Summary: (Against the judgment dated 04.06.2018 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Ehtesab Criminal Appeal No. 11-P of 2015). National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----Ss. 9(a)(iii)(vi) & 9(a)(xii)---Mis-appropriation, misuse of authority and abetment---Re-appraisal of evidence---Confession of co-accused---Effect---Appellant / accused along with co-accused was alleged to have misappropriated funds of Pakistan Tabacco Board by misusing his authority---Conviction and sentenced awarded to appellant / accused by Trial Court was maintained by High Court but amount of fine was reduced---Validity---Complaint made by Pakistan Tobacco Board was primarily against co-accused and not against appellant / accused---Confidential report was prepared by officials of complainant Board on the statement of accountant, which depicted that embezzlement was made by co-accused who had confessed almost all allegations of forging / tampering cheques and preparing fake documents depicting deposits in bank account of complainant Board---Fact finding committee did not name appellant / accused as embezzlement had taken place because of co-accused and defects in accounting system adopted by complainant Board---Prosecution failed to make out a case of misuse of authority under section 9 (a)(vi) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 against appellant / accused---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused by two Courts below and he was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed. Wahid Bakhsh Baloch v. The State 2014 SCMR 985; The State and others v. M. Idrees Ghauri and others 2008 SCMR 1118; Mansur-ul-Haque's case PLD 2008 SC 166 and The State v. Anwar Saifullah Khan PLD 2016 SC 276 rel. Kamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner/Applicant along with Petitioner/Applicant. Raja Muhammad Rizwan Ibrahim Satti, Special Prosecutor General NAB for NAB. Date of hearing: 16th June, 2025.

Summary: Acquittal granted --- (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (XVIII of 1999) ----S. 9(a)(iii), (vi) & (xii), S. 10 ----Corruption and corrupt practices---- Misuse of authority ---- Essential ingredients ---- Mens rea and actus reus ---- Mere procedural irregularities not constituting offence ---- Conviction of petitioner (Deputy Director (Budget & Finance)/DDO, PTB) by Trial Court and High Court set aside ---- Benefit of doubt extended ---- Held, prosecution failed to prove that petitioner derived illegal gain, facilitated embezzlement, or acted with dishonest intent ---- Departmental inquiries and fact-finding committee exonerated petitioner ---- Prosecution witnesses’ testimonies contradictory and not confidence inspiring ---- Petition converted into appeal and allowed ---- Petitioner acquitted. Court observed that the prosecution failed to establish mens rea (guilty mind) or actus reus (guilty act) against the petitioner. His omissions, at most, amounted to procedural irregularities or administrative lapses and did not qualify as “misuse of authority” under S.9(a)(vi) NAO, 1999. The record revealed absence of evidence of illegal enrichment or undue benefit. Departmental inquiries and final fact-finding reports held cashier Aleem Mehmood solely responsible for embezzlement of PTB funds. Mere procedural improprieties could not form basis for criminal conviction. (b) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (XVIII of 1999) ----S. 14(d)---- Burden of proof---- Requirement for prosecution to establish a reasonable case of misuse of authority before presumption of guilt can arise against accused---- Held, principle of criminal jurisprudence that initial onus rests upon prosecution not displaced by NAB Ordinance---- Prosecution failed to discharge burden. Court held that the prosecution neither produced wealth statements, bank accounts, assets, or tax documents of petitioner nor proved that he, his family, or associates benefitted from alleged acts. Without evidence of illegal gain or connivance, the presumption of guilt under S.14(d) could not be invoked. (c) Criminal law ----Burden of proof---- Benefit of doubt ---- Petitioner exonerated where prosecution case based on conjectures, contradictions, and unsupported allegations ---- Held, benefit of doubt always goes to accused if reasonable doubt arises regarding prosecution’s case. Court emphasized that since contradictions existed in depositions of prosecution witnesses and primary responsibility for embezzlement was established against cashier A.M, the petitioner was entitled to acquittal. Cited Cases Wahid Bakhsh Baloch v. The State 2014 SCMR 985 M. Anwar Saifullah Khan v. State PLD 2002 Lahore 458 The State and others v. M. Idrees Ghauri and others 2008 SCMR 1118 Mansur-ul-Haque’s case PLD 2008 SC 166 The State v. Anwar Saifullah Khan PLD 2016 SC 276 Disposition Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Conviction and sentence recorded by Trial Court and High Court set aside. Petitioner Sardar Hussain acquitted by extending benefit of doubt.

