Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---- ----S. 5---Proof of Nikah---Registration of marriage---Nikahnama not proved through reliable evidence---Suit for jactitation of marriage was filed by respondent No.1, while petitioner filed connected suit for restitution of conjugal rights on the plea that a Sharia Nikah had been solemnized between parties on 03.04.2020---Family Court decreed suit for jactitation and dismissed suit for restitution; Appellate Court and High Court maintained concurrent findings---Supreme Court held that alleged Nikah was not established through reliable or legally admissible evidence---No credible explanation was offered as to why alleged Nikah was never registered despite legal requirement under S.5 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Registered Nikahnama is a public record and carries probative value in Court---Failure to register alleged Nikah and failure to prove Nikahnama in accordance with law weakened legal basis of petitioner’s claim. (b) Family law---- ----Jactitation of marriage---False and persistent claim of marriage---Object and scope---Suit for jactitation of marriage is a civil remedy available where a person persistently and falsely asserts existence of marriage---Object of such suit is to obtain declaration that no valid marriage exists and to secure decree of perpetual silence against wrongful assertion---Supreme Court held that petitioner’s conduct reflected an attempt to fabricate an impression of legality to his inhumane acts; therefore Courts below rightly decreed suit for jactitation of marriage and dismissed petitioner’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights. (c) Muslim personal law---- ----Alleged Sharia Nikah---Prohibited degree during subsistence of earlier marriage---Petitioner was already married and his lawful wife was paternal aunt/phupho of respondent No.1---Supreme Court observed that even on petitioner’s own showing, alleged marriage with respondent would attract doctrine of prohibited degree and would not be permissible during subsistence of earlier marriage---To overcome such legal impediment, petitioner set up wholly unsubstantiated plea of divorce against his lawful wife---Such plea, instead of strengthening petitioner’s case, reflected an attempt to tailor facts and manufacture a narrative to lend colour of legality to an otherwise unlawful and coercive relationship. (d) Criminal proceedings---- ----Allegations of sexual assault---Observations in family/civil proceedings---No prejudice to criminal trial---Respondent alleged that petitioner, being her paternal uncle/phupha and taking advantage of relationship of trust, proximity and dominance, subjected her to sexual assault---Supreme Court clarified that any criminal liability arising from such allegations would be adjudicated by competent criminal Court strictly in accordance with law, and observations made in present proceedings would not prejudice such criminal proceedings. (e) Family law---- ----Minor child---Maintenance---Biological father---Distinction between legitimate child and biological child---Petitioner was declared biological father of minor child born to respondent---Supreme Court held that even where petitioner’s version of marriage was discarded, he could not evade consequences of his own conduct---Minor child is an innocent life and cannot be left unprotected---Law does not permit deprivation of sustenance, dignity and lawful support merely because relationship between parents is disputed, unlawful or subject matter of criminal proceedings---Right of maintenance is vested in child and is founded upon welfare, justice and equity---Once biological paternity is established, corresponding obligation of maintenance follows as necessary legal consequence---Biological father cannot deny responsibility or seek refuge behind technical pleas of legitimacy. Cited Cases: • Qudrat Ullah v. Additional District Judge, Renala Khurd District Okara and others PLD 2024 SC 581 • Muhammad Afzal v. Judge Family Court, etc. 2025 LHC 495 (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 9, 14, 25 & 35---Welfare of child---Child born outside wedlock---No deprivation of maintenance and protection---Supreme Court emphasized that welfare and rights of minor child cannot be made hostage to unlawful conduct, disputes or defences of adults---Even where child is alleged to have been born outside wedlock, law does not permit such child to be treated as a person without entitlement---Right to maintenance and protection vests in child---Stigma of illegitimacy cannot become shield for biological father to evade responsibility, nor justify deprivation of innocent child---Approach is consistent with constitutional obligations under Arts. 9, 14, 25 and 35 of Constitution and Pakistan’s international commitments under Convention on the Rights of the Child, requiring protection of children without discrimination. (g) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185(3)---Concurrent findings of Family Court, Appellate Court and High Court---No reappraisal of evidence by Supreme Court---Supreme Court held that while exercising jurisdiction under Art.185(3), it does not sit as a Court of further appeal to reappraise evidence or substitute its own conclusions for concurrent findings recorded by Courts below---Interference is warranted only where findings are perverse, arbitrary, based on misreading or non-reading of material evidence, suffer from jurisdictional defect, or result in manifest miscarriage of justice---Petitioner failed to establish lawful basis for relief and sought reassessment of evidence, which was impermissible. Cited Cases: • Saleh Muhammad and another v. Mst. Mehnaz Begum and others PLD 2025 SC 1039 • Allah Bakhsh deceased through LRs and others v. Muhammad Riaz and other PLD 2025 SC 63 • Muhammad Ain-Ul-Haq v. Abdul Ali and another 2024 SCMR 1767 (h) Civil litigation---- ----Frivolous and vexatious litigation---Use of judicial process as coercion and harassment---Exemplary costs---Supreme Court observed that petitioner, despite failing to establish alleged Nikah before three forums, persisted in invoking legal process to pressurize and morally intimidate respondent---Respondent, a young woman, was compelled to undergo repeated, invasive and demeaning scrutiny through a defence concurrently found unsubstantiated---Use of judicial proceedings as instrument of coercion and harassment is impermissible---To mark strong disapproval, compensate respondent for needless hardship, and deter frivolous/vexatious litigation, exemplary costs of Rs.1,000,000 were imposed, payable to respondent No.1 within thirty days, failing which recoverable as arrears of land revenue. Cited Case: • Zakir Mehmood v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence (D.P), Pakistan Secretariat, Rawalpindi and others 2023 SCMR 960 (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 14---Dignity of person---Secondary victimization of women through court process---Supreme Court held that dignity of person is inviolable and constitutionally protected---Courts cannot remain passive venues for perpetuation of social prejudice, nor permit their process to become means of inflicting secondary victimization upon women who approach Courts for vindication of lawful rights---Frivolous allegations and contrived pleas aimed at undermining identity, character and dignity of a woman cannot be countenanced in any civilized system of justice. Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused; concurrent judgments and decrees of Family Court, Appellate Court and Lahore High Court were maintained; suit for jactitation of marriage filed by respondent No.1 remained decreed and petitioner’s suit for restitution of conjugal rights remained dismissed; petitioner was burdened with exemplary costs of Rs.1,000,000 payable to respondent No.1 within thirty days, failing which recoverable as arrears of land revenue; observations regarding criminal liability were held not to prejudice any competent criminal proceedings.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 175F(1)(c)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 491---Leave to appeal against dismissal of habeas corpus petition for recovery of alleged detenue/daughter---Scope---Petitioner/father sought recovery of his daughter on the plea that she was a Christian minor and had been taken into unlawful custody by respondent, who claimed to be her husband---Courts below dismissed the petition on the basis of the girl’s voluntary statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and her assertion that she had contracted marriage of her free will---Federal Constitutional Court held that where the alleged detenue had repeatedly appeared before competent fora and unequivocally stated that no abduction had taken place and that she had married voluntarily, her custody with the person claiming to be her husband could not, in summary proceedings under S.491, Cr.P.C., be termed illegal or unlawful---Question whether Nikahnama was forged, or whether investigation required transfer, pertained to criminal process and could not by itself justify habeas corpus relief---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed. (b) Muslim Personal Law---Marriage between Muslim male and Christian female---Validity---Petitioner contended that his Christian daughter could not lawfully marry a Muslim male---Held, contention was misconceived and contrary to settled principles of Islamic law---A Muslim male may validly contract marriage with a Christian woman, being from Ahl al-Kitab---Such principle stood recognized in earlier Supreme Court authorities and classical juristic exposition---Court held that objection to marriage merely on the basis of difference of religion was without substance. Cited Cases: Mrs. Marina Jatoi v. Nuruddin K. Jatoi and others PLD 1967 SC 580. Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Mst. Bilqis Bibi and others PLD 1981 SC 56. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 189---Federal Constitutional Court---Precedential value of judgments of Supreme Court of Pakistan after establishment of Federal Constitutional Court---Held, judgments of the former Supreme Court of Pakistan do not bind the Federal Constitutional Court as a matter of absolute precedent under the restructured constitutional hierarchy, but continue to carry great persuasive value where they are based on sound reasoning, are consistent with constitutional text and structure, and do not offend fundamental rights or evolved constitutional values---Doctrine of stare decisis was not abrogated but recalibrated in light of constitutional supremacy---Departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent must be express, reasoned and principled, and may be justified where such precedent is manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution, undermines fundamental rights, reflects judicial overreach, becomes incompatible with evolved constitutional values and democratic norms, or where any other compelling reason advances the cause of justice. (d) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)----S.1(2)---Marriage---Conversion to Islam---Effect---Though marriage of a Muslim male with a Christian female is permissible in principle, solemnization and registration under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is confined to Muslim citizens---Respondent’s stance was that the girl had embraced Islam before marriage---Affidavit appended with Nikahnama and subsequent certificate issued by a religious institution were produced to show conversion---Held, faith is a personal matter; once a person openly professes adherence to Islam, ordinarily no roving inquiry into the sincerity or motive of conversion is warranted in such proceedings---No specific ritual is indispensable beyond declaration and profession of belief---Where girl herself acknowledged correctness of Nikahnama and declared conversion, Court would not undertake deeper inquiry into genuineness of conversion in summary jurisdiction---Marriage was, prima facie, validly solemnized under the Ordinance. Cited Cases: Mst. Zarina and another v. The State PLD 1988 FSC 105. Tariq Masih v. The State 2004 PCr.LJ 622. (e) Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929---Child marriage---Effect on validity of marriage---Petitioner asserted that alleged detenue was about twelve years of age and, therefore, incapable of contracting valid marriage---Held, the Act of 1929 restrains and criminalizes solemnization of child marriage, but does not expressly render such marriage void or voidable---In absence of explicit statutory language invalidating the marriage, its legal status remains unaffected---Where legislature intends to override settled personal law, it must do so in clear and unequivocal terms; such intention cannot be inferred from silence---Therefore, even assuming minority, marriage would not automatically become void merely because it was contracted in contravention of the Act of 1929. Cited Cases: Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mirza Muhammad Amin and another PLD 1962 W.P. Karachi 442. Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad and another PLD 1970 SC 323. Mauj Ali v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah and another 1970 SCMR 437. Nasreen Bibi v. Station House Officer and others 2024 PCr.LJ 2058. Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate 1st Class and others PLD 2021 Lahore 21. Muhammad Azam v. The State and another 2018 PCr.LJ Note 175. Muhammad Safeer v. Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad PLD 2018 Islamabad 385. Allah Nawaz v. Station House Officer PLD 2013 Lahore 243. Allah Bakhsh v. Safdar and others 2006 YLR 2936. Ghulam Qadir v. The Judge Family Court, Murree 1988 CLC 113. Ghulam Hussain v. Nawaz Ali and another 1975 PCr.LJ 1049. (f) Evidence---Age of alleged detenue---Delayed birth documents---Probative value---Petitioner relied on birth certificate and child registration certificate to show that his daughter was born on 07.10.2012---Held, both documents had been procured many years after the alleged date of birth and no satisfactory explanation for such inordinate delay was furnished---Delayed registration of birth, unless supported by independent and reliable material, is susceptible to manipulation and its evidentiary value is diminished---Further, inconsistency in petitioner’s own stance regarding age in the F.I.R., close birth dates shown for the alleged detenue and her next sibling, entry of a different date of birth in the Nikahnama, and the girl’s own denial of minority materially weakened petitioner’s case---In such circumstances, delayed documents could not be treated as sole basis for holding that the girl was minor, particularly when she appeared physically before the Court and seemed to be of more advanced age. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.164---Statement of alleged detenue---Evidentiary significance in habeas corpus proceedings---Girl had recorded statement before Magistrate that nobody abducted her, no zina was committed, and that she had married respondent of her own free will; she had also made a similar statement in proceedings under Ss.22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.---Held, such consistent voluntary statements before judicial fora carried significant value in determining whether custody was illegal---Where marriage was acknowledged and free will asserted, summary court was justified in declining to infer unlawful detention. