Summary: (a) Islamic law --- Gift (Hiba) --- Essentials --- Offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession --- Proof --- Failure to prove valid oral gift --- Effect. Petitioners, legal heirs of deceased Imdad Ali, claimed title to inherited property through alleged oral and registered gift deeds. Supreme Court reaffirmed that a valid gift requires: (i) offer by the donor, (ii) acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession. Petitioners failed to plead or prove these elements. Neither the date, time, nor place of the alleged oral gift was provided, nor were any attesting witnesses of the gift transaction produced. No cogent or confidence-inspiring evidence was led to establish offer and acceptance. The petitioners also failed to produce key evidence such as the scribe, marginal witnesses, stamp vendor, sub-registrar, or Patwari to prove the execution and attestation of the registered gift deeds. Consequently, the gift was held to be invalid, and the petitioners' claim was rejected. Cited Cases: • Bilal Hussain Shah v. Dilawar Shah PLD 2018 SC 698 • Khalid Hussain v. Nazir Ahmad 2021 SCMR 1986 • Faqir Ali v. Sakina Bibi PLD 2022 SC 85 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim 2025 SCMR 955 • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 (b) Law of evidence --- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 --- Arts. 129(g) & 133 --- Best evidence rule --- Withholding material witnesses --- Adverse inference --- Application. Petitioners failed to produce essential witnesses, including the scribe, attesting witnesses, and relevant revenue officials, raising an adverse presumption under Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Court held that in cases where a party fails to present the best available evidence, the court is justified in drawing a presumption against that party. Oral claims of gift unsupported by credible documentary or witness testimony were held insufficient. (c) Succession --- Inheritance --- Gift by ancestor to exclusion of daughters --- Burden of proof --- Reason for exclusion must be shown --- Presumption against disinheritance. The Court noted that no reason was given by the petitioners for the exclusion of daughters from the inheritance. In cases involving alleged gifts by a deceased ancestor in favour of male heirs to the exclusion of female heirs, courts must scrutinize the claim with greater care. Absence of evidence showing affection or reward-based motivation for the gift raised strong suspicion. Petitioners bore the heavy burden to justify exclusion, which they failed to discharge. (d) Pleadings and evidence --- Relief beyond pleadings --- Impermissibility --- Case to be proved within bounds of pleadings. Supreme Court reiterated that no party may lead evidence beyond its pleadings. Petitioners did not clearly plead the particulars of the alleged oral gift in their written statements and thus were barred from leading evidence in that regard. Courts below correctly refused to entertain unpleaded facts. Cited Cases: • Zulfiqar v. Shahdat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582 • Combined Investment Ltd. v. Wali Bhai PLD 2016 SC 730 • Saddaruddin v. Sultan Khan 2021 SCMR 642 (e) Limitation Act, 1908 --- Art. 120 --- Declaratory suits --- Right to sue --- When accrues --- Continuing right in suits based on inheritance. Court held that in inheritance-based declaratory suits, the right to sue is a continuing right so long as the plaintiff retains a claim over the property. Where fraud or concealment is alleged, limitation begins from the date of knowledge. Respondents in this case only discovered the fraudulent gift when attempting to obtain a revenue extract in 2009. All three courts below rightly held the suit within time under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act. Cited Case: • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim 2025 SCMR 955 (f) Civil procedure --- Concurrent findings of fact --- Scope of interference by Supreme Court --- Principles. The Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of three courts below, holding that the judgments were based on proper appraisal of evidence and application of settled legal principles. The petitioners had failed to dislodge those findings through any legal or factual error warranting interference under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. Disposition: Leave refused. Petition dismissed. Judgments of trial court, appellate court, and High Court upheld concurrently.