Summary: (Against the order dated 13.03.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Civil Petition No. D-1077 of 2023). (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 516-A---Superdari---Interim custody of vehicle---Effect---Permitting interim custody of vehicle on Superdari neither amounts to prejudice the trial nor gives a clean chit to accused, nor does it relieve or exempt owner / recipient of custody from pending legal proceedings---Duration of interim custody may continue subject to the bond and surety till the final fate of the case---Till then the person allowed interim custody is duty-bound under law to attend, participate and produce the vehicle as and when directed by Court. (b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----Ss. 12, 13 & 17---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.516-A---Freezing of vehicle---Superdari---Interim custody, grant of---Non-filing of objections---Criminal Procedure Code, 1898---Applicability---Petitioner / accused was aggrieved of refusal to grant interim custody of vehicle in question which was frozen under section 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 by Accountability Court---High Court declined to give interim custody of the vehicle as the accused had not filed any objection against freezing order---Validity---Accused never endeavored to challenge freezing order, rather he accepted it without demur but he applied for custody of vehicle within the sphere of freezing order (which was confined to an embargo against transfer of vehicle only)---There was no demonstrable restriction or prohibition in law that if an accused or aggrieved person had failed to lodge a claim or objection against freezing order in terms of Section 13 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, they would be deprived and perpetually or unremittingly not be able to apply for interim custody of vehicle / property---There is no inconsistency or incongruity between section 516-A, Cr.P.C. and provision of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---There is no specific provision for releasing custody of vehicle embedded in National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and there are also no absolute restrictions against doing so---Aid and assistance may be taken by Courts from general provisions of Cr.P.C., particularly when the letter of law indubitably makes it clear that provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings unless there is anything inconsistent with the provisions of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court and allowed interim custody of vehicle in question on Superdari, in terms of Section 516-A, Cr.P.C.---Appeal was allowed. Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry v. Secretary, Ministry of Industries and Production, Government of Pakistan and others PLD 2004 SC 413; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630; Amanullah Khan v. Federal Government of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 1092; Abid Hasan v. PIAC 2005 SCMR 25 and Khalid Humayun v. The NAB through DG Quetta and others PLD 2017 SC 194 ref. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----General and special laws---Object, purpose and scope---Special law is meant to refer to laws regulating specific subjects and stipulating their own limitations and conditions to be applied---Special law prevails and dominates over general law---Courts while resolving the issue of whether a statute is a special or general law, the crucial consideration must be the legislative intent---In case of divergence, rule of harmonious construction may be adopted. Shaukat Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Sattar Mehmood Awan, Deputy Prosecutor General, Syed Meeral Shah, Special Prosecutor and Irfan Ali, I.O/Deputy Director for the NAB. Date of hearing: 18th March, 2025. (a) The Chairman NAB or the court trying an accused for any offence as specified under this Ordinance, may, at any time, if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed such an offence, order the freezing of his property or part thereof, whether in his possession or in the possession of any relative, associate or person on his behalf. (d) If the property ordered to be frozen consists of livestock or is of a perishable nature, the Chairman NAB, or the Court may, if it deems proper and expedient, order the immediate sale thereof and the proceeds of the sale may be deposited with the Chairman NAB or the Court, or as either may direct as Appropriate. (e) The powers, duties, and liabilities of a receiver, if any, appointed under this section shall be the same as those of a receiver appointed under Order-XL of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). 1 (f) The order of freezing mentioned in sub-sections 'a' to 'e' shall remain operative until the final disposal of the case by the Court, and in the event of the acquittal of the accused, shall continue to remain operative for a period of ten days after receipt of certified copy of the order of acquittal or release by NAB, whereafter it shall be subject to an order by the court in which an appeal, if any, is filed. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon all claims or objections against the freezing of any property under Section 12 above. Such claims or objection shall be made before the Court within 14 days from the date of the order freezing such property. (c) The accused or any other aggrieved party, whose claim or objection against freezing of property has been dismissed by the Court, may, within ten days file an appeal against such order before the High Court.

