Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 175F(1)(c)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 491---Leave to appeal against dismissal of habeas corpus petition for recovery of alleged detenue/daughter---Scope---Petitioner/father sought recovery of his daughter on the plea that she was a Christian minor and had been taken into unlawful custody by respondent, who claimed to be her husband---Courts below dismissed the petition on the basis of the girl’s voluntary statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and her assertion that she had contracted marriage of her free will---Federal Constitutional Court held that where the alleged detenue had repeatedly appeared before competent fora and unequivocally stated that no abduction had taken place and that she had married voluntarily, her custody with the person claiming to be her husband could not, in summary proceedings under S.491, Cr.P.C., be termed illegal or unlawful---Question whether Nikahnama was forged, or whether investigation required transfer, pertained to criminal process and could not by itself justify habeas corpus relief---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed. (b) Muslim Personal Law---Marriage between Muslim male and Christian female---Validity---Petitioner contended that his Christian daughter could not lawfully marry a Muslim male---Held, contention was misconceived and contrary to settled principles of Islamic law---A Muslim male may validly contract marriage with a Christian woman, being from Ahl al-Kitab---Such principle stood recognized in earlier Supreme Court authorities and classical juristic exposition---Court held that objection to marriage merely on the basis of difference of religion was without substance. Cited Cases: Mrs. Marina Jatoi v. Nuruddin K. Jatoi and others PLD 1967 SC 580. Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Mst. Bilqis Bibi and others PLD 1981 SC 56. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 189---Federal Constitutional Court---Precedential value of judgments of Supreme Court of Pakistan after establishment of Federal Constitutional Court---Held, judgments of the former Supreme Court of Pakistan do not bind the Federal Constitutional Court as a matter of absolute precedent under the restructured constitutional hierarchy, but continue to carry great persuasive value where they are based on sound reasoning, are consistent with constitutional text and structure, and do not offend fundamental rights or evolved constitutional values---Doctrine of stare decisis was not abrogated but recalibrated in light of constitutional supremacy---Departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent must be express, reasoned and principled, and may be justified where such precedent is manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution, undermines fundamental rights, reflects judicial overreach, becomes incompatible with evolved constitutional values and democratic norms, or where any other compelling reason advances the cause of justice. (d) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)----S.1(2)---Marriage---Conversion to Islam---Effect---Though marriage of a Muslim male with a Christian female is permissible in principle, solemnization and registration under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is confined to Muslim citizens---Respondent’s stance was that the girl had embraced Islam before marriage---Affidavit appended with Nikahnama and subsequent certificate issued by a religious institution were produced to show conversion---Held, faith is a personal matter; once a person openly professes adherence to Islam, ordinarily no roving inquiry into the sincerity or motive of conversion is warranted in such proceedings---No specific ritual is indispensable beyond declaration and profession of belief---Where girl herself acknowledged correctness of Nikahnama and declared conversion, Court would not undertake deeper inquiry into genuineness of conversion in summary jurisdiction---Marriage was, prima facie, validly solemnized under the Ordinance. Cited Cases: Mst. Zarina and another v. The State PLD 1988 FSC 105. Tariq Masih v. The State 2004 PCr.LJ 622. (e) Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929---Child marriage---Effect on validity of marriage---Petitioner asserted that alleged detenue was about twelve years of age and, therefore, incapable of contracting valid marriage---Held, the Act of 1929 restrains and criminalizes solemnization of child marriage, but does not expressly render such marriage void or voidable---In absence of explicit statutory language invalidating the marriage, its legal status remains unaffected---Where legislature intends to override settled personal law, it must do so in clear and unequivocal terms; such intention cannot be inferred from silence---Therefore, even assuming minority, marriage would not automatically become void merely because it was contracted in contravention of the Act of 1929. Cited Cases: Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mirza Muhammad Amin and another PLD 1962 W.P. Karachi 442. Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad and another PLD 1970 SC 323. Mauj Ali v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah and another 1970 SCMR 437. Nasreen Bibi v. Station House Officer and others 2024 PCr.LJ 2058. Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate 1st Class and others PLD 2021 Lahore 21. Muhammad Azam v. The State and another 2018 PCr.LJ Note 175. Muhammad Safeer v. Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad PLD 2018 Islamabad 385. Allah Nawaz v. Station House Officer PLD 2013 Lahore 243. Allah Bakhsh v. Safdar and others 2006 YLR 2936. Ghulam Qadir v. The Judge Family Court, Murree 1988 CLC 113. Ghulam Hussain v. Nawaz Ali and another 1975 PCr.LJ 1049. (f) Evidence---Age of alleged detenue---Delayed birth documents---Probative value---Petitioner relied on birth certificate and child registration certificate to show that his daughter was born on 07.10.2012---Held, both documents had been procured many years after the alleged date of birth and no satisfactory explanation for such inordinate delay was furnished---Delayed registration of birth, unless supported by independent and reliable material, is susceptible to manipulation and its evidentiary value is diminished---Further, inconsistency in petitioner’s own stance regarding age in the F.I.R., close birth dates shown for the alleged detenue and her next sibling, entry of a different date of birth in the Nikahnama, and the girl’s own denial of minority materially weakened petitioner’s case---In such circumstances, delayed documents could not be treated as sole basis for holding that the girl was minor, particularly when she appeared physically before the Court and seemed to be of more advanced age. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.164---Statement of alleged detenue---Evidentiary significance in habeas corpus proceedings---Girl had recorded statement before Magistrate that nobody abducted her, no zina was committed, and that she had married respondent of her own free will; she had also made a similar statement in proceedings under Ss.22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.---Held, such consistent voluntary statements before judicial fora carried significant value in determining whether custody was illegal---Where marriage was acknowledged and free will asserted, summary court was justified in declining to infer unlawful detention. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.491---Summary nature of proceedings---Limitations---Question whether Nikahnama was forged or unregistered, and whether offences were made out in investigation, could not properly be adjudicated in proceedings of interim and summary nature under S.491, Cr.P.C.---Such issues were to be pursued before competent criminal court or through appropriate investigative remedies---Habeas corpus jurisdiction is not designed to conclusively determine complex factual controversies touching upon validity of marriage documents. (i) Res judicata---Constitutional petition for recovery of daughter---Earlier writ petition on same cause having attained finality---Effect---Petitioner had earlier filed writ petition for recovery of same daughter from same alleged custody on same foundational ground, which was dismissed by High Court after considering her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and holding that her custody with husband was not illegal or unlawful---Said finding was not challenged before higher forum and, therefore, attained finality---Held, subsequent proceedings on same issue were barred by principle of res judicata, and petitioner could not re-agitate the same question through another round of litigation. Cited Case: Pir Bakhsh v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145. (j) Constitutional law---Fundamental rights---Reliance on High Court judgment concerning discriminatory definition of “child”---Relevance---Petitioner relied upon PLD 2025 Lah. 1---Held, said judgment had no application to the controversy in hand, as that case concerned challenge to discriminatory definition of “child” prescribing different minimum ages for males and females with reference to provincial legislation, whereas present case concerned legality of custody and alleged invalidity of marriage in the factual setting of Punjab law. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed; however, observations made in the judgment were not to prejudice or impede criminal proceedings, if any, before the competent criminal court in accordance with law. ------ "The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 merely criminalizes the solemnization of a child marriage but does not expressly declare such a marriage to be void or voidable. The binding force of judicial precedent is not derived from institutional seniority but from the constitutional hierarchy itself. Since, the supremacy of constitutional adjudication now vests in this Court, therefore, all courts, including the Supreme Court of Pakistan, are bound by its pronouncements. However, this Court would ordinarily respect and follow the earlier constitutional jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, unless it is established that the same is manifestly erroneous, inconsistent with the constitutional text or scheme, or incompatible with fundamental rights and contemporary constitutional values. "

