution case. Cited cases: Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846); Zafar Abbas v. The State (2010 SCMR 939); Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224); Muhammad Rizwan v. The State (2025 SCMR 762). (g) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 212----Criminal justice system---Wrongful incarceration due to defective investigation, flawed appreciation of evidence and delay---State liability to compensate and rehabilitate victims of miscarriage of justice---Scope---Appellants, aged about 27 and 37 years at time of their arrest, remained incarcerated for more than two decades on capital charges, ultimately to be acquitted on ground of total failure of prosecution to prove case; investigation did not meet basic standards of fairness or diligence, no serious effort was made to trace actual perpetrators of heinous terrorist act, and two young citizens were made scapegoats; trial and appeal before High Court consumed inordinate time and fixation of matter before Supreme Court was unjustifiably delayed---Held, that such prolonged and unjust imprisonment entailed irretrievable loss of more than twenty years of life, careers, livelihoods, family and social relationships and inflicted deep psychological trauma; process of justice itself became an instrument of oppression; this constituted a grave breach of State’s duty of care towards its citizens and was an indictment of criminal justice system---Authority of State, exercised through investigation, prosecution and judiciary, carries corresponding obligation to safeguard life, liberty and dignity of every person; Art.212 of the Constitution reinforces a constitutional right to seek compensation for tortious acts of government and public functionaries and provides a remedy against public wrongs, ensuring that State cannot act with impunity when its failures cause harm---In light of constitutional mandate, it is incumbent upon governments, as representatives of State, to take immediate, effective steps for compensation, rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of miscarriage of justice; such measures are constitutional obligations, not charity---Governments may consider enactment of legislation providing a structured mechanism to compensate, rehabilitate and assist such victims and to hold public functionaries accountable where breach of duty is established. (h) Criminal procedure----Appeal/leave against acquittal----Scope and considerations----Double presumption of innocence---Criminal Petition No.74-K of 2020 filed by State challenging High Court judgment acquitting accused (Abdul Hameed Bugti) of charges arising from same occurrence---Held, that case against said accused was essentially one of no evidence; learned Additional Prosecutor General failed to point out any instance of misreading or non-reading of evidence or any perversity in reasoning of High Court; where two views are possible on appreciation of evidence, the one favouring accused must prevail in an acquittal matter---An acquittal carries double presumption of innocence; interference by Supreme Court is justified only where findings of acquittal are shown to be blatantly perverse, arbitrary, capricious, speculative, shocking, illegal or based on impossibility; scope of interference in acquittal is profoundly narrow and limited and is resorted to only in exceptional cases---Since no question of law arose and no legal or factual defect in impugned judgment was demonstrated, leave to appeal was refused and State’s criminal petition was dismissed. Cited cases: Mst. Askar Jan v. Muhammad Daud (2010 SCMR 1604); Jehangir v. Aminullah (2010 SCMR 491); Haji Amanullah v. Munir Ahmed (2010 SCMR 222); State v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh (2021 SCMR 873); The State v. Anwar Saifullah Khan (PLD 2016 SC 276); State v. Abdul Khaloq (PLD 2011 SC 554).

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 148, 149, 337-F(iii), 109—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342—Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129(g)—Murder and hurt—Aggressor theory—Benefit of doubt. For one deceased and one injured, twelve persons were implicated. The incident occurred in front of the co-accused’s house; several members of the accused party also sustained firearm injuries, one medically verified and others admitted by the investigating officer. Prosecution suppressed this material fact, undermining its credibility. The admitted presence of injuries on accused persons and the location of occurrence near their house made it probable that the complainant party was the aggressor. Suppression of such evidence rendered the prosecution witnesses untrustworthy. Muhammad Yaqoob v. Manzoor Hussain (2008 SCMR 1549), Ghulam Nabi v. Ikram alias Kama (2020 SCMR 477), Muhammad Iqbal v. Abid Hussain (1994 SCMR 1928), Nasrullah v. State (1985 SCMR 1715) and Muhammad Ramzan v. State (2021 SCMR 655) relied upon. (b) Recovery and forensic corroboration—Empties deposited after arrest—Evidentiary value. Recovery of 12-bore gun and PFSA report were disbelieved where empties were recovered on 23-08-2012 but deposited in the forensic laboratory on 28-08-2012, after the appellant’s arrest. Such sequence made the forensic link doubtful. Muhammad Amin v. State (2019 SCMR 2057) and Asad Rehmat v. State (2019 SCMR 1156) followed. (c) Motive—Joint and unproved. Prosecution alleged a quarrel and exchange of abuses two days earlier as common motive against all accused. Ten co-accused had already been acquitted and no specific motive was attributed to the appellant. High Court had also disbelieved motive. Absence of motive further weakened prosecution case. (d) Defence plea—Standard of proof. Where the accused demonstrates reasonable possibility of an alternate version, even by cross-examination or admitted circumstances, benefit of doubt must follow. Defence is not required to prove its plea beyond reasonable doubt; it suffices to create reasonable doubt in prosecution story. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. State (PLD 2009 SC 814), Rashid Ahmad v. State (2001 SCMR 41), and Muhammad Nazir v. Tariq (1992 SCMR 1983) referred. (e) Prosecution witnesses—Unreliability due to suppression of material facts. Prosecution’s failure to disclose injuries on accused side, coupled with inconsistencies in recoveries and motive, demonstrated deliberate suppression, warranting rejection of their testimony. (f) Benefit of doubt—Principle reaffirmed. If a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted; here, numerous infirmities rendered the case doubtful. Tariq Pervez v. State (1995 SCMR 1345) and Muhammad Akram v. State (2009 SCMR 230) applied. Disposition: Crl. A. No. 57 of 2021 allowed—Trial Court and High Court judgments dated 27-03-2017 and 19-11-2018 set aside—Iftikhar Ahmed alias Papu acquitted of all charges and to be released forthwith unless required in another case. Crl. A. No. 58 of 2021 (for enhancement/against acquittal) dismissed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- ----S. 302(b); Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 40; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 164, 342, 382-B; Criminal jurisprudence—Circumstantial evidence—“Last seen” theory—Standards and application—Unwitnessed murder case founded on last-seen plus recoveries and FSL—Held, prosecution failed to establish a complete, unbroken chain of incriminating circumstances; substantial time-gap between last-seen (22.09.2020 at 8:30 p.m.) and death (post-mortem 23.09.2020 at 6:30 p.m.; time of death not fixed with certainty) did not exclude third-party intervention—Mere last-seen is insufficient without cogent corroboration (motive, proximity, airtight timeline)—Benefit of doubt extended. Principles in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, AIR 1984 SC 1622, and Sh. Muhammad Amjad, PLD 2003 SC 704, applied; elements reiterated in Fayyaz Ahmad, 2017 SCMR 2026. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ---- ----Art. 40—Disclosure/pointation and recoveries—Evidentiary worth—Dead-body recovery portrayed as made on joint disclosure of accused on 23.09.2020, yet disclosure memo was prepared on 05.10.2020 with no plausible explanation—Such delay and “joint pointation” render the recovery legally infirm—Recovery on joint pointation held inadmissible; planting suspected. Muhammad Riaz v. State, 2024 SCMR 1839, and Muhammad Mushtaq v. Mustansar Hussain, 2016 SCMR 2123, followed. (c) Forensic science evidence ---- ----Chain of custody and reliability—Crime empty recovered on 23.09.2020; pistol allegedly recovered on 05.10.2020; both kept together in malkhana and dispatched to FSL only on 04.11.2020—Chain-of-custody lapses fatally undermine matching report—Recovery is at best corroborative and cannot by itself sustain conviction; tainted item cannot corroborate another tainted piece. Ali Sher v. The State, 2008 SCMR 707, applied. (d) Criminal trial ---- ----Confession of co-accused under S. 164, Cr.P.C.—Evidentiary value—Confession recorded after 14–15 days’ police custody was exculpatory/retracted and could not constitute substantive evidence against the petitioner; at most usable for assurance if independent evidence inspires confidence—Where other evidence is weak/unsafe, co-accused confession cannot fill gaps—Presumption of innocence prevails. Hari Charan Kurmi, AIR 1964 SC 1184, relied on. (e) Criminal appellate jurisdiction ---- ----Concurrent findings—Reappraisal by Supreme Court—Scope—Although the Court ordinarily refrains from re-evaluating evidence where concurrent findings exist, intervention is warranted on perversity, illegality, material irregularity, or miscarriage of justice—Material infirmities in last-seen timeline, disclosure/recovery, FSL handling, and non-proof of motorcycle sale warranted interference and acquittal. Held, prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt; chain of circumstances was incomplete. Criminal Petition No. 63-Q of 2024 converted into appeal and allowed; convictions dated 08.06.2022 and 29.10.2024 set aside; appellant Osama acquitted and to be released if not required in any other case. Consequent thereto, Criminal Petition No. 64-Q of 2024 (complainant’s enhancement plea) became infructuous and was dismissed. Majority 2-1 (Musarrat Hilali, J., dissenting). Dissent (Musarrat Hilali, J.)—Last-seen firmly established; prompt, compliant recoveries; co-accused’s S.164 Cr.P.C. confession voluntary and corroborative; investigative lapses not fatal absent prejudice; conviction and life sentence ought to stand; enhancement dismissed. Cited cases: • Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 • Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State, PLD 2003 SC 704 • Fayyaz Ahmad v. The State, 2017 SCMR 2026 • Muhammad Riaz v. State, 2024 SCMR 1839 • Muhammad Mushtaq v. Mustansar Hussain, 2016 SCMR 2123 • Ali Sher v. The State, 2008 SCMR 707 • Nizam v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC 550 • Hari Charan Kurmi & others v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 — S. 428 — Additional evidence at appellate stage — Scope, pre-conditions, and procedure — High Court, while allowing jail appeal, set aside conviction and remanded to the trial court to record additional evidence and decide the case — Held: This course is beyond S. 428 Cr.P.C. — If an appellate court (including High Court) finds additional evidence “necessary,” it must (i) record it itself