Summary: (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (NAO) --- Ss. 12, 13 & 17 --- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 --- S. 516-A --- Freezing of property --- Scope of freezing order --- Interim custody of vehicle on superdari --- Maintainability of application under S. 516-A, Cr.P.C. during pendency of NAB Reference --- Applicability of Cr.P.C. in NAB proceedings. A freezing order under section 12(b)(iii) of NAO 1999, which prohibits the transfer of property, does not amount to seizure or possession by the NAB. Therefore, a vehicle subject to such an order can be released on superdari under section 516-A, Cr.P.C., provided no inconsistency arises between NAO and Cr.P.C. provisions. In the present case, the freezing order only restricted the transfer of the vehicle and did not bar interim custody. The petitioner, while accepting the freezing order without objection, retained the right to seek superdari. The Court held that section 516-A Cr.P.C. applies mutatis mutandis to NAB proceedings under section 17 of the NAO 1999 and that the denial of interim custody was legally misconceived. Cited Cases: Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry v. Secretary Ministry of Industries (PLD 2004 SC 413) Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Govt. of Pakistan (2015 SCMR 630) Amanullah Khan v. Federal Government of Pakistan (PLD 1990 SC 1092) Khalid Humayun v. NAB (PLD 2017 SC 194) Abid Hasan v. PIAC (2005 SCMR 25) (b) Freezing Order --- Interpretation --- Typographical error in freezing order --- Correction by trial court --- Discretion of courts to consider substance over form. The Freezing Order referred to the impounded vehicle as “Toyota Vezel” whereas the correct make was “Honda Vezel.” The Supreme Court directed the trial court to treat the superdari order as applicable to the vehicle identified by registration, chassis, and engine numbers, irrespective of the typographical error in the original order. Substance must prevail over clerical error to avoid unjust deprivation of property. (c) Constitutional law --- Arts. 23 & 24 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 --- Right to property --- Interim deprivation of property --- Judicial discretion to grant superdari must be exercised fairly and reasonably. Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution protect the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and prohibit deprivation without due process of law. Courts, when dealing with applications for superdari, must consider the constitutional safeguards against arbitrary deprivation of property. Discretion under section 516-A Cr.P.C. must be exercised fairly, and reasons must be recorded to justify withholding or granting interim custody. (d) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 --- S. 516-A --- Superdari --- Judicial responsibility --- Standard for granting custody of seized property --- Requirement of ownership proof and solvent surety. An application under section 516-A Cr.P.C. must be decided based on clear ownership documents such as registration certificates or purchase invoices. Interim custody should be granted subject to furnishing personal bond and solvent surety equivalent to market value. Courts must record specific reasons while granting or denying interim custody and must ensure the vehicle is produced whenever required during trial. (e) Accountability Court --- Discretion --- Exercise of jurisdiction --- Requirement of speaking order --- Duty to apply judicial mind. The Accountability Court failed to examine the exact scope of the Freezing Order and summarily dismissed the application for superdari without analyzing the relevant statutory provisions or the facts specific to the petitioner. The Supreme Court observed that slipshod or perfunctory dismissal of interlocutory applications violates the obligation to provide reasoned, lawful, and structured decisions, especially in matters involving fundamental rights. Disposition: Appeal allowed; Orders of Accountability Court and High Court set aside. Application under S. 516-A, Cr.P.C. for custody of vehicle on superdari allowed subject to personal bond and solvent surety equivalent to market value, and undertaking to produce the vehicle before court as required. Trial court directed to mark caution against vehicle’s transfer.

Summary: ----S. 22-A---Registration of cross-version in presence of FIR, registered by Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)---Legality---Petitioners filed constitutional petition against the order passed by the Ex-officio Justice of Peace whereby on the application under S.22-A, Cr.P.C., filed by respondent, the concerned SHO was ordered to record her (respondent's) cross-version---Allegation/assertion of the respondent was that on fateful day, he was at his shop along with his uncle, the petitioners arrived in two vehicles, armed with firearms; that the petitioners allegedly abused and assaulted his uncle, stole Rs. 1,600,000 from the shop, took important documents and forcibly snatched mobile phones and Rs. 5,000 from his pocket and abducted his uncle---Respondent claimed that he reported the incident the same day via daily diary No. 22, but no action was taken---Consequently, respondent approached the Ex-officio Justice of Peace, leading to the issuance of impugned order---Validity---In the instant case, the FIR had already been registered by the FIA against the respondents' party---FIA operated under its special laws, including the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974, and was