Summary: (a) Family law—Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (DMMA) ----S. 2(ii), (ii-a), (viii); Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO), S. 6; Constitution, Arts. 14, 25 & 35 Dissolution—Grounds—Second marriage without permission—Admitted second marriage contracted by husband during subsistence of first marriage, without consent of first wife or permission of Arbitration Council—Conviction under S. 6(5), MFLO remained unchallenged—Held, contravention of S. 6, MFLO squarely attracts S. 2(ii-a), DMMA and, by itself, furnishes a complete ground to dissolve the marriage—Marriage dissolved on this ground. (b) Family law—Khula v. statutory dissolution ----DMMA, S. 2; MFLO, S. 6 Whether Family Court may convert a suit for dissolution on statutory grounds into khula without wife’s consent—Held, No—Khula is a distinct remedy premised on the wife’s informed, voluntary consent; it cannot be imposed to replace a failed statutory ground—Family Court erred in granting khula suo motu and in forfeiting dower on that basis. (PLD 2024 SC 645 ref.) (c) Evidence—Standard of proof in DMMA proceedings ----DMMA, S. 2; QSO, 1984, Art. 117 (general burden) Standard—Balance of probabilities applies; insistence on FIRs, medical certificates or documentary corroboration to prove cruelty is misconceived—Courts must assess the woman’s testimony and surrounding circumstances, including mental and emotional abuse often occurring in private (“bedroom crime”)—High Court’s reliance to avoid re-appraisal in constitutional jurisdiction is inapt where the legal standard applied below is erroneous. (PLD 2022 SC 353; 2024 SCMR 1271; 2021 SCMR 1986; PLD 1996 SC 267; 1995 SCMR 955; 2022 CLC 974; 2023 SCMR 1434 distinguished) (d) Cruelty—Scope and assessment ----DMMA, S. 2(viii) Cruelty includes physical, mental and emotional abuse; may consist of patterns of conduct rendering marital life intolerable; focus is the impact of the husband’s behavior on the wife—Courts below erred by treating absence of eyewitnesses and documents as fatal and by ignoring the cumulative effect of conduct pleaded and deposed. (PLD 1963 Dacca 947; 2015 MLD 1623; 2013 CLC 1203; 2023 SCMR 246 ref.) (e) Maintenance during subsistence of marriage ----Nikahnama (cl. 17); MFLO; Constitution, Arts. 14, 25 & 35 Obligation—Payment of Rs.10,000 per month stipulated—Unrebutted evidence of non-payment—Alleged “disobedience” is not a lawful ground to deny maintenance—Findings to contrary set aside; maintenance payable for the subsistence period of marriage. (PLD 2022 SC 686 ref.) (f) Dower (mehr) ----Khula not granted—Effect—Where dissolution is decreed on a statutory ground (here, illegal second marriage), wife is not required to return dower—Petitioner entitled to retain plot (200 sq. yds., FES Jinnah Garden Phase-I, Islamabad), 30 tolas gold, and Rs.500,000/-; amount not earlier paid remains payable. (g) Judicial reasoning—Gender-sensitive adjudication & language ----Constitution, Arts. 14, 25 & 35 Courts must eschew patriarchal stereotypes and moralistic terminology (“disobedient/self-deserting wife”, “compelled to contract second marriage”) that stigmatize women and obscure legal standards—Judicial language must reflect dignity, equality and non-discrimination; findings must be evidence-based, not presumption-driven. (h) Case law distinguished / affirmed ----Rashid Ali Shah v. Haleema Bibi, PLD 2014 Pesh 226, and similar views—Not good law post-PLD 2025 SC 262; clause (ii-a) of S. 2, DMMA remains a subsisting ground—Hamad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari, 2023 SCMR 1434, distinguished on scope (standard of proof issue, not re-appraisal of facts). (PLD 2025 SC 262 ref.) Cited Cases: • Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan, PLD 2024 SC 645 • Faryal Maqsood v. Khurram Shehzad Durrani, PLD 2025 SC 262 • Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum, PLD 2022 SC 686 • Hamad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari, 2023 SCMR 1434 (dist.) • Muhammad Shariful Islam v. Suraya Begum, PLD 1963 Dacca 947; Shahana Bibi v. Nadeem Shah, 2015 MLD 1623; Rabia Rasheed v. Faisal Mir, 2013 CLC 1203; Tayyeba Ambareen v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani, 2023 SCMR 246 • Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din, PLD 2022 SC 353; Nazeeran v. Ali Bux, 2024 SCMR 1271; Khalid Hussain v. Nazir Ahmad, 2021 SCMR 1986; Muhammad Amir v. Khan Bahadur, PLD 1996 SC 267; Begum Hamid Mehmood v. Muhammad Masood, 1995 SCMR 955; Meezan Bank Ltd. v. WAPDA First Sukuk Co., 2022 CLC 974 Disposition: Civil petition converted into appeal and allowed—Judgments of Family Court, Appellate Court and High Court set aside to the extent of khula, dower and maintenance—Marriage dissolved on ground of second marriage in violation of law (DMMA S. 2(ii-a) read with MFLO S. 6)—Petitioner retains dower (plot, gold, Rs.500,000/-) and is entitled to maintenance at Rs.10,000 per month