Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D, 337-F(i) & 337-F(ii)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342, 382-B & 544—Sentence of death—Commutation—Subsequent mental illness—Schizophrenia—Supervening and mitigating circumstance—The appellant was convicted for the murder of three minor sons of the complainant, who was his real brother, and for causing knife injuries to the complainant’s wife. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution case stood proved beyond doubt through the natural and confidence-inspiring ocular account of the injured mother, corroborated by the complainant and other witnesses as well as by medical evidence. The Court observed that, in the circumstances of the case, false implication was wholly improbable, particularly where the bereaved parents themselves were witnesses to the murder of their own children. The conviction on merits was, therefore, maintained. However, on the question of sentence, the Court held that although nothing had been brought on record to establish that at the time of commission of the offence the appellant was suffering from such mental infirmity as would impair his criminal responsibility, the subsequent medical evaluation ordered by the Court conclusively established that he was suffering from schizophrenia and was under treatment requiring regular follow-up. In these circumstances, the appellant’s diagnosed mental illness constituted a supervening and mitigating circumstance warranting commutation of the sentence of death to imprisonment for life on all three counts of murder. Criminal law—Mental illness—Execution of mentally ill convict—Humanity and conscience of law—The Supreme Court held that execution of a person suffering from profound mental illness offends the dictates of humanity and the settled conscience of law. The Court emphasized that the death penalty is premised on retribution and deterrence, both of which assume the offender’s rational capacity to comprehend the nature and wrongfulness of conduct and to be influenced by punishment. A person afflicted with severe mental illness, particularly one suffering from delusion or psychosis, stands outside these assumptions. Therefore, while such illness may not necessarily erase criminal liability for the past act in the absence of proof regarding the accused’s condition at the time of occurrence, it may nevertheless operate as a supervening factor rendering execution inhumane and unjust. The Court observed that when the State executes a person whose mental illness has eroded his capacity for reason, the punishment ceases to reflect the majesty of justice and instead becomes an exhibition of cruelty inconsistent with law. Evidence and procedure—Medical Board constituted by Supreme Court—Psychiatric evaluation—Schizophrenia established—The Court took note of the appellant’s assertion in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C. that the occurrence was linked to “mental health disorder” and, acting on that plea, directed constitution of a Medical Board. Pursuant to the Court’s order, the Punjab Institute of Mental Health, Lahore constituted a Board of Certification, admitted the appellant for comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, and reported that according to history and psychological assessment he was suffering from schizophrenia, was under treatment, and required regular follow-up for maintenance treatment. The Court treated this medical opinion as sufficient to establish the appellant’s present mental condition for purposes of sentence, though not for negating criminal responsibility at the time of the offence. Sentence—Concurrent running of sentences—Benefit under S. 382-B, Cr.P.C.—Directions for treatment in custody—While partially allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts, maintained all other sentences awarded by the courts below, and directed that all sentences shall run concurrently. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was also extended to the appellant. The jail authorities were further directed to ensure provision of necessary medical treatment in accordance with the appellant’s diagnosed mental condition, including referral to the concerned medical facility where specialized care may be required, and to adopt suitable precautionary and supervisory measures so that the appellant does not pose a threat to other inmates and his custody and treatment remain consistent with prison regulations and medical advice. Case references—The Court referred to and relied upon the following authorities and materials: Sir Edward Coke’s statement in The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1797); Ford v. Wainwright (477 U.S. 399, 1986); Panetti v. Quarterman (551 U.S. 930, 2007); Madison v. Alabama (586 U.S. ___, 2019); and Safia Bano’s case (PLD 2021 SC 488). These authorities were cited to affirm the settled principle that execution of a person who is insane or mentally incompetent is contrary to law, humanity, and fundamental human dignity, and that mental unsoundness may constitute a supervening circumstance justifying commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Appeal partially allowed—Death sentence commuted to imprisonment for life—Conviction and remaining sentences maintained—The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for murder and allied offences, but commuted the death sentence to imprisonment for life on three counts on account of his established schizophrenia as a supervening and mitigating circumstance. All remaining sentences were maintained, to run concurrently, with benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and with further directions for continued psychiatric treatment and custodial supervision.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—Ss. 302(b), 148 & 149—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—S. 382-B—Double murder case—Appraisal of ocular and medical evidence—Partial acceptance of prosecution case—Conviction of one accused maintained, co-accused acquitted on benefit of doubt—The Supreme Court held that where the ocular account against one accused was straightforward, confidence-inspiring and fully corroborated by medical evidence, his conviction under S. 302(b), P.P.C. was rightly maintained. In the present case, the role of effective firing upon both deceased was consistently attributed to petitioner-convict Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu, and the post-mortem evidence supported the prosecution version regarding the firearm injuries caused by him. The Court, therefore, found that the prosecution had successfully established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, as regards co-accused Rab Nawaz, although a role of a single effective fire shot with a .30-bore pistol was attributed to him qua one deceased, the medical evidence did not support that version: the relevant injury was not shown to have been caused by a .30-bore pistol, no bullet was recovered from the body, pellets were recovered instead, and the prosecution failed to produce any forensic material connecting the alleged recovered pistol with the crime. In these circumstances, the evidence against Rab Nawaz was held to be shaky, deficient and insufficient to sustain conviction, entitling him to acquittal on the principle that benefit of doubt, however slight, must go to the accused. Criminal evidence—Ocular account and medical evidence—Extent of corroboration—Rule of cautious