Summary: Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983--- ----Arts. 9(2), 29 & 32---Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199---Service matter---Pensionary benefits---Jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib---Bar regarding personal grievance of public servant---Effect of undertaking given before Ombudsman---Representations before President---Maintainability of constitutional petition--- Petitioner, retired employee of Telephone Industries of Pakistan, sought redress before Wafaqi Mohtasib regarding non-settlement of pensionary benefits, including cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted pension and annual increases---Chief Financial Officer of employer gave written undertaking before Mohtasib that pension issues would be resolved within 30 to 45 days, whereupon complaint was disposed of with direction for compliance---On review, Mohtasib further directed employer to place matter before Board of Directors and determine date of payment---Representation before President was dismissed on limitation, but High Court in constitutional jurisdiction set aside orders of Mohtasib and President on ground of want of jurisdiction---Federal Constitutional Court held that grievance raised by petitioner was plainly a personal service grievance relating to his employment in agency where he had served, and thus fell squarely within bar contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983---Wafaqi Mohtasib had no lawful authority to entertain such complaint or pass directions thereon, and orders passed by him were coram non judice and void ab initio---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts under Art. 29 of the Order of 1983 did not preclude interference by High Court where order of Ombudsman suffered from want or excess of jurisdiction---Dismissal of representation before President on ground of limitation did not validate inherently void order, nor did exhaustion of alternate remedy bar constitutional jurisdiction in such case---Undertaking or participation by employer before Ombudsman could not confer jurisdiction on forum expressly barred by statute, nor could doctrine of estoppel operate against law---High Court had rightly set aside impugned orders---Leave was refused and petition dismissed. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Karachi v. Wafaqi Mohtasib and others (1998 SCMR 841); Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), Islamabad and others (PLD 2016 SC 940); Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another (PLD 1967 SC 314); Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.-W.F.P. (PLD 1995 SC 66); Maulvi Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Ahmad Khan and others (2004 SCMR 1622); Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Ashiq and others (PLD 2006 SC 328); Syed Muhammad Hussain Shah v. Abdul Qayyum and others (2011 SCMR 743) rel. (a) Wafaqi Mohtasib---Jurisdiction---Service matters of employees of agency---Bar contained in Art. 9(2), Order of 1983--- Article 9(2) of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 expressly prohibits Wafaqi Mohtasib from accepting for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of a public servant or functionary concerning any matter relating to agency in which he is or has been working, where grievance pertains to his personal service affairs---Such matters are to be agitated before competent fora constituted for service disputes, and not before Ombudsman. (b) Pensionary claim of retired employee---Nature of dispute--- Claim regarding recalculation of pension, inclusion of cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted portion of pension and grant of annual increases is a personal grievance arising out of service and retirement benefits---Such dispute falls within exclusionary clause of Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (c) Order passed without jurisdiction---Effect--- Any order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib in a matter expressly excluded by Art. 9(2) is without lawful authority, coram non judice and void ab initio---Such order cannot be sustained irrespective of merits of underlying claim. (d) Article 29, Order of 1983---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts---Scope--- Statutory bar against challenge to action or order of Wafaqi Mohtasib does not oust constitutional jurisdiction of High Court where impugned order suffers from want or excess of jurisdiction, is coram non judice, or has been passed in violation of law---In such cases, judicial review under Art. 199 of the Constitution remains available. (e) Representation before President under Art. 32, Order of 1983---Dismissal on limitation---Effect--- Dismissal of representation on technical ground of limitation does not amount to affirmation of impugned order on merits, nor does it cure inherent jurisdictional defect in original proceedings---Even a decision on merits cannot validate an order that is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. (f) Alternate