Summary: Sentence upheld --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Murder of sister by brother---Sororicide---Nature of offence---Petitioner was convicted for committing murder of his sister, who had married complainant of her own choice many years prior to occurrence---Supreme Court observed that killing of one’s own sister was not merely a criminal act but a grave breach of family trust and moral responsibility---Such offence struck at the bond of companionship, care and protection inherent in sibling relationship and reflected a disturbing social phenomenon---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC was maintained. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Prompt FIR---Delay of one hour and ten minutes---Effect---Occurrence took place at about 12:30 p.m. and matter was reported to police at 01:40 p.m. on same day, despite police station being about 13 kilometers away---Held, that prompt reporting of FIR ruled out possibility of deliberation, consultation or fabrication---Petitioner was specifically nominated in FIR as sole accused with definite role of causing fatal firearm injury---Prompt FIR substantially supported truthfulness of prosecution version. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Identification of accused---Close familial relationship---Mistaken identity---Effect---Complainant was husband of deceased and petitioner was brother of deceased---Both parties were closely known to each other---Held, that where accused is a close relative and is specifically nominated in promptly lodged FIR, possibility of mistaken identity stands effectively excluded---No material existed to show ulterior motive or animus on part of complainant to falsely implicate petitioner while allowing real culprit to escape. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Ocular account---Natural witnesses---Presence at place of occurrence---Confidence-inspiring testimony---PW-5 complainant and PW-7 furnished ocular account of occurrence and consistently deposed that petitioner, armed with carbine, fired at deceased---Both witnesses were natural witnesses present at the place of occurrence and their presence stood established---Despite searching cross-examination, their testimony remained unshaken on material particulars---Held, that ocular account inspired confidence and was sufficient to connect petitioner with commission of offence. (e) Criminal trial--- ----Ocular account corroborated by medical evidence---Effect---Medical evidence supported mode and manner of occurrence narrated by prosecution witnesses and established that deceased died as result of firearm injury---Held, that consistency between ocular account and medical evidence reinforced prosecution narrative and rendered it cogent, reliable and confidence-inspiring---No doubt remained regarding manner of occurrence. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 302(b)---Motive---Marriage of own choice by deceased---Motive disbelieved---Effect on prosecution case---Prosecution alleged that petitioner bore grudge because deceased and complainant had contracted marriage of their own choice approximately seventeen years before occurrence---Held, that such motive was implausible because couple had lived together for nearly two decades and had five children without any untoward incident---Prosecution failed to produce evidence substantiating alleged motive---High Court rightly disbelieved motive. (g) Criminal trial--- ----Motive not proved---Effect where ocular account reliable---Held, that failure to prove motive did not demolish prosecution case where ocular account was confidence-inspiring and stood corroborated by medical evidence---Even after excluding motive from consideration, prosecution evidence remained sufficient to prove charge against petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. (h) Criminal trial--- ----Recovery of firearm---Forensic report showing weapon mechanically operational only---Evidentiary value---Recovery of 12-bore carbine on pointing out of petitioner was relied upon by prosecution---Forensic report merely established that weapon was mechanically operational and did not prove that fatal shot had been discharged from said firearm---Held, that High Court rightly disbelieved recovery evidence---Recovery was excluded from consideration. (i) Criminal trial--- ----Recovery disbelieved---Effect on conviction---Held, that even if recovery evidence was excluded, prosecution case could still stand where direct ocular account was reliable and corroborated by medical evidence---Benefit regarding recovery had already been afforded to petitioner, but such exclusion did not create reasonable doubt in prosecution case. (j) Criminal trial--- ----Substitution of real culprit---Close relative murdered---Principle---Held, that substitution of real culprit is a rare phenomenon, particularly where eyewitness has witnessed murder of a close relative---In such circumstances, it is highly improbable that actual offender would be allowed to escape while an innocent person is falsely implicated---Record contained no material showing complainant had reason to falsely implicate petitioner in murder of his wife and mother of his children. (k) Criminal petition for leave to appeal--- ----Concurrent conviction by Trial Court and High Court---No legal infirmity---Scope of interference---Trial Court convicted petitioner under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life with compensation under S.544-A, Cr.P.C.; High Court dismissed appeal and maintained conviction and sentence---Supreme Court found ocular account reliable, medical evidence corroborative, and conviction neither baseless nor tainted with legal infirmity---No ground existed for grant of leave to appeal. Disposition: Jail petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Conviction of petitioner under S.302(b), PPC and sentence of imprisonment for life, compensation of Rs.100,000 under S.544-A, Cr.P.C., default sentence and benefit under S.382-B, Cr.P.C. were maintained.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D, 337-F(i) & 337-F(ii)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342, 382-B & 544—Sentence of death—Commutation—Subsequent mental illness—Schizophrenia—Supervening and mitigating circumstance—The appellant was convicted for the murder of three minor sons of the complainant, who was his real brother, and for causing knife injuries to the complainant’s wife. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution case stood proved beyond doubt through the natural and confidence-inspiring ocular account of the injured mother, corroborated by the complainant and other witnesses as well as by medical evidence. The Court observed that, in the circumstances of the case, false implication was wholly improbable, particularly where the bereaved parents themselves were witnesses to the murder of their own children. The conviction on merits was, therefore, maintained. However, on the question of sentence, the Court held that although nothing had been brought on record to establish that at the time of commission of the offence the appellant was suffering from such mental infirmity as would impair his criminal responsibility, the subsequent medical evaluation ordered by the Court conclusively established that he was suffering from schizophrenia and was under treatment requiring regular follow-up. In these circumstances, the appellant’s diagnosed mental illness constituted a supervening and mitigating circumstance warranting commutation of the sentence of death to imprisonment for life on all three counts of murder. Criminal law—Mental illness—Execution of mentally ill convict—Humanity and conscience of law—The Supreme Court held that execution of a person suffering from profound mental illness offends the dictates of humanity and the settled conscience of law. The Court emphasized that the death penalty is premised on retribution and deterrence, both of which assume the offender’s rational capacity to comprehend the nature and wrongfulness of conduct and to be influenced by punishment. A person afflicted with severe mental illness, particularly one suffering from delusion or