Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 233, 235 & 239---Separate charges for distinct offences---Joint trial---Same transaction---General rule and exceptions---Held, that S.233, Cr.P.C. embodies the general rule that every distinct offence shall carry a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately---Such rule is, however, subject to the exceptions contained in Ss.234, 235, 236 and 239, Cr.P.C.---Section 235 permits one accused to be charged and tried in one trial for multiple offences where the offences arise from one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction---Section 239(d), Cr.P.C. extends the principle to joint trial of several accused for different offences committed in the course of the same transaction---Provisions of Ss.235 and 239 are enabling and discretionary, not mandatory, because the legislature used the expression “may”---Mere legal possibility of joinder does not create a legal duty to consolidate trials. Cited Cases: • MD. Mosaddar Hoque and another v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131 • Shahadat Khan and another v. Home Secretary PLD 1969 SC 158 • Nadir Shah v. The State 1980 SCMR 402 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 235 & 239---Expression “same transaction”---Tests for determination---Continuity of action---Community of purpose or design---Causal connection---Held, that the expression “transaction” is not defined in the Code and it is for the Court to determine whether a given set of facts constitutes the “same transaction”---Tests include proximity of time and place, community of purpose or design, continuity of action and causal connection---Proximity of time and place alone is insufficient; the essential elements are community of purpose or design and continuity of action---Where offences are separable in nature, purpose and motive, they cannot automatically be treated as forming the same transaction---In the present matter, allegations relating to physical occurrence and allegations relating to later dissemination of the event were separable; former could relate to sexual gratification while the latter could relate to humiliation, degradation or blackmail---Same transaction was therefore not established. Cited Cases: • MD. Mosaddar Hoque and another v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131 • Emperor v. Datto Hanmant Shahapurkar ILR 30 Bom 49 • Babulal Chaukhani v. King Emperor 65 IA 158 • Emperor v. Sejmal Poonamchand ILR 51 Bom 310 • Ata Muhammad Khan Alvi v. Crown PLD 1950 Lahore 288 (c) Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act (XXXI of 2021)---- ----Ss. 9 & 16(4)---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss.29 & 30---Special statutes---Separate investigative and trial mechanisms---Joint trial of scheduled and non-scheduled offences---Scope of S.16(4) of Anti-Rape Act---Held, that the Anti-Rape Act and PECA are special statutes with distinct investigative and procedural regimes---Scheduled sexual offences under the Anti-Rape Act are to be investigated by Special Sexual Offences Investigation Units, whereas offences under PECA are investigated by the notified cybercrime investigation agency---Section 16(4) of the Anti-Rape Act, 2021, which provides that the Special Court “may also try” connected non-scheduled offences, is an enabling provision and must be read narrowly so as not to displace the forum and procedure contemplated by PECA---Consolidation across separate statutory regimes may raise issues of jurisdictional enlargement not expressly conferred by law. (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.175(2)---Jurisdiction of courts---Special courts---Joint trial across statutory regimes---Held, that in view of Art.175(2) of the Constitution, Courts must avoid any impression of enlarging jurisdiction beyond what is expressly conferred by law---Where legislature has created separate court structures for distinct categories of offences, consolidation of proceedings across different regimes is not to be ordered mechanically---Court must exercise caution before requiring a trial court to assume jurisdiction not clearly conferred by the relevant statute. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 173, 233, 235 & 239---Separate FIRs under different statutory regimes---Separate investigations and challans---Charges framed and evidence partly recorded---Consolidation after commencement of trial---Held, that where separate FIRs were registered under two different statutory regimes, separate investigations were undertaken by distinct agencies, separate reports under S.173, Cr.P.C. were submitted, separate charges had been framed and prosecution evidence had partly been recorded, formal consolidation at such advanced stage would require alteration of charges and restructuring of proceedings---Consolidation after commencement of evidence is an exception rather than the norm---Discretion under Ss.235 and 239, Cr.P.C. is to be exercised judiciously and not mechanically. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 235 & 239---Joint trial---Apprehension of conflicting judgments---Same Court conducting both trials---Held, that apprehension of conflicting judgments did not arise in the peculiar facts where both matters stood entrusted to the same Court---Possibility of inconsistency is substantially minimized when the same judicial forum evaluates the evidence---Simultaneous continuation of separate trials before the same Court sufficiently safeguards coherence in proceedings without disturbing the procedural structure already in place. (g) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.10-A & 14---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984), Arts.131 & 143 to 148---Cross-examination---Right of accused---Protection of witness dignity---Role of trial Judge---Held, that the right of an accused to cross-examine a complainant or witness exists, but it is neither unlimited nor unbridled---Trial Judge must balance the right of cross-examination with the right of fair trial and human dignity guaranteed under Arts.10-A and 14 of the Constitution---Questions which are irrelevant, indecent, without reasonable grounds, or intended to insult or annoy the witness must not be permitted---Prolonged cross-examination designed to exhaust the witness or manipulate error amounts to misuse of such right---Presiding Judge must not remain a silent spectator and should intervene where cross-examination is abused. (h) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts.9, 10-A & 14---Witness protection and dignity---Witness box---No requirement that witness must remain standing---Provision of seating arrangements---Held, that there is no legal requirement under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 that a witness must remain standing while giving evidence---Compelling a witness, particularly in sexual offence cases, to remain standing for prolonged periods during testimony imposes unnecessary physical and psychological burden and may impair clarity and composure of evidence---Allowing a witness to remain seated does not diminish the sanctity of oath or dignity of judicial proceedings; rather, it promotes fairness, composure and orderly administration of justice---Witnesses assist the administration of justice and must be treated with dignity, security and respect. (i) Witness protection statutes---- ----Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, 2017---Sindh Witness Protection Act, 2013---Balochistan Witness Protection Act, 2016---Punjab Witness Protection Act, 2018---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Witness Protection Act, 2021---Protection of witnesses and complainants---Constitutional duty of State---Held, that protection of witnesses and complainants is grounded in Arts.9, 10-A and 14 of the Constitution and reinforced by federal and provincial