remedy---Exhaustion of statutory recourse---Whether bars writ jurisdiction--- Availability or even exhaustion of alternate statutory remedy does not operate as absolute bar to constitutional jurisdiction where impugned order is ex facie contrary to statute or passed without jurisdiction---High Court remains competent to correct such illegality. (g) Undertaking before Ombudsman---Consent, waiver or acquiescence---Effect on jurisdiction--- Jurisdiction is creature of statute and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, acquiescence, silence, participation or undertaking of parties---An employer’s written undertaking before Ombudsman to resolve employee’s grievance cannot validate proceedings before a forum expressly barred by law from entertaining such matter. (h) Estoppel against statute---Non-application of doctrine--- Doctrine of estoppel does not operate against statute---No concession or conduct of parties can override express prohibition contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (i) Undertaking given before incompetent forum---Remedy--- Although undertaking given before Wafaqi Mohtasib cannot cure lack of jurisdiction, aggrieved person may, if so advised, agitate effect of such undertaking before a competent forum in accordance with law. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ----S. 17; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 497 & 498 Bailability after amendments—Applicability of Cr.P.C. to NAO trials—Held, following wholesale amendments to NAO, offences under NAO are now bailable; by virtue of S.17 NAO the Cr.P.C. applies mutatis mutandis to NAO proceedings—Consequently, post-arrest and pre-arrest bail are to be governed by Ss. 497 and 498 Cr.P.C., to be first sought before the Trial Court and thereafter before appellate fora—Direct resort to constitutional jurisdiction for bail in NAO matters is no longer the necessary route. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A Fair trial and due process—Delay in conclusion of criminal trials—Prolonged pre-trial detention—Held, “delay” is antithetical to fair trial and due process; inordinate, unexplained delay for no fault of accused attracts constitutional protections to life, liberty, and fair trial—Earlier jurisprudence condemned day-to-day-trial mandates being ignored in NAO matters and recognized release where statutory timelines are frustrated; principle reaffirmed. Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah (PLD 2022 SC 497) relied upon. (c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----S. 497, third proviso—Statutory bail as of right Nature of relief and pre-conditions—Held, statutory bail on ground of delay is not discretionary; once the limbs of the third proviso are satisfied, bail follows as of right unless the delay is attributable to the accused or persons acting on their behalf, or the excepted categories (hardened/dangerous criminals, prior convicts for death/life offences, terrorism) apply—Period thresholds: exceeding one year for non-capital offences; two years for capital—Accrual of right cannot be defeated on considerations outside the provisos. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) followed. (d) Criminal procedure—Assessment of delay on facts ----S. 497, third proviso—NAO references—Case management Applicants incarcerated about 18 months; no delay attributable to them—Reference filed 18-07-2023; charge framed 15-08-2023; three witnesses partly examined—Supplementary reference filed 17-01-2024; amended charge 21-02-2024 necessitating re-recording—There are 43 accused and 208 witnesses; with separate cross-examinations, practical completion within near time is implausible—Direction to conclude within six months would be ineffectual given stage of proceedings—Keeping accused incarcerated further would risk constitutional violation; statutory right to bail triggered. (e) Bail—Heinousness of offence—White-collar crime ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. Heinousness not a standalone ground to refuse statutory bail—Legislative scheme even permits statutory bail in capital offences upon delay; NAO maximum sentence (14 years) does not alter the statutory entitlement—Purpose of bail is to secure attendance at trial; where evidence is predominantly documentary and investigation is complete, risk of tampering is minimal—Speculative fears of absconsion cannot defeat a crystallized statutory right; adequate surety and conditions can mitigate flight risk. Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State (2017 PCr.LJ 631), State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan (2022 YLR Note 64 Sindh), Hasnain Mustafa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1914) referred. (f) Practice and procedure—NAO prosecutions ----Case structuring and delay Court observed NAB’s practice of arraying numerous accused and voluminous witness lists renders trials “never-ending”; emphasized prosecutorial case-management: include only most responsible persons, rely on strongest documentary proof, and minimize witnesses to ensure effective, expeditious trials. (g) Application of third-proviso limbs on record ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. (i) Offences not punishable with death—Satisfied. (ii) Continuous detention exceeding one year with trial unconcluded, and no delay attributable to accused—Satisfied. (iii) Not previously convicted for death/life offences; not hardened/dangerous; not terrorism accused—Satisfied. Result: entitlement to bail as of right. Cited cases: • Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah PLD 2022 SC 497 • Muhammad Usman v. The State 2024 SCMR 28 • Shahid Umar v. Chairman NAB 2019 PCr.LJ 370 • Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State 2017 PCr.LJ 631 • State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan 2022 YLR Note 64 (Sindh) • Hasnain Mustafa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1914 (g) Disposition — Applications allowed—Post-arrest bail granted to Mukhtiar Ali Chandio, Tabish Ali Shah Hussaini, Saood-ul-Haq and Muhammad Adnan Rasheed under S. 497 (third proviso) Cr.P.C., subject to furnishing solvent surety of Rs. 1,500,000 each with PR bonds in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Additional Registrar—Ministry of Interior directed to place applicants’ names on the ECL and ensure immediate compliance—No comment on merits; Trial Court to proceed strictly in accordance with law.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts. 9, 10A, 14, 25 & 37(d)--- Incarcerated prisoners---Fundamental rights--- Release of inmates from the prisons on the basis of 'probation'---Duty of care owed by the State and its functionaries towards incarcerated prisoners explained. It is an undeniable fact that living conditions and the treatment of prisoners in overcrowded and inadequately equipped prisons profoundly affects the constitutionally guaranteed rights. Most of the victims of a non-functional criminal justice system are those who belong to economically and socially marginalized sections of the society. They do not have the means to access the courts nor has the State fulfilled its constitutional obligation to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice contemplated under Article 37(d) of the Constitution. The prisoner, whether convicted or non-convicted, has no choice but to place reliance for his right to life and other needs, such as medical attention, solely on the authorities holding him/her in custody. This reliance gives rise to a duty of care on the part of the State and its functionaries. The Constitution guarantees the right to life under Article 9. In the context of a prisoner, it is implicit in Article 9 that it is the duty of the State to ensure that every person incarcerated including those who are convicted for an offence and undergoing sentence, are treated in a manner that does not expose the latter to harm and that humane treatment is extended so long as the incarceration lasts. The prisoner is thus entirely dependent on the State and is at its mercy for the purposes of safeguarding the right to life. The State, therefore, owes a duty of care to every prisoner, regardless of the nature of offence for which the latter has been incarcerated. It is only liberty and the right of free movement that has been curtailed and definitely not the constitutional rights to life and to betreated with respect, having regard to the fundamental rights of inviolability of the dignity of man guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. Moreover, it becomes a duty of the functionaries to ensure that no prisoner is unjustifiably deprived of the right to liberty even if it is on the basis of being released on probation. It is a right of every eligible prisoner to be considered for the purposes of enjoying liberty on the basis of probation. The neglect of the executive authorities to perform their obligations and duties imposed by law and to give effect to the enforced laws, particularly relating to the inmates of prisons amounts to a breach of the duty of care that is owed to the incarcerated prisoner. This breach of a fiduciary duty could expose the concerned authorities and the State to be sued by the inmates of the overcrowded prisons for damages. Neglect or refusal to effectively enforce the enacted laws relating to release of a prisoner on the basis of probation is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, inter alia, under Articles 9, 10-A, 14 and 25. The respective Chief Executives' of the Federal Government and the provinces are directed to ensure that the enacted laws relating to release of a prisoner on the basis of probation are effectively implemented and made functional. The Federal and Provincial Governments, as the case may be, shall ensure that the prisoners who are eligible under the enacted laws for availing the benefit of being released on probation are identified and their cases are processed expeditiously. ------ (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 10-A, 14, 25 & 37(d)---Prisoners---Release on probation---Fundamental