Summary: Issues:Whether the compensation and plot allotment commitments made by the Government of Sindh to the affectees of Gujjar, Orangi, and Mehmoodabad Nallahs were adequate and appropriately administered.Whether the orders regarding refunds for the purchasers of units in the demolished Nasla Tower have been complied with, and the proper handling of the deceased owner?s estate.The legality of public encroachments by government entities and the appropriate measures for removal.The responsibility of local governments towards environmental management, specifically regarding the maintenance and planting of trees on public pavements.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:Gujjar, Orangi, and Mehmoodabad Nallahs: The court affirmed the commitment by the Government of Sindh to allot 80 square yard plots to the identified affectees and ordered prompt compensation as per previous stipulations. A directive was issued to finalize all claims within a specified timeframe.Nasla Tower: The court ordered that the land on which Nasla Tower stood should be auctioned, with proceeds going to the affectees, due to non-compliance with the refund orders by the deceased owner. The court also issued directives for handling the amenity plot according to the law.Public Encroachments: The court condemned the encroachment of public spaces by governmental entities, ordering the immediate clearance of such encroachments and recovery of costs from responsible parties.Environmental Concerns: The court directed local governments to conduct surveys and undertake the planting and maintenance of trees on public pavements to combat environmental degradation and enhance public welfare.----Citations/Precedents:Order dated 8 April 2024 for compliance on compensation to Gujjar, Orangi, and Mehmoodabad Nallahs affectees.Order dated 16 June 2021 regarding the refund responsibilities of the Nasla Tower owner.Order dated 22 September 2021 concerning the use of the amenity plot adjacent to Nasla Tower.Order dated 29 October 2021 addressing the failure to compensate purchasers in the Tejori Heights project.

Summary: Facts: The Registrar of the Supreme Court received a note reporting systematic deforestation and tree cutting at Fatima Jinnah Park, F-9, Islamabad, allegedly under the direction of the CDA. The Supreme Court's Committee, established under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, considered this matter significant enough to warrant a constitutional petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, citing the public importance and the potential infringement on fundamental rights, including access to public places and the right to life due to environmental degradation.Issue: Whether the systematic deforestation and tree cutting at Fatima Jinnah Park, directed by the CDA, infringes upon the fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan, necessitating intervention by the Supreme Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution.Holding: The Court found that the preconditions stipulated in Article 184(3) of the Constitution were met, indicating a significant matter impacting fundamental rights, warranting the Supreme Court's intervention.Order:Notices were issued to the CDA and the Government of Pakistan through the Ministry of Climate Change and Environmental Coordination, as well as the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Islamabad Wildlife Management Board.The CDA was ordered to submit a detailed report addressing specific inquiries related to the tree cutting and deforestation activities.The Court appointed joint commissioners from the Press Association of Supreme Court to document the affected areas within the park.Representation for the Public was appointed to assist the Court.An interim order was issued prohibiting the CDA from further tree cutting or deforestation activities until the next hearing.The case was scheduled to come up again on 4 March 2024.Rationale: The Court's intervention was based on the potential infringement of fundamental rights, particularly the right to life and access to public places, due to the environmental degradation caused by deforestation. The Court also referenced previous notices taken under Article 184(3) regarding illegal activities in the same park, reinforcing the significance of the matter.

Summary: ''Detailed reasons for holding that Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is not a self-executory provision and for overruling Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nausherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405) with Justice Mansoor Ali Shah's opinion.'' ---- Issue:Does the lifetime disqualification for electoral candidacy under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution align with the Constitution itself, especially in light of Section 232(2) of the Elections Act 2017, which prescribes a maximum disqualification period of five years?