scrutiny—The Supreme Court observed that the testimony of the complainant and ocular witnesses had to be examined separately with regard to the specific role assigned to each accused. The ocular account was accepted to the extent that it matched the medical evidence concerning the fatal injuries caused to the deceased. In relation to Muhammad Sarwar deceased, the role of effective firing was specifically attributed to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu and co-accused Shoukat Ali, and the post-mortem findings fully supported that account. In relation to Muhammad Ashraf deceased, the fatal injuries affecting the brain and left lung were likewise attributed to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu and co-accused Shoukat Ali, whereas the alleged injury assigned to Rab Nawaz was neither shown by medical evidence to have been caused by a .30-bore pistol nor found to be the cause of death. The Court thus applied the settled principle of sifting the grain from the chaff and accepted the prosecution case only to the extent it was supported by independent medical evidence. Criminal law—Recovery of weapon—Inconsequential recovery—Mitigating circumstance—The Supreme Court endorsed the view of the Lahore High Court that the alleged recoveries did not materially strengthen the prosecution case for purposes of sentence enhancement. The recovery of the .30-bore pistol allegedly on the pointation of Rab Nawaz was held inconsequential because the Punjab Forensic Science Agency report merely showed that the weapon was in working condition and did not connect it with any crime empty. Likewise, the High Court had rightly treated the recovery of the alleged 12-bore rifle as inconsequential in the matter of sentence. The Court held that inconsequential recovery, particularly when not forensically linked to the occurrence, cannot by itself justify maintaining or enhancing the extreme penalty. Sentence—Death sentence—Commutation to imprisonment for life—Non-proof of motive—Inconsequential recovery as mitigating circumstance—The Supreme Court held that the Lahore High Court had rightly commuted the sentence of death awarded to Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu to imprisonment for life on two counts. It was observed that the motive set up by the prosecution had not been proved, and the alleged weapon recovery had also remained inconsequential. Both factors constituted mitigating circumstances in terms of the settled principles governing capital punishment, and no legal infirmity was found in the High Court’s view that these circumstances warranted commutation. Accordingly, the complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence from life imprisonment to death was dismissed on merits. Case references—No specific reported precedent was expressly named or cited in the text of the judgment provided. The Court only referred generally to the “settled principle” of sifting the grain from the chaff, the rule that benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused, and the settled principle that non-proof of motive and inconsequential recovery are mitigating circumstances warranting commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life. Since no case names or citations were mentioned in the judgment text, none can properly be added as judicially cited authorities. Jail Petition No. 448 of 2023 dismissed—Leave refused—The conviction and sentence of petitioner-convict Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu were maintained. Jail Petition No. 557 of 2023 converted into appeal and allowed—The conviction and sentence of Rab Nawaz were set aside and he was acquitted of the charge, with direction for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No. 1080-L of 2023 dismissed—The complainant’s request for enhancement of Zulfiqar Ali alias Pappu’s sentence from imprisonment for life to death was refused on merits, while the petition against Rab Nawaz was dismissed as infructuous owing to his acquittal.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Murder by churri blows---Conviction under S.302(b) converted to S.302(c), P.P.C.---Right of private defence of honour of niece---Petitioner-convict did not deny occurrence in entirety but pleaded that he acted in defence of honour of his paternal niece Mst. Shagufta Rafique, aged about 17 years---Defence version was that deceased caught hold of niece, dragged her towards abandoned land with evil design, and on her alarm petitioner reached the spot; during quarrel deceased pulled out churri, petitioner snatched it and, in heat of passion, inflicted fatal injuries---Supreme Court held that occurrence took place at spur of moment, without premeditation or calculated design, and case fell within S.302(c), P.P.C., not S.302(b), P.P.C. (b) Criminal trial---- ----Statement under S.342, Cr.P.C.---Specific defence plea---Consideration by Court---Petitioner in his statement under S.342, Cr.P.C. gave detailed version that deceased had placed honour of his niece at stake, dragged her with evil design, and that petitioner lost control when he saw the episode---Supreme Court examined said plea along with defence evidence and surrounding circumstances, holding that defence version could not be ignored where it appeared probable and was supported by testimony of defence witness. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Defence witness---Young girl alleging assault on her modesty---Intrinsic assurance---Mst. Shagufta Rafique appeared as DW-1 and deposed that deceased caught and dragged her towards abandoned land, whereupon petitioner came on her alarm and quarrel occurred---Supreme Court held that in peculiar social milieu, it cannot ordinarily be expected of a young girl to falsely level an allegation touching her modesty and honour merely to save accused from penal consequences---Such allegation carries social stigma which no woman would lightly invite upon herself---Her testimony lent intrinsic assurance to defence version. (d) Criminal trial---- ----Maternal/paternal uncle relying on honour of niece as defence---False implication through stigma---Improbability---Supreme Court observed that it was improbable that an uncle would expose his niece to stigma by fabricating a story involving her honour solely to create defence---This circumstance supported genuineness of defence plea that incident was triggered by deceased’s conduct towards niece. (e) Criminal trial---- ----Acquittal of co-accused---Finality---Effect on prosecution version---FIR alleged that petitioner and co-accused jointly attacked deceased with churri blows---Investigation found co-accused Muhammad Abbas not present at spot and co-accused Muhammad Rafique alias Rafi unarmed and not participating in offence---Both co-accused were acquitted by Trial Court and their acquittal was not challenged by State or complainant---Supreme Court held that such final acquittal lent support to defence plea that occurrence was not a pre-planned attack by multiple assailants but an incident confined to petitioner and deceased at spot. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Premeditation absent---Sudden provocation and heat of passion---Deceased’s act as trigger---Supreme Court held that material on record suggested that act of deceased triggered incident; petitioner acted in heat of passion upon sudden provocation, lost self-control and inflicted fatal injuries---Element of prior concert or calculated design was absent---Such circumstances brought case within ambit of S.302(c), P.P.C. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(c)---Sentence---Fourteen years’ rigorous imprisonment---After setting aside conviction and death/life sentence under S.302(b), P.P.C., Supreme Court convicted petitioner under S.302(c), P.P.C. and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years---Compensation awarded by Trial Court and sentence in default thereof were maintained. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of period already undergone---Conviction converted from S.302(b) to S.302(c), P.P.C.---Supreme Court extended benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. to petitioner-convict after holding that occurrence took place without premeditation and under sudden provocation connected with defence of honour of niece. (i) Criminal petition for enhancement---- ----Complainant seeking enhancement from life imprisonment to death---Conviction converted to S.302(c), P.P.C.---Effect---Complainant sought enhancement of sentence from imprisonment for life to death under S.302(b), P.P.C.---Since Supreme Court converted conviction from S.302(b) to S.302(c), P.P.C., enhancement petition became infructuous and was dismissed. Disposition: Jail Petition No.338 of 2018 was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentence under S.302(b), P.P.C. were set aside; petitioner was instead convicted under S.302(c), P.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years; compensation and default sentence awarded by Trial Court were maintained; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended. Criminal Petition No.519-L of 2018 seeking enhancement of sentence was dismissed as infructuous. Not approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC---Conversion to S.302(c), PPC---Sudden provocation---Heat of passion---Deceased allegedly murdered by petitioner/convict by inflicting churri blows, while two other prosecution witnesses also received injuries during the same occurrence---Trial Court convicted petitioner under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced him to death, while High Court maintained conviction but commuted death sentence to imprisonment for life---Supreme Court, upon reappraisal of evidence, found that prosecution version regarding occurrence inside complainant’s chobara was materially doubtful---Defence version was that deceased had illicit relations with petitioner’s wife and was seen by petitioner inside his house during late hours of night, whereafter deceased fled and petitioner chased him in a state of emotional disturbance---Medical and investigative evidence showed that deceased was not wearing shalwar at the time of post-mortem, which materially supported defence version and rendered prosecution version highly unbelievable---Occurrence was held to be neither premeditated nor result of prior design, but had taken place suddenly in the heat of passion upon grave and sudden provocation---Prosecution failed to establish requisite ingredients of S.302(b), PPC---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC was set aside and petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC instead. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(c)---Grave and sudden provocation---Scope---Where homicide was committed without pre-planning, in heat of passion, upon sudden provocation, and without taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner, offence would fall within S.302(c), PPC and not S.302(b), PPC---Petitioner, after allegedly seeing deceased with his wife at late night, lost self-control and chased deceased, culminating in fatal assault---Such facts brought case within S.302(c), PPC---Sentence of rigorous imprisonment for twenty years was awarded under S.302(c), PPC. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Appreciation of evidence---Two divergent versions of same occurrence---Suppression of material facts by both sides---Duty of Court---Where prosecution and defence presented divergent versions and both sides appeared to have suppressed material facts to minimize their respective roles, Court was required to sift evidence and form its own view consistent with probabilities of case and capable of satisfying a prudent mind---Supreme Court found defence version substantially corroborated by medical officer, investigating officer and constable who escorted dead body---Circumstance that deceased remained without shalwar up to post-mortem was highly unbelievable if prosecution version of murder inside complainant’s chobara were accepted, but strongly supported defence version that deceased had fled from petitioner’s house after being found with petitioner’s wife. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 342---Statement of accused---Evidentiary value---Admission by accused---Petitioner/convict, in his statement under S.342, Cr.P.C., admitted inflicting injuries but explained occurrence as result of sudden loss of self-control after seeing deceased with his wife---Such statement, when supported by surrounding circumstances and prosecution evidence itself, was considered for determining true nature of offence---Admission did not sustain conviction under S.302(b), PPC, but supported alteration of conviction to S.302(c), PPC. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 337-L(2) & 337-F(ii)---Causing injuries to prosecution witnesses---Convictions maintained---Injured prosecution witnesses received injuries during the same transaction when they intervened in occurrence---Although murder conviction was altered from S.302(b) to S.302(c), PPC, convictions and sentences under remaining offences were maintained---Sentence for causing injuries to Mst. Umme Farwa and Syed Gohar Hussain remained intact. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of previous detention---Sentences to run concurrently---After converting Jail Petition into appeal and partly allowing same, Supreme Court extended benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. to petitioner/convict---Substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. (g) Sentence---- ----Enhancement of sentence---Petition by complainant seeking restoration/enhancement to death sentence---Effect of conversion of conviction from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC---Since conviction of respondent/convict was converted from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC, complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence from imprisonment for life to death lost efficacy and became infructuous---Criminal Petition seeking enhancement was dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Jail Petition No.716 of 2017 was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentence under S.302(b), PPC were set aside; petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for twenty years; compensation and default sentence were maintained; convictions and sentences under remaining offences were maintained; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended and substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Criminal Petition No.1475-L of 2017 seeking enhancement of sentence was dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC---Conversion to S.302(c), PPC---Sudden altercation---Heat of moment---Single fire shot---Petitioner/convict was alleged to have fired at deceased during a dispute over payment/deduction of price of pedi crop---Trial Court convicted petitioner