witness protection laws---State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that witnesses and victims are protected from intimidation, coercion, humiliation and undue hardship so that testimony may be rendered freely and judicial proceedings may proceed in accordance with law. (j) Administration of justice---- ----Witness seating arrangements---Directions to subordinate courts, Special Courts and Tribunals---Held, that all District and Sessions Judges, courts subordinate to them, Administrative Judges of Special Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan were directed to ensure that appropriate seating arrangements are mandatorily provided to persons in the witness box, whether by chair, seat or bench---Registrar of Supreme Court was directed to circulate the judgment to the Chief Justices of all High Courts for implementation and compliance in all courts where evidence is recorded, including civil courts, criminal courts, special courts and tribunals. (k) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.185(3)---Leave to appeal---Consolidation of trials---Discretion exercised by Courts below---Interference by Supreme Court---Held, that the impugned order did not suffer from any jurisdictional defect, illegality or perversity warranting interference under Art.185(3) of the Constitution---Question raised related essentially to exercise of judicial discretion by Courts below and did not call for intervention in absence of injustice. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and Criminal Petition No.1160 of 2025 was dismissed; directions were issued for mandatory seating arrangements for witnesses in courts and for circulation of the judgment to all High Courts for implementation.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Arts. 17 & 79---Agreement to sell---Proof through attesting witnesses---Mandatory requirement---Suit for specific performance was founded upon alleged agreement to sell dated 22.09.2000 relating to immovable property---Defendants specifically denied execution of said agreement---Held, that where a document is required by law to be attested, its execution must be proved through attesting witnesses in accordance with Arts.17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, unless absence of such witnesses is satisfactorily explained---Production of attesting witnesses is mandatory and failure to comply renders document legally unproved. Cited Cases: • Rafaqat Ali and others v. Mst. Jamshed Bibi and others 2007 SCMR 1076 • Ainuddin and others v. Abdullah and another 2019 SCMR 880 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Arts. 17 & 79---Agreement to sell---Non-production of marginal witnesses---Effect---Plaintiff relied upon agreement to sell but failed to produce marginal witnesses of the document---No explanation was furnished for their non-production despite serious denial of execution by defendants---Held, that failure to produce most natural witnesses to the transaction struck at the root of plaintiff’s case---Agreement to sell could not be treated as proved in accordance with law. Cited Case: • Mst. Hajyani Bar Bibi through L.R. v. Mrs. Rehana Afzal Ali Khan and others PLD 2014 SC 794 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Art. 17(2)(a)---Power of attorney and agreement concerning immovable property---Instrument creating financial obligations---Attestation---Requirement---Agreement to sell and powers of attorney relied upon by plaintiff related to immovable property and created financial obligations---Held, that such documents fall within ambit of Art.17(2)(a) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and must be attested and proved in accordance with Arts.17 and 79 thereof---A document not proved through prescribed legal mode cannot form basis of decree for specific performance. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmad and others v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din through Legal Heirs and others PLD 2011 SC 241 (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Art. 129(g)---Withholding of best evidence---Adverse presumption---Agreement to sell denied by defendants---Plaintiff failed to produce marginal witnesses and gave no explanation for such omission---Held, that adverse presumption under Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 would arise against plaintiff that had marginal witnesses been produced, they would not have supported his stance---Plaintiff failed to discharge burden of proof. (e) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Specific performance---Equitable and discretionary relief---Proof of contract---Requirement---Relief of specific performance is not granted as a matter of right merely because it is lawful to do so---Court must examine facts, conduct of parties, delay, surrounding circumstances and whether contract has been proved in accordance with law---Held, that where alleged agreement to sell itself remained legally unproved, plaintiff was not entitled to discretionary relief of specific performance. Cited Case: • Liaqat Ali Khan and others v. Falak Sher and others PLD 2014 SC 506 (f) Specific performance--- ----Agreement to sell not proved---Third-party rights---Effect---Plaintiff alleged prior agreement to sell and full payment of consideration, whereas defendants asserted lawful subsequent transfer through chain of title and bona fide purchase without notice---Record reflected that third-party rights had already been created through transfer duly recognized by Capital Development Authority---Held, that in presence of legally unproved agreement and intervening third-party rights, equitable relief of specific performance could not be granted. (g) Civil suit--- ----Specific performance, possession and permanent injunction---Foundation of claim legally unproved---Effect---Entire claim of plaintiff rested upon agreement to sell dated 22.09.2000---Marginal witnesses were not produced, execution was denied, and mandatory evidentiary requirements were not satisfied---Held, that Courts below failed to properly appreciate mandatory requirements of Arts.17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and erroneously decreed suit despite fundamental defects in plaintiff’s evidence. (h) Civil proceedings--- ----Concurrent findings below---Interference by Supreme Court---Mandatory evidentiary requirements ignored---Trial Court decreed suit, Appellate Court dismissed appeal, and High Court dismissed civil revision---Supreme Court held that plaintiff failed to prove alleged agreement to sell in accordance with mandatory provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Where Courts below proceed on a document not legally proved, interference by Supreme Court is warranted. Disposition: Petitions were converted into appeal and allowed. Judgments of Trial Court, Appellate Court and Islamabad High Court were set aside. Suit instituted by plaintiff/respondent No.1 for specific performance, possession and permanent injunction stood dismissed. Parties were left to bear their own costs.