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.491---Summary nature of proceedings---Limitations---Question whether Nikahnama was forged or unregistered, and whether offences were made out in investigation, could not properly be adjudicated in proceedings of interim and summary nature under S.491, Cr.P.C.---Such issues were to be pursued before competent criminal court or through appropriate investigative remedies---Habeas corpus jurisdiction is not designed to conclusively determine complex factual controversies touching upon validity of marriage documents. (i) Res judicata---Constitutional petition for recovery of daughter---Earlier writ petition on same cause having attained finality---Effect---Petitioner had earlier filed writ petition for recovery of same daughter from same alleged custody on same foundational ground, which was dismissed by High Court after considering her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and holding that her custody with husband was not illegal or unlawful---Said finding was not challenged before higher forum and, therefore, attained finality---Held, subsequent proceedings on same issue were barred by principle of res judicata, and petitioner could not re-agitate the same question through another round of litigation. Cited Case: Pir Bakhsh v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145. (j) Constitutional law---Fundamental rights---Reliance on High Court judgment concerning discriminatory definition of “child”---Relevance---Petitioner relied upon PLD 2025 Lah. 1---Held, said judgment had no application to the controversy in hand, as that case concerned challenge to discriminatory definition of “child” prescribing different minimum ages for males and females with reference to provincial legislation, whereas present case concerned legality of custody and alleged invalidity of marriage in the factual setting of Punjab law. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed; however, observations made in the judgment were not to prejudice or impede criminal proceedings, if any, before the competent criminal court in accordance with law. ------ "The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 merely criminalizes the solemnization of a child marriage but does not expressly declare such a marriage to be void or voidable. The binding force of judicial precedent is not derived from institutional seniority but from the constitutional hierarchy itself. Since, the supremacy of constitutional adjudication now vests in this Court, therefore, all courts, including the Supreme Court of Pakistan, are bound by its pronouncements. However, this Court would ordinarily respect and follow the earlier constitutional jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, unless it is established that the same is manifestly erroneous, inconsistent with the constitutional text or scheme, or incompatible with fundamental rights and contemporary constitutional values. "

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 ----Ss. 7(1), 7(3) & 8---Talaq “in any form whatsoever”---Effectiveness of divorce---Cooling-off period---Revocation within ninety days---Held, S.7 expressly applies to talaq in all forms without distinction, including talaq-e-bidat---Talaq does not take effect automatically upon pronouncement once the statutory mechanism under S.7 is invoked---By virtue of S.7(3), talaq “unless revoked earlier expressly or otherwise” shall not take effect until expiry of ninety days from date notice is delivered to Chairman---Legislative scheme provides reconciliation opportunity and postpones legal effect of divorce regardless of form---Statutory phrase “talaq in any form whatsoever” must be given effective meaning and cannot be rendered redundant by carving out exceptions for talaq-e-bidat---Held further, where right to divorce is delegated to wife, S.8 applies S.7 mutatis mutandis, placing wife in shoes of husband for purposes of notice, effectiveness, and revocation within ninety days---Unconditional delegation includes authority to revoke/withdraw divorce within statutory period; any contrary view would defeat object of S.8 and uniform application of S.7. (b) Talaq-e-bidat ----Applicability of S.7, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Instant triple talaq---Immediate effect claimed---Held, contention that talaq-e-bidat is outside purview of S.7 is untenable in view of express statutory wording and binding precedent---Where talaq deed contains three pronouncements, divorce still remains ineffective until statutory period expires unless revoked earlier---Court reiterated that statutory requirement of ninety-day period under S.7(3) governs effectiveness and safeguards against hasty dissolution consistent with legislative intent. (c) Delegated divorce (Tafweez-e-talaq) ----Unconditional delegation---Power to revoke---Held, once right to divorce is duly delegated to wife, she acquires all rights/powers and bears all obligations/liabilities contemplated by S.7---Consequently, wife can revoke divorce expressly or otherwise within ninety days, exactly as husband can under S.7(3)---Revocation by wife within statutory period held lawful and effective. (d) Constitutional jurisdiction ----Scope of review---Chairman Union/Arbitration Council’s role---Foreign proceedings---Held, validity of Chairman’s disposal order turns on compliance with S.7 framework and admitted fact of withdrawal within ninety days---Subsequent institution of divorce proceedings abroad, timing, or alleged mala fides held irrelevant for purposes of constitutional review and for Chairman’s administrative disposal of proceedings---Chairman and High Court could not go behind admitted revocation and set it aside on perceived intent or foreign litigation. (e) West Pakistan Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and S.R.O. No.1086(K)/61 dated 09.11.1961 ----Rule 3(b)---Territorial jurisdiction of Chairman/Union Council---Pakistani citizens residing abroad---Functions of Chairman through Pakistan Missions---Held, in case of notice under S.7(1), jurisdiction lies where wife resides at time of pronouncement---Where wife residing abroad, proceedings are to be pursued through concerned Pakistan Mission abroad pursuant to S.R.O. issued under S.2(b) of the Ordinance---Petitioner’s notice before local Chairman in Karachi held not maintainable due to lack of territorial jurisdiction when wife was residing in New York---Proceedings rightly disposed of with direction to approach Pakistan Mission in New York. (f) Delegated divorce and vires challenge ----Effect of non-challenge to S.R.O.---Held, where vires of S.R.O. was not challenged before High Court, constitutional court could not adjudge its legality and was bound to enforce it as operative instrument---In absence of challenge, orders based upon S.R.O. could not be invalidated on that ground. Cited Cases: • Ali Nawaz v. Muhammad Yusuf PLD 1963 SC 51 • Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise v. Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. 2005 SCMR 1166 • Aziz Ahmad v. Musarat PLD 2025 SC 469 • Roheela Yasmin v. Neelofar Hassan 2017 CLC 516 • Pakistan International Freight Forwarders Association v. Province of Sindh 2017 PTD 1 Disposition: Civil Petition was converted into appeal and dismissed; impugned judgment of High Court of Sindh dated 07.10.2024 was maintained; respondent-wife’s withdrawal/revocation of divorce within ninety days under S.7(3), read with S.8, was upheld and petitioner was held to have to pursue divorce proceedings through Pakistan Mission in New York in terms of Rule 3(b) and S.R.O. No.1086(K)/61 dated 09.11.1961. (Announced 28.11.2025).