for the period the marriage subsisted—Approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 ---- Ss. 10(4), 10(5) & 10(6) --- Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 --- Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 ---- S. 7 --- Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 ---- S. 2 --- Dower --- Khula --- Dissolution of Marriage --- Maintainability --- Through this judgment, we propose to decide C.P.L.A. Nos.2555 and 2556 of 2022 since they entail common features with same contesting parties --- Record shows that Adeel Akhter ("respondent") and Wajiha Rasheed ("petitioner") got married on 05.04.2001 --- Rukhsati did not take place until 28.06.2004 --- As per contents of Nikahnama, dower was fixed at Rs.10,00,000/- on demand in addition to Plot No.6, Sector-D, Ghazikot Township, Mansehra ("Plot No.6") --- Couple lived in United Kingdom for about three years after which petitioner returned to Pakistan --- After respondent's father, Muhammad Akhter sold Plot No.6 to one Riaz Ahmed, petitioner, on 20.12.2010, filed suit for declaration, permanent injunction and possession ("Suit No.216/FC of 2010") before family court against respondent as well as Muhammad Akhter and Riaz Ahmed praying inter alia for declaration to effect that she is owner of Plot No.6 on basis of entries in Nikahnama dated 05.08.2001 --- Petitioner had impleaded Riaz Ahmed as defendant in suit as he had purchased Plot No.6 from petitioner's father-in-law through Transfer Deed No.1194 dated 30.04.2004 --- This suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 18.10.2011 --- By this time, marriage between petitioner and respondent was intact --- Respondent's appeal against family court's said judgment and decree dated 18.10.2011, was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 09.06.2012 --- Respondent filed writ petition No.548-A/2012 before high court against said concurrent judgments and decrees --- At this juncture, we deem it appropriate to make reference to suit for dissolution of marriage, recovery of maintenance allowance, dower and dowry articles ("Family Suit No.45 of 2012") filed by petitioner on 01.02.2012 before family court against respondent and his father --- On 09.10.2012, petitioner made statement before family court that there was no chance of reconciliation between parties; that on account of hatred and aversion that she had developed for respondent, she does not want to live with him; that she has not been paid her dower; and that she has no intention of relinquishing her dower --- After recording petitioner's statement, family court, vide order dated 08.11.2012 dissolved marriage and proceeded to frame issues --- One of issues framed was whether petitioner was entitled to recover dower amounting to Rs.10,00,000/- from respondent --- It appears that issue whether she was entitled to Plot No.6 as dower was not framed as by time issues were framed, she had already obtained decree with respect to said plot in her favour in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 --- As petitioner had alleged cruelty at hands of respondent, and had not relinquished her dower, family court proceeded further with trial --- Trial culminated in judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 whereby petitioner was held entitled to recovery of dowry articles or their alternative depreciated value of Rs.200,000/- as well as to maintenance allowance of Rs.20,000/- per month for three-month Iddat period --- Family court turned down petitioner's claim for recovery of gold ornaments --- Her claim for recovery of dower was also turned down as she had not been able to prove cruelty or brutality at hands of respondent --- Petitioner's appeal against family court's said judgment and decree was dismissed by appellate court vide judgment and decree dated 01.03.2016 --- Petitioner preferred writ petition No.1007/2016 before high court against said concurrent judgments and decrees --- High court decided writ petition No.548-A/2012 titled "Adeel Akhter etc. Vs. Wajiha Rasheed etc." (reference to which has been made in paragraph-4 above) and writ petition No.1007/2016 titled "Wajiha Rasheed Vs. Additional District Judge, etc." vide two separate judgments dated 17.03.2022 --- In its judgment passed in writ petition No.1007/2016, high court did not interfere with concurrent judgments and decrees of family court and appellate court passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 --- As regards writ petition No.548-A/2012, high court allowed same by holding that since marriage had been dissolved on basis of khula, petitioner would not be entitled to recovery of dower --- In holding so, high court had taken cognizance of development subsequent to judgment and decree passed in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 i.e. judgment and decree passed by family court in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 --- In fact, high court reproduced