Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 341, 186, 188, 143 & 147---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 249-A & 417---Wrongful restraint, obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant, unlawful assembly, rioting---Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Accused-respondents were charged for protesting and blocking a main road---In the instant case S.147, P.P.C., was not applicable, because four ingredients as defined in S.141 of P.P.C regarding unlawful assembly had not been established specially use of criminal force by the accused during protest was missing---No statement was available on case file regarding any person who was prevented from proceedings in any direction in which he had right to proceed, hence the attraction of S.341, P.P.C., in the FIR against the accused/respondents was also not justified---As for S.186 and 188, P.P.C., mentioned in FIR, no Police Officer was authorized to register FIR for the violation of S.144, Cr.P.C., unless complaint in writing was made by the authority in terms of S.1951(a), Cr.P.C., which stipulated that, “No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Ss.172 to 188 of P.P.C, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he was subordinate---Section 249-A, Cr.P.C., categorically empowers Magistrate of acquitting the accused persons at any stage of the case, if after hearing the prosecutor and the accused, for reasons to be recorded, he considers that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence, which has judiciously been done by him after hearing the parties---In the instant case, after full trial of the matter, there was no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence mentioned in the FIR, as such further proceedings in the Court amounted to wastage of time and abuse of process of the Court---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed being devoid of any merit. Malik Sherbaz Khan Addl. A.G for the State. Respondent/accused in person along with Counsel Athar Hussain. Date of hearing: 27th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 341, 500, 147 & 34---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, wrongful restraint, defamation, rioting, common intention---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the accused-petitioner was that he made firing upon the complainant and his son with the intention to kill them---All offences reflected in the FIR except S.324, P.P.C., were bailable---Admittedly, the allegation pertained to ineffective aerial firing and no one had sustained injuries, as such it would be moot question for the Trial Court to determine whether the allegation of attempt to murder was established in the case or not, which could be done at the time of conclusion of trial, which made the instant case of prosecution as one of further inquiry under S.497(2),Cr.P.C.---Investigation of case was complete and the accused petitioner was behind bar since his arrest---Accused was no more required for further investigation or for any other case to the prosecution---Speedy trial was the right of the accused and was now guaranteed under the Constitution but trial of the case did not witness any progress because complete challan of the case was still awaited---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Sajjad Hussain v. State 2021 YLR Note 150; 2020 MLD 1187; 2018 MLD 724; 2020 YLR Note 147; 2019 MLD 724 and 2022 YLR 2082 ref. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail---Observations of the Court---Scope---Findings of the Court made in bail order are tentative in nature and the Trial Court need not be influenced in any way---Trial Court may reach its own conclusions after recording evidence in the case. Burhan Wali for Petitioner. Malik Sher Baz Addl. AG for the State. Shehbaz Ali for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 24th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Law—Appeal against Acquittal ----Standard of interference; double presumption of innocence— Acquittal can be set aside only on showing perversity, arbitrariness, misreading/non-reading of material evidence, or disregard of settled legal principles; mere possibility of a different view on re-appraisal is insufficient—Once the Trial Court and the High Court have acquitted, a double presumption of innocence operates in favour of the accused. Cited Cases: Ali Muhammad v. Muhammad Akram & another 2014 SCR 351; Muhammad Afzal v. Mst. Riaz Begum & others 2004 SCR 140; Muhammad Sadiq v. Raja Muhammad Nasim & others 1996 SCR 215; Ghulam Sikandar & another v. Mamaraz Khan & others PLD 1985 SC 11. (b) Evidence—Contradictions inter se FIR/§161, Cr.P.C. statements and ocular testimony—Effect ----Ss. 161, 173, 242 & 342, Cr.P.C. Material inconsistencies in complainant’s versions (absence from scene in written report/§161 statement versus presence and attempted assault in testimony; who took the injured to hospital; omission of alleged Rs. 18,000 theft later replaced by a fodder allegation) rendered the prosecution narrative unsafe—benefit of doubt warranted. (c) Medical evidence—Weight and reconciliation with ocular account ----Injury description; credibility of witness Victim’s claim of “22 stitches” contradicted by medical officer noting only “1–2 stitches”; assertion of eight-day unconsciousness incompatible with a §161, Cr.P.C. statement recorded on the third day—material infirmities undermined reliability; conviction could not rest upon such discrepant evidence. (d) Criminal Jurisprudence—Benefit of doubt—“Golden rule” Even a single reasonable doubt must go to the accused as of right, not concession; where multiple doubts arise, acquittal must follow. Cited Cases: Tasawar Husain v. The State & others 2016 SCR 373; Abid Hanif v. Muhammad Afzal & 4 others 2014 SCR 983. (e) Penal Code (AJ&K) ----Ss. 337-A(ii), 337-F(ii), 341 & 34—Proof of specific role Mere occurrence and presence are insufficient; prosecution must establish each accused’s specific role through clear, confidence-inspiring evidence—standard not met; acquittals sustained. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; High Court judgment dated 07.02.2024 affirming acquittals maintained. Approved for reporting.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 (Article 199) – Quashing of FIR – Investigation initiated with malafide intention or without jurisdiction. The High Court, under its extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction, has the power to quash an FIR if it is found to be registered with malafide intent, beyond the jurisdiction of investigating authorities, or where no likelihood of conviction exists. This principle has been consistently upheld by the superior courts. (See: Anwar Ahmad Khan v. The State (1996 SCMR 24), Raja Rustam Ali Khan v. Muhammad Hanif (1997 SCMR 2008)) ------- 2. Penal provisions – Section 16 of Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 – Requirements of fear or public disorder. To attract Section 16 of the Ordinance, it must be established that the accused made a speech, statement, or act likely to cause fear, alarm, or a breach of public safety or order. Mere participation in chanting slogans, without specifics of words used or their impact, does not meet the legal threshold. (See: The Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad Khan (PLD 1974 SC 151)) ------- 3. Penal provisions – Section 341 PPC – Wrongful restraint – Human obstruction necessary. Section 341 PPC requires that the accused voluntarily obstructed a human being to prevent their movement. Mere disruption of traffic flow does not constitute wrongful restraint unless specific individuals are identified as being obstructed. (See: Mst. Riaz Bibi v. SHO Police Station Zahirpir (2002 P Cr.LJ 530)) ------- 4. Mens rea – Absence of intent – Essential element of crime. For an act to constitute a crime, the accused must have the requisite intent (mens rea). In this case, the petitioner was participating in a peaceful rally celebrating Independence Day without evidence of intent to disrupt public peace or order. Absence of mens rea negates the charges. (See: Sir Matthew Hale’s Principles on Mens Rea, R v. Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396) ------- 5. Fundamental rights – Right to peaceful assembly – Article 16 of the Constitution. Every citizen has the right to peaceful assembly without arms, subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law for public order. In the absence of Section 144 Cr.P.C. or evidence of violence or disruption, exercising this right cannot be curtailed. The impugned FIR disregarded this constitutional guarantee. (See: Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416)) ------- 6. Quashing of FIR – Judicial oversight over investigative process. While the courts typically avoid interfering in ongoing investigations, they are empowered to intervene in cases of clear malafide intent or where the FIR lacks legal foundation. Judicial oversight ensures the protection of fundamental rights and the prevention of misuse of authority. (See: Muhammad Irshad Khan v. NAB Chairman (2007 P Cr.LJ 1957), Muhammad Bashir v. The State (PLD 1972 SC 139)) ------- Outcome: The petition was allowed, and the impugned FIR registered under Section 16 of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, and Section 341 PPC was quashed. The court held that the FIR was based on political victimization, lacked the essential elements of the alleged offences, and violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to peaceful assembly.