Summary: Bail granted --- (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ----S. 17; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 497 & 498 Bailability after amendments—Applicability of Cr.P.C. to NAO trials—Held, following wholesale amendments to NAO, offences under NAO are now bailable; by virtue of S.17 NAO the Cr.P.C. applies mutatis mutandis to NAO proceedings—Consequently, post-arrest and pre-arrest bail are to be governed by Ss. 497 and 498 Cr.P.C., to be first sought before the Trial Court and thereafter before appellate fora—Direct resort to constitutional jurisdiction for bail in NAO matters is no longer the necessary route. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A Fair trial and due process—Delay in conclusion of criminal trials—Prolonged pre-trial detention—Held, “delay” is antithetical to fair trial and due process; inordinate, unexplained delay for no fault of accused attracts constitutional protections to life, liberty, and fair trial—Earlier jurisprudence condemned day-to-day-trial mandates being ignored in NAO matters and recognized release where statutory timelines are frustrated; principle reaffirmed. Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah (PLD 2022 SC 497) relied upon. (c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----S. 497, third proviso—Statutory bail as of right Nature of relief and pre-conditions—Held, statutory bail on ground of delay is not discretionary; once the limbs of the third proviso are satisfied, bail follows as of right unless the delay is attributable to the accused or persons acting on their behalf, or the excepted categories (hardened/dangerous criminals, prior convicts for death/life offences, terrorism) apply—Period thresholds: exceeding one year for non-capital offences; two years for capital—Accrual of right cannot be defeated on considerations outside the provisos. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) followed. (d) Criminal procedure—Assessment of delay on facts ----S. 497, third proviso—NAO references—Case management Applicants incarcerated about 18 months; no delay attributable to them—Reference filed 18-07-2023; charge framed 15-08-2023; three witnesses partly examined—Supplementary reference filed 17-01-2024; amended charge 21-02-2024 necessitating re-recording—There are 43 accused and 208 witnesses; with separate cross-examinations, practical completion within near time is implausible—Direction to conclude within six months would be ineffectual given stage of proceedings—Keeping accused incarcerated further would risk constitutional violation; statutory right to bail triggered. (e) Bail—Heinousness of offence—White-collar crime ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. Heinousness not a standalone ground to refuse statutory bail—Legislative scheme even permits statutory bail in capital offences upon delay; NAO maximum sentence (14 years) does not alter the statutory entitlement—Purpose of bail is to secure attendance at trial; where evidence is predominantly documentary and investigation is complete, risk of tampering is minimal—Speculative fears of absconsion cannot defeat a crystallized statutory right; adequate surety and conditions can mitigate flight risk. Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State (2017 PCr.LJ 631), State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan (2022 YLR Note 64 Sindh), Hasnain Mustafa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1914) referred. (f) Practice and procedure—NAO prosecutions ----Case structuring and delay Court observed NAB’s practice of arraying numerous accused and voluminous witness lists renders trials “never-ending”; emphasized prosecutorial case-management: include only most responsible persons, rely on strongest documentary proof, and minimize witnesses to ensure effective, expeditious trials. (g) Application of third-proviso limbs on record ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. (i) Offences not punishable with death—Satisfied. (ii) Continuous detention exceeding one year with trial unconcluded, and no delay attributable to accused—Satisfied. (iii) Not previously convicted for death/life offences; not hardened/dangerous; not terrorism accused—Satisfied. Result: entitlement to bail as of right. Cited cases: • Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah PLD 2022 SC 497 • Muhammad Usman v. The State 2024 SCMR 28 • Shahid Umar v. Chairman NAB 2019 PCr.LJ 370 • Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State 2017 PCr.LJ 631 • State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan 2022 YLR Note 64 (Sindh) • Hasnain Mustafa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1914 (g) Disposition — Applications allowed—Post-arrest bail granted to Mukhtiar Ali Chandio, Tabish Ali Shah Hussaini, Saood-ul-Haq and Muhammad Adnan Rasheed under S. 497 (third proviso) Cr.P.C., subject to furnishing solvent surety of Rs. 1,500,000 each with PR bonds in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Additional