Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 ----S. 7(3)----Effectiveness of Talaq---Death of husband during iddat period—Succession rights of divorced wife—Scope Talaq not effective unless ninety days have passed from notice given to Chairman under S. 7(3) of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961—Petitioners contended that deceased had divorced respondent by a written talaq deed prior to his death and that she was no longer entitled to inherit—Held, statutory period of ninety days had not expired and talaq had not attained legal effect at the time of death—As death occurred during respondent’s iddat period, marriage was subsisting, and succession had opened—Respondent continued to be legal heir entitled to inherit from deceased husband’s estate—Peshawar High Court’s decision, allowing respondent's share in inheritance, upheld—Petition dismissed. Cited Case: • Mst. Rehmat Bibi v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi 1988 SCMR 1812 (b) Islamic Law ----Talaq-e-Biddat---Nature and effect---Recognition by various schools of Islamic jurisprudence---Interpretation Triple talaq (Talaq-e-Biddat), though historically practiced, not sanctioned by Quran or Hadith—Term “Biddat” itself denotes innovation—Recognized by Hanbali school in limited form, but rejected by Fiqh Jafaria, Shafi, and Maliki schools—Divorce in Islam must follow a structured process that allows reflection, reconciliation, and fairness—Talaq-e-Biddat held inconsistent with Islamic injunctions that prescribe waiting period and opportunity for reconciliation—Recognizing instantaneous triple talaq as final deprives woman of protection embedded in Quranic guidance—Therefore, unless mandatory waiting period is observed, divorce does not become effective in Shariah or law. Cited References: • Surah Al-Baqrah (2:226–232) • Surah Al-Talaq (65:1) • Surah Al-Ahzab (33:49) • Surah Al-Nisa (4:35) • Muslim Law of Divorce by K.N. Ahmed (1984) (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 185(3)---Scope of interference by Supreme Court in revisional matters---Inheritance and succession---Concurrent findings set aside by High Court—Justifiability Where concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are found to be contrary to settled law and Islamic injunctions, High Court is justified in setting them aside—Succession opens at the time of death, and legal status of heirs must be determined with reference to that moment—Peshawar High Court rightly concluded that respondent’s marital bond with deceased remained valid at the time of death, entitling her to inherit—Supreme Court declined leave to appeal—No legal infirmity found in impugned judgment. (d) Succession Act, 1925 ----S. 372---Succession certificate---Eligibility of widow during iddat---Effect of pending talaq Where divorce proceedings initiated but not legally completed due to failure of prescribed notice period, widow retains status as lawful heir—Talaq deed alone not sufficient to deprive wife of inheritance unless accompanied by compliance with both Islamic requirements and statutory obligations under Family Laws Ordinance—Respondent, divorced only in writing shortly before husband’s death, continued to be wife under law—Succession certificate cannot exclude such a widow solely on basis of unperfected talaq.

Summary: (a) Succession Act, 1925: ---- Sections 372 & 373—Issuance of multiple succession certificates—Bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC not applicable ----- The petitioner, the eldest unmarried daughter of a deceased government officer, filed a second application for a succession certificate claiming her share in the family monthly pension. The respondents contested the application, arguing it was barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC as the petitioner had previously obtained a certificate for an amount left in the deceased's bank account. The Supreme Court held that the Succession Act, 1925, being a special law, provides a specific procedure for granting certificates, which does not impose a bar on filing successive applications. The provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC are inapplicable in matters governed by the Act. The court further emphasized that a certificate issued under the Act is limited in scope and does not preclude subsequent claims or proceedings. ----Cited Cases: Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Nadeem Kachloo 2006 SCMR 434 (b) Balochistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1989: ---- Rule 4.10(2) (as amended in 1999)—Entitlement of eldest unmarried daughter to family pension The petitioner claimed entitlement to a share in her late father’s family pension under the amended Rule 4.10(2) of the Balochistan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1989, which provides that the eldest surviving unmarried daughter of a deceased government officer is entitled to receive the family pension until her marriage. The High Court dismissed her claim based on unamended Rules, failing to consider the 1999 amendment. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s decision, relying on outdated rules, constituted an illegality. The case was remanded to the Trial Court to determine the petitioner’s status and entitlement in light of the amended Rules, ensuring the rights of other legal heirs were considered. (c) Succession Act, 1925—Procedural principles: ---- Section 373—Summary proceedings—Determination of prima facie entitlement The Supreme Court highlighted the simplified procedure under Section 373 of the Succession Act, 1925, for granting certificates. Courts must conduct summary proceedings to determine the prima facie entitlement of an applicant while maintaining principles of natural justice. A succession certificate is limited in scope and does not constitute a final adjudication of the parties' rights, allowing subsequent claims. The Trial Court was directed to expedite the matter and decide within 60 days. ----Disposition: The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the judgments of the High Court, Appellate Court, and Trial Court. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court to determine the petitioner’s entitlement and share in the family pension through summary proceedings.