Summary: The backdrop of the case involves a habeas corpus petition filed under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) by Fahad Saleem for the recovery of his brother, Mohsin Saleem, allegedly held in illegal custody. The original petition lacked specific details, notably the name of the police station involved, leading to procedural complications.The petitioner contended that all legal protocols, including the detainee's transfer and obligatory presentation before a magistrate within 24 hours, were adhered to, arguing that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace's order overlooked these legal compliances.The Lahore High Court, upon examination of the case, underscored several constitutional and legal frameworks pertinent to personal liberty and arrest procedures in Pakistan. The court invoked Article 10(2) of the Constitution and Section 61 of the Cr.P.C., emphasizing the paramount importance of personal liberty and the legal safeguards against arbitrary detention, including the mandate that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within a specified 24-hour period, excluding the time required for travel.The court meticulously analyzed the sequence of events, including the issuance of police records (Rapts) and the conduct of the bailiff appointed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore. It was noted that there were inconsistencies and procedural lapses in the bailiff's reporting and in the actions taken by the petitioner, Muhammad Waqas, regarding the custody and subsequent presentation of the detainee before the court.Conclusively, the High Court determined that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace exceeded his jurisdiction by issuing the contested order without proper regard for the constitutional and statutory provisions that regulate police custody and judicial remand procedures. As a result, the court annulled the impugned order, declaring it null and void ab initio, and without any lawful basis. This ruling, delivered by Justice Aalia Neelum on 17.01.2024, reiterates the judiciary's imperative to uphold legal and constitutional mandates concerning arrest and detention processes, ensuring adherence to due process and safeguarding individual liberties against unlawful state actions.