Registrar—Ministry of Interior directed to place applicants’ names on the ECL and ensure immediate compliance—No comment on merits; Trial Court to proceed strictly in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 ----R. 11-A—Appointment on deceased quota—Eligibility of legal heir—Mandatory consideration by department—Delay in processing—Effect. Rule 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 provides that where a civil servant dies during service, one of his children shall be provided employment in BPS-1 to BPS-10 in the same department if otherwise eligible. The rule is clear and mandatory in nature, conferring a legitimate right on the surviving legal heir to be considered for appointment, subject to fulfillment of qualifications. Delay in processing or administrative inaction cannot defeat such right once the application is filed within policy terms. (b) Constitutional law ----Art. 4 & Art. 25—Fundamental rights—Right to fair treatment and equality before law—Obligation of public functionaries. The conduct of the respondent department, which failed to act on the petitioner’s application for over a decade despite repeated communications, was held contrary to the principles of fairness, justice, and equality under Arts. 4 and 25 of the Constitution. Government departments are bound to act fairly, promptly, and in accordance with law when dealing with citizens’ rights, particularly those arising from compassionate employment provisions. (c) Service matter ----Appointment against deceased quota—Belated consideration—Whether application time-barred—Effect. The objection that the petitioner’s father died in 2003 and that his application was delayed was rejected. The Court held that the petitioner had applied in 2008 within the policy framework and the delay was entirely attributable to official apathy. Once the petitioner applied within the prescribed policy period, the department was under a continuing obligation to process and decide the case in accordance with law. (d) Administrative law ----Non-filing of comments by respondents—Apathy and neglect—Consequences. The respondent department failed to submit comments despite repeated opportunities. Such inaction demonstrated administrative negligence and disregard of judicial proceedings. The Court observed that government officials cannot evade their statutory duty by simply pleading “policy matters” without substantiating their stance through record. (e) Public service recruitment ----Deceased quota—Consideration for suitable post—Scope of discretion. While the petitioner had sought appointment as Junior School Teacher (JST), the Court directed that he be considered for *any suitable ministerial post* commensurate with his qualifications, provided he fulfilled eligibility requirements under relevant recruitment rules and policies. The discretion to select a suitable post must be exercised fairly, in accordance with Rule 11-A and the law declared by the Supreme Court on the subject. (f) Directions and compliance ----Chief Secretary and Secretary Education Department—Obligation to implement Court’s directive—Timeline for compliance. The Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, and Secretary, School Education & Literacy Department were directed to ensure compliance of this order in letter and spirit within 30 days. They must evaluate petitioner’s eligibility for appointment against the deceased quota, complete all codal formalities, and issue appointment orders if found suitable. (g) Disposition— Constitutional petition allowed. Respondent departments directed to consider the petitioner’s case for appointment against the deceased quota strictly in accordance with Rule 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 and Supreme Court precedents on the subject. Compliance to be reported within 30 days. Held— (i) Rule 11-A creates a mandatory obligation to provide employment to one eligible child of a deceased civil servant. (ii) Delay attributable to administrative neglect cannot deprive the petitioner of his lawful right. (iii) Petition allowed; directions issued for consideration and compliance.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4 & 14; Art. 10A (presumption of innocence); Police Rules, 1934, r. 24.5; Police Order, 2002, Art. 10(3); Punjab Right to Public Services Act, 2019, s. 10 - Police Record Certificates (PRCs) and acquittals—Disclosure of non-conviction data—Right to be dealt with in accordance with law and dignity—Held, inclusion in a PRC of any case that has culminated in acquittal, discharge, or cancellation (Category-1 matters) is unconstitutional and unlawful as it offends Arts. 4 and 14 and undermines the presumption of innocence protected by Art. 10A—Such disclosure carries stigma which a “no adverse effect” notation cannot cure—Absent an express statutory framework authorizing calibrated disclosure with safeguards, police cannot publish non-conviction history in PRCs—Directions issued to omit the petitioner’s acquitted case from PRC and to re-issue within