Summary: Acquittal granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– Ss. 4(k), 154, 156(3), 157, 173, 190, 200–204, 265-K, 342 –– Cognizable offence –– Entry in daily diary instead of FIR –– Scope and effect of Magistrate’s power under S.156(3) –– Legality of arrest prior to registration of FIR. Information given by complainant regarding disappearance and suspected abduction of two young men clearly disclosed commission of a cognizable offence, yet the officer incharge did not register an FIR under S.154 Cr.P.C. and only made an entry in the daily diary while seeking “inquiry” under S.156(3) Cr.P.C. –– Held, “such an investigation” in S.156(3) refers to investigation under S.156(1) which presupposes registration of a case under S.154 –– S.156(3) cannot be invoked to order an “inquiry” and Magistrate has no authority to direct such inquiry; to read such power into S.156(3) would amount to adding words not intended by the legislature –– The duty to register and investigate cognizable offences rests exclusively with the officer incharge of the police station; entry in the roznamcha/daily diary does not convert information into a cognizable case nor authorize investigation under Chapter XIV –– An arrest prior to registration of FIR, save in exceptional circumstances expressly covered by Ss.54, 55, 57 or 151 Cr.P.C., is illegal and without lawful authority –– In the present case, the appellants were arrested on the basis of a diary entry before registration of the crime report; such arrest was held illegal and the purported “inquiry” under S.156(3) without an FIR was without lawful sanction, having direct bearing on the reliability of subsequent proceedings including judicial confession. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 –– Arts. 38 & 40 –– Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) –– Ss. 164, 364 –– Judicial confession –– Requirements of voluntariness and safeguards –– Delay and custody in police control –– Evidentiary value. Under Art.38 of the Order of 1984, confession made to or in presence of a police officer is inadmissible; confession in custody is admissible only if recorded by a Magistrate under S.164 Cr.P.C. or where it leads to discovery of a fact within Art.40 –– S.364 Cr.P.C. and Ch.13 of High Court Rules & Orders impose mandatory safeguards: Magistrate must explain to accused that he is not bound to confess, that the confession may be used against him, and must not record the statement unless he has “reasons to believe” it is voluntary, which requires objective satisfaction based on his own observations –– Judicial confession may form basis of conviction if true, voluntary and corroborated, but delay in recording, especially when accused remains in police influence, casts serious doubt on voluntariness and calls for heightened scrutiny –– In the present case, appellants were illegally arrested on 17.02.2016 and their judicial confessions recorded on 23.02.2016, six days later; there were material contradictions between the Magistrate and investigating officer regarding custody and handing over of the accused after recording of confession –– Confessions were not corroborated by independent evidence and even conflicted with prosecution’s own narrative –– Held, in such circumstances, the alleged judicial confessions were surrounded by serious doubts regarding voluntariness and safety, and could not be relied upon as a basis for conviction. (c) Criminal trial –– Evidence –– Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report –– Chain of custody –– Delay in dispatch –– Recovery of incriminating articles –– Effect. Prosecution relied on recovery at instance of appellant of a Kalashnikov rifle, blood-stained axe, churri (knife), a portion of blood-stained chitae (mat) and blood-stained stones, as well as positive FSL reports –– Evidence showed that alleged recoveries were made earlier but ballistic and serological exhibits were dispatched to FSL almost four weeks after the occurrence, impairing sanctity of chain of custody –– Firearm and spent crime-empties were sent together, further compromising evidentiary integrity –– Medical evidence indicated injuries that would cause profuse bleeding, yet there was no evidence of extensive blood at the alleged crime scene, nor was it the prosecution case that blood had been washed to remove traces –– Investigating officer did not corroborate complainant’s assertion that personal effects of the deceased were recovered during a joint police/Chitral Scouts raid on accused’s house –– Held, in view of unexplained delays, contradictions, scant physical traces in a case involving decapitation and dismemberment, and compromised chain of custody, reliance on FSL reports and alleged recoveries to sustain a capital conviction was unsafe. (d) Criminal trial –– Circumstantial evidence –– Standard of proof –– Absence of “last seen” and direct ocular account –– Benefit of doubt. Entire case rested on circumstantial evidence: there was no direct ocular testimony placing the appellants in the company or proximity of the deceased at the relevant time, nor any credible “last seen” evidence beyond generalized statements regarding crossing of a bridge –– Human remains in two sacks were not recovered at the instance of the appellants –– Crucial evidence regarding movement of the victims across a bridge controlled by Chitral Scouts, with a maintained register