Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 175F(1)(c)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 491---Leave to appeal against dismissal of habeas corpus petition for recovery of alleged detenue/daughter---Scope---Petitioner/father sought recovery of his daughter on the plea that she was a Christian minor and had been taken into unlawful custody by respondent, who claimed to be her husband---Courts below dismissed the petition on the basis of the girl’s voluntary statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and her assertion that she had contracted marriage of her free will---Federal Constitutional Court held that where the alleged detenue had repeatedly appeared before competent fora and unequivocally stated that no abduction had taken place and that she had married voluntarily, her custody with the person claiming to be her husband could not, in summary proceedings under S.491, Cr.P.C., be termed illegal or unlawful---Question whether Nikahnama was forged, or whether investigation required transfer, pertained to criminal process and could not by itself justify habeas corpus relief---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed. (b) Muslim Personal Law---Marriage between Muslim male and Christian female---Validity---Petitioner contended that his Christian daughter could not lawfully marry a Muslim male---Held, contention was misconceived and contrary to settled principles of Islamic law---A Muslim male may validly contract marriage with a Christian woman, being from Ahl al-Kitab---Such principle stood recognized in earlier Supreme Court authorities and classical juristic exposition---Court held that objection to marriage merely on the basis of difference of religion was without substance. Cited Cases: Mrs. Marina Jatoi v. Nuruddin K. Jatoi and others PLD 1967 SC 580. Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Mst. Bilqis Bibi and others PLD 1981 SC 56. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 189---Federal Constitutional Court---Precedential value of judgments of Supreme Court of Pakistan after establishment of Federal Constitutional Court---Held, judgments of the former Supreme Court of Pakistan do not bind the Federal Constitutional Court as a matter of absolute precedent under the restructured constitutional hierarchy, but continue to carry great persuasive value where they are based on sound reasoning, are consistent with constitutional text and structure, and do not offend fundamental rights or evolved constitutional values---Doctrine of stare decisis was not abrogated but recalibrated in light of constitutional supremacy---Departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent must be express, reasoned and principled, and may be justified where such precedent is manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution, undermines fundamental rights, reflects judicial overreach, becomes incompatible with evolved constitutional values and democratic norms, or where any other compelling reason advances the cause of justice. (d) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)----S.1(2)---Marriage---Conversion to Islam---Effect---Though marriage of a Muslim male with a Christian female is permissible in principle, solemnization and registration under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is confined to Muslim citizens---Respondent’s stance was that the girl had embraced Islam before marriage---Affidavit appended with Nikahnama and subsequent certificate issued by a religious institution were produced to show conversion---Held, faith is a personal matter; once a person openly professes adherence to Islam, ordinarily no roving inquiry into the sincerity or motive of conversion is warranted in such proceedings---No specific ritual is indispensable beyond declaration and profession of belief---Where girl herself acknowledged correctness of Nikahnama and declared conversion, Court would not undertake deeper inquiry into genuineness of conversion in summary jurisdiction---Marriage was, prima facie, validly solemnized under the Ordinance. Cited Cases: Mst. Zarina and another v. The State PLD 1988 FSC 105. Tariq Masih v. The State 2004 PCr.LJ 622. (e) Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929---Child marriage---Effect on validity of marriage---Petitioner asserted that alleged detenue was about twelve years of age and, therefore, incapable of contracting valid marriage---Held, the Act of 1929 restrains and criminalizes solemnization of child marriage, but does not expressly render such marriage void or voidable---In absence of explicit statutory language invalidating the marriage, its legal status remains unaffected---Where legislature intends to override settled personal law, it must do so in clear and unequivocal terms; such intention cannot be inferred from silence---Therefore, even assuming minority, marriage would not automatically become void merely because it was contracted in contravention of the Act of 1929. Cited Cases: Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mirza Muhammad Amin and another PLD 1962 W.P. Karachi 442. Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad and another PLD 1970 SC 323. Mauj Ali v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah and another 1970 SCMR 437. Nasreen Bibi v. Station House Officer and others 2024 PCr.LJ 2058. Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate 1st Class and others PLD 2021 Lahore 21. Muhammad Azam v. The State and another 2018 PCr.LJ Note 175. Muhammad Safeer v. Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad PLD 2018 Islamabad 385. Allah Nawaz v. Station House Officer PLD 2013 Lahore 243. Allah Bakhsh v. Safdar and others 2006 YLR 2936. Ghulam Qadir v. The Judge Family Court, Murree 1988 CLC 113. Ghulam Hussain v. Nawaz Ali and another 1975 PCr.LJ 1049. (f) Evidence---Age of alleged detenue---Delayed birth documents---Probative value---Petitioner relied on birth certificate and child registration certificate to show that his daughter was born on 07.10.2012---Held, both documents had been procured many years after the alleged date of birth and no satisfactory explanation for such inordinate delay was furnished---Delayed registration of birth, unless supported by independent and reliable material, is susceptible to manipulation and its evidentiary value is diminished---Further, inconsistency in petitioner’s own stance regarding age in the F.I.R., close birth dates shown for the alleged detenue and her next sibling, entry of a different date of birth in the Nikahnama, and the girl’s own denial of minority materially weakened petitioner’s case---In such circumstances, delayed documents could not be treated as sole basis for holding that the girl was minor, particularly when she appeared physically before the Court and seemed to be of more advanced age. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.164---Statement of alleged detenue---Evidentiary significance in habeas corpus proceedings---Girl had recorded statement before Magistrate that nobody abducted her, no zina was committed, and that she had married respondent of her own free will; she had also made a similar statement in proceedings under Ss.22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.