Summary: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860—S. 302(b)—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Ss. 342 & 544-A—Murder case—Appraisal of ocular account—Chance witnesses—Benefit of doubt—Acquittal—The Supreme Court held that where the prosecution case rests upon the testimony of alleged eyewitnesses who, in the ordinary course of events, would not be expected to be present at the place of occurrence at the relevant time, such witnesses fall within the category of chance witnesses and their evidence must be scrutinized with greater caution. In the present case, the complainant and his brother, both sons of the deceased, claimed to have witnessed the occurrence at 11:30 a.m., despite the fact that one was a mechanic at Pirmahal and the other a labourer working in village lands. The Court held that they failed to furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation for their presence at the spot, and their conduct during and after the occurrence was highly unnatural. Their silence while their mother was fired at, failure to make any meaningful resistance, omission to take immediate steps for her removal, and the unexplained delay of about two hours in reporting the matter materially impaired the credibility of their testimony. The ocular account was, therefore, held to be doubtful and unsafe for sustaining conviction without independent corroboration. Criminal evidence—Chance witness—Test of credibility—The Supreme Court elaborated that a chance witness is one who, in the normal pursuit of life, would not ordinarily be present at the place of occurrence but claims such presence by chance. The Court held that testimony of such a witness is admissible, yet it cannot be accepted as a matter of course and must be assessed in the light of natural conduct, surrounding circumstances, and available corroboration. A satisfactory, probable, and natural explanation of presence is indispensable; failing that, the testimony becomes unsafe to rely upon, especially in cases involving severe punishment. The Court reaffirmed that criminal liability cannot be founded upon doubtful or inherently improbable evidence and that, in case of doubt, benefit must accrue to the accused. Investigation—Successive inquiries declaring accused innocent—Evidentiary value of consistent investigative findings—The Supreme Court held that although courts are not bound by the mere opinion of the investigating agency and must independently appraise the evidence, consistent findings recorded through successive investigations by different officers and verified by senior supervisory authorities cannot be brushed aside without cogent reasons. In the present case, the petitioner-convict had repeatedly been found innocent during investigation, and it had surfaced that the actual assailant was his father, Akhtar Ali, while the petitioner himself was present in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court noted that this conclusion had been successively scrutinized and verified at various levels, including by officers of the Investigation Branch and the office of the I.G. Punjab. In the absence of any evidence of mala fide, collusion, or extraneous influence on the part of the investigating officers, such consistent investigative findings were held to carry persuasive value and to lend support to the defence plea. Defence plea—Presence of accused elsewhere at the relevant time—Support from investigative material—The Supreme Court observed that in his statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C., the petitioner-convict admitted the occurrence but stated that his aunt, the deceased, had been killed by his father Akhtar Ali and that he himself was on duty in Lahore at the relevant time. The Court held that this plea was not a bald denial but found support from investigative material, including statements recorded by the investigating officers from the owner of the hotel in Lahore, who confirmed the petitioner’s presence there on the date and time of occurrence. This circumstance, when read with the doubtful ocular account and other infirmities in the prosecution case, further strengthened the entitlement of the petitioner to benefit of doubt. Benefit of doubt—Right of accused—The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of petitioner-convict Muhammad Nadeem through cogent, reliable, and confidence-inspiring evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The doubtful testimony of chance witnesses, contradictions in their account, unnatural conduct, absence of independent corroboration, and the consistent investigative material affirming the petitioner’s absence from the place of occurrence created serious doubt regarding his involvement. In such circumstances, the Court held that benefit of doubt was to be extended to the accused as a matter of right and not of grace. Case references—No specific reported precedent was expressly cited by name in the judgment text provided. The Court discussed and applied settled principles relating to chance witnesses, cautious appraisal of ocular account, non-binding yet persuasive value of consistent investigative findings, and the rule that benefit of doubt must go to the accused; however, no reported case law was specifically mentioned in the text, and none should therefore be added as cited authority. Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 converted into appeal and allowed—Conviction and sentence set aside—Acquittal—The Supreme Court converted Jail Petition No. 217 of 2018 into an appeal, allowed the same, set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner-convict recorded by the courts below, and acquitted him of the charge, with direction for his release forthwith if not required in any other case. Criminal Petition No. 305-L of 2018 dismissed as infructuous—Leave refused—In view of the acquittal of the respondent-convict, the complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence became infructuous and was dismissed, with leave refused.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Electronic evidence---Audio/video recording---Admissibility---Authentication and proof of genuineness---Supreme Court held that electronic evidence may be admissible under Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and Electronic Transactions Ordinance, 2002, and may be treated as primary evidence, but its admissibility is subject to strict conditions---Source, origin and manner of obtaining recording must be proved, and expert confirmation must establish that recording was not tampered with, altered or doctored---No audio tape or video can be relied upon by Court unless proved genuine and free from tampering---In present case, prosecution primarily relied upon clandestine audio recording allegedly containing conversation between accused persons regarding payment of bribe, but no additional independent witness or incriminating evidence was available. Cited Cases: • Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 SC 675 • Ahmed Omar Sheikh v. State 2021 SCMR 873 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984) / Electronic Transactions Ordinance (LI of 2002)---- ----Secret audio/video recording---Recording made to trap, humiliate, scandalize, extort or procure evidence---Lawfulness and admissibility---Supreme Court held that recording of a conversation in which recorder is participant may generally not constitute illegal wiretapping, even if other person is unaware; however, recording conversation between two other persons is illegal---Audio recordings as evidence must be relevant, duly obtained and must not infringe rights of parties---Secret recordings intended to humiliate, disgrace, scandalize, outrage, insult, trap or extort an accused or any individual are not to be treated as lawful basis for conviction---Illegality of complainant cannot be used as solitary foundation for convicting accused. (c) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016)---- ----S. 23---Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 389---Unauthorized surveillance---Capturing image or voice with dishonest intent---Secretly collecting information about private conversation without consent for extortion or illegal purpose amounts to criminal conduct---PECA recognizes unauthorized surveillance, and S.23 criminalizes unauthorized taking, capturing or transmission of a person’s image or voice with dishonest intent---There is a distinction between routine recordings made in ordinary course of duty and recordings made for purpose of laying a trap to procure evidence---Latter category is punishable and cannot be given judicial legitimacy. Cited Cases: • Hakim Ali Bhatti