Summary: Rejection of nomination papers on trivial grounds must be avoided, at the heart of a thriving democracy lies the fundamental process of elections, an embodiment of the democratic principle that power should be vested in the hands of the people and at its core, democracy is all about participation. ---- The court's judgment initiates by emphasizing the pivotal role of elections in a democratic society, echoing the precedents set in landmark cases such as Javed Jabbar v. Federation of Pakistan [PLD 2003 SC 955], Pakistan Muslim League (Q) v. Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan [PLD 2002 SC 994], and Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan [PLD 1993 SC 473]. It underscores that elections serve as the cornerstone of a functioning democracy, encapsulating the principle that ultimate authority should rest with the citizenry. The court underscores the centrality of participation in democratic governance and the crucial role elections play in enabling citizens to express their preferences for leaders and policies.The judgment further articulates that the legitimacy of a democratic government is intrinsically tied to its ability to faithfully represent the will of the people, as established in Wesberry v. Sanders [376 U.S. 1 (1964)]. The representation of the people's will can only be accomplished through widespread and inclusive participation by both candidates and voters in the electoral process. The court emphasizes that policies promoting enfranchisement are indispensable in ensuring that every eligible citizen, irrespective of their background, is afforded an equal opportunity to vote, thereby upholding the democratic tenet of equal representation.The court proceeds to highlight the pernicious threat posed by disenfranchisement resulting from the improper rejection of nomination papers. Drawing from precedents and established democratic principles, the judgment underscores that disenfranchisement poses a grave risk to the fairness and integrity of the electoral process. In a democracy that values fairness, active measures must be taken to safeguard against disenfranchisement and ensure that every voice in the political arena is heard and valued. Inclusive electoral processes, the court posits, are not only pivotal for political stability but also for broader objectives such as social cohesion, peace, and prosperity.The court ultimately anchors its analysis on the 'right to vote freely for the candidate of one?s choice,' quoting the influential Wesberry v. Sanders decision. It underscores that any undue restrictions on this cherished right strike at the heart of representative government, as enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Constitution of Pakistan.Regarding the specific case at hand, the court reviews Pervez Elahi's nomination paper for a seat in the Punjab Provincial Assembly from PP-32, Gujrat-VI. The Returning Officer had rejected the nomination paper, citing two main grounds: (i) the petitioner's failure to maintain an exclusive bank account for each seat he intended to contest, as mandated by Section 60(2)(b) of the Elections Act, 2017, and (ii) the omission of a recently acquired asset, a 10-marla land in Phalia, Mandi Bahauddin, Punjab, from the assets statement required by Section 60(2)(d) of the Act.The court meticulously examines these grounds, invoking its interpretation of legal provisions and precedents to reach its conclusion. On the first ground, the court clarifies that the exclusivity of the required bank account pertains to the "purpose of election expenses" and not the number of seats a candidate contests, echoing the principle laid out in the Constitution's Article 17(2) and supported by Section 232 of the Elections Act, 2017. This interpretation aligns with the intent of the law, which seeks to ensure compliance with prescribed election expense limits, as indicated by Section 132(3) of the Act.Regarding the second ground, concerning the alleged misdeclaration of the asset, the court relies on Section 62(9) of the Act and underscores that the petitioner had correctly listed assets as of June 30, 2023, in line with statutory requirements. The purported acquisition of the land in November 2023 was found to be irrelevant to the validity of the nomination paper. The court observes that the Lahore High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reintroducing this ground and emphasizes the Act's pro-inclusiveness stance by discouraging the rejection of nomination papers on non-substantial defects.In its final verdict, the Supreme Court converts the petition into an appeal and grants it, setting aside the impugned orders. Consequently, Pervez Elahi's nomination paper for the Punjab Provincial Assembly seat, PP-32, Gujrat-VI, is accepted, ensuring his participation in the upcoming election. The judgment, rooted in democratic principles and legal precedents, reaffirms the paramount importance of democratic processes, safeguarding the right to contest elections while upholding the integrity of the democratic system.