and temporary retention of identity cards, was not properly collected –– Prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars, including search and recovery –– In such circumstances of illegal arrest, doubtful confessional statements, compromised recoveries, weak forensic support and incomplete investigation, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt –– Held, appellants were entitled to benefit of doubt, capital convictions under Ss.302(b) and 34 PPC, as well as convictions under Ss.201 and 15(AA) PPC, could not be sustained; acquittal was warranted. (e) Criminal justice system –– Investigation and prosecution –– Judicial censure. The case was described by the Supreme Court as a classic illustration of the abysmal state of the criminal justice system, reflecting lack of integrity, competence and professionalism in investigation and prosecution, and inability of investigation officers to discharge statutory duties –– Failure to promptly register FIR, resort to an impermissible “inquiry” under S.156(3) Cr.P.C., illegal arrest, poor collection and preservation of physical and forensic evidence, and contradictions in prosecution case collectively undermined the search for truth and risked miscarriage of justice in a double-murder case involving decapitation and dismemberment of two young men –– Court reiterated that Cr.P.C. structure, including judicial supervision of police powers, exists to protect both accused and victims from abuse of coercive authority, and disregard of these safeguards vitiates the worth of resulting evidence. (f) Result. Criminal Petition No.1674 of 2021 was converted into appeal and allowed; convictions and sentences recorded by trial court on 08.01.2020 and upheld by High Court on 09.06.2021 were set aside and appellants, Said-ur-Rehman and Noor Rehmat, were acquitted by extending benefit of doubt and ordered to be released if not required in any other case –– Criminal Petitions Nos.135-P and 136-P of 2021 filed by complainant against acquittal of co-accused were dismissed.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997: –––S. 9(c)–––Conviction–––Appreciation of evidence–––Contradiction in prosecution version regarding recovery–––Appellant was convicted for possession of 8 kg Heroin, whereas co-accused was acquitted–––Contradiction between FIR/complaint and recovery memo regarding the location and manner of recovery–––Recovery memo (Ex.PC) stated all 8 packets recovered from trunk of vehicle driven by appellant; whereas FIR and complaint (Ex.PA & Ex.PB) stated 2 packets were recovered from co-accused’s clothing–––Such material inconsistency casts serious doubt on the entire recovery–––Prosecution failed to establish safe custody of narcotics or to associate any private witnesses in the recovery, despite availability–––Investigating Officer was dismissed from service for misconduct, further undermining credibility of investigation–––Held, in narcotics cases, utmost transparency in recovery and chain of custody is essential–––Benefit of doubt given to accused–––Appeal allowed–––Conviction and sentence set aside–––Appellant acquitted. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Samiullah v. The State, 2022 SCMR 998 • Khial Muhammad v. The State, 2024 SCMR 1490 • Muhammad Riaz v. The State, 2024 SCMR 1839 • Subha Sadiq v. The State, 2025 SCMR 50 (b) Criminal trial: –––Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus–––Applicability–––Contradictory prosecution evidence–––When statements of prosecution witnesses contain major discrepancies regarding material facts, entire testimony becomes unreliable–––In the instant case, serious divergence existed between the initial complaint and recovery memo as to from whom and where the contraband was allegedly recovered–––Held, once key parts of the prosecution narrative are proven false, the rest cannot be safely relied upon–––Principle of “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” applied–––Accused entitled to acquittal. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): –––Ss. 103, 157, 342 & 382-B–––Non-association of private witnesses–––Lack of spot investigation–––Statements of accused–––Section 103 Cr.P.C. not complied with–––No credible explanation given for non-inclusion of public witnesses at the time of search and recovery–––Section 157(1), Cr.P.C. mandates spot-based investigation, which appeared missing in the case–––Benefit of doubt arising from violation of legal procedure extended to accused–––Further, Appellant’s statement under S.342 Cr.P.C. was not properly rebutted–––Acquittal upheld. (d) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997: –––S. 32–––Confiscation of vehicle–––Notice to owner–––Failure to comply with mandatory procedure–––Vehicle used in commission of offence was ordered to be confiscated by Trial Court without serving notice to registered owner or verifying ownership–––Held, forfeiture without notice violates mandatory requirements of S.32 CNSA–––Court directed that vehicle shall remain intact until expiry of limitation for appeal or revision, and may only be disposed of in accordance with law after proper notice and determination of ownership.