---Held, such consistent voluntary statements before judicial fora carried significant value in determining whether custody was illegal---Where marriage was acknowledged and free will asserted, summary court was justified in declining to infer unlawful detention. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.491---Summary nature of proceedings---Limitations---Question whether Nikahnama was forged or unregistered, and whether offences were made out in investigation, could not properly be adjudicated in proceedings of interim and summary nature under S.491, Cr.P.C.---Such issues were to be pursued before competent criminal court or through appropriate investigative remedies---Habeas corpus jurisdiction is not designed to conclusively determine complex factual controversies touching upon validity of marriage documents. (i) Res judicata---Constitutional petition for recovery of daughter---Earlier writ petition on same cause having attained finality---Effect---Petitioner had earlier filed writ petition for recovery of same daughter from same alleged custody on same foundational ground, which was dismissed by High Court after considering her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and holding that her custody with husband was not illegal or unlawful---Said finding was not challenged before higher forum and, therefore, attained finality---Held, subsequent proceedings on same issue were barred by principle of res judicata, and petitioner could not re-agitate the same question through another round of litigation. Cited Case: Pir Bakhsh v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145. (j) Constitutional law---Fundamental rights---Reliance on High Court judgment concerning discriminatory definition of “child”---Relevance---Petitioner relied upon PLD 2025 Lah. 1---Held, said judgment had no application to the controversy in hand, as that case concerned challenge to discriminatory definition of “child” prescribing different minimum ages for males and females with reference to provincial legislation, whereas present case concerned legality of custody and alleged invalidity of marriage in the factual setting of Punjab law. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed; however, observations made in the judgment were not to prejudice or impede criminal proceedings, if any, before the competent criminal court in accordance with law. ------ "The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 merely criminalizes the solemnization of a child marriage but does not expressly declare such a marriage to be void or voidable. The binding force of judicial precedent is not derived from institutional seniority but from the constitutional hierarchy itself. Since, the supremacy of constitutional adjudication now vests in this Court, therefore, all courts, including the Supreme Court of Pakistan, are bound by its pronouncements. However, this Court would ordinarily respect and follow the earlier constitutional jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, unless it is established that the same is manifestly erroneous, inconsistent with the constitutional text or scheme, or incompatible with fundamental rights and contemporary constitutional values. "

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302, 34 & 449---Murder with common intention---House-trespass to commit offence punishable with death---Ocular account---Identification parade---Judicial confession---Corroboration---Prosecution version believed on basis of ocular account of complainant (brother of deceased) and widow of deceased, supported by servant witnessing escape---Non-nomination of accused in FIR/161 statements not fatal where witnesses gave detailed physical descriptions at first instance and later identified accused through a fair identification parade---Ocular account corroborated by properly conducted identification parade, judicial confessions recorded in accordance with law, and medical evidence---Convictions under PPC upheld. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ----Ss. 6, 7(1)(a), 7(1)(b), 21-I & 21-M---Murder of public servant/judicial officer---Nexus with official duty---Terrorism---Targeted killing of serving judicial officer at residence, motivated by grievance arising from performance of judicial functions, held to transcend private vendetta and strike at authority of State and administration of justice---Such act creates fear/insecurity and intimidates public servants, bringing offence within definition of terrorism---Convictions and sentences under ATA upheld---Distinction from plea based on Ghulam Hussain’s case made on ground of nature/impact of targeted attack on judicial officer due to official act. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat / criminal evidence principles ----Identification parade---Compliance with Rules and Orders of Lahore High Court (Chap.11, Part-C, Vol-III)---Safeguards---Identification parade conducted promptly, separately for each accused, with safeguards preventing prior exposure---Positive identification with specific roles; role of firing consistently attributed to one accused---Proceedings held fair and reliable. (d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----Ss. 164 & 364---Judicial confession---Voluntariness---Safeguards---Confessional statements recorded separately, after sufficient time for reflection, meeting mandatory requirements---No evidence of coercion/inducement/torture---Confessions mutually corroborative and consistent with ocular/medical evidence---Used as strong corroborative evidence. (e) Sentence ----Capital punishment---Mitigating circumstances---Single shot---Minor inconsistencies/procedural flaws---Effect---Minor inconsistencies not sufficient for acquittal may operate as mitigating circumstance for reduction/commutation of sentence---Where firing accused caused death by single shot and did not repeat despite opportunity, along with minor procedural flaws in confession, held sufficient to commute death to life imprisonment while maintaining conviction---Co-accused with no firing role already granted commutation by High Court; Supreme Court found no further interference warranted in their case. Cited cases: • Ghulam Hussain & others v. The State & others, PLD 2020 SC 61 • Riaz Hussain v. The State, Crl.A No.22-K/2022 in Crl.P.L.A. No.184-K/2020, decided on 23.10.2025 Disposition: Jail Petition No.498 of 2021 (Aamer Bhatti) dismissed; leave refused; conviction and sentences maintained as upheld by High Court. Jail Petition No.432 of 2021 (Rashed alias Chand) dismissed; leave refused; conviction and sentences maintained as upheld by High Court. Jail Petition No.432 of 2021 (Fiaz alias Mansha) partly allowed; converted into appeal; conviction upheld; death sentence “under each count” commuted to imprisonment for life; convictions and sentences in remaining offences maintained.