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 185(3)---Civil revision---Leave to appeal---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference by Supreme Court---Petitioner’s suit for declaration of ownership based on a gift deed was dismissed by Trial Court, Appellate Court, and High Court---Held, when three Courts below concurrently appreciate evidence and reach same factual findings, Supreme Court ordinarily does not interfere unless miscarriage of justice or gross illegality is shown---No case for interference made out---Leave refused and petition dismissed. Cited Cases: • Mst. Farzana Zia v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb (2024 SCMR 916) • Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLJ 2023 SC 8) (b) Gift (Hiba)---Islamic law---Declaration and validity of oral/registered gift---Requirements---Scope **Donor's retention of possession---Effect---**Gift deed relied upon by petitioner showed that donor had retained possession during his lifetime---Held, retention of possession negates one of the essential elements of a valid gift---Where gift deed imposes future rights or obligations, it must be compulsorily registered---In absence of valid delivery of possession, no lawful title passes to donee. Cited Provisions: • Registration Act, 1908, S. 49 • Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 123 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (X of 1984) ----Art. 79---Proof of document required by law to be attested---Marginal witnesses---Failure to produce---Effect---Petitioner failed to produce attesting witnesses of the gift deed---Witnesses presented only confirmed signatures without establishing reasons for non-production of marginal witnesses or invoking secondary evidence---Held, mandatory requirements of Art. 79 not fulfilled---No evidentiary value attached to such testimony. ---(d) Islamic Inheritance Principles---Exclusion of legal heirs---Scope and burden of proof---**Petitioner, being grandsons, failed to justify why donor would exclude his sons (legal heirs) from inheritance---Held, burden was on donee to establish circumstances justifying exclusion of heirs---Such facts were neither pleaded nor proved---Courts rightly rejected claim. Cited Cases: • Fareed v. Muhammad Tufail (2018 SCMR 139) • Mst. Tahira Samina v. Javed Saeed Tariq (2024 SCMR 24) ---- (e) Evidence---Oral transaction of gift---Burden and standard of proof---Constructive possession-------In oral or informal transactions, donee must prove gift through unimpeachable evidence, including specific details such as date, time, location, and witnesses---Possession by one heir is presumed to be on behalf of all legal heirs unless rebutted---Held, none of these requirements were fulfilled in the present case. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shafiq Ullah v. Allah Bakhsh (2021 SCMR 763) • Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi (2020 SCMR 276) • Mst. Tahira Samina v. Javed Saeed Tariq (2024 SCMR 24) ---- (f) Limitation Act, 1908---Inheritance---Right not extinguished by passage of time---Held, mere passage of time does not defeat rightful claims to inheritance---Limitation is not applicable where fraud is alleged or inheritance right is being claimed. Cited Cases: • Mohammad Boota v. Mst. Fatima (2023 SCMR 1901) • Syed Kausar Ali Shah v. Syed Farhat Hussain Shah (2022 SCMR 1558)

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 ----S. 7(3)----Effectiveness of Talaq---Death of husband during iddat period—Succession rights of divorced wife—Scope Talaq not effective unless ninety days have passed from notice given to Chairman under S. 7(3) of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961—Petitioners contended that deceased had divorced respondent by a written talaq deed prior to his death and that she was no longer entitled to inherit—Held, statutory period of ninety days had not expired and talaq had not attained legal effect at the time of death—As death occurred during respondent’s iddat period, marriage was subsisting, and succession had opened—Respondent continued to be legal heir entitled to inherit from deceased husband’s estate—Peshawar High Court’s decision, allowing respondent's share in inheritance, upheld—Petition dismissed. Cited Case: • Mst. Rehmat Bibi v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi 1988 SCMR 1812 (b) Islamic Law ----Talaq-e-Biddat---Nature and effect---Recognition by various schools of Islamic jurisprudence---Interpretation Triple talaq (Talaq-e-Biddat), though historically practiced, not sanctioned by Quran or Hadith—Term “Biddat” itself denotes innovation—Recognized by Hanbali school in limited form, but rejected by Fiqh Jafaria, Shafi, and Maliki schools—Divorce in Islam must follow a structured process that allows reflection, reconciliation, and fairness—Talaq-e-Biddat held inconsistent with Islamic injunctions that prescribe waiting period and opportunity for reconciliation—Recognizing instantaneous triple talaq as final deprives woman of protection embedded in Quranic guidance—Therefore, unless mandatory waiting period is observed, divorce does not become effective in Shariah or law. Cited References: • Surah Al-Baqrah (2:226–232) • Surah Al-Talaq (65:1) • Surah Al-Ahzab (33:49) • Surah Al-Nisa (4:35) • Muslim Law of Divorce by K.N. Ahmed (1984) (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 185(3)---Scope of interference by Supreme Court in revisional matters---Inheritance and succession---Concurrent findings set aside by High Court—Justifiability Where concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are found to be contrary to settled law and Islamic injunctions, High Court is justified in setting them aside—Succession opens at the time of death, and legal status of heirs must be determined with reference to that moment—Peshawar High Court rightly concluded that respondent’s marital bond with deceased remained valid at the time of death, entitling her to inherit—Supreme Court declined leave to appeal—No legal infirmity found in impugned judgment. (d) Succession Act, 1925 ----S. 372---Succession certificate---Eligibility of widow during iddat---Effect of pending talaq Where divorce proceedings initiated but not legally completed due to failure of prescribed notice period, widow retains status as lawful heir—Talaq deed alone not sufficient to deprive wife of inheritance unless accompanied by compliance with both Islamic requirements and statutory obligations under Family Laws Ordinance—Respondent, divorced only in writing shortly before husband’s death, continued to be wife under law—Succession certificate cannot exclude such a widow solely on basis of unperfected talaq.

Summary: Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)--- ----Ss. 232(a), 232(c), 276 & 372---Sindh Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates Act (VII of 2021), Preamble---Petition for grant of probate / letter of administration---Grant of administration to universal or residuary legatees---Lady died testate and executed will in favour of her sister who filed Succession Application, however, the same was dismissed with direction to approach NADRA along with will for process / issuance of letter of administration---Stance of the appellant / petitioner was that under S. 232 of the Succession Act, 1925, which deals with grant of administration to universal or residuary legatees, she can be classified as "universal legatee" as there is no residue estate of the deceased---Validity---Subsections (a) and (c) of S. 232 of the Succession Act, 1925, stipulates that when the deceased has made a will but has not appointed an executor, such a universal or a legatee may be admitted to prove the will, and letter of administration with the will annexed may be granted to him of the whole estate, or of so much thereof as may be administered---In the present case, the impugned order (directing the Appellant to approach NADRA Authority to process letter of administration) cannot be sustained under the Sindh Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates Act, 2021---NADRA Authority under Sindh Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates Act, 2021, can only issue letter of administration in matters in which there is no probate---Existence of a will can only be proved through Court of law; hence, present case is beyond the scope of the Sindh Letters of Administration and Succession Certificates Act, 2021---High Court set-aside the impugned order and the case was remanded back to Trial Court with direction to the appellant to prove the execution of the will in the first instance; if she proves the execution of the will, the court may proceed