under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced him to death, while High Court maintained conviction but commuted death sentence to imprisonment for life---Supreme Court, on reappraisal of evidence, found that occurrence had taken place at doorstep of petitioner’s house during a spontaneous dispute arising from settlement of price of pedi crop---Parties initially entered into altercation and grappling, and petitioner fired only one shot which proved fatal---Circumstances showed absence of premeditation, prior planning or intention to kill in the manner contemplated under S.302(b), PPC---Act was found to be a spontaneous reaction in a heated moment and no undue brutality was inflicted upon deceased---Case fell within ambit of S.302(c), PPC and not S.302(b), PPC---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC was set aside and petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(c)---Sudden fight---Spontaneous reaction---Scope---Where occurrence arose suddenly from a dispute regarding deduction from price of crop, parties grappled with each other, only one fire shot was made, and no act of undue brutality was committed, offence was liable to be categorized under S.302(c), PPC---Supreme Court held that Trial Court and High Court had overlooked relevant facts and settled principles applicable to similar cases while maintaining conviction under S.302(b), PPC---Sentence of rigorous imprisonment for fifteen years was awarded under S.302(c), PPC. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Medical evidence---Single firearm injury---Ocular account furnished by complainant and eyewitness consistently attributed firing to petitioner/convict---Place of occurrence was not challenged by defence during cross-examination---Medical evidence supported ocular account, as post-mortem showed a single firearm entrance wound on lower border of left lower jaw, which caused unnatural death of deceased---However, such evidence, while establishing petitioner’s role in causing death, did not by itself establish premeditation or intention necessary for maintaining conviction under S.302(b), PPC in view of peculiar facts of sudden altercation. (d) Criminal trial---- ----Motive and manner of occurrence---Prosecution not honestly placing complete circumstances before Court---Effect---Motive related to settlement of price of pedi crop and dispute over alleged deduction from total crop price---Supreme Court observed that to some extent the motive and mode and manner of occurrence had not been honestly placed by prosecution before Court---Initial grappling/altercation between petitioner, deceased and others indicated absence of pre-planning and supported conclusion that fatal act occurred suddenly in heat of moment. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 342---Statement of accused---Different version by accused---Petitioner did not deny occurrence, but stated that during grappling deceased was hit with his own pistol---Although Court did not accept said version in entirety, the surrounding circumstances, including admitted altercation, place of occurrence, single shot and absence of premeditation, were considered for determining true nature of offence---Conviction was altered from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of previous detention---After conversion of conviction from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC, Supreme Court extended benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. to petitioner/convict---Compensation and default sentence imposed by Courts below were maintained. (g) Sentence---- ----Enhancement of sentence---Complainant’s petition seeking death penalty---Effect of conversion of conviction to S.302(c), PPC---Complainant sought enhancement of sentence from imprisonment for life to death---Since Supreme Court converted conviction and sentence from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC, petition for enhancement of sentence lost efficacy and became infructuous---Criminal Petition seeking enhancement was dismissed. Disposition: Jail Petition No.778 of 2017 was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentence under S.302(b), PPC were set aside; petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for fifteen years; compensation and default sentence imposed by Courts below were maintained; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended. Criminal Petition No.1391-L of 2017 seeking enhancement of sentence was dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984— ----Art. 46—Dying declaration—Admissibility—Evidentiary value—Standard of scrutiny— Prosecution case for murder rested primarily upon dying declaration of deceased recorded soon after occurrence in hospital and ocular account of eyewitness—Held, dying declaration is admissible under Art.46, Qanun-e-Shahadat, without pre-condition of imminent expectation of death—Such statement carries great evidentiary value on principle that a person at brink of death is presumed not to lie, yet it must be subjected to close scrutiny as maker is not available for cross-examination—In present case, dying declaration was recorded within about thirty-five minutes of occurrence and was found consistent on material particulars with ocular account—Medical evidence established deceased was conscious, oriented and fit to make statement at relevant time—Non-attestation of dying declaration by medical officer, in circumstances where doctor had examined injured and found him fit, did not render declaration unreliable—Dying declaration and corroborating ocular/medical evidence were sufficient to prove charge beyond reasonable doubt. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)— ----S. 302(b)—Murder—Proof—Ocular account and medical corroboration— Accused was charged with murder by firearm; deceased sustained multiple firearm injuries and later succumbed—Held, prosecution evidence, comprising prompt dying declaration, corroborative eyewitness testimony, medical evidence of firearm injuries, and recovery of blood-stained earth and crime empty from place of occurrence, established commission of offence beyond shadow of doubt—No material contradiction or legal infirmity was shown to discredit prosecution version—Conviction under S.302(b) was upheld. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)— ----Ss. 204 & 87—Abscondence—Evidentiary significance— Accused remained fugitive for about eight years after occurrence and was arrested much later; proceedings under Ss.204 and 87, Cr.PC were initiated and completed—Held, unexplained abscondence and disappearance immediately after occurrence, particularly when deceased was co-villager and accused could reasonably apprehend accusation, constituted strong incriminating circumstance pointing towards guilt, though conviction still rested on substantive prosecution evidence. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)— ----S. 302—Sentence—Death penalty and life imprisonment—Mitigating circumstance—Motive not proved— Trial Court awarded death sentence; High Court maintained conviction but converted sentence to life imprisonment—Held, though death is normal penalty for murder, Court retains discretion to award life imprisonment where extenuating circumstances exist—Failure of prosecution to prove alleged motive constituted mitigating circumstance justifying conversion of death sentence into life imprisonment—High Court’s exercise of sentencing discretion warranted no interference. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)— ----S. 544-A—Compensation—Maintenance— Accused was directed to pay compensation to legal heirs of deceased with default sentence—High Court maintained compensation and default sentence and extended benefit of S.382-B, Cr.PC—Held, no ground was made out to interfere with compensation and ancillary directions. Disposition: Criminal Petition for leave to appeal seeking restoration of death sentence (Crl.P.L.A. No.99-P/2019) was dismissed by majority (two to one, with Musarrat Hilali, J. dissenting); Jail Petition No.614/2019 filed by convicted accused was dismissed; leave to appeal was declined and judgment of High Court maintaining conviction under S.302(b) PPC while converting death sentence to life imprisonment (with compensation maintained and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.PC extended) was upheld.

