Summary: Acquittal granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– Ss. 4(k), 154, 156(3), 157, 173, 190, 200–204, 265-K, 342 –– Cognizable offence –– Entry in daily diary instead of FIR –– Scope and effect of Magistrate’s power under S.156(3) –– Legality of arrest prior to registration of FIR. Information given by complainant regarding disappearance and suspected abduction of two young men clearly disclosed commission of a cognizable offence, yet the officer incharge did not register an FIR under S.154 Cr.P.C. and only made an entry in the daily diary while seeking “inquiry” under S.156(3) Cr.P.C. –– Held, “such an investigation” in S.156(3) refers to investigation under S.156(1) which presupposes registration of a case under S.154 –– S.156(3) cannot be invoked to order an “inquiry” and Magistrate has no authority to direct such inquiry; to read such power into S.156(3) would amount to adding words not intended by the legislature –– The duty to register and investigate cognizable offences rests exclusively with the officer incharge of the police station; entry in the roznamcha/daily diary does not convert information into a cognizable case nor authorize investigation under Chapter XIV –– An arrest prior to registration of FIR, save in exceptional circumstances expressly covered by Ss.54, 55, 57 or 151 Cr.P.C., is illegal and without lawful authority –– In the present case, the appellants were arrested on the basis of a diary entry before registration of the crime report; such arrest was held illegal and the purported “inquiry” under S.156(3) without an FIR was without lawful sanction, having direct bearing on the reliability of subsequent proceedings including judicial confession. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 –– Arts. 38 & 40 –– Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– Ss. 164, 364 –– Judicial confession –– Requirements of voluntariness and safeguards –– Delay and custody in police control –– Evidentiary value. Under Art.38 of the Order of 1984, confession made to or in presence of a police officer is inadmissible; confession in custody is admissible only if recorded by a Magistrate under S.164 Cr.P.C. or where it leads to discovery of a fact within Art.40 –– S.364 Cr.P.C. and Ch.13 of High Court Rules & Orders impose mandatory safeguards: Magistrate must explain to accused that he is not bound to confess, that the confession may be used against him, and must not record the statement unless he has “reasons to believe” it is voluntary, which requires objective satisfaction based on his own observations –– Judicial confession may form basis of conviction if true, voluntary and corroborated, but delay in recording, especially when accused remains in police influence, casts serious doubt on voluntariness and calls for heightened scrutiny –– In the present case, appellants were illegally arrested on 17.02.2016 and their judicial confessions recorded on 23.02.2016, six days later; there were material contradictions between the Magistrate and investigating officer regarding custody and handing over of the accused after recording of confession –– Confessions were not corroborated by independent evidence and even conflicted with prosecution’s own narrative –– Held, in such circumstances, the alleged judicial confessions were surrounded by serious doubts regarding voluntariness and safety, and could not be relied upon as a basis for conviction. (c) Criminal trial –– Evidence –– Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report –– Chain of custody –– Delay in dispatch –– Recovery of incriminating articles –– Effect. Prosecution relied on recovery at instance of appellant of a Kalashnikov rifle, blood-stained axe, churri (knife), a portion of blood-stained chitae (mat) and blood-stained stones, as well as positive FSL reports –– Evidence showed that alleged recoveries were made earlier but ballistic and serological exhibits were dispatched to FSL almost four weeks after the occurrence, impairing sanctity of chain of custody –– Firearm and spent crime-empties were sent together, further compromising evidentiary integrity –– Medical evidence indicated injuries that would cause profuse bleeding, yet there was no evidence of extensive blood at the alleged crime scene, nor was it the prosecution case that blood had been washed to remove traces –– Investigating officer did not corroborate complainant’s assertion that personal effects of the deceased were recovered during a joint police/Chitral Scouts raid on accused’s house –– Held, in view of unexplained delays, contradictions, scant physical traces in a case involving decapitation and dismemberment, and compromised chain of custody, reliance on FSL reports and alleged recoveries to sustain a capital conviction was unsafe. (d) Criminal trial –– Circumstantial evidence –– Standard of proof –– Absence of “last seen” and direct ocular account –– Benefit of doubt. Entire case rested on circumstantial evidence: there was no direct ocular testimony placing the appellants in the company or proximity of the deceased at the relevant time, nor any credible “last seen” evidence beyond generalized statements