rights---Duty of care of State and prison authorities---Scope---Proceedings arose out of reports sought by Supreme Court regarding implementation of laws relating to release of prisoners on probation---Reports revealed grave prison conditions, overcrowding and non-functional enforcement of probation laws---Held, that a prisoner, whether convicted or under trial, remains entitled to constitutional protection of life, dignity and fair treatment---Incarceration curtails only liberty and freedom of movement and not the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution---Because prisoners are wholly dependent upon the State for protection of life, health and humane treatment, such dependence gives rise to a duty of care on the part of the State and its functionaries---Failure to ensure humane treatment and lawful consideration of eligible prisoners for probation amounts to infringement of constitutional guarantees, particularly where weak and marginalized prisoners suffer due to a dysfunctional criminal justice system---State was bound to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice in terms of Art.37(d) of the Constitution and could not permit prison conditions or administrative neglect to defeat rights guaranteed under Arts.9, 10-A, 14 and 25 of the Constitution. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9 & 14---Right to life and dignity of prisoners---Prisoner’s dependence on State---Extent of protection---Held, that in the case of a prisoner, the right to life under Art.9 of the Constitution includes the State’s obligation to ensure that every incarcerated person is treated in a manner which does not expose him to harm and that humane treatment is extended throughout the period of incarceration---A prisoner is entirely dependent on the State and remains at its mercy for safeguarding life and dignity---Therefore, the State owes a duty of care to every prisoner regardless of the nature of the offence for which he has been incarcerated---What stands curtailed is only liberty and free movement, and not the constitutional right to be treated with respect consistent with the inviolability of dignity of man guaranteed by Art.14 of the Constitution---Functionaries of the State are also under obligation to ensure that no prisoner is unjustifiably deprived of liberty, including where release on probation is lawfully available. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 10-A, 14 & 25---Probation laws---Non-enforcement---Effect---Right of eligible prisoner to be considered for probation---Held, that the benefit of release on probation is of pivotal importance in the context of unjustified deprivation of liberty and every eligible prisoner has a right to be considered for such release in accordance with law---Neglect or refusal by executive authorities to perform duties imposed by enacted probation laws and to give effect thereto, especially in relation to prison inmates, amounts to breach of the duty of care owed by the State and its functionaries---Such neglect is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts.9, 10-A, 14 and 25 of the Constitution---Failure to enforce probation laws effectively may also amount to breach of fiduciary duty, exposing the concerned authorities and the State to claims for damages by inmates of overcrowded prisons. (d) Administration of justice and prison administration ----Overcrowded prisons---Marginalized prisoners---Need for effective implementation of probation regime---Held, that overcrowded and inadequately equipped prisons seriously impair constitutionally protected rights and most victims of the non-functional criminal justice system belong to economically and socially marginalized classes who are least able to access courts---Prisons exist as institutions for reformation and social rehabilitation, and the failure of governments to operationalize probation laws defeats that purpose---Accordingly, the respective Chief Executives of the Federal Government and Provincial Governments were directed to ensure that enacted laws relating to release of prisoners on probation are effectively implemented and made functional and that all prisoners eligible under such laws are identified and their cases processed expeditiously. Disposition: Proceedings were disposed of by declaring that neglect or refusal to effectively enforce enacted laws relating to release of prisoners on probation is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 9, 10-A, 14 and 25 of the Constitution; the Federal and Provincial Chief Executives were directed to ensure effective implementation of probation laws and expeditious processing of all eligible prisoners’ cases. Raja Azmat Ali v. Abu Malik Naseem and another, 2023 SCMR 1867, decided on 23.05.2023.