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(1), third proviso.---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 341, 347, 107 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, wrongful restrain, kidnapping in order to murder, abetment, common intention---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Accused was charged that he along with co-accused in furtherance of their common intention had wrongfully restrained the complainant party and had committed qatl-i-amd of son of complainant and also attempted to commit qatl-i-amd of complainant and his other son by firing at them with a pistol---Record showed that the petitioner had been arrested on 26.05.2020 and till date, he had remained in jail for the last four years, seven months and 21 days---Order sheet reflected that on almost two dozens of dates petitioner had sought adjournment, however, even if all these dates which came to 204 days, were excluded even then the statutory period of the petitioner had since been completed---Thus, the petitioner had earned a right to be released on bail as provided under third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C. especially when no material was available on the record that essential ingredient of proviso four of S.497(1), Cr.P.C did exist against the petitioner---Third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C confers a right upon an accused person to be released on bail if he is charged for offences bearing punishment of death and if his trial is not concluded by the prosecution within two years, however, that right of an accused was subject to two exceptions i.e. if the delay in the conclusion of the trial was attributable to the accused or any person acting on his behalf and if the accused was a previous convict or if he was a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal---Accused/petitioner was neither previous convict nor he could be termed as hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, therefore, he had successfully crossed the two barriers to earn a right of bail under the third proviso to S.497(1), Cr.P.C.---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Muhammad Usman v. The State another 2024 SCMR 28 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of Court---Scope---Observations made in a bail order are purely tentative in nature and should in no way prejudice an independent mind of Trial Court which needs to appraise the evidence strictly in accordance with law and merits of the case. Usman Saleem for Petitioner. Aamir Khan, Assistant Advocate General for the State. Javed Khan Tanoli for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 24h October, 2024. MUHAMMAD IJAZ KHAN J.--- This order is directed to dispose of an application filed by petitioner Zaheer Elahi son of Muhammad Zaman for the grant of post arrest bail in a case registered vide FIR No.386 dated 22.05.2020 under sections 302/324/341/347/ 107/34, P.P.C read with section 15 of The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 at Police Station Khanpur Haripur, on the statutory ground.

Summary: (a) Criminal Law—Post-Arrest Bail—Grounds for Cancellation —Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), S. 497; Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 341 The petitioner/State sought cancellation of post-arrest bail granted to the respondent by the Chief Court of Gilgit-Baltistan in a case registered under Sections 324 (attempt to commit qatl-i-amd) and 341 (wrongful restraint) of the PPC. The allegation was that the respondent fired at the complainant with a 12-bore rifle, but the fire missed and caused no injury. The Supreme Appellate Court observed: Lack of Injury and Evidence: No injury was inflicted upon the complainant, and no crime empties were recovered from the scene. Civil Litigation: A pending civil dispute between the parties raised the possibility of false implication. Merits of Bail Order: The Chief Court granted bail after examining the merits of the case. Exceptional circumstances are required to justify canceling bail granted on merit, and no such circumstances were demonstrated. No Illegality in Bail Granting Order: The Law Officer failed to point out any perversity or illegality in the impugned bail order. The Court held that the question of whether the respondent actively participated in the offense would be determined during the trial. In the absence of exceptional circumstances or evidence of misuse of bail, there was no justification to cancel the bail order. Disposition: Criminal petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused.