regarding crossing of a bridge –– Human remains in two sacks were not recovered at the instance of the appellants –– Crucial evidence regarding movement of the victims across a bridge controlled by Chitral Scouts, with a maintained register and temporary retention of identity cards, was not properly collected –– Prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars, including search and recovery –– In such circumstances of illegal arrest, doubtful confessional statements, compromised recoveries, weak forensic support and incomplete investigation, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt –– Held, appellants were entitled to benefit of doubt, capital convictions under Ss.302(b) and 34 PPC, as well as convictions under Ss.201 and 15(AA) PPC, could not be sustained; acquittal was warranted. (e) Criminal justice system –– Investigation and prosecution –– Judicial censure. The case was described by the Supreme Court as a classic illustration of the abysmal state of the criminal justice system, reflecting lack of integrity, competence and professionalism in investigation and prosecution, and inability of investigation officers to discharge statutory duties –– Failure to promptly register FIR, resort to an impermissible “inquiry” under S.156(3) Cr.P.C., illegal arrest, poor collection and preservation of physical and forensic evidence, and contradictions in prosecution case collectively undermined the search for truth and risked miscarriage of justice in a double-murder case involving decapitation and dismemberment of two young men –– Court reiterated that Cr.P.C. structure, including judicial supervision of police powers, exists to protect both accused and victims from abuse of coercive authority, and disregard of these safeguards vitiates the worth of resulting evidence. (f) Result. Criminal Petition No.1674 of 2021 was converted into appeal and allowed; convictions and sentences recorded by trial court on 08.01.2020 and upheld by High Court on 09.06.2021 were set aside and appellants, Said-ur-Rehman and Noor Rehmat, were acquitted by extending benefit of doubt and ordered to be released if not required in any other case –– Criminal Petitions Nos.135-P and 136-P of 2021 filed by complainant against acquittal of co-accused were dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – S. 540— Summoning of Court Witness—Scope and limitations—Cited eyewitness given up by prosecution—Accused seeking his summoning as Court Witness—Refusal by trial court—Legality.Petitioner/accused sought summoning of Abdul Hayee, a cited eyewitness in the FIR, as a Court Witness under S.540 Cr.P.C., after he was given up by prosecution. Trial Court dismissed the application, observing that two eyewitnesses had already deposed and that Abdul Hayee's testimony was not essential for just decision of the case. Held, S.540 Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to summon any witness if his evidence appears essential, but this power is not to be exercised to aid either party or to delay proceedings—Where other eyewitnesses to the same occurrence have already testified and the witness sought is not an injured or uniquely placed individual, his summoning is not essential. The Court found no exceptional circumstances warranting interference—Petition dismissed.Citations:Saif Khan v. The State (2008 SCMR 849)Mazhar Ali v. The State (2005 SCMR 523)(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – Ss. 265-F & 540— Right of defence to summon witnesses—Prosecution prerogative in selecting witnesses—Role of trial court—Inquisitorial nature of trial.Held, prosecution is not bound to produce all listed witnesses and may give up any if sufficient evidence is otherwise led—Accused may summon unproduced witnesses in defence—Trial Court has an inquisitorial role only to the extent of ensuring a just decision; it is not required to undertake an independent inquiry or supplement gaps in evidence where the accused has avenues under law to produce a witness in defence. Summoning a given-up witness as Court Witness should not be used as a substitute for defence evidence.(c) Court Practice – Judicial Discretion in Summoning Witnesses— Summoning Court Witnesses—Guiding principle—Whether witness is essential to just decision of case.Test for application of S.540 Cr.P.C. is whether the proposed witness’s testimony is indispensable for adjudication of key facts in issue. Where witness forms part of a group of similarly placed eyewitnesses and others in the group have already deposed, there is no legal compulsion to summon the omitted one, unless his position or injury status confers additional evidentiary value. In present case, Abdul Hayee had no greater evidentiary weight than the other two examined eyewitnesses—Trial Court's refusal to summon him upheld.Disposition:Revision petition dismissed; interim relief recalled.----- Quote: ''If prosecution has produced two eyewitnesses and given-up 3rd eyewitness, whose evidence was of same category/nature and not of higher efficacy like injured, then he cannot be summoned as Court Witness; however, accused can produce him as his Defence Witness, if he opts so.''