Summary: a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961) —- S. 5 —- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (X of 1984), Art. 85 —- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3) —- Dower —- Proof of Nikah Nama —- Evidentiary presumption —- Leave to appeal —- Execution of Nikah Nama not denied —- Non-production of marginal witnesses —- Effect —- Validity —- Where the relationship of husband and wife is admitted and execution of Nikah Nama is not specifically denied in the written statement, the plaintiff-wife’s failure to produce marginal witnesses of the Nikah Nama is not fatal to her claim. A Nikah Nama is a public document under S.5 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and carries presumption of truth under Art. 85 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Mere verbal denial of execution during oral testimony, without corroborating evidence, carries no legal weight. In the present case, the defendant did not dispute the Nikah Nama in his pleadings but attempted to deny it orally at trial without proof. Such denial was rightly disregarded by the trial court. Cited Cases: Rasool Bibi v. Waryam (1992 SCMR 1520) Jan Muhammad v. Salamat Bibi (2002 SCMR 1408) (b) Family Courts —- Suit for recovery of dower and maintenance —- Appellate Court and High Court —- Failure to determine crucial issue —- Jurisdiction not properly exercised —- Remand —- The trial court had framed an issue regarding maintenance allowance (Issue No.3), yet both the Appellate Court and the High Court failed to record any findings on this issue. Such omission constituted a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in them under the law. The Supreme Court held that the non-determination of a framed issue by the subordinate forums warranted remand for proper adjudication. The matter was thus remanded to the High Court to decide the constitutional petition afresh in light of the observations made by the Supreme Court. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Impugned order of the High Court set aside. Case remanded to the Peshawar High Court for decision afresh within thirty working days after providing an opportunity of hearing to the parties.

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S. 6(5)(b) [as amended by Punjab Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Act (XIII of 2015)]---Second marriage contracted by husband without permission of first wife---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of more than three years in filing the complaint---Consequential---Record showed that there was no denial of the fact that the petitioner had contracted marriage with Mst. KS, on 27.09.2015, during subsistence of the first marriage with the respondent (first wife), without getting the requisite permission---However, the respondent did not object to the second marriage of the petitioner for about 3_ years, as she filed the complaint on 05.04.2019, and by said date, she had already been divorced by the petitioner, which factum could be duly verified from the divorce deed, registration certificate and the certificate of effectiveness issued by the Arbitration Council, according to which the divorce was pronounced on 03.12.2018, whereas it was given effect on 13.03.2019---Such facts showed that mala fide on the part of respondent was manifestly oozing from the facts and circumstances of the case---Appeal against conviction was allowed in circumstances. (b) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S. 6(5)(b) [as amended by Punjab Muslim Family Laws (Amendment) Act (XIII of 2015)]---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 20(3)---Second marriage contracted by husband without permission of first wife---Appreciation of evidence---Jurisdiction of the Court---Perusal of subsection (3) of the S.20 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, showed that only a Family Court could take cognizance of the offence on the complaint of the Union Council, Arbitration Council or an aggrieved party and obviously the respondent (first wife) was the aggrieved party---However, on going through the judgment rendered by Trial Court, it was straightway noted that in the head-note it was written "IN THE COURT OF MAGISTRATE SEC: 30, and even in the whole proceeding, including the evidence and the interim order-sheet, there was no affixation of any stamp of a Judge Family Court---Only the Family Courts were given the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the issue and adjudicate upon the matters specified in [Part-1 of the Schedule], so, the conducting of the trial by the Judicial Magistrate was certainly coram non-judice and a nullity---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances. (c) Administration of justice--- ----When the law required doing things in a particular manner, such things have to be done in that manner and all other modes stand excluded. Muzaffar Nawaz v. Ishrat Rasool and others 2022 YLR 1920 rel. Muhammad Iftikhar Ullah Dhillon for Petitioner. Ghulam Ullah Khan for Respondent No. 1. Ms. Rahat Majeed, Assistant District Public Prosecutor for the State. Date of hearing: 20th December, 2024. Judgment Muhammad Waheed Khan, J .--- Petitioner, Muhammad Waqas Gill, was tried by learned Magistrate Section 30, Shakargarh, who vide judgment dated 20.12.2019 convicted him under section 6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (the Ordinance) on account of contracting second marriage with one Kanwal Shehzadi on 27.09.2015, without permission from the respondent No.1 and the Arbitration Council and sentenced him as under;- Fifteen days SI and fine of Rs.70,000/- and in case of non-payment of fine, he shall further undergo SI for 05-days. 2. The petitioner challenged the judgment of the learned Magistrate by filing criminal appeal and respondent No.1 also challenged the same judgment by filing Crl. Revision for enhancement of sentence of the petitioner. Both the matters i.e. Crl. Appeal and Crl. Revision were dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shakargarh through consolidated judgment dated 08.09.2021. 3. Through this petition, the petitioner has challenged judgments of both the learned courts below. 4. The facts of the case are that the petitioner contracted love marriage with respondent No.1 on 18.11.2014 as per Shariah Law and during subsistence of marriage, they were not blessed with any issue. Thereafter, the petitioner contracted second marriage on 27.09.2015, during the subsistence of first marriage without taking permission from the Arbitration Council. Being offended from the above said act of the petitioner, respondent No.1/complainant filed a complaint in terms of above provision of law of the Ordinance, titled "Rifat Awan v. Muhammad Waqas Gill' before the learned Magistrate Section 30, Shakargarh and on culmination of the same, the petitioner was held guilty and awarded punishment, as stated above. 5. The crux of arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner was that the complaint filed by the respondent/complainant before the learned Magistrate Section 30 was corum non-judice, as it can be tried only by the Family Court and; the complaint by the respondent was filed with mala fide, as the same had been filed by respondent No.1 after 3 1/2 years of the divorce, hence, both the impugned judgments are nullity in the eye law. 6. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent, while taking exception to the arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the charges against the petitioner have been fully proved and substantiated during the course of trial, so, dealing the complaint of respondent, by a wrong forum could hardly affect the merits of the case and the matter be decided on merits and technicalities should not become hurdle in the way of justice. However, the learned law officer, while supporting the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, in fact, the learned trial court (Magistrate Section 30), was never given the powers of Family Court, so, according to the relevant provisions of the Ordinance, the said court had no jurisdiction in the matter, therefore, the entire proceedings, including the judgment rendered by the learned appellate court would stand vitiated. 