Summary: (a) Criminal trial----Appreciation of evidence----Contradictions in ocular account, infirm investigation and benefit of doubt----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b); Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898), Ss. 544-A & 382-B---Accused/petitioners were convicted under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced to life imprisonment with compensation under S.544-A, Cr.P.C., their convictions having been upheld by the High Court---Held, on reappraisal of the evidence, the prosecution case was found to be tainted with material doubts and contradictions: the occurrence was a night-time incident but the source of light was neither mentioned in the statements of key witnesses under S.161, Cr.P.C., nor properly secured or verified at the spot; the ocular witnesses admitted that they did not intervene or attempt to overpower the assailants and only raised hue and cry; important witnesses were either related to the complainant or chance witnesses; there were significant contradictions between statements of PWs and their earlier police versions regarding the manner of occurrence, the blows attributed to the accused, the alleged motive and the source of light; the investigation officer did not secure blood-stains from the place of occurrence, did not send blood-stained clothes and hatchets for DNA analysis and admitted that entries regarding deposit of parcels were incomplete; report No.21 did not tally with the complainant’s statement---Cumulatively, these infirmities created serious doubts regarding the reliability of the prosecution case, which had failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt---Benefit of such doubt was extended to the accused, resulting in their acquittal and setting aside of the convictions and sentences recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court. (b) Criminal trial----Night-time occurrence----Source of light not secured or proved----Effect on identification of accused---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b); Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898), S.161---Occurrence admittedly took place at about 8:30 p.m.; complainant and eyewitnesses did not mention the source of light in their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C.; draftsman conceded that he had wrongly shown a single bulb in the site plan, which bulb was neither taken into possession by the I.O. nor inspected to confirm whether it was in working order, and even its placement was incorrectly noted---Held, such failure to secure and prove the alleged source of light, coupled with omissions in statements, cast a serious doubt on the identification of the assailants at the crime scene in a night-time occurrence---Reliance in this regard was placed on Muhammad Anwar v. The State (2002 SCMR 1289) wherein non-seizure of the torchlight mentioned in the F.I.R. rendered the night-time identification doubtful, and on Khair Muhammad v. State (2025 SCMR 1599) where benefit of doubt was accorded for not taking into possession the source of light---Following the said principles, non-production and non-verification of the alleged bulb in the present case was treated as a significant circumstance creating doubt in the prosecution story. (c) Criminal trial----Recovery of weapons of offence----Delay in dispatch to PFSA---Non-association of independent witnesses---Mismatch between recovered weapon and recovery memo---Failure to send exhibits for DNA analysis----Effect----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Prosecution case rested, inter alia, on recovery of hatchets at the instance of the accused from Mangla bypass/Rohtas Fort area; the police witnesses admitted that: they did not mention in their S.161, Cr.P.C. statements who had given them information regarding presence of the accused or the exact location on the bypass; recovery was allegedly effected from a thickly populated area with houses and shops nearby yet no independent witness from the village or locality was associated, nor even their names recorded; the top of one recovered hatchet did not match the sketch prepared with the recovery memo and this discrepancy remained unexplained; Register No.19 did not mention date of deposit of the hatchets; the parcels containing the hatchets were dispatched to PFSA only on 15.08.2018, i.e., after about 27 days of occurrence, and PW Moharrar admitted giving no explanation for this delay; the I.O. further admitted that he did not send hatchets and blood-stained clothes for DNA analysis and did not secure blood from the place of occurrence---Held, these lapses seriously undermined the sanctity of the alleged recoveries and chain of custody; in the absence of independent corroboration and with unexplained delay and discrepancies in the description of the weapons, the recovery evidence could not safely be relied upon for sustaining conviction; such infirmities added to the overall doubt in the prosecution case and were resolved in favour of the accused. (d) Criminal trial----Motive---Failure to prove motive, effect when other evidence is already doubtful---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Prosecution alleged a prior altercation between one of the accused and the deceased as motive but the complainant and witnesses admitted during trial that they did not furnish any evidence regarding the alleged motive and some witnesses even expressed lack of knowledge about any prior altercation; complainant also did not mention the reason for altercation as motive in his earlier statement---Trial Court as well as High Court had already disbelieved the motive while still maintaining conviction on other material---Held, in circumstances where the prosecution had itself failed to substantiate the motive set up by it and where independent and investigative evidence also suffered from serious defects, nothing remained to buttress the prosecution version; failure to prove motive, when viewed alongside other discrepancies and doubts, further weakened the prosecution case and reinforced the conclusion that conviction could not be maintained. (e) Criminal trial----Standard of proof----Extent and nature of “reasonable doubt” necessary for acquittal---Single reasonable doubt sufficient----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)---Held, prosecution is bound to stand on its own legs and must prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt; where, on appraisal of evidence, doubts arise which are reasonable and not imaginary or fanciful, the accused is entitled to benefit of such doubt as a matter of right and