Summary: (a) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974----R.11-A---Deceased son/spouse quota---Accrued right to appointment---Effect of subsequent declaration of invalidity of rule---Respondents, being spouse/children of deceased Sindh civil servants, sought appointment under Rule 11-A---Province contended that in view of General Post Office, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Jalal (PLD 2024 SC 1276), Rule 11-A having been struck down, no appointment could thereafter be made, particularly when no formal appointment letters had yet been issued---Held, relevant event for accrual of right was death of civil servant, and as soon as death occurred, one of children and/or spouse acquired right to be appointed in service under the deceased quota---Submission of application and issuance of appointment letter were merely administrative acts and did not determine creation of right---Since right had already accrued in favour of respondents before abolition of the rule, subsequent judgment striking down Rule 11-A did not defeat such accrued entitlement. (b) Judgment of Supreme Court---Prospective operation---Accrued and closed rights---Held, judgments of the Supreme Court ordinarily operate prospectively and not retrospectively---Subsequent invalidation of Rule 11-A could not divest beneficiaries of rights already accrued prior to such pronouncement---Supreme Court had also clarified in a later decision that judgment reported as PLD 2024 SC 1276 did not wipe out accrued rights or disturb past and closed transactions---Therefore, respondents’ claims remained protected notwithstanding later declaration of invalidity of the enabling rule. Reliance was placed on Pir Bakhsh represented by his legal heirs v. Chairman Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145 and Zahida Parveen v. The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa and others (CPLA No.566-P/2024). (c) Constitution of Pakistan---Constitutional petition---Interference in appeal by Federal Constitutional Court---Held, Sindh High Court had rightly accepted writ petitions of respondents and directed Province to appoint them on deceased son/spouse quota, as no legal infirmity existed in its reasoning---Province’s objection that no right had culminated because appointment letters had not been issued was misconceived, since the substantive right had crystallized on death of employee and not on completion of administrative formalities---No case for interference was, therefore, made out. Petitions were dismissed, leave was refused, and appointments under deceased son/spouse quota were held protected on account of accrued rights arising prior to striking down of Rule 11-A.

Summary: (a) Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006--- ----Ss. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21 & 27---Punjab Emergency Service---Legal character after Punjab Emergency Service (Amendment) Act, 2021---Body corporate changed into independent administrative department of Government---Effect---Emergency Service was originally established as a body corporate with perpetual succession and power to sue and be sued, and was listed as an autonomous body under the Rules of Business---By virtue of 2021 Amendment, S.4(2) of the Act of 2006 was amended and Emergency Service was declared an independent administrative department of Government---Corresponding amendments in Rules of Business omitted Emergency Service from First and Second Schedules, with result that it was no longer shown as autonomous body under any secretariat---Held, that 2021 Amendment took away corporate entity status of Emergency Service and made it an independent statutory department of Government---However, said amendment did not alter its internal statutory framework for administration, management and regulation of its employees. (b) Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006--- ----S. 21---Public servants---Employees of Punjab Emergency Service---Status---Effect of statutory declaration---Employees of Emergency Service were declared under S.21 of Act of 2006 to be public servants within meaning of S.21 of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860---Such provision was not changed by 2021 Amendment---Held, that statutory declaration of employees as public servants recognizes public character of functions performed by them and ensures accountability under law, but does not convert them into civil servants---Employees of Emergency Service remained public servants and not civil servants. (c) Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974--- ----S. 2(b)---Civil servant and public servant---Distinction---Civil servant means person who is member of civil service of Province or holds civil post in connection with affairs of Province, subject to statutory exclusions---Public servant is a broader concept under S.21, P.P.C., covering persons performing public duties, exercising public authority or entrusted with functions connected with public administration---Held, that primary distinction is that civil servant’s terms and conditions of service are governed by relevant civil service law and rules framed thereunder, whereas public servant may perform public duties under statutory authority without being part of civil service framework---All civil servants may be public servants, but all public servants are not civil servants. Cited Case: • Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority v. Government of Sindh 2022 SCMR 595 (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 240 & 260---Service of Pakistan---Civil servant---Statutory bodies and instrumentalities of Government---Scope---Service of Pakistan includes any service, post or office in connection with affairs of Federation or Province and any other service declared by law to be service of Pakistan---Held, that expression “service of Pakistan” and expression “civil servant” are not synonymous---Civil servant is one whose appointment and terms and conditions are regulated under civil service legal framework, while public servant may serve through an instrumentality of Government created by statute to perform specialized public functions with operational autonomy---Mere performance of functions connected with affairs of Government does not by itself make employees civil servants. Cited Cases: • Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills & Distillery Ltd. PLD 1975 SC 244 • Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 (e) Punjab Emergency Service Act, 2006--- ----Punjab Emergency Service Leave, Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 2007---Punjab Emergency Service (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2022---Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974---Employees of Emergency Service---Terms and conditions governed by separate statutory framework---Effect---Emergency Service was established under Act of 2006 and employment of its employees was regulated by 2007 Rules and 2022 Regulations---Employees were not governed by Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 or rules framed thereunder---Held, that where appointment and terms and conditions of employees are governed by separate statutory framework and not by civil service law, such employees cannot be treated as civil servants---Employees of Emergency Service, therefore, did not fall within jurisdiction of Service Tribunal. (f) Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974--- ----Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal---Appeal by civil servant only---Employees of Punjab Emergency Service---Maintainability---Respondent, a rescue driver, challenged disciplinary action before Punjab Service Tribunal---Tribunal assumed jurisdiction on basis that after 2021 Amendment Emergency Service had become independent department of Government and its employees had become civil servants---Held, that Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 confers jurisdiction upon Tribunal in respect of civil servants and appeal is to be filed by a civil servant---Respondent, being employee of Emergency Service governed by separate statutory regime and declared public servant, was not a civil servant---Tribunal had no jurisdiction over matters relating to his terms and conditions of service. (g) Service law--- ----Jurisdiction---Foundational issue---Duty of Tribunal---Interim orders on jurisdiction---Merger into final judgment---Service Tribunal held that earlier interim orders on jurisdiction had attained finality because they were not challenged---Held, that finding was erroneous---Interim orders merged into final judgment where Tribunal again addressed issue of jurisdiction---Jurisdiction being foundational issue was required to be examined with care and circumspection before assuming authority over matter---In absence of jurisdiction, proceedings before Service Tribunal were without lawful basis. (h) Statutory bodies--- ----Employees of autonomous/statutory/corporate bodies---Government funding, statutory creation or administrative supervision---Effect on status of employees---Held, that mere fact that a body is created by statute, funded by Government, or subject to administrative supervision does not render its employees civil servants---Applicable test is whether employee holds a civil post and whether appointment and terms and conditions of service are governed by civil service legal framework---Employees of statutory bodies governed by their own service rules or regulations are not civil servants merely because their employer performs public functions. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 • Executive Council Allama Iqbal Open University v. M. Tufail Hashmi 2010 SCMR 1484 • Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 301 Disposition: Civil petition was converted into appeal and allowed. Order dated 07.06.2023 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal was set aside. It was held that employees of Punjab Emergency Service are not civil servants and Punjab Service Tribunal has no jurisdiction in matters relating to their terms and conditions of service. ---- "Civil servants are those whose appointment and service are regulated under the Civil Servants Act and its framework, or by express statutory declaration, whereas public servants broadly include persons performing public duties or exercising authority under law. Through the 2021 Amendment, the Punjab Emergency Service (Rescue 1122) ceased to be a corporate entity and became an independent administrative department of Government, operating outside the conventional Rules of Business framework, due to the specialized nature of its services. Therefore, employees of the Punjab Emergency Service (Rescue 1122) are governed by their own statutory framework, remain public servants and the Service Tribunal lacks jurisdiction."