7. I have heard, learned counsel for the parties and the learned law officer and gone through the record with their assistance and noted that there is no denial of the fact that the petitioner has contracted marriage with Mst. Kanwal Shehzadi, on 27.09.2015, during subsistence of the first marriage with the respondent, without getting the requisite permission, however, I have noted that the respondent had not objected the second marriage of the petitioner about 3 1/2 years, as she had filed the complaint on 05.04.2019 and it is also worth mentioning here that till that date, she had already been divorced by the petitioner, which factum could be duly verified from the divorce deed, registration certificate and the certificate of effectiveness issued by the arbitration council, according to which the divorce was pronounced on 03.12.2018, whereas it was given effect on 13.03.2019. When confronted about the filing of the complaint by the respondent with such a delay, learned counsel for the respondent submits that in fact she was not aware of contracting second marriage by the petitioner, however, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention towards the photographs, exhibited before the learned Trial Court, showing that the real sisters of the respondent and other family members had participated in the second marriage of the petitioner. So, one thing is obvious, that the respondent had never objected to the second marriage of the petitioner, until she was divorced and she filed the criminal complaint against the petitioner with a delay of about 3 1/2 years from contracting his second marriage and that too, after her divorce, so, mala fide on her part is manifestly oozing from the facts and circumstances of the case. Now, adverting to the moot point raised by learned counsel for the petitioner qua the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate Section 30, to entertain and decide the criminal complaint under the Ordinance. So, it would be in the fitness of things to reproduce the relevant provisions of section 5 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, which are as under:- "5. Jurisdiction. [(1)] Subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961, and the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, the Family Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matters specified in [Part 1 of the Schedule] [(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), the Family Court shall have jurisdiction to try the offences specified in Part 11 of the Schedule, where one of the spouses is victim of an offence committed by the other. (3) The High Court may with the approval of the Government, amend the Schedule so as to alter, delete or add any entry thereto". And through amendment in the Punjab Family Court (Amendment)Act, 2015 (XI of 2015) dated 18.3.2015 a Family Court was given the power of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class under the Cr.P.C., 1898 for the purpose of taking cognizance and trial of any offence under The Muslim Family Laws. The relevant amendments are reproduced as under:- Punjab Amendment: (20 Family Court as Judicial Magistrate. (1) A Family Court shall be deemed as the Judicial Magistrate of the first class under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) for taking cognizance and trial of any offence under this Act; the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (VII of 1961); and, the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929). (2) A Family Court shall conduct the trial of any offence under subsection (1) in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) relating to the summary trials. (3) An offence other than contempt of a Family Court shall be cognizable on the complaint of the Union Council, Arbitration Council or the aggrieved party] On going through subsection (3) of the section 20 of the Act, there is hardly any cavil with the proposition that only a Family Court can take cognizance of the offence on the complaint of the Union Council, Arbitration Council or aggrieved party and obviously the respondent was the aggrieved party, however, I have to see whether the learned Judicial Magistrate was additionally given the powers of Judge Family Court or not and on going through the judgment rendered by it, I have straightway noted that in the head-note it is written "IN THE COURT OF CH. SIFAT ULLAH, MAGISTRATE SECTION 30, SHAKARGARH" and even in the whole proceeding, including the evidence and the interim order-sheet, there is no affixation of any stamp of a Judge Family Court. Since on going through the above referred provision of Muslim Family Law, there is no cavil with the proposition that only the Family Courts have given the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the issue and adjudicate upon the matters specified in [Part-1 of the schedule], so, the conducting of the trial by the learned Judicial Magistrate was certainly corum non-judice, and a nullity, meaning thereby that very inception of the trial was not in accordance with law and it is trite that if a base of action was wrong, all superstructure raised thereon would have no sanctity under the law. It is also well entrenched principle of law that when law required doing things in a particular manner, such things had to be done in that manner and all other modes stood excluded. I have also gone through the provision of Article 175 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and Sub-Article (2) of said Article reads as under:- (2) No court shall have any jurisdiction save as is or may be conferred on it by the Constitution or by or under any law" 8. In a recent pronouncement rendered by this Court in case of "Muzaffar Nawaz v. Ishrat Rasool and others" (2022 YLR 1920), this Court had set-aside that judgments of both the Courts below on the same point, that the learned Judicial Magistrate was not empowered to hold the trial under the "Ordinance". 9. The epitome of above discussion is that the impugned judgments are not sustainable in the eye of law, because firstly, the complaint filed by the respondent is based on the sheer mala fide, as discussed in supra paras and secondly, that the learned Judicial Magistrate Section-30 was not conferred with the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under the Family Court Act, hence, the same is declared as corum non-judice. Resultantly, by accepting this petition, both the judgments of learned courts below are set aside, and the petitioner/accused is acquitted from the charge, he is on bail, his surety stands discharged. JK/M-12/L Revision allowed.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961----S. 6(5)(b)---Second marriage without prior permission---Jurisdiction of court---Corum non-judice---Petitioner contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of first marriage without seeking permission from the Arbitration Council or the first wife as required under S.6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961---Complaint was filed by the first wife nearly 3½ years after the second marriage and post-divorce---Learned Magistrate Section 30 tried and convicted the petitioner---Held, proceedings before Magistrate Sec-30 were corum non-judice as the court had not been conferred powers of a Family Court, which alone has jurisdiction to take cognizance and try offences under the Ordinance---Head-note of the original judgment revealed no designation or authority of the learned Magistrate as a Judge Family Court---Since trial was conducted by a court lacking lawful jurisdiction, entire proceedings were void ab initio and stood vitiated---Complaint was also held to be mala fide in light of delayed filing and family participation in second marriage.(b) Family Courts Act, 1964 (as amended by Punjab Amendment Act XI of 2015)----S. 5 & S. 20(3)---Exclusive jurisdiction of Family Court---Offences under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance---Cognizance of complaint---Complaint to be made by aggrieved party or Arbitration Council before Family Court---Only Family Courts designated under law have jurisdiction to try such matters as Judicial Magistrates of First Class---Amendments confer exclusive authority to Family Courts to entertain, adjudicate, and try such criminal matters---Since no proof existed that the trial Magistrate had been notified as a Family Court Judge, the assumption of jurisdiction was illegal---Established principle that when law prescribes a mode, it must be followed, and no alternative method is acceptable.(c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 175(2)---Jurisdiction of courts---Bar on exercise of jurisdiction without lawful conferment---No court shall exercise jurisdiction unless conferred by the Constitution or law---Any judicial proceedings conducted without lawful authority are null and void---In the present case, the court conducting the trial lacked jurisdiction under both statutory law and the Constitution.(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 561-A---Quashing of proceedings---Where trial was initiated by a court lacking jurisdiction, entire proceedings including judgments of appellate court stand vitiated---Jurisdictional defect goes to the root of the matter and renders trial a nullity in law.Cited Cases:• Muzaffar Nawaz v. Ishrat Rasool and others 2022 YLR 1920• PLD 2010 SC 585• PLD 1985 SC 62Disposition:Petition allowed---Judgments of both the trial court and appellate court set aside---Petitioner acquitted of charge---Bail bond discharged.