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- Ss. 154, 156(3), 157, 164 & 173 ---- Scope and legality of pre-FIR inquiry under Section 156(3) ---- Confessional statements recorded during unlawful inquiry ---- Admissibility and evidentiary value The Supreme Court held that the purported “inquiry” initiated under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the registration of FIR was ultra vires the scheme of the Code. A Magistrate is not empowered under Section 156(3) to authorize an “inquiry”; such provision only permits ordering an investigation into a cognizable offence after registration under Section 154 Cr.P.C. The arrests, interrogations, and recovery of the body in the present case all occurred during an illegal “inquiry,” thereby circumventing mandatory safeguards under Sections 154–157 Cr.P.C. This violation undermined the voluntariness of the confessional statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., which were made after prolonged police custody. The Court held that such confessions, recorded in the backdrop of procedural illegality and custodial pressure, could not be treated as voluntary. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 365-A, 302(b), 34 ---- Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ---- S. 7(a) ---- Kidnapping for ransom and murder of minor --- Conflicting confessional statements --- Benefit of doubt Appellants were convicted and sentenced to death for kidnapping and murder of a minor. The Court found that their confessional statements were mutually contradictory, exculpatory in parts, retracted later, and lacked corroboration. One accused attributed the crime to the other, and vice versa. In absence of independent evidence, such confessions could not sustain conviction. The DNA report was inconclusive; identification of the decomposed body was based merely on clothing. There was no proof of ransom demand, and the testimonies of key prosecution witnesses were inconsistent. The prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Appellants were acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt. (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872) [Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984] ---- Art. 43 (now Art. 164), Art. 22 ---- Judicial confession --- Evidentiary threshold --- Principles reiterated A retracted judicial confession must be voluntary, truthful, and confidence-inspiring to be relied upon without corroboration. The Court reiterated that confessions must be read as a whole and cannot be accepted in parts. Where exculpatory elements exist and there is no independent corroboration, the confession loses its probative value. The delay in recording the confessions after prolonged custody also raised suspicion regarding their voluntariness. (d) Criminal justice system ---- Abuse of coercive powers by police ---- Misuse of ‘madd’ entry and unauthorized inquiries ---- Directions issued to ensure compliance with Cr.P.C. The Court noted with concern the practice in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of entering mere information as a ‘madd’ and then initiating inquiries under Section 156(3) without registering an FIR. It was emphasized that such unauthorized proceedings erode constitutional safeguards and result in miscarriage of justice. Directions were issued to the Prosecutor General and IGP to ensure strict adherence to the statutory framework under Cr.P.C. and to educate magistrates and police officers accordingly. Disposition: Appeals allowed; convictions set aside; appellants acquitted. Cited Cases: • Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595) • Mohammad Ramzan v. The State (PLJ 1979 SC 302) • Tariq Mehmood v. The State (2002 SCMR 1493) • Javed Iqbal v. The State (2023 SCMR 139) • Majeed v. The State (2010 SCMR 55) • Muhammad Parvez v. The State (2007 SCMR 670) • Indian cases: Gopal Das Sindhi, Suresh Chand Jain, Sakiri Vasu Cited Provisions: • Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-A, 302(b), 34 • Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, S. 7(a) • Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Ss. 2(f), 2(k), 2(l), 154, 156(3), 157, 164, 173 • Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 22, 43 (now 164)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure – Registration of FIR: ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 154 & 157 – Police Rules, 1934, Rules 24.1 & 24.5 Registration of an FIR is not an absolute requirement upon receipt of a complaint—Police is first required to enter the substance of the complaint in the police station daily diary under Rule 24.1 of the Police Rules—Only upon forming a reasonable suspicion, based on preliminary inquiries, may the police register an FIR in the FIR Register under Rule 24.5—Distinction between Ss. 154 and 157, Cr.P.C. must be maintained—A police officer may refuse to register an FIR if no reasonable suspicion is found, and such refusal is not illegal—Reliance placed on Younas Abbas v. Additional Sessions Judge Chakwal (PLD 2016 SC 581), Abdul Rehman Malik v. Synthia D. Ritchie, American National (PLD 2020 SC 201). (b) Justice of Peace – Powers Under S. 22-A, Cr.P.C: ---- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 22-A, 22-B Ex-officio Justice of Peace (JOP) is not bound to mechanically direct registration of an FIR upon a complaint—JOP is vested with quasi-judicial powers and must apply judicial discretion while determining whether a cognizable offence is made out—JOP may consider the veracity of allegations before issuing directions for FIR registration—Precedents requiring automatic FIR