with grant of letter of administration under S. 232 of the Succession Act, 1925---Appeal, filed by beneficiary of will, was disposed of accordingly. Re: Mrs. Homai Minwalla 1989 CLC 1953 ref. Bassam Ali Dahri for Appellant. Ahmed Khan Khaskheli, Additional Advocate General for Respondent. Date of hearing: 5th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) Islamic law--- ----Will---Proof---Follower of 'Shia' sect---Relevant revenue record exhibited by one of the witnesses of plaintiff /respondent revealed that the deceased (father of respondent/lady-plaintiff) was the owner of the property-in-question---Respondent/plaintiff not only produced/exhibited the will-deed but also produced the scribe and marginal witnesses of the same (will-deed) as her witnesses---In said will-deed the deceased disclosed that he was follower of Shia sect and directed to conduct his funeral ceremony according to Shia sect and to burry him in a shia graveyard; he further directed that the respondent/plaintiff is his sole legal heir and his legacy will be devolved according to Shia sect---Petitioners/defendants were not able to shatter the evidence qua writing of the will-deed---As many as six witnesses produced by the respondent/plaintiff, including one who led the funeral prayer of deceased, remained consistent to the effect that the deceased was follower of Shia sect till his death---Respondent/plaintiff had proved on record that her father was follower of Shia sect and he validly scribed the will-deed---No mis-reading, non-reading or unlawful exercise of jurisdiction could be pointed out and both the Courts below had passed the impugned judgments/decrees after proper appreciation of the record/evidence, thereof the concurrent finding could be interfered with---Revision petition, being meritless, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (b) Maxim--- ----'Actori incumbit onus probandi'---Meaning and scope---He who asserts a fact must prove the same, which is based on latin maxim "onus probandi actori incumbit"---Mode of proof is the procedure by which the "facts in issue" as also "the relevant facts " have to be proved during the trial---In the present case, the petitioners/defendants were unable to produce medical record showing their assertion regarding disease of the deceased suffering from mouth cancer and that at the time of writing will deed, he was unable to talk---Revision petition was dismissed. (c) Islamic law--- ----Sect/sub-sect by birth, renouncing of---Scope and effect---Sect of the deceased---Proof---Inheritance---One of the witnesses produced by the respondent/plaintiff stated that he led the Janaza (funeral) prayer of deceased as per Shia sect---One of the witnesses of the petitioners/defendants (DW-1) stated that two funeral prayers of the deceased were offered; one, as pre Shia sect, and the other, as per Sunni sect led by a Maulvi (prayer leader)---On the request of said witness, prayer leader was summoned but he was abandoned---Subsequently, the prayer leader was examined as a Court Witness (CW-1), who stated in his statement that the deceased was follower of Shia sect and that he (prayer leader) had not led his Janaza (funeral) prayer---Two of the (six) witnesses of respondent/plaintiff admitted in their cross-examination that by birth the deceased was Sunni but that he (deceased) later on adopted Shia sect---Under Para 31 of Chapter 3 of Principles of Muhammadan Law, a Muhammadan male or female who has attained the age of puberty, may renounce the doctrines of the sect or sub-sect to which he or she belongs and adopt the tenets of the other sect or any other sub-sect and he or she will thenceforth be subject to the law of the new sect or sub-sect---Respondent/plaintiff had proved on record that her father was follower of Shia sect and he validly scribed the will-deed---No mis-reading, non-reading or unlawful exercise of jurisdiction had been pointed out and both the Courts below had passed the impugned judgments/decrees after proper appreciation of the record/evidence, thereof the concurrent finding could not be interfered with---Revision petition, being meritless, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. (d) Islamic law--- ----Inheritance---Shia law---Principles---Shia Law of inheritance divides heirs into two groups, namely, (1) heirs by consanguinity, that is, blood relation, and (2) heirs by marriage, that