Summary: The background of the case reveals that Afridi was apprehended by police officials outside the Peshawar High Court on 11th January 2024. Despite efforts to secure his release, the police denied having him in custody. The petitioner contends that Afridi is a political worker for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and a candidate in the upcoming General Elections. The arrest was deemed illegal, carried out without jurisdiction, and possibly with malafide intent.On 11th January 2024, a preliminary hearing resulted in the Advocate General being put on notice, with instructions to produce Afridi before the court. Afridi was subsequently presented in court. The Assistant Advocate General (AAG) explained that Afridi's arrest was due to a misunderstanding regarding his involvement in a criminal case. The AAG referenced an order from the District & Sessions Judge, Kohat, which inferred that an earlier court order had expired since Afridi failed to appear before the court as required.The petitioner's counsel argued that a previous High Court order (No.6009-P of 2023) had restrained the police from taking any action against Afridi, which is why he didn't appear for the transit bail. The High Court noted that Afridi, a lawyer and political candidate, was arrested despite an order preventing adverse action against him. The court acknowledged the Advocate General's efforts in ensuring Afridi's production and found that his detention was illegal.The court emphasized the constitutional protection of liberty and due process under Articles 4, 9, and 10 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The judgment stressed that depriving a person of liberty without legal justification is a serious matter and violative of law, justice, and fair play.As Afridi was not required for any criminal case, the court ordered his immediate release and prohibited any future actions against him that are not in accordance with law. The petition was converted into a contempt of court petition, and respondents No.1 & 2 were directed to submit a reply within ten days. The case was scheduled for re-listing on 18th January 2024.