Summary: (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----Ss. 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d) & 7(i); Explosive Substances Act, 1908----Ss. 3, 4 & 5-A; Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898)----Ss. 164, 173, 265-H(2), 342, 497(2) & 544-A----Terrorism case---Bomb blast outside PIDC House, Karachi, causing five deaths, injuries to more than twenty persons and extensive damage to property---Appellants arrested in a separate explosives case and then formally shown arrested in the present case---Convicted by Anti-Terrorism Court and sentenced to death on four counts with multiple terms of imprisonment, fines, forfeiture of property and compensation; conviction and sentences upheld by High Court; reference for confirmation of death sentence answered in affirmative---Reappraisal of evidence by Supreme Court---Held, that prosecution case rested essentially on (i) testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses who claimed to have seen the appellants park the explosive-laden vehicle and leave in another car, (ii) a test identification parade, and (iii) judicial confessions recorded under S.164, Cr.P.C.---On independent scrutiny, presence of alleged eyewitnesses at the crime scene remained doubtful; their omission from the crime report and failure to immediately disclose material facts to the complainant (an officer of the same police station), inconsistency regarding the time and circumstances of parking of the vehicle, lack of independent proof of their duty or presence at the site, and their failure to provide concrete particulars of the vehicles or accused rendered their testimony not confidence-inspiring---Test identification proceedings were conducted jointly for three accused with dissimilar dummies, possible exposure of accused to witnesses prior to parade, and without recording or ascribing distinct roles of each accused, contrary to settled principles---Judicial confessions were recorded after an unexplained delay of nearly three weeks while appellants remained in police custody; no safeguards or precautionary measures were shown to have been taken by the Magistrate to ensure voluntariness; statements were sketchy, devoid of details of commission of offence or specific individuals, were later retracted and stood contradicted by other prosecution evidence---Investigation itself was tainted by failure to secure and produce complete CCTV footage from the highly surveilled area, thereby withholding the best available evidence without explanation---In such circumstances prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; benefit of doubt must go to the accused even if arising from a single circumstance---Conviction and sentences of appellants set aside; they were acquitted of all charges and death sentences not confirmed. Cited cases: Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others (2016 SCMR 274); Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 704); Majeed v. The State (2010 SCMR 55); Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob and others v. The State and others (1992 SCMR 1983); Mst. Naseem Akhtar and another v. The State (1999 SCMR 1744); Shamoon alias Shamma v. The State (1995 SCMR 1377); Naseer Hussain v. Nawaz and others (1994 SCMR 1504). (b) Criminal trial---Eyewitnesses---Non-mention in first information report and unexplained silence---Effect---Complainant, a Station House Officer who reached the spot immediately after the blast, lodged crime report giving details of place, time and vehicle used, but did not mention the presence of traffic constable (PW-26) or taxi driver (PW-25) who later claimed to be eyewitnesses or that any person had seen the perpetrators park the vehicle---Traffic constable (PW-26), being a police official of the same station, admitted that he returned to the scene after the blast and remained there but did not disclose to the complainant or investigating officer that he had allegedly seen the accused; crime report noted that the car had been parked at “unknown time” which conflicted with his statement---No independent proof (such as duty roster) was produced to show that he was posted on duty at the relevant point---Taxi driver (PW-25) was also not named in the crime report or by any official; prosecution failed to prove he was actually driving a taxi or present at the spot---He admitted that he did not provide physical descriptions or features of the perpetrators except a vague reference to their “accent”, even though his own version showed that he never conversed with them; description of vehicle as “biscuity-coloured Suzuki Mehran” was inconsistent with other evidence---Such unexplained omissions, contradictions and lack of corroboration rendered presence of both witnesses at the scene doubtful---Held, that evidence of such witnesses was not confidence-inspiring and could not safely be relied upon for sustaining conviction in a capital terrorism case. (c) Criminal trial----Test identification parade----Joint parade; dissimilar dummies; possible prior exposure; omission to allocate roles---Effect---Proceedings of test identification parade were conducted by Judicial Magistrate (PW-24)---It stood admitted that all three accused were lined up together in a single parade amongst only twelve dummies, who did not have similar features or physical characteristics; accused were seated in the court corridor before proceedings thereby creating serious likelihood of prior exposure to witnesses; Magistrate did not record any precautionary measures to exclude possibility of such exposure; testimony and memorandum did not reflect that respective roles of the accused in the occurrence were either elicited or recorded; custody of appellants remained with CIA/police officials for several days prior to identification and prosecution did not establish that witnesses had no opportunity to see them earlier---Held, that identification parade was not conducted in accordance with settled law and principles laid down by Supreme Court; such defective proceedings were of no evidentiary value and could not be made the basis of conviction. Cited case: Kanwar Anwaar Ali (PLD 2019 SC 488). (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (X of 1984)----Art. 22----Identification parade---Nature and evidentiary value---Requirement of scrupulous care---Identification test is one of the modes of proof contemplated by Art.22 and is essentially corroborative in character; it is designed to enable a witness to identify the real offender and to exclude the possibility of witness merely confirming a vague impression or faint recollection; it must, therefore, be conducted with scrupulous care, fairness and regard to the exigencies of each case so that proceedings do not become collusive or suggestive---Where such parade is held jointly for multiple accused, with dissimilar dummies, without precautions against prior exposure and without recording individual roles, it loses all probative force and cannot be treated as corroboration of a doubtful ocular account. Cited cases: Muhammad Siddique and others v. The State (2020 SCMR 342); Javed Khan Bacha v. The State (2017 SCMR 524); Subha Sadiq v. The State (2025 SCMR 50). (e) Criminal trial----Judicial confession---Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898)----S. 