registration under S. 154, Cr.P.C. overruled—Reliance placed on Younas Abbas v. Additional Sessions Judge Chakwal (PLD 2016 SC 581), Abdul Rehman Malik v. Synthia D. Ritchie, American National (PLD 2020 SC 201). (c) Abuse of Criminal Law – Business Dispute Framed as Criminal Offence: ---- False invocation of criminal proceedings—Petitioner attempted to frame a contractual dispute as a criminal offence to exert pressure on the opposing party—Police inquiry found the allegations false, revealing a business dispute—Complainant had an alternative remedy under S. 200, Cr.P.C., by filing a private complaint—Mere existence of a dispute does not warrant FIR registration—Reliance placed on Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantonment (PLD 2007 SC 539). (d) Constitutional Petition – Maintainability Under Article 199: ---- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199 Constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 can only be invoked where a violation of law is established—No violation was shown in the refusal to register an FIR, as the complaint was found to be baseless—Petition dismissed—Reliance placed on Muhammad Ali v. Additional I.G., Faisalabad (PLD 2015 SC 753). ----Disposition: Petition dismissed—No illegality found in the decision of the JOP refusing to direct FIR registration—Petitioner advised to pursue alternative remedy under S. 200, Cr.P.C. ----Cited Cases: Younas Abbas v. Additional Sessions Judge Chakwal (PLD 2016 SC 581) Abdul Rehman Malik v. Synthia D. Ritchie, American National (PLD 2020 SC 201) Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantonment (PLD 2007 SC 539) Muhammad Ali v. Additional I.G., Faisalabad (PLD 2015 SC 753)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 22-A, 154, 157, 158, 159 & 561-A---Quashing of order, petition for---Petitionerhad sought quashing of order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace, wherebyapplication filed by respondent under S.22-A, Cr.P.C. was accepted and S.H.O.concerned was ordered to register the F.I.R. against the petitioners---Contention ofcounsel for the petitioners was that if Police Officer had suspected commission ofcognizable offence in respect of information received under S.154, Cr.P.C., then he coulddecline to register the case and submit the investigation report to the Magistrate in viewof S.158, Cr.P.C.; and then it was the duty of the Magistrate under S.159, Cr.P.C. to holdinvestigation or preliminary inquiry or otherwise dispose of the matter as provided underCr.P.C.---Contention of counsel for the petitioners seemed devoid of force as counsel hadintermingled the provisions of S.154, Cr.P.C. with the provisions of S.157, Cr.P.C.---Under the provisions of S.154, Cr.P.C., the S.H.O./Police Officer was bound to registerthe case against accused, irrespective of fact that the information, which he had receivedwas correct or otherwise; whereas S.157, Cr.P.C. was an independent section, whichwould start operating after the registration of the F.I.R., and thereafter if S.H.O. suspectedthat information was false or frivolous, then he could make an investigation in respect ofa cognizable matter and submit his report to Magistrate under S.158, Cr.P.C.---Magistrate, then could hold fresh investigation or preliminary inquiry under S.159,Cr.P.C. or dispose of the same in accordance with law.PLD 2007 SC 539 ref.

Summary: Sections 22-A, 154, 157 Cr.P.C. The Justice of Peace was required to order for registration of FIR instead of directing the SHO for conducting inquiry U/S 157(2) Cr.P.C --- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------Ss. 22-A, 154 & 157---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.379 & 453---Theft, lurking housetrespass and house-breaking---Registration of case---Powers of Justice of Peace---Applicationfiled under S.22-A, Cr.P.C. for registration of criminal case, was disposed of by Justice ofPeace in terms that S.H.O. was directed to conduct inquiry under S.157(2), Cr.P.C., and thatif a cognizable offence was made out, F.I.R. be registered as per law---Petitioner had filedrevision petition against such orders of Justice of Peace contending that it was obligatory onJustice of Peace to issue direction to S.H.O. concerned for lodging of F.I.R., but instead hedirected for conducting of inquiry under S.157(2), Cr.P.C. which was absolutely contrary tolaw--Validity-Held, there was no concept of making inquiry before registration of F.I.R.---Justice of Peace, while exercising the powers under S.22-A, Cr.P.C., had completely failed tounderstand the nature of the powers conferred on him under S.22-A, Cr.P.C.-Initialrequirement which was to be seen by an Officer Incharge of Police Station, was whethercommission of cognizable offence was made out on basis of the information received by himwhile the second step would be to reduce the same into writing, whereafter, investigation wasto be carried out and report submitted to the concerned court---By directing S.H.O. toconduct inquiry under S.157(2), Cr.P.C. before registration of the case, Justice of Peace hadfailed to exercise the powers vested in him---Impugned order being in complete negation oflaw, could not remain in field---Impugned order was set aside and S.H.O. was directed toregister F.I.R. and proceed with the case, strictly in accordance with law. Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer PLD 2007 SC 529 ref.