Summary: Background: The case involves a marital dispute where the petitioner (wife) filed a suit for the recovery of dower and dowry articles after alleging that the respondent (husband) had orally divorced her. The respondent contested the claim of divorce and sought restitution of conjugal rights. While the trial court partially decreed in favor of the petitioner, granting recovery of dower and dowry articles, the respondent had also remarried during the pendency of the case without obtaining permission from the Arbitration Council. This second marriage led to an additional ground for dissolution of the marriage. Both parties challenged various aspects of the trial and appellate court decisions, eventually bringing the case before the Supreme Court. ----- Issues: ----- Recovery of Dower and Dowry Articles: Whether the petitioner was entitled to recovery of the dower and dowry articles as claimed. ----- 2) Restitution of Conjugal Rights: Whether the respondent was entitled to restitution of conjugal rights. ----- 3) Dissolution of Marriage: Whether the appellate court's decision to dissolve the marriage on the basis of Khula (without a request from the wife) was valid, and whether the High Court was correct in dissolving the marriage on the ground of cruelty. ----- 4) Second Marriage Without Permission: Whether the respondent's second marriage, which was contracted without the required permission from the Arbitration Council, provided a valid ground for dissolution of the marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. ----- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Recovery of Dower and Dowry Articles: The Court upheld the trial court's decision to grant the petitioner recovery of Rs. 500,000 in dower and dowry articles, including 51 Tolas of gold. The findings of the trial court and lower courts were found to be consistent and supported by evidence. ----- Restitution of Conjugal Rights: The Supreme Court set aside the appellate court's decree granting restitution of conjugal rights since the issue of the marriage's validity had not been properly adjudicated. ----- Dissolution of Marriage: The Court found that the appellate court erred in dissolving the marriage on the basis of Khula because the wife had neither expressly nor impliedly requested dissolution on these grounds. Further, the High Court's decision to dissolve the marriage based on cruelty was not supported by sufficient evidence and was therefore set aside. ----- Second Marriage Without Permission: The respondent’s second marriage, which was conducted without the permission of the Arbitration Council, violated Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Supreme Court held that this provided valid grounds for dissolution under Clause (iia) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Consequently, the marriage was dissolved on this ground. ----- Citations/Precedents: Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum and others (PLD 2022 SC 686) Housing Building Finance Corporation v. Shahinshah Humayun Cooperative House Building Society and others (1992 SCMR 19) Abdul Majid v. Shahzada Asif Jan (PLD 1982 SC 82) Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani (2023 SCMR 246) Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin (PLD 1967 SC 97) Muhammad Arif v. Saima Noreen and another (2015 SCMR 804) Syed Rashid Ali Shah v. Mst. Haleema Bibi and others (PLD 2014 Peshawar 226)

Summary: -----Quote: This case, inter alia, involves following questions of law: i. Whether the learned Civil Court is vested with the jurisdiction to try the declaratory suit, inter alia, regarding the reconciliation proceedings, issuance of certificate of effectiveness of divorce in the light of Section 5 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 ("Act, 1964")? ii. Whether a husband loses the right to pronounce talaq, once such right is delegated to the wife? Held: In terms of Section 5(1) of the Act, 1964 read with Entry No.1 of Part-I of the Schedule appended thereto as also Entry No.10 thereof, exclusive jurisdiction in family matters is conferred upon the Family Court, therefore, dissolution of marriage in all its modes and manners including khula and talaq-e-tafweez falls within purview of the jurisdiction of the Family Court and Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the respondent. As regards the second question, it is held that even if a husband delegates his right of talaq to the wife, the said act of the husband does not mean that the husband has denounced his own right to pronounce the talaq and intimate factum of pronouncement of talaq to the Union Council concerned, for further proceedings leading to the issuance of certificate of effectiveness of divorce in terms of provisions of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961. -----Background: The petitioner challenged a series of orders passed by the Civil Court that granted an ad-interim injunction in favor of his second wife, Dr. Maria Khan (respondent No. 3). Dr. Khan's suit sought to prevent the Union Council from issuing a certificate of effectiveness of divorce, asserting that once her husband delegated the right of divorce (talaq-e-tafweez) to her, he lost his own right to pronounce talaq. The petitioner’s appeal against the injunction was dismissed due to a delay, prompting this writ petition. -----Issues: 1- Maintainability of the Writ Petition: Whether the petition is maintainable, considering the orders challenged are interlocutory. -----2- Jurisdiction of the Civil Court: Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction over the matter concerning divorce and reconciliation proceedings, which typically fall under Family Court jurisdiction. -----3- Effect of Talaq-e-Tafweez: Whether the husband’s delegation of the right to pronounce talaq to his wife nullifies his own right to divorce. -----4- Restraining Order Against Union Council: Whether the Civil Court could issue an injunction preventing the Union Council from conducting reconciliation proceedings and issuing a divorce effectiveness certificate. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court allowed the petition and set aside the Civil Court’s orders, reasoning as follows: --Maintainability: Although interlocutory orders are generally non-appealable, the Civil Court’s orders were arbitrary and exceeded its jurisdiction, permitting a writ petition for judicial correction. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court: Exclusive jurisdiction over matters of divorce, reconciliation, and rights related to the Nikahnama is vested in Family Courts per Section 5 of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The Civil Court’s orders were outside its jurisdiction. --Effect of Talaq-e-Tafweez: Delegating the right to pronounce talaq to the wife does not eliminate the husband's right to do so independently. The husband retains his right under Islamic law to issue talaq. Restraining Order Against Union Council: The court emphasized that, under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, it is mandatory for the husband to notify the Union Council of divorce to initiate reconciliation proceedings. The Civil Court’s restraining order violated Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act, which bars injunctions against public duties. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 5, Family Courts Act, 1964 – Establishes exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts over matrimonial issues. Section 7, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 – Mandates notification to the Union Council upon pronouncing talaq for reconciliation purposes. Section 56, Specific Relief Act, 1887 – Prohibits injunctions that interfere with public duties. Inaam-ul-Haq v. Muhammad Ali Shaheen (2013 CLC 904) – Supports High Court intervention for jurisdictional errors in interlocutory orders. Major Muhammad Khalid Karim v. Mst. Saadia Yaqub (PLD 2012 SC 66) – Clarifies exclusive Family Court jurisdiction in matrimonial cases. The High Court concluded that the orders of the Civil Court were without jurisdiction and upheld the husband's right to proceed with the notification process for divorce through the Union Council, dismissing the respondent’s objections.

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S. 5---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S.5 & Sched.---Suit for jactitation of marriage instituted by lady---Execution of valid Nikah Nama---Failure to prove---Effect---Family Court decreed the suit against the petitioner declaring alleged Nikah as void and the same (finding) was affirmed by the Appellate Court---Assertion of the petitioner was that respondent/lady renegaded from her previous position/ stand, who (lady) had filed various petitions and made statements, including statement under S.164 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, acknowledging her status as lawfully wedded wife of the petitioner---Validity---Record (evidence) revealed that conduct, relationship and execution of Nikiah Nama was categorically denied by respondent /lady in the plaint and as a witness---Petitioner, who alleged existence of valid marriage and sought decree of conjugal rights, utterly failed to prove conduct of marriage; and was evasive regarding sharai nikah in the written statement, and later pleaded conduct of sharai nikah, which was obviously an afterthought---Petitioner produced (got exhibited) Nikah Nama but failed to prove its execution, validity and lawfulness---Even otherwise requirements of a valid Nikah in terms of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, were not proved---Petitioner testified that Nikah was arranged and conducted in the office of a lawyer, where 10- 12 persons were sitting, but none of whom was produced as witness---Evidence of witness of the petitioner /defendant did not inspire any confidence, who submitted affidavit( having been marked) stating against marriage between petitioner and respondent /lady, but when confronted with it, he stated that he was under pressure ; said witness was shown as representative of the bride, who admitted having acquaintance with the lady because she worked at the medical clinic of the petitioner---Said evidence substantiated allegation by respondent / lady against petitioner that latter abducted her, and the evidence of said witness had no weightage or value---No witnesses of Nikah Nama were produced---Advocate in whose chamber Nikah was allegedly solemnized was not produced---Assertion that respondent /lady submitted petitions and appeared in courts, and made statement before Magistrate, had little value in the context of allegations levelled by respondent / lady against the petitioner---Even otherwise, voluntariness and truthfulness, essential ingredients of statement under S.164 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, were not proved---No lawyer was produced to prove that lady had signed petitions affidavit and appeared in person before the Court---Undeniably, respondent / lady worked at a Medical Clinic, run by the petitioner---Respondent/ lady appeared as witness, who was cross-examined on the point of her affidavit and statements made but she categorically denied the same---In suit(s) for jactitation of marriage, it was ethical to consider that lady had disowned marriage and her statement, and she had denied having exercised free- will and was terrorized or put in awful fear of harm/ injury and physical abuse---Even otherwise, self-harming statements carried more authenticity, high evidentiary value and deserved more credibility and weightage, compared to the evidence of the petitioner, read in the context of the apparent motive, intending to avoid incriminating charges in criminal case which manifested tendency of misrepresenting the facts--- No interference was warranted to disturb concurrent findings and conclusions under constitutional jurisdiction, in absence of any illegality and material defect---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)--- ----S.5---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5, Sched.---Suit for jactitation of marriage instituted by lady---Execution of valid Nikah Nama---Failure to prove---Nikah Khawan/Nikah Registrar, testimony of---Scope and effect---Family Court decreed the suit against the petitioner declaring alleged Nikah void and the same (finding) was affirmed by the Appellate Court---Assertion of the petitioner was that Nikah Khawan, appeared before the criminal court, in relevant criminal case( FIR under S.365-B of Penal Code 1860), and affirmed solemnization of Sharai Nikah between petitioner and lady (plaintiff / respondent)---Validity---Insisting of the petitioner on the statement of Nikah Khwan in criminal case had no evidentiary value, which piece of evidence was otherwise inadmissible, for failing to undergo test of confrontation---Nikah Khawan/Nikah Registrar appeared as one of the witnesses of lady /plaintiff, and he was never confronted with alleged statement before criminal court, alleging solemnizing of Sharai Nikah---Nikah Khawan otherwise testified against petitioner---Statement, not confronted to the witness, had no evidentiary value, besides otherwise attracting inadmissibility---Constitutional petition, being merit-less, was dismissed, in circumstances. Mst. Farhat Jabeen v. Muhammad Safdar and others 2011 SCMR 1073 distinguished Matloob Hussain v. Mst. Shahida and 2 others PLD 2006 SC 489 ref. Sheikh Jamshaid Hayat for the Petitioner. Ijaz Ahmad Gurmani for Respondents. Order Asim Hafeez, J .--- Instant constitutional petition impugns concurrent decisions, in terms whereof suit for jactitation of marriage, instituted by respondent No.3, was decreed by the Family Court and same was affirmed by the Appellate Court, consequently alleged Nikah between the petitioner and respondent No.3 was declared void for all intents and purposes. 