164----Voluntariness, delay and police custody---Retraction---Requirement that confession be accepted or rejected as a whole---Scope---Appellants were arrested on 16-11-2005 in a separate explosives case and remained in police custody; prosecution alleged that they confessed their involvement in present case before police but investigating officer of that case was not produced as witness---They were brought before Magistrate on 23-11-2005 for test identification parade yet no expressed desire to confess was recorded; statements under S.164, Cr.P.C. were ultimately recorded on 05-12-2005, almost three weeks after arrest---Such unexplained delay while in police custody, absence of assurance by Magistrate that they would not be remanded back to police, and lack of material precautions rendered voluntariness highly doubtful---Contents of alleged confessions were cryptic and devoid of particulars; they merely stated that act was done at instance of unnamed “Sardars” and did not furnish details of planning, execution, means or identity of alleged instigators; description of vehicle in confession was contradicted by prosecution’s own witness; appellants later retracted from such statements---Held, that prosecution failed to establish that judicial confessions were voluntary, true and free from duress, coercion, inducement or influence of any kind; such statements could not legally form basis of conviction, particularly when prosecution case otherwise stood discredited---Further held, when prosecution’s story is rejected and conviction is sought to be rested solely on confession, the statement must be accepted or rejected as a whole; court cannot pick and choose parts of a confession to suit prosecution while discarding exculpatory portions. Cited cases: Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others (2016 SCMR 274); Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 704); Majeed v. The State (2010 SCMR 55); Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob and others v. The State and others (1992 SCMR 1983); Mst. Naseem Akhtar and another v. The State (1999 SCMR 1744); Shamoon alias Shamma v. The State (1995 SCMR 1377); Naseer Hussain v. Nawaz and others (1994 SCMR 1504). (f) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (X of 1984)----Art. 129(g)----Withholding best evidence---Adverse inference---Occurrence took place in front of PIDC House where offices of Karachi Electric Supply Company, branches of various commercial banks and an outlet of international fast-food chain were situated---Given nature of locality, likelihood of multiple CCTV cameras was obvious; investigating officer obtained only a limited portion of footage from camera installed outside PIDC House, which was confined to moment of explosion and resulting damage---Record indicated that camera was fully functional and had captured entire sequence of events prior to blast but neither complete footage from that camera nor footage from other cameras in vicinity was obtained or produced; no plausible explanation was offered for such omission---Held, that prosecution had deliberately withheld the best available evidence which could have conclusively shown presence or absence of eyewitnesses and perpetrators at relevant time; Court was justified in drawing adverse inference under Art.129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 that had such evidence been produced it would not have supported prosecution case. Cited cases: Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846); Zafar Abbas v. The State (2010 SCMR 939); Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224); Muhammad Rizwan v. The State (2025 SCMR 762). (g) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 212----Criminal justice system---Wrongful incarceration due to defective investigation, flawed appreciation of evidence and delay---State liability to compensate and rehabilitate victims of miscarriage of justice---Scope---Appellants, aged about 27 and 37 years at time of their arrest, remained incarcerated for more than two decades on capital charges, ultimately to be acquitted on ground of total failure of prosecution to prove case; investigation did not meet basic standards of fairness or diligence, no serious effort was made to trace actual perpetrators of heinous terrorist act, and two young citizens were made scapegoats; trial and appeal before High Court consumed inordinate time and fixation of matter before Supreme Court was unjustifiably delayed---Held, that such prolonged and unjust imprisonment entailed irretrievable loss of more than twenty years of life, careers, livelihoods, family and social relationships and inflicted deep psychological trauma; process of justice itself became an instrument of oppression; this constituted a grave breach of State’s duty of care towards its citizens and was an indictment of criminal justice system---Authority of State, exercised through investigation, prosecution and judiciary, carries corresponding obligation to safeguard life, liberty and dignity of every person; Art.212 of the Constitution reinforces a constitutional right to seek compensation for tortious acts of government and public functionaries and provides a remedy against public wrongs, ensuring that State cannot act with impunity when its failures cause harm---In light of constitutional mandate, it is incumbent upon governments, as representatives of State, to take immediate, effective steps for compensation, rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of miscarriage of justice; such measures are constitutional obligations, not charity---Governments may consider enactment of legislation providing a structured mechanism to compensate, rehabilitate and assist such victims and to hold public functionaries accountable where breach of duty is established. (h) Criminal procedure----Appeal/leave against acquittal----Scope and considerations----Double presumption of innocence---Criminal Petition No.74-K of 2020 filed by State challenging High Court judgment acquitting accused (Abdul Hameed Bugti) of charges arising from same occurrence---Held, that case against said accused was essentially one of no evidence; learned Additional Prosecutor General failed to point out any instance of misreading or non-reading of evidence or any perversity in reasoning of High Court; where two views are possible on appreciation of evidence, the one favouring accused must prevail in an acquittal matter---An acquittal carries double presumption of innocence; interference by Supreme Court is justified only where findings of acquittal are shown to be blatantly perverse, arbitrary, capricious, speculative, shocking, illegal or based on impossibility; scope of interference in acquittal is profoundly narrow and limited and is resorted to only in exceptional cases---Since no question of law arose and no legal or factual defect in impugned judgment was demonstrated, leave to appeal was refused and State’s criminal petition was dismissed. Cited cases: Mst. Askar Jan v. Muhammad Daud (2010 SCMR 1604); Jehangir v. Aminullah (2010 SCMR 491); Haji Amanullah v. Munir Ahmed (2010 SCMR 222); State v. Ahmed Omar Sheikh (2021 SCMR 873); The State v. Anwar Saifullah Khan (PLD 2016 SC 276); State v. Abdul Khaloq (PLD 2011 SC 554).