Summary: (a) Punjab Emergency Service Act (III of 2006)---- ----Ss. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21 & 27---Punjab Emergency Service---Legal character after Punjab Emergency Service (Amendment) Act, 2021---Independent administrative department of Government---Effect on statutory framework---Emergency Service was originally established as a body corporate with perpetual succession and power to sue and be sued---By virtue of 2021 Amendment, S.4(2) was amended and Emergency Service was described as an independent administrative department of Government---Supreme Court held that 2021 Amendment merely changed legal form of Emergency Service from body corporate to an independent statutory department of Government and did not alter its statutory framework for administration, management or regulation of employees---Emergency Service continued to operate under Act of 2006, 2007 Rules and 2022 Regulations with its own organizational and service structure---Employees remained public servants under S.21 of Act of 2006, which provision was not changed by 2021 Amendment---Change in legal status of institution did not by itself convert its employees into civil servants. (b) Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011---- ----Rules 2(b), 2(c) & 2(j)---Attached Department, Autonomous Body and Department---Punjab Emergency Service---Independent administrative department---Status under Rules of Business---Supreme Court observed that Rules of Business regulate allocation and transaction of business of Government of Punjab and provide for Attached Departments, Autonomous Bodies, Departments and Special Institutions---There was no concept in Rules of Business of an “independent administrative department of Government” placed under any existing secretariat---After 2021 Amendment, Emergency Service was omitted from First Schedule and Second Schedule of Rules of Business and was no longer shown as an autonomous body under Home Department---Consequently, Emergency Service operated as a statutory department of Government functioning independently outside ordinary departmental structure of governance under Rules of Business---Such structure was best described as a legislatively created department of Government, independent in functioning yet to some extent controlled by Government, and as an instrumentality of Government created by statute to perform specialized public functions. (c) Punjab Emergency Service Act (III of 2006)---- ----Emergency Service---Specialized public function---Operational autonomy and government accountability---Emergency Service performed rescue services across Punjab including ambulance, fire, motorbike, water, flood, height and animal rescue services through emergency helpline 1122, besides disaster preparedness, community safety, building safety, awareness and training programs---Supreme Court held that unique independent statutory department framework emerged from specialized functions of Emergency Service involving public safety, protection of life and property during emergencies and disasters---Such framework allowed operational autonomy and institutional continuity while permitting Government to retain some element of control and accountability over emergency and disaster response, which forms part of Government’s obligation to safeguard life and public safety---Larger constitutional issue whether legislature could create a department of Government, being within domain of executive under Rules of Business, was not before Court and was therefore not decided. (d) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)---- ----S. 2(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 240 & 260---Civil servant and public servant---Distinction---Supreme Court held that a civil servant is a person who is member of civil service of Province or holds a civil post in connection with affairs of Province and whose appointment and terms and conditions are governed by civil service legal framework---Public servant, on the other hand, is a broader concept, including persons performing public duties or exercising public authority under law, particularly within meaning of S.21, P.P.C. for purposes of criminal liability and public accountability---All civil servants may be members of service of Pakistan, but all persons performing functions in connection with affairs of Federation or Province are not necessarily civil servants---Statutory declaration that employees are public servants recognizes public character of their functions and ensures accountability under law, but does not confer civil servant status upon them. Cited Cases: • Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority v. Government of Sindh 2022 SCMR 595 • Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills & Distillery Ltd. PLD 1975 SC 244 • Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 • Executive Council Allama Iqbal Open University v. M. Tufail Hashmi 2010 SCMR 1484 • Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 301 (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Arts. 240 & 260---Service of Pakistan---Civil servant---Employees of statutory bodies and instrumentalities of Government---Test for determining civil servant status---Supreme Court held that terms “service of Pakistan” and “civil servant” are not synonymous---Status of civil servant depends on whether employee holds a civil post and whether appointment and terms and conditions of service are regulated under relevant civil servants law and rules framed thereunder---Mere fact that a body is created by statute, funded by Government, performs public functions, or is subject to some administrative supervision does not make its employees civil servants---Employees of statutory corporations, autonomous bodies, universities, banks or public institutions are not civil servants unless their service is governed by civil service legal framework---Applicable test remains whether employee’s appointment and service conditions are governed by Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 and rules made thereunder, or by a separate statutory/service framework. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602 • Executive Council Allama Iqbal Open University v. M. Tufail Hashmi 2010 SCMR 1484 • Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 301 (f) Punjab Emergency Service Act (III of 2006)---- ----S. 21---Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 21---Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974), S. 2(b)---Employees of Punjab Emergency Service---Public servants, not civil servants---Punjab Emergency Service employees were governed by Punjab Emergency Service Leave, Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 2007 and Punjab Emergency Service (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Regulations, 2022---Their appointment, discipline, performance, leave, retirement and other service matters were regulated by separate statutory framework under Act of 2006 and not by Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 or rules framed thereunder---Act of 2006 expressly declared members of Emergency Service to be public servants within meaning of S.21, P.P.C., and such declaration remained unchanged after 2021 Amendment---Supreme Court held that employees of Emergency Service could not be treated as civil servants and therefore did not fall within jurisdiction of Punjab Service Tribunal. (g) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)---- ----Jurisdiction of Punjab Service Tribunal---Jurisdiction confined to civil servants---Employees of Punjab Emergency Service---Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction---Respondent, a rescue driver, challenged disciplinary proceedings before Punjab Service Tribunal, which partially allowed appeal and directed regular inquiry---Supreme Court held that Tribunal failed to correctly examine jurisdiction in light of statutory framework governing Emergency Service and settled principles laid down by Supreme Court---Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 confers jurisdiction in respect of civil servants and appeal before Tribunal lies by a civil servant---Employee of Emergency Service, being governed by separate statutory framework and declared public servant under Act of 2006, was not civil servant merely because Emergency Service was made an independent administrative department by 2021 Amendment---Proceedings before Tribunal were without lawful basis. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VII, R. 11---Interim orders on jurisdiction---Merger into final judgment---Service Tribunal earlier passed interim orders on application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. and question of jurisdiction was allegedly decided in favour of respondent---Tribunal later held that such interim orders had attained finality as they were not challenged---Supreme Court held that finding was erroneous because interim orders merged into final judgment wherein Tribunal once again addressed question of jurisdiction by holding that, due to 2021 Amendment, Emergency Service had status of independent department and Tribunal had jurisdiction---Jurisdiction being foundational issue had to be examined with care and circumspection before assuming authority over matter. Disposition: Civil Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; Supreme Court held that employees of Punjab Emergency Service are not civil servants and Punjab Service Tribunal has no jurisdiction in matters relating to their terms and conditions of service; impugned order dated 07.06.2023 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore was set aside.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---- ----R.3(i), Category (ii) & Appendix---Candidate belonging to backward area---Automatic age relaxation---Held, that where a candidate belonged to District Buner, which was included in the category of “backward areas” under the Appendix to R.3(ii) of the Rules, 2008, she was entitled to automatic relaxation of three years in upper age limit under Category (ii) of R.3(i). (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---- ----R.3(i), Category (iii)---General candidate---Further relaxation by appointing authority---Held, that in addition to automatic relaxation available to candidates from backward areas, a candidate could also claim relaxation available to general candidates under Category (iii) of R.3(i), whereby the appointing authority could grant relaxation up to two years in upper age limit. (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---- ----R.4, proviso---Backward area candidate---Additional relaxation besides automatic relaxation---Held, that under the proviso to R.4 of the Rules, 2008, candidates from backward areas, in addition to automatic relaxation of three years under Category (ii) of R.3, are entitled to one of the relaxations available to government servants, general candidates or disabled candidates, whichever is relevant and applicable to them---Respondent’s case was, therefore, covered both as a backward area candidate and as a general candidate for further age relaxation. (d) Service Law---- ----Appointment---Candidate securing first position---Appointment withheld on ground of overage---Entitlement to age relaxation---Held, that where respondent had appeared in the recruitment test, secured first position amongst successful candidates, and availability of one seat was not disputed, denial of appointment solely on the ground of overage was not sustainable when the applicable rules entitled her to relaxation in upper age limit. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Service appointment---Direction to consider age relaxation---Held, that High Court rightly exercised constitutional jurisdiction by directing the competent authority to consider the respondent’s request for age relaxation where the relevant statutory rules clearly covered her case---No illegality, irregularity or infirmity was found in the impugned judgment warranting interference by the appellate Court. (f) Service Law---- ----Age relaxation---Backward area candidate from District Buner---Effect of Rules, 2008---Held, that respondent, being from District Buner, was entitled to three years automatic relaxation as a backward area candidate and further relaxation up to two years by the appointing authority as a general candidate---Her entitlement flowed directly from the Rules, 2008, and could not be defeated merely by raising a general objection of overage. Disposition: Petition was dismissed and leave was refused; judgment of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench, directing consideration of respondent’s request for age relaxation, was maintained.