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Arts. 9 & 199—Right to life—Pension and annual increases—Scope—Held, pensionary benefits, including annual increases, are an integral component of the right to life guaranteed under Art. 9 of the Constitution—Even where an organization’s service rules are non-statutory, denial or delay of pension constitutes violation of fundamental rights and principles of natural justice—High Court can exercise constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 where the act of a public or autonomous body in a service matter is arbitrary, unreasonable, or inconsistent with law—Reliance placed on Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority v. Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed (2013 SCMR 1707), Muhammad Rafi v. Federation of Pakistan (2016 SCMR 2146), and Nasir Kamal v. Federation of Pakistan (2021 PLC (C.S.) 1226). (b) Associated Press of Pakistan Corporation Ordinance, 2002 ----S. 21—Nature of service rules—Though rules framed under the APPC Ordinance are non-statutory, the obligation to disburse pensions and apply government-announced annual increases remains binding on the Corporation—Non-payment of annual increments for 2015–2017 held unjustified; the Board’s linkage of pension increases with pending financial rules and funding approval was not a valid ground to withhold the same—Respondents themselves acknowledged that arrears remain unpaid solely due to lack of funds and have sought allocation of Rs.400 million from Finance Division. (c) Administrative law—Exercise of jurisdiction—Maintainability—Even in cases involving autonomous bodies like the Associated Press of Pakistan, constitutional jurisdiction lies where the issue pertains to payment of pensionary dues and impacts a fundamental right—Availability of alternate remedies not a bar where the violation involves basic entitlements of livelihood and dignity of retired employees. (g) Disposition— Writ petition disposed of—Respondents directed to pay arrears of annual pension increases for years 2015, 2016, and 2017 to the petitioner, subject to availability of funds upon approval by Finance Division.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9, 14, 15 & 199 Fundamental rights—Right to dignity, reputation, and freedom of movement—Post-acquittal continuation of name in police records—Scope of relief—Petitioner, acquitted under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. from FIR No. 40/2022, sought deletion of his name from all police databases and issuance of a clear Police Character Certificate (PCC)—Held, once an acquittal attains finality, no stigma or adverse inference can lawfully persist against the acquitted person—However, police may retain internal historical records of FIRs for administrative, operational, or inter-agency purposes so long as such records are not misused—Constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 cannot be invoked merely to interfere with internal record-keeping unless misuse or targeted discrimination is shown—Relief for expunction of entire record declined. (b) Police administration—Character certificate—Post-acquittal status ----Issuance of Police Character Certificate (PCC)—Obligation of police authorities—After acquittal based on complainant’s own clarification exonerating the accused, the police must issue a PCC omitting reference to the concerned FIR—Continued mention of an obsolete and unchallenged FIR in the PCC would unjustly stigmatize an exonerated citizen and offend the dignity guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution—Direction issued to authorities to issue PCC within fifteen (15) days without reference to the FIR. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 249-A—Acquittal—Finality—Once an accused is acquitted under S. 249-A Cr.P.C., and the prosecution does not challenge the decision, the acquittal attains finality and fully exonerates the accused from criminal liability—No adverse record or inference can subsist thereafter. (g) Disposition — Petition partly allowed—Request for complete expunction of FIR from police database declined—Respondents directed to issue Police Character Certificate to the Petitioner omitting reference to FIR No. 40/2022 within fifteen days.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9, 25, 35 & 199 --- Fundamental rights—Right to equality and family life—Issuance of Pakistan Origin Card (POC)—Scope—Petitioner, a Pakistani national, sought direction for issuance of POC to her foreign husband (Swiss citizen of Afghan origin)—Held, issuance of POC is not an absolute right but a conditional privilege subject to prescribed eligibility and security clearance—Where competent security agency declines clearance, NADRA has no authority to override such assessment—Court cannot interfere in executive decision based on national security considerations absent mala fides or lack of jurisdiction—No violation of fundamental rights established. (b) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000) ----Ss. 10 & 11—Issuance of Pakistan Origin Card—Conditions—Section 11 authorizes NADRA to issue POCs to prescribed classes of foreigners subject to fulfillment of criteria, terms, and security clearance—Authority lawfully refused POC when clearance was denied by security agency—NADRA acted within jurisdiction. (c) Pakistan