ten days; however, preservation of internal records under r. 24.5 remains unaffected. (b) Police administration—Disclosure vs. preservation—Standing Orders/SOPs cannot substitute legislation ----Police Rules, 1934, r. 24.5; Police Order, 2002, Art. 10(3); Punjab Right to Public Services Act, 2019, ss. 4(1), 10 ---- Rule 24.5 mandates preservation of FIR registers and related entries for sixty years; it does not authorize disclosure to third parties through PRCs—IGP’s Standing Order No. 2 of 2024 and related SOPs may regulate internal processes but do not create substantive power to disclose criminal-record information—PRPSA is procedural and applies only to Gazette-notified services; issuance of PRCs (and disclosure of non-conviction data therein) is not shown to be duly notified—Reliance on Art. 10(3) of the Police Order and s. 10 PRPSA to justify PRC disclosures is misplaced. (c) Criminal justice—Effect of acquittal; presumption restored in full ----Art. 10A; Cr.P.C., ss. 249-A, 345(6); Evidence—Standards ---- An acquittal by a competent court confers a “double presumption of innocence” and restores legal and social standing; Pakistani jurisprudence recognizes that all acquittals are honourable, whether on merits or by benefit of doubt; no shades of acquittal—Any State action that re-stigmatizes by publicizing the concluded accusation must meet strict legality, necessity, and proportionality; without statute, Category-1 matters must be excluded from PRCs. Cited: Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza (2008 SCMR 329); Chairman ADBP v. Mumtaz Khan (PLD 2010 SC 695); The State v. Abdul Khaliq (PLD 2011 SC 554); Muhammad Bashir v. SHO (PLD 2007 SC 539). (d) Pending cases and convictions—Future legislative path ----Structured disclosure only by statute ---- Pending proceedings (Category-2) may justify calibrated disclosure for narrowly defined, role-specific contexts (e.g., sensitive employment), but only under specific legislation articulating offence classes, relevance, necessity, and proportionality tests—Conviction history (Category-3) likewise requires statutory calibration; blanket, context-free disclosure is inconsistent with contemporary standards of privacy and dignity—Comparative regimes (UK/Australia/US) are statutory and filtered; Pakistan lacks equivalent legislation. (e) Judicial directions in Zulfiqar Ali (PLD 2023 Lahore 512)—Limited scope ---- Directions there concern accuracy and status-updating of records filed in judicial proceedings; they neither address nor authorize disclosure of non-conviction data in PRCs—Reliance on Zulfiqar Ali to justify PRC disclosures is misconceived. (f) Consent and “citizen-driven” issuance—No waiver of fundamental rights---- A PRC sought to satisfy administrative requirements (e.g., visas) is not a voluntary waiver of Arts. 4 or 14—Consent under administrative compulsion cannot validate an otherwise unauthorized disclosure. (g) Comparative law—Inapplicability absent statute ---- UK case law on Enhanced Certificates (e.g., AR v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] UKSC 47) operates within a detailed statutory framework (Police Act 1997; statutory guidance; filtering)—Pakistan has no comparable legislative scheme; importing outcomes without statutory footing is impermissible. (h) Maintainability—Ripeness---- Objection of prematurity overruled—The impugned PRC had already been issued for use in a visa process; risk of denial/delay and reputational harm is concrete and immediate; petition is ripe for adjudication. Cited: Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex v. Federation (2011 PTD 2260); Sabira Khatoon (2021 PLC (C.S.) 1600); Muhammad Hammad-ur-Rehman Zafar (PLD 2022 Lahore 177). (i) Misstatement in PRC—Correction mandated; dignity engaged---- PRC wrongly recorded acquittal as under s. 494 Cr.P.C. (withdrawal) whereas judicial record shows s. 249-A Cr.P.C. (reasoned acquittal)—This mischaracterization is substantive, not semantic; it diminishes the judicial nature of exoneration and offends dignity—Correction directed. (j) Record deletion vs. non-disclosure ---- Prayer to delete petitioner’s name from PSRMS/CRMS declined—Police are bound to preserve FIR indexes and case outcomes for sixty years under r. 24.5—Constitutional protection is achieved by prohibiting public disclosure of Category-1 matters in PRCs, not by erasing lawful internal records—This does not preclude disclosure when specifically required by statute or court order. (k) Service/disciplinary proceedings—Autonomy preserved---- Exclusion of acquitted matters from PRCs does not bar permissible departmental action under service law/Police Rules (e.g., r. 16.3) where independently warranted; standards and objectives differ from criminal adjudication. Cited: Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. IGP Punjab (2023 PLC (C.S.) 884). (g) Disposition — Petition allowed to this extent: Respondents shall, within ten days of receipt of certified copy, issue a revised PRC to the petitioner omitting