operative part of family court's order dated 08.11.2012 whereby marriage between petitioner and respondent, was dissolved --- High court did not give benefit of amendments made in section 10(5) and (6) of West-Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 through Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 whereby in case of dissolution of marriage through khula, wife is to surrender up to 50% of her deferred dower or up to 25% of her admitted prompt dower to husband, whereas in case of decree for dissolution of marriage, family court is to direct husband to pay whole or part of outstanding deferred dower to wife --- High court took view, and correctly so, that since decree for dissolution of marriage pre-dates enactment of Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015, it could not be given retrospective effect --- Learned counsel for petitioner's submissions centered around petitioner's entitlement to her dower --- She asserted that concurrent judgments and decrees of family court and appellate court in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 entitling petitioner to Plot No.6 on basis of entries in Nikahnama could not have been interfered with by high court simply because in subsequent suit (Family Suit No.45 of 2012) for dissolution of marriage etc., petitioner had not been able to prove cruelty at hands of respondent --- Furthermore, it was submitted that even if petitioner was required to return dower, it should have been only to extent as provided in section 10(5) and (6) of West-Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 as amended by Punjab Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015 --- We have heard learned counsel for petitioner and perused record with her able assistance --- Although order dated 08.11.2012 (passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012), whereby family court dissolved marriage between petitioner and respondent makes no mention of "khula", it does explicitly state that "marriage between parties is hereby dissolved under proviso [to] section 10 of Family Courts Act, 1964" --- Proviso to section 10(4) of said Act provides that in suit for dissolution of marriage, if reconciliation fails, family court shall pass decree for dissolution of marriage forthwith and "also restore to husband haq mahr received by wife" in consideration of marriage at time of marriage --- Through order dated 08.11.2012, marriage between petitioner and respondent was dissolved, but no order was passed as to return of dower --- This is because petitioner had alleged cruelty at hands of respondent, and she had to prove same in her evidence --- Family court and appellate court, after appraisal of evidence came to conclusion that petitioner had not been able to prove cruelty at hands of respondent in any form and therefore, she was liable to return dower --- Since petitioner had obtained decree for Plot No.6 (which was part of her dower), from another court in earlier suit (Suit No.216/FC of 2010), high court was well within its rights to allow respondent's writ petition and disentitle petitioner to such dower --- Petitioner's claim to Plot No.6 was based on entries in Nikahnama --- She had filed Suit No.216/FC of 2010 for declaration as to ownership of Plot No.6 on 20.12.2010 --- This suit was decreed on 18.10.2011 --- It is after this decree that petitioner, on 01.02.2012 had filed Family Suit No.45 of 2012 for dissolution of marriage and recovery of dower etc --- After order dated 08.11.2012 for dissolution of marriage, petitioner's entitlement to dower was dependent on whether she was compelled to leave her matrimonial abode or she had done so on her own volition for reasons not attributable to respondent --- Since family court, in its judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 had clearly held that she had not been able to prove cruelty at hands of respondent in any manner, therefore, her claim to ownership of Plot No.6 (which was part of her dower) even though based on earlier judgment and decree dated 18.10.2011 passed in earlier Suit No.216/FC of 2010 would cease --- Family court's finding that petitioner has to restore Haq Mahr/dower to respondent has been given due recognition by high court by setting aside concurrent judgments and decrees whereby Plot No.6 was declared to be petitioner's property on basis of entries in Nikahnama --- We tend to agree with findings of family court that it would have been different matter had petitioner been able to prove cruelty or brutality at hands of respondent --- In such eventuality, petitioner would have been entitled to retain her dower and there would have been no reason for high court to interfere with judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 passed by family court in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 --- Dissolution of marriage under judgment and decree dated 06.11.2014 passed in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 not entitling petitioner to retain or obtain Haq Mahr was crucial development subsequent to filing of Suit No.216/FC of 2010 and had profound bearing on decree that petitioner had got regarding Plot No.6 prior to dissolution of her marriage --- It is well settled that courts can look into subsequent events at time of deciding cases --- Reference in this regard may be made to law laid down in cases of Mst. Amina Begum Vs. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir (PLD 1978 SC 220), Muhammadi Vs. Ghulam Nabi (2007 SCMR 761), Khushi Muhammad Vs. Abdul Ghafoor (2006 SCMR 839) and Evacuee Trust Property Board Vs. Sakina Bibi (2007 SCMR 262) --- With passing of decree dated 06.11.2014 in Family Suit No.45 of 2012 (which has been upheld by appellate court and high court), decree dated 18.10.2011 that was given in petitioner's favour in Suit No.216/FC of 2010 had become obsolete or unserviceable --- In case of Muhammad Arif Vs. Saima Noreen (2015 SCMR 804), it was held that where family court had reached conclusion that no cruelty could be proved by wife, it could not grant decree for dissolution of marriage on basis of cruelty under Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 --- Furthermore, it was held that only logical conclusion was that marriage should have been dissolved on basis of khula in which event wife would have to forgo dower amount --- Since we do not find any legal infirmity in impugned judgments dated 17.03.2022 passed by high court in writ petitions No. 548-A/2012 and 1007/2016, leave to appeal is declined and petitions are dismissed --- Petitions were dismissed accordingly.

Summary: Background: The case involves a marital dispute where the petitioner (wife) filed a suit for the recovery of dower and dowry articles after alleging that the respondent (husband) had orally divorced her. The respondent contested the claim of divorce and sought restitution of conjugal rights. While the trial court partially decreed in favor of the petitioner, granting recovery of dower and dowry articles, the respondent had also remarried during the pendency of the case without obtaining permission from the Arbitration Council. This second marriage led to an additional ground for dissolution of the marriage. Both parties challenged various aspects of the trial and appellate court decisions, eventually bringing the case before the Supreme Court. ----- Issues: ----- Recovery of Dower and Dowry Articles: Whether the petitioner was entitled to recovery of the dower and dowry articles as claimed. ----- 2) Restitution of Conjugal Rights: Whether the respondent was entitled to restitution of conjugal rights. ----- 3) Dissolution of Marriage: Whether the appellate court's decision to dissolve the marriage on the basis of Khula (without a request from the wife) was valid, and whether the High Court was correct in dissolving the marriage on the ground of cruelty. ----- 4) Second Marriage Without Permission: Whether the respondent's second marriage, which was contracted without the required permission from the Arbitration Council, provided a valid ground for dissolution of the marriage under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. ----- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Recovery of Dower and Dowry Articles: The Court upheld the trial court's decision to grant the petitioner recovery of Rs. 500,000 in dower and dowry articles, including 51 Tolas of gold. The findings of the trial court and lower courts were found to be consistent and supported by evidence. ----- Restitution of Conjugal Rights: The Supreme Court set aside the appellate court's decree granting restitution of conjugal rights since the issue of the marriage's validity had not been properly adjudicated. ----- Dissolution of Marriage: The Court found that the appellate court erred in dissolving the marriage on the basis of Khula because the wife had neither expressly nor impliedly requested dissolution on these grounds. Further, the High Court's decision to dissolve the marriage based on cruelty was not supported by sufficient evidence and was therefore set aside. ----- Second Marriage Without Permission: The respondent’s second marriage, which was conducted without the permission of the Arbitration Council, violated Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Supreme Court held that this provided valid grounds for dissolution under Clause (iia) of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Consequently, the marriage was dissolved on this ground. ----- Citations/Precedents: Haseen Ullah v. Mst. Naheed Begum and others (PLD 2022 SC 686) Housing Building Finance Corporation v. Shahinshah Humayun Cooperative House Building Society and others (1992 SCMR 19) Abdul Majid v. Shahzada Asif Jan (PLD 1982 SC 82) Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani (2023 SCMR 246) Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin (PLD 1967 SC 97) Muhammad Arif v. Saima Noreen and another (2015 SCMR 804) Syed Rashid Ali Shah v. Mst. Haleema Bibi and others (PLD 2014 Peshawar 226)