v. Abdul Hakim 1986 CLC 1784 • Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2019 SC 675 (d) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 14---Dignity of man and privacy of home---Secret recording of private conversation---Constitutional violation---Supreme Court held that inviolability of dignity of man and privacy of home are guaranteed under Art.14 of Constitution---Recording citizen’s conversation secretly and using it as a weapon in judicial proceedings directly violates constitutional guarantee of privacy and dignity---Such practice reduces society to a surveillance theatre where end is treated as justifying means---Where complainant resorts to unlawful surveillance, he may transform from victim into offender, while person against whom such audio/video is leaked may be victim rather than accused. Cited Case: • Hamna Qaiser v. Chairman PEMRA 2024 MLD 243 (e) Islamic jurisprudence---- ----Right of privacy---Prohibition against spying---Surah Al-Hujurat 49:12---Supreme Court observed that right of privacy is firmly embedded in Islamic jurisprudence and constitutional thought---Holy Qur’an commands “Do not spy”---Inviolability of home and prohibition against unwarranted surveillance are foundational principles---Incident from era of Hazrat Umar ibn al-Khattab (RA) was referred to, where even suspected illegality did not justify spying, entering without permission or violating sanctity of home---Privacy is a protected right and cannot be curtailed except strictly in accordance with law. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Electronic/CCTV evidence---Doctrine of silent witness---Distinction between routine CCTV footage and clandestine private recording---Supreme Court distinguished the present case from Zahir Jaffer case, wherein CCTV footage was obtained from permanently installed security system operating routinely at place of occurrence, extracted from original DVR/hard disk by law enforcement, forensically examined by Punjab Forensic Science Agency, and certified to be unedited with affirmative facial recognition---Such evidence was forensically verified, authenticated and primary---In present case, none of those features existed; it was not routine stationary CCTV performing ordinary security function, but secret private recording of conversation by an individual with dishonest intent, sought to be converted into basis for conviction. Cited Case: • Zahir Jaffer 2025 SCP 220 (g) Criminal trial---- ----Private surveillance---Warrantless surveillance by citizens---Judicial legitimacy refused---Supreme Court held that permitting conviction on basis of such secretly procured private recordings would amount to granting general licence to citizens to conduct warrantless surveillance of fellow citizens---Such practice would empower every citizen to act as prosecutor, technician and witness while bypassing constitutional safeguards and investigative procedures---Private surveillance violating law, Islamic principles and fundamental rights cannot be justified or clothed with judicial legitimacy. (h) Criminal appeal against acquittal---- ----Double presumption of innocence---Interference with acquittal---Scope---Trial Court acquitted respondents of offences under Ss.161, 420 and 409, P.P.C. read with S.5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and High Court upheld acquittal---Supreme Court found no illegality, misreading or non-reading of evidence in impugned judgments---Acquitted accused enjoys double presumption of innocence: first before trial and second after acquittal---Acquittal cannot be interfered with except for strong and exceptional reasons, which were absent in the case. Disposition: Criminal Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused; acquittal of respondents No.1 and 2 recorded by Trial Court and upheld by Lahore High Court was maintained.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---- ----S. 9(c)---Recovery of narcotics---Contradictions in statements of recovery witnesses---Effect---Prosecution alleged recovery of 15 kilograms charas from petitioner while he was riding motorcycle and carrying a white sack---Case mainly rested upon testimonies of SHO/seizing officer and ASI/marginal witness of recovery memo---Supreme Court found material contradictions between prosecution witnesses regarding place where spy information was received, time of departure, time of arrival at spot, time of sealing of recovered substance, preparation of recovery memo, departure from place of recovery and arrival at police station---One prosecution witness also stated that another case was registered on same day against another person, while other witness expressed complete ignorance thereof---Such contradictions were not minor or inconsequential but went to root of prosecution case and impaired credibility of prosecution witnesses. (b) Criminal trial---- ----Narcotics recovery---Non-production of site plan and roznamcha/daily diary entries---Effect---Supreme Court observed that prosecution did not prepare or produce site plan of place of occurrence---Prosecution also failed to produce relevant roznamcha/daily diary entries showing departure from and arrival at police station of seizing officer---Such omissions, when considered with contradictions in evidence of prosecution witnesses, created serious doubt regarding prosecution version. (c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---- ----S. 9(c)---Safe custody and safe transmission of case property---Unbroken chain of custody---Mandatory requirement---Prosecution was required to prove safe custody and safe transmission of recovered narcotics from place of recovery till receipt in laboratory---Record showed that sealed parcel allegedly containing case property was handed over to police official, then deposited with Moharrir, but prosecution failed to clarify exact date and time when parcel was returned for onward transmission to Federal Narcotics Testing Laboratory---Investigating Officer stated that he took parcel to FNTL on 21.02.2021 and handed it over on 22.02.2021, while FNTL report confirmed receipt on 22.02.2021---No plausible explanation was offered as to where and in whose custody case property remained from 19/20.02.2021 till 22.02.2021---Break in chain of custody created serious dent in prosecution case and was fatal. Cited Cases: • Qaiser Khan v. The State through Advocate-General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar 2021 SCMR 363 • Mst. Razia Sultana v. The State and another 2019 SCMR 1300 • The State through Regional Director ANF v. Imam Bakhsh and others 2018 SCMR 2039 • Ikram Ullah and others v. The State 2015 SCMR 1002 • Amjad Ali v. The State 2012 SCMR 577 (d) Criminal trial---- ----Benefit of doubt---Single circumstance creating reasonable doubt---Accused entitled to acquittal as of right---Supreme Court reiterated that prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and any single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in mind of prudent person is sufficient to entitle accused to acquittal, not as matter of grace but as of right---Where statute provides severe and deterrent punishment, standard of proof required must be correspondingly strict and free from infirmity---In present case, cumulative effect of material contradictions, non-production of site plan and roznamcha entries, and unexplained gap in chain of safe custody rendered prosecution case doubtful. (e) Criminal trial---- ----Narcotics case---Conviction under S.9(c), Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997---Failure of prosecution to prove case beyond reasonable doubt---Trial Court convicted petitioner and sentenced him to imprisonment for life with fine, and High Court maintained conviction and sentence---Supreme Court held that prosecution evidence suffered from material contradictions and failed to establish safe custody