is, husband and wife---Heirs by consanguinity are divided into three classes and each class is sub-divided into two sections---Para 88 of Chapter 8 of the principles of Muhammadan Law provided three classes of heirs; I (1) Parents; II (ii) Children and other lineal descendants h.l.s; II (i) Grandparents h.h.s. (true as well as false); II (ii) Brothers and sisters and their descendants h.l.s; III (i) Paternal and (ii) maternal, uncles and aunts of the deceased and of his parents and grandparents h.h.s, and their descendants h.l.s. Of three classes of heirs, first excludes the second from inheritance and second excludes third---In the present case, admittedly, the respondent/plaintiff was the only daughter of the deceased while he divorced his wife during his lifetime---Respondent (plaintiff/lady), being heir of first class, excluded the petitioners, who were the heirs of third class---Even otherwise, it is settled principle of Islamic Law that nearer in degree excludes the more remote, therefore, as per the pedigree table and the law, the petitioners were not only distant kindred of the deceased but also remoter in degree---No mis-reading, non-reading or unlawful exercise of jurisdiction had been pointed out and both the Courts below had passed the impugned judgments/decrees after proper appreciation of the record/evidence, therefore the concurrent finding could not be interfered with---Revision petition, being meritless, was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Syed Ansar Hussain v. Syed Risalat Hussain and 10 others 1985 MLD 265 and Rasool (deceased) through L.Rs and 6 others v. Jano and 10 others 2021 MLD 1759 ref. Khalida Shamim Akhtar v. Ghulam Jaffar and another PLD 2016 Lahore 865 distinguished. Burhan Latif Khaisori for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents (motion case). Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 --- Ss. 2 & 2‑A; Shariat Application Act, 1948— Limited life‑estates under Punjab custom—retrospective abolition—Section 2‑A (inserted 1983) declares that male heirs who took agricultural land under custom before 15‑3‑1948 are deemed absolute owners as if inheritance had opened under Islamic law; conversely, a female donee holding a “limited” estate under earlier custom becomes full owner and the property thereafter devolves according to Sharia. Held, mutation No. 1616 (20‑05‑1990) in favour of Mst. Ghulam Zohra’s husband and children was lawful; appellants, claiming through the collateral Mohammad Yousaf, acquired no share. Cited cases: Haider v. Murad PLD 2012 SC 501; Mst. Farida Khatoon v. Dr. Masood Ahmed Butt 2009 SCMR 464. (b) Islamic Law—Wills (waṣiyyat)—Power of testamentary disposition— (i) A Muslim may bequeath only up to one‑third of his estate without heirs’ consent (Hadaya; Fatawa‑e‑Alamgiri). (ii) A condition that the legatee shall hold merely for life “until death” derogates from absolute ownership and is void; the bequest operates as an outright transfer. Applying these principles, Kala Khan’s 1934 will in favour of his daughter Mst. Ghulam Zohra, though couched as a life interest, vested absolute title in her; she could validly alienate the property inter vivos and, on death in 1988, it devolved exclusively upon her heirs (respondents Nos. 2‑5). (c) Customary succession—Ancestral versus acquired land—Onus— Custom applies only to ancestral property. Appellants neither pleaded nor proved that the land was ancestral; documentary record showed it was self‑acquired by the testator. Customary reversionary rights, therefore, could not be invoked. (d) Law of Evidence—Pedigree‑table—Probative value— A pedigree table (Exh. P‑16, Exh. D‑6) is at best a weak piece of evidence and must be corroborated. Failure to adduce independent proof that “Faqeer son of Qasim” (the nearer collateral) pre‑deceased the propositus fatally undermined appellants’ claim that Muhammad Yousaf was the last surviving male heir. (e) Civil litigation—Appellate and revisional review—Scope— Concurrent findings of the first appellate court and High Court that appellants had no title were based on correct appreciation of evidence and law; Supreme Court will not disturb such findings absent a jurisdictional defect or miscarriage of justice. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; High Court judgment dated 17‑05‑2012 and appellate decree dated 22‑10‑2001 affirmed; trial‑court decree set aside.