any reference to FIR No. 570/2016 and correctly reflecting her status; preservation and annotation of internal police records under r. 24.5 remain intact; nothing herein precludes disclosure where specifically mandated by statute or court order; no order as to costs. Cited cases (select): • Waqas Khan v. The State (PLD 2025 Peshawar 67) • Zulfiqar Ali v. Ex officio Justice of Peace (PLD 2023 Lahore 512) • Jawwad S. Khawaja v. Federation (PLD 2024 SC 337) • Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza (2008 SCMR 329) • Chairman ADBP v. Mumtaz Khan (PLD 2010 SC 695) • Muhammad Bashir v. SHO (PLD 2007 SC 539) • Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex (2011 PTD 2260) • Muhammad Hammad-ur-Rehman Zafar (PLD 2022 Lahore 177) • AR v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] UKSC 47

Summary: (a) Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979—Scope and applicability to OTT platforms ----Preamble; Ss. 2(c) & 2(d), 4, 5 & 6; 18th Constitutional Amendment (devolution) and provincial amendments (Sindh Motion Pictures Act, 2011; Punjab Motion Pictures (Amendment) Act, 2012; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Censorship of Motion Pictures (Films, CDs, Videos, Stage Dramas and Shows) Act, 2018) The Ordinance was enacted for pre-censorship and regulation of public exhibition of films by means of “cinematograph” in a physical/public setting; OTT platforms did not exist at the time and were not subsequently brought within the statutory scheme by provincial amendments after devolution—Held, the Ordinance does not extend to OTT content and its scope cannot be judicially expanded to cover a fundamentally different, private, on-demand, internet-based medium. (b) Constitutional principle—No compulsion without law; limits of judicial expansion ----Const., Art. 4(c) Compelling OTT platforms or regulators to submit to a pre-screen certification regime under the Ordinance would impose obligations not required by law—Courts cannot create a censorship framework where the legislature has not spoken—Application of the 1979 framework to OTT is both legally misconceived and practically unworkable. (c) Online content regulation—PTA’s remit and practical limits of pre-censorship ----Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, S. 37(1); Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content (Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards) Rules, 2021, rr. 4 & 5 (incl. r. 5(6)) PTA is empowered to remove/block unlawful online content or entire platforms, including acting on its own motion; however, encrypted, vast, and dynamically updated OTT streams are not amenable to human-led pre-screen certification akin to films for public exhibition—Global practice likewise eschews blanket pre-censorship for OTT in favor of post-publication tools. (d) Public exhibition in cinemas—“Deemed certification” rejected ----Const., Art. 19 (reasonable restrictions); Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979, Ss. 4–6 Petitioners’ alternative plea that unrestrained OTT content be “deemed certified” for cinematic exhibition is untenable—Public exhibition entails implicit State sanction and higher regulatory responsibility for decency, morality, public order, etc.—Granting blanket deemed certification would create a regulatory vacuum and undermine the very purpose of film censorship laws. (e) Import Policy Order—Digital origin vs. exhibition requirements ----Import Policy Order, 2022 (Serial No. 24); Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950, S. 3 Even if OTT content accessed digitally is not “import of goods” within the Import Policy paradigm, this does not exempt its public exhibition in cinemas from domestic certification requirements under the films regime—Trade classifications cannot be used to bypass lawful pre-exhibition controls. (f) Interpretation of “cinematograph”—Fixed statutory meaning; comparative authority ----Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979, S. 2(c); Commissioner of Income Tax Legal Division, Lahore v. Khurshid Ahmad (PLD 2016 SC 545); Supreme Court Bar Association v. Federation (PLD 2023 SC 42); British Amusement Catering Trades Association v. Westminster City Council ([1988] 1 All ER) Where a term is defined, its meaning “stereotypes” unless amended by the legislature—Courts will not indefinitely stretch historical definitions to cover unforeseen technologies; “exhibition of moving pictures” jurisprudence supports that video/OTT paradigms lie outside classic cinematograph frameworks—Indian authorities cited do not justify “deemed certification” for cinema display of OTT content. Cited Cases: • PLD 2016 SC 545 • PLD 2023 SC 42 • British Amusement Catering Trades Association v. Westminster City Council [1988] 1 All ER (g) Equality before law—No discrimination established ----Const., Art. 25 Cinemas (public exhibition by cinematograph) and OTT platforms (private, on-demand internet streaming) are not “similarly circumstanced”; non-application of the Ordinance to OTT is not discriminatory enforcement but reflects a legislative vacuum appropriate to a distinct medium—Petitioners’ reliance on equality principles is misconceived. Cited Cases: • I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041) • Gul Zarif Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2025 SCMR 415) (g) Disposition — Both writ petitions dismissed; reliefs seeking application of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 to OTT platforms and “deemed certification” of unrestrained OTT content for cinematic exhibition declined.