Summary: Issue:Whether S.R.O. No.927(I)/2019, banning the import of law books and law journals from India, is unconstitutional in light of Articles 9, 18, 19, and 175(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan.---- Holding:The Lahore High Court held that the impugned S.R.O. is not per se unconstitutional but directed the Federal Government to review the prohibition on importing law books and journals on a case to case basis. The judgment balanced national security interests with fundamental rights, suggesting a case-by-case review for law books and journals.--- Reasoning:Legal Authority for Import Restrictions: The court recognized the Federal Government's power under the Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1950, to regulate imports and exports for national security and foreign policy reasons.--- Balance Between National Security and Fundamental Rights: The judgment balanced national security interests with fundamental rights, suggesting a case-by-case review for law books and journals.--- Right to Read and Access to Information: The Court acknowledged the right to read as fundamental, linked to the right to life, liberty, and dignity under Articles 9 and 14 of the Constitution, and essential for the legal profession.--- Citations and Precedents:Chicago & Southern Airlines, Inc. v Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S 103 (1948): Highlighted the judiciary's deference to the executive in foreign affairs and national security matters.East and West Steamship Co. v Pakistan (PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 41): Discussed the right to conduct any lawful trade under common law, as acknowledged in Article 18 of the Constitution.City School Private Limited v. Govt. of the Punjab etc. (2018 PLD 509): Elaborated on the scope of Article 18 regarding the freedom of trade, business, or profession.Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19: Mentioned to emphasize international recognition of the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information regardless of frontiers.--- Significance:This judgment underscores the judiciary's role in mediating between national policy imperatives and constitutional rights. It highlights the need for a nuanced approach to import restrictions, especially concerning educational materials critical for professional and judicial functions. The decision to allow a review process for the import of law books and journals respects both the executive's policy-making prerogative and the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.

Summary: The background of the case reveals that Afridi was apprehended by police officials outside the Peshawar High Court on 11th January 2024. Despite efforts to secure his release, the police denied having him in custody. The petitioner contends that Afridi is a political worker for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and a candidate in the upcoming General Elections. The arrest was deemed illegal, carried out without jurisdiction, and possibly with malafide intent.On 11th January 2024, a preliminary hearing resulted in the Advocate General being put on notice, with instructions to produce Afridi before the court. Afridi was subsequently presented in court. The Assistant Advocate General (AAG) explained that Afridi's arrest was due to a misunderstanding regarding his involvement in a criminal case. The AAG referenced an order from the District & Sessions Judge, Kohat, which inferred that an earlier court order had expired since Afridi failed to appear before the court as required.The petitioner's counsel argued that a previous High Court order (No.6009-P of 2023) had restrained the police from taking any action against Afridi, which is why he didn't appear for the transit bail. The High Court noted that Afridi, a lawyer and political candidate, was arrested despite an order preventing adverse action against him. The court acknowledged the Advocate General's efforts in ensuring Afridi's production and found that his detention was illegal.The court emphasized the constitutional protection of liberty and due process under Articles 4, 9, and 10 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The judgment stressed that depriving a person of liberty without legal justification is a serious matter and violative of law, justice, and fair play.As Afridi was not required for any criminal case, the court ordered his immediate release and prohibited any future actions against him that are not in accordance with law. The petition was converted into a contempt of court petition, and respondents No.1 & 2 were directed to submit a reply within ten days. The case was scheduled for re-listing on 18th January 2024.