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898) ----Ss. 249-A & 265-K---Scope and exercise of power of acquittal at any stage of proceedings---Trial Courts possess inherent jurisdiction under Ss. 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. to acquit an accused at any stage of judicial proceedings, whether before or after framing of charge or recording of evidence, provided reasons are recorded and both parties are heard---The phrase “at any stage” covers all stages of the trial and empowers the Court to act when continuation of proceedings would constitute an abuse of process or when the available material is insufficient to warrant conviction---In the present case, substantial evidence was lost due to the 2005 earthquake which destroyed all record, several prosecution witnesses including the complainant had died, and remaining witnesses were untraceable---Under such circumstances, the trial Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. to prevent purposeless prosecution and wastage of judicial resources---Held, that the power conferred under S. 265-K is designed to preserve the integrity of criminal justice by preventing vexatious trials where conviction is improbable. Cited Cases: • Ammad Yousaf v. The State & another (PLD 2024 SC 273) • Abbas Haider Naqvi & another v. Federation of Pakistan & others (PLD 2022 SC 562) (b) Criminal Law---Principle of double jeopardy / autrefois acquit ----Re-trial of an accused after acquittal---Bar against second prosecution for same offence---Once an accused has been tried and acquitted, whether on merits or on legal technicalities, he cannot be retried for the same offence---Re-trial of an acquitted person would offend the doctrine of autrefois acquit and the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy---The rationale behind this rule is to ensure finality of judicial proceedings and to protect citizens from repeated harassment and abuse of process---Held, that the acquittal of the accused having attained finality, no justification existed for further proceedings---Reliance placed on Sherin Bacha & others v. Namoos Iqbal & others (PLD 1993 SC 247). (c) Administration of justice---Abuse of process---Inherent powers of Court ----Continuing proceedings when conviction is improbable amounts to abuse of process---Courts are under a duty to prevent misuse of the criminal justice system and to safeguard the accused from frivolous and futile prosecutions---Exercise of jurisdiction under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. is not discretionary but mandatory in exceptional circumstances where the record demonstrates impossibility of conviction---Held, that the findings of the High Court affirming the acquittal were based on sound reasoning and called for no interference. Disposition: ---Petition for leave to appeal dismissed; acquittal maintained. ---No question of public importance was established to justify grant of leave.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Criminal Trial—Presumption of Innocence—Burden of Proof ---- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A ---- An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt through legally admissible, confidence-inspiring, and reliable evidence. Any weakness in the defense does not benefit the prosecution. Failure to establish the case beyond doubt entitles the accused to acquittal. (Rel. 2009 SCMR 230, 2024 SCMR 1579, PLD 1993 SC 251) (b) Ocular Testimony—Unreliable and Interested Witnesses ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 17 & 129 ---- The prosecution relied on eyewitnesses who were close relatives of the deceased, rendering their testimony interested and requiring corroboration. Contradictions in their statements regarding the exact location of the incident, the movement of the deceased, and the presence of the accused weakened their credibility. The unnatural conduct of witnesses in failing to prevent the attack further cast doubt on their version of events. (Rel. 2020 SCMR 319, 2024 SCMR 1579) (c) Nighttime Incident—Failure to Establish Proper Identification ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129 ---- The occurrence took place at night, yet the FIR did not mention any source of light at the crime scene. In such circumstances, the possibility of mistaken identity of the accused cannot be ruled out. The absence of