Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----Ss. 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d) & 7(i); Explosive Substances Act, 1908----Ss. 3, 4 & 5-A; Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898)----Ss. 164, 173, 265-H(2), 342, 497(2) & 544-A----Terrorism case---Bomb blast outside PIDC House, Karachi, causing five deaths, injuries to more than twenty persons and extensive damage to property---Appellants arrested in a separate explosives case and then formally shown arrested in the present case---Convicted by Anti-Terrorism Court and sentenced to death on four counts with multiple terms of imprisonment, fines, forfeiture of property and compensation; conviction and sentences upheld by High Court; reference for confirmation of death sentence answered in affirmative---Reappraisal of evidence by Supreme Court---Held, that prosecution case rested essentially on (i) testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses who claimed to have seen the appellants park the explosive-laden vehicle and leave in another car, (ii) a test identification parade, and (iii) judicial confessions recorded under S.164, Cr.P.C.---On independent scrutiny, presence of alleged eyewitnesses at the crime scene remained doubtful; their omission from the crime report and failure to immediately disclose material facts to the complainant (an officer of the same police station), inconsistency regarding the time and circumstances of parking of the vehicle, lack of independent proof of their duty or presence at the site, and their failure to provide concrete particulars of the vehicles or accused rendered their testimony not confidence-inspiring---Test identification proceedings were conducted jointly for three accused with dissimilar dummies, possible exposure of accused to witnesses prior to parade, and without recording or ascribing distinct roles of each accused, contrary to settled principles---Judicial confessions were recorded after an unexplained delay of nearly three weeks while appellants remained in police custody; no safeguards or precautionary measures were shown to have been taken by the Magistrate to ensure voluntariness; statements were sketchy, devoid of details of commission of offence or specific individuals, were later retracted and stood contradicted by other prosecution evidence---Investigation itself was tainted by failure to secure and produce complete CCTV footage from the highly surveilled area, thereby withholding the best available evidence without explanation---In such circumstances prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; benefit of doubt must go to the accused even if arising from a single circumstance---Conviction and sentences of appellants set aside; they were acquitted of all charges and death sentences not confirmed. Cited cases: Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others (2016 SCMR 274); Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 704); Majeed v. The State (2010 SCMR 55); Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob and others v. The State and others (1992 SCMR 1983); Mst. Naseem Akhtar and another v. The State (1999 SCMR 1744); Shamoon alias Shamma v. The State (1995 SCMR 1377); Naseer Hussain v. Nawaz and others (1994 SCMR 1504). (b) Criminal trial---Eyewitnesses---Non-mention in first information report and unexplained silence---Effect---Complainant, a Station House Officer who reached the spot immediately after the blast, lodged crime report giving details of place, time and vehicle used, but did not mention the presence of traffic constable (PW-26) or taxi driver (PW-25) who later claimed to be eyewitnesses or that any person had seen the perpetrators park the vehicle---Traffic constable (PW-26), being a police official of the same station, admitted that he returned to the scene after the blast and remained there but did not disclose to the complainant or investigating officer that he had allegedly seen the accused; crime report noted that the car had been parked at “unknown time” which conflicted with his statement---No independent proof (such as duty roster) was produced to show that he was posted on duty at the relevant point---Taxi driver (PW-25) was also not named in the crime report or by any official; prosecution failed to prove he was actually driving a taxi or present at the spot---He admitted that he did not provide physical descriptions or features of the perpetrators except a vague reference to their “accent”, even though his own version showed that he never conversed with them; description of vehicle as “biscuity-coloured Suzuki Mehran” was inconsistent with other evidence---Such unexplained omissions, contradictions and lack of corroboration rendered presence of both witnesses at the scene doubtful---Held, that evidence of such witnesses was not confidence-inspiring and could not safely be relied upon for sustaining conviction in a capital terrorism case. (c) Criminal trial----Test identification parade----Joint parade; dissimilar dummies; possible prior exposure; omission to allocate roles---Effect---Proceedings of test identification parade were conducted by Judicial Magistrate (PW-24)---It stood admitted that all three accused were lined up together in a single parade amongst only twelve dummies, who did not have similar features or physical characteristics; accused were seated in the court corridor before proceedings thereby creating serious likelihood of prior exposure to witnesses; Magistrate did not record any precautionary measures to exclude possibility of such exposure; testimony and memorandum did not reflect that respective roles of the accused in the occurrence were either elicited or recorded; custody of appellants remained with CIA/police officials for several days prior to identification and prosecution did not establish that witnesses had no opportunity to see them earlier---Held, that identification parade was not conducted in accordance with settled law and principles laid down by Supreme Court; such defective proceedings were of no evidentiary value and could not be made the basis of conviction. Cited case: Kanwar Anwaar Ali (PLD 2019 SC 488). (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (X of 1984)----Art. 22----Identification parade---Nature and evidentiary value---Requirement of scrupulous care---Identification test is one of the modes of proof contemplated by Art.22 and is essentially corroborative in character; it is designed to enable a witness to identify the real offender and to exclude the possibility of witness merely confirming a vague impression or faint recollection; it must, therefore, be conducted with scrupulous care, fairness and regard to the exigencies of each case so that proceedings do not become collusive or suggestive---Where such parade is held jointly for multiple accused, with dissimilar dummies, without precautions against prior exposure and without recording individual roles, it loses all probative force and cannot be treated as corroboration of a doubtful ocular account. Cited cases: Muhammad Siddique and others v. The State (2020 SCMR 342); Javed Khan Bacha v. The State (2017 SCMR 524); Subha Sadiq v. The State (2025 SCMR 50). (e) Criminal trial----Judicial confession---Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898)----S. 