Summary: ---Quote: "Every citizen has a right of political and social justice, freedom of speech and thought. Print and electronic media are the means of receiving and providing such information to and from the people. Upon exercise of right of freedom of speech and expression, politically motivated FIRs are being registered for offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, 505 of the PPC, without following the procedure, as provided in section 196 of the Cr.P.C., which is an illegality. The Government must tolerate the criticism of its political opponents being the chosen representatives of the people, instead of considering them as enemy of State." -----Background: ---- The High Court had dismissed his criminal revision for acquittal in a case involving allegations of conspiracy and incitement against the state. The FIR, No. 691 dated 09.08.2022, was registered against Shahbaz Gill and others, including the petitioner, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) based on views expressed by Gill during a live telecast on ARY News. -----Issues: 1) Whether the Trial Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, and 505 of the PPC without a complaint by the Federal or Provincial Government as required by Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. ---2) Whether the registration of the FIR and subsequent proceedings against the petitioner were valid. ---3) Whether there was sufficient material to frame charges against the petitioner. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction and Section 196 of the Code: The court emphasized that Section 196 of the Code mandates a complaint by the Federal or Provincial Government for offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, and 505 of the PPC. The FIR was registered with the permission of the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, which did not satisfy the requirements of Section 196, as the Secretary was not authorized to delegate this power further. Thus, the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of these offences based on the FIR. -----Registration of FIR and Proceedings: The court found that the FIR was registered without adhering to the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 196. The petitioner was not initially named in the FIR but was implicated later based on the investigation. The main evidence against the petitioner, a transcript allegedly obtained from the main accused, was contested and lacked clear evidentiary value. -----Material for Framing Charges: The court held that there was insufficient material to frame charges against the petitioner. The petitioner could not be held responsible for the actions of the main accused without prima facie cogent evidence. The court highlighted the misuse of authority and the potential chilling effect on media freedom, stressing the importance of protecting constitutional rights. ----Outcome: The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed. The judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court were set aside. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner based on FIR No. 691 were quashed. The petitioner was acquitted from the case. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan; PLD 2016 SC 808. The State v. Raja Abdul Rehman; 2005 SCMR 1544. Zahoor-ud-Din v. Khushi Muhammad; 1998 SCMR 1840.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----Ss. 124-A, 147, 149, 153, 153-A, 341 – Cognizance of Offenses Against the State – Authority for Complaint – Abuse of Process The petitioners sought to quash FIR No. 92/2023, registered under Sections 124-A, 147, 149, 153, 153-A, and 341 PPC, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Balochistan Regulation & Control of Loudspeakers and Sound Amplifiers Ordinance, 1965. The allegations involved hate speech and incitement against state institutions during a gathering. Under Section 196 Cr.P.C., no court can take cognizance of offenses against the state (e.g., Sections 124-A, 153-A PPC) unless a formal complaint is filed by the Federal or Provincial Government or an officer empowered by them. Since the FIR was registered by a police sub-inspector without authorization from the competent authority, it lacked legal validity. Reliance was placed on Section 196 Cr.P.C., which serves as a safeguard against misuse of prosecutorial powers in cases involving offenses against the state. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973: ----Arts. 16, 17 & 19 – Fundamental Rights – Freedom of Assembly, Association, and Speech The Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of assembly (Article 16), freedom of association (Article 17), and freedom of speech (Article 19). These rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, morality, or the integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan. However, such restrictions must be imposed through proper legal mechanisms. In the present case, the FIR and subsequent proceedings were initiated without following due legal process, violating these constitutional safeguards. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 196 – Prosecution for Offenses Against the State – Mandatory Procedure Section 196 Cr.P.C. mandates that offenses against the state, including Sections 124-A and 153-A PPC, cannot be prosecuted without explicit authorization from the Federal or Provincial Government or an officer empowered by them. In this case, the FIR was lodged by a police officer without adhering to this legal requirement, rendering the proceedings void ab initio. (d) Abuse of Process of Law – Quashing of FIR: The court emphasized that inherent jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and only to prevent abuse of the legal process or to secure the ends of justice. The allegations in the FIR were vague, non-specific, and failed to establish any clear role of the petitioners. The court observed that the proceedings appeared to be initiated with mala fide intent to harass and scandalize the petitioners. Reliance was placed on the principle that courts can quash proceedings when they are manifestly groundless or an abuse of legal process. ----Disposition: The petition was allowed. FIR No. 92/2023, dated 4th August 2023, registered at P.S. City Pishin, and all subsequent proceedings were quashed. The court held that the FIR was registered without proper legal authority under Section 196 Cr.P.C., and no specific role was attributed to the petitioners. The court further ruled that the case constituted an abuse of legal process aimed at harassment and reputational damage.