Summary: The petitioner sought the recovery of her mentally disordered brother, Syed Qadeer Abbas, from the alleged illegal custody of Respondents No.3 to 8. The petitioner claimed that these respondents intended to take control of Qadeer Abbas's 19 kanals 09 marlas land in Chak No.543/E.B. The court issued notices to Respondents No.3 to 8 and directed the SHO, Police Station Machiwal, District Vehari, to produce Qadeer Abbas.The SHO reported that Qadeer Abbas had been missing for 4/5 years, and the petitioner had applied for his death certificate in May 2022, stating that he died on 15.05.2022. The SHO provided details about the inheritance mutation, land transactions, and a conflict between the petitioner and Respondent No.4. FIR No.185/2023 was lodged on 25.02.2023 by Respondent No.4.After considering the SHO's report and confronting the petitioner's counsel, the court found that the petitioner had filed the petition with false assertions and submitted a false affidavit. The court held that the petitioner had rendered herself liable to criminal prosecution and contempt of court.The judgment cited various legal precedents to underscore the imposition of costs for false or vexatious claims, including cases such as Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma [(1995) 1 SCC 421], Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana [(1995) 3 SCC 757], B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Association and others [(2006) 11 SCC 731], K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited and others [(2008) 12 SCC 481], Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi [(2012) 4 SCC 307], ABCD v. Union of India and others [(2020) 2 SCC 52], and Qazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge, Gujrat, etc. (PLD 2023 SC 298).The judgment also referenced sections 35 and 35A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), as well as sections 147, 148, 491, and 547 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.). It emphasized the court's authority to impose costs in criminal matters and cited specific rules from the Lahore High Court Rules & Orders governing the imposition of costs in habeas corpus petitions.In line with these legal principles, the court invoked its inherent powers and dismissed the petition with costs of Rs.10,000/-. The petitioner was held to have incurred criminal liability and was deemed liable for contempt of court, for which separate proceedings would be initiated.

Summary: Article 199clause (1) (b) &(i) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.i.Production of minors before the Court.ii.Custody of minors to real mother.iii.Minors in custody of uncle even in custody of their grandmother is unlawful in absence of Court order.iv.Concurrence of jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge under Section 491 Cr.PC and Habeas Corpus writ before the High Court. While the Habeas Corpus petition has been properly presented, the minors were given in custody of their mother in preference of their uncle or grandmother.v.Mst. Nazish Jehangiri (paternal aunt)/ counsel on behalf of respondent No. 1 demeanor has been condemned as she has become furor and degrading while her conduct is highly deplorable by unbecoming of a sagacious lawyer while coming to know the grant of custody to the mother opposed by her.

Summary: Imposition of compensation/cost to delinquent police official while dealing with petition under Section 491 Cr.P.C---In this case, Tahir Mahmood Gujar, a police official, has filed a revision petition challenging an order from the Sessions Judge, Gujranwala, which directed him to pay compensation of Rs. 10,000 to each of the detenus for their illegal detention. The detenus were allegedly taken into custody by the police and kept in the premises of C.I.A. Staff, Gujranwala, without proper documentation of their arrest. The Sessions Judge, after examining the situation, concluded that the detenus were indeed held illegally and held Tahir Mahmood Gujar responsible for the unlawful detention. The petitioner challenged this decision, arguing that compensation cannot be awarded in habeas corpus cases. The court discussed the permissible orders in habeas corpus cases, including the award of compensation. While acknowledging the validity of awarding compensation, the court finds that a more detailed inquiry should be conducted to determine responsibility for illegal detention. The court sets aside the order directing Tahir Mahmood Gujar to pay compensation and remands the case to the Sessions Judge.

Summary: (a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-------S. 24---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199(1)(b)(i)---Writ of Habeas Corpus andquo-warranto---Scope---Locus standi---Detention in foreign country---Petitionerinvoked jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution on grounds thather husband was illegally detained in Dubai, United Arab Emirates by Interpol onbasis of illegal orders and warrants of arrest issued against him by NationalAccountability Bureau authorities as well as by Accountability Court---Authoritiesobjected to petition on plea that same was not maintainable---Validity---At time offiling of petition before High Court, Detenu was in restrained custody in Dubai,United Arab Emirates at the time of filing of petition before the High Court onaccount of red notices/warrants of arrest issued against him therefore, petition wasfiled by his wife---Petition having been filed in nature of Habeas Corpus therefore,same was validly filed by wife of detenu---Constitutional petition under Art.199 ofthe Constitution in matter of Habeas Corpus or petition of writ of Quo Warrantocould be filed by any person and it was not necessary that such person should be an"aggrieved person"---Constitutional petition was maintainable in circumstances. Bugum Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan PLD1977 SC 657 rel.(b) Constitution of Pakistan-------Art. 199(1)(b)(i)---Constitutional petition---Writ of Habeas Corpus---Scope---Release of detenue---Effect---Merely on account of release of detenue from custodypetition does not become infructuous---High Court can see as to whether order onbasis of which detenue was kept in confinement was issued in accordance with law ornot.