psychosis, stands outside these assumptions. Therefore, while such illness may not necessarily erase criminal liability for the past act in the absence of proof regarding the accused’s condition at the time of occurrence, it may nevertheless operate as a supervening factor rendering execution inhumane and unjust. The Court observed that when the State executes a person whose mental illness has eroded his capacity for reason, the punishment ceases to reflect the majesty of justice and instead becomes an exhibition of cruelty inconsistent with law. Evidence and procedure—Medical Board constituted by Supreme Court—Psychiatric evaluation—Schizophrenia established—The Court took note of the appellant’s assertion in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C. that the occurrence was linked to “mental health disorder” and, acting on that plea, directed constitution of a Medical Board. Pursuant to the Court’s order, the Punjab Institute of Mental Health, Lahore constituted a Board of Certification, admitted the appellant for comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, and reported that according to history and psychological assessment he was suffering from schizophrenia, was under treatment, and required regular follow-up for maintenance treatment. The Court treated this medical opinion as sufficient to establish the appellant’s present mental condition for purposes of sentence, though not for negating criminal responsibility at the time of the offence. Sentence—Concurrent running of sentences—Benefit under S. 382-B, Cr.P.C.—Directions for treatment in custody—While partially allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts, maintained all other sentences awarded by the courts below, and directed that all sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was also extended to the appellant. The jail authorities were further directed to ensure provision of necessary medical treatment in accordance with the appellant’s diagnosed mental condition, including referral to the concerned medical facility where specialized care may be required, and to adopt suitable precautionary and supervisory measures so that the appellant does not pose a threat to other inmates and his custody and treatment remain consistent with prison regulations and medical advice. Case references—The Court referred to and relied upon the following authorities and materials: Sir Edward Coke’s statement in The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1797); Ford v. Wainwright (477 U.S. 399, 1986); Panetti v. Quarterman (551 U.S. 930, 2007); Madison v. Alabama (586 U.S. ___, 2019); and Safia Bano’s case (PLD 2021 SC 488). These authorities were cited to affirm the settled principle that execution of a person who is insane or mentally incompetent is contrary to law, humanity, and fundamental human dignity, and that mental unsoundness may constitute a supervening circumstance justifying commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Appeal partially allowed—Death sentence commuted to imprisonment for life—Conviction and remaining sentences maintained—The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder and allied offences, but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts on account of his established schizophrenia as a supervening and mitigating circumstance. All remaining sentences were maintained, to run concurrently, with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and with further directions for continued psychiatric treatment and custodial supervision.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—S. 302(b)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342 & 544-A—Murder case—Appraisal of ocular account—Chance witnesses—Benefit of doubt—Acquittal—The Supreme Court held that where the prosecution case rests upon the testimony of alleged eyewitnesses who, in the ordinary course of events, would not be expected to be present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time, such witnesses fall within the category of chance witnesses and their evidence must be scrutinized with greater caution. In the present case, the complainant and his brother, both sons of the deceased, claimed to have witnessed the occurrence at 11:30 a.m., despite the fact that one was a mechanic at Pirmahal and the other a labourer working in village lands. The Court held that they failed to furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation for their presence at the spot, and their conduct during and after the occurrence was highly unnatural. Their silence while their mother was fired at, failure to make any meaningful resistance, omission to take immediate steps for her removal, and the unexplained delay of about two hours in reporting the matter materially impaired the credibility of their testimony. The ocular account was, therefore, held to be doubtful and unsafe for sustaining conviction without independent corroboration. Criminal evidence—Chance witness—Test of credibility—The Supreme Court elaborated that a chance witness is one who, in the normal pursuit of life, would not ordinarily be present at the place of occurrence but claims such presence by chance. The Court held that testimony of such a witness is admissible, yet it cannot be accepted as a matter of course and must be assessed in the light of natural conduct, surrounding circumstances, and available corroboration. A satisfactory, probable, and natural explanation of presence is indispensable; failing that, the testimony becomes unsafe to rely upon, especially in cases involving severe punishment. The Court reaffirmed that criminal liability cannot be founded upon doubtful or inherently improbable evidence and that, in case of doubt, benefit must accrue to the accused. Investigation—Successive inquiries declaring accused innocent—Evidentiary value of consistent investigative findings—The Supreme Court held that although courts are not bound by the mere opinion of the investigating agency and must independently appraise the evidence, consistent findings recorded through successive investigations by different officers and verified by senior supervisory authorities cannot be brushed aside without cogent reasons. In the present case, the petitioner-convict had repeatedly been found innocent during investigation, and it had surfaced that the actual assailant was his father, Akhtar Ali, while the petitioner himself was present in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court noted that this conclusion had been successively scrutinized and verified at various levels, including by officers of the Investigation Branch and the office of the I.G. Punjab. In the absence of any evidence of mala fide, collusion, or extraneous influence on the part of the investigating officers, such consistent investigative findings were held to carry persuasive value and to lend support to the defence plea. Defence plea—Presence of accused elsewhere at the relevant time—Support from investigative material—The Supreme Court observed that in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C., the petitioner-convict admitted the occurrence but stated that his aunt, the deceased, had been killed by his father Akhtar Ali and that he himself was on duty in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court held that this plea was not a bald denial but found support from investigative material, including statements recorded by the investigating officers from the owner of the hotel in Lahore, who confirmed the petitioner’s presence there on the date and time of occurrence. This circumstance, when read with the doubtful ocular account and other infirmities in the prosecution case, further strengthened the entitlement of the petitioner to benefit of doubt. Benefit of doubt—Right of accused—The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of petitioner-convict Muhammad Nadeem through cogent, reliable, and confidence-inspiring evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The doubtful testimony of chance witnesses, contradictions in their account, unnatural conduct, absence of independent corroboration, and the consistent investigative material affirming the petitioner’s absence from the place of occurrence created serious doubt regarding his involvement. In such circumstances, the Court held that benefit of doubt was to be extended to the accused as a matter of right and not of grace. Case references—No specific reported precedent was expressly cited by name in the judgment text provided. The Court discussed and applied settled principles relating to chance witnesses, cautious appraisal of ocular account, non-binding yet persuasive value of consistent investigative findings, and the rule that benefit of doubt must go to the accused; however, no reported case law was specifically mentioned in the text, and none should therefore be added as cited authority. Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 converted into appeal and allowed—Conviction and sentence set aside—Acquittal—The Supreme Court converted Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 into an appeal, allowed the same, set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner-convict recorded by the courts below, and acquitted him of the charge, with direction for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No. 305-L of 2018 dismissed as infructuous—Leave refused—In view of the acquittal of the respondent-convict, the complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence became infructuous and was dismissed, with leave refused.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Murder of minor child by alleged poisoning---Evidence of chance witnesses---Requirement of cautious scrutiny---Prosecution alleged that petitioner administered poisonous substance to his four-year-old son, who later died due to insecticide poisoning---Two alleged eyewitnesses, namely complainant and his cousin, claimed presence at house of petitioner’s wife at time of occurrence---Supreme Court held that both witnesses were chance witnesses as, in ordinary course, they were not expected to be present at place of occurrence and failed to disclose any plausible reason for visiting house of Mst. Sumaya at relevant time---Evidence of chance witness requires cautious and deeper scrutiny and such witness must satisfactorily explain his presence at crime spot, supported by strong independent circumstances---In absence of plausible and convincing explanation, evidence of such witness is looked upon with suspicion. (b) Criminal trial---- ----Chance witnesses---Contradictions and unnatural conduct---Effect---Alleged chance witnesses gave inconsistent versions regarding time and manner of arrival at house of Mst. Sumaya, whether they travelled on one or two motorcycles, time taken to reach the house, time of departure from their houses, and meeting prior to visit---Both witnesses admitted that they did not enter room from where petitioner allegedly brought glass containing poisonous substance---Supreme Court held that such omission was inconsistent with natural human conduct, as persons present would ordinarily examine utensil or glass from which child consumed something and inspect room from where suspicious substance was allegedly fetched---Their complete inaction, contradictions regarding cot and other material particulars, and discrepancy about colour of clothes of deceased rendered their presence doubtful and their version contrary to normal human behaviour. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Delay in lodging FIR---Unexplained delay despite presence of alleged eyewitnesses---Effect---Incident allegedly occurred at about 10:30 a.m.; police official reached hospital at about 1450 hours after receiving information regarding death of child, but FIR was lodged at 2335 hours at police station---Supreme Court held that if alleged eyewitnesses were present at hospital, normal and expected conduct was to immediately report occurrence without loss of time---Unexplained delay in lodging FIR, when considered with other infirmities, created serious doubt regarding prosecution version. (d) Criminal trial---- ----Improvements in testimony---Recovery of steel glass---Effect---Alleged eyewitnesses made material improvement before Court by stating that poison had been administered through a steel glass, apparently to bring their testimony in conformity with subsequent recovery of steel glass allegedly at instance of petitioner---Confrontation with earlier statements showed that such detail was not mentioned therein---Supreme Court held that such dishonest improvement further weakened credibility of witnesses and contributed to serious doubt about their presence at place of occurrence. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Poisoning of minor---Testimony of mother of deceased---Admissions supporting alternate hypothesis of accidental ingestion---Mother of minor deceased was naturally present in house, but her cross-examination materially affected prosecution case---She admitted that petitioner’s mother and four brothers were also present in house at time of occurrence, a fact not mentioned by alleged eyewitnesses---She further admitted that family was engaged in agricultural activities and pesticide poison was ordinarily kept in house for spraying cotton crops during month of August---Medical officer conceded that a four-year-old child could consume poison on his own by mistaking it for drink and that a child of such tender age could not differentiate between harmful substance and potable liquid---Supreme Court held that medical opinion provided a plausible hypothesis consistent with innocence and possibility of accidental ingestion could not be excluded. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Motive---Allegation that father poisoned his own minor son---Absence of motive and inherent improbability---Petitioner was biological father of deceased minor and had been living with him since birth---Supreme Court observed that in societal and moral framework father is regarded as natural protector, guardian and well-wisher of his children, and relationship of parent and child is founded upon affection, protection and sacrifice---In absence of compelling evidence of strained relations, denial of paternity, grave motive, enmity between spouses, or any circumstance justifying such extreme act, it was wholly unnatural to presume that father would administer poison to his own minor son, particularly in presence of relatives---Prosecution story appeared inherently improbable and against human conduct. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Benefit of doubt---Single circumstance creating reasonable doubt---Accused entitled to acquittal as of right---Supreme Court held that prosecution evidence was fraught with material contradictions, improvements, unexplained delay in lodging FIR, absence of motive, and medical opinion consistent with accidental ingestion---Cumulative effect of such circumstances created reasonable doubt in prosecution case---If a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in mind of prudent person regarding guilt of accused, accused is entitled to benefit thereof not as matter of grace or concession but as matter of right---Courts below overlooked material infirmities and failed to appreciate evidence in its true perspective. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Conviction and death sentence---Evidence not confidence-inspiring---Petitioner was convicted by Trial Court under S.302(b), P.P.C. and sentenced to death as Ta’zir with compensation under S.544-A, Cr.P.C.; High Court maintained conviction and sentence and confirmed murder reference---Supreme Court, upon independent reappraisal of entire evidence, found prosecution case doubtful due to unreliable chance witnesses, material contradictions, unnatural conduct, unexplained delay, absence of motive and possibility of accidental ingestion---Conviction and sentence could not be sustained. Disposition: Jail Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; conviction and sentence awarded to petitioner under S.302(b), P.P.C. were set aside; petitioner was acquitted of the charge and ordered to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-A(i), 337-A(ii), 337-F(ii), 337-F(iv) & 34---Triple murder with dagger blows---Injured eyewitnesses---Presence at place of occurrence---Stamp of truth---Prosecution alleged that petitioner, along with absconding co-accused, deceitfully called deceased persons one after another to haveli/cattle farm and murdered them with daggers, while two eyewitnesses sustained sharp-edged injuries when they attempted to intervene---Supreme Court held that medico-legal reports showed injuries on injured eyewitnesses caused by sharp-edged weapon, which constituted a stamp of truth and lent intrinsic assurance to their presence at place of occurrence---Presence of injured witnesses was natural and free from doubt---Despite searching cross-examination, defence failed to extract anything capable of casting doubt on their presence or veracity. (b) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Broad daylight occurrence---Accused known to witnesses---Mistaken identity ruled out---Occurrence took place at about 3:00 p.m. in broad daylight inside haveli/cattle farm where petitioner was admittedly employed by complainant and deceased persons for care of cattle---Supreme Court held that petitioner was known to eyewitnesses as their employee; therefore possibility of mistaken identity stood completely ruled out---Eyewitnesses gave harmonious account on material particulars including date, time, place, manner of occurrence, prelude and aftermath---Ocular account was confidence-inspiring and rightly relied upon by Courts below. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Related witnesses---Murder of close relatives---Substitution of real offender rare---Complainant was real brother of two deceased persons and uncle of third deceased, while injured witnesses were sons/nephews within same family---Supreme Court held that it was beyond realm of prudence to believe that closely related witnesses, having seen brutal murder of their own kith and kin, would allow real culprits to escape and falsely implicate an innocent person with whom they had no prior animosity---Substitution of real offenders is a rare phenomenon, particularly where eyewitnesses have lost loved ones before their eyes. Cited Cases: • Asfandiyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009 • Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487 (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302(b) & 324---Medical evidence corroborating ocular account---Sharp-edged weapon injuries---Medical officer found seven injuries on injured witness Abdullah and four injuries on injured witness Ihtisham, all caused by sharp-edged weapon---Postmortem examination revealed eleven injuries on deceased Attique Ullah, twenty-two injuries on deceased Zaka Ullah and five injuries on deceased Shafaat Ullah---Medical officer opined that injuries were ante-mortem and sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death---Defence cross-examined medical officers at length but failed to undermine their opinions or suggest that injuries were caused otherwise than by sharp-edged weapon---Medical evidence fully supported and fortified ocular account. (e) Criminal trial---- ----Recoveries---Bloodstained earth and incriminating articles---Positive PFSA report---Corroboration---Investigating Officer secured bloodstained earth and other incriminating articles from places where deceased and injured were found through recovery memos---Articles were sent to Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore, and positive forensic report corroborated prosecution version by confirming crime scene and connecting bloodstained articles and weapons with occurrence---Supreme Court held that medical and circumstantial evidence, including recoveries and PFSA report, completed and corroborated prosecution case. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Motive---Demand of advance amount relating to cattle farm---Proof---Motive alleged by complainant was that accused persons demanded advance amount from deceased in respect of cattle farm and, upon refusal, became annoyed and committed murders---Supreme Court held that prosecution proved motive through testimony of informant, which supported the ocular account and overall prosecution version. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Capital sentence---Triple murder---No mitigating circumstance---Extreme brutality and betrayal of trust---Supreme Court held that no mitigating or extenuating circumstance existed to justify leniency---Petitioner, acting with co-accused, deceitfully called deceased persons one after another to cattle farm and subjected them to merciless dagger attacks, resulting in cold-blooded murder of three persons and serious injuries to two intervening eyewitnesses---Number of injuries, particularly twenty-two wounds on one deceased, reflected extreme brutality and shocking disregard for human life---Occurrence was committed at place where petitioner was employed, trusted and residing with his family; abuse of such trust aggravated guilt---No sudden provocation, grave and immediate cause, remorse or exceptional factor was available to warrant lesser sentence---Capital punishment was justified. (h) Criminal appeal---- ----Concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court---Conviction and death sentence maintained---Supreme Court, upon independent reappraisal of evidence, held that Courts below had rightly appreciated ocular testimony in conjunction with medical and circumstantial evidence---Chain of evidence was complete and unbroken---Prosecution successfully established commission of triple murder, injuries to two eyewitnesses, and motive---Conviction and sentence were based on confidence-inspiring evidence and called for no interference. Disposition: Jail Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; conviction of petitioner under S.302(b), P.P.C. on three counts with death sentence as Ta’zir, compensation under S.544-A, Cr.P.C., and sentences under Ss.324, 337-A(i), 337-A(ii), 337-F(iv) and 337-F(ii), P.P.C. were maintained; Murder Reference answered in affirmative by Lahore High Court remained undisturbed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Life imprisonment---Leave to appeal---Petitioner was convicted under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life for committing qatl-i-amd of deceased Muhammad Abbass, with compensation of Rs.500,000 under S.544-A, Cr.P.C. and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C.---High Court maintained conviction and sentence---Supreme Court, on reappraisal of evidence, found ocular account unimpeachable, consistent and corroborated by medical evidence and forensic recovery---Impugned judgment was well reasoned and required no interference---Leave to appeal was refused and petition was dismissed. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Delay in registration of FIR---Delay attributable to police and not informant---Effect---Occurrence took place at 10:20 p.m. on 10.08.2017, while FIR was formally registered at 4:30 p.m. on 11.08.2017---Roznamcha entry showed that informant had reported matter to police within thirty minutes with same version against petitioner---Delay was caused by police and not by informant---Victim or prosecution could not be made to suffer due to omission, inefficiency or neglect of police officials over which complainant/victim had no control---While considering delay, Court must examine whether delay is attributable to informant in reporting crime, and not delay caused by failure of police to discharge statutory duty of promptly registering FIR. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 21---Previous or subsequent conduct---Prompt conduct of informant---Relevance---Conduct of party or person in relation to fact in issue is relevant under Art.21---Informant’s conduct in immediately approaching police and reporting incident within thirty minutes was relevant and showed promptitude---Formal delay in FIR registration was therefore not fatal where contemporaneous Roznamcha entry supported prompt reporting by informant. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Registration of FIR---Mandatory duty of police---Police cannot delay or refuse registration once information of cognizable offence is received---Registration of case under S.154, Cr.P.C. cannot be refused or delayed where information regarding commission of cognizable offence has been given to or received by Officer Incharge of Police Station---Police officer cannot assume role of adjudicator, Magistrate or Court by first conducting inquiry into credibility of information before recording it---FIR is primary step to set criminal law in motion and enable investigation according to Cr.P.C.---Police are not legally justified in waiting for heirs of deceased to complete funeral rites before registering FIR. Cited Cases: • Seeta Ram v. The State Jail Petition No.51 of 2023 • Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara and others PLD 2007 SC 539 • Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1123 (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 154 & 162---Inquiry before FIR---Effect---Investigation or inquiry to find correctness or otherwise of information before registration of FIR would be hit by S.162, Cr.P.C.---Police may commence investigation on credible information or knowledge of cognizable offence from any source and need not wait for formal complainant to appear---Where police have reason to believe cognizable offence has been committed, they must take initiative, investigate and preserve evidence without delay. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Related witnesses---Evidentiary value---Eyewitnesses gave consistent and unimpeachable account on material particulars---Lengthy cross-examination failed to discredit them---Accused and deceased were related to each other, therefore question of mistaken identity or false implication did not arise---Related witnesses are not to be discarded merely because of relationship if their testimony is confidence-inspiring and supported by other evidence---Conviction could safely be maintained on such evidence. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Medical evidence---Harmony with ocular account---Firearm injuries---Medical evidence showed injuries were caused by firearm from distance of about two to three feet, which was consistent with statements of eyewitnesses---Duration between injuries and post-mortem also corroborated prosecution testimony---No material contradiction existed between ocular and medical evidence. (h) Criminal trial---- ----Recovery of weapon---Positive forensic report---Corroborative value---Recovery of 9mm pistol was effected from accused and forensic report confirmed use of weapon in commission of offence---Such recovery, read with ocular and medical evidence, further corroborated prosecution case. (i) Criminal trial---- ----Minor contradictions---Effect---Minor contradictions not going to root of prosecution case do not justify discarding otherwise reliable evidence---Natural course of conduct, passage of time, exaggeration due to anxiety for justice and human fallibility may result in minor discrepancies---Where contradictions are not vital, whole prosecution evidence cannot be discarded. Cited Case: • Sher Afzal v. The State 2024 SCMR 894 (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 4(h), 154 & 200---“Complainant” and “informant”---Distinction---Use of terms interchangeably deprecated---“Complaint” under S.4(h), Cr.P.C. means allegation made orally or in writing to Magistrate with view to his taking action under Code and does not include police report---Proceedings under S.200, Cr.P.C. give status of complainant to person who files complaint before Magistrate---Person who furnishes information to police for registration of FIR under S.154, Cr.P.C. is only an informant---FIR is not complaint within meaning of S.4(h), Cr.P.C.; it is information recorded by police under S.154, Cr.P.C.---State is prosecutor/complainant in prosecutions initiated on basis of FIR---Terminological confusion is not mere semantic lapse but may blur well-defined procedural distinctions. Cited Cases: • Ganesha v. Sharanappa and another Criminal Appeal No.1948 of 2013 • Wajid Khan v. The State 2020 PCrLJ 454 (k) Police proceedings---- ----Use of words “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”---Legality---Use discontinued---Terms “Faryaadi” in Sindh and “Muddai” in other federating units for person furnishing information to police were not supported by statutory scheme of Cr.P.C.---Such terms wrongly portray citizen as supplicant or seeker of favour rather than rights-bearing person invoking protection of law---Citizen approaches police as matter of right, not mercy or charity---Police officers are public servants paid from public funds and are bound to serve citizens---Use of such terminology was legally misconceived, constitutionally impermissible and inconsistent with Articles 4, 9, 10-A and 14 of the Constitution---Use of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai” in police proceedings was directed to be discontinued. (l) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 14---Citizen-centric policing---Dignity and lawful treatment---Police duty to register cognizable offence---Any practice treating citizen reporting cognizable offence as supplicant offends constitutional guarantees of lawful treatment, access to justice, fair treatment, dignity and protection of life, liberty and security---Terminology used by courts and public institutions shapes procedural understanding, institutional behaviour and lived experience of constitutional rights---Language of public authorities must reflect legislative intent, constitutional values and procedural clarity---Institutional practices perpetuating unconstitutional hierarchies undermine rights-based application of criminal law. (m) Police proceedings---- ----Address to Station House Officer---Expression “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” discouraged---Phrase “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” has no legal sanction and implies subordinate tone inconsistent with citizen-centric policing---It is not citizen who is at service of SHO; rather SHO is at service of citizen---Simple address “Janaab SHO” was held sufficient. (n) Police Rules, 1934---- ----Form No.24.2(1)---Use of term “complainant”---Need for revision---Police Rules and Form No.24.2(1) use term “complainant” in contexts where “informant” should be used---Such usage is not in consonance with Cr.P.C., which does not recognize complaint to police officer---Several spelling mistakes were also noticed in Police Rules, 1934---Revision of Police Rules was considered necessary so that forms and terminology conform to Cr.P.C. (o) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 201---Delayed registration of FIR by police---Loss or disappearance of evidence---Criminal liability of police officer---Where Officer Incharge of Police Station delays registration of FIR after receiving information of cognizable offence, it shall be presumed that such delay was caused to benefit accused unless police official proves contrary---Burden of proof lies on delinquent police officer---S.201, PPC uses expression “whoever” and creates no exception in favour of public functionaries or police officials---Police officer delaying or refusing FIR registration, thereby causing concealment, loss or disappearance of evidence, may be proceeded against under S.201, PPC like any private citizen---Departmental proceedings do not bar criminal liability. Cited Cases: • Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 420 • Muhammad Bashir v. The State PLD 2007 SC 539 • Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1841 • The State v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 2011 SC 554 (p) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 190---Power of Magistrate/District and Sessions Judge---Delay in FIR by police---Show-cause notice---Where deliberate delay or inaction by Officer Incharge of Police Station results in concealment, loss or destruction of evidence, District and Sessions Judges and Magistrates taking cognizance under S.190, Cr.P.C. are competent, on their own observation or on application of informant/victim, to call such officer and proceed under S.201, PPC or any other applicable law, if satisfied that delay was caused by police officer---Such action shall be taken after serving show-cause notice to