Summary: (a) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---- ----Jurisdiction of Federal Service Tribunal---Recruitment policy---Promotion quota---Modification of statutory rules/SRO---Federal Service Tribunal directed Auditor General of Pakistan to enhance promotion quota from Naib Qasid to Junior Auditor from 10% to 35% by modifying SRO No.953(1)/2011 dated 12.07.2011---Supreme Court held that jurisdiction of Service Tribunal is confined to examining grievances arising out of terms and conditions of service---Such jurisdiction does not extend to restructuring cadres, altering recruitment or promotion policy, determining promotional ratios, or directing amendment/modification of recruitment rules---Formulation of recruitment policy, including mode of appointment and quota distribution, lies within exclusive domain of competent authority---By directing enhancement of promotion quota and modification of SRO, Tribunal assumed role of policy maker and substituted its own view for that of competent authority, which was impermissible. Cited Case: • Federal Public Service Commission v. Shiraz Manzoor 2023 SCMR 2087 (b) Civil service---- ----Promotion---No vested right to promotion---Right only to be considered according to rules---Promotion in public service is neither a vested right nor an entitlement---Employee may claim consideration for promotion strictly in accordance with governing rules, subject to availability of sanctioned posts and fulfilment of prescribed criteria, but cannot compel employer department to alter recruitment policy or modify promotional ratios---Matters relating to cadre structure, quota distribution and method of appointment are administrative in nature and fall outside adjudicatory jurisdiction of Service Tribunal unless mala fides, violation of law, or infringement of vested rights is shown---Tribunal overlooked settled principle that competent authority alone is empowered to prescribe criteria and conditions relating to eligibility and promotion. (c) Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973---- ----R. 3(3)---Competent authority---Power to consider modification of recruitment rules/SRO---Supreme Court held that modification of promotional quota from Naib Qasid to Junior Auditor, if required, remains within discretion of competent authority under R.3(3) of Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973---Court left it to competent authority to consider whether SRO impugned before Federal Service Tribunal required modification in percentage/ratio of promotional quota---Such discretion could not be exercised by Tribunal in place of department. (d) Service law---- ----Employee accepting appointment under existing service structure---No accrued right to seek amendment of rules---Respondent was appointed as Naib Qasid in April 2014, long after promulgation of SRO No.953(1)/2011 dated 12.07.2011, and accepted appointment subject to existing service structure---Supreme Court held that no vested right had accrued in his favour to seek amendment of rules or alteration of promotion quota---Courts and Tribunals cannot direct amendment of recruitment rules or restructure promotional avenues merely to accommodate individual expectations---Tribunal exceeded jurisdiction by issuing directions which effectively rewrote governing policy framework. (e) Service law---- ----Promotion dependent upon sanctioned and available posts---Exhaustion of quota---Respondent’s case for promotion to post of Junior Auditor was rejected on ground that existing 10% quota for promotion from Naib Qasid to Junior Auditor had already been exhausted---Supreme Court held that promotion depends upon sanctioned and available posts and must be considered strictly under governing recruitment rules---Perceived inadequacy of promotional avenues could not justify judicial direction to enhance quota or modify SRO. Disposition: Civil Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgment dated 14.05.2025 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad was set aside; service appeal filed by respondent No.1 was dismissed; however, competent authority under R.3(3) of Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 was left at liberty to consider whether SRO No.953(1)/2011 required any modification in percentage/ratio of promotional quota from Naib Qasid to Junior Auditor.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.18---Public employment---Right to compete for public appointment---Transparent and fair recruitment---Held, that the process of public appointments is anchored in constitutional guarantees, particularly Art.18, which includes the right of citizens to compete for appointment to posts in Federal or Provincial Government departments, attached departments, autonomous bodies and corporations through open competition---Such right can only be meaningfully exercised where recruitment is transparent, fair, just and free from bias or doubt regarding integrity of the process. (b) Service Law---- ----Public appointments---Class-IV recruitment---Competing recommendations by two Departmental Selection Committees---Irregular recruitment process---Effect---Held, that where two sets of candidates claimed rights over the same public posts, one on the basis of recommendations of the first Committee and the other on the basis of appointment orders issued on recommendations of the second Committee, and serious procedural irregularities surrounded both processes, relief could not be granted exclusively to one group at the expense of the other---Court was required to adopt a balanced approach preserving fairness, transparency and equal treatment. (c) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989---- ----Rr.10 & 11---Class-IV appointments---Public notice/advertisement---Requirement---Held, that public appointments are required to be made in accordance with the prescribed recruitment procedure, including public notice/advertisement where applicable---However, in the peculiar circumstances, since candidates had already been invited through the District Employment Exchange pursuant to earlier publication and the same list was available on record, fresh advertisement was not directed; instead, recruitment was ordered to be re-initiated from the already available list. (d) Service Law---- ----Recruitment process initiated by competent authority---Procedural lapses by department---Candidates not guilty of fraud or misrepresentation---Effect---Held, that where appointments are made through a process initiated by the competent authority pursuant to public advertisement, and appointees possess prescribed qualifications, they ordinarily cannot be penalized for procedural lapses or administrative irregularities attributable to the authorities, particularly in absence of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment or active connivance on their part---Ordinarily, action should be taken against the delinquent authority rather than punishing innocent appointees. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Akhtar Shirani v. Punjab Text Book Board and others 2004 SCMR 1077 • Abdul Hafeez Abbasi v. Managing Director, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi and others 2002 SCMR 1034 • Secretary to the Government of N.W.F.P. Zakat/Social Welfare Department, Peshawar v. Sadullah Khan 1996 SCMR 8413 (e) Service Law---- ----Public appointments---Humanitarian consideration---Retention in service despite irregular recruitment---Held, that recruitment to public posts must stand or fall on legality rather than sympathy---Recommendation for retention of appointees merely on humanitarian grounds, without proper examination of applicable rules and recruitment record, is alien to service jurisprudence. (f) Service Law---- ----Departmental Selection Committee---Official record---Minutes retained in personal custody by former Medical Superintendent---Effect---Held, that unexplained retention of minutes of a Selection Committee meeting in personal custody for more than six months, instead of placing the same in official record or forwarding through proper channel before transfer, raised serious questions of transparency, procedural propriety and institutional regularity---Administrative authorities could not reasonably be expected to act upon recommendations which were neither formally communicated nor duly placed on record at the relevant time. (g) Service Law---- ----Recruitment---Inquiry reports---Conflicting findings---Judicial scrutiny---Held, that where two departmental inquiries regarding the same recruitment process produced materially different conclusions, Court was required to carefully examine the record and surrounding facts---First inquiry’s recommendation to retain appointees on humanitarian basis could not override subsequently identified verifiable irregularities, including appointments to posts not properly advertised, overage candidates, appointments to gender-specific posts, and irregular constitution/functioning of the Selection Committee. (h) Service Law---- ----Recruitment process---High Court judgment based on non-reading/misreading of record---Effect---Held, that High Court failed to consider material aspects, including the non-availability of first Committee’s minutes in official record until after the previous Medical Superintendent’s transfer, competing claims of two sets of candidates, and irregularities found in departmental inquiries---Such non-reading