Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 561-A, 265-K & 249-A—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-B, 494, 496-A, 420, 468, 471, 109 & 34— —Acquittal—Scope of inherent jurisdiction—Petition for acquittal during trial—Maintainability— Petitioners sought acquittal under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. after rejection of earlier application under S.265-K, Cr.P.C.—Held, final challan had been submitted, charge was framed, and trial was underway with prosecution witnesses yet to be examined—Main accused were absconding and recovery of vehicle used in commission of alleged offence had been effected from petitioners’ premises—Court observed that criminal trials should ordinarily proceed to conclusion on merits, and extraordinary jurisdiction under Ss. 265-K or 561-A should not be invoked when trial has commenced—Preemptive acquittal of some accused may prejudice the prosecution case against absconding co-accused—Petition dismissed. Principle: Where trial has commenced, the Court should refrain from short-circuiting proceedings through premature acquittal under inherent or statutory provisions. (b) Criminal Trial—Multiple accused—Effect of acquitting some accused during trial—Prejudice to prosecution— Two co-accused had absconded and their trial was yet to be conducted—Held, in cases involving multiple accused, allowing acquittal of some accused at an early stage could adversely affect prosecution of others—Prosecution had listed around 20 witnesses—Premature acquittal would obstruct evaluation of collective liability under Ss.34 & 109, P.P.C.—Court must adopt cautious approach in such cases. Principle: Acquittal of one accused during pendency of trial may prejudice case of co-accused, particularly when trial is incomplete and evidence is yet to be recorded. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A—Scope—When not to be invoked— S.561-A, Cr.P.C. confers inherent powers to secure ends of justice or prevent abuse of process—However, such powers are not a substitute for trial and must be exercised sparingly—Held, where factual controversy exists and trial is in progress, accused must be tried in accordance with law—Assessment of guilt or innocence should be left to trial court after full evidence is led. Held, petition under S.561-A dismissed as misconceived. Petition dismissed.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973------Art. 199--Constitutional petition--Arms Ordinance, 1965,S. 13(b)(d)--Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Ss. 4 & 5--Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, S. 7--Recovery of huge quantity of Arms--Lodging of FIR--Completion of Investigation--Challan wassubmitted--Application for withdrawal of case by special public prosecutor--Dismissed--Challenge to--We are of opinion that withdrawal of case is based on mala fide on part of ChiefMinister, which is evident of fact that Secretary Home and Tribal Affairs, Secretary Prosecutionand Chief Secretary, Government of Balochistan, had opposed withdrawal--Moreover, no reasonhas been given by Provincial Government for withdrawal of case--Be that as it may, trial Courthad passed a well reasoned order based on comments/proposal of State functionaries, which donot call for any interference by this Court--Parties are directed to appear before trial Court whoshall proceed with case in accordance with law and to decide it as early as possible--Interimorder dated 26.3.2018 passed by this Court is hereby recalled. [P. 30] C & DCriminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)------S. 494--Withdrawal of--Consent of Judicial domain--Powers of public prosecutor--Locusstandi--Effect of--Provision of law shows that a move for withdrawal of prosecution underSection 494, Cr.P.C could be made by Public Prosecutor and he could withdraw suchprosecution with ?consent? of trial Court, before pronouncement of a judgment--It further showsthat power of Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution of any case is subject to ?consent?of Court--Therefore, it is within judicial domain of trial Court to refuse or accede to withdrawalof prosecution of a person in any case--Application for withdrawal was filed by learnedProsecutor, as he alone was competent to do so as provided by Section 494, Cr.P.C.--Afterdismissal of that application, learned Prosecutor or Government did not challenge orderimpugned--Rather, learned Prosecutor appearing before this Court had defended impugned orderand opposed this petition--Under such circumstances, petitioner/ accused has no locus standi tochallenge order nor can request for withdrawal of case--Petition in circumstances is incompetent.[Pp. 29 & 30] A & BPLD 1991 Lah. 268, PLD 1977 SC 45 & 1992 SCMR 1983, ref.