Summary: Quote: ''The spectre of being made liable to pay actual costs should be such as to make every litigant think twice befor putting forth a vexatious claim or defence3 before the Court. These costs in an appropriate case can be over and above the nominal costs which include costs of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental cost, besides the amount of the court fee, process fee and lawyer's fee paid in relation to the litigation.4 Imposition of costs in frivilous and vexatious cases meets the requirement of fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution, as it not only discourages frivilous claims or defences brought to the court house but also absence of such cases allows more court time for the adjudication of genuine claims. '' ---- [Scope of Section 476, Cr.P.C and importance of imposition of costs to curb frivolous and vexatious litigation] The facts of the case involved a dispute over a succession certificate for an amount of Rs.32,185 left by the deceased father of respondent No. 3. The petitioner's father had filed an application for cancellation of the succession certificate, claiming fraud and perjury by respondents No. 3 to 5. The trial court dismissed the application, and subsequent appeals were also unsuccessful. The High Court, in the impugned order, upheld the dismissal. Upon analyzing the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner's repeated applications and pursuit of litigation over a period of more than a decade amounted to an abuse of the court's process. The petitioner had no legitimate interest in challenging the succession certificate issued in favor of respondent No. 3. The court noted that the petitioner's actions appeared to be driven by private vengeance and a desire to settle a dispute over another property.The court emphasized the discretionary power granted by Section 476 of the CrPC to take cognizance of certain offenses committed in court proceedings. It stressed the need for judicious exercise of this discretion and warned against its abuse by litigants seeking personal vendettas. The court held that the trial court had rightly dismissed the applications, considering the absence of any legitimate interest and the mala fide nature of the claims. In addition, the court highlighted the detrimental impact of frivolous and vexatious litigation on the judicial system. To deter such practices, the court advocated for the imposition of costs in such cases. It emphasized that costs should go beyond nominal expenses and should include compensation for the successful party's time, transportation, lodging, court fees, process fees, and lawyer's fees. Imposing costs serves the interests of fair trial, discourages frivolous claims, encourages alternative dispute resolution, and reduces the burden on the courts. Based on its analysis, the Supreme Court dismissed the present petition as frivolous and vexatious, and imposed costs of Rs. 100,000 on the petitioner. The petitioner was directed to deposit the costs within three months, and failure to comply would result in recovery as a money decree with additional monthly increase and execution costs.