independent evidence confirming identification further weakened the prosecution’s case. (Rel. 2017 SCMR 596, 2017 SCMR 1572, 2019 SCMR 1170) (d) Motive—Failure to Prove—Effect ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129 ---- The prosecution alleged an exchange of hot words between the complainant and the accused as the motive for the murder. However, no independent witnesses were produced to establish this motive. The investigating officer also admitted that no witnesses were examined in support of the motive. Since motive is a supporting factor, its absence significantly weakened the prosecution's case. (Rel. 2017 SCMR 596, 2017 SCMR 1572, 2019 SCMR 1170) (e) Recovery of Weapon—Violation of Section 103 Cr.P.C.—Negative Forensic Report ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103 ---- The alleged recovery of a 12-bore repeater gun was made in the absence of independent witnesses and in violation of Section 103 Cr.P.C. Moreover, the forensic report did not link the weapon to the crime, rendering the recovery inconsequential. (Rel. 2017 SCMR 898, 2024 SCMR 1741) (f) Medical Evidence—Corroborative Value—Failure to Link Accused ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129 ---- Medical evidence can corroborate the manner and weapon used in the crime, but it cannot identify the accused. In this case, the prosecution failed to produce reliable eyewitness testimony linking the accused to the crime. Thus, the medical evidence alone was insufficient to establish guilt. (Rel. PLD 1993 SC 251, PLD 1976 SC 695, 2024 SCMR 1741) (g) Unnatural Conduct of the Accused—Doubtful Prosecution Story ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129 ---- The prosecution alleged that the accused had a dispute with the complainant (PW-8) but targeted the complainant's father instead. The accused did not even threaten the complainant, raising serious doubts about the real motive behind the incident. The unnatural conduct of the accused, in sparing the person he allegedly had a dispute with, suggested that the prosecution story was fabricated. (Rel. 2017 SCMR 596, 2017 SCMR 1572, 2019 SCMR 1170) (h) Benefit of Doubt—Legal Requirement for Acquittal ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 265-K ---- If even a single reasonable doubt arises in the prosecution’s case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. In this case, multiple serious discrepancies were found in the ocular testimony, motive, recovery, forensic evidence, and medical evidence, all of which created reasonable doubt about the prosecution's version. (Rel. 2009 SCMR 230, 2024 SCMR 1579, 2024 SCMR 1741) Disposition: Appeal allowed. Conviction and death sentence of Muhammad Amjad set aside. He was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be released unless required in another case. Murder Reference answered in the negative—death sentence not confirmed. Complainant’s appeal against the acquittal of Muhammad Usman dismissed for lack of merit.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure—Acquittal under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Scope and judicial discretion— Section 249-A Cr.P.C. empowers a trial court to acquit an accused at any stage of the proceedings where the charge appears groundless or evidence insufficient to justify continuation of trial. This discretion must be exercised judiciously—not mechanically—but where the prosecution’s material fails to disclose a prima facie case, early termination of proceedings is lawful and proper. In the present matter, the trial court found that evidence did not substantiate allegations of fraud or dishonest inducement under Ss. 419 & 420 Cr.P.C.; hence its order of acquittal was held to be within lawful authority and free from mala fide intent or procedural impropriety. Cited Case: 2012 PCr.LJ 507 (distinguished). (b) Remedy against acquittal—Appeal or revision—Bar of Section 439(5) Cr.P.C.