and safe transmission of alleged contraband---Conviction could not be sustained on doubtful evidence. Disposition: Criminal Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; conviction and sentence awarded to petitioner under S.9(c), Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 by Trial Court and maintained by High Court were set aside; petitioner was acquitted by extending benefit of doubt and ordered to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---- ----S. 5---Proof of Nikah---Registration of marriage---Nikahnama not proved through reliable evidence---Suit for jactitation of marriage was filed by respondent No.1, while petitioner filed connected suit for restitution of conjugal rights on the plea that a Sharia Nikah had been solemnized between parties on 03.04.2020---Family Court decreed suit for jactitation and dismissed suit for restitution; Appellate Court and High Court maintained concurrent findings---Supreme Court held that alleged Nikah was not established through reliable or legally admissible evidence---No credible explanation was offered as to why alleged Nikah was never registered despite legal requirement under S.5 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Registered Nikahnama is a public record and carries probative value in Court---Failure to register alleged Nikah and failure to prove Nikahnama in accordance with law weakened legal basis of petitioner’s claim. (b) Family law---- ----Jactitation of marriage---False and persistent claim of marriage---Object and scope---Suit for jactitation of marriage is a civil remedy available where a person persistently and falsely asserts existence of marriage---Object of such suit is to obtain declaration that no valid marriage exists and to secure decree of perpetual silence against wrongful assertion---Supreme Court held that petitioner’s conduct reflected an attempt to fabricate an impression of legality to his inhumane acts; therefore Courts below rightly decreed suit for jactitation of marriage and dismissed petitioner’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights. (c) Muslim personal law---- ----Alleged Sharia Nikah---Prohibited degree during subsistence of earlier marriage---Petitioner was already married and his lawful wife was paternal aunt/phupho of respondent No.1---Supreme Court observed that even on petitioner’s own showing, alleged marriage with respondent would attract doctrine of prohibited degree and would not be permissible during subsistence of earlier marriage---To overcome such legal impediment, petitioner set up wholly unsubstantiated plea of divorce against his lawful wife---Such plea, instead of strengthening petitioner’s case, reflected an attempt to tailor facts and manufacture a narrative to lend colour of legality to an otherwise unlawful and coercive relationship. (d) Criminal proceedings---- ----Allegations of sexual assault---Observations in family/civil proceedings---No prejudice to criminal trial---Respondent alleged that petitioner, being her paternal uncle/phupha and taking advantage of relationship of trust, proximity and dominance, subjected her to sexual assault---Supreme Court clarified that any criminal liability arising from such allegations would be adjudicated by competent criminal Court strictly in accordance with law, and observations made in present proceedings would not prejudice such criminal proceedings. (e) Family law---- ----Minor child---Maintenance---Biological father---Distinction between legitimate child and biological child---Petitioner was declared biological father of minor child born to respondent---Supreme Court held that even where petitioner’s version of marriage was discarded, he could not evade consequences of his own conduct---Minor child is an innocent life and cannot be left unprotected---Law does not permit deprivation of sustenance, dignity and lawful support merely because relationship between parents is disputed, unlawful or subject matter of criminal proceedings---Right of maintenance is vested in child and is founded upon welfare, justice and equity---Once biological paternity is established, corresponding obligation of maintenance follows as necessary legal consequence---Biological father cannot deny responsibility or seek refuge behind technical pleas of legitimacy. Cited Cases: • Qudrat Ullah v. Additional District Judge, Renala Khurd District Okara and others PLD 2024 SC 581 • Muhammad Afzal v. Judge Family Court, etc. 2025 LHC 495 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 9, 14, 25 & 35---Welfare of child---Child born outside wedlock---No deprivation of maintenance and protection---Supreme Court emphasized that welfare and rights of minor child cannot be made hostage to unlawful conduct, disputes or defences of adults---Even where child is alleged to have been born outside wedlock, law does not permit such child to be treated as a person without entitlement---Right to maintenance and protection vests in child---Stigma of illegitimacy cannot become shield for biological father to evade responsibility, nor justify deprivation of innocent child---Approach is consistent with constitutional obligations under Arts. 9, 14, 25 and 35 of Constitution and Pakistan’s international commitments under Convention on the Rights of the Child, requiring protection of children without discrimination. (g) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185(3)---Concurrent findings of Family Court, Appellate Court and High Court---No reappraisal of evidence by Supreme Court---Supreme Court held that while exercising jurisdiction under Art.185(3), it does not sit as a Court of further appeal to reappraise evidence or substitute its own conclusions for concurrent findings recorded by Courts below---Interference is warranted only where findings are perverse, arbitrary, based on misreading or non-reading of material evidence, suffer from jurisdictional defect, or result in manifest miscarriage of justice---Petitioner failed to establish lawful basis for relief and sought reassessment of evidence, which was impermissible. Cited Cases: • Saleh Muhammad and another v. Mst. Mehnaz Begum and others PLD 2025 SC 1039 • Allah Bakhsh deceased through LRs and others v. Muhammad Riaz and other PLD 2025 SC 63 • Muhammad Ain-Ul-Haq v. Abdul Ali and another 2024 SCMR 1767 (h) Civil litigation---- ----Frivolous and vexatious litigation---Use of judicial process as coercion and harassment---Exemplary costs---Supreme Court observed that petitioner, despite failing to establish alleged Nikah before three forums, persisted in invoking legal process to pressurize and morally intimidate respondent---Respondent, a young woman, was compelled to undergo repeated, invasive and demeaning scrutiny through a defence concurrently found unsubstantiated---Use of judicial proceedings as instrument of coercion and harassment is impermissible---To mark strong disapproval, compensate respondent for needless hardship, and deter frivolous/vexatious litigation, exemplary costs of Rs.1,000,000 were imposed, payable to respondent No.1 within thirty days, failing which recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Cited Case: • Zakir Mehmood v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence (D.P), Pakistan Secretariat, Rawalpindi and others 2023 SCMR 960 (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 14---Dignity of person---Secondary victimization of women through court process---Supreme Court held that dignity of person is inviolable and constitutionally protected---Courts cannot remain passive venues for perpetuation of social prejudice, nor permit their process to become means of inflicting secondary victimization upon women who approach Courts for vindication of lawful rights---Frivolous allegations and contrived pleas aimed at undermining identity, character and dignity of a woman cannot be countenanced in any civilized system of justice. Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused; concurrent judgments and decrees of Family Court, Appellate Court and Lahore High Court were maintained; suit for jactitation of marriage filed by respondent No.1 remained decreed and petitioner’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights remained dismissed; petitioner was burdened with exemplary costs of Rs.1,000,000 payable to respondent No.1 within thirty days, failing which recoverable as arrears of land revenue; observations regarding criminal liability were held not to prejudice any competent criminal proceedings.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 117---Burden of proof---Suit for declaration of ownership over alleged allotted land---Foundational allotment document not produced---Respondents/plaintiffs claimed title over 66 kanals 9 marlas on basis of alleged allotment in favour of respondent No.9 through R.L-II No.188, followed by Mutation No.1 and subsequent purchase by respondents No.1 to 8---Supreme Court held that entire claim rested upon R.L-II No.188, but said foundational document was never produced in evidence, nor proved through competent witness from concerned department---Mere oral assertions or mutation entries could not establish lawful allotment or title---Plaintiff must succeed on strength of his own case and not on weakness of defendant’s case. Cited Case: • Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar 2022 SCMR 1054 (b) Evidence---- ----Document mentioned during cross-examination---No substitute for formal proof---Respondents argued that R.L-II No.188 stood admitted or established because it surfaced during cross-examination---Supreme Court rejected contention and held that mere mention of a document in cross-examination does not prove its existence, authenticity, contents or legality---Obligating statement in cross-examination may at best be treated as inferential evidence and cannot replace strict proof of foundational transaction. Cited Case: • Mst. Farrukh Jabin v. Maqbool Hussain through LRs and others PLD 2004 SC 499 (c) Revenue record---- ----Mutation entries---Fiscal nature---No conferment of title---Respondents relied upon Mutation No.1 and subsequent revenue entries to establish ownership---Supreme Court reiterated that mutation entries are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and do not by themselves create, extinguish or confer title---Once mutation was disputed, party relying upon it was bound to prove original transaction giving rise thereto through lawful evidence---Mutation could not become substitute for unproved allotment record. (d) Government / State land---- ----TDA land---Alleged allotment by Settlement Department---Public property not to be lost through negligence or collusion of officials---Petitioners pleaded that suit land belonged to Thal Development Authority/Government and was not capable of lawful allotment by Settlement Department---Supreme Court held that even if subordinate officials failed to safeguard Government interest, their omission, negligence or possible connivance could not operate to deprive State of its property---Courts must exercise heightened vigilance in matters involving public land, alleged allotments, collusive decrees and engineered revenue entries. Cited Case: • Ashiq Hussain Shah v. Province of Punjab through Collector District, Attock and others 2003 SCMR 1840 (e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----First Sched., Art. 14---Suit to set aside act/order of Government officer---One year limitation---Respondents sought to question official orders passed in 1992 and 1995, including resumption order dated 17.10.1995, but instituted suit long thereafter---Supreme Court held that where relief is sought to set aside act or order of Government officer made in official capacity, limitation is one year from date of such act or order under Art.14 of First Schedule to Limitation Act, 1908---No plausible explanation for delay was furnished; claim was prima facie barred by limitation. Cited Case: • Muhammad Din v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner and others 2022 SCMR 1481 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 9---Civil Court jurisdiction after revenue hierarchy has decided matter---Scope limited to legality of orders, not full retrial---Matter had already travelled through revenue hierarchy, including orders of Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Chief Settlement Commissioner and resumption in favour of Government---Supreme Court held that after statutory revenue remedies are exhausted, Civil Court may examine whether acts/orders of special tribunal were made in accordance with law, but cannot sit as appellate authority or conduct complete retrial on merits---Civil Court’s role is to examine legality, jurisdictional defect, mala fide, absence of evidence or lack of lawful authority on existing record. Cited Case: • Nausher v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Khanewal and another PLD 2022 SC 699 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XV, Rr. 3 & 4---Summary procedure---Challenge to orders of administrative/revenue tribunal---Supreme Court observed that in suits questioning legality of administrative/revenue orders, Civil Court may adopt summary procedure and treat complete record of proceedings before administrative tribunal as sufficient evidence---Parties should not ordinarily be allowed to reopen whole controversy through full-fledged civil trial with fresh oral and documentary evidence after revenue forums have already adjudicated matter. (h) Doctrine of election---- ----Exhaustion of statutory remedy before revenue hierarchy---Fresh civil suit to relitigate same controversy---Not permissible---Respondents, after revenue hierarchy decided matter against them, instituted fresh civil suit and led evidence as if dispute were being tried at first instance---Supreme Court held that such course was inconsistent with doctrine of election---A litigant who has consciously chosen and pursued one statutory remedy to its logical conclusion cannot seek another bite of cherry by reopening same matter through original civil jurisdiction merely because earlier result was unfavourable. Cited Cases: • Qazi Mumtaz Hussain and others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary Revenue and others 2025 SCMR 939 • Mir Mujib-Ur-Rehman Muhammad Hassani v. Returning Officer and others PLD 2020 SC 718 • Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Limited PLD 2018 SC 828 (i) Public property---- ----Revenue entries, alleged allotments and collusive proceedings---Duty of Courts---Supreme Court emphasized that Courts are under solemn obligation to jealously guard public property and ensure that revenue entries, alleged allotments or fiscal mutations do not become instruments for unlawful deprivation of State land through defective proof, procedural laxity or collusive conduct---Parallel and protracted civil trials after statutory revenue adjudication undermine finality, encourage forum-shopping and burden civil courts with disputes falling essentially within revenue administration. (j) Civil revision---- ----High Court restoring Trial Court decree in favour of private claimants---Interference by Supreme Court---Trial Court decreed suit; Appellate Court set aside decree and dismissed suit; High Court in civil revision restored Trial Court decree---Supreme Court held that respondents failed to establish lawful title and valid allotment, foundational document remained unproved, mutation entries did not confer title, claim was hit by limitation, and fresh civil trial after revenue hierarchy was legally objectionable---High Court’s judgment could not be sustained. Disposition: Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgment of Lahore High Court dated 23.05.2014 was set aside; judgment and decree of Appellate Court dated 31.01.2006 was restored; suit filed by respondents No.1 to 8 was dismissed with costs throughout.