Summary: -----Quote: This case, inter alia, involves following questions of law: i. Whether the learned Civil Court is vested with the jurisdiction to try the declaratory suit, inter alia, regarding the reconciliation proceedings, issuance of certificate of effectiveness of divorce in the light of Section 5 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 ("Act, 1964")? ii. Whether a husband loses the right to pronounce talaq, once such right is delegated to the wife? Held: In terms of Section 5(1) of the Act, 1964 read with Entry No.1 of Part-I of the Schedule appended thereto as also Entry No.10 thereof, exclusive jurisdiction in family matters is conferred upon the Family Court, therefore, dissolution of marriage in all its modes and manners including khula and talaq-e-tafweez falls within purview of the jurisdiction of the Family Court and Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the respondent. As regards the second question, it is held that even if a husband delegates his right of talaq to the wife, the said act of the husband does not mean that the husband has denounced his own right to pronounce the talaq and intimate factum of pronouncement of talaq to the Union Council concerned, for further proceedings leading to the issuance of certificate of effectiveness of divorce in terms of provisions of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961. -----Background: The petitioner challenged a series of orders passed by the Civil Court that granted an ad-interim injunction in favor of his second wife, Dr. Maria Khan (respondent No. 3). Dr. Khan's suit sought to prevent the Union Council from issuing a certificate of effectiveness of divorce, asserting that once her husband delegated the right of divorce (talaq-e-tafweez) to her, he lost his own right to pronounce talaq. The petitioner’s appeal against the injunction was dismissed due to a delay, prompting this writ petition. -----Issues: 1- Maintainability of the Writ Petition: Whether the petition is maintainable, considering the orders challenged are interlocutory. -----2- Jurisdiction of the Civil Court: Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction over the matter concerning divorce and reconciliation proceedings, which typically fall under Family Court jurisdiction. -----3- Effect of Talaq-e-Tafweez: Whether the husband’s delegation of the right to pronounce talaq to his wife nullifies his own right to divorce. -----4- Restraining Order Against Union Council: Whether the Civil Court could issue an injunction preventing the Union Council from conducting reconciliation proceedings and issuing a divorce effectiveness certificate. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court allowed the petition and set aside the Civil Court’s orders, reasoning as follows: --Maintainability: Although interlocutory orders are generally non-appealable, the Civil Court’s orders were arbitrary and exceeded its jurisdiction, permitting a writ petition for judicial correction. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court: Exclusive jurisdiction over matters of divorce, reconciliation, and rights related to the Nikahnama is vested in Family Courts per Section 5 of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The Civil Court’s orders were outside its jurisdiction. --Effect of Talaq-e-Tafweez: Delegating the right to pronounce talaq to the wife does not eliminate the husband's right to do so independently. The husband retains his right under Islamic law to issue talaq. Restraining Order Against Union Council: The court emphasized that, under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, it is mandatory for the husband to notify the Union Council of divorce to initiate reconciliation proceedings. The Civil Court’s restraining order violated Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act, which bars injunctions against public duties. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 5, Family Courts Act, 1964 – Establishes exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts over matrimonial issues. Section 7, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 – Mandates notification to the Union Council upon pronouncing talaq for reconciliation purposes. Section 56, Specific Relief Act, 1887 – Prohibits injunctions that interfere with public duties. Inaam-ul-Haq v. Muhammad Ali Shaheen (2013 CLC 904) – Supports High Court intervention for jurisdictional errors in interlocutory orders. Major Muhammad Khalid Karim v. Mst. Saadia Yaqub (PLD 2012 SC 66) – Clarifies exclusive Family Court jurisdiction in matrimonial cases. The High Court concluded that the orders of the Civil Court were without jurisdiction and upheld the husband's right to proceed with the notification process for divorce through the Union Council, dismissing the respondent’s objections.