Summary: Background: The petitioner was arrested under offences including sedition, provocation of riots, public mischief, and criminal intimidation. His physical custody was initially extended by the Trial Court but later refused further extension, leading to a criminal revision which was then allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge, granting further physical remand. The petitioner challenged this order under Article 199 of the Constitution. -----Issues: 1- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere in the investigation and remand orders under Article 199 of the Constitution. 2- Whether the petitioner was subjected to torture during police custody. 3- Whether the FIR could proceed without the sanction of the Federal Government as required under sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C. 4- Whether the physical remand granted by the Additional Sessions Judge was legally valid. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Jurisdiction under Article 199: The High Court emphasized that it cannot adjudicate a petition under Article 199 like an appeal, and it should only determine whether there was an error of law or jurisdiction. Interference in the investigation can only occur under specific circumstances, such as mala fide intentions or actions beyond the jurisdiction of the investigating agency, which were not proven in this case. --Allegation of Torture: The petitioner claimed torture during police custody. The jail authorities noted bruises on his body upon his admission, but no further action was taken to investigate these injuries. The Court observed that allegations of torture are serious and suggested an inquiry by a retired High Court Judge to investigate the matter thoroughly. --Sanction under Sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C.: The Court held that the provisions of sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C., relate to the Court taking cognizance of the offence, not to the investigation itself. It referenced Supreme Court rulings that investigations could proceed without the sanction, but cognizance by a Court would require it. Therefore, the FIR could continue, and the issue of sanction would be relevant when the Court takes cognizance. --Legality of Physical Remand: The Court found that the Additional Sessions Judge correctly examined police diaries and other materials before granting further physical remand. The decision was not based on conjectures but on the need for further investigation, including the recovery of the cellular phone and conducting a polygraph test. The petition was dismissed, and the order for further physical remand was upheld. The Court suggested an inquiry into the allegations of torture by a retired High Court Judge and expected the Ministry of Interior to ensure this. -----Citations/Precedents: Ghulam Sarwar Zardari v. Piyar Ali alias Piyaro 2010 SCMR 624 Hayatullah Khan and another v. Muhammad Khan and others 2011 SCMR 1354 Muhammad Hanif v. The State 2019 SCMR 2029 Muhammad Nazir v. Fazal Karim and others PLD 2012 Supreme Court 892 General (R) Pervez Musharaf v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2020 Lah. 285 Ali Raza and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2017 Isl. 64 Salman Taseer v. Judge, Special Court 1993 SCMR 71

Summary: Bail granted----Background: In the Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit-Baltistan, a criminal petition arose from an order dated November 27, 2017, in Criminal Misc. No. 154/2017, passed by the learned Chief Court, dismissing the criminal miscellaneous application filed by the petitioner. The petitioner sought leave to appeal against this decision. The court issued a notice to the respondent on January 27, 2018, and the case was heard on July 19, 2018. ----Issues: The primary issue was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail, considering the allegations against him and the legal provisions under which he was apprehended. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome The court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the petitioner. Reasoning: The petitioner argued that he was falsely implicated and that the allegations were vague and unsupported by reasonable grounds. The counsel for the petitioner highlighted that the FIR was lodged without following Section 196 Cr. P.C, rendering the subsequent proceedings illegal. Additionally, it was pointed out that the main accused in the same FIR had been granted bail, invoking the principle of consistency. The court granted bail to the petitioner, on the principle of consistency, subject to furnishing two solvent sureties of Rs. 5,00,000/- each and two reliable bail bonds of the same amount. The petitioner was also required to furnish fresh surety bonds under Schedule-IV of Police Rules if applicable. Any violation of police rules or involvement in anti-State activities after release would result in immediate custody. ----Citations/Precedents: Order dated November 27, 2017, in Criminal Misc. No. 154/2017 by the learned Chief Court. Order dated July 31, 2017, by the learned Trial Court in Cr. Misc. Application No. 67/2017. Bail granting order dated May 25, 2018, for the main accused Mehboob Ali by the learned Chief Court.