— Under S. 417 Cr.P.C. an appeal lies against an acquittal, whereas S. 439(5) Cr.P.C. expressly bars revision when such appeal is available. A party cannot bypass the appellate remedy by filing a revision petition. The revision filed by the appellant before the Additional Sessions Judge was thus incompetent, and the High Court rightly upheld its dismissal. Cited Cases: 2016 PCr.LJ 1457; 2008 PCr.LJ 1067. (c) Acquittal under Section 249-A versus post-trial acquittal—Presumption of innocence—Extent of appellate scrutiny— An acquittal under Ss. 249-A or 265-K Cr.P.C., though rendered at a preliminary stage, remains a valid exercise of judicial discretion. While such orders do not carry the “double presumption of innocence” attached to full-trial acquittals, interference is still limited to cases of perversity, mala fide intent, or arbitrary exercise of discretion. No such infirmity being shown, the trial court’s order warranted no interference. Cited Cases: 2005 SCMR 1544 (clarified); 2008 PCr.LJ 1067. (d) Principle of procedural discipline—Hierarchy of remedies— Statutory scheme under the Criminal Procedure Code requires adherence to prescribed remedies in their proper sequence. Substituting revision for appeal undermines procedural orderliness and cannot be permitted. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Trial court’s acquittal under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. and concurrent findings of lower courts affirmed. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 265-K---Quashment of FIR---Scope and limitations---Availability of alternate remedy---Effect. The petitioner sought quashment of an FIR registered against him, claiming that it was without lawful authority and jurisdiction. The High Court, however, held that quashing an FIR under its constitutional jurisdiction should not be exercised routinely, especially when alternate remedies under Ss. 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C., were available. The court reiterated that once an FIR is registered, a challan is submitted, and cognizance is taken by the trial court, the matter should be decided by the trial court itself. An accused who claims innocence or wrongful implication has the remedy to seek premature acquittal under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., rather than approaching the High Court for quashment of proceedings. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction of High Court: ----Art. 199 of the Constitution---Quashment of FIR under constitutional jurisdiction---Judicial review of investigation---Principles. The High Court emphasized that constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 should not be exercised to quash an FIR where alternate remedies exist under the ordinary criminal procedure. The petitioner had directly approached the High Court without first availing the remedy before the trial court. The court held that such an approach was not appreciated, as judicial review in criminal matters is limited to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist. The accused should instead challenge the proceedings before the trial court under the relevant provisions of Cr.P.C. (c) Quashment of Criminal Proceedings: ----Judicial reluctance in interfering with pending trials---Role of trial court in assessing guilt or innocence. The court held that determining the guilt or innocence of an accused is the exclusive domain of the trial court, which examines the entire evidence. The High Court does not act as a substitute for the trial court in deciding criminal liability. Once cognizance has been taken, the accused must contest the case on its merits before the trial court. The general legal principle is that a criminal case should not be quashed in a routine manner, and courts should avoid interfering with the investigative and judicial process unless compelling circumstances necessitate intervention. (d) Abuse of Legal Process: ----Misuse of constitutional jurisdiction to evade trial---Legal consequences. The High Court noted that the petitioner initially obtained an ad-interim bail but subsequently failed to appear before the court for extended periods, which indicated an attempt to evade trial. The court reiterated that constitutional remedies should not be exploited as a substitute for trial procedures, and mere allegations of unlawful registration of FIR do not justify bypassing statutory remedies. The proper course of action for an accused seeking relief from prosecution is to approach the trial court under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C., rather than seeking quashment of an FIR under Article 199. ----Disposition: Petition dismissed as misconceived. Petitioner directed to avail remedy before the trial court under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C.