164----Voluntariness, delay and police custody---Retraction---Requirement that confession be accepted or rejected as a whole---Scope---Appellants were arrested on 16-11-2005 in a separate explosives case and remained in police custody; prosecution alleged that they confessed their involvement in present case before police but investigating officer of that case was not produced as witness---They were brought before Magistrate on 23-11-2005 for test identification parade yet no expressed desire to confess was recorded; statements under S.164, Cr.P.C. were ultimately recorded on 05-12-2005, almost three weeks after arrest---Such unexplained delay while in police custody, absence of assurance by Magistrate that they would not be remanded back to police, and lack of material precautions rendered voluntariness highly doubtful---Contents of alleged confessions were cryptic and devoid of particulars; they merely stated that act was done at instance of unnamed “Sardars” and did not furnish details of planning, execution, means or identity of alleged instigators; description of vehicle in confession was contradicted by prosecution’s own witness; appellants later retracted from such statements---Held, that prosecution failed to establish that judicial confessions were voluntary, true and free from duress, coercion, inducement or influence of any kind; such statements could not legally form basis of conviction, particularly when prosecution case otherwise stood discredited---Further held, when prosecution’s story is rejected and conviction is sought to be rested solely on confession, the statement must be accepted or rejected as a whole; court cannot pick and choose parts of a confession to suit prosecution while discarding exculpatory portions. Cited cases: Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others (2016 SCMR 274); Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 704); Majeed v. The State (2010 SCMR 55); Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob and others v. The State and others (1992 SCMR 1983); Mst. Naseem Akhtar and another v. The State (1999 SCMR 1744); Shamoon alias Shamma v. The State (1995 SCMR 1377); Naseer Hussain v. Nawaz and others (1994 SCMR 1504). (f) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (X of 1984)----Art. 129(g)----Withholding best evidence---Adverse inference---Occurrence took place in front of PIDC House where offices of Karachi Electric Supply Company, branches of various commercial banks and an outlet of international fast-food chain were situated---Given nature of locality, likelihood of multiple CCTV cameras was obvious; investigating officer obtained only a limited portion of footage from camera installed outside PIDC House, which was confined to moment of explosion and resulting damage---Record indicated that camera was fully functional and had captured entire sequence of events prior to blast but neither complete footage from that camera nor footage from other cameras in vicinity was obtained or produced; no plausible explanation was offered for such omission---Held, that prosecution had deliberately withheld the best available evidence which could have conclusively shown presence or absence of eyewitnesses and perpetrators at relevant time; Court was justified in drawing adverse inference under Art.129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 that had such evidence been produced it would not have supported prosecution case. Cited cases: Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846); Zafar Abbas v. The State (2010 SCMR 939); Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224); Muhammad Rizwan v. The State (2025 SCMR 762). (g) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 212----Criminal justice system---Wrongful incarceration due to defective investigation, flawed appreciation of evidence and delay---State liability to compensate and rehabilitate victims of miscarriage of justice---Scope---Appellants, aged about 27 and 37 years at time of their arrest, remained incarcerated for more than two decades on capital charges, ultimately to be acquitted on ground of total failure of prosecution to prove case; investigation did not meet basic standards of fairness or diligence, no serious effort was made to trace actual perpetrators of heinous terrorist act, and two young citizens were made scapegoats; trial and appeal before High Court consumed inordinate time and fixation of matter before Supreme Court was unjustifiably delayed---Held, that such prolonged and unjust imprisonment entailed irretrievable loss of more than twenty years of life, careers, livelihoods, family and social relationships and inflicted deep psychological trauma; process of justice itself became an instrument of oppression; this constituted a grave breach of State’s duty of care towards its citizens and was an indictment of criminal justice system---Authority of State, exercised through investigation, prosecution and judiciary, carries corresponding obligation to safeguard life, liberty and dignity of every person; Art.212 of the Constitution reinforces a constitutional right to seek compensation for tortious acts of government and public functionaries and provides a remedy against public wrongs, ensuring that State cannot act with impunity when its failures cause harm---In light of constitutional mandate, it is incumbent upon governments, as representatives of State, to take immediate, effective steps for compensation, rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of miscarriage of justice; such measures are constitutional obligations, not charity---Governments may consider enactment of legislation providing a structured mechanism to compensate, rehabilitate and assist such victims and to hold public functionaries accountable where breach of duty is established. (h) Criminal procedure----Appeal/leave against acquittal----Scope and considerations----Double presumption of innocence---Criminal Petition No.74-K of 2020 filed by State challenging High Court judgment acquitting accused (Abdul Hameed Bugti) of charges arising from same occurrence---Held, that case against said accused was essentially one of no evidence; learned Additional Prosecutor General failed to point out any instance of misreading or non-reading of evidence or any perversity in reasoning of High Court; where two views are possible on appreciation of evidence, the one favouring accused must prevail in an acquittal matter---An acquittal carries double presumption of innocence; interference by Supreme Court is justified only where findings of acquittal are shown to be blatantly perverse, arbitrary, capricious, speculative, shocking, illegal or based on impossibility; scope of interference in acquittal is profoundly narrow and limited and is resorted to only in exceptional cases---Since no question of law arose and no legal or factual defect in impugned judgment was demonstrated, leave to appeal was refused and State’s criminal petition was dismissed. Cited cases: Mst. Askar Jan v. Muhammad Daud (2010 SCMR 1604); Jehangir v. Aminullah (2010 SCMR 491); Haji Amanullah v. Munir Ahmed (2010 SCMR 222); State v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh (2021 SCMR 873); The State v. Anwar Saifullah Khan (PLD 2016 SC 276); State v. Abdul Khaloq (PLD 2011 SC 554).