and misreading materially affected adjudication; therefore, impugned judgment could not be sustained in its original form. (i) Service Law---- ----Competing claims over same posts---Fresh recruitment from existing candidate list---Age requirement---Relevant date---Held, that where both sets of candidates were affected without fault of their own, appropriate relief was to set aside both the first Committee’s recommendations and the appointment orders issued on recommendations of the second Committee, and to direct re-initiation of recruitment from the already available candidate list---Eligibility and suitability of each candidate were to be examined in accordance with prescribed requirements, including age, qualification and character verification---No candidate was to be disqualified solely on age if he met the maximum age requirement on the date of advertisement, i.e., 02.02.2020. (j) Service Law---- ----Class-IV public appointments---Discretion of appointing authority---Public trust---Held, that appointments to lower posts such as Naib Qasid, Sweeper and Chowkidar require utmost care, diligence and integrity, especially because such posts involve wide discretion due to absence of stringent qualifications---Such discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised as a sacred public trust, as appointees are paid from the public exchequer and the public has a right to be served by the most suitable candidates. (k) Service Law---- ----Recruitment irregularities---Departmental proceedings against delinquent officers---Direction---Held, that where recruitment process suffered from serious irregularities attributable to officers/officials, the proper course included initiation of departmental proceedings against delinquent officers in accordance with relevant laws and rules so that such irregularities are not repeated. Disposition: Petitions were converted into appeals and partly allowed; impugned judgment was modified; recommendations of the first Committee and appointment orders issued on recommendations of the second Committee were set aside as void ab initio; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was directed to re-initiate recruitment for the same posts from the existing list of candidates, without fresh advertisement, complete the process within sixty days, and initiate departmental proceedings against delinquent officers/officials.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Engineering Council Act (V of 1976)---- ----Ss. 2(xxv), 2(xxvii), 12 & 16---“Professional engineer”, “registered engineer” and “professional engineering work”---Scope and connotation---Supreme Court examined cautionary note in Maula Bux Shaikh requiring Government not to allow any person to perform professional engineering work unless he possessed accredited engineering qualification and was registered under Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1975---Court held that term “professional engineer” has specific connotation and refers to persons who are in profession of engineering and practise as such to tender technical advice in respect of work involving engineering skill---After 2011 amendments, category of “registered engineer” was introduced to include person holding accredited engineering qualification, whether working privately or in employment of engineering public organisation, and registered with Pakistan Engineering Council---Such registered engineers may perform professional engineering work within framework of Act, though they are not authorised to independently sign off designs. Cited Cases: • Maula Bux Shaikh and others v. Chief Minister Sindh and others 2018 SCMR 2098 / 2019 PLC (CS) 282 • Fida Hussain v. Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Affairs Division, Islamabad and another PLD 1995 SC 701 • Muhammad Azim Jamali and 11 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary/Chairman, Ministry of Railways and 33 others 1992 PLC (CS) 637 • Pakistan Engineering Council through Registrar v. Muhammad Azim Jamali and 44 others 1994 SCMR 1807 (b) Pakistan Engineering Council Act (V of 1976)---- ----S. 2(xxv)---Professional engineering work---Interpretation---Professional advice and opinion as core functions---Supreme Court held that “professional engineering work” primarily encompasses services and works ordinarily performed by professional engineer in practice, especially provision of professional advice and opinion---Other works and services mentioned in S.2(xxv) must be read in conjunction with these core functions---If such words were read disjunctively, absurd consequences would follow, because masons, head mistris, overseers, assistant engineers and other staff who take measurements, prepare layouts, reports and specifications under supervision, but do not hold engineering degrees, would become disqualified from ordinary job functions---Such result could not have been legislative intent. (c) Pakistan Engineering Council Act (V of 1976)---- ----2011 Amendment---Registered engineer---Purpose---Engineering public organisations---Supreme Court held that introduction of “registered engineer” category was meant to streamline functioning of Government and Government-controlled organisations by enabling public entities to assign or delegate professional engineering work to their own qualified engineers registered with Pakistan Engineering Council, thereby reducing burden of hiring professional engineers from outside---However, inclusion of registered engineers in Act does not limit Government’s power to prescribe qualifications, recruitment criteria, postings, transfers, promotions or service conditions for employees in engineering-related departments. (d) Civil service---- ----Promotion policy---Academic qualification---Government’s domain---Pakistan Engineering Council Act not controlling service terms---Supreme Court held that provisions of Pakistan Engineering Council Act regulate practice of professional engineering work and registration with Council; they do not regulate terms and conditions of civil servants, nor restrict Government’s authority to frame policies regarding recruitment, promotion, job responsibilities, posting or service conditions---Government may allow employees to progress within same cadre according to its rules and policies, but if any employee is required to perform professional engineering work as defined in Act, such work must be performed only by professional engineer or registered engineer. (e) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 25---Equality and non-discrimination---Same cadre---No creation of separate classes merely by enforcement of PEC Act---Question before larger Bench was whether restricting an Executive Engineer BS-18 from performing professional engineering work would create divergent classes within same cadre, offending Art.25---Supreme Court held that enforcement of PEC Act does not create distinct classifications of employees within same Government cadre---Act merely ensures that professional engineering work is undertaken by authorised professional or registered engineers; service progression within cadre remains subject to Government rules and policies. (f) Pakistan Engineering Council Act (V of 1976)---- ----Ss. 2(xxv), 12 & 16---Government departments---Employment on professional engineering work---Registration requirement---Supreme Court held that after amendments to Act, no person may practise as professional engineer, serve as professional consultant, or perform as registered engineer for executing professional engineering work without prior registration with Pakistan Engineering Council or temporary licence under S.12---Likewise, no engineering public organisation may employ a person as professional engineer, professional consultant or registered engineer unless his name appears on register maintained by Council under S.16. (g) Precedent---- ----Cautionary note in Maula Bux Shaikh---Meaning and effect---Supreme Court clarified that cautionary note in Maula Bux Shaikh is confined to professional engineering work under S.2(xxv) of Pakistan Engineering Council Act---It prevents Government from allowing persons lacking necessary statutory authorisation to undertake professional engineering work and reminds that non-compliance may attract penalties under Act---It does not mean that all civil servants in engineering departments must be registered engineers for every administrative or cadre-related purpose, nor does it invalidate Government promotion policies by itself. (h) Civil service---- ----Transfer orders---Underlying justification based on PEC Act cautionary note---Tribunal order set aside---Appellant’s transfer/rescission issue was earlier dealt with in reported order of Supreme Court, and larger Bench addressed remaining question regarding justification founded on PEC Act cautionary note---Supreme Court concluded that Government was required to consider appellant’s case in light of clarified legal position: service progression and cadre matters remain within Government policy domain, while performance of professional engineering work remains subject to PEC Act registration requirements. Disposition: Appeal was allowed; Sindh Service Tribunal’s order dated 28.01.2021 was set aside; respondents were directed to consider appellant’s case in accordance with conclusions recorded by Supreme Court in the present judgment and paragraph 6 of the earlier reported order; all pending CMAs were disposed of.