Summary: Background:Allah Ditta filed a civil revision against the judgments and decrees dated 06.02.2010 and 19.06.2010 by the Civil Judge and Additional District Judge, Burewala, respectively, which dismissed his suit for declaration concerning his inheritance rights. Allah Ditta claimed his share as the legal heir of Mst. Fazal Noor, out of her share from the estate of her brother Sakhi Muhammad, specifically challenging mutations No. 820 and 821 dated 15.09.1990.-----Issues:Whether the mutations No. 820 and 821 dated 15.09.1990 were against law and facts, void, and liable to be canceled, affirming Allah Ditta as the legal heir of Sakhi Muhammad.The applicability of the statute of limitations to inheritance claims.-----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court allowed the revision petition and set aside the lower courts' judgments and decrees, decreeing Allah Ditta's suit in his favor. The court observed that:Allah Ditta, as the real son and sole legal heir of Mst. Fazal Noor (deceased), who was the real sister of the deceased Sakhi Muhammad, is entitled to his share in Sakhi Muhammad's inheritance.The evidence, including the succession certificate and Jamabandi records, supported Allah Ditta's claim as the legal heir.The principle that no limitation runs in inheritance matters was emphasized, stating that a claim to inheritance can be made at any time, and wrongful entries in the revenue record do not extinguish a party's right to inheritance.The court criticized the lower courts for deciding the case on technical grounds without considering the substantive rights of the parties involved in inheritance matters.-----Citations/Precedents:Mst. Janat Bibi through L.Rs. v. Aslam Khan and 13 others (2017 CLC 436): Highlighted the principle that no limitation runs in matters of inheritance.Nusrat Abbas v. Nighat Parveen and others (2018 CLC 1115) and Muhammad Amin through Legal Heirs and 2 others v. Mst. Ashraf Bibi through Legal Heirs and another (2018 YLR 2524): Reinforced the notion that rights to inheritance are not extinguished by adverse entries in the revenue record and that the statute of limitations does not apply to inheritance claims.

Summary: Background: The appellants and respondent both sought succession certificates under Section 372 of the Succession Act, 1925, to claim the pension and pensionary benefits of Abdul Khaliq, a deceased public servant. The respondent, being the widow of the deceased, filed for the certificate, while the appellants, who are distant relatives of the deceased, also filed a separate claim. The trial court dismissed the appellants' application and issued the succession certificate to the respondent (widow), granting her the right to receive the pension and other service-related benefits of the deceased. -----Issues: 1- Whether the pension and pensionary benefits of the deceased form part of his "tarka" (estate) and can be claimed by distant relatives under Islamic inheritance law. -----2- Whether the widow of the deceased has exclusive rights to the pension and related benefits. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that pension and pensionary benefits do not constitute "tarka" or heritable property under Islamic law. Citing precedents, the court reasoned that these benefits are governed by specific statutes or rules and are not considered part of the deceased’s estate. Therefore, these benefits are to be granted to the next-of-kin as prescribed by the relevant laws and rules, which in this case was the widow. The court relied on the precedent that pension benefits are not subject to inheritance laws, but rather they cease upon the pensioner's death. After death, these benefits are treated as a grant to the family of the deceased according to the governing statutes. As such, the appellants, being distant relatives, had no right to claim a share in these benefits. The court dismissed the appellants' claims and upheld the trial court's decision to grant the succession certificate to the widow of the deceased, as she was the legitimate next-of-kin according to the governing laws. -----Citations/Precedents: Mrs. Hina Mumtaz Soomro and others v. Abdul Sami Soomro and others (PLD 2018 Sindh 671) – Pension does not form part of the heritable estate of a deceased individual. Wafaqi Hakoomat-e-Pakistan v. Awamunnas (PLD 1991 SC 731) – Pension ceases upon the death of the pensioner and is governed by statutory provisions for the benefit of the next-of-kin. Dr. Safdar Hussain and another v. Flt. Lt. Nadia Latif and others (2014 YLR 1553) – Pension and benefits that accrue after death are treated as grants and are not part of the deceased's estate.