Summary: Trial of civilians by court martial under s. 2(1)(d) of Pakistan Army Act 1952 declared ultra vires the Constitution. --- Merged Final Judgement of Justice Munib Akhtar, Justice Yahya Afridi, Justice Ayesha A. Malik ---- The examination of the War Articles reveals that it substantially contained provisions corresponding to the Army Act, particularly in matters related to the military justice system. Title III of the War Articles, dealing with courts martial, aligns with the current court martial system under the Army Act and the 1954 Rules. The historical perspective emphasizes that legislative competence regarding armed forces, including the military justice system, has been integral since the early days of British rule.The analysis draws parallels with the Muhammad Yusuf case, highlighting that legislative competence may extend to matters judicial, even if seemingly unrelated. The challenge regarding the constitutionality of courts martial under Article 175 is dismissed, asserting that courts martial, deeply embedded in the military justice system, fall within the legislative competence of entry No. 1 of the Federal Legislative List.The composition of courts martial, historically manned by military officers, aligns with their current structure under the Army Act. The challenge asserting a separation between the judiciary and executive under Article 175 is rejected, emphasizing the unique historical arc of courts martial.Moving to the challenge based on fundamental rights, Article 10A (right to a fair trial) is invoked, arguing that civilians brought before courts martial are denied their fundamental rights under Article 8(3)(a). The court explores the historical context of Article 8(3)(a) across different constitutions, emphasizing its consistent purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of duties and maintaining discipline among armed forces.Comparatively, the court notes the Indian Constitution's Article 33, which allows Parliament flexibility in restricting or abrogating fundamental rights for armed forces. However, the Pakistani Constitution's Article 8(3)(a) follows a more rigid approach.The court concludes that the challenge based on specific fundamental rights may miss the broader picture. Regardless, the denial of fundamental rights stems from Article 8(3)(a). The court explores the historical and comparative aspects of this provision, emphasizing its consistent purpose. While acknowledging the need for flexibility, the court upholds the constitutional validity of Article 8(3)(a) in the context of the military justice system. The case involves a constitutional challenge regarding the insertion of para (i) provisions into the Army Act, which pertain to the trial of civilians by military courts. The court interprets Article 8(3)(a) and Article 8(5) of the Constitution, addressing the denial or derogation of fundamental rights. It emphasizes the need for a narrow interpretation of Article 8(3)(a) due to its drastic consequences, contrasting it with the robust protection provided by Article 8(5).The court discusses the historical context, citing the Indian Constitution's approach, and distinguishes it from the rigid nature of Article 8(3)(a) in the local context. The judgment also references the case of Prithi Pal Singh vs. The Union of India, highlighting the importance of not creating a separate class of citizens devoid of constitutional protections.The court introduces Article 8(5) and underscores its role in safeguarding fundamental rights. It explains that Article 8(5) protects fundamental rights collectively and requires both situational and anticipatory consideration. The court emphasizes that if a law, including para (i) insertions, results in the suspension or denial of fundamental rights, it must be declared ultra vires the Constitution.The judgment critiques the decision in F.B. Ali within the context of the 1962 Constitution, asserting that the present Constitution, with Article 8(5), necessitates a different analysis. It concludes that para (i) insertions are ultra vires the Constitution, particularly Article 8(5), irrespective of whether they were initially insertions or became provisions of the Army Act.The court addresses the argument concerning Article 10A and clarifies that the essence of fundamental rights cannot be altered by granting transitory rights through legislation. It underscores that citizens should not be reduced to seeking additional rights as a plea to the State.The court makes it clear that its judgment does not question the fairness of courts martial within their traditional framework for the military but addresses the constitutional issues raised in the case.the court reviewed constitutional provisions and legal precedents to address the interpretation of Article 8(3)(a) and the validity of certain provisions. The court acknowledged the 1956 Constitution's Article 22, which guaranteed the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights. However, it emphasized the limited scope of Article 22(3) compared to the contemporary Article 8(5), highlighting the latter's explicit requirement for express suspension.The court then delved into the Attorney General's arguments, particularly focusing on the "nexus" theory derived from the F.B. Ali case. The "nexus" theory posits that legislative