Summary: Legislative history of book mentioned in section 154 of Cr.P.C., and way out if FIR stood registered in a non-cognizable offence. (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 154, 155, 157, 173 & 196B Registration of FIR—Non-cognizable offence—Preliminary investigation—Scope—FIR was registered under S. 295A, P.P.C., a non-cognizable offence, based on a private complainant’s application—Petitioner contended that such registration was a nullity in law as S. 295A, P.P.C. requires a complaint by the Provincial or Federal Government under S. 196, Cr.P.C.—Held, registration of FIR under a non-cognizable offence is not a nullity per se but an irregularity, which can be rectified through due process—Police were bound to conduct preliminary investigation under S. 196B, Cr.P.C., and the report must be placed before the competent government authority before proceeding further—High Court ruled that police may investigate non-cognizable offences only with prior sanction of a Magistrate, but if cognizable offences were added, the investigation would be valid under S. 157, Cr.P.C.—Petitioner’s prayer for quashing the FIR was declined, as the matter required further legal process and scrutiny. (b) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----S. 295A Hate speech—Religious decree (“Fatwa”)—Insulting religious beliefs—Legal consequences—Petitioner accused of issuing a religious decree declaring a sect as non-Muslim, allegedly insulting religious beliefs and causing communal unrest—Contention that an individual complainant could not initiate prosecution under S. 295A, P.P.C., and only the Provincial or Federal Government could file a complaint—Held, while procedural irregularities existed, legal scrutiny under S. 196B, Cr.P.C., was essential before quashing the case—If the Superintendent of Police (Investigation) directs a preliminary inquiry and determines that an offence under S. 295A, P.P.C. is disclosed, the matter must proceed for government sanction—However, if the offence is found to be cognizable under other provisions, such as S. 8/9 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, police could proceed with investigation without government complaint under S. 196, Cr.P.C.. (c) Administration of Justice: ----Police functions—Procedural compliance—Quashing of FIR at the initial stage Judicial scrutiny of FIR registration and police investigation—Court extensively analyzed the procedural framework of FIR registration, police powers, and statutory limitations under Cr.P.C. and Police Rules, 1934—Held, police officials cannot act as mere conduits for FIR registration but must apply judicial mind to assess whether a cognizable offence is disclosed—FIR in a non-cognizable offence may not be void ab initio but must be validated through a procedural mechanism—Court declined to quash the FIR at the preliminary stage, observing that legal and procedural avenues remained open for rectification or continuation of the proceedings. (d) Cognizance and Prosecution of Offences: ----Ss. 196, 196B, Cr.P.C. & S. 8/9 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Sanction of Government—Addition of cognizable offences—Court laid down that if an offence under S. 295A, P.P.C. is alleged, preliminary investigation is mandatory under S. 196B, Cr.P.C., before seeking government sanction—However, if an Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) offence is attracted, the bar under S. 196, Cr.P.C. does not apply, and the case may proceed before the Anti-Terrorism Court—Police have discretion to modify charges upon investigation, and the Magistrate may stay proceedings under S. 230, Cr.P.C. if required sanction from the government is pending. ----Disposition: Petition for quashing of FIR was dismissed—Court ruled that procedural mechanisms were available for addressing defects in FIR registration—Matter was directed to be processed in accordance with S. 196B, Cr.P.C., with guidance from the Superintendent of Police (Investigation) and relevant prosecutorial authorities. ----Cited Cases: • ALI RAZA v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2017 Islamabad 64) • ATTA MUHAMMAD DESHANI v. District Police Officer (2019 P Cr. L J 275) • MUHAMMAD ASLAM v. The State (1980 P Cr. L J 742) • SHABBIR HUSSAIN v. The State (2011 P Cr. L J 1631) • Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. & Ors. (AIR 2014 SC 187) • JAVED IQBAL v. The State (2016 SCMR 787) • Mst. SUGHRAAN BIBI v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595)