primarily responsible for investigating offenses related to federal statutes, including cybercrimes, financial frauds, human trafficking, and offences under special laws---On the other hand, local police operated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (Cr.P.C.) and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, (P.P.C.) for general criminal offenses---Since both agencies function in different spheres, the clubbing of a complaint as a cross-version in a case already registered under FIA's domain raised legal and procedural complications---Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, under S. 22-A(6), Cr.P.C, had the power to direct Police Officials to register FIR if a cognizable offense was made out---However, that power generally applied to local police and did not automatically extend to specialized investigation agencies like FIA, NAB or ANF unless a particular law permitted it---Moreover, cross-version cases were typically entertained where both versions would fall under the same jurisdiction (i.e., within the police domain)---Justice of Peace might have overstepped jurisdiction by directing that FIA-registered FIR be clubbed with another complaint as a cross-version case when the agencies had separate investigative mandates---Legally, FIA case could not be merged with a case investigated by local police since both agencies derived their authority from different legal frameworks---Thus, unless the allegations in the cross-version complaint related to the same federal law under which the FIA's, FIR was registered, the Ex-officio Justice of Peace lacked jurisdiction to order such clubbing---Constitutional petitions were allowed, accordingly. Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State PLD 2018 SC 595; Ali Raza v. Additional Sessions Judge PLD 2020 Lah. 109; Mian Allah Nawaz v. The State 2019 SCMR 2009; Muhammad Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2021 Isl. 16 and State v. Haji Naseer PLD 2022 SC 347 rel. Muhammad Ismail Alizai, Chaudhry Muhammad Javed Akhtar and Haji Muhammad Shakeel for Petitioners (in both the petitions). Ghulam Muhammad Sappal, Addl. A.G. for Respondents Nos. 1 and 4 to 7 (in W.P. No.351-D of 2024) and for Respondents Nos.1 to 4 (in W.P.No. 597-D of 2024). Muhammad Saleem Khan Marwat for Respondent No.3 (in W.P. No.351-D of 2024). Bahadur Khan Marwat for Respondent No.5 (in W.P.No.597-D of 2024). Date of hearing: 13th March, 2025. INAM ULLAH KHAN, J.--- This judgment addresses the aforementioned two writ petitions concerning a common legal and factual issue. The petitions stem from orders issued by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II/Ex-Officio Justice of the Peace, Dera Ismail Khan, on 07.03.2024 and 19.12.2023. These orders directed the local police to register criminal cases based on applications filed under Section 22-A(6) Cr.P.C.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ----S. 17; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 497 & 498 Bailability after amendments—Applicability of Cr.P.C. to NAO trials—Held, following wholesale amendments to NAO, offences under NAO are now bailable; by virtue of S.17 NAO the Cr.P.C. applies mutatis mutandis to NAO proceedings—Consequently, post-arrest and pre-arrest bail are to be governed by Ss. 497 and 498 Cr.P.C., to be first sought before the Trial Court and thereafter before appellate fora—Direct resort to constitutional jurisdiction for bail in NAO matters is no longer the necessary route. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A Fair trial and due process—Delay in conclusion of criminal trials—Prolonged pre-trial detention—Held, “delay” is antithetical to fair trial and due process; inordinate, unexplained delay for no fault of accused attracts constitutional protections to life, liberty, and fair trial—Earlier jurisprudence condemned day-to-day-trial mandates being ignored in NAO matters and recognized release where statutory timelines are frustrated; principle reaffirmed. Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah (PLD 2022 SC 497) relied upon. (c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----S. 497, third proviso—Statutory bail as of right Nature of relief and pre-conditions—Held, statutory bail on ground of delay is not discretionary; once the limbs of the third proviso are satisfied, bail follows as of right unless the delay is attributable to the accused or persons acting on their behalf, or the excepted categories (hardened/dangerous criminals, prior convicts for death/life offences, terrorism) apply—Period thresholds: exceeding one year for non-capital offences; two years for capital—Accrual of right cannot be defeated on considerations outside the provisos. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) followed. (d) Criminal procedure—Assessment of delay on facts ----S. 497, third proviso—NAO references—Case management Applicants incarcerated about 18 months; no delay attributable to them—Reference filed 18-07-2023; charge framed 15-08-2023; three witnesses partly examined—Supplementary reference filed 17-01-2024; amended charge 21-02-2024 necessitating re-recording—There are 43 accused and 208 witnesses; with separate cross-examinations, practical completion within near time is implausible—Direction to conclude within six months would be ineffectual given stage of proceedings—Keeping accused incarcerated further would risk constitutional violation; statutory right to bail triggered. (e) Bail—Heinousness of offence—White-collar crime ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. Heinousness not a standalone ground to refuse statutory bail—Legislative scheme even permits statutory bail in capital offences upon delay; NAO maximum sentence (14 years) does not alter the statutory entitlement—Purpose of bail is to secure attendance at trial; where evidence is predominantly documentary and investigation is complete, risk of tampering is minimal—Speculative fears of absconsion cannot defeat a crystallized statutory right; adequate surety and conditions can mitigate flight risk. Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State (2017 PCr.LJ 631), State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan (2022 YLR Note 64 Sindh), Hasnain Mustafa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1914) referred. (f) Practice and procedure—NAO prosecutions ----Case structuring and delay Court observed NAB’s practice of arraying numerous accused and voluminous witness lists renders trials “never-ending”; emphasized prosecutorial case-management: include only most responsible persons, rely on strongest documentary proof, and minimize witnesses to ensure effective, expeditious trials. (g) Application of third-proviso limbs on record ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. (i) Offences not punishable with death—Satisfied. (ii) Continuous detention exceeding one year with trial unconcluded, and no delay attributable to accused—Satisfied. (iii) Not previously convicted for death/life offences; not hardened/dangerous; not terrorism accused—Satisfied. Result: entitlement to bail as of right. Cited cases: • Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah PLD 2022 SC 497 • Muhammad Usman v. The State 2024 SCMR 28 • Shahid Umar v. Chairman NAB 2019 PCr.LJ 370 • Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State 2017 PCr.LJ 631 • State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan 2022 YLR Note 64 (Sindh) • Hasnain Mustafa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1914 (g) Disposition — Applications allowed—Post-arrest bail granted to Mukhtiar Ali Chandio, Tabish Ali Shah Hussaini, Saood-ul-Haq and Muhammad Adnan Rasheed under S. 497 (third proviso) Cr.P.C., subject to furnishing solvent surety of Rs. 1,500,000 each with PR bonds in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Additional Registrar—Ministry of Interior directed to place applicants’ names on the ECL and ensure immediate compliance—No comment on merits; Trial Court to proceed strictly in accordance with law.

Summary: Bail granted ----(a) Criminal Law – Post-Arrest Bail & Political Victimization ----Grant of Bail in Cases of Alleged Political Victimization----Held, where a petitioner claims political victimization, the court must assess whether the prosecution is selective in its approach and whether there is prima facie evidence to support the charge. Mere political association or prior incarceration in different cases does not justify prolonged detention without strong supporting evidence. Cited Cases: • Nawaz Sharif v. State (PLD 2009 SC 814) • Asif Ali Zardari v. State (2019 SCMR 2003) (b) Offense Under Section 409 PPC & Criminal Breach of Trust ----Application of Section 409 PPC in Toshakhana Cases----Held, criminal breach of trust under Section 409 PPC requires clear proof of dishonest misappropriation of public property by a public servant or an individual in a position of trust. Mere retention of a gift without malafide intent or established fraudulent undervaluation does not necessarily constitute an offense under Section 409 PPC. Cited Cases: • Asfandyar Wali v. State (2018 SCMR 1834) • State v. Sheikh Muhammad Rashid (PLD 2010 SC 457) (c) Retrospective Application of Rules & Legal Effect ----Applicability of Cabinet Division's Office Memoranda on Toshakhana----Held, an office memorandum (O.M.) that alters the legal consequences of an act cannot have retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. The O.M. dated 18.12.2018, which was applicable at the time of the alleged offense, did not stipulate criminal liability for non-deposit of gifts, whereas the O.M. dated 18.03.2023 introduced punitive action. Since the latter O.M. does not apply retrospectively, the case against the petitioner requires further inquiry. Cited Cases: • Gul Hassan v. State (PLD 2016 SC 249) • Shahid Orakzai v. Pakistan (PLD 2017 SC 514) (d) Grant of Bail & Burden of Proof ----Consideration for Granting Bail in White-Collar Crimes----Held, in cases of white-collar crimes or financial offenses, bail should be granted if (i) the prosecution evidence is primarily documentary, (ii) the accused is not required for further investigation, (iii) the trial is likely to be prolonged, and (iv) there is no likelihood of tampering with evidence. A prima facie case of further inquiry is sufficient to justify bail. Cited Cases: • NAB v. Anwar Majeed (2022 SCMR 304) • Syed Khursheed Shah v. NAB (2021 SCMR 1412) (e) Suspension of Sentence & Its Legal Implications ----Effect of Suspended Conviction on Bail Consideration----Held, the suspension of a sentence does not nullify the conviction, but it does impact the accused’s right to bail. Where an appeal is pending, and no final determination of guilt has been made, the court must balance the presumption of innocence with the severity of the allegations before denying bail. Cited Cases: • Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif v. NAB (2019 SCMR 1929) • Khizar Hayat v. State (PLD 2019 SC 527) Disposition: Bail granted. Petitioner admitted to post-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs.10,00,000/- with two sureties.