Summary: PLJ 2021 Quetta 24 (DB) Present Mrs Syeda Tahira Safdar CJ and Muhammad Ejaz Swati J HAWA BEGUM - - Petitioner versus NAIK BAKHT and 13 others - - Respondents CP No 1 of 2014 and RFA No 22 of 2017 decided on 172019 Constitution of Pakistan 1973 - - - - - - Art 199 - - Death during service in bumb blast - - Announcement of compensation of package - Issuance of succession certificate - - Application for - - Grant of revised succession certificate for separating shares of parents of deceased - - Settlement during pendency of application - - Application was allowed - - Challenge through application - - Dismissed - - Appeal - - Dismissed - - Suit for declaration for recovery - - Decreed - - Issuance of revised succession certificate - - Challenge to - - It is settled principle of law of inheritance that co - sharership is result of devolution of inheritance co - sharer becomes co - sharer moment inheritance open even mutation of entries or share in movable property also not necessary - - Deceased was issueless therefore parent ie Respondents Nos 1 and 2 who were living with deceased and were dependent therefore as held in PLD 2013 Peshawar 1 included in family - - In instant case in this respect order was passed by trial Court pursuant to succession certificates with consent of both parties and thereafter separate certificate were issued respectively - - Petitioner has only assailed one order but another order has not been assailed which had taken finality hence impugned order arising out of CP No 01 of 2014 warrants no interference - - Findings of trial Court with regard to salary of deceased received by petitioner to extent of her share during subsistence of second marriage is intact - - Petition was dismissed [Pp 30 31] A B C PLD 2013 Pesh 1 Nemo for Petitioner (in CP No 1 of 2014) Mr Farooq Anwar Advocate for Respondents Nos 1 to 11 (in CP No 1 of 2014) Mr Zahoor Ahmed Baloch Assistant AG for Official Respondents (in CP No 1 of 2014) Mr Khushal Khan Kasi Advocate for Appellant (in RFA No 22 of 2017) Mr Farooq Anwar Advocate for Respondents Nos 1 and 2 (in RFA No 22 of 2017) Mr Zahoor Ahmed Baloch Assistant AG for Official Respondents (in RFA No 22 of 2017)Judgement Result:Petition dismissed

Summary: The appellant, challenged an order related to the application for Success Certificate and Letters of Administration filed by the legal heirs of deceased Shaheen Liaquat. The deceased's properties included an immovable property in Karachi and Bahbood Saving Certificates. The appellant contested the valuation of the immovable property, which was determined by the IX-Additional District Judge at Rs. 1,50,00,000, arguing that it was based on presumption.The appellant's counsel claimed that the court did not consider the request for property evaluation through an estate agent and provided a new valuation of Rs. 10 Million by Habib Associates. The High Court, noting the lack of evidence for the higher valuation, set aside the impugned order and remanded the case to the IX-Additional District Judge Karachi South for a proper determination of the property's value. The court emphasized the need for an appropriate procedure to ascertain the actual value and allowed the appeal accordingly.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a suit claiming a share in the compensation amount of Rs. 2,000,000, which was granted by the Government of Balochistan to the legal heirs of Din Muhammad, who was martyred in a traffic accident while serving in the Balochistan Traffic Police. The petitioner, being the deceased's brother, claimed entitlement to a portion of the compensation. The respondents (the widow and other family members) had already obtained a succession certificate without including the petitioner. The trial court initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting him a share. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, leading to the present revision petition. -----Issues: 1- Whether the compensation amount granted by the government qualifies as "tarka" (inheritance) and should be distributed among all legal heirs, including the petitioner. -----2- Whether the widow and other respondents were correct in claiming the compensation amount without including the petitioner. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the compensation amount granted by the government does not qualify as tarka (inheritance). Referring to established precedents, the court explained that tarka consists of assets and property that the deceased owned or had a legal right to claim during his lifetime. Since the compensation was awarded posthumously by the government as a grant and not something the deceased owned or controlled, it does not form part of his estate. Thus, the petitioner could not claim a share in the compensation as a matter of inheritance under Islamic law. The court relied on multiple precedents, including the rulings of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court and the Lahore High Court, to establish that posthumous benefits like compensation or grants are not subject to inheritance laws. These benefits are paid to nominees or next-of-kin as per the relevant statutes and cannot be considered part of the deceased’s estate (tarka). The court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the appellate court’s decision that the compensation amount does not constitute tarka and thus cannot be claimed by the petitioner as a legitimate right. -----Citations/Precedents: Wafaqi Hakoomat-e-Pakistan v. Awamunnas (PLD 1991 SC 731) – Compensation and grants provided posthumously do not form part of tarka. Wafaqi Hakoomat-e-Pakistan v. Awamunnas (PLD 1991 SC 750) – Compensation is a form of sympathy or grant, not subject to inheritance laws. Dr. Safdar Hussain and another v. Flt. Lt. Nadia Latif and others (2014 YLR 1553) – Clarified the distinction between assets constituting tarka and posthumous grants or compensations, which are not part of the estate.