not of concession---It is not necessary that there be multiple infirmities or numerous doubtful circumstances; even a single reasonable doubt in the prosecution case is sufficient to entitle the accused to acquittal---Reliance was placed on Ahmed Ali and another v. The State (2023 SCMR 781), in which this Court reiterated that the slightest reasonable doubt would warrant acquittal, and on a consistent line of precedents including Tajamal Hussain v. The State (2022 SCMR 1567), Sajjad Hussain v. The State (2022 SCMR 1540), Abdul Ghafoor v. The State (2022 SCMR 1527), Kashif Ali v. The State (2022 SCMR 1515), Muhammad Ashraf v. The State (2022 SCMR 1328), Khalid Mehmood v. The State (2022 SCMR 1148), Muhammad Sami Ullah v. The State (2022 SCMR 998), Bashir Muhammad Khan v. The State (2022 SCMR 986), The State v. Ahmed Omer Sheikh (2021 SCMR 873), Najaf Ali Shah v. The State (2021 SCMR 736), Muhammad Imran v. The State (2020 SCMR 857), Abdul Jabbar v. The State (2019 SCMR 129), Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State (PLD 2019 SC 64), Hashim Qasim v. The State (2017 SCMR 986), Muhammad Mansha v. The State (2018 SCMR 772), Muhammad Zaman v. The State (2014 SCMR 749), Khalid Mehmood v. The State (2011 SCMR 664), Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230), Faheem Ahmed Farooqui v. The State (2008 SCMR 1572), Ghulam Qadir v. The State (2008 SCMR 1221) and Tariq Pervaiz v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345). (f) Criminal procedure----Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal---Acquittal on benefit of doubt---Effect on connected miscellaneous application---Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898)---Criminal petition for leave to appeal was converted into appeal; for reasons of doubts and infirmities in the prosecution case, appeal was allowed; convictions and sentences recorded by trial Court and maintained by High Court were set aside and appellants were acquitted of the charge by extending benefit of doubt; it was directed that, if not required in any other case, they be released forthwith---Connected Criminal Misc. Application was not pressed by learned counsel and was dismissed as not pressed.

Summary: (a) Criminal trial ---- Appreciation of ocular, medical and forensic evidence ---- Murder of accused in judicial lockup; injuries to police constables; recovery of weapon; serological and ballistic reports ---- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 353 ---- Sindh Arms Act, 2013, S. 24 ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 382-B ----- Abdul Wahab, an accused remanded to judicial custody in a case under Ss. 365-B, 452, 148, 149, P.P.C., was brought to Sub-Jail/Judicial Lockup Warrah in pursuance of a ten-days’ remand order. Due to the absence of the Jailor, he was made to sit handcuffed in the courtyard of the judicial lockup when the appellant, along with co-accused, armed with pistols, entered the lockup and opened indiscriminate fire upon him and the police party, resulting in the deceased’s death on the spot and firearm injuries to Constables Zahid Ali and Muhammad Ayoub. Ocular account was furnished by the Incharge Judicial Lockup (ASI Muhammad Idrees Wahoocho) and the two injured constables, who were independent, disinterested witnesses with no animosity against the appellant; their presence at the scene was natural and unimpeachable, and their testimony was consistent and confidence-inspiring on all material particulars and remained unshaken in cross-examination. The appellant was apprehended at the spot and a 30-bore pistol recovered from his possession; four empties of the same calibre, recovered from the spot, on forensic examination matched the said pistol, thereby providing scientific corroboration to the ocular account. Recovery of blood-stained earth from the place where the deceased fell and his blood-stained clothes, together with a positive serological report, further substantiated the prosecution version. Medical evidence, including M.L.Cs. of the injured constables and post-mortem of the deceased, confirmed fresh firearm injuries on the injured witnesses, categorized as Ghayr Jaifah Hashimah and Ghayr Jaifah Mutalahimah respectively, and four firearm entry wounds on the deceased, with death opined as due to firearm injuries. Held, that on re-appraisal of the entire evidence, the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court regarding the appellant’s guilt under Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, P.P.C. and S. 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013 were based on proper appreciation of reliable ocular, medical and forensic evidence; no misreading or non-reading was found warranting interference. Convictions under the said provisions were, therefore, maintained; benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C., and direction that all sentences run concurrently, was affirmed. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n), Ss. 2(j), 2(w), 7(a), 7(b), 7(h) ---- Terrorism ---- Mens rea; “design” and “purpose”; serious coercion/intimidation of public servants; serious violence against members of police force ---- Clarification and refinement of Ghulam Hussain’s case ---- A larger Bench in Ghulam Hussain v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 61) had held that not every heinous offence causing fear or panic amounts to terrorism; where the primary motive is personal vendetta or private enmity, the act, even if it incidentally induces fear, does not per se constitute terrorism unless it satisfies the statutory criteria under S. 6, ATA. In the present case, the Supreme Court examined a specific class of incidents not squarely addressed in Ghulam Hussain’s case, namely where law enforcement personnel suffer injuries or lose their lives in the course of a private dispute between third parties while acting in the line of duty. The Court reiterated that the three cumulative elements of terrorism under S. 6(1), ATA are: (i) commission of an act enumerated in S. 6(2); (ii) the requisite “design” under S. 6(1)(b) or “purpose” under S. 6(1)(c); and (iii) the impact of such act in terms of intimidating or creating fear and insecurity in the public or a section thereof. By substituting the word “design”, the legislature broadened the inquiry to include the scheme or object in the offender’s mind, not merely the actual consequences. Thus, the decisive consideration is whether the act was designed to coerce, intimidate or overawe the Government, its officials, or law enforcement agencies, as opposed to being confined to private vengeance. Serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force or prevent the discharge of lawful duties (S. 6(2)(m)), and serious violence against a member of the police force or a public servant (S. 6(2)(n)), read with the definitions of “serious violence” and “grievous bodily injury” in Ss. 2(w) and 2(j), ATA, cover violent conduct that endangers life or causes grievous harm to officials/public servants. Comparative reference to “serious violence offence” under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (New South Wales, Australia) was made only to illustrate that, in other jurisdictions also, “serious violence” is reserved for extreme forms of harm, especially those endangering life or causing grievous injury, thus aligning with the legislative intent underlying Ss. 6(2)(m), (n), ATA. The Court held that this refined analysis does not depart from but supplements the principles in Ghulam Hussain’s case by recognizing that serious violence against law enforcement agencies, even in the context of private feuds between third parties, may, in given circumstances, assume the character of terrorism when it systematically targets those upholding the rule of law. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Hussain v. The State PLD 2020 SC 61 (c) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Harm to law enforcement personnel during private vendetta; categories of situations; design to resist and overawe law enforcement ---- When private disputes cross into terrorism ---- The Court distinguished two broad situations relating to harm caused to law enforcement personnel: firstly, where police or security officials are directly and deliberately targeted (e.g., ambushes or bombings) with the clear objective of spreading fear or disrupting the State; such attacks straightforwardly fulfill the physical and mental elements of terrorism under the ATA. Secondly, where violence arises from a private conflict but harm is caused to law enforcement officials who intervene or are inherently present, including in premises where police presence is explicit and inevitable, such as courts, police stations or lock-ups, or during transit of accused persons to or from such premises. In the latter category, if the offender arms himself with the deliberate intention to use the weapon against security officials in the event of their intervention or apprehension, the law enforcement authority becomes the foreseeable and primary target of resistance, and violence employed to evade arrest or neutralize resistance constitutes “serious coercion or intimidation” of public servants under S. 6(2)(m) and “serious violence” under S. 6(2)(n), ATA. Likewise, where the offender’s primary target is a private individual but the attack is launched in a location where police presence is inevitable, and the assailant acts with knowledge that harm to security officials is a foreseeable consequence of executing the plan, the resulting injuries or risk to law enforcement personnel can attract the provisions of S. 6(2)(m) & (n), ATA, provided that the design or purpose satisfies S. 6(1)(b) or (c), namely, to intimidate, overawe, or deter law enforcement agencies and undermine State authority. The Court emphasized that in such cases, the harm to police officers/officials is not merely incidental or collateral but forms an integral component of the criminal plan to neutralize lawful resistance and thereby constitutes an attack on the law enforcement machinery of the State. (d) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Attack in judicial lockup; injuries to police personnel escorting accused; transformation of private vendetta into terrorism; objective test for “serious violence” against police ---- Application to present case ---- In the instant matter, the initial motive of the accused arose from a personal vendetta against the deceased Abdul Wahab, who had been nominated in a case of abduction of the daughter-in-law of a co-accused and was under lawful judicial custody within the precincts of the judicial lockup. Fully aware of the deceased’s custodial status and the inevitable presence of police officials, the appellant and co-accused chose to launch an armed attack in the very courtyard of the judicial lockup, indiscriminately firing not only at their intended private target but also at the police escort, resulting in firearm injuries to Constables Zahid Ali and Muhammad Ayoub. Held, that the location (judicial lockup), timing, and manner of the attack demonstrated preparation, anticipation of resistance by law enforcement, and a willingness to overcome lawful authority through serious violence; harm to the police officials was not collateral or unintended but formed part of the accused’s broader design to execute a targeted killing in custody by neutralizing the resistance of police. Such conduct amounted to serious violence against members of the police force and serious coercion/intimidation of public servants within the meaning of S. 6(2)(m) & (n), ATA, viewed through the objective test whether the act posed a real and substantial danger to the lives of law enforcement personnel acting in the discharge of official duties. Actual fatality among police was not a prerequisite; the use of deadly weapons and indiscriminate firing in a volatile custodial environment where officials were known to be present satisfied both actus reus and mens rea under the ATA. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (PLD 2014 SC 383) to affirm that firing upon a police party in uniform engaged in lawful duties, thereby obstructing discharge of their functions, constitutes serious violence against members of the police force. Accordingly, the Court held that where officers/officials of law enforcement agencies are harmed or killed not due to personal enmity but solely because of their deployment for the discharge of lawful duty, and such attacks are deliberately planned as part of an assault on a person in custody, the intent and effect transcend private vendetta and attract the provisions of the ATA; such acts fall within the statutory definition of terrorism. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz v. The State PLD 2014 SC 383 (e) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 6(1)(b), (c), S. 6(2)(m), (n) ---- Harm to officials arising out of discharge of official functions versus purely personal enmity ---- Scope ---- The Court clarified that where harm is inflicted on an official/officer of a law enforcement agency on account of, or as a consequence of, acts performed by such official in discharge of his official duties, even if such harm is caused outside duty hours, the act is to be treated as arising from the official’s role and would fall within the ambit of terrorism, subject to fulfillment of the other statutory elements under S. 6, ATA. Conversely, where a police or law enforcement official is harmed solely due to personal enmity, without any intention of attacking or intimidating law enforcement in its institutional or official capacity, such conduct, though criminal and punishable, does not amount to terrorism and is to be dealt with under the ordinary provisions of the P.P.C. or other applicable laws. The distinction rests on whether the violence is directed at the individual in his personal capacity, or at the authority of the State and law enforcement system which he represents. (f) Anti-Terrorism Courts ---- Joint trial of scheduled and connected offences ---- Effect on nature of offences ---- Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, S. 21-M ---- While trying a scheduled offence, an Anti-Terrorism Court is empowered under S. 21-M, ATA to jointly try any other offence committed by the accused, provided such offence is connected with the offence triable under the Act. Held, that merely by virtue of being tried in the Anti-Terrorism Court, a scheduled or non-scheduled offence does not ipso facto assume the character of a terrorism offence; it remains punishable under the ordinary criminal law unless it independently meets the definitional and mens rea requirements of terrorism as laid down in S. 6, ATA. The jurisdictional competence of the Anti-Terrorism Court to try connected offences is thus procedural and does not alter the substantive nature or ingredients of the underlying offences. (g) Criminal appeal ---- Convictions under P.P.C. and Sindh Arms Act maintained ---- Convictions under S. 7(a) & 7(b), ATA altered to S. 7(h), ATA ---- Sentence modified ---- On the basis of re-appraisal of evidence, the Supreme Court found no justification to interfere with the appellant’s convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court and maintained by the High Court under Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, P.P.C., and S. 24 of the Sindh Arms Act, 2013; these convictions were upheld. However, in light of the refined legal position regarding the scope and application of the Anti-Terrorism Act to acts of serious violence against law enforcement personnel in the line of duty, the Court set aside the appellant’s convictions under Ss. 7(a) and 7(b), ATA and altered them to a conviction under S. 7(h) of the said Act. Consequently, the appellant was sentenced under S. 7(h), ATA to five years’ imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to the appellant and all convictions were ordered to run concurrently. Appeal was, thus, partly allowed.