Summary: S.494 Cr.P.C., Ss.409/420/467/468 Penal Code , S.S(2) Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947). Appeal does not abate on the death of accused. --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 431---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.409/420/467/468---Prevention of Corruption Act(II of 1947), S.5(2)---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, cheating, forgery,corruption---Death of accused, a government employee---Abatement of appeal---Scope---Ordinarily, a criminal appeal would abate on the death of appellant/accused, but S.431,Cr.P.C. had provided an exception to that general rule---Under S.431, Cr.P.C. an appealagainst sentence of fine would not abate by reason of death of accused, because it was not amatter, which would affect his person, but would affect his estate---Upon death of accused,his appeal to the extent of a portion of sentence of an imprisonment, would abate, whereas theappeal to the extent of sentence of fine, affecting the property of accused, would not abate---Sentence awarded to a government officer or employee would certainly affect his service; insuch an eventuality, his conviction would also affect his pensionary benefits---On that scoreas well, appeal would not abate---In the present case, the amount of fine had been ordered tobe recovered from the properties of accused---Accused being a government employee, hisconviction and sentence, would certainly have an impact not only upon his estate, but alsoupon his pensionary benefits---Appeal to the extent, in circumstances would not abate ondeath of accused.Anwar Hussain Khan v. The State 1970 PCr.LJ 279; AIR 1957 All. 20=58 Cr.LJ 16 and AIR1962 Mys. 275 ref.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S.494---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409/420/467/468--Prevention of Corruption Act(II of 1947), S.S(2)---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, cheating, forgery,corruption---Withdrawal from prosecution---Scope---Allegations levelled against accused formisappropriation had not been supported by any witness---To the contrary, the reportsexhibited by the prosecution favoured accused, which had shown that whatever amount wasallocated to him, was properly spent---Evidence available on record, was not sufficient toconnect accused with the commission of alleged offence---Even otherwise, the Trial Courtwas also requested by the Prosecutor, through application for withdrawal of case againstaccused---Trial Court declined such request without assigning any reason--Section 494, Cr. P.C. empowered a Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case on ground of insufficient evidence---Court had a supervisory jurisdiction to see that said power could not be used by an authorityarbitrarily or contrary to the public interest-Court must satisfy itself about the request forwithdrawal by assigning its reasons for the acceptance or rejection of an appeal---For thepurpose of allowing or disallowing a request for withdrawal and assigning the reasons, thecourt must not necessarily record evidence and such discretion could also be exercised on thebasis of material available on record--Prosecution had not been able to prove its case againstaccused---Trial Court had not only failed to properly appreciate the evidence, but had alsofailed to exercise its jurisdiction for not granting permission for withdrawal of the case on theground of meagre evidence---Trial Court had not advanced any reason while rejecting theapplication for withdrawal, which would mean that court had not considered the evidence andmaterial available before it---Act of Trial Court not only amounted to misreading and nonreading of the evidence, but also amounted to non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in it, whichwas an illegality and irregularity---Impugned judgment was not sustainable, in circumstanceswhich was set aside.Mir Hassan v. Tariq Saeed and 2 others PLD 1977 SC 451 ref.