competence exists if an offense has a connection with the defense of Pakistan. The court scrutinized this theory, quoting relevant passages from the F.B. Ali judgment and underlining the importance of the term "expressly" in Article 8(5).Rejecting the "nexus" theory, the court addressed the second strand of the argument concerning the purposes of Article 8(3)(a). The Attorney General asserted that laws ensuring the proper discharge of duties by the Armed Forces, either internally or externally, fell within Article 8(3)(a). However, the court disagreed, emphasizing a holistic interpretation of the provision and rejecting attempts to create internal and external aspects.The court then clarified constitutional principles, distinguishing between legislative competence and constitutional permissibility. It highlighted that even if a law falls within legislative competence, it might be constitutionally impermissible due to violations of fundamental rights. It cited examples related to concurrent competences and fundamental rights challenges.The court concluded that the "nexus" theory and the expansive interpretation of Article 8(3)(a) were not sustainable. It affirmed the ultra vires status of the para (i) provisions, reiterating the role of Article 8(5) in scrutinizing laws affecting fundamental rights. The court noted that its conclusion was provisional, pending an examination of Emergency Provisions, as outlined in Article 233.Turning to Emergency Provisions, the court explored Article 233, highlighting its two clauses and their respective implications during a Proclamation of Emergency. It explained how clause (1) allows the State to make laws that would be competent but for the specific fundamental rights restrictions during an emergency. The court underscored that this suspension was temporary, automatically ceasing when the Proclamation ended.The court then addressed clause (2) of Article 233, which empowers the President to suspend the right to move courts for the enforcement of specified fundamental rights during an emergency. It drew a parallel with the Indian Constitution's Articles 358 and 359, emphasizing the distinction between the suspension of fundamental rights and the suspension of the right to enforce them.Referring to the Indian case Makhan Singh Tarsikka v State of Punjab, the court highlighted the acknowledgment that an order under Article 359(1) suspended the right to move courts for enforcement without expressly suspending the fundamental rights themselves.The court concluded by acknowledging subsequent amendments in the Indian Constitution, specifically clauses (1A) and (1B) of Article 359, which further clarified the distinction between the suspension of rights and the suspension of the right to enforce them during an emergency.In summary, the court thoroughly examined constitutional provisions, the "nexus" theory, and relevant precedents to assert the provisional ultra vires status of the para (i) provisions and laid the groundwork for further analysis in the context of Emergency Provisions. The passage discusses the legal implications of Clause (1A) in comparison with Article 358 of the Indian Constitution, highlighting its attempt to equalize the effects of a Proclamation of Emergency and the suspension of fundamental rights enforcement. The discussion includes citations from Durga Das Basu's treatise and Union of India v Bhanudas Krishna Gawde case.Furthermore, the passage distinguishes the constitutional context between India and the jurisdiction under consideration, particularly in relation to Article 8(5) and the absence of an equivalent provision in Article 233(2). It emphasizes that the explicit suspension of fundamental rights under Article 8(5) prevents any implicit suspension and underscores the importance of adhering to the express provisions of the Constitution.The text then delves into the analysis of Article 233(2) and the distinction between the suspension of the right to move a court for enforcement and the suspension of the fundamental rights themselves. It argues that even during a Proclamation of Emergency, the rights specified in Article 233(1) are suspended, but not all fundamental rights, as highlighted in the context of Article 8(5).The passage subsequently explores the three cases discussed in paragraph 4, particularly focusing on F.B. Ali. It asserts that F.B. Ali is distinguishable due to the material differences in the present Constitution, particularly the existence of Article 8(5), and concludes that even within the framework of F.B. Ali, the handling of around 103 persons appears contrary to law, violating Articles 9 and 10A.Finally, the discussion turns to Liaquat Hussain, a decision made in the context of a state of emergency. The passage briefly outlines the key aspects of the case, highlighting the unconstitutional nature of the Pakistan Armed Forces (Acting in Aid of the Civil Power) Ordinance, 1998, and the subsequent striking down of the law. The case under consideration involves the challenge to an ordinance on the grounds that it establishes a parallel judicial system, specifically military courts, which is deemed impermissible under the Constitution. The dispute focuses on whether the Armed Forces, acting in aid of civil power under Article 245 of the Constitution, can set up Military Courts for