or (ii) direct a Magistrate/Court of Session to record it and certify it back to the appellate court, which must then dispose of the appeal itself; remand to trial court for decision on such additional evidence is impermissible under S. 428. (Text of S. 428 explained; distinction drawn from S. 423 Cr.P.C. on remand powers.) (b) Appellate powers — Additional evidence not to cure prosecution lapses — Principles reaffirmed: power under S. 428 is exceptional; to be exercised sparingly “when necessary for a just decision,” not to fill lacunae or repair negligence/omissions of investigation/prosecution; must not prejudice fair trial rights; reasons must be recorded. Shahadat Khan v. Home Secy., WP (PLD 1969 SC 158); Nadir Shah v. State (1980 SCMR 402); Dildar v. State (PLD 2001 SC 384); Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation (PLD 2019 SC 675) — followed. (c) Comparative guidance — S. 428 Cr.P.C. vis-à-vis O.XLI r.27 CPC — In both regimes, appellate court may take/commission additional evidence but must itself decide the appeal after receipt; remand for decision is outside O.XLI r.27 CPC (remand lies, if at all, under O.XLI r.23). Indian Cr.P.C. s.391 cases applied: Rajeswar Prasad Misra (AIR 1965 SC 1887), State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal (1987 2 SCC 364), Rambhau v. State of Maharashtra (2001 4 SCC 759). (d) Practice & procedure — Motu proprio invocation of S. 428 — Even when no party applies, appellate court may invoke S. 428 on its own perception of necessity, after hearing parties and recording reasons; additional evidence must comply with Ch. XXV Cr.P.C. (mode of taking/recording evidence) and the accused must have opportunity to meet it, including confrontation under S. 342 Cr.P.C. Held: Criminal petition converted to appeal and allowed; impugned judgment of the Islamabad High Court set aside. Case remanded to the High Court to decide the jail appeal afresh in accordance with law — the High Court may, if “necessary,” record additional evidence itself or have it recorded by Sessions/Magistrate and certified back under S. 428, then itself dispose of the appeal — preferably within three months.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 —- S. 9(c) —- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A Right to fair trial — Safe custody and transmission of narcotics sample — Delay in dispatching sample — Failure to establish chain of custody — Effect — Prosecution alleged that 1280 grams of charas were recovered from the accused, with a 64-gram sample sent for chemical analysis — Delay of 15 days in sending sample to PFSA, and unexplained delay in depositing the remaining contraband in the Malkhana — Held, no evidence was presented to establish secure custody or safe transmission of the recovered substance or its sample — In absence of such foundational proof, benefit of doubt must go to the accused — Conviction under S. 9(c), CNSA could not be sustained — Reliance placed on Amjad Ali v. The State (2012 SCMR 577) and Ikramullah v. The State (2015 SCMR 1002). Disposition: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted. (b) Constitution of Pakistan —- Art. 10-A —- Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 Fair investigation — Bias — Complainant and Investigating Officer being the same person — Legal permissibility and implications — Inspector Naeem Zia acted as both complainant and Investigating Officer — Held, while not expressly barred under CNSA, 1997, such dual role undermines impartiality and fairness in trial — Accused’s right to cross-examine an independent investigator was denied — Petitioner specifically alleged bias and personal animosity — Failure to assign investigation to independent officer rendered the process defective — Supreme Court reiterated that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, particularly under laws like CNSA that reverse the burden of proof — Where prejudice is pleaded, dual role of complainant-cum-IO must be avoided and justified on record. Cited Cases: • Ikramuddin Rajput v. IGP Sindh (2024 SCMR 510) • Ashiq alias Kaloo v. The State (1989 P Cr. LJ 601) (c) Police Rules, 1934 —- R. 25.2(3) Duties of Investigating Officer —- Obligation to discover truth —- Prohibition against premature commitment to prosecution narrative — Held, under R. 25.2(3), I.O. must act objectively to find the truth and arrest actual offender — Must not commit to prosecution's version prematurely — In present case, the same officer who lodged complaint also supervised recovery, recorded witness statements, prepared site plan, filed report, and supervised dispatch to Chemical Examiner — Such defective investigation was likely to contaminate justice process and offend human rights — Superior officers must ensure investigations are impartial and legal. Judicial Observation: Defective or biased investigations undermine fairness and violate Art. 10-A; emphasis laid on constitutional due process and safeguards in narcotics trials. (d) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 —- S. 342 Statement of accused — Allegation of animosity against Investigating Officer — Evidentiary value — Accused in his statement under S. 342 Cr.P.C. alleged that police had falsely implicated him due to a financial dispute over unpaid food services — Allegations went unrefuted by prosecution — Held, once accused pleads prejudice, it is incumbent upon prosecution to dispel that apprehension through fair and transparent investigation — Failure to do so entitles accused to benefit of doubt. Final Disposition: Petition converted to appeal and allowed. Conviction and sentence under S. 9(c), CNSA, 1997 set aside. Accused acquitted and ordered to be released if not required in any other case.