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860); Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 302(b); S. 544-A & S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. Murder—Conviction—Sentence modified—Accused (Frontier Corps member) convicted under S. 302(b), PPC on ocular account, judicial confession, positive FSL, and test identification—Trial Court awarded death with compensation of Rs. 1,000,000/- u/S 544-A, Cr.P.C.; High Court maintained conviction and corrected default imprisonment on compensation from six years to six months—Held (by majority 2-1): conviction u/S 302(b) maintained; however, in view of absence of prior enmity, the suddenness of the incident following bomb blasts, and the accused’s stated loss of self-control, sentence of death is altered to imprisonment for life—Benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. extended—Compensation and corrected default term maintained. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984; Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Art. 43 (confession); S. 164, Cr.P.C.; Test identification; Forensic corroboration Judicial confession—Voluntariness and corroboration—Confession recorded by Magistrate after statutory warnings; no coercion found—Confession that accused, angered after blasts injuring colleagues, fired at the apprehended victim—Confession duly corroborated by (i) recovery of official rifle, (ii) FSL report matching eight empties with said rifle, (iii) test identification parade conducted by Magistrate wherein PW-2 identified the accused, and (iv) consistent ocular account (PW-2, PW-4)—Cross-examination failed to shake prosecution evidence—Held, prosecution proved case beyond shadow of doubt. (c) Sentencing—Standards and discretion under S. 302(b), PPC ----“Having regard to the facts and circumstances”—Mitigating vs. aggravating factors Where guilt is proved, court must exercise structured discretion between death and life imprisonment—Majority noted lack of prior motive/enmity and the immediate emotional trigger (post-blast scene with injured colleagues) as mitigating—Accordingly, life imprisonment sufficed to meet ends of justice—(Dissent per Athar Minallah, J.: extra-judicial custodial killing of an unarmed citizen in presence of parents, eight shots to the back with official weapon, is brutal, shocking, and attracts ‘fasad-fil-arz’; deterrence and retribution demanded affirmation of death sentence). (d) Jurisdiction—Sessions trial vs. military court ----Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959; Pakistan Army Act, 1952; Cr.P.C. Plea that only a military court had jurisdiction—Repelled—Accused was governed by Frontier Corps Ordinance, 1959; offence was under S. 302, PPC against a civilian in Turbat—Sessions Judge, Mekran at Turbat, had competent jurisdiction; transparency and open trial before ordinary criminal court served public interest; Army Act not attracted. (e) Practice & Procedure—State-appointed defence counsel fee ----Supreme Court Rules, 1980 (as amended) Office practice of withholding fee of State-appointed defence counsel once a private counsel is later engaged—No statutory/rule-based bar—Direction issued: irrespective of subsequent private engagement, office shall pay full fee, as per law/rules, to counsel appointed at State expense who appeared and assisted the Court. (f) Disposition ----Criminal Petition converted into appeal; partly allowed (majority 2-1) Conviction u/S 302(b), PPC maintained; death sentence altered to imprisonment for life; S. 382-B benefit extended; compensation and corrected default imprisonment (six months SI) maintained—Per Athar Minallah, J. (dissent): appeal dismissed; death sentence to stand affirmed. Cited Cases (inter alia): • Khurram Malik v. State PLD 2006 SC 354; Abdul Malik v. State PLD 2006 SC 365; Zarin v. State 1976 SCMR 359; Rajasab Khan PLD 1976 SC 452; Muhammad Sharif 1991 SCMR 1622; Noor Muhammad 1999 SCMR 2722; Jetharam 1986 SCMR 1056; Bakshish Elahi 1977 SCMR 389; Muhammad Afzal PLD 2000 SC 12; Ms. Najiba 2001 SCMR 988; Dilawar Hussain 2013 SCMR 1582; Hassan PLD 2013 SC 793; Zafar 1999 SCMR 2028; Muhammad Ilyas PLD 2003 SC 465; Asad Mahmood 2010 SCMR 868; Suo Motu “Rangers killing” PLD 2011 SC 799; Shahid Zafar PLD 2014 SC 809; Rashid Ali 2011 SCMR 1037; Mumtaz Qadri PLD 2016 SC 17; Muhammad Aslam PLD 2006 SC 465.