Origin Card Rules, 2002 ----R. 13—Refusal of registration—Scope—Authority may refuse registration or issuance of POC if, in its opinion, such issuance is prejudicial to the sovereignty, integrity, security, or defense of Pakistan, or against public interest—Rule 13 validly invoked where security agency withheld clearance of applicant—Refusal neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (d) Case law distinguished ----Regional Manager NADRA Hayatabad Peshawar v. Mst. Hajira (2024 SCMR 197) and Mst. Amina v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2024 Peshawar 87) Cited precedents inapplicable since those matters involved no adverse security clearance—Current refusal based solely on non-clearance by competent authority under Rule 13. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction—Judicial restraint ----Art. 199 --- Courts cannot substitute executive discretion or reappraise security assessments made by specialized agencies unless shown to be mala fide or ultra vires—No material on record proving such infirmities—Constitutional petition not maintainable. (g) Disposition — Petition dismissed; NADRA’s refusal to issue POC to petitioner’s husband upheld; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4 & 199----Executive action—requirement of lawful authority and due process—High Court’s duty to enforce Art. 4----Islamabad Boy Scouts Association (IBSA) office allegedly sealed and keys taken by Assistant Commissioner (City) without any written/speaking order---Held, that every action detrimental to property or reputation must be “in accordance with law” (Art. 4); High Court, in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199, is bound to secure compliance with Art. 4 and to strike down arbitrary, mala fide or colourable acts not backed by lawful authority or proper legal process—Reliance placed on Ch. Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan and Government of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri (PLD 1969 SC 14). (b) Administrative law ----Ultra vires executive measures—Sealing/closure of premises—necessity of a speaking order----Record contained minutes of review meeting but disclosed no directive to seal IBSA office; no formal order of Chief Commissioner authorizing seizure of keys or closure was produced---Action held arbitrary, without jurisdiction, and violative of Art. 4; mere dissatisfaction with an organization’s performance cannot justify coercive measures without statutory basis and due process. (c) Pakistan Boy Scouts framework ----Pakistan Boy Scouts Association Ordinance, 1959 & Rules (1993)----Governance in ICT—scope noted----PBS functions under the Ministry of Federal Education & Professional Training; President is Chief Scout nationally; Governors act as Chief Scouts in provinces; for ICT, rules are silent as to Chief Scout—Court recorded the administrative backdrop but found that, irrespective of governance debates, the impugned sealing lacked any lawful order and could not stand. (d) Constitutional petition ----Maintainability despite factual controversies----Where undisputed absence of lawful authority and non-production of a speaking order impinging fundamental rights is shown, writ under Art. 199 is maintainable notwithstanding parties’ rival narratives on management/performance. Disposition: Petition disposed of with directions—Chief Commissioner, Islamabad, ordered to conduct a thorough inquiry into the illegal closure/seizure of IBSA office, fix responsibility, resolve the matter within seven (07) days, and submit a comprehensive report to the Additional Registrar (Judicial).

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––Ss. 22-A & 22-B–––Application for registration of criminal case–––Scope and object–––Respondent No. 4 filed an application under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace alleging abduction of her son by unknown persons in official uniform–––Learned Justice of Peace, upon obtaining report from police, directed registration of a case–––Petitioner contended that the order was passed without hearing him and in ignorance of material facts showing involvement of respondent’s family members in various criminal cases–––Held, that proceedings under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. are meant to ensure that a citizen’s complaint regarding commission of a cognizable offence is duly entertained and that no person is deprived of legal recourse owing to inaction of police–––Justice of Peace rightly exercised jurisdiction to direct registration of FIR when the report showed unexplained delay between respondent’s 15-call and formal arrest of her son, giving rise to reasonable apprehension of unlawful detention–––No illegality or irregularity found in the impugned order directing registration of FIR. (b) Constitution of Pakistan–––Arts. 4, 9 & 10–––Fundamental rights–––Unlawful detention–––Protection of liberty–––Court observed that wrongful confinement of respondent’s son by police amounted to gross violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 