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4 & 14; Art. 10A (presumption of innocence); Police Rules, 1934, r. 24.5; Police Order, 2002, Art. 10(3); Punjab Right to Public Services Act, 2019, s. 10 - Police Record Certificates (PRCs) and acquittals—Disclosure of non-conviction data—Right to be dealt with in accordance with law and dignity—Held, inclusion in a PRC of any case that has culminated in acquittal, discharge, or cancellation (Category-1 matters) is unconstitutional and unlawful as it offends Arts. 4 and 14 and undermines the presumption of innocence protected by Art. 10A—Such disclosure carries stigma which a “no adverse effect” notation cannot cure—Absent an express statutory framework authorizing calibrated disclosure with safeguards, police cannot publish non-conviction history in PRCs—Directions issued to omit the petitioner’s acquitted case from PRC and to re-issue within ten days; however, preservation of internal records under r. 24.5 remains unaffected. (b) Police administration—Disclosure vs. preservation—Standing Orders/SOPs cannot substitute legislation ----Police Rules, 1934, r. 24.5; Police Order, 2002, Art. 10(3); Punjab Right to Public Services Act, 2019, ss. 4(1), 10 ---- Rule 24.5 mandates preservation of FIR registers and related entries for sixty years; it does not authorize disclosure to third parties through PRCs—IGP’s Standing Order No. 2 of 2024 and related SOPs may regulate internal processes but do not create substantive power to disclose criminal-record information—PRPSA is procedural and applies only to Gazette-notified services; issuance of PRCs (and disclosure of non-conviction data therein) is not shown to be duly notified—Reliance on Art. 10(3) of the Police Order and s. 10 PRPSA to justify PRC disclosures is misplaced. (c) Criminal justice—Effect of acquittal; presumption restored in full ----Art. 10A; Cr.P.C., ss. 249-A, 345(6); Evidence—Standards ---- An acquittal by a competent court confers a “double presumption of innocence” and restores legal and social standing; Pakistani jurisprudence recognizes that all acquittals are honourable, whether on merits or by benefit of doubt; no shades of acquittal—Any State action that re-stigmatizes by publicizing the concluded accusation must meet strict legality, necessity, and proportionality; without statute, Category-1 matters must be excluded from PRCs. Cited: Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza (2008 SCMR 329); Chairman ADBP v. Mumtaz Khan (PLD 2010 SC 695); The State v. Abdul Khaliq (PLD 2011 SC 554); Muhammad Bashir v. SHO (PLD 2007 SC 539). (d) Pending cases and convictions—Future legislative path ----Structured disclosure only by statute ---- Pending proceedings (Category-2) may justify calibrated disclosure for narrowly defined, role-specific contexts (e.g., sensitive employment), but only under specific legislation articulating offence classes, relevance, necessity, and proportionality tests—Conviction history (Category-3) likewise requires statutory calibration; blanket, context-free disclosure is inconsistent with contemporary standards of privacy and dignity—Comparative regimes (UK/Australia/US) are statutory and filtered; Pakistan lacks equivalent legislation. (e) Judicial directions in Zulfiqar Ali (PLD 2023 Lahore 512)—Limited scope ---- Directions there concern accuracy and status-updating of records filed in judicial proceedings; they neither address nor authorize disclosure of non-conviction data in PRCs—Reliance on Zulfiqar Ali to justify PRC disclosures is misconceived. (f) Consent and “citizen-driven” issuance—No waiver of fundamental rights---- A PRC sought to satisfy administrative requirements (e.g., visas) is not a voluntary waiver of Arts. 4 or 14—Consent under administrative compulsion cannot validate an otherwise unauthorized disclosure. (g) Comparative law—Inapplicability absent statute ---- UK case law on Enhanced Certificates (e.g., AR v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] UKSC 47) operates within a detailed statutory framework (Police Act 1997; statutory guidance; filtering)—Pakistan has no comparable legislative scheme; importing outcomes without statutory footing is impermissible. (h) Maintainability—Ripeness---- Objection of prematurity overruled—The impugned PRC had already been issued for use in a visa process; risk of denial/delay and reputational harm is concrete and immediate; petition is ripe for adjudication. Cited: Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex v. Federation (2011 PTD 2260); Sabira Khatoon (2021 PLC (C.S.) 1600); Muhammad Hammad-ur-Rehman Zafar (PLD 2022 Lahore 177). (i) Misstatement in PRC—Correction mandated; dignity engaged---- PRC wrongly recorded acquittal as under s. 494 Cr.P.C. (withdrawal) whereas judicial