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b) read with Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129(g)—Homicide—Absence of post-mortem / death certificate—Effect. Prosecution proved that the accused (petitioner) fired upon the victim causing three firearm injuries (right neck, right chest, right arm). However, no post-mortem was conducted, no Medical Officer deposed to the cause/date of death, and even the death certificate was withheld. Adverse inference under Art. 129(g) QSO was drawn against the prosecution for suppressing the best evidence. In such circumstances, conviction for murder under S. 302(b) PPC could not be sustained merely on presumptions or probabilities that the injuries resulted in death. Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600), Ghulam Qadir v. The State (2008 SCMR 1221), Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan (PLD 2006 SC 538), and Muhammad Luqman v. The State (PLD 1970 SC 10) relied upon; principle that conjectures/probabilities cannot replace proof reiterated. Further reliance on Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846) as to withholding of material evidence; and Gul Muhammad v. The State (2021 SCMR 381) that external examination is not a substitute for post-mortem where cause of death is in issue. (b) Criminal jurisprudence ----Benefit of doubt—Standard of proof—Scope. Where a single material infirmity (non-production of mandatory medical evidence of death) creates reasonable doubt about the charge of homicide, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. Prosecution’s burden to prove each charge beyond reasonable doubt does not shift to the accused. Ghulam Qadir (2008 SCMR 1221), Naveed Asghar (PLD 2021 SC 600) reaffirmed. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 324 & 337-L(i)—Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd—Causing hurt by firearm—Proof and sentencing. Ocular account of natural witnesses (PW-1 complainant and PW-2 paternal uncle) was confidence-inspiring; occurrence was promptly reported (FIR within ~2 hours; distance 7/8 km); medical evidence (PW-5) noted three firearm injuries; recovery of TT pistol at accused’s pointation with positive FSL corroboration (Exh. P/6-G). Even though motive remained unproved, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally caused firearm injuries on vital parts, attracting S. 324 PPC. In absence of declared nature of hurt by the Medical Officer, S. 337-L(i) PPC was also attracted. (d) Evidence—Ocular, medical and corroborative ----Prompt FIR—Natural presence—Weapon recovery—Forensic corroboration. House-occurrence; presence of inmate PW-1 and close-by PW-2 held natural; cross-examination did not shake their testimony. Prompt FIR added assurance. Recovery of weapon and positive FSL provided independent corroboration of the prosecution’s ocular account regarding causing injuries. Cited Cases: • Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846) • Riaz Ahmed v. The State (2010 SCMR 846) • Abdul Qadeer v. The State (2024 SCMR 1146) • Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224) • Gul Muhammad v. The State (2021 SCMR 381) • Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600) • Ghulam Qadir v. The State (2008 SCMR 1221) • Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan (PLD 2006 SC 538) • Muhammad Luqman v. The State (PLD 1970 SC 10) Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and partly allowed. Conviction and sentence under S. 302(b) PPC set aside. Appellant convicted under S. 324 PPC and sentenced to 10 years’ RI with fine Rs. 50,000 (SI 6 months in default). Appellant further convicted under S. 337-L(i) PPC and sentenced to 7 years’ RI with Daman Rs. 100,000 payable to legal heirs (non-payment to be dealt with per S. 337-Y(2) PPC). Compensation under S. 544-A Cr.P.C. as ordered by Trial Court and upheld by High Court maintained. Benefit of S. 382-B Cr.P.C. extended.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 302(b), 392 & 411 ---- Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 382-B & 544-A ---- Murder and robbery—Juvenile accused—Appreciation of evidence—Ocular account corroborated by medical and recovery evidence—Benefit of concurrent sentence. Held, prosecution successfully established that the petitioner, tried as a juvenile, along with co-accused, intercepted the complainant and his son, snatched valuables, and fired upon the deceased, causing his death. Sole eye-witness, the complainant (father of deceased), gave a confidence-inspiring account consistent with the medical evidence and supported by prompt reporting. Non-production of additional witnesses did not impair prosecution case, as quality of evidence prevailed over quantity. Identification of petitioner in sufficient moonlight and motorcycle light was natural and reliable. Cited Cases: • Abdur Rauf v. The State and another (2003 SCMR 522) (b) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ---- Arts. 71 & 75 ---- Minor discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence—Effect. Minor variation between the seat of injury in medical evidence (right side of lower chest) and the narration in FIR (right side of abdomen) held immaterial. Eye-witnesses are not expected to reproduce exact details under stress of violent events. Such minor inconsistency did not shake the credibility of the witness. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 392 & 411 ---- Recovery of stolen property—Corroborative evidence—Value. Petitioner’s arrest and subsequent recovery of the snatched motorcycle, deceased’s mobile phone, complainant’s identity card, and Rs.300/- provided strong corroboration to the ocular account. Recovery was witnessed by the complainant and the investigating officer, whose testimony remained unshaken in cross-examination. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- Ss. 397 & 382-B ---- Concurrent running of sentences—Juvenile offender—Discretion of Court. Since both offences (murder and robbery) were part of the same transaction and petitioner was a juvenile at the time of offence, Supreme Court ordered sentences of imprisonment (except imprisonment in default of fine) to run concurrently. Disposition: Petition dismissed. Convictions and sentences under Sections 302(b) and 392 PPC maintained; however, sentences of imprisonment ordered to run concurrently. Benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. extended.