concerned police officer. (q) Police Order, 2002---- ----Art. 155---Delayed FIR registration---Departmental proceedings---Since S.154, Cr.P.C. is mandatory, delayed registration amounts to wilful breach or neglect of law by police officer---Trial Court judges shall refer matter to District Police Officer concerned for initiation of departmental proceedings where police delays FIR registration---Earlier Police Act, 1861 also carried provisions penalizing neglect of duty---Departmental action and criminal prosecution may proceed in their respective fields. (r) Criminal administration of justice---- ----Prompt FIR registration---Forensic evidence---Delay prejudicing investigation---Time is essence in criminal investigation, particularly for preservation of forensic evidence---Delay between commission/reporting of crime and police response increases risk that evidence may be contaminated, destroyed or lost by victim, witnesses or passersby---Delayed FIR registration causes delayed start to investigation and may prejudice merits of case. (s) Supreme Court directions---- ----Prompt registration of FIR---Discontinuance of incorrect terminology---Internal policing---Directions issued---Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces and ICT were directed to ensure prompt FIR registration under S.154, Cr.P.C. where information relates to cognizable offence---If information is initially entered in Roznamcha/daily diary, it shall be treated as part of FIR and incorporated accordingly---IGPs were directed to ensure mechanism of internal policing to curb excess/misuse of powers by police officers---Prosecutor Generals of provinces and ICT were expected to advise police authorities and frame SOPs in accordance with Cr.P.C.---Police Rules, particularly FIR form, were directed to be brought in line with Cr.P.C. in consultation with relevant departments. (t) Supreme Court directions---- ----Province of Sindh---Delay in FIR registration---Report and disciplinary action---Since delayed FIR registration was noticed to be more prevalent in Sindh, Prosecutor General Sindh was directed to submit report within one month regarding average delay in registration of FIRs in heinous offences during last two years in Sindh---Inspector General of Police Sindh was directed to initiate departmental proceedings against police officers who caused delay in FIR registration in the present case---District and Sessions Judges in Sindh were directed to ensure that in lower courts the complainant/informant is not referred to as “Faryaadi” while calling cases. Disposition: Criminal Petition No.1021 of 2021 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; conviction and sentence of petitioner under S.302(b), PPC were maintained; Supreme Court held that delay in formal FIR registration was caused by police and not informant; directions were issued for prompt FIR registration, discontinuance of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”, correction of police terminology/forms, possible criminal and departmental action against police officers causing deliberate delay, and circulation of judgment to High Courts, District Courts, Inspector Generals of Police and Prosecutor Generals of all provinces and ICT.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Conviction and sentence maintained---Petitioner was convicted under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life for committing qatl-i-amd of deceased Muhammad Abbass, with compensation of Rs.500,000 under S.544-A, Cr.P.C. and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C.---High Court maintained conviction and sentence---Supreme Court held that ocular account was unimpeachable, consistent on material particulars, supported by medical evidence and corroborated by recovery of 9mm pistol with positive forensic report---Impugned judgment was well reasoned and did not warrant interference---Leave to appeal was refused. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Delay in registration of FIR---Delay caused by police and not by informant---Effect---Occurrence took place at 10:20 p.m. on 10.08.2017 while FIR was formally registered at 4:30 p.m. on 11.08.2017---Roznamcha entry showed that informant had reported matter to police within thirty minutes with same version against petitioner---Delay in registration of FIR was caused by police and not by informant---Victim/prosecution could not be made to suffer due to omission, inefficiency or negligence of police officials---While examining delay, Court must consider whether delay was attributable to informant in reporting crime, and not delay caused by failure of police to perform statutory duty. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 21---Subsequent conduct---Prompt reporting by informant---Relevance---Conduct of informant immediately after occurrence was relevant---Informant promptly approached police and reported occurrence within thirty minutes, as reflected in Roznamcha entry---Such conduct established due promptitude and excluded inference that delay was attributable to informant. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 154---Registration of FIR---Mandatory duty of police---Police cannot refuse or delay registration---Once information relating to commission of cognizable offence is received by Officer Incharge of Police Station, registration of FIR cannot be refused or delayed---Police officer cannot assume role of adjudicator, Magistrate or Court by first inquiring into credibility of information before recording it---FIR is primary step for setting criminal law in motion and enabling investigation---Police are not justified in waiting for heirs of deceased to complete funeral rites before registering FIR. Cited Cases: • Seeta Ram v. The State Jail Petition No.51 of 2023 • Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara and others PLD 2007 SC 539 • Syed Qambar Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1123 (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 154 & 162---Inquiry before registration of FIR---Effect---Investigation or inquiry into correctness of information before registration of FIR would be hit by S.162, Cr.P.C.---Police may commence investigation upon credible information or knowledge of cognizable offence from any source and need not wait for a formal complainant to appear---Police must act promptly to investigate and preserve evidence. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Related witnesses---Evidentiary value---Eyewitnesses gave consistent and unimpeachable ocular account on all material particulars---Lengthy cross-examination failed to discredit them---Accused and deceased were related, therefore question of mistaken identity or false implication did not arise---Related witnesses may be relied upon where testimony is confidence-inspiring and supported by other evidence. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Medical evidence---Consistency with ocular account---Firearm injuries---Medical evidence showed injuries caused by firearm from distance of about two to three feet, which was consistent with statements of eyewitnesses---Duration between injuries and post-mortem also supported prosecution version---No material contradiction existed between ocular and medical evidence. (h) Criminal trial---- ----Recovery of weapon---Positive forensic report---Corroborative value---9mm pistol was recovered from accused and forensic report confirmed its use in commission of offence---Recovery, read with ocular and medical evidence, further strengthened prosecution case. (i) Criminal trial---- ----Minor contradictions---Effect---Minor contradictions not going to root of prosecution case do not justify discarding otherwise reliable evidence---Human memory, passage of time and anxiety for justice may naturally cause minor discrepancies---Whole prosecution evidence could not be discarded on minor contradictions not vital to case. Cited Case: • Sher Afzal v. The State 2024 SCMR 894 (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 4(h), 154 & 200---“Complainant” and “informant”---Distinction---FIR is not a complaint---Complaint under S.4(h), Cr.P.C. means allegation made orally or in writing to Magistrate with view to his taking action under Code and does not include police report---Proceedings under S.200, Cr.P.C. give status of complainant to person filing complaint before Magistrate---Person furnishing information to police for registration of FIR under S.154, Cr.P.C. is only an informant---Use of expressions “complainant” and “informant” interchangeably is unsupported by statute and has legal consequences. Cited Cases: • Ganesha v. Sharanappa and another Criminal Appeal No.1948 of 2013 • Wajid Khan v. The State 2020 PCrLJ 454 (k) Police proceedings---- ----Use of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”---Discontinued---Terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai” used in police proceedings to describe person furnishing information to police are not supported by Cr.P.C.