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Arts. 4, 25 & 199—Fundamental rights—Due process and fair trial—Scope—Invocation of constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199—Held, although the petitioner invoked Art.199 of the Constitution read with S.24 C.P.C., no violation of a fundamental right was established; however, where procedural obstacles between different Sessions Divisions create a judicial impasse, the High Court may exercise its supervisory powers to ensure justice, fair trial, and avoidance of conflicting judgments—Petition rightly treated as a transfer application under S.24 C.P.C. in the interest of justice. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S.24—Transfer and consolidation of suits—Power of High Court—Where two civil suits pending before separate courts in different Sessions Divisions involved identical parties, the same negotiable instrument, and common factual and legal questions, their consolidation was necessary to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting findings—Leave to defend having been granted in the summary suit under O.XXXVII, R.7, C.P.C., the case assumed the character of a regular civil suit, making consolidation legally permissible—Reliance placed on Zahid Zaman Khan v. Khan Afsar (PLD 2016 SC 409) and First Women Bank Ltd. v. High Court of Sindh (2004 SCMR 108). (c) Order XXXVII, Rule 7—Summary suit converted into regular civil suit—Effect—Once leave to defend is granted, proceedings under O.XXXVII, C.P.C. lose their summary character and stand on the same procedural footing as an ordinary civil suit—Hence, consolidation with another civil suit arising from the same transaction is procedurally valid. (d) Specific Relief Act, 1877 ----S.39—Cancellation of instrument—Where one suit seeks recovery on a negotiable instrument and the other seeks cancellation of that same instrument and underlying agreements, both matters are interdependent, and joint trial ensures consistency and prevents irreconcilable findings. (g) Disposition— Writ petition treated as transfer application under S.24 C.P.C.—Allowed—Civil Suit “Saqib Ali Khan v. Shuja Mukhtar Kiyani” pending before Civil Judge-XVIII, Islamabad (East) ordered to be withdrawn and transferred to Additional District Judge-IX, Islamabad (West), where connected summary suit “Shuja Mukhtar Kiyani v. Saqib Ali Khan” is pending—Both suits to be consolidated and tried jointly by the said court in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 — Natural Gas Regulatory Authority (Licensing) Rules, 2002 ----R. 15(2) (Decisions of the Authority); R. 10(9) (Re-opening of hearings) Licensing—Mandatory decision period—OGRA’s failure to decide application within statutory period—Effect—Petitioner’s application (20-12-2017) for license to compress, store and sell flare gas remained undecided despite OGRA’s “final determination” (15-04-2022) directing submission of specified documents, which the parties submitted on 10-05-2022—Under R. 15(2), the Authority shall decide an application within six months of filing; any extension is confined to causes beyond control, at most one month, and reasons must be recorded—OGRA neither concluded proceedings within the prescribed aggregate period nor recorded reasons for extension—Action held contrary to mandatory rule and beyond lawful authority. Cited cases: Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Anwar 2025 SCMR 153; Nadir Khan v. Qadir Hussain 2024 SCMR 770; Tri-Star Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trisa Burstenfabrik AG Triegen 2023 SCMR 1502. (b) Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 — Natural Gas Regulatory Authority (Licensing) Rules, 2002 ----R. 10(9) Re-opening of concluded hearing—Prerequisites—OGRA fixed a further public hearing on 28-02-2023 after closing evidence and rendering a final decision—No good cause was shown nor reasons recorded as required by R. 10(9)—Such re-opening, absent a reasoned order on motion and good cause, is impermissible. (c) OGRA Ordinance, 2002 ----S. 12(2) (High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction over regulated activity decisions) Maintainability—Scope of judicial review—Where no other adequate remedy exists, High Court may direct the Authority to refrain from unlawful action or to perform its legal duty—Given OGRA’s procedural lapses under the Ordinance/Rules, recourse under S. 12(2) was competent; Court’s review confined to testing procedural