Summary: While agreeing with the final conclusion, Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi disagreed with the reasoning of the majority judgment and offered a separate note outlining his concerns, particularly in relation to the scope of Intra-Court Appeals (I.C.A.) under the newly enacted Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 (SCPPA). ----- Issues: ----- 1) Scope and Extent of I.C.A.: Whether the I.C.A. under the SCPPA can be considered a full-fledged appeal in the traditional sense, or if it is merely an internal corrective mechanism of the same court. ----- 2) Judicial Propriety: Whether the majority judgment's critical remarks towards former judges of the court were appropriate, given the Code of Conduct for Judges, which demands courtesy and restraint among judicial peers. ----- 3) Constitutionality of Amendments: The constitutionality of the National Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2022 and National Accountability (Second Amendment) Act, 2022, which altered the powers of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). ----- Holding/Reasoning: Scope of I.C.A.: Justice Rizvi emphasized that an Intra-Court Appeal (I.C.A.) is not an appeal against a decision from a lower court but an internal correction mechanism within the same court, where the appellate bench holds the same jurisdiction as the original bench. He drew upon Indian and Pakistani case law to support the notion that the powers of a bench hearing an I.C.A. are distinct from those hearing traditional appeals. The I.C.A. serves a corrective, not supervisory, function. ----- Judicial Propriety: Justice Rizvi took issue with the remarks made by the Chief Justice in the majority judgment, suggesting that they violated judicial comity. He cited the Code of Conduct for Judges, which requires disagreement between judges to be expressed courteously and constructively. He argued that criticism should be directed at legal principles, not the judges personally. ----- Constitutionality of Amendments: Justice Rizvi found that Parliament acted within its legislative competence when enacting the 2022 Amendments to the NAB Ordinance, and these amendments did not infringe upon fundamental rights or the Constitution. He argued that the NAB’s new threshold of Rs. 500 million for corruption cases was a matter of legislative discretion and could not be questioned by the courts unless it violated fundamental constitutional principles. ----- Citations/Precedents: Shahid Orakzai v. Pakistan Muslim League (2000 SCMR 1969) Raja Amer Khan & others v. Federation of Pakistan (PLJ 2024 SC 114) Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple (1996 SCC 52) Zaman Cement Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (2002 SCMR 312) Province of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq Patwari (PLD 1966 SC 854) Messrs Cherat Cement Co. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2021 SC 327)

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a Deputy Director at the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), filed a writ petition challenging four show cause notices and four notices for personal hearings issued by NAB, which suggested potential dismissal from service as a penalty. The petitioner argued that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the charges, as per a prior inquiry report, and that the show cause notices lacked specific legal violations. NAB's counsel countered that the petitioner had previously filed a similar petition (C.P.No.D-1604/2020) in the Sindh High Court challenging the same initial show cause notice, which was still pending. NAB argued that the petitioner’s failure to disclose this previous filing constituted concealment, making him ineligible for relief in this petition. -----Issues: -----1- Jurisdiction of Constitutional Petition: Can a petitioner challenge show cause notices through a writ petition under constitutional jurisdiction? -----2- Material Concealment: Does the petitioner’s failure to disclose a prior, ongoing petition on the same subject matter justify dismissal of the current writ petition? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Jurisdiction of Constitutional Petition: The Court held that show cause notices are preliminary steps and do not represent adverse orders. The petitioner had the opportunity to provide explanations during personal hearings, so challenging the notices through a writ petition was premature. --Material Concealment: The Court found that the petitioner’s failure to disclose the prior petition constituted material concealment. The Court noted that the petitioner falsely certified the current petition as his first on this subject, contravening principles of judicial transparency and clean hands. Consequently, the Court declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction and dismissed the petition with costs of Rs. 100,000. -----Citations/Precedents: Sajjad Ahmad v. Chairman, Capital Development Authority (2016 CLC 896) – Concealment of prior litigation affects writ jurisdiction. Abdur Rashid v. Pakistan (1969 SCMR 141) – Suppression of material facts negates eligibility for writ relief. Ramzan v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1968 Lahore 258) – Equitable relief requires full disclosure. Muhammad Saddiq v. Ruqaya Khanum (PLD 2001 Karachi 60) – Emphasizes duty of transparency before the court. Dilawar Hussain v. District Coordination Officer (2004 CLC 324) – Concealing the use of alternative remedies can lead to writ petition dismissal. Shaukat Medicos v. Government of the Punjab (2005 YLR 171) – Concealment of prior suits affects discretionary jurisdiction. Muhammad Akram v. Mansoor Sarwar Khan (2006 CLC 40) – Dismissal for non-disclosure of previous petitions on the same matter. Bashir Ahmed v. Habib (2006 MLD 148) – Incomplete disclosure of relevant litigation history impacts writ eligibility.

Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Rights of subjects---Scope---Statute which transgresses on the rights of a subject whether as regards his person or property, should be construed, if possible, in such a way that it may preserve such rights. Crawford, "Statutory Construction" Page 474, Understanding Statute, Page 258 and The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah 1992 SCMR 2192 rel. (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)--- ----S. 24-A---Speaking order---Object, purpose and scope---Statutory authority dealing with rights of people whether exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, while passing any order under any statute, is required to give reasons for passing that order---Reasons must confirm that statutory authority while passing an order has considered the matter as required by statute conferring power to it to pass such order and it is satisfied that the circumstances exist which are prerequisite for passing such order---Such reasons must be reflected from the contents of the order---Any vague order of a statutory authority, though authorized under the law to pass the order, is nullity in the eye of law. R v. HEFC, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery (1994) 1 WLR 242 rel. (c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----S. 12(a)---Word "reasonable"---Object, purpose and scope---Word "reasonable" itself attracts judicial process of ascertainment of quality of consistency with reasons---Word "reasonable" excludes subjective satisfaction and in judging whether a restriction is reasonable, an objective standard, that is, the standard of average prudent man has to be applied. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Central Secretariat, Islamabad and others 2015 SCMR 630 and PLD 1964 SC 673 rel. (d) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----S. 12(a)---Words "his property"---Applicability---Words "his property" occurring in S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 cannot be given wider meaning as to include any of the property owned by accused---Such words have to be restricted only to those assets or properties of accused which are subject matter of investigation---If wider meaning is given to it as to include any of the property of accused then it has the effect of enlarging scope of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 to those properties of accused, the acquisition whereof is no offence under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Penal statute has to be construed strictly to preserve the rights of citizens. The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah 1992 SCMR 2192 and Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607 rel. (e) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----S. 12---Freezing of property---Exercise of power---Essential conditions---Essential conditions for invoking S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 in a case are; (i) the power under S. 12 can be exercised by Chairman NAB (delegatee) or the Court trying an accused for any offence as specified under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999; (ii) there must be reasonable grounds for believing that accused has committed an offence under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999; (iii) the reasons for such belief of his must be provided in the order; and (iv) property/assets so frozen by the order under S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 must have some nexus with alleged crime of accused being investigated. (f) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----S. 12---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 18 & 23---Constitutional petition---Freezing of accounts---Confirmation by Accountability Court- --Petitioners/accused persons were aggrieved of freezing of all their bank accounts including those having no nexus with investigation---Validity-- -Accounts of petitioners/accused in question had no connection with alleged inquiry/investigation being conducted by NAB, and if said accounts remained frozen then it would have an adverse effect on execution of the contract as it would hamper mode of receiving payment from the employer as well as payment to employees and payment towards other contractual obligations of petitioners/accused---Defense offered by petitioners/accused persons required evidence---Orders passed by Chairman NAB neither contained any reasons nor he had mentioned in the orders any relevance of amount allegedly earned by petitioners through corruption and corrupt practices with the accounts so frozen---So far guilt of petitioners/accused persons had not been established---Harsh order of NAB authorities had the effect of depriving both the petitioners / accused persons of carrying on lawful trade as well as right to hold property in terms of Arts. 18 & 23 of the Constitution---Orders of NAB authorities were unreasonable, harsh, deficient in its contents and incorrect in its result---Freezing orders were an offhand decision by NAB authorities which completely lacked essential attributes of S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and were not sustainable in the eye of law---High Court declared that orders passed by NAB authorities followed by orders of Accountability Court were illegal and without lawful authority---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances . Dr. Muhammad Azam Kasi v. The State through Deputy Prosecutor-General Accountability Court No.1, NAB, Quetta 2012 PCr.LJ 1950; Shah Rukh Jamal v. National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad and others PLD 2022 Isl. 1; Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar v. Malik Riaz Hussain and others PLD 2012 SC 903; Mst. Rukhsana Bangash v. Chairman, National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and 4 others 2021 PCr.LJ 1813; Messrs Memom Motors Private Limited through Genral Manager v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman and 2 others 2014 PCr.LJ 1378; Ehsan Ullah Sirazai and another v. Director General (Karachi) National Accountability Bureau and another PLD 2018 Sindh 696; Haji Muhammad Arif Khattak and 2 others