the trial of civilians for offenses not connected with the Armed Forces.The judgment, delivered by Chief Justice Ajmal Mian, concludes that the impugned Ordinance, which established Military Courts for trying civilians, is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament and therefore ultra vires the Constitution. The Chief Justice references previous cases, including Mehram Ali's case, to emphasize that the Constitution only allows specific tribunals to share judicial power and that Military Courts are not within this category.The Court rejects the argument that Military Courts, convened under the Ordinance, are incidental measures under Article 245 and asserts that such courts cannot be exempted from the constitutional provisions governing the judiciary. It concludes that the power to legislate the impugned Ordinance for establishing Military Courts cannot be derived from Article 245 or the Federal Legislative List.In the course of the judgment, the Chief Justice considers F.B. Ali, emphasizing that it dealt with a different context, legislative competence, and the specific application of the Army Act. The judgment clarifies that F.B. Ali does not support the arguments put forth by the Attorney General in the present case.Additionally, the judgment delves into the Full Court decision in District Bar Association, which involved constitutional amendments enabling the trial of civilians by military courts. The Court distinguishes the context of District Bar Association, where amendments were time-bound and exceptional due to the perceived warlike situation, from the present case, where the impugned Ordinance lacked legislative competence without such extraordinary circumstances.The case involves a constitutional challenge to certain provisions, specifically para (i) of sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (d) of s. 2(1) of the Army Act, inserted by the Ordinances of 1967, and equivalent provisions in the Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953, and the Navy Ordinance, 1961. These provisions pertain to the jurisdiction of courts martial over civilians in certain circumstances.The constitutional amendments incorporated laws related to the Armed Forces and the Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014, into the First Schedule, immunizing them against challenges based on fundamental rights. The court emphasizes that any alteration to the First Schedule requires a constitutional amendment.The District Bar Association case is discussed, noting that it addressed different issues and questions, making it distinguishable from the present case. The court rejects the argument that legislative competence, as established in F.B. Ali, becomes ineffective under the present Constitution, asserting that the legislative competence can be limited, and its exercise is subject to conditions outlined in District Bar Association.The court also discusses Article 199(3) and rejects the argument that it recognizes the legislative competence identified in F.B. Ali, pointing out that the Constitution can be amended to omit such provisions.The judgment declares para (i) provisions as ultra vires the Constitution, impacting the jurisdiction of courts martial over civilians. It addresses the maintainability of petitions, emphasizing the denial of fundamental rights and the public importance of the issues raised.Concerning cases already decided by courts martial, the court establishes categories and directions for their treatment based on whether the sentences have been served, legal remedies exhausted, or convictions are still under review.In conclusion, the court reaffirms its view on the unconstitutionality of para (i) provisions and provides directions for the treatment of past and ongoing cases affected by the judgment.

Summary: Merged Detailed Judgement ---- Civilian Trials in Military Court declared unconstitutional ---- Ultra Vires Declaration: The Court Declared That Clause (D) Of Subsection (1) Of Section 2 Of The Pakistan Army Act, 1952 (In Both Of Its Sub-Clauses (I) And (Ii)) And Subsection (4) Of Section 59 Of The Same Act Are Ultra Vires The Constitution And Of No Legal Effect. This Means That These Provisions Were Found To Be In Violation Of The Constitution And, Therefore, Were Deemed Legally Invalid. Civilian Trials: The Court Ruled That The Trials Of Civilians And Accused Persons, Specifically Around 103 Individuals Mentioned In The List Provided By The Attorney General, And Others Similarly Situated Regarding The Events Of 9th And 10th May 2023, Should Be Conducted By Criminal Courts Of Competent Jurisdiction Established Under Ordinary And Special Laws. This Decision Underscores The Fundamental Principle That Civilians Should Be Tried In Civilian Courts, Not Military Tribunals. No Legal Effect Of Military Proceedings: The Court Explicitly Stated That Any Actions Or Proceedings Under The Pakistan Army Act, Including Trials By Court Martial, In Respect Of The Aforementioned Persons Are And Would Be Of No Legal Effect. This Means That Military Proceedings Or Trials Under The Army Act Against Civilians Or Accused Individuals In This Context Were Rendered Legally Null And Void. Partial Dissent: One Member Of The Bench, Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi, Reserved Judgment As To One Part Of The Declaration But Joined The Other Members Of The Bench Regarding The Other Aspects. This Indicates That There May Have Been Some Differences In Opinion Among The Judges On Certain Elements Of The Case. In Summary, The Supreme Court's Legal Analysis In This Judgment Focused On The Constitutionality Of Specific Provisions Within The Pakistan Army Act, The Rights Of Civilians To Be Tried In Civilian Courts, And The Legal Consequences Of Military Proceedings Against Civilians In The Specified Context. The Judgment Sets A Legal Precedent For The Treatment Of Civilians In Legal Matters Related To The Armed Forces In Pakistan.