Summary: Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983--- ----Arts. 9(2), 29 & 32---Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199---Service matter---Pensionary benefits---Jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib---Bar regarding personal grievance of public servant---Effect of undertaking given before Ombudsman---Representations before President---Maintainability of constitutional petition--- Petitioner, retired employee of Telephone Industries of Pakistan, sought redress before Wafaqi Mohtasib regarding non-settlement of pensionary benefits, including cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted pension and annual increases---Chief Financial Officer of employer gave written undertaking before Mohtasib that pension issues would be resolved within 30 to 45 days, whereupon complaint was disposed of with direction for compliance---On review, Mohtasib further directed employer to place matter before Board of Directors and determine date of payment---Representation before President was dismissed on limitation, but High Court in constitutional jurisdiction set aside orders of Mohtasib and President on ground of want of jurisdiction---Federal Constitutional Court held that grievance raised by petitioner was plainly a personal service grievance relating to his employment in agency where he had served, and thus fell squarely within bar contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983---Wafaqi Mohtasib had no lawful authority to entertain such complaint or pass directions thereon, and orders passed by him were coram non judice and void ab initio---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts under Art. 29 of the Order of 1983 did not preclude interference by High Court where order of Ombudsman suffered from want or excess of jurisdiction---Dismissal of representation before President on ground of limitation did not validate inherently void order, nor did exhaustion of alternate remedy bar constitutional jurisdiction in such case---Undertaking or participation by employer before Ombudsman could not confer jurisdiction on forum expressly barred by statute, nor could doctrine of estoppel operate against law---High Court had rightly set aside impugned orders---Leave was refused and petition dismissed. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Karachi v. Wafaqi Mohtasib and others (1998 SCMR 841); Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), Islamabad and others (PLD 2016 SC 940); Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another (PLD 1967 SC 314); Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.-W.F.P. (PLD 1995 SC 66); Maulvi Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Ahmad Khan and others (2004 SCMR 1622); Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Ashiq and others (PLD 2006 SC 328); Syed Muhammad Hussain Shah v. Abdul Qayyum and others (2011 SCMR 743) rel. (a) Wafaqi Mohtasib---Jurisdiction---Service matters of employees of agency---Bar contained in Art. 9(2), Order of 1983--- Article 9(2) of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 expressly prohibits Wafaqi Mohtasib from accepting for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of a public servant or functionary concerning any matter relating to agency in which he is or has been working, where grievance pertains to his personal service affairs---Such matters are to be agitated before competent fora constituted for service disputes, and not before Ombudsman. (b) Pensionary claim of retired employee---Nature of dispute--- Claim regarding recalculation of pension, inclusion of cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted portion of pension and grant of annual increases is a personal grievance arising out of service and retirement benefits---Such dispute falls within exclusionary clause of Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (c) Order passed without jurisdiction---Effect--- Any order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib in a matter expressly excluded by Art. 9(2) is without lawful authority, coram non judice and void ab initio---Such order cannot be sustained irrespective of merits of underlying claim. (d) Article 29, Order of 1983---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts---Scope--- Statutory bar against challenge to action or order of Wafaqi Mohtasib does not oust constitutional jurisdiction of High Court where impugned order suffers from want or excess of jurisdiction, is coram non judice, or has been passed in violation of law---In such cases, judicial review under Art. 199 of the Constitution remains available. (e) Representation before President under Art. 32, Order of 1983---Dismissal on limitation---Effect--- Dismissal of representation on technical ground of limitation does not amount to affirmation of impugned order on merits, nor does it cure inherent jurisdictional defect in original proceedings---Even a decision on merits cannot validate an order that is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. (f) Alternate remedy---Exhaustion of statutory recourse---Whether bars writ jurisdiction--- Availability or even exhaustion of alternate statutory remedy does not operate as absolute bar to constitutional jurisdiction where impugned order is ex facie contrary to statute or passed without jurisdiction---High Court remains competent to correct such illegality. (g) Undertaking before Ombudsman---Consent, waiver or acquiescence---Effect on jurisdiction--- Jurisdiction is creature of statute and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, acquiescence, silence, participation or undertaking of parties---An employer’s written undertaking before Ombudsman to resolve employee’s grievance cannot validate proceedings before a forum expressly barred by law from entertaining such matter. (h) Estoppel against statute---Non-application of doctrine--- Doctrine of estoppel does not operate against statute---No concession or conduct of parties can override express prohibition contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (i) Undertaking given before incompetent forum---Remedy--- Although undertaking given before Wafaqi Mohtasib cannot cure lack of jurisdiction, aggrieved person may, if so advised, agitate effect of such undertaking before a competent forum in accordance with law. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973---- ----S. 17, second proviso---Dismissal from service set aside---Reinstatement---Back pay/arrears of pay---Discretion of authority---Scope---Police officials were reinstated after their dismissal orders were set aside, with continuity of service and due adjustment, but back pay for dismissal period was denied/partially allowed---Supreme Court held that under second proviso to S.17 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, arrears of pay do not automatically follow every annulment of dismissal order; rather, authority setting aside such order has discretion to determine arrears of pay---Such discretion, however, is not arbitrary or absolute and must be exercised fairly, rationally, transparently and in accordance with legal principles of reason, justice and proportionality. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 10-A---Administrative law---Culture of justification---Exercise of administrative discretion---After insertion of Art.10-A, administrative decisions must be examined through culture of justification rather than culture of authority---Mere possession of authority to act is no longer sufficient; every exercise of public power must be supported by cogent, persuasive, rational and reasonable justification---Authorities must give reasons and cannot rely merely on command, coercion or official power---Discretion regarding back pay after reinstatement must therefore be justified on record and cannot be based on whim, caprice or unexplained administrative preference. Cited Case: • Muhammad Arshad v. Deputy District Food, Multan and others 2025 PLC (CS) 1607 (c) Administrative law---- ----Discretionary power---Fairness, transparency and accountability---Duty to give reasons---Discretion conferred by law is a grave responsibility and sacred trust---Authority must exercise such power with diligence, vigilance, impartiality, fairness and transparency---Decision-making must be guided by relevant factors, precise articulation of reasons, avoidance of bias or ulterior motives and respect for natural justice---Failure to act fairly or provide sound reasons constitutes breach of duty of fairness and invites judicial scrutiny. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Hafiz Javaid v. Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Government of Punjab and another PLD 1992 SC 31 • Anisul Hassan v. Government of Punjab through Secretary, Local Government and another 2003 SCMR 694 • Chief Executive MEPCO and others v. Muhammad Fazil and others 2019 SCMR 919 (d) Administrative law---- ----Doctrine of proportionality---Back pay after reinstatement---Authority must ensure that decision regarding arrears of pay is reasonable and proportionate to facts, circumstances and objective sought to be achieved---Decision excessive, disproportionate or unsupported by persuasive reasons may be challenged as arbitrary or unreasonable---Discretion to deny or reduce back pay cannot be used as an instrument of oppression or injustice. (e) Service law---- ----Dismissal set aside---Back pay---Unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal---Distinction---Supreme Court classified cases where dismissal is set aside into two broad categories: unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal---Unfair dismissal generally includes cases where punishment is set aside due to procedural irregularity leading to de novo inquiry, technicality or lenient view, or punishment being disproportionate to proven misconduct---Wrongful dismissal arises where alleged misconduct is not proved at all---Consequences regarding back pay may differ depending on whether dismissal was merely unfair or wholly wrongful. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Arif Khan v. Dy. Enc. E-in-C’s Branch, GHQ Rawalpindi and another 1991 SCMR 1904 • Engineer Majeed Ahmed Memon v. Liaquat University of Medical and Health Sciences Jamshoro and others 2014 SCMR 1263 • Commandant Elite Force, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others v. Jamshed Ali PLD 2019 SC 570 • Muhammad Sadiq v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and others 2017 SCMR 1880 • Raja Muhammad Shahid v. Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135 • Muhammad Sharif and others v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and others 2021 SCMR 962 (f) Service law---- ----Back pay---Principle of “fair go all round”---Individual justice and institutional justice---Orders relating to back pay must be founded on fairness not only to individual civil servant but also to institution---Court/authority must balance rights of reinstated employee, circumstances of dismissal, conduct of parties, public interest and justice of case---No rigid formula applies; each case must be assessed on its own facts. (g) Service law---- ----Back pay---Burden regarding gainful employment during dismissal period---Civil servant, in first instance, must plead or state that he was not gainfully employed during intervening period or was employed only at substantially reduced wages---If authority seeks to deny full back pay on ground of gainful employment, burden shifts to authority to specifically plead and prove that civil servant was gainfully employed and was earning same or comparable salary---This rule follows general principle that party asserting existence of a fact must prove it, and positive fact of employment is easier to establish than negative fact of non-employment. Cited Cases: • Administrator Zila Council, Sahiwal v. Arif Hussain and others 2011 SCMR 1082 • General Manager, National Radio Telecommunication Corporation, Haripur v. Muhammad Aslam and 2 others 1992 SCMR 2169 • Khalid Mehmood v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 376 (h) Service law---- ----Back pay after unfair dismissal---General rule and exceptions---Civil servant unlawfully deprived of office should ordinarily be granted back pay, but such principle is not absolute---Back pay may be granted in full, in part, or denied depending on facts and circumstances---Relevant factors may include nature of appointment, length and quality of service, proven misconduct, financial circumstances and other legally relevant considerations---Full back pay is generally the standard, but authority may deviate from such norm only for compelling reasons recorded with clear and convincing rationale. Cited Case: • Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77 (i) Service law---- ----Wrongful dismissal---Exoneration from charges---Full back pay---Where dismissal is set aside because misconduct is not proved and civil servant is exonerated, dismissal is wrongful and full back pay should ordinarily follow---Wrongful dismissal deprives civil servant of livelihood, reputation and means of sustenance through fault of authority---Authority cannot avoid consequences of its wrongful action by denying back pay without lawful justification. Cited Cases: • Pakistan through General Manager, P.W.R., Lahore v. Mrs. A.V. Issacs PLD 1970 SC 415 • General Manager/Circle Executive Muslim Commercial Bank Limited and another v. Mehmood Ahmed Butt and others 2002 SCMR 1064 • Umer Said and others v. District Education Officer (Female) and others 2007 SCMR 296 • Sohail Ahmed Usmani v. Director-General Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority and another 2014 SCMR 1843 • Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77 (j) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 9---Wrongful dismissal from service---Constitutional tort---Right to life and livelihood---Wrongful dismissal from service, where allegations are not proved, deprives civil servant of means of livelihood and constitutes constitutional wrong/tort for which authority bears responsibility---Expression “life” under Art.9 includes means to sustain life---Back pay in such cases is not merely financial restitution but a necessary step to restore employee’s economic condition and uphold dignity and constitutional rights. (k) Service law---- ----“No work, no pay”---Wrongfully dismissed civil servant---Applicability---Doctrine of “no work, no pay” cannot be mechanically applied where civil servant was kept out of service due to wrongful dismissal and was later exonerated---Where employee was prevented from working by unlawful order of authority and charges were not proved, denial of back pay on basis of “no work, no pay” would be unjustified. (l) Service law---- ----Floating status during litigation---Prolonged proceedings---Judicial interference with back pay order---Where civil servant challenges punishment order and remains in floating status during prolonged litigation, delay not attributable to civil servant weighs in favour of full back pay upon reinstatement---Civil servant should not be penalized for systemic delay, inadequate infrastructure or slow adjudication---Courts and Tribunals may interfere where denial or reduction of back pay causes grave injustice due to prolonged litigation not caused by employee. (m) Service Tribunal---- ----Back pay---Exoneration from charges---Failure to give compelling reasons for denial---Tribunal/authority must determine whether punishment was unfair or wrongful and whether employee was gainfully employed during intervening period---Where charges were not substantiated, employee was exonerated, and no