Summary: (a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----S. 540—Scope; timing; “may” (discretion) vs “shall” (duty)—Essentiality test—Fair-trial limits—Held: An application under S.540 Cr.P.C. is maintainable at any stage, even at the final-arguments threshold, but only where the proposed evidence is essential for a just decision and its reception does not undermine the accused’s fair-trial guarantees under Art. 10-A of the Constitution—Section 540 cannot be deployed to stage “evidentiary ambushes” or to fill lacunae after closure of evidence; the trial court must guard against misuse and avoid placing the prosecution in an advantageous position over the defence. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 & Cr.P.C. ----Arts. 34, 37–43, 38 & 39; Cr.P.C., S.164—Confession: nature, voluntariness, and admissibility—Confession to a journalist while the accused is in police custody, not recorded before a Magistrate under S.164 Cr.P.C., is inadmissible by virtue of Arts.38–39 QSO—Articles 37–43 embody safeguards against coerced or untrustworthy confessions; voluntariness is the controlling criterion—A media interview recorded during custody and later uploaded online cannot be treated as a voluntary judicial confession nor as essential evidence for S.540 purposes. (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Arts. 10-A, 13(b) & 14(2)—Right to fair trial; protection against self-incrimination; prohibition on torture—Courts must apply confession rules to minimise risk of wrongful conviction; attempts to introduce custodial “confessions” outside S.164 safeguards offend Art.10-A and the nemo tenetur principle under Art.13(b); Art.14(2) reinforces exclusion of statements tainted by coercive environments. (d) Trial management & adverse inference ----Closure of evidence; adverse presumption—The trial process is not a “game of surprise”; certainty after closure must be respected—Where a party withholds available adverse material, courts may draw an adverse inference (Art.129, Ill.(g), QSO), but cannot re-open evidence under S.540 to repair prosecutorial omissions absent genuine essentiality consistent with fair-trial rights. (e) Media interviews / social-media dissemination ----Public broadcast irrelevant to admissibility—A confession’s publication on YouTube or other platforms does not convert an otherwise inadmissible custodial statement into admissible evidence—Such material neither satisfies S.164 Cr.P.C. nor the voluntariness standard; permitting its late introduction would compromise trial sanctity and due process. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 • Painda Gul v. The State 1987 SCMR 886 • Mehrzad Khan v. The State PLD 1991 SC 430 • Ghulam Ali v. Pakistan 1993 SCMR 540 • The State v. Muhammad Yaqoob 2001 SCMR 308 • Muhammad Murad Abro v. The State 2004 SCMR 966 • Shahbaz Masih v. The State 2007 SCMR 1631 • Ansar Mehmood v. Abdul Khaliq 2011 SCMR 713 • Nawabzada Shah Zain Bugti v. The State PLD 2013 SC 160 • Sajid Mehmood v. The State 2022 SCMR 1882 • Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State PLD 2003 SC 704 • Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47 (nature of confession) • Sidheshwar Nath v. Emperor AIR 1934 All 351 (confession–admission distinction) • Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (self-incrimination/fair-warning principles) • Ward v. The Queen (1979) 2 SCR 30; Horvath v. The Queen (1979) 2 SCR 376 (voluntariness) (g) Disposition — Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Orders of the Trial Court (04.06.2025) and High Court (12.06.2025) set aside—Prosecution’s application under S.540 Cr.P.C. to summon journalist and introduce the custodial, non-Magisterial “confession” dismissed as inadmissible and non-essential—Trial to proceed to conclusion without the impugned material.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- ----S. 302(b); Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 40; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 164, 342, 382-B; Criminal jurisprudence—Circumstantial evidence—“Last seen” theory—Standards and application—Unwitnessed murder case founded on last-seen plus recoveries and FSL—Held, prosecution failed to establish a complete, unbroken chain of incriminating circumstances; substantial time-gap between last-seen (22.09.2020 at 8:30 p.m.) and death (post-mortem 23.09.2020 at 6:30 p.m.; time of death not fixed with certainty) did not exclude third-party intervention—Mere last-seen is insufficient without cogent corroboration (motive, proximity, airtight timeline)—Benefit of doubt extended. Principles in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda, AIR 1984 SC 1622, and Sh. Muhammad Amjad, PLD 2003 SC 704, applied; elements reiterated in Fayyaz Ahmad, 2017 SCMR 2026. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ---- ----Art. 40—Disclosure/pointation and recoveries—Evidentiary worth—Dead-body recovery portrayed as made on joint disclosure of accused on 23.09.2020, yet disclosure memo was prepared on 05.10.2020 with no plausible explanation—Such delay and “joint pointation” render the recovery legally infirm—Recovery on joint pointation held inadmissible; planting suspected. Muhammad Riaz v. State, 2024 SCMR 1839, and Muhammad Mushtaq v. Mustansar Hussain, 2016 SCMR 2123, followed. (c) Forensic science evidence ---- ----Chain of custody and reliability—Crime empty recovered on 23.09.2020; pistol allegedly recovered on 05.10.2020; both kept together in malkhana and dispatched to FSL only on 04.11.2020—Chain-of-custody lapses fatally undermine matching report—Recovery is at best corroborative and cannot by itself sustain conviction; tainted item cannot corroborate another tainted piece. Ali Sher v. The State, 2008 SCMR 707, applied. (d) Criminal trial ---- ----Confession of co-accused under S. 164, Cr.P.C.—Evidentiary value—Confession recorded after 14–15 days’ police custody was exculpatory/retracted and could not constitute substantive evidence against the petitioner; at most usable for assurance if independent evidence inspires confidence—Where other evidence is weak/unsafe, co-accused confession cannot fill gaps—Presumption of innocence prevails. Hari Charan Kurmi, AIR 1964 SC 1184, relied on. (e) Criminal appellate jurisdiction ---- ----Concurrent findings—Reappraisal by Supreme Court—Scope—Although the Court ordinarily refrains from re-evaluating evidence where concurrent findings exist, intervention is warranted on perversity, illegality, material irregularity, or miscarriage of justice—Material infirmities in last-seen timeline, disclosure/recovery, FSL handling, and non-proof of motorcycle sale warranted interference and acquittal. Held, prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt; chain of circumstances was incomplete. Criminal Petition No. 63-Q of 2024 converted into appeal and allowed; convictions dated 08.06.2022 and 29.10.2024 set aside; appellant Osama acquitted and to be released if not required in any other case. Consequent thereto, Criminal Petition No. 64-Q of 2024 (complainant’s enhancement plea) became infructuous and was dismissed. Majority 2-1 (Musarrat Hilali, J., dissenting). Dissent (Musarrat Hilali, J.)—Last-seen firmly established; prompt, compliant recoveries; co-accused’s S.164 Cr.P.C. confession voluntary and corroborative; investigative lapses not fatal absent prejudice; conviction and life sentence ought to stand; enhancement dismissed. Cited cases: • Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 • Sh. Muhammad Amjad v. The State, PLD 2003 SC 704 • Fayyaz Ahmad v. The State, 2017 SCMR 2026 • Muhammad Riaz v. State, 2024 SCMR 1839 • Muhammad Mushtaq v. Mustansar Hussain, 2016 SCMR 2123 • Ali Sher v. The State, 2008 SCMR 707 • Nizam v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC 550 • Hari Charan Kurmi & others v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184