Summary: The case involved the recovery of a spiritual leader, by his followers. The court had appointed a local commission to record the leader's statement through video footage. Subsequently, the court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, deeming it mala fide. The petitioner in sought a copy of the USB containing the video footage for use in the Supreme Court, and the Copy Branch refused to issue it. The judgment concluded that the USB in question qualifies as a document, and the petitioner is entitled to a certified copy.

Summary: (a) Guardianship and Custody ----Muslim Personal Law; Hizanat (custody of minors)----Preferential rights of the mother; Binding force of agreements. Under Muslim Personal Law, the mother has the preferential right of Hizanat (temporary custody) until the minor reaches seven years of age in the case of males and puberty in the case of females. Any agreement or compromise between parents relinquishing the mother's right to Hizanat is not binding in law and is unenforceable. Custody granted to paternal grandparents does not override the mother’s legal right, provided there is no evidence of remarriage or immoral character that disqualifies her. Reliance placed on Mst. Razia Rehman v. SHO (PLD 2006 SC 533) and Munazza Bibi v. SHO Police Station City Chichawatni (2012 P.Cr.L.J. 1567). (b) Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction ----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, S. 491----Habeas corpus; Res judicata; Custody of minors. Decisions in habeas corpus petitions do not operate as res judicata in subsequent petitions. Courts are empowered to restore custody to the lawful guardian, particularly in cases where the minor’s welfare is at stake. Earlier dismissal of a similar petition by a Sessions Court does not bar the High Court from granting relief. Reliance placed on Mst. Razia Rehman v. SHO (PLD 2006 SC 533). (c) Tender Age and Welfare of the Minor ----Custody of minors; Welfare principle----Custody with paternal grandparents; Absence of father. Where the father is absent and the minor resides with paternal grandparents, the welfare of the minor remains paramount. Custody is awarded to the mother in light of her preferential rights under Hizanat and the tender age of the minor. Paternal grandparents may seek regularization of custody through the Guardian Court.

Summary: Educational Institution------Admission To MPH programs--Filing of writ petition by unregistered associationïLocus BrandióAggrieved person-. Baluchistan ïMedical Association--A person cannot be said to be en aggrieved person unless he has a right in performance of statutory duty by a person performing functions in respect of any right which he may have in relation to performance of such functionsó Petitioner cannot claim to be a recognized body for purpose of in case, as it is not a registered association of DoctorsóFurther president of B.M.A., who has filed petition is not even employee and he is not eligible for admission to MPH Progra.me at Institute of Public Health, because as per policy and guidelines for admission of candidates to MPH program at IPHQ issued by Health Department that MPH Programs at IPHQ is an in service training program akin to various long and short courses under taken at NIM-NSPP for general and administrative cadres of civil service side. 'Pp. 39 & 401 AConstitution of Pakistan. 1973-- 199--Enforcement of fundamental rights--It is also a settled legal proposition that a person who does not fall within ambit of aggrieved person have not right to invoke jurisdiction under Art. 199 of Constitution--Except, for relief in nature of Habeas Corpus or quo warranto a petitioner has to show that he is an aggrieved person and it is also imperative for him to show that any of his propriety or personal right as recognized' by law has been invaded or denied--Any person, who foils to demonstrate prerequisites as recognized by law has no locus standi or any cause of action to seek any relief under Art. 199 of Constitution.