Summary: Acquittal ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302, 324, 363 & 34---Murder of four family members inside house---Matrimonial dispute---Ocular account by informant, injured witness and eyewitness---Petitioner Fayyaz Akhtar, husband of deceased Mst. Aqsa Bibi, allegedly came armed with co-accused to house of his in-laws after matrimonial discord, raised lalkara and fired upon family members, resulting in death of Muhammad Zahid, Mst. Musarrat Bibi, Mst. Aqsa Bibi and Bilal Ahmad, while Faizan Ahmad sustained firearm injuries---Supreme Court held that ocular account furnished by informant, injured witness and eyewitness was straightforward, confidence-inspiring and consistent on material particulars including date, time, place, manner of assault and specific role of firing attributed to Fayyaz Akhtar. (b) Criminal trial---- ----Injured witness---Stamped witness---Evidentiary value---Injured witness Faizan Ahmad was inmate of house and sustained firearm injuries during occurrence---Supreme Court held that his presence at place of occurrence could not be doubted and his testimony carried intrinsic worth and great evidentiary value---Medical evidence supported ocular account regarding injuries sustained by deceased persons and injured witness. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Related witnesses---Close relatives of deceased---Effect---Eyewitnesses were close relatives of deceased persons---Supreme Court reiterated that close relatives who witness brutal murder of near and dear ones are least likely to substitute real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person, particularly where no previous enmity or motive for false implication is shown---No material was brought on record to suggest that witnesses had reason to falsely involve Fayyaz Akhtar while shielding actual offender. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Specific role, motive and medical corroboration---Conviction maintained---Petitioner Fayyaz Akhtar was specifically assigned active role of firing; he had direct motive arising from matrimonial dispute with deceased wife Mst. Aqsa Bibi; ocular account remained unshaken despite lengthy cross-examination and was supported by medical evidence---Supreme Court held that prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt active participation and specific role of Fayyaz Akhtar in commission of offence---Conviction recorded by Courts below called for no interference. (e) Criminal trial---- ----Non-nominated accused---Subsequent nomination after three days---No source of identification disclosed---Benefit of doubt---Petitioner Ghulam Ghous was not nominated in FIR and was admittedly not known to informant at time of occurrence---He was nominated after three days by injured witness, who did not disclose source or basis of identification---Supreme Court held that if accused had been known, he would have been named in initial report---Subsequent nomination without proper basis rendered prosecution case against him doubtful. (f) Criminal trial---- ----Identification parade---Accused already named before parade---Reduced evidentiary value---Although identification parade of Ghulam Ghous was conducted, Supreme Court held that its evidentiary value was substantially diminished because he had already been named by injured witness before such parade. (g) Criminal trial---- ----General and omnibus allegation of firing---No specific injury attributed---No motive---Recovery disbelieved---Benefit of doubt---Ghulam Ghous was shown in site plan at outer/main gate whereas crime empties were recovered from courtyard; no specific injury on any deceased was attributed to him and allegation against him was general/omnibus firing along with co-accused---He had no motive against deceased persons and recovery of alleged weapon had already been disbelieved by High Court on sound reasoning---Supreme Court held that evidence against him was shaky, deficient and insufficient to sustain conviction. (h) Criminal trial---- ----Sifting grain from chaff---One accused convicted, another acquitted---Supreme Court observed that while appreciating evidence Court must sift grain from chaff---On reappraisal, prosecution evidence was reliable against Fayyaz Akhtar but insufficient against Ghulam Ghous---Conviction of Fayyaz Akhtar was maintained, while conviction and sentence of Ghulam Ghous were set aside. (i) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of period already undergone---Discretionary relief---Extreme brutality---Supreme Court declined benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. to Fayyaz Akhtar, observing that offence reflected extreme brutality and gruesome manner in which he dealt with four close family members, including his wife, inside dwelling house---Occurrence was not result of sudden provocation or spur-of-the-moment act but reflected calculated vengeance arising out of matrimonial discord and annihilation of a segment of wife’s family---Such heinousness and betrayal of familial sanctity took case outside category where benefit under S.382-B should be extended as matter of course. (j) Sentencing---- ----Death sentence commuted by High Court to imprisonment for life---Complainant’s petition for enhancement---Refusal---High Court had commuted death sentence of Fayyaz Akhtar on four counts to imprisonment for life on four counts---Supreme Court held that findings of High Court were based on proper and judicious appraisal of attending circumstances and consistent with settled principles governing discretion in capital punishment cases---No misreading or non-reading of evidence was shown; petition seeking enhancement was dismissed. (k) Limitation---- ----Jail petition barred by 15 days---Condonation---Life imprisonment on four counts---Supreme Court condoned delay in filing jail petition in interest of justice, considering grounds urged and fact that petitioners had been awarded life imprisonment on four counts. Disposition: Jail Petition No.520 of 2018 was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentence of Ghulam Ghous were set aside and he was acquitted, with direction for release if not required in any other case; petition to extent of Fayyaz Akhtar was dismissed and leave refused; his substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was declined. Criminal Petition No.832-L of 2018 seeking enhancement of sentence of Fayyaz Akhtar was dismissed and leave refused; to extent of Ghulam Ghous, it was dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 115---Estoppel of tenant---Tenant denying title of landlord---Scope---Respondents instituted suit for recovery of produce and ejectment against petitioners, which was decreed by Trial Court and such decree was maintained by appellate, revisional and constitutional forums---Supreme Court held that where a person enters into possession as tenant, he is estopped from disputing title of landlord so long as he continues to retain possession under tenancy---Doctrine embodied in Art.115 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 is founded on public policy and prevents tenant from approbating and reprobating simultaneously---Tenant who subsequently asserts ownership rights cannot retain possession as tenant and, at same time, deny landlord’s title. Cited Case: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 (b) Landlord and tenant---- ----Tenant asserting ownership/proprietary rights---Duty to first surrender possession---Tenant disputing proprietary title of landlord must first vacate and surrender possession and thereafter may contest his alleged title before competent forum---Law does not permit tenant to continue possession under tenancy while