Summary: Matrimonial dispute, recall of khula decree---Interference under Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908---Petition challenging the recall of khula decree on grounds of misrepresentation---Petitioner, Fozia Mazhar, contested the reinstatement of marriage decree originally dissolved on grounds of khula, which was recalled on a purported joint application, later claimed to be misrepresented---Family Court initially granted dissolution based on khula with dower return, subsequently reversed on alleged joint application, despite lack of respondent?s signature or proper representation---High Courts upheld the decision, confirming no misrepresentation in the initial decree recall---Evidence from attorney and witnesses of the respondent supported claims of no compromise or consent for the joint application, leading to restoration of original khula decree---Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts, thereby dismissing the appeal and upholding the original dissolution of marriage. Key judicial precedents cited included Muhammad Arshad Anjum v. Mst. Khurshid Begum and others (2021 SCMR 1145), and Allah Dad v. Mukhtar and another (1992 SCMR 1273)---Petition dismissed, confirming no misrepresentation in recalling of khula decree.-----Issues:Whether Section 12(2) of C.P.C. can be invoked to challenge the judgment and decree passed by a Family Court under the Family Courts Act, 1964?Whether the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional writ jurisdiction rightly declined to not interfere in the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the courts below?Whether the recall of the decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of khula was in violation of Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, read with Section 21 of the Family Courts Act, 1964?----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. It ruled that:Section 12(2) of C.P.C. is applicable in proceedings before Family Courts as per established jurisprudence allowing the general principles of C.P.C. to be applied.The High Court properly exercised its jurisdiction by not interfering with the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts, as such findings were based on substantial evidence indicating misrepresentation in the recall application.Addressing the recall of the decree under Section 7 of the Ordinance, in conjunction with Section 21 of the Act, was deemed unnecessary as the case was decided on the misrepresentation found in the recall application, making further discussion academic.-----Citations/Precedents:Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Yusuf (PLD 1963 SC 51)Mst. Farida Parwin v. Qadeeruddin Ahmad Siddiqi (PLD 1971 Karachi 118)Mst. Rehmat Bibi v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi (1988 SCMR 1812)Muhammad Arshad Anjum v. Mst. Khurshid Begum (2021 SCMR 1145)Allah Dad v. Mukhtar (1992 SCMR 1273)Allah Rakha v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2000 Federal Shariat Court 1)Board of Governors, Area Study Centre for Africa and North America, Quaid-e-Azam University v. Ms. Farah Zahra (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 153)Barkhurdar v. Muhammad Razzaq (PLD 1989 Supreme Court 749)Sayed Abbas Taqi Mehdi v. Mst. Sayeda Sabahat Batool (PLJ 2010 SC 891)Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge, Lahore (2014 SCMR 1365)Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 2007 SC 45)Hamad Hassan v. Isma Bukhari (2023 SCMR 1434)Dobbs v. Jackson Women?s Health Org. (597 U.S. 215, 348)

Summary: Issues:Whether Rabia Rafique and Ali Imran are the legal heirs of the deceased, Imran Azam, entitled to inheritance rights.The validity of the previous judgments and decrees in light of the alleged fraud and misrepresentation by the respondents.The applicability of Section 12(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to review the judgments based on allegations of fraud and misrepresentation.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court dismissed the applications filed by Muhammad Siddique and Irfan Azam, challenging the legal heir status of Rabia Rafique and Ali Imran. The Court found no substantial evidence of fraud or misrepresentation that could invalidate the previous judgments recognizing the respondents as legal heirs. The Court emphasized that the allegations primarily pertained to disputes between the parties rather than fraud upon the Court. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the doctrine of election precludes the applicants from pursuing multiple remedies once one has been exhausted, especially after the dismissal of a review petition by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.The Court also clarified that the dissolution of marriage through Khula does not become ineffective due to non-issuance of a divorce certificate by the Union Council, addressing the applicant's claim regarding the marital status of Rabia Rafique. Additionally, the birth certificate of Ali Imran and other corroborative evidence sufficiently established his paternity, thus negating the applicant's claim of paternity.----Citations/Precedents:The Court referenced several legal principles and past judgments, including the interpretation of Section 12(2) of the CPC, the finality of Supreme Court decisions, the doctrine of election in legal remedies, and the effectiveness of Khula without a divorce certificate from the Union Council. Specific case citations include "DR. AKHLAQ AHMED V. MST. KISHWAR SULTANA & OTHERS" (PLD 1983 Supreme Court 169), "MST. LAILA QAYYUM V. FAWAD QAYUM AND OTHERS" (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 449), and "TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN V. DEVAN SUGAR MILLS LIMITED AND OTHERS" (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 828), among others, to support the Court's reasoning and conclusions.