Summary: Acquittal granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – S. 342 – Judicial Confession – Retraction – Evidentiary Value Held, a retracted judicial confession, although admissible, must be corroborated by independent and trustworthy evidence—In the present case, the confession allegedly made by the accused was later retracted, and no independent, confidence-inspiring corroboration was available—Medical and forensic evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction—Confession recorded under pressure or in the presence of hostile parties cannot form the basis for conviction—Conviction based solely on a retracted confession, without credible supporting evidence, is unsustainable—Principles reiterated from Obaidullah v. The State (2025 SCP 177), Aala Muhammad v. The State (2008 SCMR 649), Muhammad Ismail v. The State (2017 SCMR 898), and Daniel Boyd v. The State (1992 SCMR 196). (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) – Ss. 302(b), 377 – Circumstantial Evidence – Standard of Proof – Benefit of Doubt Held, prosecution case was entirely based on circumstantial evidence—There were significant doubts including unexplained delay in lodging FIR, interested witnesses, lack of direct evidence, and belated introduction of last-seen witness—Recovery of weapon and forensic evidence not sufficient to conclusively link accused to the offence—Medical opinion regarding sodomy was inconsistent and not corroborated by initial postmortem—Held, in cases based on circumstantial evidence, each link in the chain must be unbroken and incapable of any other explanation than guilt of accused—Failure of one link destroys entire case—Principles reiterated from Siraj v. The Crown (PLD 1956 FC 123), Ch. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia (1992 SCMR 1047), and Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain (2008 SCMR 1103). (c) Criminal Law – FIR – Delay in Lodging – Effect on Prosecution Credibility Held, FIR was registered approximately 47 hours after discovery of deceased—No plausible explanation provided—Complainant had ample opportunity to lodge FIR, but chose to wait until after burial and consultations—Such delay casts serious doubt on credibility and spontaneity of prosecution version—Cited: Altaf Hussain v. The State (2019 SCMR 274), Amir Muhammad Khan v. The State (2023 SCMR 566). (d) Constitutional Criminal Jurisprudence – Benefit of Doubt – Standard of Acquittal Held, where doubt exists in a prosecution case, no matter how minor, it must be resolved in favour of accused—It is the duty of the court to ensure that no innocent person is convicted based on assumptions, conjecture or interested testimony—Where multiple factors (retracted confession, inconsistent medical findings, delayed FIR, biased witnesses) raise serious doubt, acquittal is the only lawful outcome—Reaffirmed: “Benefit of doubt is not a concession but a legal right of the accused.” Disposition: Appeal allowed—Judgments of the Trial Court dated 02.01.2017 and High Court dated 30.09.2020 set aside—Appellant Manzoor Ahmed acquitted of all charges by extending benefit of doubt—To be released forthwith unless required in another case. Cited Authorities & Cases: Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 342, 164 Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 377 Obaidullah v. The State (2025 SCP 177) Altaf Hussain v. The State (2019 SCMR 274) Amir Muhammad Khan v. The State (2023 SCMR 566) Ch. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia (1992 SCMR 1047) Siraj v. The Crown (PLD 1956 FC 123) Aala Muhammad v. The State (2008 SCMR 649)

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)––S. 302(b)––Murder of minor––Circumstantial evidence––Last seen, confessional statement, recovery, and medical evidence––Unbroken chain of incriminating circumstances––Conviction maintained–– Appellant was convicted under S. 302(b), P.P.C. for the rape and murder of a 5½-year-old girl. While no direct eyewitness account was available, conviction was based on circumstantial evidence forming a coherent and unbroken chain leading to the guilt of the accused. Evidence included: (i) last seen testimony of PW-2 who saw the appellant with the deceased; (ii) judicial confessional statement made under S. 164, Cr.P.C.; (iii) recovery of the deceased's dopatta at the appellant’s instance; and (iv) medical evidence confirming homicidal asphyxia consistent with the confession. The Court held that such circumstantial evidence, if cogent and consistent, could support a conviction even in a capital case. Cited cases: Munawar Hussain v. Imran Waseem 2013 SCMR 374; Manjeet Singh v. The State PLD 2006 SC 30. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)––S. 376––Rape––Confessional statement lacking unequivocal admission––Medical evidence inconsistent––Conviction set aside–– High Court rightly acquitted the appellant under S. 376, P.P.C. after finding that his judicial confession did not clearly mention the act of rape in unequivocal terms, and the medical evidence did not support the prosecution’s claim of sexual assault. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, holding that courts may accept parts of a confessional statement that are corroborated by independent evidence and reject parts that are unsupported. Cited cases: Manjeet Singh v. The State PLD 2006 SC 30. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)––S. 164––Confessional statement––Voluntariness––Retracted confession––Legal test––Reliability–– The confessional statement of the appellant recorded under S. 164, Cr.P.C. was held to be voluntary, truthful, and recorded in compliance with all legal safeguards. The Magistrate ensured proper reflection time and recorded the confession without coercion. Although the confession was later retracted, it remained admissible and formed a key piece of evidence when corroborated by other circumstances. Cited cases: Manjeet Singh v. The State PLD 2006 SC 30. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984––Art. 40––Recovery on pointation of accused––Corroborative evidence––Admissibility–– Recovery of the dopatta of the deceased from an abandoned house on the pointation of the appellant was admissible under Art. 40, QSO 1984, and formed a corroborative link with the confessional statement and the prosecution’s version. Witnessed by PW-3 and conducted by PW-7, the recovery further reinforced the reliability of the circumstantial chain. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)––S. 544-A––Compensation––Conviction partially upheld––Compensation order sustained–– The compensation of Rs. 200,000/- awarded to the legal heirs of the deceased under S. 544-A, Cr.P.C., was upheld by the Supreme Court, including the default sentence of six months’ simple imprisonment in case of non-payment. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)––S. 382-B––Benefit of set-off––Sentence computation–– The benefit of S. 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to the appellant for the time already spent in custody since his arrest on 20.12.2011, during which he remained continuously confined, including in the death cell. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)––S. 302(b)––Sentence––Commutation from death to life imprisonment––Mitigating circumstances––Long incarceration––Minor inconsistencies–– In view of minor inconsistencies in prosecution evidence not affecting core reliability, long incarceration of over a decade in death cell, and the High Court’s acquittal of the rape charge under S. 376, PPC, the Supreme Court treated these factors as mitigating. Accordingly, the death sentence under S. 302(b), PPC was commuted to imprisonment for life. Disposition: Appeal partly allowed. Conviction under Section 302(b), PPC maintained; sentence of death commuted to life imprisonment. Conviction and sentence under Section 376, PPC set aside. Compensation under Section 544-A, Cr.P.C. and benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. upheld.