---Such terms portray citizen as supplicant or seeker of mercy rather than rights-bearing person invoking protection of law---Citizen approaches police as matter of right and not as matter of charity, grace or indulgence---Use of such terminology was legally misconceived and constitutionally impermissible---Supreme Court directed discontinuance of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai” in police proceedings. (l) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 4, 9, 10-A & 14---Citizen-centric policing---Dignity of citizen---Due process and lawful treatment---Police officers are public servants entrusted with constitutional and statutory duties to protect life, liberty and security of person---Terminology portraying citizen as supplicant violates dignity and undermines constitutional guarantees of lawful treatment, access to justice and fair treatment---Courts and executive authorities must use language reflecting legislative intent, constitutional values and procedural clarity. (m) Police proceedings---- ----Applications to Station House Officer---Expression “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” discouraged---Phrase “Bakhidmat Janaab SHO” has no legal backing and implies subordinate tone---It is not citizen who is at service of SHO; rather SHO serves citizens---Simple address “Janaab SHO” shall suffice. (n) Police Rules, 1934---- ----Form No.24.2(1)---Use of word “complainant”---Need for revision---Police Rules, 1934 and FIR form use word “complainant” where “informant” should be used---Cr.P.C. does not recognize complaint to police officer---Police Rules and FIR forms should be brought in line with Cr.P.C.---Spelling mistakes in Police Rules were also noticed and revision was considered necessary. (o) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 201---Delayed registration of FIR by police---Concealment, loss or disappearance of evidence---Criminal liability of police officer---Where Officer Incharge of Police Station delays FIR registration after receiving information of cognizable offence, presumption shall be that delay was caused to benefit accused unless police official proves contrary---S.201, PPC uses expression “whoever” and creates no exception for police officials or public functionaries---Police officer stands on no higher pedestal than private citizen where concealment or disappearance of evidence is concerned---If deliberate delay results in loss, destruction or disappearance of evidence, criminal liability under S.201, PPC is attracted. Cited Cases: • Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 420 • Muhammad Bashir v. The State PLD 2007 SC 539 • Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1841 • The State v. Abdul Khaliq PLD 2011 SC 554 (p) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 190---Magistrate and Sessions Judge---Power to proceed against police officer delaying FIR---Where deliberate delay or inaction by Officer Incharge of Police Station results in concealment, loss or destruction of evidence, District and Sessions Judges as well as Magistrates taking cognizance under S.190, Cr.P.C. are competent to call such officer on their own observation or on application of informant/victim---If satisfied after show-cause notice that delay was caused by police officer, such officer may be proceeded against under S.201, PPC and any other applicable law. (q) Police Order, 2002---- ----Art. 155---Delayed FIR registration---Departmental proceedings---Since S.154, Cr.P.C. is mandatory, delayed registration of FIR amounts to wilful breach or neglect of mandatory provision of law---Trial Courts shall refer matter to concerned District Police Officer for departmental proceedings against police officer responsible for delay---Departmental and criminal liabilities operate independently. (r) Criminal administration of justice---- ----Prompt FIR registration---Preservation of forensic evidence---Delay prejudicing investigation---Time is of essence in criminal investigation, especially for preservation of forensic evidence---Delay between crime, report to police and police response increases likelihood of contamination, destruction or disappearance of evidence---Delayed FIR registration means delayed start of investigation and may prejudice merits of case. (s) Supreme Court directions---- ----Prompt FIR registration---Internal policing---SOPs---Inspector Generals of Police of all provinces and ICT were directed to ensure prompt registration of FIR once information of cognizable offence is furnished to Officer Incharge of Police Station---If information is initially entered in Roznamcha/daily diary, it shall be treated as part of FIR and incorporated accordingly---IGPs were directed to ensure internal policing mechanism to curb misuse/excess of police powers---Prosecutor Generals of provinces and ICT were expected to advise police authorities and frame SOPs in accordance with Cr.P.C.---Police Rules, particularly FIR form, were directed to be brought in line with Cr.P.C. (t) Supreme Court directions---- ----Sindh---Delayed FIR registration---Report and disciplinary action---Practice of delayed FIR registration was noticed to be more prevalent in Sindh---Prosecutor General Sindh was directed to submit report within one month regarding average delay in registration of FIRs in heinous offences during last two years in Sindh---Inspector General of Police Sindh was directed to initiate departmental proceedings against police officers who caused delay in registration of FIR in present case---District and Sessions Judges of Sindh were directed to ensure that in lower courts “complainant” or “informant” is not referred to as “Faryaadi” while calling case. Disposition: Criminal Petition No.1021 of 2021 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; conviction and sentence of petitioner under S.302(b), PPC were maintained; Supreme Court held that formal delay in FIR registration was caused by police and not informant; directions were issued for prompt FIR registration, discontinuance of terms “Faryaadi” and “Muddai”, correction of police forms/terminology, criminal and departmental action against police officers causing deliberate delay, and circulation of judgment to High Courts, District Courts, Inspector Generals of Police and Prosecutor Generals of all provinces and ICT.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)— ----S. 302(b)—Qatl-i-amd—Sentence—Conversion from death to life imprisonment—Scope— Trial Court convicted accused under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced him to death along with compensation under S.544-A, Cr.P.C.