record shows s. 249-A Cr.P.C. (reasoned acquittal)—This mischaracterization is substantive, not semantic; it diminishes the judicial nature of exoneration and offends dignity—Correction directed. (j) Record deletion vs. non-disclosure ---- Prayer to delete petitioner’s name from PSRMS/CRMS declined—Police are bound to preserve FIR indexes and case outcomes for sixty years under r. 24.5—Constitutional protection is achieved by prohibiting public disclosure of Category-1 matters in PRCs, not by erasing lawful internal records—This does not preclude disclosure when specifically required by statute or court order. (k) Service/disciplinary proceedings—Autonomy preserved---- Exclusion of acquitted matters from PRCs does not bar permissible departmental action under service law/Police Rules (e.g., r. 16.3) where independently warranted; standards and objectives differ from criminal adjudication. Cited: Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. IGP Punjab (2023 PLC (C.S.) 884). (g) Disposition — Petition allowed to this extent: Respondents shall, within ten days of receipt of certified copy, issue a revised PRC to the petitioner omitting any reference to FIR No. 570/2016 and correctly reflecting her status; preservation and annotation of internal police records under r. 24.5 remain intact; nothing herein precludes disclosure where specifically mandated by statute or court order; no order as to costs. Cited cases (select): • Waqas Khan v. The State (PLD 2025 Peshawar 67) • Zulfiqar Ali v. Ex officio Justice of Peace (PLD 2023 Lahore 512) • Jawwad S. Khawaja v. Federation (PLD 2024 SC 337) • Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza (2008 SCMR 329) • Chairman ADBP v. Mumtaz Khan (PLD 2010 SC 695) • Muhammad Bashir v. SHO (PLD 2007 SC 539) • Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex (2011 PTD 2260) • Muhammad Hammad-ur-Rehman Zafar (PLD 2022 Lahore 177) • AR v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2018] UKSC 47

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898) ----Ss. 200, 540-A, 494---Private complaint and police challan arising out of same occurrence---Trial procedure---Scope and order of trials---Petitioner dissatisfied with police investigation filed a private complaint under S.200 Cr.P.C., while challan case under Ss.302, 341, 34, P.P.C. and 15(2) A.A. was already pending---Trial Court partially admitted complaint but dismissed it to the extent of respondents No.7 & 8 and ordered consolidation with challan case---Held, where complainant lodges an F.I.R. but remains dissatisfied with police investigation, a private complaint in respect of same incident is maintainable and must be tried first---Complainant being master of his own case cannot be deprived of opportunity to prove allegations independently---Consolidation of police challan and private complaint for joint trial deprives complainant of his right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and to control proceedings---Law and judicial precedent require trial of complaint first and thereafter, depending on result, appropriate proceedings in challan case. (b) Criminal trial---Consolidation of complaint and police challan cases---Legality---Practice disapproved---Evidence recorded in one criminal proceeding cannot be treated as legal evidence in another---Each proceeding must be decided on its own record and evidence---Direction issued to trial Court to stop proceedings in challan case, take up complaint case first, and permit complainant’s counsel, if necessary, to conduct prosecution under supervision of Public Prosecutor or as notified special Public Prosecutor. (c) Precedents---Authoritative view in Noor Elahi v. State (PLD 1966 SC 708) followed---Principles enunciated that private complaint should precede police challan trial reaffirmed---Contra view in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s case (PLD 1979 SC 53) distinguished as fact-specific---Followed in Arshad Mahmood v. State (2003 P.Cr.L.J 704), Zakar Ullah v. State (2002 YLR 1714), and Mst. Haleema Bibi v. State (2008 YLR 1144). Held, impugned order to the extent of respondents No.7 & 8 is set aside; trial Court directed to try the complaint case first, suspend further proceedings in challan case, and decide entire lis expeditiously in accordance with law. Cited Cases: PLD 1966 SC 708; PLD 1979 SC 53; 1984 SCMR 221; 2003 P.Cr.L.J 704; 2002 YLR 1714; 2008 YLR 1144; PLD 1981 SC AJK 77; 2019 MLD 1434; PLD 1970 Kar. 261; 2004 YLR 1850; 2004 YLR 1153; 2004 YLR 1234; 2003 P.Cr.L.J 528; 1979 SCMR 129. Disposition: Revision petition partly allowed; impugned order modified; case remanded for trial of complaint first and disposal in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – ----Ss. 233 & 239---Joint trial of two sets of accused in the same occurrence---Legality---Scope---Held, where two sets of accused are involved in the same incident but on mutually exclusive narratives, they cannot be tried jointly as per the provisions of S. 239, Cr.P.C.