Summary: Acquittal ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b) — Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence — Standards for Judicial Confession — Reversal of Conviction Murder trial based on circumstantial evidence — Petitioners were convicted by Trial Court under S. 302(b), PPC; one sentenced to death and the other to life imprisonment — High Court converted death sentence to life imprisonment — Supreme Court observed that prosecution’s case was entirely dependent on circumstantial evidence and retracted judicial confessions — Judicial confessions held inadmissible due to non-compliance with legal requirements — Magistrate failed to mention whether accused were given time for reflection or that they made confessions voluntarily — No independent corroboration found — Medical evidence did not support confessional statements — It is settled law that in circumstantial evidence, all links in the chain must be unbroken, and confessions must be voluntary, truthful, and corroborated — In absence of credible and unbroken chain of evidence, conviction is not sustainable — Petitioners acquitted on benefit of doubt. Cited Cases: • Ch. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia 1992 SCMR 1047 • Sarfraz Khan v. The State 1996 SCMR 188 • Asadullah v. The State PLJ 1999 SC 1018 • Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain 2008 SCMR 1103 • Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 (b) Criminal Trial — Judicial Confession — Requirements for Admissibility — Confession Discarded Judicial confession — Legal prerequisites not followed — Magistrate did not record whether accused were given sufficient time for reflection or whether confession was made voluntarily without police presence — No mention in official reports of compliance with S. 164 Cr.P.C. safeguards — Supreme Court held that judicial confessions, when not recorded in accordance with law and unsupported by medical or other corroborative evidence, cannot form basis for conviction — Retracted confession without corroboration carries no evidentiary value. (c) Criminal Trial — Circumstantial Evidence — Principle of Continuous Chain — Failure to Prove Prosecution Case Beyond Reasonable Doubt Conviction in circumstantial evidence case — Legal requirement that each piece of evidence must form part of an unbroken chain — Any break in chain warrants acquittal — In present case, multiple contradictions and inconsistencies in evidence — Confessional statements uncorroborated — No recovery or direct linkage to the crime — Benefit of doubt must be extended where prosecution fails to exclude hypothesis of innocence — Supreme Court reaffirmed that even a single unresolved doubt is sufficient for acquittal — Conviction set aside. Disposition: Appeals allowed — Judgment of High Court and conviction under S. 302(b), PPC set aside — Petitioners Obaidullah and Zubair Ahmed acquitted of all charges — To be released unless required in another case — Connected criminal petitions for enhancement of sentence dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 496-A---Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegations against the petitioner were that he enticed away the wife of the complainant for the purpose of committing fornication---Perusal of the record revealed that the alleged abductee returned home on 22.3.2025 and recorded her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C, before the Magistrate on 26.3.2025, wherein, she did not mention that she was enticed or abducted by the accused for the purpose of illicit activities---Section 496-A, PPC, criminalizes the enticement or concealment of a married woman with intent that she may have illicit intercourse---Central ingredient was not merely the abduction or unlawful confinement but the specific intent for illicit intercourse, which must be positively asserted or inferred from evidence---In the present case, although the abductee had narrated that she was taken away and detained against her will yet she had not alleged that she was taken with the intent of illicit relations, nor had she made any accusation that would attract the penal provisions of S.496-A, P.P.C---Accused was arrested by the police on 27.02.2025 and the complainant wife returned home on 22.3.2025, while her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C, was recorded on 26.3.2025, with a 4-day delay---Notably, the Magistrate did not summon the accused from jail to provide him an opportunity to cross -examine abductee as required by S.164 (1A), Cr.P.C.---Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of case, such statement of the complainant's wife might not influence/ affect bail---Record did not provide information about the whereabouts of the complainant's wife from 27.02.2025 (accused's arrest) to March 22, 2025 (her return home)---Similarly, wife's statement under S.164 Cr.P.C was recorded 04 days after she returned home, but the record lacked any explanation or justification for such delay---Given the lack of information about the wife's whereabouts from 27.02.2025 to 22.03.2025, combined with the unexplained delay in filing the FIR and recording her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C, without following S.164 (1A), Cr.P.C, her statement could not be relied upon for bail decision without a plausible explanation being offered during the trial---Thus, a case of further inquiry within the meaning of S.497(2), Cr.P.C, was made out in favour of petitioner---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Inam Ullah Khan Wazir for Petitioner. Mehboob Ali Khan for Respondent. Najeeb Ullah Khan, A.A.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 21st April, 2025.