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure—Registration of FIR—Duty of police: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 154, 157(1)(b) & 157(2)----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 341 & 34 Registration of FIR—Scope and duty of police—Justice of Peace directed police to register FIR for alleged snatching of a car at gunpoint—SHO refused, citing pending inquiry under S. 157(2), Cr.P.C.—Held, under S. 154, Cr.P.C., police is bound to register an FIR when a cognizable offense is disclosed—SHO cannot delay or refuse registration of a case—Inquiry under S. 157(2), Cr.P.C. applies only after FIR registration—Justice of Peace rightly directed registration—Application for quashment of FIR dismissed. (b) Criminal Procedure—Powers of Justice of Peace: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 22-A----Jurisdiction Justice of Peace is empowered under S. 22-A, Cr.P.C. to direct the registration of an FIR where a cognizable offense is disclosed—Refusal by police without lawful justification amounts to dereliction of duty—Police cited disputed ownership of the vehicle as grounds for non-registration—Held, police had no authority to determine ownership; their duty was limited to registering the case and submitting a report to the Magistrate—Justice of Peace acted within jurisdiction in ordering registration. (c) Quashment of FIR—Scope under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A Quashment of FIR—Principles—FIR can only be quashed where: (i) it does not disclose a cognizable offense, (ii) it is registered without lawful authority, or (iii) a civil dispute is maliciously given criminal color—None of these grounds were present—Accused allegedly snatched a car at gunpoint and abducted complainant—Such allegations could not be dismissed at the FIR stage—Matters of fact and evidence must be determined by trial court—Mere assertion that the FIR is based on falsehood does not warrant quashment under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.—Application dismissed in limine. (d) Role of High Court in criminal investigations: ----Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A----High Court’s inherent jurisdiction High Court cannot interfere at the investigation stage unless there is a clear abuse of process—Registration of an FIR is the sole duty of police, and courts cannot intervene unless FIR is manifestly illegal—Accused’s contention that the case was fabricated is a matter for trial, not quashment—Law permits any person to file an FIR, barring limited exceptions under Ss. 195-199, Cr.P.C.—Accused’s argument that complainant lacked locus standi was without merit—Impugned order directing FIR registration upheld. ----Cited Cases: • 2003 YLR 1316 • PLD 2003 Lahore 228 • 2005 YLR 152 • Allah Bakhsh v. The State (PLD 2013 Peshawar 117) ----Disposition: Application dismissed. FIR No. 98/2017 upheld. Justice of Peace’s order for FIR registration maintained.

Summary: Background: The case involves the prosecution of an accused under sections 10 and 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance VII of 1979, following allegations made by the complainant, a student, who claimed that the accused had forcibly taken her to his house and attempted to commit zina (forcible sexual intercourse). The trial court acquitted the accused, and the State, along with the complainant, filed appeals against the acquittal. The appeals were heard by the Federal Shariat Court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court erred in acquitting the accused of charges under sections 10 and 16 of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance VII of 1979. 2- Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution, including oral testimonies and medical reports, was sufficient to convict the accused. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Federal Shariat Court upheld the trial court’s acquittal, dismissing the appeals on the following grounds: Investigation and Procedural Flaws: The investigation was conducted improperly, with the police failing to register a First Information Report (FIR) as required by law. Instead, they conducted an inquiry under section 157(2) Cr.P.C., which was not applicable in this case. The police's actions, including obtaining a medical certificate without first registering the FIR, were outside their legal powers. Inconsistent and Contradictory Testimonies: The testimonies of the complainant and witnesses were inconsistent. The complainant provided conflicting statements regarding the nature of the offense. Additionally, the key witnesses failed to corroborate the complainant’s allegations of zina-bil-jabr. Medical Evidence: The medical certificate presented by the prosecution was unverified, as neither the examining doctor nor the nurse who conducted the examination was produced before the court. The certificate, which indicated that no penetration had occurred and that the complainant’s hymen was "old ruptured," failed to support the prosecution's case. Lack of Corroborative Evidence: The prosecution failed to provide independent evidence to support the occurrence of the offense. The identification parade was improperly conducted, further weakening the prosecution's case. The Court concluded that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to establish the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the trial court’s decision to acquit the accused was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 154 Cr.P.C.: Mandates the registration of an FIR upon receiving information about a cognizable offense. Section 157 Cr.P.C.: Addresses the procedure for investigating suspected cognizable offenses, which was incorrectly applied in this case. Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance VII of 1979: Relevant legal provisions under which the accused was charged.