Summary: Acquittal granted----Background: The appellant was tried and convicted under sedition, abetting mutiny, and forgery, based on an FIR registered against him. He was sentenced by the Sessions Judge, Islamabad, but appealed the decision on grounds of procedural violations and political victimization. -----Issues: 1- Whether the proceedings and conviction under Section 124-A, PPC (sedition), were valid without a complaint instituted by the Federal Government as required by Section 196, Cr.P.C. 2- Whether the entire process, from registration of the FIR to the trial, complied with mandatory legal provisions. 3- Whether the actions and statements of the appellant constituted sedition, abetting mutiny, and forgery. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Violation of Section 196, Cr.P.C.: The Court found that Section 124-A, PPC, is non-cognizable, and its cognizance can only be taken upon a complaint by the Federal Government. Since no such complaint was made, the entire proceedings were invalid. The mandatory nature of Section 196, Cr.P.C., was emphasized, and non-compliance vitiated the proceedings. --Procedural Violations: The Court noted multiple procedural violations, including improper registration of the case and investigation processes. The rules of procedure are meant to protect the right to liberty and ensure justice, which were not followed in this case. --Evidence and Mens Rea: The prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of the charges, particularly the requisite mens rea for sedition and abetting mutiny. The trial court did not adequately consider these aspects, leading to an erroneous conviction. The appeal was accepted, and the conviction and sentences were set aside. The appellant was acquitted of all charges, and the surety was discharged from liability. The criminal revision for enhancement of the sentence was dismissed. ------Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Khan v. Government of West Pakistan PLD 1960 W.P. Lah. 434 Bashir Ahmad v. The State 2000 PCr.LJ 902 Fazal-i-Raziq v. Riaz Ahmad PLD 1978 Lah. 1082 Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King PLD 1948 PC 11 Dost Muhammad v. The State 1976 PCr.LJ 184 Salman Taseer v. Judge Special Court 1993 SCMR 71

Summary: Bail granted----Background: The petitioner was convicted and sentenced including sedition and abetment to mutiny. The petitioner sought a review of the Supreme Court's judgment, which dismissed his petition for suspension of his conviction and sentence. The review was sought on the grounds that the petitioner had already undergone a significant portion of his sentence and that necessary government sanction for certain charges was not obtained. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the petition for suspension of conviction and sentence without considering the period already undergone by the petitioner. 2- Whether the necessary sanction for taking cognizance of the offense under Section 124-A of the Penal Code was obtained. 3- Whether the petitioner was entitled to suspension of sentence due to having undergone a substantial portion of the sentence. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court found that: The period already undergone by the petitioner was not considered in the previous judgment. The petitioner had completed all sentences except for the one under Sections 131/109 of the Penal Code, and with remissions, he had almost completed the entire sentence. There was a prima facie case that the necessary government sanction under Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the offense under Section 124-A of the Penal Code was not obtained. Given that the appeal had not been heard for over three years and considering the substantial period already served by the petitioner, the suspension of the sentence was justified in the interest of justice. The Supreme Court reviewed and recalled its earlier judgment, converted the criminal petition into an appeal, and allowed the suspension of the petitioner’s conviction and sentences during the pendency of the appeal before the Lahore High Court. The petitioner was ordered to be released on bail. -----Citations/Precedents: Salman Taseer v. Judge, Special Court 1993 SCMR 71 Adnan A. Khawaja v. The State Criminal Petition No.281 of 2001