v. Chairman/ Director General, National Accountability Bureau and another PLD 2018 Pesh. 207; Adam Amin Chaudhry and another v. National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Islamabad through Chairman and 29 others 2023 PCr.LJ 1536; Pir Mazharul Haq v. The State through Chief Ehtesab Commissioner, Islamabad PLD 2005 SC 63; Mansur ul Haque v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2008 SC 166; Fazlul Qader Choudhury v. Crown PLD 1952 FC 19; Ch. Abdul Malik v. The State PLD 1968 SC 349; Chaudhry Shujat Hussain v. The State 1995 SCMR 1249; United Business Lines, S.I.E. Gujranwala and another v. Government of Punjab through Secretary, Local Government, Lahore and 5 others PLD 1997 Lah. 456 and Messrs Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lah. 672 rel. (g) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--- ----Ss. 12 & 13---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Freezing of bank accounts---Alternate and efficacious remedy---Scope---During pendency of objection petitions before Accountability Court, petitioners/accused persons assailed orders passed by NAB officials freezing all their bank accounts including those which were not subject matter of inquiry and investigation before NAB---Objection was raised by NAB to maintainability of Constitutional petition on the ground that S. 13 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 provided mechanism for receiving and adjudication of an objection by any person aggrieved by freezing order passed under S. 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and such objection petition was already pending before Accountability Court---Validity---Almost 75 bank accounts of petitioners/accused persons had been frozen by NAB authorities without realizing that those accounts related to existing business activities of petitioners/ accused persons, in which not only pecuniary interest of petitioners/ accused persons were involved but the accounts related to their business activities regarding execution of public contracts and huge interest of the government/semi government organization were also involved---Remedy under S. 13 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 was merely illusory---It was not a settled rule that in all circumstances availability of an alternate remedy to an aggrieved person would be a bar for maintaining Constitutional petition---High Court overruled the objection of NAB authorities---Constitutional petition was held to be maintainable, in circumstances. Arshad Mehmood v. Commissioner/Delimitation Authority, Gujranawala and others PLD 2014 Lah. 221 and Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd v. Muhammad Ramzan and others PLD 2020 SC 414 rel. Shumail Ahmad Butt and Barrister Qasim Wadoud for Petitioners. Syed Azeem Dad, D.P.G. and Muhammad Ali, A.D.P.G. for Respondents. Date of hearing: 3rd July, 2024. SYED ARSHAD ALI, J.--- This consolidated judgment shall dispose of the instant as well as the connected W.P. No.2710-P/2024 having involved a common question of law for adjudication beside having common facts. (i) Order dated 13.03.2024. Through the said order, the worthy Director General NAB Khyber Pakhtunkhwa while exercising his power under section 12 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ("Ordinance") has ordered for freezing of 75 Bank Accounts maintained by the Petitioners at different banks and at different places i.e. Islamabad, Karachi, Toba Tek Singh etc. It is the opinion of the worthy Director General NAB in Para-2 of the said order that after perusing the record collected during inquiry/investigation, he finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused have committed the offence of corruption and corrupt practices and resultantly caused loss to the exchequer being an offence under section 9(a) of the Ordinance and schedule thereto. (i) Order dated 04.04.2024. Through the said order, the worthy Director General NAB KP has ordered for freezing of two bank accounts of the Petitioner at Habib Bank Limited, Corporate Brach Islamabad and Post Mall Branch, F-7 Islamabad. It is the opinion of the worthy Director General NAB that after perusing the record collected during inquiry/ investigation, he finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed the offence of corruption and corrupt practices. (a) The Chairman NAB or the Court trying [an accused] for any offence as specified under this Ordinance, may, at any time, if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed such an offence, order the freezing of his property, or part thereof, whether in his possession or in the possession of any relative, associate or person on his behalf. (d) If the property ordered to be frozen consists of livestock or is of a perishable nature, the Chairman NAB, or the Court may, if it deems proper and expedient, order the immediate sale thereof and the proceeds of the sale may be deposited with the Chairman NAB or the Court, or as either may direct as appropriate. (e) The powers, duties, and liabilities of a receiver, if any, appointed under this section shall be the same as those of a receiver appointed under Order-XL of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). (f) The order of freezing mentioned in subsections (a) to (e) shall remain operative until the final disposal of the case by the Court, and in the event of the acquittal [or release] of the accused, shall continue to remain operative for a period of ten days after receipt of certified copy of the order of acquittal or release by NAB, where after it shall be subject to an order by the court in which an appeal, if any, is filed. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of ay law for the time being in force, the Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon all claims or objections against the freezing of any property under section 12 above. Such claims or objections shall be made before the Court within 14 days from the date of the order freezing such property. (c) The accused or any other aggrieved party, whose claim or objection against freezing of property has been dismissed by the Court, may, within ten days file an appeal against such order before the High Court.