Summary: Background: This criminal appeal involved the prosecution of individuals accused of tax evasion and money laundering under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 (AMLA), based on offenses listed under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO). The prosecution claimed that the respondents failed to explain significant amounts of income and engaged in money laundering by concealing taxable income between the years 2014 and 2017. The Special Court (Customs, Taxation & Anti-Smuggling) had acquitted the accused under Section 265-K of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), and the State appealed the acquittal. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Special Court correctly acquitted the accused under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. when the charges included tax evasion and money laundering under AMLA and ITO. ----2- Whether the provisions of AMLA could be applied retrospectively for offenses that occurred before May 20, 2016, when Sections 192 and 192A of the ITO were included in the AMLA’s schedule of predicate offenses. ----3- Whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the charges of tax evasion and money laundering. ----4- Whether the investigating officer (I.O.) had the legal authority to investigate and prosecute the case under the AMLA and ITO without the required findings from tax authorities. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal of the respondents. --Retrospective Application: The court held that the AMLA provisions could not be applied retrospectively. The offenses under Sections 192 and 192A of the ITO were added to AMLA’s schedule of predicate offenses only on May 20, 2016. Therefore, any offenses related to tax years before that date could not be prosecuted under AMLA due to Article 12 of the Constitution, which prohibits retrospective punishment. --Insufficient Evidence: The court found that the prosecution failed to provide conclusive evidence that the respondents engaged in tax evasion or money laundering. The Investigating Officer admitted that the audit for the relevant tax years was incomplete, and there were no conclusive findings from tax authorities regarding tax evasion. --Authority of Investigating Officer: The court also questioned whether the Investigating Officer had the legal authority to initiate the prosecution. The investigation was based on personal assumptions and not on formal findings from the tax authorities. The court emphasized that for tax evasion to qualify as a predicate offense under AMLA, tax authorities must first determine tax evasion or false statements. The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. was upheld, as there was no probability of conviction based on the evidence presented. -----Citations/Precedents: 1993 SCMR 523 – State vs. Ashiq Ali Bhutto PLD 1997 SC 275 – Muhammad Khalid Mukhtar vs. The State 1998 SCMR 1840 – Zahoor ud Din vs. Khushi Muhammad PLD 2009 SC 102 – Ajmeel Khan vs. Abdur Rahim 2023 PCrLJ 38 Islamabad – Muhammad Rafiq vs. DG FIA, Islamabad 2021 PCLJ 946 Lahore – Deputy Director Anti Money Laundering vs. Special Judge PLD 2021 SC 1 – Justice Qazi Faez Isa vs. The President of Pakistan and others 2024 PTD Lahore 517 – Abdul Saboor vs. Federation of Pakistan

Summary: Background: The appellants, facing charges under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, challenged an order passed by the Special Court (Customs, Taxation & Anti-Smuggling) in Rawalpindi/ICT. The case originated from a tax investigation that led to the issuance of a notice under section 9(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, based on alleged tax evasion under sections 192/192-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. The appellants sought relief under section 265-K Cr.P.C., which was dismissed by the trial court. They then filed a criminal appeal before the Islamabad High Court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the invocation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, for the tax year 2014 is valid given the fact that sections 192/192-A of the Income Tax Ordinance were added to the Schedule of predicate offenses in 2016. ----2- Whether the proceedings initiated under section 9(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, against the appellants were lawful. ----3- Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the application under section 265-K Cr.P.C., despite the appellants' arguments that the alleged offense occurred before the inclusion of tax evasion in the predicate offenses of the AMLA. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court held that sections 192/192-A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, were added to the Schedule of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, by SRO No.425(I)/2016, effective from May 14, 2016. As a result, any alleged tax evasion before this date (such as in the tax year 2014) could not form the basis for prosecution under the Anti-Money Laundering Act. The court found that the trial court, as well as the investigating officer, had misapplied the law by prosecuting the appellants for a period before the inclusion of the tax offenses in the AMLA's Schedule of predicate offenses. Therefore, the proceedings were beyond the court’s legal jurisdiction. The High Court allowed the appeal, acquitted the appellants, and set aside the trial court's order and the proceedings. However, the court clarified that new proceedings could be initiated if future acts fall within the scope of sections 192/192-A after the May 2016 notification. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Rafiq vs. DG FIA, Islamabad (2023 P.Cr.L.J [Islamabad] 38) Govind Ram vs. Federation of Pakistan (2022 PTD [Karachi] 634) Collector of Central Excise vs. New Tobacco Co. (AIR 1998 [SC] 668) Common Cause vs. Union of India and others (AIR 2003 [SC] 4493) Mirza Ali Khan vs. Hidayat Ullah Khan (2014 P.Cr.L.J 78) District Bar Association Rawalpindi vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2015 [SC] 401) Munir Ahmed vs. State (1985 SCMR 257) Surajmani Stella Kujur vs. Durga Charan Hansdah (AIR 2001 [SC] 938) Iqbal Singh Marwah vs. Meenakshi Marwah (AIR 2005 [SC] 2119)