Summary: Background: The appellant filed a suit for declaration cum perpetual injunction seeking the cancellation of a sale deed dated 10.10.2002, which was executed in favor of the respondent. The appellant claimed that the sale deed was executed without consideration and solely to protect the marital rights of the respondent, who was his wife at the time. Following the dissolution of their marriage through Khula, the appellant sought the cancellation of the sale deed. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the appellate court upheld the decision. Consequently, the appellant appealed to the High Court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the sale deed dated 10.10.2002 was executed without consideration. 2- Whether the dissolution of marriage between the parties affects the validity of the sale deed. 3- Whether the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts were justified and should be upheld. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Sale Deed Execution and Consideration: The court found that the sale deed, which was a registered document, explicitly stated that the house was sold to the respondent for Rs.2,00,000 and that the possession was handed over with the consideration amount received by the appellant. The registered document holds a valid presumption of truth unless rebutted by cogent and convincing evidence. The appellant failed to provide such evidence to prove the absence of consideration. --Impact of Marriage Dissolution: The court noted that the sale deed was not conditional upon the marital relationship. Even if the sale deed was executed for humanitarian reasons due to the marriage, its termination did not affect the validity of the sale deed. --Concurrent Findings of Fact: The court highlighted that both the trial court and the appellate court had concurrently found that the consideration amount was duly paid and substantiated. The High Court emphasized that such concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed in a second appeal unless there was a clear oversight or error resulting in a miscarriage of justice. No such misreading, non-reading of evidence, or violation of law was found in this case. The court concluded that the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the registered sale deed and found no reason to disturb the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The appeal was dismissed. ----Citations/Precedents: 2022 SCR 416: The Supreme Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir stated that the second appellate court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court unless there was clear oversight or error resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

Summary: (a) Family Law ----Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 (DMMA)---- ----Ss. 2 & 5----Family Courts Act, 1964 (FCA)----S. 10(5)---- Khula vs. dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty—Court’s authority to convert dissolution into khula ----A Muslim woman can seek dissolution of marriage on statutory grounds under the DMMA or seek khula, which is an independent right—Trial court erred in converting dissolution on grounds of cruelty into khula without the woman’s consent—Khula is a special and exclusive right of a woman, which must be explicitly and unequivocally sought by her—Under S. 10(5) of the FCA, waiver of dower is a consequence of khula, but a woman cannot be forced to forgo her dower unless she voluntarily seeks khula—Court held that trial and appellate courts misapplied the law by granting khula when the wife never sought it, leading to wrongful waiver of her dower—Legal distinction between dissolution under DMMA and khula must be maintained. (b) Divorce ----Dissolution of marriage—Talaq—Proof of divorce---- Petitioner denied pronouncing talaq, but evidence established that divorce was given in the presence of a jirga and at a police station—Statements of PW-4 and PW-5 corroborated the wife’s claim, and no cross-examination was conducted to rebut these claims—Held, trial and appellate courts failed to give a definitive finding on the existence of talaq, despite available evidence—High Court correctly found that talaq had already been pronounced, and granting khula was unnecessary. (c) Dower Rights ----Effect of divorce on dower—Right of a Muslim woman to retain dower---- Khula results in waiver of dower, whereas dissolution of marriage on statutory grounds does not—Since the wife did not seek khula, and talaq was already pronounced, she remained entitled to her dower, which was half of a portion of the house—Court ruled that denying her dower was unjustified, as dissolution on the ground of cruelty under the DMMA does not affect dower rights (S. 5, DMMA). (d) Maintenance & Dowry Articles ----Grant and enhancement of maintenance---- Maintenance awarded to wife and minor child, with an increase in past maintenance and iddat period maintenance by the appellate court—Trial court also granted Rs. 15,000 for dowry articles, which was later enhanced—Held, factual