Summary: (a) Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 — S. 27 — Nominee vis-à-vis legal heir — Scope Nomination of a person under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, does not confer proprietary rights upon the nominee after the death of a society member. Legal heirs of the deceased member have superior rights under the law of succession. In the present case, the suit land was originally allotted to Hameed Khan under the Co-operative Farming Scheme. Upon his death, his nominee, Anwar, was entered in the society records, and after Anwar’s death, the petitioner Matloob claimed proprietary rights as his nominee. The High Court held that nomination merely conferred the right to receive money or benefits from the society but did not substitute inheritance rights under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1948. Held, a nominee could not supplant the legal heirs of the original allottee under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925, and the proprietary rights should devolve upon the legal heirs of Hameed Khan. Cited Cases: Mst. Amtul Habib and others v. Mst. Musarrat Parveen and others (1974 SCMR 185) Fazal Shah v. Muhammad Din and others (1990 SCMR 868) Manzoor Ahmad v. Mst. Salman Bibi and others (1998 SCMR 388) Muhammad Bakhsh v. Mst. Ghulam Fatima (2007 SCMR 1227) (b) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1948 — Inheritance — Legal heirs' entitlement Nomination under a co-operative society’s byelaws does not affect inheritance rights under Shariah. Petitioner Matloob, being a nominee, could not inherit the suit land as the proprietary rights vested in the legal heirs of Hameed Khan by operation of law. The High Court correctly applied the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 1948, which mandated that upon the death of a member, his estate devolves upon his heirs in accordance with Islamic inheritance principles. (c) Administration of Justice — Fraud — Effect of fraud on property rights Petitioner Matloob was not born at the time of the original allotment in 1948, yet he claimed membership rights in the society. The Court found that incorrect entries in the society records were manipulated to deprive the legal heirs of Hameed Khan. Fraud vitiates all proceedings. Held, no proprietary rights could be conferred upon the petitioner based on fraudulent claims, and the petition was dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Petition dismissed — Leave to appeal refused. This version keeps the legal tone intact while correcting formatting issues. Let me know if you need further refinements!

Summary: (a) Succession Act, 1925: ---- Sections 372 & 373—Issuance of multiple succession certificates—Bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC not applicable ----- The petitioner, the eldest unmarried daughter of a deceased government officer, filed a second application for a succession certificate claiming her share in the family monthly pension. The respondents contested the application, arguing it was barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC as the petitioner had previously obtained a certificate for an amount left in the deceased's bank account. The Supreme Court held that the Succession Act, 1925, being a special law, provides a specific procedure for granting certificates, which does not impose a bar on filing successive applications. The provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC are inapplicable in matters governed by the Act. The court further emphasized that a certificate issued under the Act is limited in scope and does not preclude subsequent claims or proceedings. ----Cited Cases: Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Nadeem Kachloo 2006 SCMR 434 (b) Balochistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1989: ---- Rule 4.10(2) (as amended in 1999)—Entitlement of eldest unmarried daughter to family pension The petitioner claimed entitlement to a share in her late father’s family pension under the amended Rule 4.10(2) of the Balochistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1989, which provides that the eldest surviving unmarried daughter of a deceased government officer is entitled to receive the family pension until her marriage. The High Court dismissed her claim based on unamended Rules, failing to consider the 1999 amendment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision, relying on outdated rules, constituted an illegality. The case was remanded to the Trial Court to determine the petitioner’s status and entitlement in light of the amended Rules, ensuring the rights of other legal heirs were considered. (c) Succession Act, 1925—Procedural principles: ---- Section 373—Summary proceedings—Determination of prima facie entitlement The Supreme Court highlighted the simplified procedure under Section 373 of the Succession Act, 1925, for granting certificates. Courts must conduct summary proceedings to determine the prima facie entitlement of an applicant while maintaining principles of natural justice. A succession certificate is limited in scope and does not constitute a final adjudication of the parties' rights, allowing subsequent claims. The Trial Court was directed to expedite the matter and decide within 60 days. ----Disposition: The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the judgments of the High Court, Appellate Court, and Trial Court. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court to determine the petitioner’s entitlement and share in the family pension through summary proceedings.