—High Court maintained conviction but converted death sentence into imprisonment for life on ground that prosecution failed to prove motive and recovery of weapon beyond doubt—Validity—Supreme Court held that ocular account supported by medical evidence proved guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt and no contradiction affecting prosecution case was pointed out—However, where motive remained unproved and recovery of weapon was doubtful, such circumstances constituted mitigating factors—In cases where motive is not proved, normal rule is to award life imprisonment rather than capital punishment—High Court rightly exercised discretion in converting death sentence into life imprisonment—No interference warranted. Cited Cases: Bashir-ud-Din v. The State (2025 SCMR 1380) Muhammad Bilal v. The State (2025 SCMR 1580) Nawab Ali v. The State (2019 SCMR 2009) Mst. Nazia Anwar v. The State (2018 SCMR 911) Arshad Beg v. The State (2017 SCMR 1727) Allah Wasaya v. The State (2017 SCMR 1797) Mazhar Abbas v. The State (2017 SCMR 1884) Ghulam Muhammad v. The State (2017 SCMR 2048) (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)— ----S. 544-A—Compensation—Maintenance— Trial Court awarded compensation to legal heirs of deceased which was maintained by High Court—Supreme Court observed that conviction and compensation were based on reliable ocular and medical evidence—Such compensation order did not warrant interference where conviction itself was maintained. (c) Criminal jurisprudence— ----Benefit of doubt—Extent— Failure of prosecution to prove motive and safe recovery of weapon does not necessarily result in acquittal where ocular evidence is confidence-inspiring and corroborated by medical evidence—However, such deficiencies constitute mitigating circumstances relevant to quantum of sentence—In such circumstances, conversion of death sentence into life imprisonment is justified in accordance with settled principles. Disposition: Jail Petition No.6 of 2018 was dismissed; leave to appeal was refused; judgment of Lahore High Court converting death sentence into imprisonment for life was affirmed.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984— ----Art. 46—Dying declaration—Admissibility—Evidentiary value—Standard of scrutiny— Prosecution case for murder rested primarily upon dying declaration of deceased recorded soon after occurrence in hospital and ocular account of eyewitness—Held, dying declaration is admissible under Art.46, Qanun-e-Shahadat, without pre-condition of imminent expectation of death—Such statement carries great evidentiary value on principle that a person at brink of death is presumed not to lie, yet it must be subjected to close scrutiny as maker is not available for cross-examination—In present case, dying declaration was recorded within about thirty-five minutes of occurrence and was found consistent on material particulars with ocular account—Medical evidence established deceased was conscious, oriented and fit to make statement at relevant time—Non-attestation of dying declaration by medical officer, in circumstances where doctor had examined injured and found him fit, did not render declaration unreliable—Dying declaration and corroborating ocular/medical evidence were sufficient to prove charge beyond reasonable doubt. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)— ----S. 302(b)—Murder—Proof—Ocular account and medical corroboration— Accused was charged with murder by firearm; deceased sustained multiple firearm injuries and later succumbed—Held, prosecution evidence, comprising prompt dying declaration, corroborative eyewitness testimony, medical evidence of firearm injuries, and recovery of blood-stained earth and crime empty from place of occurrence, established commission of offence beyond shadow of doubt—No material contradiction or legal infirmity was shown to discredit prosecution version—Conviction under S.302(b) was upheld. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)— ----Ss. 204 & 87—Abscondence—Evidentiary significance— Accused remained fugitive for about eight years after occurrence and was arrested much later; proceedings under Ss.204 and 87, Cr.PC were initiated and completed—Held, unexplained abscondence and disappearance immediately after occurrence, particularly when deceased was co-villager and accused could reasonably apprehend accusation, constituted strong incriminating circumstance pointing towards guilt, though conviction still rested on substantive prosecution evidence. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)— ----S. 302—Sentence—Death penalty and life imprisonment—Mitigating circumstance—Motive not proved— Trial Court awarded death sentence; High Court maintained conviction but converted sentence to life imprisonment—Held, though death is normal penalty for murder, Court retains discretion to award life imprisonment where extenuating circumstances exist—Failure of prosecution to prove alleged motive constituted mitigating circumstance justifying conversion of death sentence into life imprisonment—High Court’s exercise of sentencing discretion warranted no interference. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)— ----S. 544-A—Compensation—Maintenance— Accused was directed to pay compensation to legal heirs of deceased with default sentence—High Court maintained compensation and default sentence and extended benefit of S.382-B, Cr.PC—Held, no ground was made out to interfere with compensation and ancillary directions. Disposition: Criminal Petition for leave to appeal seeking restoration of death sentence (Crl.P.L.A. No.99-P/2019) was dismissed by majority (two to one, with Musarrat Hilali, J. dissenting); Jail Petition No.614/2019 filed by convicted accused was dismissed; leave to appeal was declined and judgment of High Court maintaining conviction under S.302(b) PPC while converting death sentence to life imprisonment (with compensation maintained and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.PC extended) was upheld.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b) & 449---Qatl-i-amd---House-trespass to commit offence punishable with death---Conviction---Ocular account---Related witnesses---Credibility---Prompt FIR---FIR lodged promptly on same day of occurrence without delay, excluding possibility of deliberation or fabrication---Prosecution case rested primarily on eye-witness account of deceased’s parents, who were natural inmates of house and whose presence at spot was natural---Ocular version found internally consistent, substantially unshaken in cross-examination and assigning specific, effective role to accused---Medical evidence fully corroborated manner, locale and time of occurrence and supported firearm injury as narrated---Relationship of witnesses with deceased not a ground to discard testimony when otherwise confidence-inspiring and natural---Conviction under Ss.302(b) & 449 maintained. (b) Criminal jurisprudence ----Motive---Recovery of weapon---Effect---Even if motive and recovery excluded from consideration, straightforward ocular account duly supported by medical evidence sufficient to sustain conviction---High Court had already viewed motive and recovery with reservation yet maintained conviction---Non-establishment of motive or inconsequential recovery not fatal where direct trustworthy ocular evidence exists. (c) Criminal trial ----Appreciation of evidence---Misreading or non-reading---Perversity---Concurrent findings---Interference by Supreme Court---No material misreading or non-reading of evidence, contradiction going to root of prosecution case or perversity in concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court shown---In absence thereof, interference in conviction not warranted. (d) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b)---Sentence---Death penalty v. life imprisonment---Enhancement---High Court commuted death sentence to life imprisonment while maintaining conviction---No legal ground made out for restoration of death sentence---Complainant’s enhancement petition not pressed at time of dictation of short order---Sentence of life imprisonment upheld. (e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----S. 544-A---Compensation---Default sentence---Compensation awarded to legal heirs maintained---Default imprisonment upheld---Benefit of S.382-B maintained---Sentences directed to run concurrently upheld. Cited cases: Nil mentioned in judgment text. Disposition: Jail Petition No. 607 of 2021 dismissed and Criminal Petition No. 1820-L of 2021 dismissed; conviction of petitioner under sections 302(b) and 449, PPC maintained; sentence of life imprisonment under section 302(b) as awarded by High Court upheld; compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C., fine and default sentences maintained; benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C., and direction of concurrent running of sentences upheld; enhancement petition not pressed.