---A joint trial would be contrary to the legal requirement that accused persons must be charged together only if they are alleged to have committed the same offense in the course of the same transaction---Separate trials must be conducted in such cases to ensure a fair trial and avoid prejudice to either party. Cited Cases: Ali v. The Crown (PLD 1954 Lah. 183) Noor Ahmad v. The State (PLD 1964 SC 120) Ali Muhammad v. Amir Ali (Criminal Misc. No. 998 of 1945, Lahore High Court) ---- (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – ----Ss. 233, 239 & 540-A---Trial procedure in cases involving conflicting versions of the same incident---Scope---Held, while joint trials are impermissible in such cases, a fair procedure should be adopted to avoid conflicting verdicts on the same occurrence---It is advisable for the trial court to hear the complaint case first, summoning witnesses listed in the police challan as court witnesses under S. 540-A, Cr.P.C., so that their testimony is available for both trials---If the first trial results in a conviction, the Public Prosecutor may consider withdrawing the other prosecution under S. 494, Cr.P.C., to prevent inconsistent judgments---If the first trial ends in acquittal, the prosecution must assess whether proceeding with the second trial is justified in light of the first trial's findings. Cited Cases: Ali Muhammad v. Amir Ali (Criminal Misc. No. 998 of 1945, Lahore High Court) (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872) – ----S. 43---Use of evidence or findings from one trial in another---Scope---Held, findings recorded in a criminal case are not admissible as legal evidence in another criminal proceeding, as per S. 43 of the Evidence Act---Each trial must be decided based on its own record without being influenced by judgments in related or cross cases---Superior courts have cautioned against trial courts basing their decisions on findings from a parallel or prior proceeding. Cited Cases: Muhammad Anwar v. Muhammad Ilyas Begum (PLD 2013 SC 255) (d) Administration of Justice – ----Avoiding conflicting decisions in multiple trials arising from the same occurrence---Scope---Held, while every criminal proceeding must be adjudicated on its own merits, the law cannot allow inconsistent convictions in separate trials based on mutually exclusive narratives of the same event---It would be legally unsound for two courts to convict different accused persons on entirely contradictory accounts of a single incident---To avoid such conflicts, courts must adopt procedural safeguards, such as consolidating proceedings or directing the prosecution to present all versions and evidence together, allowing the trial court to assess the full factual matrix before reaching a decision. Cited Cases: G.M. Sikdar v. The State (PLD 1970 SC 158) (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – ----S. 270---Role of Public Prosecutor in trials based on conflicting versions of the same occurrence---Scope---Held, as per S. 270, Cr.P.C., every trial before a Court of Session must be conducted by the Public Prosecutor, even if it originates from a private complaint---The Public Prosecutor is not bound to advocate a particular version but should present all relevant evidence objectively, allowing the court to determine the true facts of the case---In exceptional circumstances, the complainant's counsel may be designated as a Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the trial, ensuring fair representation of both versions. Cited Cases: Muhammad Saleem v. The State (1994 SCMR 2213) ------Disposition: Appeal partially allowed. Trial court directed to proceed with separate trials while ensuring fair consideration of all evidence in accordance with procedural safeguards.