Summary: (a) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925) ----Ss. 372, 376 & 383—Revocation of succession certificate—Scope and grounds—Certificate granted to widow of deceased police official (declared “Shaheed”) challenged by his mother and minor daughters—Earlier revocation dismissed but remanded by High Court for reconsideration of parties’ Sharai shares—Held, subsequent “Sharai Fatwa” relied upon by trial court failed to distinguish between property owned by deceased during his lifetime and posthumous governmental compensation—Compensation granted after martyrdom is not part of *Tarka* (estate) and thus not heritable property—Mother of deceased not entitled to any share therein—Trial and appellate courts misconstrued the legal position; orders of revocation unsustainable. (b) Islamic Law ----Inheritance—Tarka—Definition—Assets accruing after death of a person (such as ex-gratia or compensation payments by the Government) do not constitute *Tarka*; only property existing during the deceased’s lifetime passes to heirs—Sharai Fatwa dated 1-6-2023 reaffirmed that compensation after martyrdom falls outside inheritance—Earlier Fatwa set aside as it was issued without full factual context. (c) Minor’s property—Protection of rights ----Where minors’ shares already secured through a property purchased by their maternal uncle (though unregistered), Court recorded his undertaking to safeguard minors’ legal and legitimate rights—Direction issued accordingly. (d) Succession proceedings—Remand—Scope ----When earlier remand order required framing of issues and ascertainment of Sharai shares, compliance must remain confined to those directions; trial court could not extend its determination beyond scope of inheritance law and include non-heritable compensatory grants. Disposition --- Civil revision allowed. Orders dated 24-07-2019 (revocation allowed) and 07-08-2021 (appeal dismissed) set aside. Succession Certificate No. 56/2015 dated 19-11-2015 issued to the petitioner (widow of Shaheed) restored. Mother not entitled to share in post-death compensation. Maternal uncle of minors held responsible for protection of their shares. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Inheritance Law –– Death of legal heir during lifetime of propositus –– Right of substitution –– Entitlement of grandchildren to ancestral property –– Application of amendment to Transfer of Property Act, 1882- Plaintiffs, being legal heirs of deceased son (Saleh Muhammad), claimed inheritance from property of Raza Muhammad who had allegedly distributed land among his four sons during his lifetime––Held, since Saleh Muhammad died during the lifetime of his father, the plaintiffs could not inherit directly from their grandfather under prevailing law––Amendment to Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (inserted via Act of 2021) allowing children of deceased son to inherit was not retrospective in nature––Therefore, plaintiffs could not benefit from said statutory amendment––Inheritance devolved only upon surviving sons of propositus at the time of his death. → Principle: No substitution right unless specifically recognized under applicable law or made retrospective by statute. (b) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 –– S. 147 –– Private partition –– Legal sanctity –– Requirement of official mutation- Although it was pleaded that Raza Muhammad had orally partitioned his land during his lifetime, the same was never confirmed through legal mutation under Section 147 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967––Held, oral/private partition without attestation through revenue authorities lacks legal sanctity––Possession-based claims arising from such unconfirmed partition carry no enforceable title in declaratory suit. → Private arrangements without formal revenue recognition are legally ineffective. (c) Civil Procedure –– Declaration suit –– Improvements in property –– Effect on ownership –– Admission by one defendant- Plaintiffs claimed to have made improvements in disputed land and relied on admission by one defendant (Ghulam Sarwar)––Held, improvements alone do not confer ownership––Likewise, admission by one defendant does not bind others or grant title unless followed by transfer through recognized legal mode––Plaintiffs may pursue transfer from the admitting defendant separately, but declaration of ownership cannot be granted on that basis alone. (d) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 –– S. 100 –– Second appeal –– Concurrent findings of fact –– Interference by High Court –– Scope- Findings of fact recorded by trial and appellate courts concurrently held that plaintiffs had no claim to inherited land––No misreading, non-reading of evidence, or legal error shown––Held, High Court in second appeal will not disturb concurrent findings unless there is clear miscarriage of justice, legal misapplication, or disregard of material evidence––None established in present case. → Reliance placed on 2022 SCR 416 –– Interference in second appeal permissible only under exceptional circumstances. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; concurrent findings upheld; no legal error, statutory violation, or factual misappreciation found.