legality and timeliness, not merits of licensing. Cited cases: Messrs Mehran Oils (Pvt.) Ltd. v. OGRA, PLD 2021 Sindh 67. (d) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Arts. 4, 5 & 18 Fundamental rights—Regulatory delay and arbitrary inaction—OGRA’s inordinate and unreasoned delay in deciding the license application infringed the petitioner’s rights to be dealt with in accordance with law (Arts. 4 & 5) and to enter upon and conduct a lawful business (Art. 18). (e) Practice and procedure Multiplicity of proceedings—Costs—Petitioner’s resort to multiple suits at different fora for injunctive relief deprecated; costs of Rs. 100,000/- imposed. (f) Flare gas—Regulatory context (observation) OGRA’s license dated 23-07-2024 to GAP pertained to industrial usage from the same field; not a license for CNG use—Safety and policy requirements to be considered by OGRA while deciding petitioner’s application. (g) Disposition — Writ petition disposed of. OGRA directed to decide the petitioner’s 20-12-2017 licensing application strictly in accordance with law within one month; OGRA restrained from taking adverse action against the petitioner until decision; costs of Rs. 100,000/- imposed on the petitioner.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9, 14, 15 & 199 Fundamental rights—Right to dignity, reputation, and freedom of movement—Post-acquittal continuation of name in police records—Scope of relief—Petitioner, acquitted under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. from FIR No. 40/2022, sought deletion of his name from all police databases and issuance of a clear Police Character Certificate (PCC)—Held, once an acquittal attains finality, no stigma or adverse inference can lawfully persist against the acquitted person—However, police may retain internal historical records of FIRs for administrative, operational, or inter-agency purposes so long as such records are not misused—Constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 cannot be invoked merely to interfere with internal record-keeping unless misuse or targeted discrimination is shown—Relief for expunction of entire record declined. (b) Police administration—Character certificate—Post-acquittal status ----Issuance of Police Character Certificate (PCC)—Obligation of police authorities—After acquittal based on complainant’s own clarification exonerating the accused, the police must issue a PCC omitting reference to the concerned FIR—Continued mention of an obsolete and unchallenged FIR in the PCC would unjustly stigmatize an exonerated citizen and offend the dignity guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution—Direction issued to authorities to issue PCC within fifteen (15) days without reference to the FIR. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 249-A—Acquittal—Finality—Once an accused is acquitted under S. 249-A Cr.P.C., and the prosecution does not challenge the decision, the acquittal attains finality and fully exonerates the accused from criminal liability—No adverse record or inference can subsist thereafter. (g) Disposition — Petition partly allowed—Request for complete expunction of FIR from police database declined—Respondents directed to issue Police Character Certificate to the Petitioner omitting reference to FIR No. 40/2022 within fifteen days.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9, 25, 35 & 199 --- Fundamental rights—Right to equality and family life—Issuance of Pakistan Origin Card (POC)—Scope—Petitioner, a Pakistani national, sought direction for issuance of POC to her foreign husband (Swiss citizen of Afghan origin)—Held, issuance of POC is not an absolute right but a conditional privilege subject to prescribed eligibility and security clearance—Where competent security agency declines clearance, NADRA has no authority to override such assessment—Court cannot interfere in executive decision based on national security considerations absent mala fides or lack of jurisdiction—No violation of fundamental rights established. (b) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000) ----Ss. 10 & 11—Issuance of Pakistan Origin Card—Conditions—Section 11 authorizes NADRA to issue POCs to prescribed classes of foreigners subject to fulfillment of criteria, terms, and security clearance—Authority lawfully refused POC when clearance was denied by security agency—NADRA acted within jurisdiction. (c) Pakistan Origin Card Rules, 2002 ----R. 13—Refusal of registration—Scope—Authority may refuse registration or issuance of POC if, in its opinion, such issuance is prejudicial to the sovereignty, integrity, security, or defense of Pakistan, or against public interest—Rule 13 validly invoked where security agency withheld clearance of applicant—Refusal neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. (d) Case law distinguished ----Regional Manager NADRA Hayatabad Peshawar v. Mst. Hajira (2024 SCMR 197) and Mst. Amina v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2024 Peshawar 87) Cited precedents inapplicable since those matters involved no adverse security clearance—Current refusal based solely on non-clearance by competent authority under Rule 13. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction—Judicial restraint ----Art. 199 --- Courts cannot substitute executive discretion or reappraise security assessments made by specialized agencies unless shown to be mala fide or ultra vires—No material on record proving such infirmities—Constitutional petition not maintainable. (g) Disposition — Petition dismissed; NADRA’s refusal to issue POC to petitioner’s husband upheld; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4 & 199----Executive action—requirement of lawful authority and due process—High Court’s duty to enforce Art. 4----Islamabad Boy Scouts Association (IBSA) office allegedly sealed and keys taken by Assistant Commissioner (City) without any written/speaking order---Held, that every action detrimental to property or reputation must be “in accordance with law” (Art. 4); High Court, in constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199, is bound to secure compliance with Art. 4 and to strike down arbitrary, mala fide or colourable acts not backed by lawful authority or proper legal process—Reliance placed on Ch. Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan and Government of West Pakistan v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri (PLD 1969 SC 14). (b) Administrative law ----Ultra vires executive measures—Sealing/closure of premises—necessity of a speaking order----Record contained minutes of review meeting but disclosed no directive to seal IBSA office; no formal order of Chief Commissioner authorizing seizure of keys or closure was produced---Action held arbitrary, without jurisdiction, and violative of Art. 4; mere dissatisfaction with an organization’s performance cannot justify coercive measures without statutory basis and due process. (c) Pakistan Boy Scouts framework ----Pakistan Boy Scouts Association Ordinance, 1959 & Rules (1993)----Governance in ICT—scope noted----PBS functions under the Ministry of Federal Education & Professional Training; President is Chief Scout nationally; Governors act as Chief Scouts in provinces; for ICT, rules are silent as to Chief Scout—Court recorded the administrative backdrop but found that, irrespective of governance debates, the impugned sealing lacked any lawful order and could not stand. (d) Constitutional petition ----Maintainability despite factual controversies----Where undisputed absence of lawful authority and non-production of a speaking order impinging fundamental rights is shown, writ under Art. 199 is maintainable notwithstanding parties’ rival narratives on management/performance. Disposition: Petition disposed of with directions—Chief Commissioner, Islamabad, ordered to conduct a thorough inquiry into the illegal closure/seizure of IBSA office, fix responsibility, resolve the matter within seven (07) days, and submit a comprehensive report to the Additional Registrar (Judicial).

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)–––Ss. 22-A & 22-B–––Application for registration of criminal case–––Scope and object–––Respondent No. 4 filed an application under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace alleging abduction of her son by unknown persons in official uniform–––Learned Justice of Peace, upon obtaining report from police, directed registration of a case–––Petitioner contended that the order was passed without hearing him and in ignorance of material facts showing involvement of respondent’s family members in various criminal cases–––Held, that proceedings under Sections 22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C. are meant to ensure that a citizen’s complaint regarding commission of a cognizable offence is duly entertained and that no person is deprived of legal recourse owing to inaction of police–––Justice of Peace rightly exercised jurisdiction to direct registration of FIR when the report showed unexplained delay between respondent’s 15-call and formal arrest of her son, giving rise to reasonable apprehension of unlawful detention–––No illegality or irregularity found in the impugned order directing registration of FIR. (b) Constitution of Pakistan–––Arts. 4, 9 & 10–––Fundamental rights–––Unlawful detention–––Protection of liberty–––Court observed that wrongful confinement of respondent’s son by police amounted to gross violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 4, 9 and 10 of the Constitution–––Such conduct reflected abuse of authority and disregard for rule of law and could not be condoned. (c) Administration of justice–––Exercise of revisional or constitutional jurisdiction–––Interference with orders of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace–––High Court held that where an order is well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of record, no interference is warranted–––Petition challenging order dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Petition dismissed.