findings of trial and appellate courts regarding maintenance and dowry were justified—No interference warranted by the Supreme Court. (e) Legislative History ----Historical background of the DMMA—Evolution of Muslim women’s rights in divorce cases---- Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, was a progressive legislative reform that granted Muslim women greater divorce rights—Before its enactment, Hanafi jurisprudence required the husband’s consent for khula, which was deemed contrary to principles of justice—Statute provides specific grounds for dissolution without requiring the husband’s approval, distinguishing it from khula. (f) Final Disposition Petitions dismissed—Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision—Held that Respondent No.1 was rightfully entitled to dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, and her right to dower was protected—Factual findings regarding maintenance and dowry articles required no interference—Trial and appellate courts erred in converting dissolution into khula, leading to an incorrect waiver of dower, which was rectified by the High Court and upheld by the Supreme Court. Cited Cases: • Khurshid Bibi v. Muhammad Amin (PLD 1967 SC 97) • Haji Saif-ur-Rahman v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1994 FSC 10) • Muhammad Siddiq v. Mst. Sughra Bibi (PLD 2008 SC 95) • Mukhtar Ahmed v. Mst. Nargis Bibi (PLD 2009 SC 205) • M. Hamad Hassan v. Mst. Rubina Yasmeen (PLD 2015 SC 302)

Summary: Issue:Whether the respondent is entitled to dower as decreed by the lower courts, considering the marriage was dissolved without consummation or valid retirement.---- Judgment:The petition was allowed. The High Court set aside the lower courts' decisions, holding that the respondent was not entitled to any dower. The suit for recovery of dower filed by the respondent was dismissed.---- Reasoning:The Court noted the established facts of non-consummation of marriage and dissolution via decree under section 10(4)(5) of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The Court relied on Islamic law principles and precedents, including "Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique" (PLD 2007 SC 45) and "Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another" (2023 SCMR 246), to conclude that since the marriage was dissolved at the respondent's instance without consummation or valid retirement, she was not entitled to any dower. The Court also highlighted that the petitioner did not pronounce divorce, and the dissolution was through a court decree on the basis of Khula.---- Precedents Cited:"Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique" (PLD 2007 SC 45)"Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another" (2023 SCMR 246)Principles of Muhammadan Law by D.F. MullaAnglo-Muhammadan Law by Sir Roland Knyvet Wilson---- Legal Principles:Judicial review under Article 199 of the Constitution is limited to instances of misreading or non-reading of evidence leading to miscarriage of justice.---- Dower entitlement is governed by consummation of marriage or valid retirement, with specific conditions applied when divorce is pronounced by the husband.--- In cases of dissolution by Khula without consummation or valid retirement, the wife is not entitled to any dower.This case underscores the application of Islamic law principles in determining dower rights, particularly in the context of non-consummated marriages dissolved at the wife's instance. The High Court's reliance on established precedents and Islamic jurisprudence illustrates the integration of religious law within Pakistan's legal framework.

Summary: Suit will be filed where wife ordinarily resides ---- ''Pakistani courts have jurisdiction in cases where either party resides or has resided in Pakistan, and specifically, in cases of marriage dissolution or dower, where the wife ordinarily resides.'' --- West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and the West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, especially Rule 6 --- The court referred to Black?s Law Dictionary and Dicey's "Conflict of Laws" to define "ordinarily resides," emphasizing that it does not necessarily mean permanent residence. The court noted that the respondent, though living in the USA, had substantial connections to Pakistan. --- The court found that the Family Court?s preliminary decree for dissolution of marriage by way of Khula and the subsequent proceedings were in compliance with the legal and Islamic principles. It noted that the respondent?s withdrawal of the suit for the remaining clauses rendered the preliminary decree final. --- The judgment referred to Islamic law, specifically the concept of Khula, where a woman can seek dissolution of marriage. It cited Surah Baqra from the Quran to explain the principles governing Khula. --- The Supreme Court agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of the lower courts, finding no legal or factual errors. The petitions were dismissed as meritless, and leave to appeal was refused.