Summary: The applicants were accused of delivering speeches at a public meeting that allegedly incited hatred and animosity between different groups and communities and brought the government into disrepute. The meeting, attended by a large audience, led to the registration of an FIR under sections 124-A and 153-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) on 6-11-1986. The applicants were already under preventive detention and were arrested on 9-12-1986 and 10-12-1986. An interim challan was submitted mentioning offences under sections 123-A, 124-A, 153-A, PPC, section 13 of the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act, 1974, and section 16 of the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (M.P.O.). ----Issues: 1- Whether the First Information Report (FIR) and the investigation were valid under the relevant provisions of law. 2- Whether the applicants were entitled to bail under sections 123-A, 124-A, 153-A, PPC, and section 13 of the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act, 1974. 3- Whether the provisions of section 196 Cr.P.C. were complied with for taking cognizance of the offences. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The FIR and investigation under sections 124-A and 153-A PPC required a complaint under the order of the Federal Government or Provincial Government as per section 196 Cr.P.C. The report made by a police constable did not meet this requirement. The offences under sections 123-A and 124-A PPC and section 13 of the Prevention of Anti-National Activities Act, 1974, were exclusively triable by a Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. A complaint in respect of these offences had been filed before the competent Special Court, rendering the bail application for these offences infructuous. The bail application for offences under section 153-A PPC and section 16 of the M.P.O. was granted, as these offences were not scheduled offences triable by the Special Court. ----Citations/Precedents: Moulana Dost Muhammad v. The State, 1978 PCr.LJ 184 Muhammad Gul and another v. The State, 1985 P Cr.LJ 205 Gul Muhammad etc. v. The State, 1987 P Cr.LJ 737 AIR 1919 Mad. 968 AIR 1936 Pesh 65 PLD 1962 SC 397 PLD 1975 Lah. 126 PLD 1978 Kar. 108 PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 177 Sardar Gian Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1938 Lahore 82 Muhammad Ehsan Khan v. State, 1968 P Cr.LJ 759 Khizar Hayat v. Commissioner Sargodha Division and others, PLD 1965 Lah. 349 Ch. Khadim Hussain v. The State, PLD 1985 SC (AJ&K) 125

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 435, 439 & 196--- Sanction for prosecution under S. 295-A, Penal Code, 1860—Scope—Petitioner's application for obtaining sanction under S. 196, Cr.P.C. for prosecution under S. 295-A, Penal Code, 1860, was dismissed by the trial court—Challenge to said dismissal—Held, S. 196, Cr.P.C. does not apply where the court is constituted under a special statute inconsistent with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.—Provisions of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (PECA, 2016), being special law, override the Cr.P.C. to the extent of inconsistency—Section 50(2) of PECA, 2016 explicitly provides that the Act has overriding effect over any contrary law—Offences under Ss. 295-A, 295-B, 295-C & 298-C, Penal Code, 1860, when coupled with S. 11 of PECA, 2016, are interlinked and not inconsistent inter se—Such offences fall within the jurisdiction of the special court established under S. 44(1) of PECA, 2016—Hence, sanction under S. 196, Cr.P.C., is not required—Petition was devoid of merit and dismissed. (b) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (XL of 2016): ----Ss. 11, 28, 29, 44(1), 50 & 51--- Jurisdiction—Overlap with Penal Code—Nature of offences under PECA, 2016 and Penal Code—Interrelation—Provisions of PECA, 2016 are to be read in conjunction with the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 to the extent they are not inconsistent—Section 50(1) of PECA, 2016 clarifies the Act is not in derogation of existing penal laws, but S. 50(2) provides overriding effect in case of conflict—FIA designated as the investigating agency under PECA by virtue of Rules notified under S. 29 & 51 of the Act—Special courts under PECA have exclusive jurisdiction to try offences falling within its domain, including those overlapping with Penal Code provisions such as Ss. 295-A to 298-C—Thus, trial for such offences lies before the PECA court without recourse to Cr.P.C. procedural requirements for sanction. (c) Constitution of Pakistan (1973): ----Art. 203 & Interpretation of Special Laws--- Special law v. general law—Principle of statutory interpretation—When a special law provides a self-contained mechanism for prosecution, investigation, and trial, its provisions take precedence over general laws like Cr.P.C.—Held, the purpose of PECA, 2016, as a special enactment, is to address electronic crimes comprehensively—Sanction under general law (S. 196, Cr.P.C.) is not needed where proceedings are under a special statute with its own procedure—Court found no procedural irregularity or illegality in rejection of sanction application—Petition was dismissed. ---Cited Case: • Sheraz Ahmad v. The State, Crl. Rev. No. 69407 of 2022 (Lahore High Court), upheld by Supreme Court in Crl. Petition No. 168-L/2023 (dismissed as withdrawn on 20.04.2023).