evidence of gainful employment existed, denial of full back pay without cogent reasons was misdirection and could not be sustained. (n) Civil Petitions Nos.1936 to 1938 of 2018---- ----Police officials exonerated from charges---Partial back pay by Tribunal---No compelling rationale---Effect---Petitioners were exonerated, but Tribunal treated part of intervening period as leave of kind due and remaining as leave without pay---Supreme Court held that denial of complete back pay, without credible evidence or reasoning, reflected culture of authority no longer permissible after Art.10-A---No evidence showed that petitioners were gainfully employed or that punishments were not wrongful---Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; petitioners were held entitled to complete back pay. (o) Civil Appeal No.174 of 2020---- ----Exonerated police official---Affidavit of no gainful employment---Full back pay---Tribunal denied full back pay on principle of “no work, no pay” despite exoneration---Supreme Court held that punishment was wrongful because charges were not substantiated---Appellant submitted affidavit that he was not engaged in gainful employment during intervening period---In such circumstances, appellant could not be denied back pay---Tribunal’s judgment was set aside and appellant was held entitled to full back pay. (p) Civil Appeals Nos.185 to 187 of 2020---- ----Appeals by Provincial Police Officer---Respondents exonerated---Full back pay granted by Tribunal---Supreme Court found Tribunal’s conclusions sound because respondents had been exonerated and authority had provided no substantial justification for withholding back pay---Dismissal was wrongful and case fell within principles entitling reinstated employees to full back pay---Appeals filed by Provincial Police Officer were dismissed. (q) Service law---- ----Authority determining arrears of pay---Judicial review---Scope---Although authority has discretion under second proviso to S.17 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973 to determine arrears of pay, such discretion is subject to judicial review where exercised arbitrarily, without reasons, contrary to fairness, or without considering relevant facts---Tribunal/Court may interfere where authority denies full back pay despite exoneration and absence of proof of gainful employment. (r) Service law---- ----Back benefits after reinstatement---Continuity of service---Reinstated police officials had already been restored to service without break and with due adjustment---Remaining dispute concerned back pay for period of dismissal---Supreme Court clarified that reinstatement with continuity does not by itself finally resolve monetary consequences; back pay must be determined according to legal principles of fairness, justification, gainful employment, nature of dismissal and reasons recorded by authority. Disposition: Civil Petitions Nos.1936 to 1938 of 2018 were converted into appeals and allowed; judgment dated 19.03.2017 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal was set aside and petitioners were held entitled to complete back pay. Civil Petition No.1935 of 2018 was dismissed as withdrawn. Civil Appeal No.174 of 2020 was allowed; Tribunal’s judgment dated 18.04.2018 was set aside and appellant was held entitled to full back pay. Civil Appeals Nos.185 to 187 of 2020 filed by Provincial Police Officer, KP were dismissed. Relevant authority was directed to implement the judgment within one month from receipt of certified copy, with no order as to costs.

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989—R. 3(2)—Recruitment to post of Qari (BPS-12)—Advertisement conditions—Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya—Exclusion of additional marks—Validity of recruitment criteria—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the petitioner, who had applied for the post of Qari (BPS-12) in the Elementary and Secondary Education Department, could not claim award of additional marks for the qualification of Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya, because the advertisement expressly provided that such marks would not be counted for cadres other than Theology Teacher (TT) and Arabic Teacher (AT). The Court observed that the prescribed qualification for the post of Qari was Bachelor’s Degree from a recognized university together with Qirat Sanad from a recognized institution, and that the petitioner had applied subject to those declared conditions. Since the advertisement unambiguously excluded marks of Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya for the post in question, the petitioner’s claim that those marks ought to have been added for improvement of his merit position was held to be without substance. Service law—Recruitment qualifications—Advertisement backed by statutory rules and notifications—No condition without lawful authority—The Court further held that the qualifications and conditions mentioned in the advertisement were not arbitrary or without legal basis, but were anchored in law. Reliance was placed on Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC/Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre dated 13.11.2012, whereby the minimum qualification for the post of Qari (BPS-12) had been prescribed, and on subsequent Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC (Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre/2017 dated 30.01.2018), through which the qualification was enhanced to Bachelor’s Degree along with Qirat Sanad and mandatory in-service training. The Court also noted that these notifications had been issued in pursuance of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989. Accordingly, the challenge to the impugned condition on the ground that it lacked legal backing was repelled. Equality clause—Uniform treatment of candidates—No discrimination—The Federal Constitutional Court held that no case of discrimination had been made out, as the petitioner was not singled out for hostile treatment. Rather, all competing candidates for the post of Qari were treated alike, and none was given marks for Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya in respect of that cadre. Since the exclusion applied uniformly to all applicants and was founded on the governing recruitment framework, the petitioner could not successfully invoke any claim of unequal treatment. Recruitment to public post—Candidate not possessing qualification as recognized for the advertised cadre—No enforceable right to appointment—The Court concluded that the petitioner did not fulfill the qualifications in the manner recognized for the post for which he had applied, and that his grievance was rooted in an attempt to import marks from a qualification expressly excluded for that cadre. In such circumstances, he had no enforceable right to seek revision of his merit position or appointment on the basis of marks not admissible under the advertisement and the governing legal framework. Case references—No judicial precedent or prior case law was cited or discussed in the text of the reported order. The Court relied on the following statutory and administrative instruments: Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC/Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre dated 13.11.2012; Notification No. SO(PE)4-5/SSRC (Meeting/2012/Teaching Cadre/2017 dated 30.01.2018; and Rule 3(2) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989. Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court found that the petitioner was not entitled to marks for Shahadat-ul-Aalmiya for the post of Qari (BPS-12), that the recruitment conditions were lawful and uniformly applied, and that the impugned judgment of the Peshawar High Court called for no interference. Leave to appeal was, therefore, refused and the petition dismissed.