4, 9 and 10 of the Constitution–––Such conduct reflected abuse of authority and disregard for rule of law and could not be condoned. (c) Administration of justice–––Exercise of revisional or constitutional jurisdiction–––Interference with orders of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace–––High Court held that where an order is well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of record, no interference is warranted–––Petition challenging order dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––S. 497–––Cancellation of bail–––Principles governing recall of bail order–––Petitioner, accused in FIR No.561/2021 under Section 406, PPC, was granted post-arrest bail on the basis of a written compromise/Iqrarnama dated 01.07.2022–––Her bail was later recalled by the trial Court for breach of the agreed terms, and the order was upheld in revision–––Held, that once bail is granted on the basis of a conditional compromise voluntarily executed by the accused herself, any failure to comply with those conditions constitutes sufficient cause for its recall–––Accused did not object to the compromise deed when it was recorded in her presence before the Magistrate, nor did she challenge its validity before any competent forum–––Allegation of coercion or duress raised belatedly after default was devoid of merit–––No illegality found in cancellation of bail based on breach of voluntarily agreed conditions. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––S. 497–––Bail granted on compromise–––Effect of breach–––Although bail cannot ordinarily be made conditional, when an accused seeks release based on a settlement and undertakes specific obligations, those undertakings become enforceable–––Default or non-compliance with such voluntarily assumed conditions justifies recall of bail–––Practice deprecated where accused obtain conditional bail and later retract under pretext of coercion after benefiting from release. (c) Constitution of Pakistan–––Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A–––Due process and protection of liberty–––Scope–––Court held that cancellation of bail in consequence of non-compliance with a lawful compromise does not violate constitutional guarantees of liberty or due process when the bail order itself arose from voluntary consent of the accused–––No violation of fundamental rights established. (d) Administration of justice–––Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court–––Interference with concurrent findings–––Where both the trial Court and revisional Court have passed concurrent reasoned orders after examining the record, the High Court would not interfere in constitutional jurisdiction absent illegality or material irregularity–––Both Courts below rightly concluded that the petitioner failed to honour her own undertakings and that cancellation of bail was lawful. Disposition: Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan–––Arts. 4, 9, 15, 18 & 25–––Right to movement, livelihood and dignity–––Unlawful restriction on travel–––Petitioner, a private cook employed by an Air Commodore during his posting in Italy, was repeatedly detained at the airport and prevented from travelling abroad on the pretext of being an “Army Deserter”–––Record revealed that petitioner was never an employee of any branch of the Armed Forces–––Respondents failed to produce any proof of military employment or desertion–––Held, that placing petitioner’s name on Exit Control List (ECL) without lawful authority and in absence of any credible material amounted to arbitrary exercise of power and violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4, 9, 15, 18 and 25 of the Constitution–––Such administrative action could not be sustained. (b) Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981–––S. 2–––Placing of name on Exit Control List–––Scope and limitations–––Petitioner’s name was placed on ECL on intelligence recommendation labeling him as a “deserter”–––No record or service history substantiated that claim–––Mere assumption or unverified intelligence input cannot justify curtailment of constitutional right to travel abroad–––Ministry of Interior and FIA required to act strictly within statutory framework and ensure that inclusion on ECL is supported by lawful material and due process. (c) Administrative law–––Due process and abuse of authority–––Duty of public functionaries–––Held, that no citizen may be deprived of liberty or right to travel except by due process of law–––Misuse of administrative discretion to obstruct petitioner’s lawful movement constituted abuse of power and violation of constitutional guarantees. (d) Fundamental rights–––Employment abroad–––Protection of livelihood–––Where petitioner’s overseas employment and visa renewal were jeopardized by arbitrary travel restrictions, Court intervened to protect his right to earn livelihood through lawful means abroad. Disposition: Petition allowed; respondents directed to forthwith remove petitioner’s name from Exit Control List and permit him to travel abroad.