Summary: Conviction upheld ---- Background:In Criminal Petitions No.1288-L and 1354-L of 2017, the Supreme Court of Pakistan reviewed the judgments from the Lahore High Court and the trial court concerning Muhammad Imtiaz Baig and Muhammad Fayyaz Baig. The petitions arose after the Lahore High Court upheld the convictions of both individuals for murder under sections 302/34/109 of the Pakistan Penal Code, but modified their death sentences to life imprisonment.---Issues:1.Whether the conviction of Muhammad Imtiaz Baig and Muhammad Fayyaz Baig was justified based on the evidence presented.2.Whether the death sentences, modified to life imprisonment by the appellate court, were appropriate given the facts and circumstances of the case.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Muhammad Imtiaz Baig, dismissing his appeal. However, the Court found the prosecution's case against Muhammad Fayyaz Baig doubtful and acquitted him, citing insufficient evidence to substantiate his involvement in the murder.-Key points from the Supreme Court?s judgment include:The conviction of Muhammad Imtiaz Baig was sustained due to credible and corroborating eyewitness accounts that directly linked him to the murder.Muhammad Fayyaz Baig's involvement was considered implausible by the Supreme Court, noting the lack of motive and credible evidence against him. The testimonies against him were deemed influenced by familial disputes and possibly fabricated to implicate him due to his relation to Muhammad Imtiaz Baig.----Citations/Precedents:Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code: Pertains to murder charges.Section 544-A of the Criminal Procedure Code: Relates to compensation for legal heirs of the deceased.Sections 265-K and 382-B of the Criminal Procedure Code: Refer to acquittal guidelines and the benefits to the accused in sentencing, respectively.Punjab Forensic Science Laboratory (PFSL) Reports: Played a crucial role in the analysis of the forensic evidence, which the Court found to be mishandled.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C.) – Sections 265-D, 249-A, and 265-K – Dismissal of Application: ---- Limited scope for acquittal at intermediary stages The acquittal of an accused under Sections 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. should only be granted if there is no probability of conviction based on the evidence. Courts must exercise extreme caution before granting such acquittals, especially in cases where substantial material evidence exists. (b) Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 – Applicability to Co-Owners: ---- Act not applicable to disputes between co-owners and co-sharers The Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 does not apply in cases where parties are co-owners or co-sharers in the disputed property. Such disputes fall within the purview of civil litigation. (c) Misuse of Legal Proceedings – Multiple Revision Petitions: ---- Filing successive revision petitions on the same grounds is impermissible The filing of successive revision petitions on identical grounds amounts to an abuse of the process of law, especially where earlier petitions have been dismissed. Such actions indicate a deliberate attempt to delay the proceedings. (d) Pending Civil Litigation and Criminal Proceedings: ---- Parallel proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act and civil suits Where civil litigation regarding ownership and possession is pending, the initiation of criminal proceedings under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 may be considered redundant. Courts must ensure that criminal law is not used to harass the opposing party. (e) Police Reports and Inquiry Findings: ---- Evidentiary value of police reports in determining illegal dispossession Findings of police inquiries, particularly when corroborated by higher authorities, hold evidentiary value in determining whether the accused engaged in illegal dispossession. Contradictory reports, however, must be scrutinized to avoid miscarriage of justice. (f) Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Section 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C: ---- Presumption against acquittal without full trial Supreme Court rulings emphasize that acquittals under Sections 249-A and 265-K should not disrupt the normal course of trial unless there is a clear absence of evidence or probability of conviction. Courts are directed to proceed with full trials to ensure justice. ----Disposition: The criminal revision petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The trial court was directed to conclude the trial within three months and decide the matter expeditiously. Parties were ordered to appear before the trial court by 19.03.2024.