simultaneously setting up hostile title against landlord---If tenant ultimately succeeds in establishing his proprietary rights, he may enforce decree according to law with all its consequences. Cited Case: • Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad deceased through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068 (c) Landlord and tenant---- ----Agreement to sell or alleged purchase by tenant---Effect on tenancy---Mere assertion of ownership on basis of agreement to sell or alleged acquisition of proprietary rights does not defeat maintainability of ejectment proceedings---Until tenant establishes his claim before competent Court, landlord continues to enjoy status of owner/landlord and relationship between parties remains regulated by tenancy---Tenant cannot legitimately resist ejectment proceedings merely on ground of alleged sale agreement or ownership claim. Cited Cases: • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 • Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 (d) Ejectment proceedings---- ----Maintainability---Tenant claiming purchase of share/co-ownership---Effect---Ejectment proceedings remain maintainable even where tenant asserts that he has acquired ownership rights by purchase of a share in the property---Such assertion does not automatically terminate tenancy nor oust jurisdiction of forum deciding ejectment---Tenant’s plea of ownership cannot be made basis to resist ejectment where his possession qua demised premises remains that of tenant. Cited Cases: • Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913 • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 (e) Rent Controller / ejectment forum---- ----Limited jurisdiction---Complicated question of title---Proper remedy---Forum exercising limited jurisdiction in ejectment proceedings cannot adjudicate upon complicated questions of ownership title between parties---Where tenant claims to have purchased a share or acquired co-ownership, proper remedy is to seek partition through competent civil forum and not to resist ejectment proceedings by raising disputed title questions before ejectment forum. (f) Landlord and tenant---- ----Tenant claiming co-ownership by purchase of share---Proper recourse---Tenant claiming co-ownership cannot use such plea as shield against ejectment while retaining possession under tenancy---His remedy is to file suit for partition or appropriate proceedings before competent civil forum---Ejectment cannot be refused merely because tenant claims purchase of a share, where his position in respect of disputed premises remains that of tenant. Cited Case: • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 (g) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Concurrent findings---Interference by Supreme Court---Suit for recovery of produce and ejectment was decreed by Trial Court; appeal, revision, second revision and constitutional petition were dismissed---High Court correctly construed law relating to estoppel of tenant, surrender of possession, maintainability of ejectment proceedings and remedy of partition---No illegality or jurisdictional defect warranting interference by Supreme Court was shown---Petition was devoid of merit. Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.806-P of 2018 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; Supreme Court held that tenant asserting ownership/co-ownership must first surrender possession before contesting title, ejectment proceedings remain maintainable, and remedy for alleged co-ownership lies through partition before competent civil forum. CMA No.1877-P of 2018 became infructuous and was disposed of accordingly.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860— ----Ss. 302(b), 34—Qanun-e-Shahadat / criminal jurisprudence—Ocular account—Chance witnesses—Credibility—Standard— Conviction for murder was founded mainly on ocular testimony of complainant (father) and another witness (uncle) who claimed to have seen the incident at a location where neither had residence nor property—Supreme Court held that such witnesses fell in the category of chance witnesses, requiring a natural, plausible and confidence-inspiring explanation for presence—Neither witness explained presence in FIR or examination-in-chief; justification (going to buy a buffalo and returning) surfaced for the first time in cross-examination, treated as belated improvement—Unnatural coincidence of reaching the spot exactly when the assailants allegedly arrived further dented credibility—Where presence becomes doubtful, testimony becomes unsafe for reliance—Ocular account held unreliable. (b) Criminal trial—Appreciation of evidence—Material contradictions—Effect— Supreme Court noted glaring contradictions between alleged eyewitnesses on (i) departure time, (ii) distance of village Beharri from occurrence spot, (iii) duration of stay at seller’s house, (iv) whether buffalo had a calf, (v) timing of reaching seller’s house, (vi) availability of hiding place at spot, and (vii) sequence/timing of police arrival, shifting of dead body and post-mortem—Such inconsistencies struck at root of presence and veracity—Alleged seller (Yameen) was neither associated in investigation nor produced to corroborate claimed purpose—Cumulative effect created serious doubt about presence; witnesses held procured/introduced after occurrence. (c) Criminal jurisprudence—Unnatural conduct—Stereotyped role assignment in firearm cases— Witnesses gave minute, segmented attribution of each shot to each accused and corresponding body part injuries—Court held such narration humanly improbable given speed/velocity of firearms and ordinary human reaction (especially father witnessing son’s murder)—Observed recurring pattern of stereotyped accounts in murder FIRs/ocular statements assigning precise shot-by-shot roles to rope in multiple accused—Such conduct reinforced conclusion of deliberation and unreliable ocular account. (d) Circumstantial evidence—Recoveries/forensics—Corroborative nature—Delay—Non-corroboration— Prosecution alleged different weapons (.7mm rifle, .44 rifle, .30 pistol) with distinct firing roles—However, spot recoveries comprised only five empties, one missed bullet and two bullets of .44 bore—No .30 bore empty recovered from alleged position of one accused; no .7mm empties recovered despite assigned role—PFSA report showed empties fired from two weapons, and High Court had treated recovery as inconsequential due to unexplained delay in dispatch—Supreme Court endorsed principles that forensic/recovery evidence is corroborative, meant to support trustworthy ocular account, and cannot by itself sustain conviction where direct evidence is unreliable. (e) Medical evidence—Supporting value only—Non-identification of assailant— Medical evidence did not align with the specific injury attribution advanced by alleged eyewitnesses—Court reiterated settled law that medical evidence may confirm nature/time/weapon-type but cannot identify assailant and cannot repair fundamentally unreliable ocular evidence. Cited Cases (medical evidence principle): Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain (PLD 2009 SC 53) Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain (2008 SCMR 1103) Mursal Kazmi alias Qamar Shah v. The State (2009 SCMR 1410) (f) Criminal jurisprudence—Benefit of doubt—Right, not concession— Where prosecution evidence suffers from material contradictions and lack of trustworthy corroboration, even one reasonable circumstance creating doubt entitles accused to acquittal as a matter of right—Principle applied: “better that ten guilty be acquitted than one innocent be convicted.” Disposition: Criminal Appeals allowed; convictions and sentences set aside; appellants acquitted and ordered to be released if not required in any other case. Complainant’s petition for enhancement of sentence dismissed as infructuous.