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a former prime minister of Pakistan and chairman of a leading political party, filed a writ petition seeking a direction to the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to allow the broadcast/rebroadcast of his speeches and press talks on electronic media. PEMRA had issued a Prohibition Order on 05.03.2023, banning the coverage of the petitioner on electronic media. The petitioner appealed against the Prohibition Order, and the court suspended the operation of the order, referring the matter to a full bench to ascertain the appropriate court's jurisdiction. ----Issues: 1- Whether PEMRA's Prohibition Order was valid and enforceable. 2- Whether the petitioner was unlawfully censored on electronic media, violating the Code of Conduct for media channels. 3- Whether the petitioner’s right to media coverage, especially during the pre-election period, was being unjustly restricted. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --PEMRA's Position: PEMRA's counsel stated that no further instructions were issued to TV channels regarding the petitioner’s coverage. PEMRA made a statement that it would not hinder the broadcast of live or recorded programs concerning the petitioner or his political party. The court acknowledged the petitioner's claims that his media coverage was being censored. The Electronic Media (Programmes and Advertisements) Code of Conduct, 2015, mandates that media channels present information accurately and fairly, ensuring political programs are objective and inclusive. The court emphasized the significance of providing the public with accurate information about candidates and political parties, especially during election periods. --Significance of Free and Fair Elections: The court highlighted the importance of free and fair elections, noting that citizens must have access to multiple sources of information to make informed choices. It stressed that the government and its agencies must not prevent media coverage of political parties or candidates to ensure a fair pre-election environment. The court allowed the petitioner’s application to include additional documents and a USB in the record. It was concluded that PEMRA must not prevent media coverage of the petitioner, ensuring adherence to the Code of Conduct and democratic norms. ----Citations/Precedents: Dr. Shahid Masood and others v. Federation of Pakistan etc. 2010 SCMR 1849 Reference was made to this case to support the petitioner’s urgency and the need for media coverage in the context of upcoming elections. Academic Articles: "Elections Without Democracy" by Andreas Schedler, Journal of Democracy, John Hopkins University Press, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002. "The Rise of Election Monitoring: What Makes Elections Free and Fair?" by J. Elklit and Palle Svensson, Journal of Democracy, John Hopkins University Press, Volume 8, Number 3, July 1997.

Summary: Regarding enforced disappearances --- The Federal Government was directed to submit undertakingin writing, signed by senior most officers of the concernedministries, that henceforth no one shall be picked up other than inaccordance with the law. --- During the hearing it was brought to the attention of the court thatduring the Court?s winter vacations the families of protestingmissing persons at Islamabad were manhandled by police/lawenforcement personnel --- ''This Court takes great exception to suchhigh handedness because the right to peaceful protest is amongstthe guaranteed Fundamental Rights which must be honourd inletter and spirit.'' Supreme Court has already held that:?Every citizen and political party has the right toassemble and protest provided such assembly andprotest is peaceful and complies with the lawimposing reasonable restrictions in the interest ofpublic order. The right to assemble and protest iscircumscribed only to the extent that it infringes onthe fundamental rights of others, including theirright to free movement and to hold and enjoyproperty.? --- ''Therefore, the Commission is directed tocollate and submit: (a) the names with parentage and addresses ofthose who went missing, (b) name and relationship of the personwho reported the missing person, (c) the date they went missing,(d) those who were in government in the Federation and theconcerned province at that time, (e) whether the missing personwas recovered or not, and (f) if not recovered the efforts, if any,taken to find out the whereabouts of the missing person. Inaddition, (g) all those in respect of whom production orders wereissued but were not produced, and (h) what was the follow-up bythe Commission when its production orders were not compliedwith.''