Summary: The case involved Writ Petition filed by Mst. Shahnaz Begum and others against the Additional District Judge, challenging the dismissal of their appeal under section 388(2) of the Succession Act, 1925. The dispute arose over the distribution of service benefits of Rana Muhammad Akram, a deceased ASI in the Punjab Police. Mst. Shahnaz Begum and her minor children filed for a Succession Certificate, while Respondents No. 4 & 5 claimed a share as the deceased's second widow and son, respectively. The petitioner argued that the lower courts exceeded their jurisdiction by deciding intricate factual matters summarily. They contested the finding that Respondents No. 4 & 5 were legal heirs, claiming it was based on conjectures. However, the respondents argued in favor of the impugned order. The court delved into the provisions of the Succession Act, emphasizing that the purpose of a Succession Certificate is to facilitate debt collection and protect debtors dealing with the deceased's representatives. It highlighted that such certificates are granted only for debts and securities, not for other property, and do not establish the grantee's title as an heir. The court analyzed several legal precedents to underscore the fundamental principles governing the issuance of Succession Certificates under the Succession Act, 1925. These precedents helped establish the parameters within which the court adjudicated the matter. Notable cases mentioned includes, Mst. Jameela Akhtar v. Public-at-large (2002 SCMR 1544): This case highlighted the necessity of obtaining a civil court declaration regarding the status of a claimant, particularly in disputes concerning marriage or relationship status. Aziz Ahmad v. Hakimzadi and 7 others (2013 CLC 406): The court emphasized the requirement for claimants to seek declarations from the civil court regarding their legal status when disputes arise during Succession Certificate proceedings. Liaqat Zaman Khan and others v. Mst. Tazeem Akhtar and others (2017 YLR 150): This case illustrated situations where the court upheld the issuance of a Succession Certificate pending a civil suit for declaration, emphasizing the need for due process and legal clarity. Sofia Ashfaq v. Haseeb Ashfaq Bhatti and others (PLD 2019 Islamabad 238): The judgment discussed the circumstances under which a Succession Certificate could be granted, subject to the outcome of a civil suit, especially when disputes exist regarding the validity of marriage or inheritance rights. These precedents served as guiding principles for the court in determining the validity of the claims presented before it and in ensuring the proper application of the law in the case at hand. Ultimately, the court directed the issuance of a Succession Certificate to Respondents No. 4 & 5, subject to them furnishing a bond and filing a civil suit to establish their status. It allowed the petitioner to seek revocation if the respondents failed to establish their claim in the civil suit.

Summary: Background:The appellant, Mst. Khalasa Begum, widow of late Javeed Akhtar Baig, challenged the impugned order dated 06-11-2018 passed by the District Judge/Guardian Judge Gilgit. The appellant sought the dismissal of the respondent's execution petition concerning a succession certificate granted to her.---Issues:Whether the succession certificate issued to the appellant can be considered a decree and thus be subject to execution under Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).Whether the execution petition filed by the respondent is maintainable.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The appellant's husband, Javeed Akhtar Baig, had passed away, prompting the appellant to apply for a succession certificate. The respondent, Samar Abbas, filed objections to this application. The dispute was settled amicably, and the succession certificate was granted to the appellant on 16-04-2013.The respondent subsequently filed an execution petition to enforce the succession certificate. The appellant objected, arguing that the succession certificate is not a decree and cannot be executed as such.The court examined the definition of a decree under Section 2(2) CPC, which is a formal expression of an adjudication conclusively determining the rights of the parties. The court concluded that a succession certificate does not fall within this definition as it merely declares the legal heir's entitlement to recover the amount mentioned.The court found that the succession certificate is not a decree or order as defined under Section 2(2) and Section 2(14) of CPC and is therefore not capable of execution under Order 21 of CPC. The respondent could only recover the amount by filing a civil suit.Additionally, the respondent's name did not appear on the succession certificate. The court suggested that the respondent could file a fresh application under Section 378 of the Succession Act 1925 to amend the certificate.----Citations/Precedents:AIR 1986 Karnataka 1671991 CLC Peshawar Note-199