Summary: Background: The petitioner stood as a surety for an accused, Muhammad Siddique, in a criminal case under sections 324/341, 337-D, 337-F(3), 34 of the Azad Penal Code (APC), and section 15(2) of the Arms Act. Upon the accused's failure to appear, the Additional Sessions Judge of Kotli ordered the forfeiture of the surety bond worth Rs. 10,00,000 and initiated proceedings for the attachment and auction of the petitioner’s property. ----Issues: 1- Whether the order of the Additional Sessions Judge for forfeiture of the bond and attachment of property was passed without due process. 2- Whether the petitioner was given an opportunity to explain or contest the forfeiture before the property attachment order was issued. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Due Process Violation: The court held that the Additional Sessions Judge did not follow the mandatory procedure under Section 514 Cr. P. C., which requires three stages: recording reasons for forfeiture, calling upon the person bound by the bond to pay the penalty or show cause, and considering any explanation provided by the person bound by the bond. The order was deemed non-speaking and procedurally flawed. Opportunity to Contest: The petitioner was not given an opportunity to explain or contest the forfeiture, as required by law, before the order of attachment of property was issued. The High Court quashed the order of the Additional Sessions Judge dated 03.01.2023, and all subsequent proceedings were declared illegal and ineffective. The case was remanded to the Additional Sessions Judge for a decision in accordance with the law. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P. C) This section outlines the procedure for the forfeiture of bonds and requires the court to: Record the reasons for forfeiture. Call upon the person bound by the bond to pay the penalty or show cause why it should not be paid. Consider any explanation provided by the person before proceeding with the recovery of the penalty through attachment and sale of property.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Post-arrest bail---Vicarious liability---Two versions of the incident---Self-defense--- Petitioners sought post-arrest bail in a case involving multiple charges, including murder and grievous injuries. FIR alleged that petitioners attacked the complainant party, causing injuries and fatalities. However, medical reports revealed injuries sustained by petitioners themselves, which were suppressed by the prosecution. Court observed that the injuries on petitioners supported their plea of self-defense, rendering it a case of two versions. Vicarious liability under S. 34, P.P.C., was held inapplicable, as every accused must be held responsible for their individual actions. Furthermore, no recovery was made from some of the petitioners, and the FIR lacked clarity on the presence of specific weapons. Petitioners had been in custody for a considerable period and were no longer required for investigation. Post-arrest bail was granted. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302, 324, 337-A, 341, 109, 114, 147, 148---Multiple injuries---Nature of injuries not determined---Deficiency in medico-legal examination--- During the course of arguments, it was revealed that medico-legal certificates issued by doctors failed to classify injuries under specific sections of S. 337-F of the P.P.C., such as Ghayr-Jaifah Mutalahimah (337-F(iii)), Ghayr-Jaifah Mudihah (337-F(iv)), Ghayr-Jaifah Hashimah (337-F(v)), and Ghayr-Jaifah Munaqqillah (337-F(vi)). Doctors admitted lack of training and absence of standard procedures in Gilgit-Baltistan hospitals for classifying injury types. Court directed the Secretary Health Gilgit-Baltistan to appear in person and provide an explanation, along with steps to rectify the deficiency. (c) Administration of Justice--- ----Medical evidence---Inadequate medico-legal training---Role of state institutions--- Court highlighted the alarming deficiency in medico-legal practices in Gilgit-Baltistan government hospitals. Doctors were unable to properly classify the nature of injuries due to insufficient training and absence of protocols. The Court directed the Secretary Health Gilgit-Baltistan to ensure proper mechanisms and training for medico-legal officers to avoid recurrence of such lapses. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle of individual liability--- In cases where two distinct versions of an incident exist, each accused must be held responsible for their individual acts. Petitioners presented injuries sustained during the incident as evidence of self-defense. Court held that the prosecution's suppression of these injuries weakened its case, entitling petitioners to the benefit of doubt. ----- Cited Provisions: Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (S. 497) Penal Code, 1860 (Ss. 302, 324, 337-A, 341, 109, 114, 147, 148) ----- Disposition: Criminal appeal accepted. Petitioners admitted to post-arrest bail, subject to furnishing bail bonds of PKR 200,000 each with one surety to the satisfaction of the trial court. Observations regarding deficiencies in medico-legal procedures directed to Secretary Health, Gilgit-Baltistan, for remedial action.