2. Facts, essential for adjudication, are that petitioner alleged marriage with respondent No.3 and brought action for restitution of conjugal rights. Conversely, respondent No.3 sought declaration against alleged claim of marriage, who alleged that she was abducted and subjected to sign documents and made statements without freewill and affording independent decision-making choice. Trial court framed issues and recorded evidence which declared marriage invalid. Petitioner remained unsuccessful before the Appellate Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner emphasized that respondent No.3 renegaded from her previous position/ stand, who had filed various petitions and made statements, including statement under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, acknowledging her status as lawfully wedded wife of the petitioner. Submits that Nikah Khawan appeared before the criminal court, in case FIR No. 203 dated 07.06.2020 under section 365-B of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, who affirmed solemnization of Sharai nikah between petitioner and respondent No.3. 4. Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.3 supported concurrent decisions, hereby impugned. 5. Heard. Record perused. 6. Evidence is examined threadbare. Conduct, relationship and execution of Nikah Nama was categorically denied by respondent No.3 in the plaint and as witness. Petitioner, who alleged existence of valid marriage, and sought decree of conjugal rights utterly failed to prove conduct of marriage, who was evasive regarding sharai nikah in the written statement, later pleaded conduct of sharai nikah, which obviously is an afterthought. Petitioner produced Nikah Nama Exh.D-2 but failed to prove execution, validity and lawfulness thereof. Even otherwise requirements of a valid Nikah in terms of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 were not proved. Petitioner testified that Nikah was arranged and conducted in the office of the lawyer, where good 10-12 persons were sitting, none of which was produced as witness. Evidence of DW-2-Muhammad Arshad-did not inspire any confidence, who submitted affidavit -[Mark-B]- stating against marriage between petitioner and respondent No.3, but when confronted with it, he stated that he was under pressure. Muhammad Arshad was shown as representative of the bride, who admitted having acquaintance with the lady because she worked at the medical clinic of the petitioner - this substantiates allegation by respondent No.3 against petitioner that latter abducted her. Arshad's evidence had no weightage or value. No witnesses of Nikah Nama were produced. Advocate in whose chamber Nikah was allegedly solemnized was not produced. Assertion that respondent No.3 submitted petitions and appeared in courts, made statement before Magistrate, have had little value in the context of allegations levelled by respondent No.3 against the petitioner. Even otherwise voluntariness and truthfulness, essential ingredients of statement under section 164 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 were not proved. No lawyer was produced to prove that lady had signed petitions / affidavit and appeared in person before the court. It is not denied that respondent No.3 worked at Medical Clinic, run by the petitioner. Respondent No.3 appeared as PW-1, who was cross-examined on the point of her affidavit and statements made but she categorically denied. In suit(s) for jactitation of marriage, where lady had disowned marriage and her statement, when she had denied having exercised free-will and was terrorized or put in awful fear of harm / injury and physical abuse, is critical. Even otherwise self-harming statements carry more authenticity, high evidentiary value and deserve more credibility and weightage, as compared to the evidence of the petitioner, read in the context of the apparent motive, intending to avoid incriminating charges in criminal case - which manifest tendency of misrepresenting the facts. Insistence of learned counsel on the statement of Nikah Khawan in criminal case has no evidentiary value, which piece of evidence is otherwise inadmissible, for failing to undergo test of confrontation. Nikah Khawan/Nikah Registrar appeared as PW.6, who was never confronted with alleged statement before criminal court, alleging solemnizing of sharai nikah. Nikah Khawan otherwise testified against petitioner. In the circumstances, statement, not confronted to the witness, had no evidentiary value, besides being otherwise attracting inadmissibility. Case-law cited by counsel for the petitioner, reported as "Mst. Farhat Jabeen v. Muhammad Safdar and others." (2011 SCMR 1073) is distinguishable on facts. Conversely, ratio of the decision in the case of "Matloob Hussain v. Mst. Shahida and 2 others" (PLD 2006 SC 489) is more proximate, illustrative and supports the case of respondent No.3. 7. No interference warranted to disturb concurrent findings and conclusions under constitutional jurisdiction, in absence of any illegality and material defect. 8. Petition is meritless and same is, hereby, dismissed. MQ/M-111/L Petition dismissed.

Summary: -----Effect of self-harming statement(s) in the context of action for jactitation of marriage. -----Background: The petitioner filed a constitutional petition challenging concurrent decisions from the Family Court and Appellate Court, which declared the alleged Nikah between the petitioner and respondent void. The respondent claimed she was forced into signing documents under duress, alleging abduction by the petitioner. The petitioner sought restitution of conjugal rights, asserting a valid marriage through Nikah documentation, which the respondent denied. -----Issues: 1- Validity of Nikah: Whether the petitioner validly solemnized the marriage with the respondent in accordance with the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. ----2- Free Will and Consent: Whether the respondent’s statements and signatures were made voluntarily or under duress. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court upheld the concurrent findings, confirming that the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence of a valid Nikah. The Nikah Nama was presented without credible witnesses, and the petitioner could not establish the voluntary and lawful nature of the respondent’s alleged statements. The Court found that the respondent consistently denied the marriage, claiming coercion, and her testimony was deemed credible. Statements made under duress were given higher evidentiary weight than those produced by the petitioner, who sought to avoid criminal implications. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Farhat Jabeen vs. Muhammad Safdar and others (2011 SCMR 1073): Distinguished on factual grounds. Matloob Hussain vs. Mst. Shahida and others (PLD 2006 SC 489): Supported the respondent’s case, illustrating similar legal principles regarding invalidation of coerced marriages.