Summary: Legislative history of book mentioned in section 154 of Cr.P.C., and way out if FIR stood registered in a non-cognizable offence. (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----Ss. 154, 155, 157, 173 & 196B Registration of FIR—Non-cognizable offence—Preliminary investigation—Scope—FIR was registered under S. 295A, P.P.C., a non-cognizable offence, based on a private complainant’s application—Petitioner contended that such registration was a nullity in law as S. 295A, P.P.C. requires a complaint by the Provincial or Federal Government under S. 196, Cr.P.C.—Held, registration of FIR under a non-cognizable offence is not a nullity per se but an irregularity, which can be rectified through due process—Police were bound to conduct preliminary investigation under S. 196B, Cr.P.C., and the report must be placed before the competent government authority before proceeding further—High Court ruled that police may investigate non-cognizable offences only with prior sanction of a Magistrate, but if cognizable offences were added, the investigation would be valid under S. 157, Cr.P.C.—Petitioner’s prayer for quashing the FIR was declined, as the matter required further legal process and scrutiny. (b) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----S. 295A Hate speech—Religious decree (“Fatwa”)—Insulting religious beliefs—Legal consequences—Petitioner accused of issuing a religious decree declaring a sect as non-Muslim, allegedly insulting religious beliefs and causing communal unrest—Contention that an individual complainant could not initiate prosecution under S. 295A, P.P.C., and only the Provincial or Federal Government could file a complaint—Held, while procedural irregularities existed, legal scrutiny under S. 196B, Cr.P.C., was essential before quashing the case—If the Superintendent of Police (Investigation) directs a preliminary inquiry and determines that an offence under S. 295A, P.P.C. is disclosed, the matter must proceed for government sanction—However, if the offence is found to be cognizable under other provisions, such as S. 8/9 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, police could proceed with investigation without government complaint under S. 196, Cr.P.C.. (c) Administration of Justice: ----Police functions—Procedural compliance—Quashing of FIR at the initial stage Judicial scrutiny of FIR registration and police investigation—Court extensively analyzed the procedural framework of FIR registration, police powers, and statutory limitations under Cr.P.C. and Police Rules, 1934—Held, police officials cannot act as mere conduits for FIR registration but must apply judicial mind to assess whether a cognizable offence is disclosed—FIR in a non-cognizable offence may not be void ab initio but must be validated through a procedural mechanism—Court declined to quash the FIR at the preliminary stage, observing that legal and procedural avenues remained open for rectification or continuation of the proceedings. (d) Cognizance and Prosecution of Offences: ----Ss. 196, 196B, Cr.P.C. & S. 8/9 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Sanction of Government—Addition of cognizable offences—Court laid down that if an offence under S. 295A, P.P.C. is alleged, preliminary investigation is mandatory under S. 196B, Cr.P.C., before seeking government sanction—However, if an Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) offence is attracted, the bar under S. 196, Cr.P.C. does not apply, and the case may proceed before the Anti-Terrorism Court—Police have discretion to modify charges upon investigation, and the Magistrate may stay proceedings under S. 230, Cr.P.C. if required sanction from the government is pending. ----Disposition: Petition for quashing of FIR was dismissed—Court ruled that procedural mechanisms were available for addressing defects in FIR registration—Matter was directed to be processed in accordance with S. 196B, Cr.P.C., with guidance from the Superintendent of Police (Investigation) and relevant prosecutorial authorities. ----Cited Cases: • ALI RAZA v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2017 Islamabad 64) • ATTA MUHAMMAD DESHANI v. District Police Officer (2019 P Cr. L J 275) • MUHAMMAD ASLAM v. The State (1980 P Cr. L J 742) • SHABBIR HUSSAIN v. The State (2011 P Cr. L J 1631) • Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. & Ors. (AIR 2014 SC 187) • JAVED IQBAL v. The State (2016 SCMR 787) • Mst. SUGHRAAN BIBI v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595)