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----Ss. 124-A, 147, 149, 153, 153-A, 341 – Cognizance of Offenses Against the State – Authority for Complaint – Abuse of Process The petitioners sought to quash FIR No. 92/2023, registered under Sections 124-A, 147, 149, 153, 153-A, and 341 PPC, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Balochistan Regulation & Control of Loudspeakers and Sound Amplifiers Ordinance, 1965. The allegations involved hate speech and incitement against state institutions during a gathering. Under Section 196 Cr.P.C., no court can take cognizance of offenses against the state (e.g., Sections 124-A, 153-A PPC) unless a formal complaint is filed by the Federal or Provincial Government or an officer empowered by them. Since the FIR was registered by a police sub-inspector without authorization from the competent authority, it lacked legal validity. Reliance was placed on Section 196 Cr.P.C., which serves as a safeguard against misuse of prosecutorial powers in cases involving offenses against the state. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973: ----Arts. 16, 17 & 19 – Fundamental Rights – Freedom of Assembly, Association, and Speech The Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of assembly (Article 16), freedom of association (Article 17), and freedom of speech (Article 19). These rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, morality, or the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. However, such restrictions must be imposed through proper legal mechanisms. In the present case, the FIR and subsequent proceedings were initiated without following due legal process, violating these constitutional safeguards. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 196 – Prosecution for Offenses Against the State – Mandatory Procedure Section 196 Cr.P.C. mandates that offenses against the state, including Sections 124-A and 153-A PPC, cannot be prosecuted without explicit authorization from the Federal or Provincial Government or an officer empowered by them. In this case, the FIR was lodged by a police officer without adhering to this legal requirement, rendering the proceedings void ab initio. (d) Abuse of Process of Law – Quashing of FIR: The court emphasized that inherent jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and only to prevent abuse of the legal process or to secure the ends of justice. The allegations in the FIR were vague, non-specific, and failed to establish any clear role of the petitioners. The court observed that the proceedings appeared to be initiated with mala fide intent to harass and scandalize the petitioners. Reliance was placed on the principle that courts can quash proceedings when they are manifestly groundless or an abuse of legal process. ----Disposition: The petition was allowed. FIR No. 92/2023, dated 4th August 2023, registered at P.S. City Pishin, and all subsequent proceedings were quashed. The court held that the FIR was registered without proper legal authority under Section 196 Cr.P.C., and no specific role was attributed to the petitioners. The court further ruled that the case constituted an abuse of legal process aimed at harassment and reputational damage.

Summary: Bail denied --- Background: The petitioners filed a criminal revision petition challenging the order dated May 8, 2023, passed by the Additional District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Dudyal, which rejected their bail application. The petitioners were accused in a case registered under FIR No. 315/2022 for offences under Sections 302, 341, 147, 148, 149, 337A, and 109 of the Azad Penal Code, 1860, at Police Station Dudyal. After their arrest, their initial bail application was rejected on February 13, 2023. Upon submission of the challan, they filed another bail application, which was also rejected. ----Issues: 1- Whether the rejection of the bail application by the Additional District Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Dudyal, was lawful. 2- Whether the accused-petitioners are entitled to bail despite the serious nature of the charges. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Rejection of Bail: The court upheld the rejection of bail, stating that the investigation had been completed, and the accused were no longer required for further investigation. However, the severity of the charges, including murder, made them ineligible for bail as the offences fell under the "prohibitory clause" of Section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. ---Role and Evidence: The court noted that specific roles were attributed to the accused-petitioners in the FIR and supported by witness statements and other material evidence. The allegations included causing injuries to the victim and being part of an unlawful assembly with a common object, leading to a prima facie case against them. ---Rule of Consistency: The court dismissed the argument regarding the rule of consistency, stating that the roles of the accused-petitioners differed from those of the co-accused who were granted bail. Each case must be evaluated on its own facts, and the petitioners did not qualify for bail under this principle. ---Mere Submission of Challan: The court clarified that mere submission of the challan was insufficient grounds for granting bail. The nature of the alleged offences did not support the petitioners' release on bail. ----Citations/Precedents: Junaid Ahmed v. State [2023 YLR 1740] Muhammad Sarfraz Ansari v. State [PLD 2021 SC 738] Saifullah v. State [2019 SCMR 1458] Hayatullah v. Lal Badshah [PLD 2009 Peshawar 28] Yar Muhammad v. State [2004 YLR 2230] Muhammad Shafi Mansoori v. The State [2001 P.Cr.LJ 588] Subedar Major (retd.) Zulfiqar Ali Shah v. Abid Shah [2018 P.Cr.LJ 270] Qamar Bughio v. The State [1993 P.Cr.LJ 2135] Muhammad Azim v. The State [PLD 1988 SC 84] Asif Ayub v. The State [2010 SCMR 1735] Jehanzeb alias Bhobi v. State [2002 SCMR 1380] The court concluded that the accused-petitioners were not entitled to bail given the nature of the offences and the evidence against them. The revision petition was dismissed.